You are on page 1of 100

Empowered lives.

Resilient nations.

Localizing the 2030 Agenda and the SDGs:


Strengthening Local Government Action
in Central Africa
United Nations Development Programme – Regional Service Centre for Africa
United Nations Development Programme
One United Nations Plaza
New York, NY, 10017 USA

© 2018 United Nations Development Programme. All right reserved.

The views expressed in this publication are the ones of the authors
and do not necessarily represent those of the United Nations, inclu­
ding UNDP and UNCDF.

Layout: Phoenix Design Aid, Denmark

Cover photo: UN photo / Gill Fickling / Gabon


Localizing the 2030 Agenda and the SDGs:
Strengthening Local Government Action
in Central Africa
United Nations Development Programme – Regional Service Centre for Africa
Acknowledgements
This report is a compilation of results from one In line with the increasing recognition of the
of the two studies that were commissioned by importance of local action for SDGs implemen­
the United Nations Development Programme tation, the report is expected to contribute
(UNDP) Regional Service Center (RSC) for Af­ to the implementation of the 2030 Agenda
rica to develop knowledge on the state of for sustainable development and the Agenda
Local Governments in West and Central Afri­ 2063 for Africa to be more responsive and rele­
ca. The project was led by Ms Mylène Lavoie, vant to local needs. The report establishes the
Programme Specialist for Local Development, baseline, highlights best practices, identifies
Economic Recovery and Livelihoods of the In­ key challenges and proposes strategies and
clusive Growth and Sustainable Development policy options under the four following areas
Cluster led by Mr Mansour Ndiaye in collabo­ of local governance and local development: 1)
ration with the Governance and Peacebuilding Decentralization and Local Governance Le­
Cluster led by Mr Ozonnia Ojielo. A consulting gal and Policy Framework; 2) Local Finances
team was contracted by UNDP to undertake and Inclusive Services Delivery; 3) Local Eco­
the study on the state of local government in nomic Development; and 4) Capacity Deve­
the eight (8) countries of Central Africa: Ca­ lopment. In line with the current context and
meroon, Central African Republic (CAR), security issues prevailing in the subregion,
Chad, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), each section also includes a set of special con­
Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Republic of Con­ siderations and recommendations for Fragile
go (Congo) and São Tomé and Principe. A val­ and Conflict-Affected States.
idation workshop of the initial findings of the
study was held in May 2014 in Dakar, Senegal, We would like to thank the following for their
bringing together representatives of the na­ useful contribution and comments provided at
tional and subnational governments of West different stages of the study:
and Central Africa. Taking stock of the know­
ledge developed by the study and considering Government Representatives
the adoption of the Sustainable Development Cameroon: Ms Balesse Victorine Sassongo, Mr
Goals (SDGs) in 2015 and the New Urban Agen­ Biloa Embolo
da in October 2016, Ms Lavoie then worked Central African Republic: Mr Georges Petrokoni
with a consultant in 2017 to develop this re­ Zeze
port to propose recommendations for enhan­ Gabon: Mr Isidore Toukou Moubedi
cing the action of Local Governments for the Republic of Congo: Mr Fidel Kanza
SDGs localization process. São Tomé and Principe: Mr Cílcio Bandeira Pires
dos Santos, Mr Celasié Ferreira Trindade

ii Localizing the 2030 Agenda and the SDGs: Strengthening Local Government Action in Central Africa
Representatives of Local Governments UNDP Headquarters
and their Associations Mr Kodjo Mensah-Abrampa, Ms Amita Gill
Central African Republic: Mr Jules Abezoua
Chad: Mr Annaïm Oumar Abderrahman UNCDF
Gabon: Mr Roger Valère Ayimambenwe Ms Christel Alvergne, Mr Christian Fournier, Mr
Republic of Congo: Mr Banga Luncien Axel De Ville, Mr Djoumé Sylla, Mr Katiella Mai
Moussa, Ms Nisha Schumann
African Union Representative
Executive Secretary General of the Former Afri­
can Ministers Conference on Decentralization
and Local Development (AMCOD): Ms Reneva
Fourie

UNDP Country Offices in Central Africa


Cameroon: Mr Emini Zéphirin
Central African Republic: Ms Rokhaya Paquita
Chad: Mr Tom Brahim Mbailemdana
Democratic Republic of Congo: Mrs Anastasie
Manzanga
Equatorial Guinea: Ms Leticia Carmen Asumu
Bengo
Gabon: Mr Mactar Fall
Republic of Congo: Ms Claude Angella Mabas­
sy
São Tomé and Principe: Mr António de Lima
Viegas
Senegal: Mr Francis James

UNDP Regional Service Center for Africa


Mr Ozonnia Ojielo, Mr Mansour Ndiaye, Ms
Odette Kabaya, Ms Viviane Ralimanga, Ms Pas­
cale Bonzom, Ms Renata Nowak-Garmer, Ms
Sophie Baranes, Mr Fabrice Boussalem

Acknowledgements iii
PHOTO: UN PHOTO/ESKINDER DEBEBE/CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

Foreword
At the United Nations Sustainable Development Summit on 25 September 2015, world leaders ad­
opted the 2030 Agenda, which defines the opportunities, objectives and challenges of Sustainable
Development. The implementation of this ambitious Development Agenda is guided by 17 Sus­
tainable Development Goals (SDGs). The new goals, along with the broader sustainability agenda,
address the root causes of poverty, the problems affecting the planet, the interconnected nature of
both challenges and solutions, and the universal need for development that works for all people.

Two years earlier, at the African Union (AU) Summit of May 2013, the Heads of State and Govern­
ment of the African Union laid down a vision for the “Africa they want”, including eight ideals,
which were later translated into the seven aspirations of Agenda 2063. Member states thereby
reaffirmed the importance of supporting the African Union’s Agenda 2063 in the 2030 Agenda.
Studies conducted by UNDP clearly show a high degree of convergence between the Global 2030
Agenda and Africa’s 2063 vision. SDGs implementation in Africa must, therefore, also consider the
continent’s aspirations that are articulated in Agenda 2063.

Development goals can, however, only be achieved if local actors fully participate in their im­
plementation and monitoring. Top-down policies have revealed their limitations in promoting
sustainable and equitable development. In many cases, public policies, in the context of such
approaches, lead to increased individual and territorial disparities. Decentralization is, therefore,
being increasingly considered as an essential avenue for poverty reduction and sustainable deve­
lopment strategies as it redesigns territorial balances in a more coherent way, as close as possible
to the socio-spatial realities. It also contributes to localizing the Development Agenda and the
SDGs. By transferring competencies related to different sectors of the SDGs, decentralization is
creating the conditions for the type of development in which local actors can play a leading role
and further promote and support development at a local level.

iv Localizing the 2030 Agenda and the SDGs: Strengthening Local Government Action in Central Africa
Local Development plays an important role in the development of local economies, enhancing
job and livelihoods creation as well as aiding in the provision of basic services to the population,
thereby having a significant impact on achieving the SDGs and fostering communities’ well-being.
Local governments are well positioned to play a catalytic role in involving local actors and enhan­
cing local action in the strategies to achieve the SDGs. As stressed in the 2014 Synthesis Report of
the UN Secretary General (A/69/700), “many of the investments to achieve the sustainable deve­
lopment goals will take place at the subnational level and be led by local authorities”. The “locali­
zation” of the Global Development Agenda and the SDGs therefore aims to empower local actors
and make sustainable development more responsive to local needs.

The search for the most appropriate means of localizing the SDGs is critical to the successful im­
plementation and optimization of Agenda 2063 and the 2030 Agenda in Africa. Drawing from
research on the state of local governance in Central Africa, the report’s outputs are expected to
contribute strategically to the localization of the SDGs by providing a set of recommendations for
fostering inclusive services delivery, enhance local economic development and reinforce related
capacities of Local Governments in Africa. The report’s findings and recommendations are expec­
ted to further promote regional and national dialogue on local governance, local development
policy and institutional frameworks as a means to achieving Sustainable Development that “leaves
no one behind”.

Lamin M. Manneh
Director, UNDP Regional Service
Centre for Africa, Addis Ababa

Foreword v
PHOTO : UN PHOTO/SYLVAIN LIECHTI/DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

Table of contents
Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii
Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv
Acronyms and abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . viii
Executive summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xii

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xiv
Context and objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Geographical scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Historical evolution of local governments in Central Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Chapter 1: Legal and policy framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12


1.1 Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1.2 Functional assignments of local governments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
1.3 Political decentralization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
1.4 Levels of subnational governance and types of local governments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
1.5 Key findings and recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
1.5.1  Fragile and conflict-affected states . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Chapter 2: Financing and delivering services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20


2.1 Local government financing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.1.1  Revenue raising and taxation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.1.2  Intergovernmental transfers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.1.3  Fiscal equalization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
2.1.4  Budgeting and borrowing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
2.2 Delivering local services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
2.3 Special feature: Natural resources management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
2.4 Key findings and recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
2.4.1  Fragile and conflict-affected states . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

vi Localizing the 2030 Agenda and the SDGs: Strengthening Local Government Action in Central Africa
PHOTO: UN PHOTO/CATIANNE TIJERINA/ CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

Chapter 3: Local economic development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44


3.1 The role of local governments in LED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
3.2 Importance of the role of other actors in LED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
3.2.1  Private sector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
3.2.2  Informal sector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
3.2.3 Youth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
3.3 Examples of successful programmes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
3.4 Key findings and recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
3.4.1  Fragile and conflict-affected states . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56

Chapter 4: Capacity development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58


4.1 Capacity development of local governments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
4.2 Local government capacity development in Central Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
4.3 Case studies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
4.3.1  Case study 1: Cameroon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
4.3.2  Case study 2: Central African Republic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
4.4 Key findings and recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
4.4.1  Fragile and conflict-affected states . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69

Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70

Annexes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
Annex 1: Summary table of recommendations to promote sustainable
and resilient local development in Central Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
Annex 2: References and bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76

Table of contents vii


Acronyms and abbreviations
ACEP Agence de Crédit pour l’Entreprise Privée/Credit Agency for Private Business
AFD Agence Française de Développement/French Development Agency
AfDB African Development Bank
AIDS Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
AIMF Association Internationale de Maires Francophone/International Association of Francophone Mayors
AMCA Association des Maires de Centrafrique/Association for Central African Mayors
AMCOD All Africa Ministerial Conference on Decentralization and Local Development
ASDP Agribusiness Supplier Development Programme
BOT Build, Operate and Transfer
CAR Central African Republic
CASAGC Comité d’Action pour la Sécurité Alimentaire/Système d’Alerte Précoce/Food Security Action Committee/Early
Warning System
CECAB Cooperative for the Export and Market of Organic Cocoa
CEFAM Centre de Formation des Collectivités Locales/Centre for the Training of Local Governments
CND Conseil National de la Décentralisation/National Council for Decentralisation
COREF Comité de réforme des finances publiques
CSMOD Cadre Stratégique de Mise en Oeuvre de la Décentralisation/Strategic Framework for the Implementation of
Decentralisation
CSO Civil society organization
CTAD Cellule Technique d’Appui à la Décentralisation/Technical Unit supporting Decentralisation
CTD Collectivités Territoriales Décentralisées/Public Finance Reform Committee
CVUC Communes et Villes Unies de Cameroun/Cameroon’s United Cities and Municipalities
DFID Department for International Development
DRC Democratic Republic of Congo

viii Localizing the 2030 Agenda and the SDGs: Strengthening Local Government Action in Central Africa
EADs Entités Administratives Décentralisées/Decentralized administrative bodies
ECLAC/CEPAL United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean
EITI Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (DRC)
ENAM École Nationale d’Administration et de Magistrature/National School for Administration and the Judiciary
ENAP École Nationale d’Administration Publique/National School of Administration
EU European Union
FAD Fonds Africain de Développement/African Development Fund
FCAS Fragile and conflict-affected states
FEICOM Fonds Spécial d’Equipement et d’Intervention Intercommunale/Equipment and Intermunicipal Intervention
Special Fund
FIC Fundo de Infraestruturas Comunitárias/Fund for Communitarian Infrastructure
FPCL Fonds de péréquation des collectivités locales/Local equalization fund (Gabon)
GDP Gross domestic product
GIZ Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit/German Corporation for International Cooperation
Habitat III UN Conference on Housing and Sustainable Urban Development
HIV Human immunodeficiency virus
IFAD International Fund for Agricultural Development
IFC International Finance Corporation
ILO International Labour Organization
IMF International Monetary Fund
KfW German development bank
LDCs Least-developed countries
LED Local economic development
LEDNA Local Economic Development Network of Africa
LGLD Local governance and local development
M&E Monitoring and evaluation

Acronyms and abbreviations ix


MDGs Millennium Development Goals
MF Microfinance
MML Multiple modes of livelihood
MSMEs Micro-, small and medium-sized enterprises
NGO Non-governmental organization
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PADDL Programme d’appui à la Décentralisation et au Développement Local/Decentralisation and Local Development
Assistance Program
PADL/GRN Projet d’Appui au Développement Local et à la Bonne Gestion des Ressources Naturelles/Support Project for
local development and natural resources good management
PAPFA Programa de Apoio Participativo à Agricultura Familiar et à Pesca Artesanal/Program for Participative Support
to Family Agriculture and Artisanal Fisheries
PARSEGD Projet d'appui à la réinsertion socioéconomique des groupes défavorisés/Support project for socio-economic
reintegration of disadvantaged groups
PB Participatory budgeting
PCGD Programme Cadre de Gouvernance Démocratique et Décentralisation/ Framework Program for Democratic
Governance
PDUE Projet de Développement des secteurs Urbain et de
l’approvisionnement en Eau/Urban and Water Development Project
PNFMV Programme National de Formation aux Métiers de la Ville/Cameroon’s National Training Programme for Urban
Professions
PPP Public–private partnership
PRCG Programme en Renforcement de Capacités en Gouvernance/Programme for the Strengthening of Government
Capacities
PROADEL Projet d'appui au Programme de développement local/Local Economic Development Support Project
PRSP Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
PwC PricewaterhouseCoopers
RFA Regional Forest Tax (Cameroon)
SDGs Sustainable Development Goals
SGBV Sexual and gender-based violence
SME Small and medium-sized enterprise
UCCC United Councils and Cities of Cameroon
UCLG United Cities and Local Governments

x Localizing the 2030 Agenda and the SDGs: Strengthening Local Government Action in Central Africa
UCLGA United Cities and Local Governments in Africa
UN United Nations
UNCDF United Nations Capital Development Fund
UNDAF+ United Nations Development Assistance Framework Plus
UNDG United Nations Development Group
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
UNFPA United Nations Population Fund
UN-Habitat United Nations Human Settlements Programme
UNV United Nations Volunteers Programme

Acronyms and abbreviations xi


PHOTO: UN PHOTO/ESKINDER DEBEBE/ DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

Executive summary
I
n September 2015, the UN General Assem­ ing cities and human settlements inclusive,
bly unanimously adopted the 2030 Agen­ safe, resilient and sustainable.
da for Sustainable Development, which
introduced a new set of global development Localization of the SDGs refers to the process
objectives captured as the Sustainable Devel­ of defining, implementing and monitoring
opment Goals (SDGs) to be achieved by 2030. strategies at the local level for achieving global,
These new development goals present major national and subnational sustainable develop­
challenges for the Central Africa region, giv­ ment goals and targets.1 This approach consists
en low levels of human development, fragile of mechanisms, tools, innovations, platforms
and conflict-affected settings, rural–urban mi­ and processes to effectively translate the devel­
gration and limited economic development. opment agenda into results at the local level.
The UN Conference on Housing and Sustain­ The concept should therefore be understood
able Urban Development (Habitat III), held in holistically, beyond the institutions of local gov­
Quito in October 2016, led to the adoption ernments, to include all local actors through a
of the New Urban Agenda (Quito Declaration territorial approach that includes the broader set
on Sustainable Cities and Human Settlements of actors of the local development ecosystem,
for All), which seeks to address the way cities, including central and regional governments, civ­
towns and villages are planned, designed, fi­ il society, the private sector, traditional leaders,
nanced, developed, governed and managed. religious organizations, academia and others.
The New Urban Agenda establishes the im­
portant contribution of cities and human While recognizing that multi-level and
settlements to the implementation and local­ multi-sector partnerships will be required to
ization of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable De­ achieve the SDGs at the local level, as high­
velopment and the achievement of the SDGs, lighted in the New Urban Agenda, a central
including, but not limited to, Goal 11 of mak­ premise of this report is that strong and capa­
ble local governments play a fundamental role

1 UNDP, UN-Habitat and UCLG, 2015. Localizing the Post-2015 Development Agenda.

xii Localizing the 2030 Agenda and the SDGs: Strengthening Local Government Action in Central Africa
as key drivers and enablers of sustainable and key enabling conditions needed to strengthen
resilient local development. Amidst the discus­ local governments in the region:
sion on the role of local governments for the
localization of the SDGs, an important debate i. Establishing a clear legal framework and
is required on whether local governments supportive policy environment;
have the required autonomy, competencies,
resources and capacity to effectively monitor ii. Ensuring that mandates are adequately
and achieve the SDGs. funded and inclusive service delivery is
promoted;
The objective of this report is to characterize
the state of local governance and local devel­ iii. Local governments play a greater role in
opment in Central Africa and to propose rec­ local economic development (LED);
ommendations to strengthen local govern­
ments as a precondition for implementing the iv. Adequate capacity development is delive­
SDGs and the New Urban Agenda at the local red and responds to needs.
level. Drawing from research on the state of
local governments in the Central Africa region, These are underpinned by a cross-cutting, en­
this report assesses the current state of the abling condition on social cohesion and peace.
enabling environment for local governments
in four key areas: i) the legal and policy frame­ For each of these enabling conditions, this re­
work (Chapter 1); ii) financing and delivering port identifies a set of recommendations for
services (Chapter2); iii) local economic devel­ the replication and scaling up of innovative
opment (Chapter 3); and iv) capacity develop­ and successful strategies, mechanisms and
ment (Chapter 4). models that can be adopted into local govern­
ment frameworks to strengthen the role that
Based on an assessment of baseline condi­ local governments can play as key promoters
tions, this report identifies the following four of sustainable and resilient local development.

Executive summary xiii


Introduction

PHOTO: UN PHOTO/ESKINDER DEBEBE/DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

xiv Localizing the 2030 Agenda and the SDGs: Strengthening Local Government Action in Central Africa
Context and objectives low levels of human development, fragile and
conflict-affected settings, rural–urban migra­
The Sustainable Development Goals and tion, and limited economic development.
New Urban Agenda context

I
n September 2015, the UN General Assem­ As one of the first global summits following
bly unanimously adopted the 2030 Agen­ the adoption of the SDGs, the UN Conference
da for Sustainable Development, which on Housing and Sustainable Urban Develop­
introduced a new set of global development ment (Habitat III), held in Quito in October
objectives captured as the Sustainable De­ 2016, led to the adoption of the New Urban
velopment Goals (SDGs) to be achieved by Agenda (Quito Declaration on Sustainable
2030.2 The SDGs, which came into effect in Cities and Human Settlements for All), which
January 2016, comprise a set of 17 universal seeks to address the way cities, towns and
goals and 169 targets that build on the Mil­ villages are planned, designed, financed, de­
lennium Development Goals (MDGs) by seek­ veloped, governed and managed. The New
ing to complete what was not achieved by Urban Agenda establishes the important con­
2015. The SDGs aim to go beyond the MDGs tribution of cities and human settlements to
by not only continuing to focus on develop­ the implementation and localization of the
ment priorities such as poverty eradication, 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development
health, education, and food security and nutri­ and the achievement of the SDGs, including,
tion, but also by adding a wide range of eco­ but not limited to, Goal 11 of making cities
nomic, social and environmental objectives. and human settlements inclusive, safe, resil­
These new development goals present major ient and sustainable.
challenges for the Central Africa region, given

Table 1: Sustainable Development Goals

1 NO
POVERTY 2 ZERO
HUNGER 3 GOOD HEALTH
AND WELL-BEING 4 QUALITY
EDUCATION 5 GENDER
EQUALITY 6 CLEAN WATER
AND SANITATION

7 AFFORDABLE AND
CLEAN ENERGY 8 DECENT WORK AND
ECONOMIC GROWTH 9 INDUSTRY, INNOVATION
AND INFRASTRUCTURE 10 REDUCED
INEQUALITIES 11 SUSTAINABLE CITIES
AND COMMUNITIES 12 RESPONSIBLE
CONSUMPTION
AND PRODUCTION

13 CLIMATE
ACTION 14 LIFEBELOW WATER 15 LIFEONLAND 16 PEACE, JUSTICE
AND STRONG
INSTITUTIONS
17 PARTNERSHIPS
FOR THE GOALS

2 Detailed SDGs goals and targets can be found on the UN Sustainable Development Knowledge Platform at: https://sustainabledevelop­
ment.un.org/?menu=1300.

1
Localization of the SDGs refers to the process been highlighted in the joint UNDP, UNCDF,
of defining, implementing and monitoring UNV framework on supporting local gover­
strategies at the local level for achieving glob­ nance and local development (referred here­
al, national and subnational sustainable de­ after as the ‘LGLD Framework’), which seeks
velopment goals and targets.3 This approach to promote “territorial development that is
consists of mechanisms, tools, innovations, endogenous and spatially integrated, lever­
platforms and processes to effectively trans­ ages the contribution of actors operating at
late the development agenda into results at multiple levels and bring incremental value to
the local level. The concept should therefore national development efforts”.4 Table 2 details
be understood holistically, beyond the insti­ the inputs, outputs and outcomes of the LGLD
tutions of local governments, to take into ac­ Framework.
count all local actors through a territorial ap­
proach that includes the broader set of actors An important contribution of the LGLD Frame­
of the local development ecosystem, including work is to highlight the crucial linkage between
central and regional governments, civil society, resilience in the face of disasters, conflicts, and
the private sector, traditional leaders, religious in state–society relationships on the one hand,
organizations, academia and others. and sustainable development on the other.
The Framework notes that sustainable local
The importance of multi-stakeholder part­ development is a key premise for building re­
nerships in promoting local development has silience in risk-prone areas.5 This is particularly

Table 2: Integrated framework to support local governance and local development


(UNDP, UNCDF, UNV, 2016)

Inputs Outputs Outcomes


1. The facilitation of democratic account- 1. Local and Regional Associations 1. Improving the quality of life for
ability (LRAs) empowered with meaning- local residents
2. Strengthening rule of law and security ful autonomy and embedded in 2. Building resilient state–society
effective accountability networks relationships at the local level
3. The development of necessary ad-
ministrative capacity for development 2. Equitable and effective delivery of
management and service delivery goods and services
4. The facilitation of necessary fiscal 3. Inclusive decision-making processes
empowerment and resources involving women and men
5. The availability of spatial information 4. A secure environment where the
rule of law prevails
6. The crucial acceleration of social capital
formation 5. The sustainable use and manage-
ment of natural resources
6. Increased economic opportunities
(and jobs) for women and men

3 UNDP, UN-Habitat and UCLG, 2015. Localizing the Post-2015 Development Agenda.
4 UNDP, UNCDF and UNV, 2016. An Integrated Framework to Support Local Governance and Local Development.
5 UNDP, UNCDF and UNV, 2016. An Integrated Framework to Support Local Governance and Local Development.

2 Localizing the 2030 Agenda and the SDGs: Strengthening Local Government Action in Central Africa
relevant to the Central Africa region, which in­ investing in local development. This is based
cludes a number of fragile and conflict-affect­ on evidence of production efficiencies, where
ed states, and is the rationale for this report local public investment has been shown to
to connect sustainability and resilience as the have higher rates of return than those provid­
central elements of local development (UNDP, ed by national agencies, and allocative efficien-
UNCDF and UNV, 2016). cies, where decision-making at the local level
tends to better reflect local preferences iden­
The LGLD Framework identifies six mutual­ tified through local planning processes.7 The
ly reinforcing areas of capacity development growing role of local governments has also
to operationalize this framework: 1) capacity emerged in the context of increasing global
for the national visioning process (including demands for democratic advances at the local
the capacity to conduct a thorough institu­ level, in the form of representative democracy
tional and context analysis); 2) capacity for through the election of local officials, but also
managing an integrated development plan­ including more direct forms of democratic
ning process at the sectoral level; 3) capacity practices, such as citizen engagement in plan­
for subnational/local development planning ning and budget decision-making.
and implementation; 4) capacity for manag­
ing territorial partnerships and relationships; As a result of their expanding responsibilities,
5) capacity for fostering social cohesion and local governments will in many cases be direct­
managing heterogeneous communities; and ly responsible for delivering a large part of the
6) capacity for knowledge management and national governments’ commitments to the
advocacy.6 SDGs. They will also play an important leader­
ship role in bringing stakeholders of the local
The role of local governments in localizing development ecosystem together to achieve
the SDGs the SDGs. As such, the LGLD Framework labels
While recognizing that multi-level and local and regional governments as the “key
multi-sector partnerships will be required to promoters” of an integrated multi-partnership
achieve the SDGs at the local level, as high­ framework at the local level.8
lighted in the New Urban Agenda and the
LGLD Framework, a central premise of this re­ The enabling environment for local govern­
port is that strong and capable local govern­ ments to foster sustainable and resilient local
ments play a fundamental role as key drivers development
and enablers of sustainable and resilient local
development. Amidst the discussion on the role of local gov­
ernments for the localization of the SDGs, an
In the past three decades, amidst a growing important debate is required on whether lo­
global trend for decentralization, local gov­ cal governments have the required autonomy,
ernments have been given increasing roles competencies, resources and capacity to effec­
and responsibilities. This is often grounded tively monitor and achieve the SDGs. In many
in the economic rationale that empowering cases, local government capacity to enable
local governments is a more efficient way of sustainable local development is constrained

6 UNDP, UNCDF and UNV, 2016, Ch. 5.


7 Oates, W., 1999. An Essay on Fiscal Federalism. Journal of Economic Literature Vol. XXXVII pp. 1120–1149.
8 UNDP, UNCDF and UNV, 2016, p. ix.

3
by lack of clarity in mandates, lack of appro­ ers of sustainable and resilient local develop­
priate resources to implement transferred ment. This report identifies the following four
responsibilities, lack of transparency and pre­ key enabling conditions to achieve this in the
dictability in funding flows, limited technical region: 1) establishing a clear legal framework
capacity, lack of tools for stimulating LED, and and supportive policy environment; 2) ensur­
limited initiatives to build multi-sector and ing that mandates are adequately funded and
multi-level partnerships. Without addressing inclusive service delivery is promoted; 3) local
these underlying challenges, the capacity of governments play a greater role in local eco­
local governments to participate in achieving nomic development (LED); and 4) adequate
the SDGs will inevitably be curtailed. A United capacity development is delivered and re­
Cities and Local Government World Council sponds to needs. These are underpinned by a
motion adopted in December 2015 stressed cross-cutting, enabling condition on social co­
that “the localization of the 2030 Agenda is hesion and peace (see Figure 1).
not the implementation of a global or nation­
al agenda at the local level; but rather build­ For each of these four enabling conditions,
ing adequate conditions at the local level to this report identifies a set of recommenda­
achieve the global goals”,9 thus highlighting tions for the replication and scaling up of
that localization is strongly anchored in pro­ innovative and successful strategies, mech­
viding adequate competencies, capacities and anisms and models that local government
resources to local governance mechanisms. frameworks can adopt to strengthen their
role as key promoters of sustainable and re­
The objective of this report is to characterize silient local development. These recommen­
the state of local governance and local de­ dations will be based on highlighting good
velopment in Central Africa and to propose practices, as well as identifying gaps and ca­
recommendations to strengthen local gov­ pacity challenges of local governments in the
ernments as a precondition for the implemen­ Central Africa region.
tation of the SDGs and the New Urban Agenda
at the local level. Drawing from research on As mentioned above, while this report focuses
the state of local governments in the Central on the specific role of local governments, it is
Africa region, this report assesses the current important to recognize that they are not the
state of the enabling environment for local sole actors of local development, but are part
governments in four key areas: i) the legal and of a broader local development ecosystem.
policy framework; ii) financing and delivering This includes both local-level stakeholders
services; iii) local economic development; and (including the private sector, civil society, and
iv) capacity development. traditional leaders, which all play a key part
in collectively identifying and fulfilling the lo­
Through an assessment of the baseline condi­ cal development potential), and other tiers of
tions and the identification of key bottlenecks government (as multi-level governance is par­
and deficiencies in these four areas in the eight amount to articulate national and local devel­
countries of the region, this report identifies opment policies as well as sectoral and place-
the key enabling conditions that will be critical based policies, in order to maximize their
in order to strengthen local governments to impact). These vertical and horizontal interac­
enable them to play their role as key promot­ tions and partnerships play an important role
9 UCLG, 2015. ‘The Local Dimension of the 2030 Agenda’, motion adopted by the World Council of the UCLG, Paris, December 2015.

4 Localizing the 2030 Agenda and the SDGs: Strengthening Local Government Action in Central Africa
Figure 1: Enabling conditions to strengthen local governments to promote resilient
and sustainable local development in Central Africa

Enabling conditions / Inputs Output Outcome

1. Establishing a clear legal


framework and supportive policy
environment

2. Ensuring that mandates are ade-


Cross quately funded and inclusive service
cutting: delivery is promoted
­Strengthened Contributes to Sustainable and
Social Local resilient local
cohesion ­Governments development
3. Local governments play a greater
and peace role in Local Economic Development
(LED)

4. Adequate capacity development is


delivered and responds to needs

in setting overall policies, targets and planning, sary elements for achieving SDG 16 (peace,
which impacts the mobilization and allocation justice and strong institutions). In fragile
of resources across the territory. As appropri­ and conflict-affected states (FCAS), local
ate, the recommendations provided in this re­ development is considered a key premise
port seek to include local government-specific for building resilience in risk-prone areas.10
recommendations, as well as drawing in the Some Central African states have recently
interactions of local governments with other been involved in a conflict or civil war; for
local-level actors and multi-level governance example, after a violent civil conflict in 2013,
structures to promote sustainable and resilient the Central African Republic (CAR) remains in
local development. the grips of instability and sporadic unrest,
despite significant progress and successful
Considerations for fragile and conflict- elections.11 Chad has recently emerged from
affected states a five-year civil war (2005–2010) and a civil
Social cohesion and peace represent a war took place in Congo between 1997 and
cross-cutting theme that underpins the oth­ 1999. These wars have left deep scars in the
er four enabling conditions for strengthen­ region’s consciousness.
ing local governments and are the neces­

10 UNDP, UNCDF, UNV, 2016.


11 UN News Center, January 13th 2017, Central African Republic: UN-backed humanitarian plan aims to save 2.2 million lives, available at:
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=55967#.WIS3A3eZPBK.

5
PHOTO : UN PHOTO/ESKINDER DEBEBE/DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is recov­ ceived as unfair treatment of minority or dis­
ering from many years of conflicts that caused advantaged groups by the majority or ruling
the loss of almost three million lives. This is a communities. As such, well-managed and in­
significant loss in terms of human resources at clusive local governance can reduce potential
the provincial and local level. According to the conflicts.
Economic Commission for Africa's report on
conflict in DRC (2015), the conflicts and their Countries that have experienced ethnic con­
aftermath remain a major cause for concern, flicts, including Central African states, are
as they pose a multi-dimensional challenge more likely to adopt a decentralized system
to economic and human development in DRC of government. A study by UNDP (2007)
and in the region as a whole. While the con­ states that “in certain situations of conflict and
flicts have claimed hundreds of thousands of post-conflict, decentralization can be useful in
lives and have inflicted significant material resolving tensions, ensuring the involvement
damage, the more long-term consequences of stakeholders and ensuring better access to
have undoubtedly been in the arena of the the decision making. It can also encourage lo­
functioning of central and local institutions in cal authorities to assume their leadership role
the states of Central Africa. in leading the development of a local devel­
opment strategy and mobilizing partners and
Local governance is one of the main factors resources for implementation.” This has also
contributing to the process of peacebuilding been reinforced in a 2016 UNDP publication
and post-conflict reconstruction in the region, that builds on the LGLD Framework and ap­
as it is widely accepted that the empowerment plies it to fragile and conflict-affected settings,
of local authorities helps reduce conflict. Local called ‘Guide to Local Governance in Fragile
governance is supposed to meet the needs of and Conflict-Affected Settings’, a practical
different communities by giving them a stake guide to building a resilient foundation for
in local government management. This is one peace and development.12
of the ways of overcoming what may be per­
12 UNDP, 2016. Guide to Local Governance in Fragile and Conflict-Affected Settings.

6 Localizing the 2030 Agenda and the SDGs: Strengthening Local Government Action in Central Africa
Strengthening local governance has been a Methodology
significant element of the wider conflict-pre­
vention agenda and has acted as an import­ The methodology of this study consists of
ant confidence-building measure. Weak local qualitative and case-study research. The main
governing institutions have posed difficulties source of information includes a review of the
for Central Africa in furthering the aims of existing literature and documentation (books,
development. Inefficient and ineffective local journals, official documents, legislative mate­
governance has caused instability and unpre­ rials, and strategy documents) on the state of
dictability, which has affected the economic local governments in Central Africa. The first
development of the region. Corruption, a phase of the study included a literature review
likely result of weak local governance, has (desk study) of the existing work on the local
caused the inefficient allocation of resources, governments in Central Africa, from a series of
and undermined legitimate economic activ­ publications. Second, relevant news obtained
ities. from international and local newspapers, jour­
nals and news agencies was considered. Third,
The conflicts that have occurred in some Cen­ interviews with key informants were also con­
tral African countries have resulted in the loss ducted. Finally, an analysis was carried out on
of control over part of the territory and have policies, examining how and to what degree
led to political and economic stagnation. As new policies had been adopted and imple­
a result, in some areas the rule of law did not mented.
extend to all parts of the region. Decentral­
ization reform became an important factor in Political, economic and social data, where avail­
Central Africa’s endeavours for post-conflict able, were widely used. Previous works pro­
reconstruction. In this context, building lo­ duced in the same series on the state of local
cal government capacity has taken on a new governments in East and Southern Africa were
shape and urgency: it has become one of the also taken into account. A validation workshop
most important tools to enhance security, to of the initial findings of the study was held on
strengthen governance structures, and to pro­ 21–22 May 2014 in Dakar, Senegal, bringing to­
mote further democratization. gether national and subnational government
representatives of many countries of West and
As already stated, consideration of fragile and Central Africa.
conflict-affected states is a cross-cutting ele­
ment in this report. For each set of recommen­ Taking stock of the knowledge developed by
dations on supporting the enabling conditions the study and considering all new develop­
for fostering strengthened local governments, ments in the area of local development with
an additional set of recommendations is pro­ the adoption of the Sustainable Development
vided for FCAS. For a more detailed analysis Goals (SDGs) in 2015 and the New Urban
of local governance options in FCAS settings, Agenda in October 2016, the current report
readers are encouraged to consult the afore­ has been developed in 2017 to propose rec­
mentioned dedicated UNDP publication fo­ ommendations for enhancing the action of
cusing on the matter, ‘Guide to Local Gover­ local governments for the SDGs localization
nance in Fragile and Conflict-Affected Settings’ process.
(UNDP, 2016).

7
Geographical scope ple in the Central African Republic. Although
multi-party systems are in place, electoral
This regional study focuses on the eight states democracy is limited and Central Africa has
of Central Africa: Cameroon, Central African one of the worst human rights records in the
Republic, Chad, Congo (Republic of Congo/ world. The region is endowed with significant
Congo-Brazzaville), Democratic Republic of natural resources, including agriculture, for­
Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, and São estry, gas, and oil, yet despite this abundance,
Tomé and Principe. the population in general is poor. Progress
was made towards the achievement of the
Central Africa, also known as Middle Africa, Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), how­
is a core subregion of the African continent. ever, these were limited to only a few areas;
Central African states comprise the Economic health and education indicators are particu­
Community of Central African States. Other larly alarming, including a low life expectan­
subregional organizations include the Mone­ cy at birth. The improvement of governance,
tary Community of Central African States and including functioning local governments, is
the Bank of Central African States. These are re­ one of the greatest challenges faced by Cen­
gional integration initiatives, and have been a tral Africa and consequently concerted efforts
pillar of reforms in the region. Historically these will be required for the region to achieve the
regional initiatives have significantly facilitated SDGs by 2030.
reforms in Central African countries and their
role will be considered in various parts of this Historical evolution of local
study. governments in Central Africa

Central Africa is characterized by diversity in Central African countries have a relatively short
economic development: for example, of the history of existence as independent states. Al­
eight countries in this study, five belong to the most all Central African states became inde­
middle-income category, while Chad and the pendent in 1960, with the exception of Equa­
Central African Republic are low-income coun­ torial Guinea (1968) and São Tomé and Principe
tries. Some countries in the region are large (1975). Their history as independent countries
natural-resource exporters and are considered currently spans little more than 50 years. All of
resource economies, while five countries be­ them have faced different challenges in estab­
long to the category of least-developed coun­ lishing themselves as nation states and their
tries (LDCs). The region also comprises fragile divergent history has led to varied relation­
and conflict-affected states (FCAS). ships with their local governments.

Nevertheless, Central Africa boasts a strong Local governments first attracted attention in
and young demographic composition as well Central Africa in the 1950s and 1960s when
as linguistic, geographic and ethnic diversi­ colonial administrations prepared their colo­
ty. The region is generally considered to be nies for independence by devolving respon­
stable politically, but to be fragile below the sibilities for certain sectors to local authorities
surface as there are political, security and so­ (Adeyeye, 2010). In the 1980s, decentralization
cietal challenges that threaten the existing gradually came to the forefront of the agenda
stability. The political and security situation in when these Central African states started to
some countries remains very fragile, for exam­ open up internationally and when they started

8 Localizing the 2030 Agenda and the SDGs: Strengthening Local Government Action in Central Africa
seeing decentralization as a means to build a elite allowed the implementation of reform
unitary state or promote national unity (Ebel programmes, including for local governments.
and Yilmaz, 2001). The development of local The concept of decentralization in the region
governments in Central Africa can therefore was in part promoted in the early 1990s when
be divided into two periods: first, the post-in­ Central African states were negotiating struc­
dependence years that were characterized by tural adjustment programmes with the IMF
inadequate action in instituting a decentral­ and World Bank, which included the adop­
ization framework and second, the period just tion of further measures for decentralization.
before the end of 1980s and early 1990s, which Thus, from its inception, decentralization in
witnessed a favourable domestic and regional Central Africa has been developed also in re­
environment for undertaking decentralization sponse to external pressures and shocks. At
reforms. this time, decentralization also became a high­
light of the “stickiness” of institutional and pol­
In the post-independence period starting in icy arrangements in Central African countries,
the 1960s, decentralization in Central Africa which have observed patterns of incremental
was mainly seen as a technique of admin­ change. Nevertheless, the policy of “incremen­
istrative organization. This was confirmed tal change” towards decentralized governance
with the adoption of local government laws and local development has occasionally been
that devolved limited competencies to lo­ interrupted by seismic events in the region,
cal government units and mainly made the namely wars in CAR, DRC, Congo and Chad,
subnational governments function as decon­ coups attempts in São Tomé and Principe and
centrated or delegated units of the central Equatorial Guinea, political crises in Gabon,
government, or extensions of central exec­ and substantial economic growth in Equatorial
utives, a tendency that remains a reality to Guinea.
this date in many Central African countries.
This post-independence regime of local gov­ The current framework for local governments
ernment was unsustainable due to serious in the region varies from country to country,
deficiencies: namely, it did not provide for depending not only on factors such as the spe­
democratically elected local authorities and cific state formation, the occurrence of con­
it only afforded a limited transfer of respon­ flicts, access to natural resources, the patterns
sibilities and resources to local governments. of policy-making, exposure to international
The most pronounced functional deficiency, experiences, and the political culture, but also
as in the example of Gabon, included the the balance of power between central govern­
insufficient operationalization of provisions ment on the one hand and subnational units
for the laws on decentralization; or, as in the on the other. Most Central African countries
example of Cameroon, the dominance of the have experienced both responsive and intend­
representatives of the central government in ed decentralization processes, defined as fol­
running local affairs. lows:

The late 1980s and early 1990s, however, saw »» Responsive decentralization – this is
a significant evolution in the political and ad­ where decentralization has developed
ministrative environment within which local spontaneously as a response to the pres­
governments operated. The rapid growth of sures of extraordinary events or of the
revenues and the emergence of a reformist conditionality of the international commu­

9
PHOTO : UN PHOTO/ESKINDER DEBEBE/DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

nity. While there has been outside support, Regional development and local economic
there have also been endogenous initia­ development, as a result of pressure from lo­
tives to support strengthening local go­ cal communities due to their abundant natu­
vernments. Internal crises, such as the coup ral resources, are additional important factors
attempt of 2003 in São Tomé and Principe, in the drive towards more decentralization in
have had a major impact in this regard. Central Africa. Examples include regions of
Cameroon endowed with abundant forestry
»» Intended decentralization – this is where resources, and a wealth of petroleum resourc­
there has been an intention and thus a es and minerals in Chad, DRC, Equatorial Guin­
purposefully framed scheme by political ea, Gabon, and São Tomé and Principe, where
actors to transfer the logic, dynamics, orga­ these constitute major export commodities of
nizational traits, behavioural and regulato­ these countries.
ry patterns associated with the concept of
decentralization into their political systems. In some cases, the impetus for decentralization
Another determining factor is that of natio­ of Central African states was also determined
nal leaderships increasingly being inclined by the decentralization experience from other
to new ideas in the push for change. parts of Africa. Because Central African coun­
tries have had to react rapidly to numerous
It has been observed that countries prone to political and economic crises, many have had
experience conflicts, such as those of Central limited time to develop novel or endogenous
Africa, have been more likely to adopt a de­ approaches for their political governance; in­
centralized system of government. For Central stead, they have drawn on existing practices.
African countries, with their strong regional In these cases, the launch of decentralization
divisions and where people speak distinct has also been based on experiences from other
languages and practice different religions, a parts of the world, mediated by international
decentralized system of government is an im­ organizations. This has partly come in the form
portant option. of a “snowball” effect of decentralization in Af­
rica: the Eastern and Southern African experi­

10 Localizing the 2030 Agenda and the SDGs: Strengthening Local Government Action in Central Africa
ences have been important models for local
government reform in Central Africa. Domi­
no-style influences of the changes in Eastern
and Southern Africa encouraged the countries
of Central Africa to follow and institute reforms
in the local government sector. Also, the in­
creased interest of Central African countries in
decentralization and the growing readiness of
the international financial institutions and do­
nor agencies to assist them in decentralization
reforms, such as Germany’s GIZ funding de­
centralization programmes in Cameroon (GIZ,
2013), have further strengthened this agenda.

At the regional level, the perspective offered by


the 2014 African Charter for Decentralization,
Local Governance and Local Development and
the All Africa Ministerial Conference on Decen­
tralization and Local Development,13 have giv­
en an overarching philosophical underpinning
to Central Africa’s decentralization process:
that decentralization is a world standard and
an African value to which states of Central Af­
rica aspire. Thus, there are also regional initia­
tives underlined by the African Charter and the
All Africa Ministerial Conference that have also
set the vision and impetus for decentralization
reform in Central Africa.

13 The All Africa Ministerial Conference on Decentralization and Local Development, a pan-African forum that promotes social and politi­
cal reform processes and decentralization throughout Africa, was founded in 2000 and is based in Cameroon.

11
Chapter 1:
Legal and policy framework

PHOTO: UN PHOTO/SYLVAIN LIECHTI/DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

12 Localizing the 2030 Agenda and the SDGs: Strengthening Local Government Action in Central Africa
1.1 Overview enshrine the principle of decentralization in
their constitutions.

T
he legal and policy framework for local
governance and local development plays More recently, African countries have also ad­
an important role in establishing the rules opted international and regional strategic
and responsibilities of local governments and frameworks and policies for decentralization.
multi-level coordination mechanisms. These Central African countries’ commitment to sup­
are particularly relevant for SDGs 1 (no pover­ porting decentralization, local governance and
ty), 2 (zero hunger), 3, 4, 6 and 7 (for access to local development is backed by recent policy
basic social services), 5 (gender equality), 8 (de­ documents that incorporate elements and is­
cent work and economic growth), 10 (reduced sues related to decentralization processes and
inequalities), 11 (sustainable cities and com­ local authorities' roles and responsibilities. The
munities), 16 (peace, justice and strong institu­ African Ministerial Conference on Decentraliza­
tions) and 17 (partnerships for the goals). They tion and Local Development has developed the
also play an essential role in the implementa­ 2014 African Charter on the Values and Princi­
tion of the principle of “leaving no one behind.” ples of Decentralisation, Local Governance and
Local Development. Other instruments and
Central African countries have laid the basis declarations include the Yaoundé Declaration
of the principles for the functioning of local and the Kampala Call to Action. At the inter­
government units and have empowered cen­ national level, important initiatives include the
tral governments to oversee the work of local Aberdeen Agenda and the New Urban Agenda.
governments through legal provisions: con­
stitutions, laws, and implementing legislation At the country level, there have also been pol­
have defined the authorities, tasks and struc­ icy initiatives supporting the strengthening of
tures for local governments. With the advent of local governments. At a high level, this includes
the decentralization reform agenda, six of the National Development Plans and/or Poverty
eight Central African countries have chosen to Reduction Strategies. At a more operational

Table 3: Constitutional references to decentralization in Central African countries

Countries Constitutional references


Cameroon 1972 Constitution (Article 1)
Central African Republic 2004 Constitution (Article 61)
Chad 1996 Constitution (Articles 2, 36–39, 48, 203–215)
Congo 1992 Constitution (Preamble, Article 1)
Democratic Republic of Congo 2006 Constitution (Article 3)
Equatorial Guinea 1996 Constitution (Article 101–102)
Gabon 1991 Constitution (no reference to decentralization)
São Tomé and Principe 1975 Constitution (no reference to decentralization)

Chapter 1: Legal and policy framework 13


Table 4: International and regional policy initiatives supporting local governance

Strategies Year of adoption


New Urban Agenda 2016
African Charter on the Values and Principles of Decentralisation, Local Governance and Local Develop- 2014
ment
Kampala Call to Action 2010
Aberdeen Agenda: Commonwealth Principles on Good Practice for Local Democracy and Good Gover- 2009
nance
Yaoundé Declaration 2005

level, sector-specific strategies have also been DRC has a Strategic Framework for Implemen­
developed. However, no Central African coun­ tation of Decentralization, supplemented by a
try has a specific sectoral strategy on local gov­ multi-year Priority Action Plan. The Framework
ernment reform, but Central African Republic, was adopted at the end of a National Work­
Chad and Democratic Republic of Congo have shop held in June 2009. The roadmap for im­
designed decentralization programmes. Nev­ plementation of the national strategy for the
ertheless, these changes are gathering mo­ transfer of powers and resources was validated
mentum as local government reform is estab­ in a November 2013 workshop that brought
lished in the National Development Plans and together more than 300 national, provincial
Poverty Reduction Strategies of many Central and local actors.
African countries.

Table 5: National strategic frameworks

Countries Strategies
Cameroon Vision 2035; the Growth and Employment Strategy/Poverty Reduction Strategy 2009–2019
Central African Republic Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper; Framework Programme for Democratic Governance
and Decentralization (Programme Cadre Gouvernance Démocratique et Décentralisation
2008–2011)
Chad Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper; Decentralization Master Plan
Congo Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
Democratic Republic of Congo Plan National Stratégique du Développement (2016)
Equatorial Guinea National Plan for Economic and Social Development, (2008–2020): Horizonte 2020
Gabon Strategic Plan for Emerging Gabon (Plan Stratégique Gabon Emergent)
São Tomé and Principe Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper

14 Localizing the 2030 Agenda and the SDGs: Strengthening Local Government Action in Central Africa
1.2 Functional assignments of local changes, local governments can only build
governments additional classrooms at the direction of the
central Ministry of Basic Education (World
Central African countries, despite some sim­ Bank, 2012). Decentralization in Central Af­
ilarities in their development levels, cannot rica is not yet complete, even on paper, and
be considered a homogenous region with in reality, few sectors have experienced true
regard to adopted policies and practices for devolution of power and resources to local
local governance. The system of decentraliza­ governments.
tion in Central Africa often contains sectoral
devolvement from the central government Policy areas that have been devolved from
to local government units. Major policy and central to local levels differ from country to
management responsibility lies with the cen­ country. For example, in many countries, local
tral government or its deconcentrated, sub­ governments do not have competencies in ar­
national units, or with its representatives at eas such as health, education, sanitation, trans­
the local level that function next to decentral­ port, and water.
ized units. Decentralization in Central Africa,
as Cabral notes, is widespread, but not deep, 1.3 Political decentralization
and experiences in the region have consisted
mainly of the deconcentration of administra­ The concept of decentralization often entails
tive functions, rather than a true devolution a degree of accountability of local govern­
of power (Cabral, 2011). While primary edu­ ments to local people, through an electoral
cation is typically a decentralized function process. Without political decentralization
in many countries, for instance in Cameroon, with broadly elective local political pro­
local governments have limited effective re­ cesses, it would be difficult to consider the
sponsibilities in this area. Under the recent countries of Central Africa as possessing de­

Table 6: Functional assignments of local governments in Central Africa

Countries Functions of local governments


Cameroon Economic development, health, education, culture, sports, social issues, water
Central African Republic Education, health
Chad Education, health
Congo Education, health
Democratic Republic of Congo Education, health, agriculture, rural development
Equatorial Guinea Implementation of social and economic development projects initiated and directed by the
central government
Gabon Economic and social development; implementation of nationwide programmes in the fields
of health, education, sports and tourism
São Tomé and Principe Execution and support of central government projects

Chapter 1: Legal and policy framework 15


Table 7: Election of mayors in Central Africa

Countries Forms of municipal elections


Cameroon Direct election of municipal council members; indirect election of mayors
Central African Republic Limited political decentralization; indirect election of mayors
Chad Direct election of municipal council members; indirect election of mayors
Congo Direct election of municipal council members; indirect election of mayors
Democratic Republic of Congo Direct election of municipal council members; indirect election of mayors
Equatorial Guinea Provinces’ governors and district administrators appointed by central government. Mayors of
local governments and chairs of the village councils and the residents’ associations elected by
municipal council members, elected by universal suffrage
Gabon Governors, prefects and sub-prefects appointed by central government. Mayor is indirectly
elected. Elections are held for county, municipal councils and district bodies and the election
of senators who represent the local communities
São Tomé and Principe Members of district assemblies are elected by the population that later elects mayors

centralized systems (Cabral, 2011). However, 1.4 Levels of subnational


most local government units in Central Africa governance and types of local
currently function as instruments for admin­ governments
istering the interior by the central executive
(Ndegwa, 2002) and mayors are not elected All eight Central African countries have sub­
directly in any of the countries. The current national governance structures in place, how­
system in Central African countries is one in ever, there is often limited autonomy for local
which the members of municipal councils are governments, and central government is still
directly elected, and they in turn select their dominant in policy affairs. Central Africa’s de­
mayors. centralized systems of government have two
different levels of local government: regional
As decentralization in the region of Central and local. They also have two different versions
Africa has been seen as a technique of ad­ of local government: decentralized and decon­
ministrative organization to ensure uniform centrated subnational units.
administration of the territory by central gov­
ernments, the process has led only to a ratio­ The types of structure include provinces, re­
nalization of administrative structures, and not gions, districts, town, communes, municipal­
to a change in the operations of national gov­ ities, and municipal councils or municipal as­
ernance. Central government representatives semblies. Most of these structures are not new
often dominate local-level affairs more than and they date back to the pre- and directly
locally elected mayors. post-independence era. These structures func­
tion as both devolved and deconcentrated
subnational units. Devolved units are headed
by indirectly elected mayors, while deconcen­

16 Localizing the 2030 Agenda and the SDGs: Strengthening Local Government Action in Central Africa
Table 8: Type and number of local subunits in Central Africa

Countries Type and number of local governments


Cameroon Local councils (366) and regions (10). Local councils are of three types: rural or urban councils,
city councils and subdivisional urban councils within the cities
Central African Republic Regions (7), prefectures (16), sub-prefectures (66), municipalities (175), villages or neigh-
bourhoods (8,800)
Chad Regions (23), counties (départements) (67), municipalities (282), rural municipalities
(more than 800)
Congo 6 Municipalities (Brazzaville, Pointe Noire, Dolisie, Nkayi, Mossendjo, Ouesso) and 12 depart-
ments. Brazzaville and Pointe-Noire are both municipality and department
Democratic Republic of Congo 1,117 subunits, including 71 cities, 309 municipalities, 480 sectors, 257 chiefdoms
Equatorial Guinea Regions (2: continental and insular), provinces (7), districts (30) and municipalities (41),
village councils, traditional chiefdoms and residents’ associations (1,000)
Gabon Provinces (9), departments or prefectures (37), sub-prefectures (8)
São Tomé and Principe Provinces or islands (2) and districts (7)

trated authorities are part of the central gov­ local governments in this area is to establish
ernment and are headed by functionaries ap­ clear legal frameworks and provide supportive
pointed by the central state. policy environments to promote SDGs local­
ization, in particular for SDGs 5, 10, 11 and 16.
1.5 Key findings and The following recommendations are formulat­
recommendations ed with these objectives in mind.

The rules governing local governments in Recommendation 1.1: Introduce or


Central Africa are in the midst of an immense update legal provisions to provide clarity
change that is moving in the direction of the to subnational entities
continued establishment and enhancement Broad legal frameworks are generally in place
of local government structures. Progress has for the functioning of local governments in
been uneven in Central Africa and although Central Africa, however, the current model of
legal frameworks are often in place, the overall legislation in these countries is designed for a
assessment is that only moderate progress has centralized environment and could be ineffi­
been made in putting these into practice. And cient and inapplicable in future with further
although Central African countries differ in autonomy of local governments. Legislative
their use of the term “decentralization”, current regulations that will guarantee legal certain­
efforts are moving towards more devolution ty to the subnational players in the strength­
than the previous generation of decentraliza­ ened decentralization process and avoid the
tion reforms. possibility of day-to-day political meddling in
the decentralized governance are often yet
In view of these findings, this report suggests to be delivered or adequately applied. It is
that the key enabling condition to strengthen also important to address the numerous am­

Chapter 1: Legal and policy framework 17


PHOTO: UN PHOTO/ESKINDER DEBEBE/CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

biguities and in some cases contradictions in with policy-making issues rather than the
the roles and responsibilities of local govern­ day-to-day coordination of local service deliv­
ments. ery. These national conferences would also be
an opportunity to broaden sensitization and
Recommendation 1.2: Launch political understanding in line with the role of local
processes in the form of national multi- governments and SDGs localization. Citizens
stakeholder conferences on the adequate are often not adequately informed about the
transfer of resources and competencies to advantages of decentralization and what it
local governments offers in the way of bridging national divides
To achieve further progress in the decentral­ and cleavages, allowing citizens to benefit
ization agenda, a number of major challeng­ from the deployment of new, innovative and
es need to be addressed, the first being the competitive local services, and participating
political willingness to launch a strengthened in the renewal of the social contract.
decentralized agenda. A political process
should be initiated in the form of national Recommendation 1.3: Develop national
conferences that will lay the groundwork for strategies on local development and SDGs
further transfer of competencies and resourc­ localization
es to local governments. These conferences Drawing on the political process suggested
should set the parameters for the elabora­ in recommendation 1.2, Central African coun­
tion of strategies and plans for making local tries should develop national strategies for
governments more effective, to allow for local development and SDGs localization. An
a comprehensive reform of governance in absence of strategies blurs and undermines
Central African countries, from centralized the reform agenda. The strategies can not
to decentralized, including consideration of only establish the role of local governments
the role of the local level in the achievement as key promoters of local development, but
of the SDGs. Decentralization of powers to also be an opportunity to better define the
local governments would release additional role of other key actors in the local develop­
capacity to the central government to deal ment ecosystem (private sector, CSOs, oth­

18 Localizing the 2030 Agenda and the SDGs: Strengthening Local Government Action in Central Africa
er levels of government, etc.) The strategies 1.5.1 Fragile and conflict-affected
empowered with actions plans and the nec­ states
essary financial resources should not be ab­
stract and remote from specific, forseeable FCAS Recommendation 1.1: Carry out
problems, and should give due attention to appropriate situational analysis in
gender equality. Operative content should be programming local governance and local
adapted to the specific country conditions, development interventions in FCAS
including specifying roles, responsibilities, Particular attention should be placed on carry­
processes and timeframes to encourage local ing out situational analysis in interventions in
development. FCAS in order to build knowledge of the po­
litical economy of the overall local governance
Recommendation 1.4: Set up coordination system, including formal and informal actors,
mechanisms that will guide the work on the quality of state–society relations and un­
multi-sector and multi-level partnerships derstanding how fragility at the local level can
for local development and SDGs fuel violence.14 Some key elements of a situa­
localization tional analysis include: mapping of local gover­
A further challenge is to design coordination nance; conflict and violence; local governance
mechanisms that will guide the national pro­ processes; service delivery; peace, justice, se­
cesses for local development and SDGs local­ curity and social cohesion; land, environment
ization. There is a current lack of inter-minis­ and livelihoods; and the enabling framework.
terial coordination mechanisms that would This analysis is critical in ensuring that the pol­
guide the process and tackle the challenges icies and plans introduced do not exacerbate
faced along the way. These should include a conflicts, and to lay the groundwork for sus­
central-level coordination mechanism as well tainable peace.
as local-level coordination, with local gov­
ernments acting as facilitators. The line min­ FCAS Recommendation 1.2: Target
istries and governmental agencies should quick wins and phase in legal and policy
be represented in these coordination mech­ reforms
anisms, and other important local develop­ In FCAS settings, rather than targeting legal
ment actors, such as the private sector and and policy challenges, the simplest issues
civil society, should also be included. These should be addressed before the most com­
mechanisms should lead to more coherence plex, which can mean, for example, dealing
and harmonization in the national, sectoral with immediate capacity needs. Before policy
and subnational planning and budgeting ex­ reforms are introduced, it is advisable to start
ercises. Multi-level and multi-sector planning with building the capacities needed for the
should also be promoted with an offer of ade­ most basic functions. When reforms are intro­
quate related capacity building. duced, it is also useful to take an approach that
tests or pilots a few options before long-term
choices are made.

14 UNDP, 2016. Guide to Local Governance in Fragile and Conflict-Affected Settings, p. 41.

Chapter 1: Legal and policy framework 19


Chapter 2:
Financing and delivering
services

PHOTO: UN PHOTO/EVAN SCHNEIDER/ CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

20 Localizing the 2030 Agenda and the SDGs: Strengthening Local Government Action in Central Africa
A
s highlighted in the legal framework ernments or intergovernmental transfers, and
discussion in Chapter 1, Central African size of local revenue bases varies from one
countries have undergone processes of Central African country to another. In terms of
change on decentralization, which in turn have measuring the extent of fiscal decentralization
resulted in a changing environment for the fi­ in Central Africa, the following aspects are key
nancing and delivery of services by local gov­ measures: the extent of the share of public
ernments. The general view of this study is that expenditure controlled by local governments;
the decentralization of services has resulted in whether countries have regulated fiscal de­
an improvement in local services, and the qual­ centralization in legislation; whether countries
ity and efficiency of service delivery outcomes have set-down mechanisms or grants for the
is closely related to the availability of finan­ transfer of financial resources to local govern­
cial resources and local government capacity. ments; whether the countries concerned pos­
As services are increasingly delivered at the sess an established formula for fiscal transfers;
local level, it will be essential to put the ap­ whether local governments have the authori­
propriate funding mechanisms and effective ty to raise and set the rates of municipal tax­
service-delivery modalities in place for the es; whether the local authorities have the fis­
achievement of the SDGs in the region. This cal autonomy to exercise their functions; and
section discusses the current practices of local whether the national legislation provides for
government financing and the delivery of local fiscal autonomy of the local authorities. These
services, and formulates a set of recommenda­ criteria are assessed for the eight countries of
tions for strengthening these. this study in Table 9.

2.1 Local government financing Fiscal decentralization has been part of the re­
forms undertaken in the framework of overall
An essential element of effective local govern­ local government and decentralization reform
ment is clear and predictable financial flows processes in Central Africa. Local authorities
to local governments, also referred to as “fis­ ideally would have autonomy to prepare and
cal decentralization”. The policy framework of execute their own budgets and independently
fiscal decentralization includes the transfer of dispose of their own sources of revenue. The
resources and revenues, as well as the assign­ challenge in this regard is the extent to which
ment of rights for raising taxes and retaining local governments have the discretion to de­
financial resources to fulfil service delivery re­ termine and address their local needs with the
sponsibilities at the local level (Cabral, 2011). resources they have.

The important role of local finances is high­ In general, local governments in Central Africa
lighted in SDGs 11 (sustainable cities and com­ are extremely underfunded as they have limit­
munities) and 17 (partnerships for the goals). ed sources of revenue. No clear information is
The latter has a specific target on domestic available on the share of local revenues and ex­
resource mobilization (17.1), which includes penditures as a share of GDP, or as a share of all
improvement of tax collection and revenue public revenues, but reviewing the budgets of
collection. the individual Central African countries shows
that there are imbalances between the central
The extent of decentralization of fiscal resourc­ government and local governments (known as
es, size of transfers from central to local gov­ vertical imbalances), and imbalances among

Chapter 2: Financing and delivering services 21


Table 9: Extent of fiscal decentralization in Central Africa

Countries Cameroon Central Chad Congo DRC Equatorial Gabon São Tomé
African Guinea and Principe
Republic
Legislation in place on Yes Yes No N/A Yes Yes Yes No
fiscal decentralization
Grants in place for fiscal Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
transfer to local govern-
ments
Formula exist for fiscal Yes N/A No N/A Yes No No No
transfers
Local governments can Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
raise taxes
Local governments can set Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes No
tax rates
Local authorities endowed Yes No N/A Yes Yes No N/A No
with autonomy to prepare
and execute their own
budgets
Local authorities endowed Yes N/A No Yes Yes No Yes No
with autonomy to dispose
of their own source
revenues
Local authorities can own Yes Yes N/A N/A Yes No N/A N/A
property
Local authorities can Yes Yes N/A Yes No Yes Yes Yes
borrow
OVERALL ASSESSMENT Good Some Limited Some Good Some Some Limited
progress progress progress progress progress progress progress progress

the local governments themselves (referred to Some Central African countries have no dedi­
as horizontal imbalances). Most of the munic­ cated legal frameworks governing local gov­
ipal revenues in Central Africa derive directly ernment finances. Instead, the rules governing
from the transfers from national government. the revenues, budgets, and financial reporting
There is a high proportion of local govern­ obligations are embedded in a wider set of
ments with per-capita revenues well below laws and orders. There is also a lack of good
the national average. In some cases, such as data on the current financial situation of local
Cameroon, a large amount of debt is owed by governments.
local governments to suppliers of goods and
services. For sound financial management at the local
level, the following are key issues to articulate

22 Localizing the 2030 Agenda and the SDGs: Strengthening Local Government Action in Central Africa
in a coherent framework: revenue raising and which are available only to central authorities
taxation; intergovernmental transfers; equal­ and mainly benefit localities with large eco­
ization systems; and budgeting and borrow­ nomic activities.
ing. These are discussed in turn below.
The possibility of local authorities being fun­
2.1.1 Revenue raising and taxation ded by the revenues from local fees and taxes
according to rates that they define themselves
The local authorities in Central Africa have very is very limited. In general, most revenues are
few own-source revenues. Local government collected by central governments which also
sources of revenue include a share of national set the taxes rates as well as the percentage
taxes, and local taxes, some of which are a leg­ to be reallocated to the local authorities. The
acy of colonial times, such as dog ownership current system is that most revenues are col­
fees in Equatorial Guinea. In most places, prop­ lected by regional or local branches of the
erty tax belongs to local governments. How­ central government, paid to the account of the
ever, as most countries in Central Africa lack central budget or treasury, and the funds are
cadastre, the basis of the property tax is quite then redistributed to the local governments,
limited, thus collections of these local taxes as in the case of Congo. It is rare to find local
and fees are poor since the highest-quality governments being able to assess and collect
revenue sources are economic activity-related their own revenues.
taxes (such as natural resource revenue taxes),

Table 10: Tax revenues of local governments in Central Africa

Countries Local taxes


Cameroon Direct council taxes, cattle tax, licences, business levy, market trading licences, public
transport licences, patent, forestry tax, property tax, sale tax of immovable property, taxes on
games, betting and lotteries, taxes on cars, local business tax, automobile registration, VAT
and corporate income tax
Central African Republic Patent, licence and property taxes, permits to carry a gun and hunting permits, forestry tax,
fines imposed by the courts, permits for gambling, hunting tax, farm tax, annual fee for
research of a mining area
Chad Property tax, mining tax
Congo Property tax, mining tax
Democratic Republic of Congo Property tax, mining tax for artisanal exploitation
Equatorial Guinea Direct Taxes such as property taxes; Indirect taxes, such as licences for cars; Public fees such as
construction permits, and renting taxes; VAT, customs duties, tax on dog or pet ownership, tax
for bicycle ownership
Gabon Patents, licences, property taxes, land ownership taxes, specific taxes relating to mining,
logging and oil, hotel accommodation tax, revenue tax, municipal tax on tobacco
São Tomé and Principe Property tax

Chapter 2: Financing and delivering services 23


However, there has been growing evidence of can decide the tax rates, within legally speci­
improved collection of existing taxes follow­ fied brackets, for three taxes: patents; licenc­
ing decentralization in a number of countries. es; and tax at source on activities. Four other
The improvement appears to be partly due to taxes (immovable property; sale of immovable
increased motivation on the part of local gov­ property; games, betting and lotteries; and
ernment officials, but also to improvements taxes on vehicles) are only local in the sense
in administrative efficiency. This has not been that the yields are attributed to local govern­
the case everywhere and there are instances ments, but are totally managed by the central
where difficulties in tax collection in Chad, government that also fixes the tax rates. The
Congo and DRC have been noted. However, local business tax goes directly to local gov­
evidence from Gabon, Equatorial Guinea and ernments, and although shared, it is their main
São Tomé and Principe suggests that there has own-source revenue. Revenues from automo­
also been considerable progress in the collec­ bile registration accrue to FEICOM rather than
tion of taxes in some countries (PwC, 2013). the locality in which the vehicle is registered.
Evidence from Cameroon also suggests that
when local authorities are involved in estab­ Property taxes generate relatively little reve­
lishing the tax rates and collection, the situa­ nue in Cameroon, even in the better-off metro­
tion improves. politan areas, including Yaoundé and Douala.
A large share (60 percent) is assigned to the
Country examples metropolitan area rather than the decentral­
ized local governments (World Bank, 2012).
Cameroon There are fees and charges applied that restrict
In Cameroon, the local authorities raise reve­ inter-regional trade and commerce, which also
nue from taxes and fees, and receive transfers generate very little or no revenues. Since 2009,
from the national government. The regions the macroeconomic crisis has led to a curtail­
and councils are mostly financed by funds gen­ ment in revenues and transfers, which has
erated by FEICOM, a central decentralization adversely affected local governments. Com­
fund. Local councils are empowered to levy pounding this effect, a repeated build-up of lo­
taxes and charges, including direct council cal government debt and arrears has resulted
taxes, cattle tax and licences, a business levy, in their amnesty or assumption by the central
market trading licences, and public transport government (World Bank, 2012).
licences. The main local government sources
of tax revenue in Cameroon are from shared Central African Republic
or concurrent sources, such as patent and for­ Taxes collected by local governments in the
estry tax. Twenty percent of six local taxes and case of the Central African Republic include
one local fee collected go to FEICOM for redis­ patent, licence and property taxes; permits
tribution to rural or urban local governments, to carry a gun and hunting permits; forestry
or special intercommunal purpose districts tax; fines imposed by the courts; permits for
(World Bank, 2012). gambling; hunting tax; farm tax; annual fees
for researching a mining area, etc. These taxes,
Tax collections are centralized and redistrib­ although local, are collected by the central tax
uted to all rural and urban local governments. authority in the capital Bangui, and returned
The redistribution criteria and formula are fixed to the Treasury, which is then responsible for
through central regulation. Local governments

24 Localizing the 2030 Agenda and the SDGs: Strengthening Local Government Action in Central Africa
returning part of the revenue collected to the 2.1.2 Intergovernmental transfers
local governments.
Intergovernmental transfers play a critical role
Equatorial Guinea in closing fiscal gaps as well as in alleviating
The 2003 law on decentralization in Equatorial inter-regional resource disparities. With regard
Guinea provides for different taxing powers to to intergovernmental transfer systems, there
local governments. However, these powers are are numerous problems that hinder their prop­
limited as the tax system establishes a specif­ er functioning in Central African countries.
ic requirement that any local government tax Most local governments in the region rely on
initiative must be approved in advance by the central government grants for financing local
central government. Local tax authorities still activities, yet these transfers are mostly very
retain the tax structure established during co­ limited and are provided as conditional grants
lonial times, whose efficiency is questionable. – local governments have limited autonomy to
The types of taxes include a tax on dog or pet dispose of the transferred funds. Local govern­
ownership, and a tax on bicycle ownership. ments mainly act as agents for the implemen­
Thus, the majority of local taxes have a colonial tation of central government projects at the
origin and do not meet current requirements local level. Transfers or grants from the budget
(Ariza Duarte, 2012). A local government in of the central government provide additional
Equatorial Guinea is entitled to collect the revenue for local governments to finance their
following taxes: direct taxes such as property competencies. However, the transfers are often
taxes; indirect taxes such as licences for cars; project-bound and local governments have
public fees such as construction permits; and no autonomy in spending decisions for the
renting taxes (Ariza Duarte, 2012). The local funds; local governments are therefore limited
tax system is very complex and inefficient. The in their ability to allocate resources based on
conditions and formalities required for taxpay­ their constituents’ specific needs as the funds
ers to meet their obligations are tortuous and allocated by the state are for dedicated uses.
there are no standardized formats for payment
settlement. Normally, the determination of the volume and
design of the transfer system are important re­
Gabon form issues. In Central Africa, in countries such
Some local taxes in Gabon are administered by as Cameroon, there is a mechanism to deter­
the central services of the central government mine the volume of transfers, and a distribu­
on behalf of local authorities. These include tion formula. However, in other countries these
contributions from patents and licences, and do not exist. The introduction of a rule-based
land taxes. These taxes are collected by the transfer system is an important challenge. The
state tax service and are then returned to the economies of Central Africa often function
Treasury to be made available to local authori­ with a planned economy approach that resem­
ties. Other local taxes are directly managed by bles communist republics of the former Sovi­
the local authorities, with local legislative bod­ et Union (specifically in the case of Equatorial
ies setting the rate in the range imposed by the Guinea, which for number of years lived under
legislature. Specific taxes relating to mining, communist rule). This has introduced a number
logging and oil extraction also provide bene­ of distortions and inequities which means that
fit to local communities in the form of natural fiscal transfer systems in these countries cease
resources taxes. to be an efficient institutional arrangement.

Chapter 2: Financing and delivering services 25


Table 11: Grants allocated from the central level to local governments in Central Africa

Countries Grants given to local governments


Cameroon Share from forest tax (RFA)
Central African Republic Share from forest and mining taxes
Chad Share from mining taxes
Congo Shares from national taxes
Democratic Republic of Congo 40% on paper, 10% in practice share from taxes from the mining sector
Equatorial Guinea 10% from central government revenues in the form of grants funding local projects
Gabon Equipment endowments, grants, donations, support funds, salary subsidies, special equip-
ment grant, grant for maintenance and garbage collection, grant for maintenance of vehicles
São Tomé and Principe Shares from national taxes

Transfers are also subject to political manip­ ernments must match decentralized compe­
ulation by central governments. There is an tencies. However, there is no precision about
emerging convergence in the region of Central the nature of the transferred resources, and it
Africa that political variables representing the is not specified whether these should be tax­
incentives of central political agents are signif­ es or transfers. Cameroon's law of 2004 states
icant determinants for resource distribution that the financial burden of the decentral­
across subnational governments. Thus, politi­ ized competencies must be assessed before
cally weak subnational governments generate their transfer. Since estimating this burden is
weak political incentives for central resources quite subjective, the line ministries actually in
to be transferred towards them, and risk hav­ charge of the assessment should play an im­
ing lower per-capita allocations and a result­ portant role. The law also stipulates that the
ing lower capacity for service delivery. Several general transfer should be decided annually
countries, such as Cameroon, have established with the central budget – which means that it
an independent commission to oversee and will likely be adjusted to the financial circum­
protect fiscal transfers from the central to the stances of the central government, as often
subnational level. However, the performance seen in recent years as a result of the global
of these commissions has been mixed; for ex­ financial crisis. Weaknesses in budget controls
ample, in Cameroon, the Finance Commission, allow a local government to run overdrafts, as
while playing an important role in the early well as arrears in terms of commitments made,
years of its establishment, has progressively but with outstanding payments (World Bank,
lost its influence. 2012).

Country examples In Cameroon, there is a considerable emphasis


on equality in the design of the allocation of
Cameroon shared taxes. The basis appears to be per-capi­
There is a legal requirement in Cameroon that ta equality of transfers, however, the use of the
financial resources transferred to local gov­ population basis for transfers poses a number

26 Localizing the 2030 Agenda and the SDGs: Strengthening Local Government Action in Central Africa
of significant difficulties. A major source of dis­ ernment in Equatorial Guinea was adopted in
satisfaction with the transfer system is that it is the late 1990s. In 2003, the proportion of state
based on out-of-date information on the pop­ revenue for financing the functions of local
ulation. An equal per-capita transfer may not governments was set at 10 percent and the
generate equal access to public services. The criteria for its distribution were established.
per-capita basis for the allocation of the shared These criteria included: 25 percent equal dis­
taxes is to ensure “equality”, but, given the dif­ tribution; 25 percent based on the size of pop­
ferences in infrastructure and unequal capital ulation; 25 percent in direct proportion to tax
endowments, this is not normally achieved. revenues generated by the local governments
Another area of concern is the provision for in the previous year; 15 percent according to
marginalized and ultra-poor minorities, for in­ the number of existing village councils; and 10
stance in the resource-rich but poorly served percent in inverse proportion to their own tax
forest region. There may not be enough polit­ revenues generated by the local governments
ical support at the local level for targeted pro­ in the previous year. Initially, 4 percent of the
vision for marginal groups, such as the Baka revenues were transferred in 2003 and then
(World Bank, 2012). gradually increased to 10 percent by 2005. At
least 90 percent of transfers were conditioned
Central African Republic for investment and for the training of local of­
The principle of distribution of funds in the ficials.
case of the Central African Republic is a func­
tion of the size of the population of a munic­ However, later in 2005 the distribution of the
ipality or commune, and as such some local 10 percent was linked to the fact that it gave
governments are provided with very small authority to the central government to negoti­
amounts. There is a large discrepancy between ate on behalf of local communities to fund in­
taxes collected in the capital Bangui and other vestments for local governments. This change
provinces. The majority of the 177 local gov­ radically transformed the intergovernmental
ernments are impoverished, while the budget transfer system in Equatorial Guinea because
of towns located in forest areas depends on it was contrary to the original intention of
the forest tax by more than 70 percent. This providing unconditional grants to local gov­
extreme dependence creates significant chal­ ernment, and resulted in the funding of proj­
lenges in sustaining local services in the medi­ ects selected by the central government. Thus,
um and long term. In Central African Republic, there was a return to a centralized budget sys­
there is a budget allocation from the state to tem, with investment decisions being made
provide for operating costs and the investment away from the towns, and local governments
capacity of local governments are very limited. found themselves in a difficult position be­
The small amounts transferred often do not al­ tween the powers conferred on them and the
low local governments to finance investment lack of resources. The change also meant that
projects or to provide social transfers to those transfers shifted from direct to indirect sources
living in poverty. Another problematic area is of revenue, from the transfer of a percentage
the late payment of transfers. of the state budget to local governments (in­
tergovernmental transfers), to the financing of
Equatorial Guinea local investment projects. Additionally, the dis­
The initial system specifying the redistribution tribution criteria of “in proportion to the popu­
of transfers between different levels of gov­ lation”, “the number of villages” or territory, and

Chapter 2: Financing and delivering services 27


PHOTO : UN PHOTO/MARIE FRECHON/DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

the “fiscal effort” were replaced by the ability expected to cover the annual costs for trans­
of proposals and projects to be chosen at the ferred competencies.
national level (Ariza Duarte, 2012).
Extraordinary resources include equipment
In this context, small towns that have no tech­ endowments; grants and loans; donations
nical capacity for project design and submis­ and support funds (Ikoghou-Mensah, 2012).
sion have little or no access to national fund­ Local governments receive state grants each
ing. The decision to make the transfer is left to year for their operational costs, namely: sala­
the ability of mayors to influence or lobby the ry subsidies; special equipment grant; a grant
central authorities. This change has negatively for maintenance and garbage collection; and
transformed the intergovernmental transfer a grant for the maintenance of vehicles. As in
system in Equatorial Guinea, yet despite these other countries, the question of autonomy
challenges, further investments were made in of local governments in the management of
municipal infrastructure, including roads, wa­ their local resources remains. The definition
ter supply and landfill sites. of decentralization under the law of 1996 in
Gabon provides for supervision of the use of
Gabon the resources by the central government (Ikog­
Financial resources of local governments in hou-Mensah, 2012).
Gabon are divided into two parts: regular re­
sources and extraordinary resources. Regular Democratic Republic of Congo
resources include own resources, e.g. trans­ The transition from a largely deconcentra­
port activities; rental equipment and spaces; ted structure to a system of decentralization
sand mining; local taxes and duties, including in DRC is mandated by the 2006 constitution,
taxes on hotel accommodations; and taxes on however, it lacks clarity on fiscal decentraliza­
revenues. These common resources also in­ tion. There has been a sizeable increase in re­
clude the general operating grant allocated by source transfer to subnational governments.
the state, covering commercial land sales and Accordingly, fiscal decentralization may gen­
a municipal tax on tobacco. This allocation is erate large vertical as well as horizontal imbal­

28 Localizing the 2030 Agenda and the SDGs: Strengthening Local Government Action in Central Africa
ances, and entails significant macrofiscal risk. ferent government levels nor does it provide
Fiscal decentralization in DRC has been viewed clarity on the methodology, including the
as a way to hold a vast and diverse country definition of the tax base, for calculating the
together following a long civil war. According 40 percent of revenues to be transferred to the
to the existing organic public finance law, four provinces. The constitution also lacks clarity
categories of local governments, called Entités on expenditure assignments across govern­
Administratives Décentralisées (EADs), maintain ment levels, thereby increasing the risk of a
a separate legal personality, have their own duplication of responsibilities and unfunded
budgets, and have the right to raise local taxes. mandates in areas with competing legal com­
Local authority decisions were subject to pro­ petence.
vincial-level control and their budgets had to
be approved by the Interior Ministry (for the Three laws promulgated in 2008 contribute
provinces) or by the governor (for other EADs). little to clarifying the fiscal relations between
the central and the provincial governments.
The transfer system was de facto based on They specify the legislative powers and the
largely arbitrary revenue sharing. Revenue organization and functioning of public ad­
transfers from the central government to prov­ ministration at the level of the provinces and
inces were supposed to be calculated based the local authorities. However, they leave the
on the amount of central government taxes methodology for implementing the consti­
and duties collected in the provinces by the tutionally mandated revenue-sharing mech­
three revenue collection agencies, and were anism undefined; and instead of providing
to be paid into the provinces’ accounts at the for a more precise delineation of expenditure
central bank. Since 1998, transfers have been assignments in areas with competing compe­
officially set at 20 percent of revenues collect­ tencies, these laws repeat the definitions in
ed in the provinces, out of which 15 percent the constitution.
were supposed to be transferred automatically
by the central bank to the provinces. However, Fiscal aspects of the decentralization process
actual revenue transfers were 6.4 percent and are regulated in the law of public finance pub­
6.5 percent of total domestic revenue in 2006 lished in July 2011. Several texts on public fi­
and 2007, respectively. Moreover, there were nances with a direct impact on the provinces
important differences in the distribution of were enacted recently: general regulation of
transfers between provinces. The three richest public accounting; regulation of accounting
provinces (Kinshasa, Katanga, and Bas-Congo), administration; statutory law on public ser­
which together account for 76 percent of total vices; organic law on the organization and
domestic revenues, benefited from the highest operation of services of provinces; organic law
absolute transfers, albeit being affected by the determining the boundaries of the new prov­
largest shortfall with respect to the 15/20-per­ inces and those of the city of Kinshasa; and the
cent rule (IMF, 2009). act on the status of traditional leaders and their
place in the current configuration of territorial
The new constitution stipulates that 40 per­ governance. An organic law establishing the
cent of “national revenues” collected in each organization and functioning of the National
province will be devolved to them. However, Equalization Fund is currently under analysis at
the legal framework has not yet assigned re­ the parliament.
sponsibilities for revenue collection to the dif­

Chapter 2: Financing and delivering services 29


2.1.3 Fiscal equalization tively defined criteria. However, there is a high
level of central government discretion, mainly
Systems for equalizing the financial situation political, in the final decision for the transfer of
of local authorities are emerging in the region funds to the local governments. Political con­
of Central Africa. Currently, examples of instru­ siderations and mismanagement dominate
ments being envisaged for the purposes of this the financial equalization system in Cameroon,
equalization include the Regional Forest Tax in which otherwise could be considered as the
Cameroon, forest and mining taxes in the Cen­ only Central African country to have a func­
tral African Republic, and the Caisse Nationale tional specific tax for equalization purposes
de Péréquation (National Equalization Fund) in among local governments.
the Democratic Republic of Congo. In DRC, 10
percent of national revenues are assigned to Other Central African countries lack specific
an investment fund with equalization purpos­ financial equalization mechanisms. In Equato­
es (Caisse Nationale de Péréquation) in charge rial Guinea and Gabon, funds distributed to all
of reducing the development differential be­ local governments for the implementation of
tween provinces. In Equatorial Guinea, the centrally planned projects can be considered
government pledged 10 percent of oil taxes to as fulfilling the equalization function. However,
a Solidarity Fund for local governments (Reve­ these funds are earmarked mainly for invest­
nue Watch, 2013). ments and for specific use, and local govern­
ments have no discretion in their utilization.
The Regional Forest Tax in Cameroon, which Most of these transfers are allocated by the
can be treated as the most significant equal­ central governments. The 1996 law of Gabon
ization fund in Central Africa, if not the only set up the local equalization fund (FPCL), which
functional equalization fund in the region, provides local governments with resources to
suffers from insufficient funds. There are ob­ meet the tasks assigned to them. This grant
jective criteria set for the allocation of this tax is intended to cover the cost of equipment as
in Cameroon and they are based on quantita­ part of competencies transferred (Sciences-Po

Table 12: Existence of fiscal equalization mechanisms in Central Africa

Countries Fiscal equalization grants given to local governments


Cameroon Regional Forest Tax
Central African Republic Forest and mining taxes
Chad N/A
Congo N/A
Democratic Republic of Congo Caisse Nationale de Péréquation (National Equalization Fund)
Equatorial Guinea Solidarity Fund
Gabon Local equalization fund (FPCL)
São Tomé and Principe No fiscal equalization grants

30 Localizing the 2030 Agenda and the SDGs: Strengthening Local Government Action in Central Africa
Bordeaux, 2013). Due to a lack of objective and largest beneficiaries of funds transferred from
quantitatively defined criteria in distribution the central government, while, at the same
and allocation, these transfers in Equatorial time, there are frequent cases in which smaller
Guinea and Gabon do not constitute a proper local governments receive resources well be­
and functioning equalization system. In DRC, yond their fiscal needs. The system is also not
the planned equalization fund is unable to sufficiently transparent nor based on objective
mitigate horizontal imbalances generated by criteria, as the funds are mostly transferred on
revenue-sharing, as it is limited to investment the basis of the political and personal connec­
financing (IMF, 2009). tions of the mayors or prefects.

The forestry tax (RFA) in Cameroon is fairly 2.1.4 Budgeting and borrowing
centralized, with collection and use deter­
mined by the central government. This has Local governments in Central Africa generally
led to conflicts and tensions between the de­ do not have significant control of their bud­
centralized entities and local communities on gets. Instead, municipal budgets are com­
the one hand, and the logging companies and posed of an administrative budget, and a
the central government on the other. Prior to number of off-budget funds that are referred
1994, very little of the forestry revenue bene­ to as projects or programmes of the central
fited the local communities, which also bore government, implemented locally. In many
the environmental costs of logging and defor­ cases, local governments have no autonomy
estation. The establishment of the RFA as an to prepare and execute their own municipal
equalization grant was a partial response to budgets. For example, the content of the local
these tensions, and stipulated a share to be governments' budget in Cameroon includes:
redistributed to the municipalities and rural fiscal revenues; proceeds from exploitation
villages. Although RFA funds are distributed to of municipal property and services; endow­
subnational entities, the amounts are not very ments and grants; other operating revenues;
predictable and have been changed by the investment revenues; and loans (World Bank,
central government without warning. More­ 2012). However, these local budgets in Cam­
over, the funds are not entirely under the dis­ eroon are often quite unrealistic; the gap be­
cretion of the local and regional governments tween budgeted figures and actual spending
(World Bank, 2012). is enormous. This is a significant problem in the
accountability of local governments in general
In other Central African countries, the methods (World Bank, 2012).
of fund allocation have not removed disparities
among local governments, as allocations pro­ In Gabon, a budget cap is imposed on local
vided from central to local governments are communities: for each year, the maximum
not based on acceptable standards for the pro­ amount is determined by calculating the aver­
vision of public services, nor do they take into age community recoveries made over the pre­
account municipal fiscal capacities. The system vious three years. Local authorities are obliged
of allocating transfers from the central budget to take into account the maximum amounts
to local governments in Central Africa suffers as determined by the central government be­
from a number of deficiencies typical of devel­ cause only it has the power to approve local
oping countries that lack financial equalization budgets.
mechanisms. Large local governments are the

Chapter 2: Financing and delivering services 31


Recently, Central African countries have seen In Gabon, local governments may resort to
the emergence of innovative participatory borrowing as the ability to borrow is granted
budgeting mechanisms, in particular in Cam­ to local authorities by law. It is subject to prior
eroon and DRC. Originating from the Brazilian authorization from councils and in some cases
city of Porto Alegre in 1989, participatory bud­ from the central government. Local authorities
geting (PB) can be broadly defined as the par­ in Gabon are authorized within the limits of
ticipation of citizens in the decision-making their actual debt capacity to borrow from do­
process of budget allocation and in the mon­ mestic and international financial institutions.
itoring of public spending.  Experts estimate However, if they constitute over 30 percent of
that up to 2,500 local governments around the the budget, the loans are subject to the prior
world have implemented PB, from major cities approval of the central government. In other
such as New York, Paris, Seville, and Lima, to words, the state endorses the local authorities
small and medium-sized cities in countries as in their borrowing process (Sciences-Po Bor­
diverse as Poland, South Korea, India, and Ban­ deaux, 2013).
gladesh. Participatory budgeting has been
shown to deliver significant impacts, including 2.2 Delivering local services
an increase in tax collection (see for example
Beuermann and Amelina, 2011), as citizens are Providing inclusive and quality services is cen­
more willing to pay taxes when they perceive tral to achieving the SDGs and is a major chal­
that their preferences are properly taken into lenge for the Central Africa region. The provi­
account by public institutions, and when there sion of services at the local level is particularly
is an increase in the level of “pro-poor” spend­ relevant to SDGs 1 (no poverty); 2 (zero hun­
ing (Touchton and Wampler, 2013). In Camer­ ger); 3 (good health and well-being); 4 (quality
oon, participatory budgeting was launched in education); 5 (gender equality); 6 (clean water
Yaoundé in 2012, on 10–15 percent of the mu­ and sanitation); 11 (sustainable cities and com­
nicipal budget, and has been met with consid­ munities); 14 (life below water); and 15 (life on
erable enthusiasm.15 land).

Municipal borrowing is very limited in Central Central African states made some progress to­
Africa. Borrowing in general is limited to the wards achieving the MDGs, such as in the fight
funds of the general budget of Central African against non-communicable diseases, universal
countries and to their domestic market. For primary education, improving maternal health
example, the decentralization law in DRC re­ and reducing child mortality. However, the
quires the Interior Ministry to authorize all sub­ MDGs were largely not achieved in the region
national borrowing operations, but does not and the eradication of poverty, promotion of
specify the criteria to implement control on gender equality, and environmental sustain­
subnational borrowing (IMF, 2009). Borrowing ability remain key development challenges.
by local authorities in Congo is only possible Tens of millions of citizens in Central Africa live
with the prior approval of the supervisory au­ below the poverty line, in both rural and urban
thority, which is the representative of the cen­ areas. The net primary school enrolment rate is
tral government in the local area (Préfet). low in CAR, Chad and Equatorial Guinea. Wom­

15 A detailed description of the Yaoundé participatory budgeting experience is provided in the Africa Research Institute report: ‘The
Booklovers, The Mayors and the Citizens: Participatory Budgeting in Yaoundé, Cameroon’ available at: http://www.africaresearchinstitute.
org/newsite/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/ARI-Cameroon-Paper-online.pdf.

32 Localizing the 2030 Agenda and the SDGs: Strengthening Local Government Action in Central Africa
en are generally excluded from political and countability. Monitoring refers to the system­
economic life, while infant mortality remains atic collection of data on specified targets to
high in CAR and Chad, and maternal mortality measure progress, and evaluation is based on
is very high in Cameroon, CAR, Chad and Con­ the collected data to inform implementation
go. Three of the eight countries have a high HIV and assess results in terms of SDGs implemen­
incidence rate. Access to drinking water is lim­ tation, with consideration for relevance, effec­
ited and the coverage of wastewater treatment tiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainabil­
and sanitation remains very low. Several coun­ ity.16 SDG 17 (partnerships for the goals) also
tries have a high to very high proportion of highlights the importance of M&E systems,
urban population living in slums (the highest and states as a target (17.9) the intention to by
rate is in CAR, with 95.9 percent of the urban 2030 “build on existing initiatives to develop
population in these conditions). measurements of progress on sustainable de­
velopment that complement gross domestic
Based on lessons learned and in order to sup­ product, and support statistical capacity-build­
port the implementation of the SDGs at the lo­ ing in developing countries”.17
cal level through the provision of inclusive ac­
cess to basic services, governments across the Evidence suggests that decentralization of au­
Central African region are engaged in efforts to thorities and resources to local governments
devolve power and resources to local bodies, has increased access to affordable public
which are increasingly assuming responsibility services and this has contributed to achiev­
for managing the delivery of health, education ing part of the MDGs, such as the increase of
and other essential services, such as sanitation access to clean water and reduction of infant
and water, to the populace. Decentralized ser­ mortality. The transfer of resources and author­
vice delivery is now seen as a key determinant ity from central to local governments has been
of the scope for Central African countries to associated with positive impacts, however, it is
achieve the SDGs, since many of these goals often difficult to link these improvements sole­
are premised on outcomes that are increas­ ly to decentralization processes. In most cases,
ingly within the realm of responsibility of local in Central Africa the quality of public services
governments. Most efforts to promote decen­ has in principle either remained unchanged or
tralization are based on the assumption that has improved, but it is difficult to attribute this
local governments will be more responsive to solely to decentralization. Nevertheless, the
the needs of the citizens and take their prefer­ evidence collated and reviewed in this report
ences into account in determining the type of suggests that decentralized service delivery
services to be provided, the level of resources has started to improve people’s access to and
required, and the optimal means of ensuring the quality of services provided in the region.
effective delivery.
Service examples
Importantly, SDGs localization will entail plan­
ning and delivering services, as well as estab­ Education
lishing adequate monitoring and evaluation Overall, there have been improvements in edu­
(M&E) systems to track progress and ensure ac­ cational achievements in Central African states,

16 The OECD framework for evaluating development interventions is a useful evaluation framework; more information is available at:
http://www.oecd.org/dac/evaluation/daccriteriaforevaluatingdevelopmentassistance.htm.
17 SDGs goals and targets can be found online at: https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/sdgs.

Chapter 2: Financing and delivering services 33


and this progress has coincided with the ongo­ regions there have been declining indicators –
ing decentralization process in the region. De­ especially in Yaoundé – for access to drinking
spite this improvement, significant disparities water, clean toilets, and an increase in infant
remain among social groups in terms of en­ mortality. For indicators such as child mortality
rolment and completion of schooling. Urban/ and life expectancy at birth, Cameroon does
rural and boys/girls differences persist. Consid­ worse than the average for sub-Saharan Africa
erable success has been achieved with specific (World Bank, 2012). In Equatorial Guinea, there
education initiatives, however, significant inef­ is a lack of primary healthcare with a preven­
ficiencies arise from the unclear demarcation tive approach at the municipal level and a lack
of responsibilities between local and central of a social protection system extending to all
governments. In the education sector there groups of the population for access to care in
are also marked disparities in the availability of health centres and hospitals.
resources for service provision between differ­
ent localities. Increased funds that have been In many cases, local governments are unable
made available to finance school infrastructure to fulfil their healthcare provision responsibili­
through local governments have led in most ties due to the absence of adequate resources.
cases to positive results. Positive health outcomes in the context of de­
centralization have been seen in cases where,
Health for example as in São Tomé and Principe, there
Unlike the education sector, health indicators have been accompanying reforms in healthcare
in Central Africa are of concern. The Central funding. In the case of decentralization of public
African Republic remains one of the countries service delivery in primary healthcare accompa­
where the mortality rate of children under age nied with appropriate funding flows, there has
five is highest. The country now ranks ninth been a positive correlation with the reduction
among the world’s 24 most AIDS-affected in child mortality. However, health services in
countries and is the leading country in this re­ Central Africa are generally under the jurisdic­
gard in Central Africa. In DRC, infant and child tion of central governments and local councils
mortality levels are very high. In Gabon, mater­ have limited influence over the use of resourc­
nal mortality remains high. In Cameroon, of a es or deployment of personnel. In addition,
thousand children born alive, more than a hun­ local councils have limited discretion over the
dred die before the age of five (UNDP, 2010). In use of resources for developmental purposes,
Cameroon, local governments are responsible which are largely earmarked for schemes and
for health services, however, their effectiveness programmes determined by state and central
is often hindered by national sector-based pol­ governments. It is only in Cameroon that de­
icies that tend to privilege deconcentrated lo­ centralization of expenditure for basic services
cal authorities rather than decentralized local has taken place on a significant scale, by placing
government units (UCLG, 2008). substantial untied funds at the discretion of lo­
cal councils for developmental purposes.
It is striking that the quality of key services
has declined in Douala and Yaoundé; particu­ 2.3 Special feature:
larly striking is the increase in poverty in the Natural resources management
North, Far North, and East, as well as declining
access to clean toilets, drinking water, and an There is increasing pressure for recognizing
increase in child mortality. Even in the richest the right of subnational governments to claim

34 Localizing the 2030 Agenda and the SDGs: Strengthening Local Government Action in Central Africa
economic rents from their natural resources. accounts for approximately 7 percent of GDP;
Rents from natural resources can form an im­ rough diamond and timber are the country's
portant share of subnational budgets in coun­ leading export products. Oil provides a major
tries where such resources are in abundance. share of government revenues and exports,
Minerals, petroleum, forests, hydropower ener­ and has supplanted forestry as the mainstay of
gy, and fisheries are the main types of natural the economy. Congo also has gold and other
resources that generate revenue for local gov­ mineral resources, while Gabon’s mineral in­
ernments. Other assets, such as cultural her­ dustry is dominated by the production of man­
itage and natural attractions, may be treated ganese and petroleum. In 2010, Gabon ranked
akin to natural resources, and also have poten­ 4th among the world’s leading producers of
tial for generating revenue. The SDGs give due manganese, accounting for approximately 11
attention to natural resource management percent of world production. Crude petroleum
through SDGs 14 (life below water) and 15 (life production accounted for approximately 75
on land). percent of the country’s total exports, 60 per­
cent of government revenue, and 40 percent
Central Africa is home to significant oil reserves of the country’s GDP (EITI, 2013).
as well as mineral resources, and to the world’s
second most important forest ecosystem af­ The sharing of revenue from natural resources
ter Amazonia. Thus, it is important to consider among levels of government is a crucial issue
the management of natural resources in the for decentralized systems in the natural-re­
framework of decentralization as some Central source-rich countries of Central Africa. Not
African countries have an abundance of natu­ properly addressing this point of contention in
ral resources: oil and gas in Cameroon, Chad, the past has contributed to rivalries between
Equatorial Guinea, Gabon and São Tomé and the constituent units of almost all Central Af­
Principe; forests in Cameroon and the Central rican countries and has put a great strain on
African Republic; and mines as well as minerals discussions about devolving power to local
in Cameroon, Chad, Central African Republic, governments, as well as playing a role in exac­
Congo and the Democratic Republic of Congo. erbating tensions in fragile and conflict-prone
areas.
The oil industry contributes 50 percent of ex­
port earnings in Cameroon, while sales of oil Another issue is the potential sustainability
account for around 80 percent of Chad’s rev­ challenges of over-reliance on a single source
enue. Cobalt reserves in DRC account for ap­ of revenue that natural-resource-dependent
proximately 47 percent of the world’s supply economies can face. For example, in Equatori­
and the mining and mineral processing sector al Guinea, the oil and gas industry is the main
accounted for an estimated 13.4 percent of the contributor to the country’s revenue and also
country’s GDP in 2009. São Tomé and Principe supports many local development initiatives.
has started to exploit oil in recently discovered These contributions are made directly through
fields and companies are expected to pay sig­ the oil companies’ contribution to state reve­
nificant “signature bonuses”. In 2010, the Cen­ nues, and through direct investment in com­
tral African Republic was ranked 14th among munities, such as schools, hospitals, water
the world’s leading producers of rough dia­ facilities, parks and playgrounds; skills-build­
monds by volume, and 12th by value. The coun­ ing initiatives are financed by oil companies
try also produces gold and the mining sector through corporate social responsibility. Cur­

Chapter 2: Financing and delivering services 35


PHOTO : UN PHOTO/SYLVAIN LIECHTI/DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

rently some initiatives are being discussed Case study 1: Forestry management in
with the UN, notably a US$6 million grant al­ Cameroon
located to UNFPA by Nobel Energy to finance
a maternal health programme. In terms of po­ The process of forest management decentral­
tential challenges, the long-term sustainability ization in Cameroon is considered a pioneer­
of these programmes is questionable as Equa­ ing experiment in the Central Africa region
torial Guinea’s economic structure is heavily (Nguinguiri, 1997). The forestry sector in Cam­
dependent on the oil industry, and shocks in eroon has experienced numerous disturbanc­
this sector directly affect the economy and the es, including challenges to the monopolistic
corporate sector’s ability to continue to finance form of management implemented by the
development initiatives. This has already been state. In these unsettled circumstances, many
demonstrated with the recent falls in oil price, occasionally violent conflicts broke out be­
which have driven the country into an unprec­ tween logging companies, generally backed
edented recession and many projects have ei­ by the state, and local communities (Oyono,
ther slowed or stopped. 2003a). The latter rose up to challenge the mo­
nopoly of the state over the forests and they
The two case studies that follow illustrate the demanded direct access to the financial ben­
opportunities and challenges of managing efits of commercial logging. Conflicts between
natural resources in the context of strengthen­ local communities and logging companies are
ing local governments. The case studies, which nothing new, but since the 1990s the climate
cover forestry management in Cameroon and has been nourished by the “winds of free­
mining and minerals in DRC, describe the ram­ dom” generated by democracy and the feeling
ifications for local government finances and amongst local communities that it was time to
service delivery of natural resource manage­ claim their rights over forests. Other than the
ment. democratization of political life, through the
introduction of political pluralism in 1990, and
economic liberalization, three developments
were important in establishing the relation­

36 Localizing the 2030 Agenda and the SDGs: Strengthening Local Government Action in Central Africa
ship between policy change in general and the est is a forest classified for use by a local gov­
decentralization of forest management: i) the ernment, a “commune”, or planted by that local
law on freedom of association, promulgated in government.
December 1990; ii) the reform of the Forestry
Code in 1994; and iii) the 1996 constitutional The establishment of Community Forests is the
revision. There were also progressive rewrit­ second aspect of the decentralization of forest
ings of the forestry taxation system (Bigombe, management in Cameroon. This innovation is
2003) for which the fundamental provisions aimed at giving village communities respon­
were laid down in the 1994/95 forestry reform. sibilities and powers for the management of
their forests and any financial benefits accrued.
Cameroon’s forestry code divides the country’s A Community Forest is a forest in the state’s
forests into two types: i) the “permanent forest non-permanent estate, subject to a “manage­
estate” that includes protected areas, Council ment agreement”, signed between the village
Forests, and areas allocated to concessionaires community concerned and the forestry admin­
for commercial logging; and ii) the “non-per­ istration. The forestry legislation specifies that
manent forest estate”, which describes forests this is “a contract whereby the Administration
that can be used either for purposes other than entrusts part of the national estate with a view
protection/conservation, or for commercial to its management, conservation and use for
exploitation, such as farming and small-scale the benefit of the community” (Article 3 of the
logging. Cameroon has transferred powers to implementing Decree). The income generated
peripheral actors (Council Forests and Com­ by marketing the lumber from Community For­
munity [or Village] Forests) for the manage­ ests must be invested in village-level projects
ment of forestry fees. The law on freedom of for social and economic development. There
association allowed social actors in rural Cam­ are dozens of Community Forests currently
eroon, long excluded from public life, to orga­ being exploited and managed in the country,
nize themselves in “common initiative groups” with hundreds of applications for Community
(Oyono, 2004). Forests having been submitted to the Ministry
of Environment and Forests by village commu­
The forestry reform launched in Cameroon in nities over the last few years.
1994, considered by the World Bank as a “labo­
ratory” of innovation in Central Africa (Karsen­ The decentralized forestry taxation system,
ty, 2002), was a landmark in the decentraliza­ the third major component of the new forest
tion of the management of Cameroon’s forests. policy, has resulted in innovative strategies for
After decades of state monopoly, the 1994 re­ the allocation of a share of forestry revenue to
vision of the forestry code opened the way for local communities. Prior to 1994, the village
the institutionalization of local management communities benefited only from the con­
on the one hand, and access for village com­ struction of social and economic infrastruc­
munities to greater income from the commer­ ture, which was included in the logging com­
cial logging of their forests on the other. The panies’ specifications. The new system for the
first innovation brought by the reforms was redistribution of forestry income, established
the transfer to local authorities – specifical­ since 1994, is based on two principles: 1) the
ly, the rural local governments – of powers to payment of forestry fees, by a company log­
establish and manage Council Forests. Under ging a given concession, to the local commu­
Cameroon’s forestry legislation, a Council For­ nities (10 percent of the total amount), to the

Chapter 2: Financing and delivering services 37


relevant rural local government (40 percent), to the central level, from where FEICOM is man­
and to the central state (50 percent); and 2) the aged. The establishment of this equalization
allocation of a “village tax”, in fact an “eco-tax”, fund was provided for in the 2000/01 finance
to the village communities bordering small law. The aim of the fund is to extend distribu­
forest concessions. tion of forestry revenue throughout the coun­
try, and no longer only in areas with forestry
Between 1994 and 1998, 10 percent of the to­ concessions, as was previously the case.
tal sum allocated to each local government was
duly transferred to the village communities con­ Case study 2: The management of mines
cerned. Originally intended to promote local and minerals in DRC
development, these royalties, like the “village
tax”, were to a large extent allocated to consum­ The mining sector in DRC is a key driver of the
ables since the village communities considered country’s economy, contributing to employ­
that “it was now their turn to drink and eat with ment, fiscal revenues, and secondary econo­
the money from their forests” (Oyono and Tem­ mies. Though DRC is endowed with one of the
ple, 2003). In 1998, the Ministry of Economy and richest natural mineral resources in the world,
Finance and the Ministry of Territorial Admin­ its population subsists on an estimated GDP
istration published a joint order laying down (PPP) of US$ 700 per year. The trade of miner­
the terms for the use of revenue from logging. als in DRC begins in remote mining sites of the
The order states, primarily, that the 10 percent eastern part of the country in Ituri, Kasai Orien­
previously directly transferred to the villages tal, Maniema, (Northern) Katanga, North Kivu,
would henceforth be managed by the local Orientale, and South Kivu, from where the min­
government, at the regional level. However, as erals are often first transported by foot, then
described by Bigombe (2003), once these funds by car or truck and finally by plane to the main
were paid out at the regional level, they often export centres, such as Goma. From there, they
ended up being used for questionable purpos­ are exported throughout eastern Africa.
es. Many socio-economic village-level projects
planned were not funded and the money tend­ Gold is the primary export mineral. While gold
ed to end up unaccounted for. Equally, Kouna is of significantly higher value and is also the
(2001) reports on the proliferation of fictional principal rebel-traded mineral, it is estimated
projects, the funding for which was released that as much as 95 percent of Eastern DRC’s
but then misappropriated by the municipal and gold production is traded informally. The pro­
administrative authorities. duction of gold as well as other minerals and
precious stones in Eastern DRC is exclusively
As the situation led to anomalies, the central artisanal or from subsistence mines. A World
government established a “central equalization Bank report suggested that up to one fifth of
fund” from the forestry fees, the Fonds d’Equi- the population of DRC is dependent on artis­
pement et d’Intervention Communale (FEICOM), anal mining (World Bank, 2008). The fiscal con­
a state fund placed under the supervision of tribution of the trade in minerals from Eastern
the Ministry of Territorial Administration and DRC has increased over time but remains low,
Decentralization. In practice, this means that with tax revenues from the trade accruing to
the 10 percent of forestry fees allocated to the US$4 million in 2008 (Garrett and Mitchell,
village communities and the 40 per cent allo­ 2009). Analysis of the returns to individual
cated to local governments are now transferred workers for different mining value chains has

38 Localizing the 2030 Agenda and the SDGs: Strengthening Local Government Action in Central Africa
shown that earnings are extremely low, but tax payments and export charges. The Mining
in comparison with other options available in Code sets out separate payment regimes for
the country, they appear to offer a good cash artisanal mining and for small-scale mining.
return – up to US$ 10 or more per day for the Small-scale mining is subject to a flat tax rate
actual miners. of 10 percent of turnover and this flat rate ex­
empts small-scale operations from the pay­
Only a relatively small percentage of the finan­ ment of mining royalties, taxes on movables,
cial benefits of natural-resource exploitation taxes on profits, the exceptional tax on expatri­
return to the communities living and working ates’ remuneration, and domestic turnover tax.
at the resource-extraction sites. There is a real
opportunity to constructively engage with The principal objection to tax payments voiced
the trade in minerals to assist with positive by miners is that there would not be any rev­
decentralization reform. The cost of failure or enue streams flowing back to their mining
the wrong approach should not be underes­ community. The revenue collection capacities
timated; with up to one million people in the of the provincial authorities remain low and it
region dependent on the trade for their liveli­ therefore remains to be seen whether politi­
hood, the minerals trade represents the single cal decentralization, as stipulated in the DRC’s
biggest opportunity for poverty reduction and new constitution, will be a success. Political de­
development in the region (Mitchell and Gar­ centralization will entail fiscal decentralization,
rett, 2009). with 40 percent of all collected revenue ear­
marked to flow back to provincial administra­
A large statistical anomaly suggests a gap in tions, meaning that the different provinces will
the amounts of taxes actually received and the be confronted by a sudden increase in fiscal
amounts that should be received. The DRC’s revenue. At the local level, the largest part of
Mining Code, adopted in 2002, and its accom­ taxes and licences outlined in the Mining Code
panying Mining Regulations, including the is not collected because the Mining Code, as
Code de Conduite de l’Exploitant Artisanal ad­ statutory law, is currently not enforced. The
opted in 2003, provide the legal basis for min­ majority of miners are not aware of it and, at
ing. The Mining Code aims to ensure the devel­ least for the miners, the provisions of the Min­
opment of the DRC’s mineral resources, largely ing Code are completely inappropriate in light
through the private sector. The code makes of their meagre income and the remoteness
provisions for artisanal mining zones: artisanal of their workplaces. Instead, taxes and profits
miners have the right to exploit these special­ continue to be collected by customary and
ly designated areas on a renewable one-year traditional authorities, such as landowners and
basis, through an Artisanal Exploitation Card. traditional chiefs, as well as unsavoury, exploit­
The establishment, authorization and closure ative elements, such as mafia networks and
of artisanal mining zones are subject to an or­ armed groups and those who control mafia
der from the Ministry of Mines. In cases where networks and armed groups (EITI, 2007; EITI,
artisanal miners intend to upgrade to small- 2009).
scale mining, priority in title allocation is grant­
ed to residents of mining communities. The Neither the central government nor provincial
Mining Code and the accompanying Mining authorities publish data on subnational reve­
Regulations define what the minerals sector is nue transfers. According to the Constitution,
obliged to pay the government in licence fees, 40 percent of all taxes from the mining sector

Chapter 2: Financing and delivering services 39


are to be collected directly by the provinces er, as this has not been the subject of empirical
where extraction takes place. However, this studies in the region. Yet decentralization has
contradicts the Mining Code, which states that clearly contributed to improved participation
the central government is to collect all taxes and accountability, which in turn has indirect­
and then transfer a percentage to provinces. In ly led to improved service delivery outcomes.
practice, revenues are centralized before being There has been a major shift in responsibility
shared and, according to provincial tax agen­ from centralized government-only provision,
cies, only 10 percent of the funds are effective­ to the present-day situation in which state and
ly transferred (Revenue Watch, 2013). municipal governments share responsibility
with central government for providing the ser­
2.4 Key findings and vices in health, education and social infrastruc­
recommendations ture.

This brief review of the experience of local gov­ These insights tend to give rise to two types of
ernment financing and service delivery in Cen­ policy prescription, which may be closely com­
tral Africa leads to the following key findings patible with the current phase of decentraliza­
related to SDGs localization. First, improved tion in Central Africa: 1) services such as educa­
outcomes from decentralization have general­ tion, health and water are better administered
ly been realised for local citizens, particularly in by local authorities, and expanding the finan­
the education sector. However, outcomes have cial resources and autonomy in managing the
not been as encouraging in the health sector. resources can improve quality and efficiency of
Second, the quality of public service provision services provided; and 2) successful local ser­
has in some places improved as a result of the vice delivery is premised on participation and
allocation of funds at the local level for local accountability, as well as having the appropri­
service delivery purposes. Gains have been ate financial resources.
realised, usually as a result of the delegation
of financial responsibility for service provision In view of these findings, this report suggests
from central to local governments, though that the key enabling condition to strengthen
resources have often not been adequate to local governments in this area is to ensure that
ensure effective coverage and quality. The systems are put in place for adequate funding
availability of financial resources is a critical de­ of local government mandates and that inclu­
terminant of the equity, quality and efficiency sive service delivery is provided to promote
of public services, and the inadequacy of finan­ SDGs localization, in particular for SDGs 1, 2, 3,
cial resources often contributes to poor service 4, 5, 6, 11, 14, 15 and 17. The following recom­
delivery outcomes. mendations are formulated with these objec­
tives in mind.
Although decentralization is still in its infancy
in Central Africa, there is some evidence to sug­ Recommendation 2.1: Adopt a phased-
gest that the quality of services has improved, in approach to transferring resources to
and that there has been improved targeting local governments
and delivery, particularly in the education sec­ In Central Africa, the fiscal and service delivery
tor. However, it is difficult to establish a causal responsibilities of local governments should
link between better local service outcomes on be transferred gradually. There should be a
the one hand, and decentralization on the oth­ phased-in approach over a number of years,

40 Localizing the 2030 Agenda and the SDGs: Strengthening Local Government Action in Central Africa
with local governments initially assuming sec­ local government competencies. For example,
toral responsibility for the operation and main­ a block grant is used for payment of salaries; an
tenance of infrastructure, and later for finances earmarked grant is for financing a special activ­
and service delivery. The general principle for ity; a capital grant is for financing investment
the phased decentralization process is a gradu­ projects; and a grant for delegated competen­
al shifting of responsibilities in line with greater cy is used to finance a delegated competency
demonstrated capacity of local governments. of a mayor’s central state-management func­
In phase two, the local governments assume a tions.
larger financial role in managing the devolved
competencies. To enhance local government effectiveness,
the grant system should be geared towards
For a local government to progress to the next giving increasing predictability and respon­
phase, it will need to fulfil relevant conditions. sibility to local governments. The transfers
Local governments can be set up to have suf­ should be based on an objective formula with
ficient human resources in the fields of tax transparent criteria and be increasingly provid­
calculation and collection; have an adequate ed as unconditional grants, to allow local gov­
staff capacity for financial management; adopt ernments to allocate resources to sectors most
participatory governance mechanisms, such as needed in their locality. Good results have
participatory budgeting; show good financial been achieved in cases where these grants are
results; inform the ministries in charge of state tied to set performance metrics where local
finances of the good results in a timely man­ governments need to demonstrate basic good
ner; and have no significant arrears to suppli­ management and then compete to increase
ers or creditors exceeding the ordinary terms their performance to access additional grant
of payment. The fulfilment of each criterion resources.18
would be assessed and would gradually quali­
fy local governments to gain increased respon­ Recommendation 2.3: Design
sibilities and resources to be assigned by the equalization mechanisms to correct
central government. vertical and horizontal imbalances in
the region’s intergovernmental fiscal
Recommendation 2.2: Establish frameworks
transparent and predictable grant Intergovernmental transfers generally are
systems to transfer financial resources to used to moderate horizontal imbalances with­
local governments in each government level. Some local govern­
The system of decentralization encompasses ments may generate high levels of revenue
the transfer of various types of grants, includ­ while others can hardly pay their own essential
ing grants for delegated competencies, ear­ administrative costs. General intergovernmen­
marked grants, capital grants, and block grants tal grant transfers may not address differences
to fund education, health, welfare, water, sani­ in own-source revenue capacity; it is therefore
tation, fire protection, sports and cultural insti­ recognized that revenue disparities should
tutions, and for other sectors devolved to local be addressed through the designation of for­
governments. Grants are instruments used by mula-based equalization grants to tackle the
the central government to provide additional differences in revenue capacities among local
revenue to ensure the smooth performance of governments. In light of these revenue dispar­
18 UNCDF (2010a). Performance-Based Grant Systems, Concept and International Experiences.

Chapter 2: Financing and delivering services 41


ities, equalization grants would ensure that an management schemes and partnerships with
increase in the flow of funds would be more informal producers and dwellers can improve
pronounced for local governments with a be­ conditions in many local governments. Estab­
low-average level of revenue base. lishing platforms for mobilizing local gover­
nance actors (farmers, entrepreneurs and civil
In a decentralized framework, there may be society groups) can result in increased devel­
insufficient federal/central funds for proper opment results. In cases where local govern­
equalization to mitigate inter-regional in­ ment resources are insufficient to cover even
equalities. The equalization instrument can be basic needs, community-based organizations
designed from the revenue that is transferred and village associations can be mobilized to
from the yield of natural-resource taxes, Value play a key role in supporting the provision of
Added Tax, Personal Income Tax, or from cor­ important community infrastructure services.
porate taxes. Also, specifically for the purposes Networking outside local government with
of equalization, special funds such as the Sol­ public and private actors to arrange funding
idarity Fund or Joint Fund can be established can help to meet community needs. PPPs, es­
and financed by various tax revenues. Block pecially the Build, Operate and Transfer (BOT)
grants can also be considered as instruments principle, should also be considered as service
for the equalization of the financial situation of delivery options. But local governments need
local governments. Regarding the distribution to have strong oversight ability and capacity
of equalization transfers, the system should be to negotiate effectively for fair and transparent
objective and transparent, i.e. using a formu­ contracts.
la to determine the funds to be received by
each local government. Furthermore, the total The necessary information on practices, tools
transfer amount should be defined in advance, and approaches for the diverse service-deliv­
to avoid ad-hoc decisions that might jeopar­ ery modalities at the local level should be cap­
dize overall fiscal discipline and to allow suffi­ tured in practical how-to guides for the various
cient time for local development planning and inclusive service-delivery options in the differ­
budgeting processes. ent countries. This can promote the adoption
of participatory governance mechanisms, such
Recommendation 2.4: Develop multi- as participatory budgeting, which has shown
stakeholder “inclusive service delivery” good results in the region. This would help
practical toolkits to be distributed among to identify and promote more diverse and re­
local authorities sponsive forms of local service delivery that
In order to promote SDGs localization and promote gender equality, which will be key to
achieve inclusive and universal access to basic achieving the SDGs by 2030 in the region.
public services, such as education and health,
local governments need to play a significant Recommendation 2.5: Establish
role in the effective provision of essential monitoring and evaluation systems of
public services. Local governments have ex­ local government performance and local
perimented with different forms of delivery development
for public services, including public–private Like any other change process, implementa­
and community partnerships through coop­ tion of decentralization and promotion of local
eration with civil society organizations. Pub­ development requires continuous monitoring
lic–private partnerships (PPPs), community and evaluation. It is important to develop and

42 Localizing the 2030 Agenda and the SDGs: Strengthening Local Government Action in Central Africa
implement M&E mechanisms and indicators 2.4.1 Fragile and conflict-affected
in order to follow the impacts of decentraliza­ states
tion, local development and service delivery
with disaggregated data collection activities, FCAS Recommendation 2.1: Involve
including as related to SDGs targets at the lo­ local governments in transitional service
cal level. These will inform progress made on delivery frameworks, as appropriate
achieving SDGs and be a key input to inform­ In fragile and conflict-affected settings, af­
ing the financing and delivery of services at ter service delivery mechanisms have either
the local level, as well as the broader policy di­ partially or completely broken down, service
alogue discussed in Chapter 1. delivery often urgently needs to be reinstat­
ed through transitional frameworks. Local
Recommendation 2.6: Establish clear governments can significantly contribute to
and transparent mechanisms for sharing these transitional frameworks by acting as co­
revenues from natural resources between ordinators, if they have the capacity, or can be
central and subnational levels enabled to do so. They can play an important
Central Africa is home to significant oil re­ interface role between formal and informal
serves, as well as mineral resources, and to the networks and different levels of government
world’s second most important forest ecosys­ and agencies. This can be operationalized
tem after Amazonia. Thus, it is important to through the establishment of local service de­
consider the management of natural resources livery coordination platforms.
in the framework of the decentralization pro­
cess as some Central African countries have an FCAS Recommendation 2.2: Support
abundance of natural resources, including oil local finances and strengthen financial
and gas in Cameroon, Chad, Equatorial Guin­ integrity and anti-corruption measures at
ea, Gabon and São Tomé and Principe; forests the local government level
in Cameroon and Central African Republic; Without strengthened local finances, the
and mines as well as minerals in Cameroon, UNDP Guide to Local Governance in Fragile
Chad, Central African Republic, Congo and the and Conflict-Affected Settings notes that the
Democratic Republic of Congo. The sharing of capacity of local governments and local ac­
revenue from natural resources among levels tors to produce peace dividends and restore
of government is a crucial issue for decentral­ confidence in a sustainable manner is serious­
ized systems in natural-resource-rich countries ly compromised.19 Local governments can be
of Central Africa. Due to this issue not being empowered to carry out specific conflict-miti­
properly addressed in the past, it fed rivalries gation or resolution activities through capaci­
between the constituent units of almost every ty and grant mechanisms focusing on women’s
Central African country and put a great strain empowerment, peacebuilding, and restoration
on the discussions on devolving power to local of economic activities. Accompanying grants
governments. with activities to strengthen local finance over­
sight is critical in fragile and conflict-affected
settings where corruption can be widespread,
especially if war economies prevail.

19 UNDP, 2016. Guide to Local Governance in Fragile and Conflict-Affected Settings.

Chapter 2: Financing and delivering services 43


Chapter 3:
Local economic development

PHOTO: UN PHOTO/SYLVAIN LIECHTI/DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

44 Localizing the 2030 Agenda and the SDGs: Strengthening Local Government Action in Central Africa
E
conomic development is a key pillar of ners in a local area to work together and har­
sustainable local development. Without ness local resources for sustainable economic
consideration of economic opportuni­ growth” (Cardiff Consensus, 2011). LED is a par­
ties and the competitiveness of territories, ticipatory process in which local people from
gains in the provision of social services are all sectors work together to stimulate local
unlikely to be sustainable as sources of funds commercial activity, resulting in a resilient and
for the provision of social services that may sustainable economy. It is a way to help create
not be sustained. Local economic develop­ decent jobs and improve the quality of life for
ment is identified as a key sustainable devel­ everyone, including the poor and marginalized
opment issue through SDGs 1 (no poverty); (UN-Habitat, 2005).
8 (decent work and economic growth); and
9 (industry, innovation and infrastructure). According to Smoke (2003), local govern­
ments can contribute to LED in several ways.
At the local level, local economic development First, local government can provide services
(LED) is a key factor in improving the local econ­ that promote the production and distribution
omy and competitiveness, the rate and quality of inputs for local firms and entrepreneurs.
of employment, and in achieving inclusive and Second, they can contribute to a legal and in­
sustainable economic growth. A sustainable stitutional environment that is conducive for
LED approach goes beyond the economic per­ development. Third, they can help to coordi­
spective because it also strengthens local par­ nate key local public, private and community
ticipation, connecting citizens to improve their actors in creating partnerships that promote
quality of life. LED involves actors from the development. Local governments cannot pro­
state, the private sector and civil society, and vide certain types of large-scale infrastruc­
involves supporting structural development at ture, therefore local economic development
the local level, on methodologies, techniques is also dependent on larger macroeconomic
and skills development. and institutional coordination for aspects over
which local governments have no indepen­
This section looks at LED programmes in the dent control.
eight Central African countries studied, and
gives a review of the current situation and rec­ 3.2 Importance of the role of other
ommendations. The issue of local economic actors in LED
recovery is discussed in the Recommendations
section, through the special considerations for According to UN-Habitat, LED strategies are
fragile and conflict-affected states. only successful when the participants are in­
formed and committed, and where there is a
3.1 The role of local governments practical understanding of the local context.
in LED Other key actors in LED initiatives are the pri­
vate sector, the informal sector and youth.
First, some conceptual definitions are neces­ These are discussed in turn below.
sary to define LED. A first observation is that
LED is not the same as local development or 3.2.1 Private sector
local economy. The Cardiff Consensus for Local
Economic Development defines the term as “a The private sector is a key player in the de­
process which brings together different part­ velopment of successful LED initiatives. For

Chapter 3: Local economic development 45


instance, small and medium-sized enterpris­ Private sector participation and investment
es play a crucial role in this regard, for exam­ can involve both direct and indirect contribu­
ple, through job creation. However, it is im­ tions to LED (Rogerson, 1996) and they tend
portant to stress that the private sector also to focus on commercially active options for
mainly seeks to generate profit in its invest­ investment. In this regard it is also interesting
ments, which differs from the logic of the to mention the role of public–private allianc­
public sector. An emerging area in this space es that are being promoted, specifically in the
is also a more socially-minded private sec­ promotion of service delivery.
tor based on a notion of inclusive business
and social enterprises that can contribute One of the main challenges is how best to in­
to social and environmental goals and often volve the private sector in LED processes. This
deliver public services in relation to health, can partly be addressed through the role of
education, and access to water, sanitation local governments, but often involves broader
and energy. multi-level coordination to ensure adequate
conditions are present to attract the private
Inclusive business is the integration of low-in­ sector, including adequate infrastructure, in­
come people in business value chains. The centives, an enabling environment from a
UNDP report ‘Realizing Africa’s Wealth: Build­ rules-and-regulations point of view, access to
ing Inclusive Businesses for Shared Prosperity’ finance, public–private dialogue platforms,
developed a framework for inclusive business and information on opportunities.
that is based on the “4Is” of Information, Incen­
tives, Implementation support and Investment 3.2.2 Informal sector
as the four Ecosystem Functions that support
businesses that include low-income people in The informal economy has long been seen as
their value chain (UNDP, 2013a). a non-permanent and small sector that was
going to disappear following modernization
Rogerson (1996) studied LED in South Africa and effective industrialization in developing
and identified four key spheres where private countries (ILO 2013; Ojong, 2011). This vision
sector participation and involvement are im­ failed to recognize and understand the impor­
portant: tance and effects of the informal economy on
the overall economy; the informal economy
»» as participant and occasional initiator of lo­ has continued to be substantial and important
cal development processes; for national economies, remaining the main
source of employment in many countries (ILO,
»» as major partner in the development of ac­ 2013) and having a key role to play in LED ini­
tivities for public–private partnerships; tiatives.

»» as lead role player in certain direct initia­ Typical informal sector activities include un­
tives for revitalizing South Africa’s inner ci­ paid work in family-related companies, casual
ties; and wage labour, home-based work, street vend­
ing, own-account workers, domestic workers,
»» as promoter and facilitator of local small rural workers, members of producer’s coopera­
business development. tives, petty trading, informal vending, artisanal
manufacturing and other activities. Informal

46 Localizing the 2030 Agenda and the SDGs: Strengthening Local Government Action in Central Africa
employment is often the largest component Table 13: Breakdown of employment
of the workforce in developing countries and in Cameroon by sector
it accounts for 66 percent of the workforce in
sub-Saharan Africa. This percentage does not Employment sector Percentage
take into account rural work, and thus the pro­ Public sector 4.9
portion between informal and formal employ­
Formal private sector 4.7
ment is likely to be even bigger.
Informal non-farm activities 35.2
Bridging the formal–informal divide is a cen­ Informal agriculture 55.2
tral challenge to developing inclusive busi­
Source: National Institute of Statistics Cameroon, 2010, quoted by
nesses (UNDP, 2013b). In the context of de­ Ojong, 2011
veloping inclusive business value chains, the
informal sector can be brought in by private
sector companies that can opt to purchase From an analytical perspective, the multiple
goods and services from informal enterprises modes of livelihood (MML) approach can serve
operating in low-income communities. Anoth­ as a tool to better understand the dimensions
er option is to support the transition from in­ and role of the informal economy, explaining
formal economic activities to formal inclusive the strategies used by households to deal with
business models. the economic situation. Ojong (2011) stresses
that in several African cities, the inhabitants
The informal sector not only represents a involved in a broad range of economic sectors
source of employment, but also contributes seek multiple sources of income to ensure sur­
to the production of goods and services. Ac­ vival and capital accumulation. For instance,
cording to ILO (2013), the informal sector in part-time formal employees can have part-
sub-Saharan Africa accounts for 50 percent time informal employment; this means that
of the share of non-rural Gross Value Added there is often an “absence of demarcation
(the contribution to the economy of each between the formal and informal economy”
individual producer), as compared to 14 per­ (Ojong, 2011).
cent in Eastern European and Central Asian
countries. 3.2.3 Youth

World Bank data presents vulnerable em­ Youth represents a very important opportunity
ployment as unpaid family workers and and challenge for Central African countries. Af­
own-account workers as a percentage of total rica has the youngest population in the world
employment. Cameroon is the only Central and youth unemployment in Sub-Saharan Af­
African country having data for this indicator; rica, at 12.8 percent, is almost double the rate
in 2010, vulnerable employment in the coun­ of the adult population (UNDP, 2012a). In this
try was 76 percent. Cameroon also presents regard it is important to consider the role of
data on the type of employment according youth when it comes to creating sustainable
to sector, where a high percentage of infor­ LED interventions, given the pressing need to
mal non-agricultural and agricultural activ­ create youth employment opportunities.
ities (90.4 percent combined) is observed, as
shown in Table 13. An ILO report suggests that there is a youth
employment crisis in the region (ILO, 2012).

Chapter 3: Local economic development 47


Youth are employed predominantly in the 3.3 Examples of successful
agricultural sector and in the informal econ­ programmes
omy since opportunities in other sectors
are scarce, and in the case of Central African The Local Economic Development Network of
countries, these are mainly rural. Policy docu­ Africa (LEDNA) considers that the recent rise of
ments such as the African Youth Charter (AU, LED in Africa can be attributed to three factors:
2006) and the Decade Plan of Action for Youth globalization, decentralization and urbaniza­
Development and Empowerment (AU, 2011) tion. Globalization relates to the importance of
at the African Union Summit of Heads of business strategies and the role of the private
States and Governments in Equatorial Guinea sector, while for decentralization there is a win­
in 2011, are examples of how this issue is seen dow of opportunity to develop more inclusive
as a priority. LED projects, and finally urbanization presents
a challenge in some Central African countries
Central African countries’ data on youth em­ in creating sustainable job opportunities.
ployment, labour force participation and un­
employment from six of the eight countries According to the findings of this study, LED ini­
(Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, tiatives in the eight Central African countries
Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo and Ga­ studied vary considerably by size, implemen­
bon) are presented in Table 14. tation modalities and levels of complexity. The
following subsection describes LED projects
Mapping done by ILO on 47 interventions for and programmes already implemented that
youth employment in Africa suggests that for are particularly interesting and can serve not
the Central African countries, there is a need to only as examples for debate about the chal­
ensure better coordination for more effective lenges and bottlenecks, but also as good-prac­
youth employment projects. tice scenarios that can be scaled up and trans­
ferred to other countries.

Table 14: Youth employment indicators in Central Africa

Countries Employment to population Labour force participation rate


ratio ages 15–24, total (%) (% ages 15–24)
F M F M
Cameroon 27.4 42 43.2 60.2
Central African Republic 50 63.6 63.1 77.4
Chad 53.1 45.2 57.6 54.2
Congo 34.9 54.2 47.7 69.1
Democratic Republic of Congo 50.1 71.4 61.8 81.9
Gabon 30.8 37 54.4 66.5
Source: ILO, quoting ILO; Key Indicators of the Labour Market, 6th edition, 2011

48 Localizing the 2030 Agenda and the SDGs: Strengthening Local Government Action in Central Africa
Cameroon programme, among other microfinance
Cameroon has the most LED projects of the projects, suggests that results have been
eight countries in this study. An ILO study good. The EU oriented its support to the
from 2008 shows that Cameroon’s LED programme through capacity-building
projects mainly focus on basic service pro­ components, and Advans Cameroun re­
visions and rural community development ceived training by Horus International, a
(ILO, 2008). In the economic development development finance company working
area, local government entities promote also in Congo, DRC and Chad.
small and medium-sized industries, crafts,
agriculture and fishing. Local authorities are »» A UNDP poverty reduction programme
expected to promote crafts and fishing, and focusing on local economic development
pastoral and agricultural activities, as well from 2003–10 had women’s economic em­
as promoting tourism and organizing lo­ powerment as a core objective. The project
cal trade fairs. They are also responsible for focused on local development initiatives
planning, regional development, housing in rural areas targeting vulnerable popula­
and urbanization, development of local gov­ tions, in particular women, and population
ernment council investment projects, and affected by HIV and AIDS, to improve their
for construction and maintenance of roads. living conditions through income-gene­
These basic infrastructures lay important rating activities in the agricultural sector.
foundations for stimulating private sector The projects provided support to commu­
investments. nity-based groups working through mi­
cro-projects.
Examples of LED projects in Cameroon:
Central African Republic
»» The Ministry of Employment and Professio­ Examples of LED projects in CAR:
nal Training, with funding from the French
Development Agency (AFD), implemented »» In 2009, the European Union and UN-Habi­
a project related to centres for sectoral trai­ tat financed an infrastructure development
ning (Centres de formation sectoriels) that project in CAR. The project was funded for
aims to support youth employment. Ac­ one year with a budget of US$1 million,
cording to AFD data, the programme trains aimed at reigniting sustainable local de­
40,000 to 150,000 youths per year. velopment in ten cities. The project was
aimed at improving housing conditions,
»» AFD supports microcredit programmes environment, infrastructure, basic social
in Cameroon through the ACEP Came­ services, and security.
roun (Agence de Crédit pour l’Entreprise Pri-
vée) and Advans Cameroun. The Advans »» Mercy Corps and Western Union have offe­
program is also supported by the Euro­ red the Western Union Innovation Award
pean Union. According to Advans Came­ in the Central African Republic since early
roun, Cameroon’s micro-, small and me­ 2013. The project, which is also being im­
dium-sized enterprises (MSMEs) employ plemented in Timor-Leste, aims at setting
around 4.5 million people. An evaluation up savings and loans associations in rural
commissioned by the European Union in villages.
January 2012 on the Advans Cameroun

Chapter 3: Local economic development 49


PHOTO : UN PHOTO/SYLVAIN LIECHTI/DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

Chad or planning document for the local authori­


The Master Plan for Decentralisation in Chad ties. UNDP and other development partners
(Schéma Directeur de la Décentralisation au are therefore planning to support local gov­
Tchad, 2012) does not mention local econom­ ernments in developing this strategic docu­
ic development as a specific issue. Howev­ ment.
er, the term “local development” is used and
one of the programme pillars is to install a UNDP has also supported four local govern­
mechanism to finance local development. ments in preparing Municipal Development
In the Master Plan, the role of local radios is Plans (Plan de Développement Communal, PDC)
mentioned as a factor in strengthening local where local economic development will be an
development and promoting participative de­ important pillar.
mocracy.
Food safety remains an urgent issue in Chad
According to UNDP, officials in Chad have no and discussions on LED could include this di­
planning or management tools for local eco­ mension. Decentralisation and the transfer of
nomic development translated into a policy competencies could improve local governance

50 Localizing the 2030 Agenda and the SDGs: Strengthening Local Government Action in Central Africa
for agricultural development and rural strat­ service delivery to function, but also helps
egies. According to UNDP, implementing the to implement local economic development
regional and county-level committees of the activities.
Action Committee for Food Safety/Early Warn­
ing System – CASAGC (Comité d’Action pour la Congo
Sécurité Alimentaire/Système d’Alerte Précoce) – As concerns LED in Congo, the study ‘Étude
would assure closer monitoring, and improve sur les mécanismes de la décentralisation et du
crisis prevention. développement local au Congo – Constat et élé­
ments d’orientation’ (2012) documents that
Examples of LED projects in Chad: there is no specific transfer of funds from the
state to the counties and local governments
»» The PADL/GRN (Projet d’Appui au Dévelop- for LED, and the implementation of socio-eco­
pement Local et à la Bonne Gestion des Res- nomic projects.
sources Naturelles) project to support local
development and good governance of In order to address these challenges, two im­
natural resources is financed by the Euro­ portant financial instruments have been imple­
pean Union, the World Bank and German mented by the central government to support
bilateral cooperation. The programme local economic development: the Road Fund
aims to strengthen local development (Le Fonds Routier) and the Agriculture Support
participation and management of natural Fund (Le Fonds de Soutien à l’Agriculture).
resources through institutional support.
In this regard, it is important to note that The Road Fund was set up in 2004 to ensure
Chad has a legal framework for decentra­ the availability of resources for road manage­
lized management of natural resources ment. The Fund itself is not directly linked to
(EU Law No. 14/PR/2008). The State has full LED, but the local communities/government
sovereignty over natural resources, howe­ are encouraged to communicate with the
ver, some competencies for the environ­ Fund in order to establish priorities for road
ment are devolved to local government construction and improvement within the
entities (Collectivités Territoriales Décentra- counties.
lisées, CTD).
The Agriculture Support Fund was established
»» Chad has a collective entrepreneurship in 2005 and gives support to different kinds of
programme on inclusive finance that sup­ agricultural activities for groups and associa­
ports the development of a cooperative tions, professional promoters and small farm­
movement (UNDP, 2012b). ers.

»» The Chadian government via the World PARSEGD is a project to support socio-eco­
Bank and the French Development Coope­ nomic reintegration of disadvantaged groups,
ration Agency supported project PROADEL, which was initiated in 2007 to create jobs and
have implemented “community-driven de­ improve access to local socio-economic ser­
velopment” initiatives in approximately vices. PARSEGD has received financing from
100 villages. This approach allows local international donors, for instance the African
communities to manage their own deve­ Development Fund (Fonds Africain de Dévelop-
lopment funds that can help not only basic pement, FAD).

Chapter 3: Local economic development 51


Examples of LED projects in Congo: budget and local development, and ac­
countability. The experience helped DRC
»» The Road Fund to implement many tools and to pilot a de­
centralization and local governance scena­
»» The Agriculture Support Fund rio; the resultant manuals, guides and other
supporting tools enabled DRC to begin the
»» PARSEGD decentralization process. Another project
currently running is Uongozi na Maendeleo
Democratic Republic of Congo Bora in North Kivu: the targets are three lo­
Examples of LED projects in DRC: cal entities with a focus on peacebuilding
and conflict management in the post-cri­
»» The ILO-supported Kinshasa Youth Em­ sis context, with the accent on youth and
ployment Capacity Building Project aims women who were victims of conflict in this
to develop and implement policies and area.
programmes for youth in DRC (ILO, 2013).
The project also aims to establish a Natio­ »» Stabilization in Eastern DRC was sup­
nal Policy of Employment and Training, in­ ported in 2015–2016 through a Joint UN
tegrating the young population. So far the Reintegration Programme and provides
programme has defined a framework for an interesting approach to local econo­
the promotion of employment and a pro­ mic development in a fragile post-conflict
gramme has been established for youth setting.  The purpose of the project was to
employment, including activities for coo­ contribute to the stabilization and security
peratives and SMEs in rural and urban set­ of the targeted areas through reintegration
tings. into the local communities of children asso­
ciated with armed forces or groups, vulne­
»» The aforementioned microfinance (MF) rable groups, and displaced persons. The
institution Advans has also been active project was based on an innovative “3x6
in DRC since 2008 and opened its first approach” which has shown good results
branch in Kinshasa in 2009. The sharehol­ (see the information box for details on the
ders of the Bank are KfW, IFC (Internatio­ 3x6 approach).  
nal Finance Corporation, part of the World
Bank Group) and the AfDB (African Deve­ São Tomé and Principe
lopment Bank). DRC has one of the lowest Example of an LED project in São Tomé and
banking rates in the world (3 percent of Principe:
the population; 1.9 million out of 70 mil­
lion inhabitants) and the MSMEs employ »» The International Fund for Agricultural De­
95 percent of the population, according to velopment (IFAD) and other development
Advans Group. partners support a project in São Tomé
and Principe aimed at revitalizing the co­
»» The PADDL UNDP/UNCDF project ran from coa industry and producing organic and
2008 to 2013 with the support of DFID and fair-trade certified cocoa beans. Due to
was one of the first reform projects in DRC. the international cocoa crash in 1998, São
The project supported 3 provinces and Tomé and Principe farmers were forced
24 local entities in planning, participatory to abandon cocoa plantations, or even

52 Localizing the 2030 Agenda and the SDGs: Strengthening Local Government Action in Central Africa
3x6 approach in DRC
The 3x6 approach was used in DRC to promote reintegration in a fragile post-conflict situation. The approach includes four
phases, as follows.

Phase Zero – Promotion of dialogue (1–3 months) 


During this phase, communities are prepared and a favourable environment is created for reintegration, conflict resolution
and participatory governance, including gender aspects and raising awareness of SGBV. Although this is the initial phase,
most of the activities will continue during the other phases. Socio-economic infrastructures are identified, which will be
rehabilitated in Phase 1. 

Phase 1 – Inclusion (3–6 months) 


Voluntary members of target groups will rehabilitate socio-economic infrastructures through a process of high-intensive
labour. These infrastructures will be identified through a participatory approach and could be the rehabilitation of markets,
reforestation, anti-erosion works, road improvement, etc. Over three to six months the members will work on these aspects,
but a part of their time will also be dedicated to sensitization on issues such as HIV and AIDS, SGBV, gender, local governance,
and on technical training (business plans, management of local groups, and so forth). They will receive payment (cash for
work), but part of their salaries will be transferred into a savings scheme. Experience has shown that this cash-for-work
phase improves social cohesion as people from different backgrounds work and talk together. This phase also helps to iden-
tify, together with the beneficiaries, the economic activities that will start in Phase 2, including market and financial analysis
of the proposed activities. 

Phase 2 – Appropriation (6–12 months) 


The beneficiaries, who are organized into solidarity groups, will start their economic activities by investing their savings
(from Phase 1) that will be doubled or tripled by the project. The project will accompany the beneficiaries during this phase,
not only technically, but also on issues such as management of associations, business plans, etc. The identification of eco-
nomic activities should also be placed in a more sustainable economic development context and for this a value chain anal-
ysis, indicating not only the possible economic activities but also bottlenecks, is essential and measures should be taken to
tackle these challenges. 

Phase 3 – Towards sustainability (12–24 months) 


Strengthening of the capacities of the solidarity groups and support to the development of value chains constitutes the main
part of this phase. Links with microfinance institutions and support in evolving towards small or medium-sized enterprises
are additional elements. 

Source: UNDP (2015) Stabilization in Eastern DRC through a Joint UN Reintegration Programme in DRC, Project Document, Annexe 2.

cut down cocoa trees in order to plant is led by the government and numbers
maize and other crops. In 2000 an IFAD from 2010 show that the country’s 2,200
programme launched a pilot project that farmers are growing cocoa certified orga­
involved 500 farmers in 11 communities, nic and/or fair trade for the international
including training in the use of solar cocoa chocolate industry, exporting 600 tons of
dryers and storage facilities. An internatio­ organic and fair-trade certified beans per
nal certifier started a process to certify the year.
cocoa as organic. Today the programme

Chapter 3: Local economic development 53


»» The project is currently run by the Coope­ private sector, NGOs and CSOs in these mech­
rative for the Export and Market of Organic anisms.
Cocoa in São Tomé and Principe (CECAB)
and the buyers are Kaoka or CaféDirect. In view of these findings, this report suggests
The IFAD-funded PAPFA (Program for Par­ that the key enabling condition to strengthen
ticipative Support to Family Agriculture local governments in this area is to encourage
and Artisanal Fisheries/Programa de Apoio local governments to play a greater role in LED
Participativo à Agricultura Familiar et à Pesca in order to promote SDGs localization, in par­
Artesanal) programme is one of few local ticular SDGs 1, 8 and 9. The following recom­
development projects on the islands, even mendations are formulated with this objective
extending to the remote island of Principe. in mind.
Through PAPFA the cooperatives are linked
to FIC (Fund for Communitarian Infrastruc­ Recommendation 3.1: Identify country-
ture/Fundo de Infraestruturas Comunitárias), specific roles and responsibilities of local
the infrastructure part of PAPFA. FIC was governments to promote LED initiatives
created in 2006 for the construction and As has been noted in Latin American experi­
rehabilitation of agricultural infrastructure, ences in LED (ECLAC/CEPAL, 2005) the success
including rural roads. According to the Ru­ of LED initiatives depends not only on what
ral Poverty Portal, the families participating has worked in a specific context or area, but
in the cocoa projects have increased their there must also be a common development
incomes from 25 percent below the pover­ strategy that public and private actors can
ty line to 8 percent above it. As a result of agree on.
increasing wealth, the producer organiza­
tions have been able to invest in infrastruc­ One of the challenges for further development
ture and health projects for the cocoa far­ of LED in Central African countries is how to
mers. move from various, unlinked small projects
towards more planned programmes with inte­
3.4 Key findings and grated approaches, in order to find sustainable
recommendations solutions. LED needs to be conceived holisti­
cally, meaning that it is not part of temporary
From the above-mentioned cases of LED ini­ ad-hoc arrangements implemented by devel­
tiatives it is possible to see that they bring opment partners, but related to more integrat­
together state, non-governmental organiza­ ed national and local-level plans for employ­
tions, and private-sector actors, often with ment and sustainability, including vulnerable
the state as intermediary, either at the local/ groups such as women and youth. This should
decentralized level or at national/centralized clearly demarcate the roles and responsibilities
level. It is clear in all cases that the central lev­ of local governments for the promotion of LED,
el has a primary role in the projects discussed, for example in coordinating the local dialogue
although initiatives often include the active with the private sector in identifying invest­
participation of local governments. Local and ment priorities.
central governments must work together
to develop a framework for exchanging and Another area of focus for local governments
sharing, and it is necessary to integrate the should be to support inclusive business by
fostering a supportive ecosystem for inclu­

54 Localizing the 2030 Agenda and the SDGs: Strengthening Local Government Action in Central Africa
sive business as elaborated upon in the UN­ stakeholders, less dependent on lending and
DP’s ‘Realizing Africa’s Wealth’ report. The better inserted in the labour market.
framework includes supporting the provi­
sion of information (provide businesses with Recommendation 3.3: Promote the
the awareness, knowledge, technology and development of economic clusters
know-how required to operate in low-in­ The term “cluster” is increasingly being used to
come markets); appropriate incentives (pro­ denote an effective approach to promote eco­
vide businesses with the impetus to engage nomic development. The term originates from
with low-income communities by rewarding a cluster of grapes and a cluster in this sense is
positive externalities and reducing the cost typically defined as a geographically proximate
of doing business); promoting investment group of interconnected companies, universi­
(provide the financial backing that enables ties, institutes, and associated governmental
businesses to venture into challenging institutions in a particular field, the intention
low-income markets); and implementation of which is to create business opportunities,
support (provide the logistics, transaction, as well as stimulating new knowledge and
marketing and communication, and mi­ technology by promoting cooperation among
cro-business support services that allow in­ them (Cooke, 2001). Promoting clusters entails
clusive businesses to function in a variety of the engagement of sector stakeholders and
dynamic environments).20 the development of collaborative strategies
and actions.
Recommendation 3.2: Support
sustainable funding solutions to promote Clusters can produce wealth within a region.
LED The initial step for cluster development is to
In order to ensure sustainability in LED initia­ identify the industries that give a comparative
tives, it is important to support sustainable advantage to the territory and these may in­
financing mechanisms where both state (na­ clude various agricultural or service-based in­
tional and local level) and the private sector dustries. There are three main components in
can contribute to costs. In order to be able to a cluster: 1) the producers and products trad­
scale up experiences, local governments must ing; 2) the supplier network, which includes
seek synergies with other local governments, inputs and services; and 3) the providers of the
and link to national policies and strategies. Pri­ economic foundation, which include human
vate sector participation, in this regard, is also resources, physical infrastructure and business
essential. climate.

Microcredit institutions, whether implement­ Local governments can stimulate these pro­
ed by local non-governmental programmes cesses by acting as facilitator and enabler for
through support from development partners, cluster development by contributing to estab­
or via international or national microfinance lishing the appropriate economic foundation.
institutions, also sometimes financed by inter­ A key aspect of the cluster is to enhance collab­
national donors, are very prevalent in Central oration, networking and competition, which is
African countries. More complex designs of mi­ referred to as “clustering”. Local governments
croloan institutions need to be explored, that can also facilitate the provision of technical
could transform lenders into fully fledged SME assistance (TA) and training from state agen­
20 More details provided in UNDP (2013a) Realizing Africa’s Wealth: Building Inclusive Businesses for Shared Prosperity.

Chapter 3: Local economic development 55


cies to actors in the territory. Through the including: 1) feasibility; 2) programme prepa­
clusters, accompanying conditions can also be rations; 3) supply chain diagnostics; 4) supply
identified to promote private-sector growth, chain development planning; 5) supply chain
such as the provision of adequate infrastruc­ development implementation; and 6) phasing
ture, incentives, enabling environment from out (UNDP, 2013b).
a rules-and-regulations point of view, access
to finance, public–private dialogue platforms, 3.4.1 Fragile and conflict-affected
and information on opportunities. states

A promising area for clusters in the Central The UNDP framework for rebuilding local
Africa region, given the rural nature of many economies in fragile and conflict-affected
of the region’s countries, is the promotion of settings takes an incremental approach, from
agribusiness value chains as economic clus­ livelihood stabilization during peacebuilding
ters. A useful resource on this subject has been to local economic recovery during the recov­
prepared by the UNDP’s Agribusiness Supplier ery period, and includes economic growth
Development Programme (ASDP) which has during the development stage, as displayed in
developed a toolkit to improve the productiv­ Figure 2.
ity of smallholder farmers and SME agribusi­
ness by facilitating support (training, access FCAS Recommendation 3.1: Local
to inputs, organization, etc.) and linkages with governments to play a role in local
off-takers, with special consideration for sus­ economic recovery
tainability and inclusion of women and youth. Local governments have an important role
The approach is broken down into six phases, to play in all stages of rebuilding local econ­

Figure 2: UNDP’s approach to transforming local economies in fragile and conflict-affected


settings (UNDP, 2016)

PEACEBUILDING RECOVERY DEVELOPMENT

Track A. L­ ivelihood Track B. Local Track C. Inclusive


­stabilization ­economic recovery economic growth
CONFLICT

56 Localizing the 2030 Agenda and the SDGs: Strengthening Local Government Action in Central Africa
omies. In the period of recovery, decisions
taken on spatial planning and territorial
management will impact the inclusiveness,
employment generation potential, and re­
silience to shocks of local economies. Local
governments can specifically target at-risk
groups (such as women, youth, and minori­
ties) and ex-combatants to find a way out of
armed violence through short-term employ­
ment programmes, entrepreneurship sup­
port, and support for income-generating ac­
tivities. Some examples of activities that can
be promoted by local governments include
labour-intensive public works for the reinser­
tion of ex-combatants, small grants for live­
lihood activities, and training in basic skills
and entrepreneurship in partnership with the
central government agencies, civil society
and the private sector. A good example is the
3x6 approach discussed in subsection 3.3 as
applied in DRC, which has shown promising
results.

FACS Recommendation 3.2: Integrate


spatial planning and territorial
management approaches
After immediate needs are taken care of, a key
issue in fragile and conflict-affected states is
the spatial planning and territorial manage­
ment needed to address the conflict drivers
related to access to life-sustaining resources.
The UNDP report on local governance in FCAS
recommends that the process of devising
spatial plans itself is a highly effective vehicle
for bringing together different local actors in
divided contexts and helping them to build,
through dialogue, a common vision for the ter­
ritories they all depend on for their future. Also,
a territorial approach allows the communities
to rationalize the sharing of space and resourc­
es at a more strategic level between small areas
sharing the same resource base (e.g. bodies of
water, watersheds, coastal areas, and areas tied
by similar economic value chains).

Chapter 3: Local economic development 57


Chapter 4:
Capacity development

PHOTO : UN PHOTO/GILL FICKLING/GABON

58 Localizing the 2030 Agenda and the SDGs: Strengthening Local Government Action in Central Africa
S
trengthening human and institutional UNDP defines capacity building as the process
capacities at the local level is fundamen­ by which individuals, organizations and societ­
tal to improving public sector perfor­ ies develop abilities to perform functions, solve
mance in the Central Africa region. Capacity problems, and set and achieve goals, premised
development challenges vary between coun­ on ownership, choice, and self-esteem.
tries, within countries, and also throughout
different sectors. Local governance cannot The UNDP Capacity Building approach offers a
be effective without the establishment of ad­ 5-step process21:
equate human-resource capacity. Given sig­
nificant capacity gaps and constraints, ade­ »» Engage stakeholders on capacity develop­
quate capacity development is a key enabling ment
condition for SDGs localization in the region.
»» Assess capacity needs and assets
The importance of capacity development is
highlighted in SDG 17 (partnerships for the »» Formulate a capacity development res­
goals), which includes as a specific target: “en­ ponse
hance international support for implementing
effective and targeted capacity building in de­ »» Implement a capacity development res­
veloping countries to support national plans ponse
to implement all sustainable development
goals, including through North-South, South- »» Evaluate capacity development
South and triangular cooperation” (SDG target
17.9). According to the UNDP approach, a capacity
building response must be created based on
This section discusses recent trends in the pro­ four core issues, as follows.
vision of capacity development in the region. It
takes a comparative view of the existing frame­ i. Institutional arrangements –  assess­
works for capacity development in the eight ments often find that institutions are
Central African countries studied, focusing on inefficient because of bad or weak poli­
two case studies, followed by conclusions and cies, procedures, resource management,
recommendations for enhancing the capacity organization, leadership, frameworks, and
of local governments in Central Africa. communication.

4.1 Capacity development of local ii. Leadership –  strong leadership allows


governments for easier adaptation to changes; strong
leaders can also influence people. UNDP
The term “capacity development” emerged in uses coaching and mentoring pro­
the late 1980s (Lavergne and Saxby, 2001) and grammes to encourage the development
is today a central concept in the implementa­ of leadership skills such as priority set­
tion of development cooperation. The term ting, communication and strategic plan­
capacity building is often used, as well as tech- ning.
nical assistance as equivalent to the aforemen­
tioned concept.
21 http://www.gdrc.org/uem/undp-cb.html

Chapter 4: Capacity development 59


iii. Knowledge – UNDP believes knowledge monitor and evaluate institutions. It pro­
is the foundation of capacity. It believes motes the development of capacities
greater investments should be made in such as literacy and language skills in civil
establishing strong education systems societies that will allow for increased en­
and opportunities for continued lear­ gagement in monitoring institutions.
ning and the development of professio­
nal skills. It supports the engagement in Decentralization demands capacity develop­
post-secondary education reforms, conti­ ment initiatives since new roles and respon­
nued learning and domestic knowledge sibilities need to be installed to ensure local
service. government success. Developing capacities
for basic service delivery, such as for social
iv. Accountability –  implementation of ac­ programmes, is often a significant challenge
countability measures facilitates better since these are areas that traditionally were
performance and efficiency. A lack of administrated by central institutions (Furtado,
accountability measures in institutions 2001).
allows for the proliferation of corruption.
UNDP promotes the strengthening of Furtado (2001) sees decentralization and ca­
accountability frameworks that monitor pacity development as complementary con­
and evaluate institutions. It also promotes cepts, as “both seek to improve participatory
independent organizations that oversee, decision-making, reduce the need for external

Table 15: Capacity development and decentralization stages

Phases of Capacity development approaches


­decentralization
Devolution Capacity development needs to be implemented not only at the local level but also at central level to
ensure that the basic services are delivered with quality and consistency, and with oversight from central
to local level, gathering data and in consultation with local governments, and to ensure that the national
strategies within a particular sector are implemented via local basic service delivery.
Deconcentration This involves the transfer of administration rather than legislation, setting up new or additional admin-
istration levels (offices) and delegating functions to these offices. Often capacity development for these
new levels is ensured by government officials who advise the local offices on their new responsibilities.
The deconcentration process also involves formulating new administrative procedures, planning proce-
dures, and setting up staff structures with clear roles and responsibilities.
Delegation During this phase it is important to take into consideration capacity building; the central government
that delegates duties to local government must carefully examine how to ensure the legal and account-
ability arrangements, as well as the financial resources, and how to avoid fragile service delivery. In order
for delegation to function and be successful there is also a need for strong parastatal, NGO or private
organization commitment. However, the organizations responsible for education and health projects,
among other sectors, need to situate their responsibilities within a broader context of service delivery
in order to participate in an effective manner to meet local needs, and to be able to work with local
government officials.
Source: Furtado, 2001

60 Localizing the 2030 Agenda and the SDGs: Strengthening Local Government Action in Central Africa
resources, and achieve long-term sustainabil­ the Central African states have managed to
ity”. A key feature of capacity development is increase their capacity for local governance,
sustainability through the reduction of de­ which nevertheless remains rather low. In a
pendence by ensuring that local actors have study produced by the UCLGA (United Cities
capacities and resources to implement basic and Local Government in Africa) in 2013, the
service delivery and any other responsibilities countries were classified according to four
assigned to the local government level. Differ­ criteria regarding the implementation and
ent capacity development approaches can be status of capacity development initiatives.
taken at different stages of decentralization, as The results show an overall low score for the
described in Table 15. region, with five of the eight countries scoring
in the lowest category and none reaching the
4.2 Local government capacity top bracket. The scores are presented in Table
development in Central Africa 16.

A number of initiatives for capacity building For a comparative perspective, Table 17 takes
have been put in place to develop the skills into account the existing frameworks and doc­
and expertise in the field of local governance. uments for capacity building and the institu­
Following initiatives in the professionaliza­ tions and programmes that implement these
tion of public administration, as well as staff programmes in each of the eight countries.
training in related government departments,

Table 16: Capacity building indicators for Central Africa

Indicators for capacity building (1 out of 10 indicators for local government) Countries (score out of 40 on
local government indicators)
There is a national framework of reference that applies to all local governments in the
country, defining the qualifications and responsibilities of local government staff, and a
national strategy for training and promoting human resources in local governments.
There is a national framework of reference defining the qualifications and responsibili- Cameroon (23/40)
ties of local government staff, and a national strategy for training and promoting human Gabon (23/40)
resources in local governments; so far, they concern only a few local governments.
There is a national framework of reference defining the qualifications and responsibili- Chad (21/40)
ties of local government staff, or a national strategy for training and promoting human
resources in local governments; but they concern only a few local governments.
There is no national framework of reference defining the qualifications and responsi- São Tomé and Principe (19/40)
bilities of local government staff and no national strategy for training and promoting Congo (17/40)
human resources in local governments.
Equatorial Guinea (17/40)
Democratic Republic of Congo
(15/40)
Central African Republic (13/40)
Source: UCLGA/Cities Alliance, 2013, Assessing the Institutional Environment of Local Governments in Africa, UCLGA and Cities Alliance,
September 2013.

Chapter 4: Capacity development 61


Table 17: Frameworks and programmes for local government capacity development
in Central Africa

Countries Institution(s)/Programmes Frameworks/Documents


Cameroon CEFAM (Centre for Training of Local Government/ National Framework for qualifications and duties of
Centre de Formation des Collectivités Locales) local government staff
United Councils and Cities of Cameroon (UCCC)/ National Strategy to Strengthen the Capacity of Local
Communes et Villes Unies de Cameroun (CVUC) Administration
National Council for Decentralisation/ Cameroon’s Strategic Framework for Growth and
Conseil National de la Décentralisation (CND) Employment 2010–2020 (Document Strategie pour la
National Training Programme for Urban Pro- Croissance et l’Emploi DSCE /Cadre de référence de
fessions/Programme National de Formation aux l’action gouvernementale pour la période 2010–2010)
Métiers de la Ville (PNFMV)
Central African National School for Administration and the Judi- No national framework of reference defining the quali-
Republic ciary (ENAM – École Nationale d’Administration et fications and responsibilities of local government staff
de Magistrature) No strategy for building the capacities of local admin-
istrators
PRSP (Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper) 2011–2015 of
the Central African Republic
Chad Secrétaire Général du Ministère en charge de Draft National Strategy on Building Decentralised Local
l’Administration du Territoire et de la Décentrali- Government Capacities (2013)
sation Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) PROADEL II
(Programme d’Appui au Développement Local II)
Congo No framework of reference defining staff qualifications
and responsibilities
No national strategy for the training of local actors
Framework Document for the National Policy on
Decentralisation in Congo (2011 Document Cadre de la
Politique Nationale de la Decentralisation au Congo)
Democratic Technical Unit supporting Decentralisation No national strategy supporting local capacity building
Republic of (Cellule Technique d’Appui à la Décentralisation No national strategy for the training of local actors
Congo (CTAD) and Comité de réforme des finances
At central level we can mention the Strategic Frame-
publiques (COREF))
work for the Implementation of Decentralisation (Cadre
Stratégique de Mise en Oeuvre de la Décentralisation,
CSMOD), 2011–2013
Programme for the Strengthening of Government
Capacities, PRCG (Programme en Renforcement de
Capacités en Gouvernance)
Equatorial National School of Administration (ENAP – No national strategy supporting local capacity building
Guinea École Nationale d’Administration Publique) No national framework to define qualifications and
competencies of local government staff
Gabon Ministry of the Interior, Public Security, Immigra- National Framework Defining Qualifications and
tion and Decentralization Responsibilities of local government staff
National Strategy for Training and Promoting Human
Resources in local governments
São Tomé and No national strategy for local capacity building
Principe No national framework to define qualifications and
competencies of local government staff

62 Localizing the 2030 Agenda and the SDGs: Strengthening Local Government Action in Central Africa
4.3 Case studies UNDP Cameroon focuses on capacity building
and local development through programmes
The subsections below provide two country fighting poverty and HIV and AIDS, imple­
case studies that are considered to have been mented in ten target municipalities, in which
successful in implementing local government UNDP organizes training for civil servants as
capacity development programmes. well as civil society actors, such as women and
youth organizations. These have been consid­
4.3.1 Case study 1: Cameroon ered successful and have resulted in the devel­
opment of local HIV and AIDS plans.
Cameroon is an interesting case since there
are several local development capacity proj­ The World Bank Cameroon country pro­
ects in place and many domestic-level actors, gramme 2010–2013 stresses local develop­
as well as development-partner involvement. ment as one of the three main areas of support,
Despite the number of activities, there is to with a strong focus on increasing basic services
date no legislation governing the personal sta­ through infrastructure upgrading and capacity
tus and career track of local government staff. building for improved local governance. The
This often leads to a lack of local expertise in World Bank’s Urban and Water Development
administrative functions, even in large urban Project (PDUE) aims to support local govern­
municipalities. ment capacity building in urban areas, and
works in low-income settlements in Yaoundé,
Training programmes for all local government Douala, Bamenda, Mbalmayo and Maroua. The
officials are carried out by the Centre for the project builds local capacity for infrastructure
Training of Local Governments (CEFAM, Centre upgrading, enhancing service delivery, and
de Formation des Collectivités Locales). Found­ supporting the implementation of public–pri­
ed in 1977, CEFAM offers training of admin­ vate partnerships.
istrative and technical staff of municipalities,
the associations of municipalities and munic­ GIZ (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale
ipal services, and the personnel responsible Zusammenarbeit) in Cameroon supports the
for the supervision of municipalities and civil decentralization area and currently supports
registry. the AMCOD (All Africa Ministerial Conference
on Decentralization and Local Development)
Cameroon’s Strategic Framework for Growth through its Decentralisation and Local De­
and Employment 2010–2020 (Document velopment Assistance Program (PADDL). This
­Strategie pour la Croissance et l’Emploi DSCE programme supports actors and institutions
– Cadre de référence de l’action gouvernemen- involved in decentralization reform through
tale pour la période 2010–2010) puts forward a formal training and hands-on technical assis­
training plan for the staff of local governments, tance.
including capacity building for elected local of­
ficials, as well as for civil servants. This is provid­ Beyond supporting local government capaci­
ed through state training agencies and private ties, a number of studies stress the importance
sector training companies, known as “Sectoral of capacity building for forest and natural re­
Training Centres”. sources management in Cameroon since the
country’s economy is heavily dependent on
this industry.

Chapter 4: Capacity development 63


Figure 3: The URBA-Cam Cameroon and the National Training Programme for Urban Professions

URBA-Cam Cameroon –
Handicraft Centres 2006-2009
From 2006, Cameroon’s United Cities and Municipalities Cameroon’s National Training Program for Urban
(CVUC), together with the The École Nationale Supérieure Professions (PNFMV, Programme National de
Polytechnique in Yaoundé, and the Nantes-Métropole re- ­Formation aux Métiers de la Ville) 2013 – ongoing
gion in France implemented the URBA-Cam to support the Implementing its first activities from 2013, the National
establishment of handicraft centres and capacity develop- Training Program for Urban Professions is a joint programme
ment at the local level. by the Ministry of Habitat and Urban Development, the
The Handicraft Centres offered training in water, sanitation, Ministry of Decentralisation and Local Authorities, and
waste, public procurement, project development and fund- Cameroons United Cities and Municipalities (CVUC). The
raising. So far the project has put in place Handicraft Cen- program also receives funding from the Embassy of France.
tres in the cities Dschang (construction of a landfill), Limbé Source: LEDNA, Local Economic Development Network of Africa
(ecological latrines) and Maroua (construction of culverts), and AIMF (Association Internationale de Maires Francophone)

as well as training in 37 middle-sized cities in Cameroon.


Source: Coopération Atlantique Guinée 44

The final example of local capacity develop­ The PRSP (Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper)
ment, oriented towards capacity building for 2011–2015 of the Central African Republic
urban professions, constitutes an example considers reinforcement of state capacities
of “scaling up” a local capacity development as one central theme in the process of peace
programme. The information in Figure 3 ex­ consolidation in the country. The Strategy also
plains how the URBA-Cam Handicraft Centres mentions that institutional and human capac­
became the National Training Programme for ities should be reinforced at all levels (central,
Urban Professions. regional and local) in order to guarantee a suc­
cessful implementation of the strategy. The
4.3.2 Case study 2: Operational Action Plan (Plan Opérationnel
Central African Republic d’Actions) which results from the PRSP’s Pri­
ority Action Plans articulated around two
The second country case study discussed in important actions: 1) local development and
this subsection is the Central African Repub­ planning; and 2) strengthening sectoral ca­
lic (CAR). The republican institutions outlined pacities through capacity building. The PRSP
in the country’s Constitution of 27 December also states that the public service staff should
2004 are being progressively set up, but there be qualified and receive quality training. How­
are weaknesses in technical and managerial ever, there is as yet no national framework of
capacities at both national and decentralized reference defining the qualifications and re­
level. The 2013 conflict had severe conse­ sponsibilities of local government staff, and
quences in relation to the public administra­ no national strategy for the training and pro­
tion’s ability to mobilize and manage public motion of human resources in local govern­
resources. ments (UCLGA, 2013).

64 Localizing the 2030 Agenda and the SDGs: Strengthening Local Government Action in Central Africa
The government has supported reforms at the ized territories, establishing prefectures, and
National School for Administration and the elaborating a law on the status of the capital,
Judiciary (ENAM –École Nationale d’Adminis- Bangui. Therefore, the government elaborat­
tration et de la Magistrature) by reinforcing the ed a five-year priorities plan aimed at the fol­
institutional, human and material capacities. lowing:
There has also been a series of reforms for the
national-level public services, but challenges i. Updating and strengthening the institu­
remain at the decentralized level – and partic­ tional and legal framework for decentra­
ularly in conflict-affected areas where public lization in a participatory manner, which
services are almost non-existent. meant strengthening the capacities of the
institutional framework and organizing a
Although decentralization was initially intro­ General Assembly for decentralization.
duced in 1995, the process faced problems as
there was a lack of texts regulating decentral­ ii. Reforming the administration of the terri­
ization and regionalization, and a weak own­ tory, by establishing a legal and regulato­
ership among the population, administrators/ ry framework to lay the foundation to pro­
civil service and civil society. vide operational support to decentralized
structures. In order to operationalize the
A capacity programme was initiated by the decentralized structures of government,
High Commission for Decentralisation and elected bodies would need to be installed
Regionalisation that included training for 100 for the management of local authorities.
mayors from the Bangui and Bambari areas,
and also involved an information and aware­ A report from 2010 looking at the critical de­
ness-raising campaign directed towards the ficiencies in the system elaborated an Emer-
population on how the decentralization pro­ gency Plan for Reconstructing Deconcentrated
cess was to be implemented. Public Services. As regards human resources,
the author mentions that there is a tendency
From 2008 onwards, the decentralization to mix up technical-administrative posts with
process was relaunched through a Frame­ political posts, and the study also highlighted
work Programme for Democratic Governance the low qualifications of public agents and an
(PCGD: Programme Cadre de Gouvernance inadequate salary system.
Démocratique et Décentralisation). This frame­
work reinforced the High Commission for The High Commission in charge of the de­
Decentralisation and Regionalisation’s role, centralization and regionalization policy is
and several baseline studies were undertak­ one of the national organs in charge of im­
en to elaborate texts for the transfer of com­ plementing the Framework Programme for
petencies and local finances, as a means to Democratic Governance and Decentralisation.
formulate a National Decentralisation and An evaluation from 2010 suggests that the
Regionalisation Policy. According to the PRSP, Commission has had difficulties in recruiting
numerous challenges were encountered in national top-level executives within the spe­
boosting the decentralization process, in­ cific field and that there is a weak capacity
cluding the transfer of competencies from the for national execution of decentralization, in­
state to regions and municipalities, creating a cluding administrative and financial control.
Capital Development Fund for the decentral­ Other questions relate to delays in the deliv­

Chapter 4: Capacity development 65


As concerns capacity building on local finance
and financial management, a study from 2011
on taxation and local finance via the Frame­
work for Democratic Governance and Decen­
tralisation (PCGD), identified several capac­
ity gaps. The major capacity developments
required in this area are identified as: account­
ing; development of texts/regulations; budget
preparation and execution; creation of taxes;
the duties of the mayor; and relations to the
tax collector.

UNDP’s draft programme document for 2012–


2016 considers capacity building an important
strategy, and the support is oriented towards
improving the legal and institutional frame­
work for the electoral administration, from
adopting a law for gender quota in the repre­
sentative bodies, to organizing regional and
municipal elections with an increased partici­
pation by women and youth. UNDP also sup­
ports a strategy for capacity development for
the dissemination of legislative and regulatory
PHOTO : UN PHOTO/MARTINE PERRET/DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO
texts on decentralization and territorial admin­
istration; the formulation of a decentralization
strategy and policy; an implementation plan in
pilot zones; and the development of a strategy
for resource mobilization to be implemented
ery of office equipment, and the author also in the pilot areas).
mentions that there has been limited capacity
development for administrative and financial The UN Common Country Assessment of 2010
management. found that civil society also has a role to play
in reinforcing the capacities of the population
According to the UNDAF+ document for the as concerns development, resources mobiliza­
period 2012–2016, one of the expected results tion and participation. However, civil society is
of the United Nations system programme in considered to have weak technical and organi­
the country is the reinforcement of capacities zational capacities, and an absence of coordi­
within public institutions, civil society, social nation and ability to mobilize resources.
partners and communities. The report also
mentions a critical situation concerning capac­ The World Bank’s Country Partnership Strategy
ities within many sectors, for example, health 2009–2012 has strengthened administrative
centres, but it does not specifically mention planning and management capacity at central
the role of local governments. and local levels as a central axis to consolidate

66 Localizing the 2030 Agenda and the SDGs: Strengthening Local Government Action in Central Africa
economic governance and institutional capac­ Recommendation 4.1: Develop
ity. capacity-development systems for
local government staff/administrative
The International Association of Francophone personnel
Mayors (AIMF, Association Internationale des In many of the aforementioned examples, ca­
Maires Francophones) provides support for dif­ pacity development initiatives have been ori­
ferent capacity building initiatives to the Asso­ ented towards elected/appointed local gov­
ciation for Central African Mayors (AMCA Asso- ernment officials/parliamentarians. There has
ciation des Maires de Centrafrique). The project been a focus on electoral procedures due to
involves delivering support to Bangui, Bambari the associated increase in local elections that
and Bangassou. have taken place recently. Capacity develop­
ment has in these cases focused on mandates,
4.4 Key findings and the role of local governments, and the assign­
recommendations ment of municipal tasks.

According to the findings of this report, ca­ These projects also need to be implemented
pacity development for local government and to a greater extent for local administrative per­
decentralization in Central Africa is still in the sonnel and should increasingly focus on key
initial phase and the country case studies show capacity areas for supporting local develop­
a certain lack of coherence in the various ca­ ment, including local public financial manage­
pacity-development approaches being used. ment and the delivery of local services, either
The aforementioned report from the United by the local governments directly or through
Cities and Local Government (UCLGA, 2013) partnerships.
underlines a critical fact that capacity develop­
ment initiatives are very limited: only three of Moving beyond ad-hoc configurations, coun­
the eight countries studied in this report have tries should develop capacity-development
some kind of national framework of reference systems for local government that include vari­
defining the qualifications and responsibil­ ous delivery mechanisms (technical assistance,
ities of local government staff, and national formal training, peer learning, and so forth). An
strategies for training and promoting human important feature of these systems should be
resources in local governments. In these cases to encourage a “learning by doing” approach
the experience often only concerns a few local and should include a mechanism for capacity
governments in the countries, mostly in the ur­ development to respond to needs expressed
ban areas. by local governments through local capaci­
ty-development plans, rather than being sup­
In view of these findings, this report suggests ply driven, which may not adequately respond
that the key enabling condition to strengthen to specific local needs.
local governments in this area is to ensure that
adequate capacity development is delivered Recommendation 4.2: Scale up capacity-
and responds to needs in order to support development pilot programmes to
SDGs localization. The following recommen­ nationwide programmes
dations are formulated with this objective in In some cases, for instance in Chad, capaci­
mind. ty-development efforts are limited to certain
urban municipalities where local projects are

Chapter 4: Capacity development 67


activities in other municipalities that are lo­
cated outside the development partners’ geo­
graphical limits.

Recommendation 4.3: Include local


communities in capacity-development
activities
The role of inhabitants in rural and urban com­
munities is often forgotten in devising strat­
egies and frameworks for local government
capacities. Efforts should be made to include
communities, with special attention to vulner­
able groups, including women, in the planning
and implementation of local government ca­
pacity-enhancement activities.

Recommendation 4.4: Involve national-


level and local-level schools and training
institutes in designing and delivering
local-capacity development plans
The role of training needs to be more thor­
oughly linked to the national and regional in­
stitutes for capacity development. Cameroon’s
experience with the Centre for Training for Lo­
cal Authorities/CEFAM (Centre de Formation des
Collectivités Locales) is in this regard interesting
and represents a successful example. Equato­
rial Guinea’s National School of Administra­
tion (ENAP École Nationale d’Administration
Publique) demonstrates the opposite where
capacity-development initiatives at the local
level are unheard of.

Additionally, the role of universities and re­


search centres in the Central African countries
is often not mentioned in the programmes
PHOTO : UN PHOTO/EVAN SCHNEIDER/CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
reviewed for this study. By linking ongoing
local government capacity projects to local
academia and existing domestic research net­
works, ownership of the processes can be fur­
being implemented. Major effort needs to be ther encouraged.
applied to scale up these interesting experi­
ences on a national level so that they serve as Recommendation 4.5: Strengthen
models to implement capacity-development collaboration with regional networks of

68 Localizing the 2030 Agenda and the SDGs: Strengthening Local Government Action in Central Africa
local governments to increase interest some circumstances. Peace is not achieved
and visibility for local government only at the national level through negotiated
capacity needs processes, but importantly needs to involve
It is important to further increase the partici­ active engagement at the local level. The lo­
pation of local governments in regional and cal peace communities, as local multi-stake­
international networks to promote dialogue holder platforms, can play an important role
on local government capacities, such as the in this regard. They can also act as an early
United Cities and Local Government Africa, warning and response mechanism for unset­
and the Africities Summit, where South–South tled issues. Importantly, they must include
dialogues can be encouraged. vulnerable groups, including women and
youth.
There are also other examples of decentral­
ized international development coopera­
tion – for instance twinning arrangements
between São Tomé and Principe and other
lusophone countries – that could be further
explored as successful mechanisms to imple­
ment local government capacity-develop­
ment initiatives.

4.4.1 Fragile and conflict-affected


states

FCAS Recommendation 4.1: Establish or


restore local government operational
capacities
In cases of conflict, there may be a total loss
of local government presence in an area. It
is important to re-establish a field presence
through the construction of local government
administration buildings, either temporary or
permanent. Another important aspect for the
staffing is that the payroll should be put in
place. Precautions should be taken to ensure
these can be supported in a secure environ­
ment.

FACS Recommendation 4.2: Support local


peace committees
Local peace committees have been shown
to be effective mechanisms in promoting
local dialogue and enhancing state–society
relations. Local governments can act as facil­
itators and conveners of this process under

Chapter 4: Capacity development 69


Conclusion

PHOTO: UN PHOTO/GILL FICKLING/GABON

70 Localizing the 2030 Agenda and the SDGs: Strengthening Local Government Action in Central Africa
B
ased on the premise that empowered Enabling condition #1: Establishing a
and well-functioning local governments clear legal framework and supportive
can be key promoters and enablers of policy environment (SDGs: 5, 10, 11, 16
local development, this report has explored and 17)
the key enabling conditions required to Recommendation 1.1: Introduce or update
support the strengthening of local govern­ legal provisions to provide clarity to subna­
ments in achieving resilient and sustainable tional entities
local development and SDG localization.
Recommendation 1.2: Launch political pro­
Through reviewing baseline conditions in the cesses in the form of national multi-stake­
areas of the legal and policy frameworks (Chap­ holder conferences on the adequate trans­
ter 1); financing and delivering services (Chap­ fer of resources and competencies to local
ter 2); local economic development (Chapter governments
3); and capacity development (Chapter 4), this
report identifies the key enabling conditions Recommendation 1.3: Develop national
for improved local government performance strategies on local development and SDG
as a precondition for effective implementation localization
of the SDGs at the local level.
Recommendation 1.4: Set up coordination
For each of these enabling conditions, this mechanisms that will guide the work on
report suggests a set of recommendations multi-sector and multi-level partnerships
ranging from high-level considerations, such for local development and SDG localization
as policy and legal changes, to more practical
steps, including developing adequate M&E Additional recommendations for fragile and con-
systems and preparing user-friendly toolkits flict-affected states (FCAS)
on inclusive service delivery (recommenda­
tions are summarized below and in Annex 1). FCAS Recommendation 1.1: Carry out ap­
Given the regional context, a cross-cutting propriate situational analysis in program­
theme on social cohesion and fragility was ming local governance and local develop­
also considered and the recommendations ment interventions in FCAS
section for each enabling condition includes a
set of dedicated recommendations for fragile FCAS Recommendation 1.2: Target quick
and conflict-affected states. The weak level of wins and phase in legal and policy reforms
state–society relations in these contexts brings
additional complexities to strengthening local Enabling condition #2: Ensuring that
governments, while fostering local develop­ mandates are adequately funded and
ment in these settings is a critical measure to inclusive service delivery is promoted
encourage resilience and promote sustainable (SDGs: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 11, 14, 15, 17)
peace. The recommendations provided in the Recommendation 2.1: Adopt a phased-in
report and their linkages with the SDGs are as approach to transferring resources to local
follows. governments

Conclusion 71
Recommendation 2.2: Establish transpar­ Recommendation 3.3: Promote the devel­
ent and predictable grant systems to trans­ opment of economic clusters
fer financial resources to local governments
Additional recommendations for fragile and con-
Recommendation 2.3: Design equalization flict-affected states (FCAS)
mechanisms to correct vertical and hori­
zontal imbalances in the region’s intergov­ FCAS Recommendation 3.1: Local govern­
ernmental fiscal frameworks ments to play a role in local economic re­
covery
Recommendation 2.4: Develop multi-stake­
holder “inclusive service delivery” practical FCAS Recommendation 3.2: Integrate spa­
toolkits to be distributed among local au­ tial planning and territorial management
thorities approaches

Recommendation 2.5: Establish monitor­ Enabling condition #4: Adequate capacity


ing and evaluation systems of local govern­ development is delivered and responds to
ment performance and local development needs (SDG: 17)
Recommendation 4.1: Develop capaci­
Recommendation 2.6: Establish clear and ty-development systems for local govern­
transparent mechanisms for sharing reve­ ment staff/administrative personnel
nues from natural resources between cen­
tral and subnational levels Recommendation 4.2: Scale up capaci­
ty-development pilot programmes to na­
Additional recommendations for fragile and con- tionwide programmes
flict-affected states (FCAS)
Recommendation 4.3: Include local com­
FCAS Recommendation 2.1: Involve local munities in capacity-development activi­
governments in transitional service deliv­ ties
ery frameworks, as appropriate
Recommendation 4.4: Involve national-lev­
FCAS Recommendation 2.2: Support local el and local-level schools and training insti­
finances and strengthen financial integrity tutes in designing and delivering local-ca­
and anti-corruption measures at the local pacity development plans
government level
Recommendation 4.5: Strengthen collabo­
Enabling condition #3: Local governments ration with regional networks of local gov­
play a greater role in local economic ernments to increase interest and visibility
development (LED) (SDGs: 1, 8 and 9) for local government capacity needs
Recommendation 3.1: Identify country-spe­
cific roles and responsibilities of local gov­ Additional recommendations for fragile and con-
ernments to promote LED initiatives flict-affected states (FCAS)

Recommendation 3.2: Support sustainable


funding solutions to promote LED

72 Localizing the 2030 Agenda and the SDGs: Strengthening Local Government Action in Central Africa
FCAS Recommendation 4.1: Establish or
restore local government operational ca­
pacities

FCAS Recommendation 4.2: Support local


peace committees

The implementation of these measures will


empower local governments to more fully play
their role as key promoters of local develop­
ment and enable them to contribute to the
SDGs localization agenda, as well as fulfilling
their mission as highlighted in the New Urban
Agenda.

Conclusion 73
Annexes

PHOTO: UN PHOTO/ESKINDER DEBEBE/CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

74 Localizing the 2030 Agenda and the SDGs: Strengthening Local Government Action in Central Africa
Annex 1: Summary table of recommendations to promote sustainable and
resilient local development in Central Africa

Enabling condition and SDGs Recommendations


localization linkages
1.1: Introduce or update legal provisions to provide clarity to subnational entities
1. Establishing 1.2: Launch political processes in the form of national multi-stakeholder conferences on
a clear legal the adequate transfer of resources and competencies to local governments
framework and 1.3: Develop national strategies on local development and SDG localization
supportive policy 1.4: Set up coordination mechanisms that will guide the work on multi-sector and
environment multi-level partnerships for local development and SDG localization.
Additional recommendations for fragile and conflict-affected states (FCAS)
Linkage with SDGs: FCAS 1.1: Carry out appropriate situational analysis in programming local governance
5, 10, 11, 16 and 17 and local development interventions in FCAS
FCAS 1.2: Target quick wins and phase in legal and policy reforms
2.1: Adopt a phased-in approach to transferring resources to local governments
2.2: Establish transparent and predictable grant systems to transfer financial resources to
local governments
2. Ensuring that 2.3: Design equalization mechanisms to correct vertical and horizontal imbalances in the
mandates are region’s intergovernmental fiscal frameworks
adequately fund- 2.4: Develop multi-stakeholder “inclusive service delivery” practical toolkits to be distrib-
Cross ed and inclusive uted among local authorities
cutting: service delivery is 2.5: Establish monitoring and evaluation systems of local government performance and
Social promoted local development
cohesion 2.6: Establish clear and transparent mechanisms for sharing revenues from natural
and Linkage with SDGs: resources between central and subnational levels.
peace 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 11, 14, Additional recommendations for fragile and conflict-affected states (FCAS)
15, 17
FCAS 2.1: Involve local governments in transitional service delivery frameworks, as
appropriate
FCAS 2.2: Support local finances and strengthen financial integrity and anti-corruption
SDG: 16 measures at the local government level
3. Local govern- 3.1: Identify country-specific roles and responsibilities of local governments to promote
ments play a LED initiatives
greater role in 3.2: Support sustainable funding solutions to promote LED
local economic de-
3.3: Promote the development of economic clusters
velopment (LED)
Additional recommendations for fragile and conflict-affected states (FCAS)
FCAS 3.1: Local governments to play a role in local economic recovery
Linkage with SDGs:
1, 8 and 9 FCAS 3.2: Integrate spatial planning and territorial management approaches

4.1: Develop capacity-development systems for local government staff/administrative


personnel
4. Adequate 4.2: Scale up capacity-development pilot programmes to nationwide programmes
capacity develop- 4.3: Include local communities in capacity-development activities
ment is delivered 4.4: Involve national-level and local-level schools and training institutes in designing and
and responds to delivering local-capacity development plans
needs 4.5: Strengthen collaboration with regional networks of local governments to increase
interest and visibility for local government capacity needs
Linkage with SDG: 17 Additional recommendations for fragile and conflict-affected states (FCAS)
FCAS 4.1: Establish or restore local government operational capacities
FCAS 4.2: Support local peace committees
Annexes 75
Annex 2: References and Beuermann, Diether W. and Maria Amelina
bibliography (2011). The Role of Local Governments’ Efficiency
in Decentralized Public Service Delivery: Evidence
ACPLGP (2012). The ARIAL programme. Avai­ from a Randomized Intervention in Rural Russia.
lable at: http://www.acplgp.net/News/The- Available at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/pa­
ARIAL-programme-Background. pers2.cfm?abstract_id=1958688.

Adeyeye, Mike (2010). Exploring Democratic Beyer, Alysha, Claire Peterson and Anita Shar­
Decentralisation Reforms: Lessons from Africa. ma (2003). The Role of Participation and Part­
The Political Studies Association of Ireland An­ nerships in Local Economic Development in
nual Conference. Africa. Working Paper, May 2003, New York
University’s Robert Wagner Graduate School
AfDB (2013). Country profiles. Available at: of Public Service. Capstone: Advanced Project
http://www.afdb.org/en/countries/. in International Policy, Management, Finance,
and Planning.
Ariza Duarte, Juan Cristobal (2012). Formula-
cion de la Fase III del programa nacional de de- Bigombe, P. (2003). The decentralized forestry
sarrollo local los municipios hacia el horizonte taxation system: local management and state’s
2020. Malabo. logic. Washington DC: WRI Working Paper.

AU (2006) African Youth Charter. Available at: Bird, R. M., Ebel, R. D. and Wallich, C. I. (1995).
http://www.un.org/en/africa/osaa/pdf/au/afri­ Decentralization of the Socialist State. Washing­
can_youth_charter_2006.pdf ton D.C.: World Bank.

AU (2011) African Youth Decade 2009-2018 Plan Bobiokino, C. and E. Dipanda (2002). Enquete
of Action – Accelerating Youth Empowerment for sur les reseaux de la fraude electorale au Cam­
Sustainable Development. Available at: http:// eroun, Mutations 668: 3–4.
www.un.org/en/africa/osaa/pdf/au/african_
youth_decade_2009-2018.pdf. Brancati, Dawn (2006). Decentralization: Fuel­
ing the fire or dampening the flames of ethnic
AU (2014) African Charter on the Values, Prin- conflict and secessionism? International Orga-
ciples and Standards of Decentralisation and nization, 60, Summer 2006, pp. 651–685.
Local Governance. Available at: http://delog.
org/web/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/AF­ Brosio, Giorgio (2000). Decentralisation in Afri-
RICAN-CHARTER-ON-THE-VALUES-PRINCI­ ca. IMF.
PLES-DECENTRALISATION-EN-Final-2.pdf.
Burke, Christopher and Wenran Jiang (2009).
Awono, Abdon, Ousseynou Ndoye, and Luke Chinese Companies in the Extractive Indus-
Preece (2010). Empowering Women’s Capacity tries of Gabon & the DRC: Perceptions of Trans-
for Improved Livelihoods in non-timber Forest parency. Available at: http://eiti.org/files/
Product Trade in Cameroon. International Jour- Chinese_Companies_in_the_Extractive_In­
nal of Social Forestry, 2010, 3(2): 151–163. dustries_of_Gabon_and_the_DRC._CCS_re­
port_August_2009.pdf.

76 Localizing the 2030 Agenda and the SDGs: Strengthening Local Government Action in Central Africa
Cabral, Lidia (2011). Decentralisation in Afri- cal-Central Relations. Public Administration and
ca: Scope, Motivations and Impact on Service Development, Vol. 23, No. 1, pp. 77–88.
Delivery and Poverty. Working Paper 20, Fu­
ture Agricultures Consortium. Available at: Ebel and Yilmaz (2001). Texts Submitted for the
https://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/han­ International Symposium on Fiscal Imbalance.
dle/123456789/2325 Commission on Fiscal Imbalance. Available
at: http://www.groupes.finances.gouv.qc.ca/
Cardiff Consensus (2011). The Cardiff Consensus desequilibrefiscal/en/pdf/recueil_en.pdf.
for Local Economic Development. CLGC. Avail­
able at: http://www.clgf.org.uk/default/assets/ ECLAC/CEPAL (2004). Local Economic Devel­
File/CLGF_statements/2011%20Cardiff%20 opment and Decentralization in Latin America,
consensus%204pp.pdf CEPAL Review 82, April 2004, by Francisco Al­
burqueque.
CIA (2013). World Factbook. Available at:
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the- ECLAC/CEPAL (2005). Local economic develop­
world-factbook/. ment and territorial competitiveness in Latin
America, by Iván Silva Lira, in CEPAL Review 85,
CLGF (2008) Aberdeen Agenda: Commonwealth April 2005.
Principles on Good Practice for Local Democra-
cy and Good Governance. Available at: http:// Edou, Emmanuel (2008). Implementation of de-
www.clgf.org.uk/default/assets/File/CLGF_ centralization in Cameroon: Problems, Challeng-
statements/Aberdeen-agenda.pdf. es and Strategies. Ministry of Territorial Admin­
istration and Decentralization.
CLGF (2010) Kampala Call to Action. Avail­
able at: http://www.clgf.org.uk/whats-new/cl­ Efoua, S. (2002). Gestion des forets communau­
gf-blog/un-global-forum-kampala-2010/. taires dans la region de Lomie: quels profits
pour les communautes locales?
Conyers, Diana (2007). Decentralisation and
Service Delivery: Lessons from Sub-Saharan EITI (2007). Extractive Industries Transparency
Africa. IDS Bulletin, Vol 38 No 1. Initiative bulletin 2007.

Cooke, Philip (2001). Clusters as Key Determi- EITI (2009). Extractive Industries Transparency
nants of Economic Growth: the example of bio- Initiative bulletin 2009.
technology. Available at: http://www.nordre­
gio.se/Global/Publications/Publications%20 EITI (2013). Country reports pages, 2013.
2001/R2001_2/R0102_p23.pdf.
Etoungou, P. (2003). Decentralization viewed
Cosmas, Cheka (2007). The State of the Process from inside: the implementation of communi­
of Decentralisation in Cameroon. Africa Devel- ty forests in East-Cameroon. Washington DC:
opment, Vol XXXII, no.2, 2007, pp. 181–196. WRI Working Paper.

Crook, R. C. (2003). Decentralisation and Pov­ European Union (2013). Country strategy pa-
erty Reduction in Africa: The Politics of Lo­ pers.

Annexes 77
Fjeldstad, O-H. (2002). Collectors, councillors Ikoghou-Mensah, David (2012). Remarques à
and donors: local government taxation and propos de la décentralisation au Gabon. Avail­
state–society relations in Tanzania, IDS Bulletin able at: http://www.institut-idef.org/IMG/doc/
33, 3: 21–29. IKOGHOU-MENSAH.doc.

Furtado, Xavier (2001). Decentralization and ILO (2008). State of Local Economic Development
Capacity Development: Understanding the links LEDNA Stock Taking for Algeria, Cameroon, Cape
and the implications for Programming. CIDA oc­ Verde, Libya, Morocco, Somalia, Tunisia and Zim-
casional series on Capacity Building. babwe. International Labor Organization.

Garrett, N. (2009). Preliminary observations ILO (2012). Decent Work Indicators in Africa – A
from DRC. Available at: http://eiti.org/files/Gar­ first assessment based on national sources. In­
rett_EITI_10_2007.pdf. ternational Labour Organization.

Garrett, Nicholas and Harrison Mitchell (2009). ILO (2013). Measuring Informality: A Statisti-
Trading Conflict for Development. DFID, LSE, cal Manual on the Informal sector and informal
UGhent, RCS. umeployment. International Labor Organiza­
tion.
GIZ (2013). Supporting Decentralisation and Lo-
cal Development. Available at: http://www.giz. IMF (2009). Macro Policy Lessons for a Sound
de/en/worldwide/19638.html. Design of Fiscal Decentralization. Background
Studies. IMF. Available at: https://www.imf.org/
Glennie, Jonathan and Gideon Rabinowitz external/np/pp/eng/2009/072709.pdf.
(2013). Localising Aid: A whole of society ap-
proach. ODI, Centre for Aid and Public Ex­ IMF (2010). Cameroon: Poverty Reduction
penditure. Available at: https://www.odi.org/ Strategy Paper. IMF Country Report No. 10/257.
publications/7571-localising-aid-whole-soci­ Washington DC.
ety-approach.
Karsenty, A. (2002). Gouvernance et forets trop­
Glennie, Jonathan, Alastair McKenchie, Gideon icales: l’exemple du Cameroun, Informations et
Rabinowitz and Ahmed Ali (2013). Localising Commentaires 119.
Aid: Sustaining Change in the Public, Private and
Civil Society Sector. ODI Centre for Aid and Pub­ Kassibo, B. (2002). Participatory management
lic Expenditure. Available at: https://www.odi. and democratic decentralisation of the Samori
org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publica­ Forest in Babye commune, Mopti region, Mali.
tions-opinion-files/8284.pdf. Paper presented at the World Resources Insti­
tute Workshop on ‘Decentralisation and the
Guardian (2012). Medellín emerges as a Latin Environment’. Bellagio, Italy, 18–22 February.
American trailblazer for local economic growth.
The Guardian, Global Development, Poverty Kouna, C. (2001). Performance et accountabil-
Matters Blog. ité dans la gestion des redevances forestieres au
Sud-Cameroun. Rapport, Yaoundé: CIFOR.
Human Rights Watch (2009). Well Oiled: Oil and
Human Rights in Equatorial Guinea.

78 Localizing the 2030 Agenda and the SDGs: Strengthening Local Government Action in Central Africa
Kundishora, Phillip (2009). An overview of de- Mitullah, W. V. (2004). Local Governance and
centralization and local governance in Eastern Poverty Alleviation in Africa. Regional Develop-
and Southern Africa. Municipal Development ment Dialogue 25.1.
Partnership Eastern and Southern Africa.
Mosser-Cleaud, S. (2003). Les enjeux de la
Larson, A. M. (2002). Natural resources and de­ coope´ration au Cameroun. Revue Internatio-
centralization in Nicaragua: are local govern­ nale de l’Economie Sociale, 288: 66.
ments up to the job? World Development 30, 1:
17–31. Ndegwa, Stephen N. (2002). Decentralization in
Africa: A stocktaking survey. World Bank, Africa
Lavergne, Réal and John Saxby (2001). Capac- Region, 2002.
ity Development: Vision and Implications. CIDA
Canadian International Development Agency, Nell, Etienne, and Tony Binns (2001). Initiating
Capacity Development, Occasional Series. Developmental Local Government in South
Africa: Evolving Local Economic Development
Local Public Sector Initiative (2013). The Local Policy, in: Regional Studies, Vol. 35:4, pp.355–
Public Sector's Role in Achieving Development 370, 2001.
Goals: Subnational Governance, Finance, and
the Post-2015 Global Development Agenda. New York Times (2003). São Tomé Agreement
Available at: http://www.localpublicsector. Reinstates President; Mutineers Pardoned.
org/lps_development_study.htm.
Nguinguiri, J. C. (1997). Les approches participa-
Malam, Laouli and Ernest Ilboudo (2012). tives dans la gestion des écosystèmes forestiers
Decentralization in West and Central Africa: d’Afrique centrale. Revue des initiatives existan­
Learning from local and intersector lessons - Ed- tes. Pointe-Noire: FORAFRI/Réseau Forêt de la
ucation, Water, Health. ROCARE/ERNWACA. Ba­ CORAF.
mako, Mali.
Nnandongo, Guillermo (2002). Administrative
Medzo-Me-Ntetome, Olivia et al. (2012) La and Civil Service Reform in Equatorial Guinea.
décentralisation au Gabon: bilan et perspectives.
Oates, Wallace (1972). Fiscal Federalism. Har­
MINATD (2010). Public opinion poll – decen­ court.
tralization.
Oates, Wallace (1999). An Essay on Fiscal Feder­
Ministere de la decentralisation (2013). Strat- alism. Journal of Economic Literature Vol. XXXVII
egie nationale de decentralisation et de decon- pp. 1120–1149.
centration 2013–2018.
Oates, Wallace (2007). On the Theory and Prac­
Mitchell, Harrison and Nicholas Garrett (2009). tise of Fiscal Decentralization. Working Papers
Beyond Conflict: Reconfiguring approaches to 0701, CREI Università degli Studi Roma Tre.
the regional trade in minerals from Eastern DRC.
Available at: http://r4d.dfid.gov.uk/PDF/Out­ Ojong, Nathanael (2011) Livelihood Strate­
puts/CrisisStates/Beyond-Conflict.pdf. gies in African Cities: The Case of Residents in

Annexes 79
Bamenda, Cameroon. African Review of Eco- PRSP/Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (2009).
nomics and Finance, Vol. 3, No.1. Cameroon.

Organisation Internationale de la Franco­ PwC (2013). Global tax services pages, 2013.
phonie/OIF (2009). Lancement officiel du Pro-
gramme d’Appui au développement local (PADL) Reporters without Borders (2013). Available at:
au Gabon. http://en.rsf.org/.

Oyugi, W. O. (2000). Decentralization for good Revenue Watch (2013). Country profiles pages,
governance and development. Regional Devel- 2013.
opment Dialogue, vol 21, pp. 3–22.
Ribot, J. (2002). African decentralization: local
Oyono, P. R. (2003a). Institutional paralysis, rep­ actors, powers and accountability. Geneva:
resentation and local management of forests UNRISD, Paper no. 8.
in Cameroon: elements of natural resource
sociology for social theory and public policy. Ribot, J. (2003). Democratic Decentralization of
Washington DC: WRI Working Paper 15. Natural Resources: institutionalizing popular
participation. Washington, DC: WRI.
Oyono, P. R. (2003b). Rhetorics, infra-discourses
and violence in Cameroon’s system of natural re- Rodriguez-Posse, Andrés and Sylvia Tijmstra
source management (Ph.D. proposal). (2005). Local Economic Development as an al­
ternative approach to economic development
Oyono, P. R. and L. Temple (2003). Metamor­ in Sub-Saharan Africa (A report for the World
phose des organisations rurales au Cameroun Bank).
et implications pour la recherche agricole et la
gestion des ressources naturelles. Revue Inter- Rogerson, C. M. (1996). Image enhancement
nationale de l’Economie Sociale 288: 67–79. and local economic development in Johannes­
burg. Urban Forum 7, 139–56.
Oyono, P. R., C. Kouna and W. Mala (2003). For­
est benefits in Cameroon: global structure, Sciences-Po Bordeaux (2013). L’etat de droit.
issues involving access and decision-making Available at: http://www.etat.sciencespobor­
hiccoughs. Forest Policy and Economics. deaux.fr/index.asp.

Oyono, P. R. (2004). One step forward, two steps Seade, J., G. Brosio, A. Mati, A. Catalan, A.
back? Paradoxes of natural resources manage­ Raouya, J. Hartley, F. Vaillancourt, and K. Kubo­
ment decentralisation in Cameroon. Journal of ta (2005). DR Congo: Assistance Technique en
Modern African Studies, 42, 1, pp. 91–111. matiere de Decentralisation Fiscale. FAD.

Pashev, Konstantin (2006). Understanding Tax da Silva, Kelly Cristiane (2007). Desenvolvimen-
Corruption in Transition Economies: Evidence to de capacidades e a edificação da adminis-
from Bulgaria. MPRA Paper 974, University Li­ tração pública em Timor-Leste, en Kelly Cris­
brary of Munich, Germany. tiane da Silva y Daniel Schroeter Simião (org),
Timor-Leste por trás do palco – Cooperação

80 Localizing the 2030 Agenda and the SDGs: Strengthening Local Government Action in Central Africa
internacional e a dialética da formação do Es­ UN (2009). Public Administration Country Pro-
tado, Editora UFMG, Belo Horizonte. files.

Skalnik Leff, Carol (1999). Democratization and UNCDF (2010a) Performance-based grant sys-
Disintegration in Multi-National States: the tems: concept and international experience. UN­
break-up of the communist federations. World CDF, New York.
Politics, 51, 2, 1999, pp. 205–235.
UNCDF (2010b). Global Forum on Local Devel-
Smoke, Paul (2003). Decentralisation in Afri­ opment Report – Pursuing the MDGs through
ca: Goals, Dimensions, Myths and Challenges. Local Government. Kampala.
Public Administration and Development, 23, pp.
7–16. UNCDF (2013). Inclusive Future: Inequality, In­
clusive Growth and the Post-2015 Framework,
Snyder, Jack and Karen Ballentine (1996). Na­ UNCF Policy Note.
tionalism and the Marketplace of ideas. Inter-
national Security, 21, 2, 1996, pp. 5–40. UNDP (n.d.) Decentralization and Local Gover-
nance Support Programme - Decentralization
State Department (2013). US-bilateral relations. process in Chad.

Sundar, N. (2001). Is devolution democratiza­ UNDP (1998). Capacity Assessment and Devel-
tion? World Development 29, 12. opment, Chapter 2. Basic definitions and con­
cepts.
Touchton, Michael and Brian Wampler (2013).
Improving Social Well-Being Through New UNDP (2002). Development Policy Journal,
Democratic Institutions. Comparative Political Special Issue: Technical Cooperation, Volume
Studies, published online 27 December 2013. 2, December 2002.

UCLG (2008). Africa. Available at: http://www. UNDP (2007). Supporting Capacities for Inte-
citiesalliance.org/sites/citiesalliance.org/files/ grated Local Development (UNDP practice note
CA_Docs/resources/UCLG_Decentralization­ from 2007). Available at: http://www.undp.
andLocalDemocracy.pdf. org/content/undp/en/home/librarypage/pov­
erty-reduction/supporting-capacities-for-inte­
UCLG (2015). The Local Dimension of the 2030 grated-local-development.html.
Agenda. Available at: https://www.uclg.org/
sites/default/files/en_motion_sdgs.pdf. UNDP (2010a). National reports on progress to-
wards reaching MDGs. UNDP, New York.
UCLGA/Cities Alliance (2013). L’environnement
Institutionnel des collectivités locales en Afrique/ UNDP (2010b) Guidance Note: Scaling Up Sup-
Assessing the Institutional Environment of Lo­ port for Local Development for MDG Achieve-
cal Governments in Africa. UCLGA and Cities ment.
Alliance, September 2013.
UNDP (2011) Scaling up integrated local devel-
UN (2004). Equatorial Guinea. Public Adminis- opment innovations.
tration Country Profile.

Annexes 81
UNDP (2012a). Youth Employment and Local De- UNDP (2013b). African Agribusiness Supplier
velopment in Africa. UNDP, New York. Development Programme Toolkit. Available
at: http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/
UNDP (2012b). WCA Mapping on Local Develop- home/librarypage/poverty-reduction/private_
ment and Governance Programmes. RSC Dakar. sector/african-agribusiness-development-pro­
gramme-toolkit.html.
UNDP (2012c). Policy brief on Local and Inclusive
Service Delivery in Southern and Eastern Africa. UNDP (2013c). Decentralized Governance of
Natural Resources, Manual and Guidelines for
UNDP (2012d). Policy brief on Decentralisation Practitioners. UNDP, New York.
and Local Development in Southern and Eastern
Africa. UNDP (2015). Stabilization in Eastern DRC
through a Joint UN Reintegration Programme in
UNDP (2012e). Policy brief on Local Finance in DRC. Project Document.
Southern and Eastern Africa.
UNDP (2016). Guide to Local Governance in
UNDP (2012f ). Policy brief on Capacity Building Fragile and Conflict-Affected Settings. UNDP,
in Southern and Eastern Africa. New York. Available at: http://www.undp.org/
content/undp/en/home/librarypage/dem­
UNDP (2012g). Eastern Africa regional study on ocratic-governance/local_governance/lo­
Local Government. cal-governance-in-fragile-and-conflict-affect­
ed-settings.htm.l
UNDP (2012h). Southern Africa regional study
on Local Government. UNDP, UNCDF and UNV (2016). An Integrated
Framework to Support Local Governance and
UNDP (2012i) Le rôle des collectivités locales Local Development. Available at: http://www.
dans la mitigation des impacts de la crise undp.org/content/undp/en/home/library­
économique et le renforcement de la resilience page/democratic-governance/local_gover­
socio-économique des communautés pauvres nance/integrated-framework-to-support-lo­
Mali. cal-governance-and-local-devel.html.

UNDP (2012j) Le rôle des collectivités locales UNDP, UN-Habitat and UCLG (2015). Localizing
dans la mitigation des impacts de la crise the Post-2015 Development Agenda. Available
économique et le renforcement de la resilience at: http://observ-ocd.org/sites/observ-ocd.
socio-économique des communautés pauvres org/files/publicacion/docs/final_report_local­
Bénin. izing_the_post-2015_development_agenda.
pdf.
UNDP (2013a). Realizing Africa’s Wealth: Build-
ing Inclusive Businesses for Shared Prosperity. UN-Habitat (2005). Promoting Local Economic
Available at: http://www.undp.org/content/ Development through Strategic Planning. Vol­
undp/en/home/librarypage/poverty-reduc­ ume 1: Quick Guide.
tion/realizing-africa-s-wealth--building-inclu­
sive-businesses-for-sha.html. UN-Habitat (2009) International Guidelines on
Decentralisation and Access to Basic Services for

82 Localizing the 2030 Agenda and the SDGs: Strengthening Local Government Action in Central Africa
All. Available at: https://unhabitat.org/books/ Yusufi, Islam (2013). Europeanisation and Secu­
international-guidelines-on-decentraliza­ rity Sector Reform: The case of the Republic of
tion-and-access-to-basic-services-for-all/. Macedonia. Scholar's Press.

UN OHCHR (2003a). Core Document Forming


Part of the Reports of State Parties.

UN OHCHR (2003b). Africa Region, Equatorial


Guinea.

World Bank (2005). Capacity Building in Africa –


An OED evaluation of World Bank Support. World
Bank Operations Evaluation Department, OED,
Washington.

World Bank (2008). Growth with Governance in


the Mining Sector. Democratic Republic of Con-
go: Growth with Governance in the Mining Sec-
tor. World Bank Report, Africa Region.

World Bank (2010). Country Assistance Strate-


gy for the Republic of Cameroon, for the period
FY10–13, Central Africa Country Management
Unit (AFCC1). World Bank Report, Africa Region.

World Bank (2012). Cameroon: The Path to Fis-


cal Decentralization: Opportunities and Chal-
lenges. Washington, DC: World Bank. Avail­
able at: http://documents.worldbank.org/
curated/en/685841468239367086/Camer­
oon-The-path-to-fiscal-decentralization-op­
portunities-and-challenges.

Yaoundé Declaration (2005). Available at:

http://www.amcod.info/en/download/decla­
ration_of_yaounde%20amcod.pdf.

Yusufi, Islam (2004). The Policy Shift in Fiscal


Equalization in Macedonia: Yet to Be Imple­
mented. The Fiscal Decentralization Initiative
for Central and Eastern Europe. Budapest.

Annexes 83
Empowered lives.
Resilient nations.

United Nations Development Programme


One United Nations Plaza
New York, NY, 10017 USA

84 Localizing the 2030 Agenda and the SDGs: Strengthening Local Government Action in Central Africa

You might also like