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DESCRIPTION OF MODULE
In the case of Lalita Kumari v. Govt. of U.P.1 the Supreme Court has mentioned
following benefits of reporting of crimes:
b) It upholds the ‘Rule of Law’ inasmuch as the ordinary person brings forth
the commission of a cognizable crime in the knowledge of the State.
1
(2014) 2 SCC 1.
3. Methods to report crimes:
Under the Indian Criminal Procedure an aggrieved person may invoke the criminal
justice process either by lodging an F.I.R. or by filing a complaint. These are:
The former would lead to investigation by the police which may culminate in a police
report under section 173 of the Code. In the latter case, the Magistrate may either
order investigation by the police under section 156(3) of the Code or himself hold an
inquiry under Section 202 before taking cognizance of the offence. Though the police
officer in-charge of a police station [u/s 157(1)] and the Magistrate concerned [u/s
190(1)(c)] have also been conferred with the power to take suo-moto
investigation/cognizance of any cognizable offence.
3.1 First Information Report (F.I.R.):
“It has twin object- one, that the criminal process is set into motion and is
well documented from the very start; and second, that the earliest information
received in relation to the commission of a cognizable offence is recorded so
that there cannot be any embellishment etc., later.”
Section 154 (1) of the Code contains four mandates to be followed by the officer-in-
charge of a police station. These are
2
Ibid.
a) every information relating to commission of a cognizable offence, if given
orally shall be reduced to writing;
Section 154 (2) entitles the informant to receive a copy of the information, as
recorded under sub-section (1), free of cost.
The purpose of section 154 will be defeated if the police officer in charge of a police
station refuses to record the information. Therefore, section 154 (3) provides for
remedy against such refusal by an officer in charge of a police station to record the
information. The person aggrieved thereby may send the substance of such
information in writing and by post to the Superintendent of Police concerned who has
an option either to investigate the case himself or direct the investigation to be made
by a police officer subordinate to him, in the manner provided by the Code, if he is
satisfied that the information discloses the commission of a cognizable offence. The
police officer to whom investigation is entrusted by the Superintendent of Police has
all the powers of an officer in charge of the police station in relation to that offence.
Each FIR has a unique annual number given to it which is maintained in FIR book on
an annual basis. This makes it possible to keep a strict control and track over the
registration of FIRs by the supervisory police officers and by the courts, wherever
necessary. Copy of each FIR is sent to the superior officers and to the concerned
Judicial Magistrate. In Madhu Bala v. Suresh Kumar3 the Supreme Court has pointed
out following procedure relating to F.I.R.
Similarly in the case of S.P., CBI v. Tapan Kumar Singh4, the Supreme Court has held
that an entry in General Diary (GD) may be treated as First Information where it
discloses the commission of a cognizable offence.
The issue whether the information under section 154 need to be ‘reasonable’ or
‘credible’ has brought attention of the Supreme Court time and again. In Bhajan Lal v.
State of Haryana5 the Supreme Court has discussed this issue in detail and summed up
in the following words:
In Ramesh Kumari v. State (NCT of Delhi)6 the Supreme Court held that an officer in
charge of a police station is statutorily obliged to record an information disclosing
commission of a cognizable offence. He cannot refuse to register the FIR on the
ground that the information is not relevant or credible.
3
(1997) 8 SCC 476.
4
(2003) 6 SCC 175.
5
1992 Cri.LJ 527 (SC).
6
(2006) 2 SCC 677.
Again in Parkash Singh Badal v. State of Punjab7 the Supreme Court further fortified
its stand in the following words:
Therefore, an overall reading of the Code along-with the judgments discussed above
makes it clear that the condition which is sine qua non for recording a First
Information Report is that there must be information and that information must
disclose a cognizable offence.
The Code of Criminal Procedure has not prescribed any criterion for determining
nature of any offence as to cognizable or non-cognizable. Section 2(c) of the Code
which defines ‘cognizable’ offence simply states that an offence for which, and
‘cognizable case’ means a case in which, a police officer may, in accordance with the
First Schedule or under and other law for the time being in force, arrest without
warrant.
First Schedule of the Code refers to all the offences under the Indian Penal Code and
puts them into cognizable and non-cognizable offences. As a broad proposition it can
be stated that offences which are serious in nature and are punishable with not less
than three years of imprisonment are considered as ‘cognizable’ offence. In case of a
cognizable offence, a police officer can arrest without warrant and can investigate into
such a case without any direction or order from a Magistrate.
Section 154 of the Code requires the officer in charge of a police station to reduce to
writing every information relating to the commission of a cognizable offence, even if
7
JT 2007 (1) SC 89.
given orally to such officer. The issue whether telephonic information if reduced to
writing, can be treated as F.I.R. has been answered by the Supreme Court in the
following cases:
In Ramsinh Bavaji Jadeja v. State of Gujarat8 the Court has held that
“If the telephonic message is cryptic in nature and the officer in charge
proceeds to the place of occurrence on the basis of that information to find out
the details of the nature of the offence itself, then it cannot be said that the
information, which had been received by him on telephone, shall be deemed to
be First Information Report. The object and purpose of giving such telephonic
message is not to lodge the First Information Report, but to request the officer
in charge of the police station to reach the place of occurrence.”
“On the other hand, if the information given on telephone is not cryptic
and on the basis of that information, the officer in charge, is prima facie
satisfied about the commission of a cognizable offence and he proceeds from
the police station, after recording such information, to investigate such offence
then that piece of information will constitute F.I.R.”
Similar view has been shared by another Bench of the Supreme Court in State of A.P.
v. V.V. Panduranga Rao.9 Similarly in case of Tapinder Singh v. State of Punjab10 the
Supreme Court ruled that where an anonymous telephonic message neither discloses
names of the accused nor the commission of a cognizable offence, it cannot be treated
as FIR. The mere fact that this information was the first in point of time does not by
itself clothe it with the character of First Information Report.
In this regard a comparison of the factual matrix of Tapinder Singh and Ramsinh
Bavaji Jadeja are worth noting. In Tapinder Singh the information received over
telephone was vague in nature and only revealed ‘firing at taxi stand’ without any
specific input therefore the Court was justified in treating such information as cryptic
in nature. But in Ramsinh Bavaji Jadeja the information given over telephone could
have been considered to satisfy the requirements of section 154 of the Code because
of the fact that it was given by the Head Constable giving duty at the hospital where
the deceased was brought and secondly he also narrated the facts as to scene of crime
and commission of the cognizable offence.
8
(1994)2SCC685.
9
(2009)15SCC211.
10
(1970)2SCC 113.
3.1.5 Second F.I.R.
In a situation where more information than one are given to a police officer in respect
of the same incident involving one or more than one cognizable offences, whether the
police officer should register both the information separately or he may record any
one of the information as FIR. The Supreme Court has evolved the ‘test of sameness’
and ‘consequence test’ to decide the validity of the second FIR.
One of the earliest cases where the Indian Supreme Court discussed the permissibility
of a second FIR was Ram Lal Narang v. State (Delhi Administration).11 The Supreme
Court laid down the ‘test of sameness’ to decide this issue. It was held that the two
FIR’s denoted separate conspiracies and separate incidents, wherein the first FIR
reveals a smaller conspiracy, the second FIR exposed a larger conspiracy enlarging
the ramifications of offences and scope of the FIR. In such a situation the larger
conspiracy cannot be said to be part of the FIR registered first therefore, the second
FIR is permissible.
In T.T. Antony v. State of Kerala12 the Supreme Court relying on the ratio of Ram Lal
Narang quashed the second FIR. The Court found that the facts of both the FIR’s
were similar, against similar individuals and for similar offences; therefore they could
be stated to be in the course of the same transaction. The Court opined that
11
(1979) 2 SCC 322.
12
(2001)6SCC181.
Similarly in Chirra Shivraj v. State of Andhra Pradesh13 the Court has stated that
In Anju Chaudhary v. State of U.P.14 the Court has applied the ‘sameness test’ to
verify the validity of the second FIR and stated that
“There cannot be two FIRs registered for the same offence. However,
where the incident is separate; offences are similar or different, or even where
the subsequent crime is of such magnitude that it does not fall within the ambit
and scope of the FIR recorded first, then a second FIR could be registered.”
However, in Amitbhai Anilchandra Shah v. CBI15 the Supreme Court applied the
second test to determine whether a second FIR was permissible or not. Relying on the
‘test of consequence’ the Court has stated that
“If the offence forming part of the second FIR arises as a consequence
of the offence alleged in the first FIR then offences covered by both the FIRs
are the same and, accordingly, the second FIR will be impermissible in law. In
other words, the offences covered in both the FIRs shall have to be treated as
part of the first FIR.”
Information under section 154 must be given at the earliest possible opportunity after
the commission of the offence. Prompt lodging of FIR presumes fairness in the
administration of criminal justice. Delay in lodging the FIR often results in
embellishment, which is a creature of an afterthought and much deliberation. But
delay per se is not a ground to disbelieve the prosecution story.
Recent trends suggest that the court is not in favour of giving any weight to the factors
like delay in lodging FIR in sexual offences. In case of State of Punjab v. Ramdev
13
(2010)14SCC444.
14
(2013)6SCC384.
15
(2013)6SCC348.
Singh16 the Supreme Court appealed the courts to display a greater sense of
responsibility and ‘to be more sensitive’ in handling cases of sexual assault on
women, particularly of tender age and children.
The question whether it is obligatory for the police to register FIR on information
given by an informant or he has discretion of conducting some kind of preliminary
enquiry before registering FIR, has been answered in the affirmative by the five Judge
Bench in Lalita Kumari v. Govt. of U.P.17 It was noticed by the Supreme Court that
there were divergent judicial opinions on this issue. The Bench has set the issue at rest
and given following directions:
(a) Registration of FIR is mandatory under Section 154 of the Code, if the
information discloses commission of a cognizable offence and no preliminary
inquiry is permissible in such a situation.
(b) If the information received does not disclose a cognizable offence but
indicates the necessity for an inquiry, a preliminary inquiry may be conducted
only to ascertain whether cognizable offence is disclosed or not.
(c) If the inquiry discloses the commission of a cognizable offence, the FIR
must be registered.
(d) Action must be taken against erring officers who do not register the FIR if
information received by him discloses a cognizable offence.
(e) The scope of preliminary inquiry is not to verify the veracity or otherwise
of the information received but only to ascertain whether the information
reveals any cognizable offence.
Therefore, it can be said that a police officer is duty bound to register a case on the
basis of information pertaining to a cognizable offence.18
16
AIR2004SC1290.
17
Supra note 1.
18
The Ministry of Home Affairs has issued an Advisory on October 12, 2015 whereby all State
concerned are requested to ensure strict compliance of the directions given by Supreme Court in Lalita
Kumari case. The Advisory is available at
http://www.mha.nic.in/sites/upload_files/mha/files/AdvisoryCompulsoryRegistrationFIRs_141015.pdf
3.1.8 Exceptions to Mandatory Registration of F.I.R.
The Supreme Court in Lalita Kumari case has mentioned an illustrative list of cases
where the police officer may conduct a kind of preliminary inquiry before registering
FIR. Such category of cases are:
The Court further directed that the preliminary inquiry shall get over within seven
days time. Any delay and the causes of such delay must be recorded in the General
Diary entry. All information relating to cognizable offences, whether resulting in
registration of FIR or leading to an inquiry, must be mandatorily and meticulously
reflected in the Station Diary and the decision to conduct a preliminary inquiry must
also be recorded.
The Criminal Law Amendment Act, 2013 has brought some relevant changes in
section 154 with regard to registration of FIR in relation to crimes against women.
The first proviso to section 154 (1) provides that where any information is given by a
woman against whom an offence of acid attack, sexual harassment or rape is alleged
to have been committed or attempted, then such information shall be recorded by a
woman police officer or any other woman officer.
The number of crimes against women and children has always been shown less than
their actual number in the Crime Record statistics. The reason for this is twofold.
First, less number of reporting of these crimes and second, reluctance on the part of
the authorities to record these crimes. To overcome these situations, following
provisions are introduced in respective enactments:
Section 166A(c) confers a positive obligation on a police officer and lays down that if
a police officer fails to record any information given to him under Section 154(1) of
the Code in relation to offences of acid attack, sexual harassment or rape, he shall be
punished with rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than six
months but may extend to two years and shall also be liable to fine.
The intention of the legislature in putting forth section 166A(c) by the Criminal Law
(Amendment) Act, 2013 is to tighten the already existing provisions to provide
enhanced safeguards to women.
Section 20 of the Protection of Children against Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO)
express an obligation upon media personnel, staffs of hotels, lodges, hospitals, clubs,
studios or photographic facilities to report a case to the Special Juvenile Police Unit
(SJPU)/local police.
Registration of FIR brings the crime within the criminal justice system to which
judicial authorities have power to be appraised of by the police officer. By virtue of
section 157 of the Code, immediately after registration of FIR the Investigating
officer is required to send forthwith a copy of the FIR to the Magistrate empowered to
take cognizance of the offence. As laid down in H.N. Rishbud v. State of Delhi19, the
recording of information triggers investigation by a police officer under section
156(1) without the order of the Magistrate which consists of following steps:
(5) Formation of the opinion as to whether on the material collected there is a case to
place the accused before a Magistrate for trial and if so taking the necessary steps for
the same by the filing of a charge-sheet under section 173.
19
AIR1955SC196.
Registration of FIR under section 154 of the Code enables the police machinery to
investigate the crime. Section 157 of the Code lays down procedure for such
investigation and requires that as soon as the FIR is registered it must reach to the
Magistrate without undue delay. The object of such provision is to make judiciary
apprise of the registration of the FIR. It also prevents any kind of manipulation or
fabrication in the process of investigation. A bare reading of section 157 suggests that
FIR is not an indispensable requisite for the investigation of a crime. The police
officer may also proceed to investigate a crime if he has reason to suspect the
commission of an offence. At the same time, police is not liable to launch an
investigation in every FIR which is mandatorily registered on receiving information
relating to commission of a cognizable offence. But if it appears to the officer in
charge of a police station that there is no sufficient ground for conducting
investigation, he can foreclose the investigation. It is evident from the language of
section 157(1) of the Code which states that a police officer can start investigation
when he has a ‘reason to suspect the commission of an offence’.
Where the officer in charge of a police station has decided not to proceed with the
investigation, he is required to state reasons in his report for doing so. The officer in
charge of a police station is duty bound to inform the informant about his decision.
Under section 159 the Magistrate is empowered to take necessary steps after receiving
the report of a police officer under section 157. He may;
– direct an investigation, or
– if he thinks fit, may depute any Magistrate subordinate to him to hold a
preliminary inquiry into, or
– otherwise to dispose of the case.
In the case of Arjun Marik v. State of Bihar20 the Supreme Court has highlighted the
purpose and object of sending FIR promptly to Magistrate. The Court observed that
20
[1994]2SCR265.
introduction of any distorted version by deliberations and consultation and (ii)
to enable the Magistrate concerned to have a watch on the progress of the
investigation.”
21
Section 155(2), Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
22
Section 2 (d) of the Code which provides definition of ‘complaint’ makes it clear that any allegation
made orally or in writing to a Magistrate, with a view to his taking action under this Code that some
person, whether known or unknown, has committed an offence, but does not include a police report.
Explanation: A report made by a police officer in a case, which discloses, after
investigation, the commission of a non-cognizable offence shall be deemed to be a complaint and the
police officer by whom such report is made shall be deemed to be the complainant.
The Code of Criminal Procedure confers wide powers on Magistrate to take
cognizance of an offence. Under section 190 of the Code the Magistrate may take
cognizance in following cases:
The power of the Magistrate to take cognizance of an offence under section 190 is
independent from the duty of a police officer to record information under section 154.
Therefore, any aggrieved person can directly approach the Illaka Magistrate and file
the complaint under section 200 read with section 190(1)(a).
Upon receiving complaint, the Magistrate may take any of the following two courses.
He may
‘Cognizance’ in terms of the Code means ‘to take notice judicially’. Therefore, it is
the point when the Magistrate first takes judicial notice of an offence. Where a
Magistrate orders the investigation by the police based on a complaint filed before
him and proceeds with the case on the basis of the report submitted by the police, a
question arises whether the Magistrate had taken cognizance of the offence on the
complaint before sending it for investigation or whether the case was sent to the
police without taking ‘cognizance’ and cognizance was taken only on the report
submitted by the police. Whether the Magistrate has taken ‘cognizance’ of the offence
in a complaint case under section 190 depends upon the steps taken afterwards. Where
he is satisfied with the substance of the complaint and takes steps under section
200/202/204, he must be held to have taken the cognizance of the offence mentioned
in the complaint. On the other hand, if the Magistrate orders an investigation under
section 156(3), he cannot be said to have taken cognizance of the offence. It is a pre-
cognizance step.23
What the Magistrate takes cognizance of is the ‘offence’ and not the offender. Once
the Magistrate takes cognizance of an offence, he acquires jurisdiction to proceed
even against those offenders whose names were not known to the complainant at the
time of filing the complaint or those who had not been named by the police in their
report under section 173.
In Tula Ram v. Kishore Singh24 the Supreme Court stated that where the Magistrate
takes cognizance of the offence under section 190(1)(a), he may have following
options:
(i) He shall examine upon oath the complainant and the witnesses present and
record the evidence of the complainant or his witnesses as per section 200.
(ii) If he is satisfied that there are sufficient grounds for proceeding, he can
straightaway issue process to the accused as per section 204.
23
Judicial authorities which confirm this position are: Tula Ram v. Kishore Singh (1997)4 SCC 459
and Moti Lal Songara v. Prem Prakash (2013) 9 SCC 199.
24
(1977) 4 SCC 459.
(iii) Conversely, if he finds from the evidence led by the complainant or his
witnesses that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding, he shall dismiss the
complaint under section 203.
(iv) The Magistrate can postpone the issue of process and direct an enquiry by
himself or by any other person or an investigation by the police under section
202 to ascertain whether or not there is prima facie evidence to justify the
issue of process.
If the Magistrate is satisfied that there are sufficient grounds for proceeding, he shall
take following steps:
There are some exceptions to the general rule of examination of complainant under
section 200. The foremost exception is provided in section 200 itself. Proviso to
section 200 relaxes the rule of examination of complainant in following two
situations:
Where the Magistrate takes cognizance on the basis of the police report submitted
after investigation under section 156(3) he is not required to examine the complainant.
Instead of taking cognizance under section 190(1)(a), the Magistrate may simply
order investigation by the police under section 156(3). Where he decides to do so, he
is required to record reasons for his decision. Generally, where a complaint discloses
a cognizable offence the Magistrate sends the complaint to the police under section
156(3) for thorough investigation. The police will then investigate and submit a report
under section 173(2) of the Code. On receiving the police report the Magistrate may
take any of the following steps:
(i) He may take cognizance of the offence under section 190(1)(b) and issue
process. If he decides to take cognizance, it would be deemed to have been
taken on the police report under section 190(1)(b) and not on the original
complaint.
(ii) Where after completion of the investigation, the police sends an adverse
report under section 173(2), the Magistrate may take any of the following
steps:
(a) If he agrees with the Police report that there is no sufficient ground
for proceeding further, he may drop the proceeding and dismiss the
complaint.
(b) He may not agree with the police report and may take cognizance
of the offence on the basis of the original complaint, under section
190(1)(a) of the Code and proceed to examine the complainant under
section 200.
(c) He may reject the police report and direct an enquiry under section
202 of the Code and after such enquiry take action under section 203.
Therefore, the power of the Magistrate to take cognizance of the offence under section
190(1)(b) is independent and regardless the view expressed by the police in their
report whether an offence has been made out or not.
This view was reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in the case of Vasanti Dubey v. State
of M.P.25 where the Court held that even if no case was made out in the police report,
the Magistrate could ignore the same and could take cognizance on applying his mind
independently to the case. In doing so, he has two options;
(i) reject the police report and direct an enquiry under section 202 of the Code
and after such enquiry take action under section 203;
(ii) he can take cognizance of the offence on the basis of the original
complaint, under section 190(1)(a) of the Code at once if he disagrees with the
police report.
6. Summary:
To sum up the discussion, it can be said that the Code stipulates two channels for
invoking criminal justice machinery, one by registration of FIR to the police and
another by filing complaint before the Magistrate. It was also noticed that both these
mechanisms are separate and can be used independently by the aggrieved person.
As far as FIR is concerned the Supreme Court in Lalita Kumari case rejected the line
of authorities that favoured giving discretion to the Police to conduct a preliminary
enquiry before the registration of an FIR. Therefore, now in all cases where the
information discloses commission of cognizable offence the police officer is bound to
register the FIR with some exceptions where the police is allowed to conduct
preliminary inquiry.
It is seen that the registration of FIR and investigation are executive functions, but at
the same time the Code, to ensure that such powers are not exercised arbitrarily,
incorporated scrutiny by court at various stages. In cases where the police officer
declines to investigate, the Magistrate may take a different stand. Similarly the
Magistrate is not bound to accept the closure report filed by the police in any given
case. The aggrieved person may also register his grievance to the Magistrate by
invoking section 200. This power of Magistrate is independent of and separate from
the duty of police to register a case. Lastly, the special reporting procedure and the
25
(2012) 2 SCC 731.
insertion of section 166A(c) in the IPC will surely bring more crimes to the national
crime record data.