Case name : B.V.R. Naidu Vs The State of Andhra Pradesh and Ors.

Citation : MANU/AP/0257/2016

Name of the court: high court of judicature

bench composition : m.satya naryana murthy

facts : The plaintiff filed the suit for declaration of title over the suit schedule property and perpetual
injunction. It is alleged that the schedule property originally belonged to the estate of Raja of Tekkali. In
recognition to the serves rendered by Mallapragada Sivaji Rao and his cousin Satyanarayana, the suit
schedule property was gifted to them by the Rajas of Tekkali. The beneficiaries Sivaji Rao and
Satyanarayana reclaimed the property by investing huge amount, excavated a into a tank called
'Narappa Tank'. Besides developing the tank, they also raised babul, coconut trees and other plants.
Subsequently, the beneficiaries sold half of the property to the mother of the plaintiff by name Bade
Venkamma @ Venkatama @ Suramma and executed a registered sale deed dated 03.07.1939 and the
other half of the property was given away orally by Satyanarayana to the plaintiffs mother. Since then,
the plaintiffs mother was in possession and enjoyment of the property. Consequent upon the death of
the plaintiffs mother, the property devolved upon the plaintiff. Since then, the plaintiff is in possession
and enjoyment of the said property. The plaintiff obtained pattedar passbook No. T.D. No. 964 from the
Tahsildar for the suit schedule property and also after duly paying land revenue to the Revenue
Department.

While the plaintiff was continuing in possession and enjoyment of the property, he engaged workers for
removing filth in the tank situated in the suit scheduled property on 19.08.2004. While the process was
going on, the second defendant through his henchmen directed the plaintiff not to use water from the
tank, contending that the property belongs to the Government and thus the second defendant
interrupted cleaning of the tank.

issues: whether the scheduled property is poramboku land or rythwari land Section 11 of the A.P. Estate
(Abolition and Conversion into Rythwari) Act, 1948

reasoning: under sec 11 of the act continous possession is necessary where he contends that the
pattedar passbook and land revenue receipts would confer a title to the immovable property where the
plaintiff was in possession and enjoyment of the property for the last 70 years but it was never in the
possession of the planfiff where it was obtained from his mother upon her death.

conclusion: under literal rule of interpertion, the appeal by the plantiff against decree is dismissed .
Challa Surya Prabha vs. Challa Divakar Venkata Ram

CITATION: 2017(1)ALD134

NAME OF THE COURT: HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE

BENCH COMPOSTION: M.SATYA NARYANA MURTHY

FACTS OF THE CASE : The petitioner-husband filed petition under Section 13(1)(ia) and 13(1)(iii) of the
Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 seeking decree of divorce on the ground of cruelty and also on the ground
that the respondent-wife is suffering from mental disorder, alleging that the marriage between them
was performed on 3.11.1995, but there was no monetary transactions between the parties either before
or after the marriage. Soon after the marriage, the respondent-wife joined the petitioner-husband to
lead marital life at Dowlaiswaram. But neither the parents of the respondent-wife nor her sisters
followed her for Dowlaiswaram as a matter of custom.

The petitioner-husband laid foundation in the pleadings for the grounds under Section 13(1)(ia) and
13(1)(iii) of the Act, pointed out several instances of mental disorder and cruelty. Where trail court
granted . Aggrieved by this the wife filled appeal where she contended for the restitution of conjugal
rights under section 9 of Hindu marriage act,1955

Issues: "(1) Whether the respondent-wife has been incurably of unsound mind, or has suffering
continuously or intermittently from mental disorder of such a kind and to such an extent that the
petitioner-husband cannot reasonably be expected to live with the respondent-wife? If so, is the
petitioner-husband entitled to a decree of divorce under Section 13(1)(iii) of the Hindu Marriage Act,
1955?

(2) Whether the respondent-wife has, after the solemnization of the marriage, treated petitioner-
husband with cruelty creating reasonable apprehension in his mind that it is harmful and endangerous
for him to live with the respondent-wife? If so, is the petitioner-husband entitled to a decree of divorce
under Section 13(1)(ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955?

(3) Whether the petitioner-husband deserted the respondent-wife without any reasonable cause? If so,
is the respondent-wife entitled to a decree for restitution of conjugal rights under Section 9 of the Hindu
Marriage Act, 1955?"

REASONING:

"13(1)(iii) has been incurably of unsound mind, or has suffering continuously or intermittently from
mental disorder of such a kind and to such an extent that the petitioner cannot reasonably be expected
toOn analysis of Section 13(1)(iii) of the Act, it consists of two parts. The first part affords a ground to
grant a decree of divorce when the spouse has been suffering from incurably of unsound mind; and
second part enables the Court to grant a decree when either of the spouse has been suffering
continuously or intermittently from mental disorder of such a kind and to such an extent that the
petitioner cannot reasonably be expected to live with the respondent. The present set of facts attracts
the second part of Section 13(1)(iii) of the Act, i.e., suffering continuously or intermittently from "mental
disorder" to live with the respondent.

The trial Court upon considering the evidence of the petitioner-husband, more particularly, the medical
evidence of three doctors and voluminous documentary evidence produced before the trial Court,
concluded that the respondent-wife is suffering from "paranoid schizophrenia" and granted decrea

CONCLUSION: Since we find that there is a reasonable cause for separate living of petitioner-husband
from the respondent-wife in view of our finding on point Nos. 1 and 2, the decree for restitution of
conjugal rights cannot be passed. The trial Court rightly negated the relief under Section 9 of the Hindu
Marriage Act, 1955, while granting decree of divorce on both the grounds under Section 13(1)(ia) and
13(1)(iii) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. The finding of the trial Court does not suffer from any legal
infirmity calling interference by this Court. Hence, this point is held in favour of the petitioner-husband
(respondent herein) and against the respondent-wife
CASE NAME : : Chejerla Srilakshmi vs. Chejerla Ramesh Babu

CITATION :  2018(4)ALT651

NAME OF THE COURT : HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE

BENCH COMPOSTION: M.SATYA NARYANA MURTHY

FACTS: This petition under Section 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure (for short, 'CPC') is filed by the
petitioner-wife to withdraw FCOP No. 1787 of 2017 pending on the file of the learned Judge, Family
Court, Visakhapatnam (for short, 'the Court at Visakhapatnam'), and transfer the same to Senior Civil
Judge's Court, Kandukuru, Prakasam District on the ground that she is an indigent person having no
means to meet the expenses for traveling and other incidental expenses and that she cannot undertake
journey covering distance of more than 600 kilometers to appear before the Court at Visakhapatnam

ISSUES : Whether the proceeding can be transferred on the ground of the indigent person

REASONING: under the beneficiary rule of interpretation, learned Counsel for the petitioner is that the
motive of the respondent in filing O.P. at Visakhapatnam while working at Hyderabad as Software
Engineer. Section 19 of the Hindu Marriage Act 1955 , deals with place of suing i.e., the Court to which
petition shall be presented. Every petition under the Act shall be presented to the District Court within
the local limits of whose ordinary original civil jurisdiction the marriage was solemnized, or the
respondent at the time of the presentation of the petition, resides, or the parties to the marriage last
resided together, or the petitioner is residing at the time of the presentation of the petition, in a case
where the respondent is, at that time, residing outside the territories to which this Act extends, or has
not been heard of as being alive for a period of seven years or more by those persons who would
naturally have heard of him if he was alive. Therefore, a petition can be filed at anyplace specified from
(i) to (iv) of Section 19 of the Act.

Here, the respondent and the petitioner lastly resided together at Visakhapatnam and filed the O.P. on
the file of the Court at Visakhapatnam. Therefore, no motive is attributable to the respondent prima
facie in filing the O.P. at Visakhapatnam since the cause of action arose at Visakhapatnam. However,
territorial jurisdiction cannot be decided in the present petition since the jurisdiction of this Court is
limited and the petitioner is at liberty to raise such contention before the Court at Visakhapatnam.

CONCLUSION:

the Court at Visakhapatnam is directed as under:

"1. Not to insist the personal appearance of the petitioner on every date of adjournment in FCOP No.
1787 of 2017 pending on its file as long as her Counsel is appearing and representing the case except on
the day when reconciliation proceedings will be taken up or on the day when her cross-examination is
required to be recorded or on any other day when her personal appearance is required as directed by it;

2. Whenever the petitioner attends the Court at Visakhapatnam as directed by it or on the date of
reconciliation or on the date of recording her cross-examination, the respondent is directed to pay
traveling and other incidental expenses to the petitioner and also the companion who accompanies her
to attend the Court at Visakhapatnam; and

3. The above directions would not preclude the Court at Visakhapatnam from passing any order in
accordance with law, in the event, learned Counsel for the petitioner fails to appear and represent the
matter."

CASE NAME : K. Ananda Rao vs. V.S.K. Padma

CITATION:  MANU/AP/2907/2014

NAME OF THE CPURT: HIGHCOURT OF JUDICATURE

BENCH COMPOSTION: M.SATYA NARYANA MURTHY

FACTS OF THE CASE:

The petitioner filed petition under Sections 13(1)(i) and 13(1)(ia) of the Act of 1955 seeking decree of
divorce dissolving the marriage between the petitioner and the respondent contending that the
marriage between the petitioner and the respondent took place on 05-05-1985 at the house of the
petitioner at Karumanchi according to Hindu rites. The marriage was consummated. The petitioner and
the respondent used to live in the quarters allotted to them in the premises of A.P. Bhavan. While so,
the respondent developed illicit intimacy with one Srinivasa Rao, Prakasam District, who is residing at
New Delhi. Subsequently, the illicit intimacy was questioned by neighbours and also gave complaint to
Special Commissioner, Akbar Road, New Delhi, on 18-03-1995. The petitioner warned the respondent to
change her ways of life. Instead of changing her attitude, she started threatening the petitioner to
commit suicide in case the petitioner warned her again. However, the act of illicit contact was condoned
in the presence of mediators.

While the matter Pending the respondent started illicit contact with another person by name Kumar of
Chittoor who is also working in A.P. Bhavan Canteen at New Delhi and the petitioner found love letters
written by the respondent to Kumar. On coming to know about the illicit contact between the
respondent and Kumar, neighbours questioned her but the petitioner was insulted among the public by
the respondent. Thus, the respondent indulged in sexual intercourse with third persons other than the
petitioner which affords a ground for divorce. The petitioner excused the respondent and took her to
Delhi but the respondent continued her old illicit intimacy with Kumar. Hence, the petitioner claimed
divorce under Sections 13(1)(i) and 13(1)(ia) of the Act of 1955.

ISSUE: 1) Whether the respondent had voluntary sexual intercourse with any person other than the
petitioner, if so, is the petitioner entitled to a decree of divorce dissolving the marriage under Section
13(1)(i) of the Act of 1955?

(2) Whether the respondent, by her acts and omissions, caused mental agony, which amounts to mental
cruelty, if so, is the petitioner entitled to a decree of divorce under Section 13(1)(ia) of the Act of 1955?

REASONING:

According to the said rule, if identity particulars of adulterer are known, he must be impleaded as a co-
respondent to the petition and, if, for any reason, name, identity or whereabouts of adulterer are not
known in spite of reasonable inquiries made, the Court, if satisfied, may dispense with naming of the
adulterer as co-respondent. In the instant case on hand, name and address particulars of the alleged
adulterer are known to the petitioner since he is also working in the same building but in different
capacity. Despite knowledge about name and address particulars of the adulterer, the petitioner did not
imp lead him as co-respondent as required under Rule 8(1) of the Rule framed under the Act of 1955

Where under the strict rule, mandates imp leading of adulterer, more particularly the word 'shall'
indicates that presence of adulterer is necessary. Otherwise, it amounts to stigmatization of his
character in his absence and it would adversely affect the interests of adulterer.

CONCLUSION: the court held in favor of respondent under rule "Where evidence was not in lines of
pleadings, the said evidence cannot be looked into or relied upon." there is no pleading by way of
rejoinder, under Order VIII Rule 9 of C.P.C., denying such unholy allegations made against the petitioner.
The Court cannot make out a case basing on the allegations made in the counter filed by the respondent
and grant relief. Hence, we see no substance in the contention of learned counsel for the petitioner to
grant a decree of divorce on the ground that the respondent made unholy allegations which caused
mental agony to the petitioner.

CASE NAME :K. Narasinga Rao vs. K. Neeraja

CITATION : MANU/AP/0267/2015

NAME OF THE COURT

BENCH COMPOSTION
FACTS: Petition is filed by the appellant husband against the order passed by the Principal Senior Civil
Judge, Warangal, idated 17.08.2006, dismissing his petition seeking dissolution of marriage under
Section 13(1)(ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. The petition in 2006, is filed by the petitioner-wife
against the respondent-husband under Section 25 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 for grant of Rs.
25,00,000/- towards her permanent alimony and Rs. 20,00,000/- to Kumari K. Navya, (the daughter of
the petitioner and the respondent), towards her maintenance, education and marriage expenses

ISSUES

REASONING : In the present case, the respondent did not provide any financial support either to the
petitioner or to their daughter till he was called upon, by the Court below in the maintenance case, to
do so. It is only because of the order of the Court below has he been paying Rs. 3,500/- per month as
maintenance to the petitioner. Prior to the academic year 2012-13, the respondent did not provide any
financial assistance even towards the education expenses of their daughter. His complete indifference to
the educational needs of their daughter is evident from the fact that it is only pursuant to the order of
the Court did he pay Rs. 24,000/- and Rs. 64,000/-, for the educational expenses of their daughter, for
the academic years 2012-13 and 2013-14 respectively.

The acrimony between the petitioner and the respondent, their long and arduous legal battle, and the
fact that the respondent is due to retire from service shortly, are all factors which this Court must bear
in mind in securing payment by the respondent of the permanent alimony granted by this Court to the
petitioner. Suffice it to hold that the possibility of the respondent avoiding payment, except on
compulsion, cannot be ruled out. We are satisfied, therefore, of the need to secure payment by him of
the permanent alimony granted by this Court to the petitioner.

CONCLUSION: Divorce is the termination of matrimonial relationship, and brings to an end the status of
a wife as such. On the status of a wife being terminated, by a decree for divorce under the Hindu
Marriage Act, the rights of the divorced wife seem to be cribbed, confined and cabined by the provisions
of the Hindu Marriage Act and to the rights available under Sections 25 and 27 of the Act. (Kirtikant D.
Vadodaria v. State of Gujarat). Section 25 of the Act confers power on the Court to secure payment of
permanent alimony, if necessary, by a charge of the immovable property of the respondent. The said
provision confers a discretion on the Court, and enables exercise of the power to create a charge on
immovable properties if the Court considers it necessary to do so.
CASE NAME : K. Siva Ramakrishna Prasad and Ors. vs. Shriram City Union Finance Ltd.

CITATION : MANU/HY/0472/2018

NAME OF THE COURT :HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE

BECH COMPOSTION: M.SATYA NARYANA MURTHY

FACTS: This civil revision petition, under Section 115 of C.P.C., is filed by the judgment debtors in the
proceedings in EP No. 10 of 2015 in ARC No. 592 of 2014 questioning the order dated 23.10.2018 passed
by the Principal District Judge, West Godavari at Eluru whereby attachment of the property was ordered
under Order XXI Rule 54 of C.P.C., as a step to proceed further under Order XXI Rules 64 to 66 of C.P.C.

2. The petitioners are the judgment debtors in the arbitration case and the respondent obtained an
award to recover an amount of Rs. 1,72,10,736/- in total, together with costs. The respondent filed the
execution petition by invoking Order XXI Rules 54 and 64 to 66 of C.P.C., to attach the petition schedule
property and for sale in order to realise the amount due under the award.

3. The petitioners herein, who are the judgment debtors before the executing Court, filed a counter
denying the material allegations inter alia contending that the 2nd petitioner herein-Smt. K. Mrunalini is
also one of the sharers alongwith the 1st petitioner, as the property was acquired by her grandfather
and the property is an ancestral property of the joint family. But, this contention was rejected by the
executing Court on the ground that the petitioners did not produce any documentary proof that the
property was acquired by the grandfather of the 1st petitioner and ordered attachment under Order XXI
Rule 54 of C.P.C.

ISSUES : whether the order given by executing court to attach the property which was under challenge is
an 'interlocutory order' or 'final order'?

REASONING:

The jurisdiction of this Court under Section 115 of C.P.C., is limited and this Court may exercise such
jurisdiction where the subordinate Court appears (i) to have exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by
law; or (ii) to have failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested; or (iii) to have acted in the exercise of its
jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity. But, in this revision, none of these grounds were raised.
Further, as per proviso to Section 115 C.P.C., the High Court shall not, under this section, vary or reverse
any order made, or any order deciding an issue, in the course of a suit or other proceeding, except
where the order, if it had been made in favour of the party applying for revision, would have finally
disposed of the suit or other proceedings. In this case, the present stage is an attachment was ordered
under Order XXI Rule 54 of C.P.C., which is a step towards sale of the property after filing sale papers,
encumbrance certificate etc., this order of attachment will not terminate the proceedings finally.
Therefore, such order cannot be treated as a final order in view of the law declared by a Constitutional
Bench of the Supreme Court

CONCLUSION:

The order impugned in this revision is not a final order. Therefore, the revision is barred by proviso to
Section 115 of C.P.C. On this ground also, the civil revision petition is liable to be dismissed at the stage
of admission.

In view of our foregoing discussion, we find no ground to interfere with the order passed by the
executing Court and consequently, the revision is liable to be dismissed at the stage of admission itself.

CASE NAME : Kavuru Venkataramanarnma vs. Kavuru Narayana Rao (06.02.2015 - HYHC) :

CITATION: MANU/AP/1076/2015

NAME OF THE COURT: HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE

BENCH COMPOSTION: M.SATYA NARYANA MURTHY

FACTS: The plaintiff filed the suit for partition of schedule property into three equal shares and for
allotment of one such share to the plaintiff and for rendering the account of income from plaintiff's
share in properties, from the year 1949. The trial Court decreed the Suit on 31.3.1955. Aggrieved by the
judgment, the defendants preferred the appeal in AS Nos. 740 and 741 of 2010 and they were dismissed
by this Court.

4. As the first defendant did not render true and correct account and did not cooperate for division of
the property, the plaintiff filed IA No. 1313 of 1982 to appoint an Advocate-Commissioner for division of
property into three equal shares by metes and bounds and to determine the profits payable by the first
defendant. The Commissioner was appointed by the trial Court and the Commissioner filed his report
suggesting the division of property and settled the account. The trial Court, after considering the report
of the Commissioner, passed final decree directing respondents 2 to 5 in the petition i.e., defendants 2
to 5 in the Suit, to pay Rs. 1,23,560/- together with interest from the year 1953-54 to 1985-86 @ 6% per
annum, Rs. 69,599.90 ps. from the year 1986-87 for A-schedule and on Rs. 1,200/- for B-schedule from
the year 1988-89 till the date of realization.

ISSUES: "(i) Whether the trial Court awarded mesne profit against the defendant? If so, whether the
plaintiff is entitled to recover the profits or mesne profits?

(ii) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to claim interest on the share of the profits payable by the defendant
to the plaintiff?
(iii) Whether the first defendant incurred any amount for maintenance and education of the plaintiff?
whether it is deductible from the profits payable to the plaintiff?"

REASONING:

i)According to Section 2(12) C.P.C., the "mesne profits" means those profits which the person in
wrongful possession of such property actually received or might with ordinary diligence have received
therefrom, together with interest on such profits.

It is not the case of the plaintiff at any stage that the defendant is in wrongful possession and never
claimed mesne profits. Therefore, the contention that the plaintiff is not entitled to claim mesne profits
though sustainable. As the plaintiff did not claim mesne profits, the contention or learned Counsel for
the for the appellant is not required to be gone into while deciding this appeal. The principle laid down
by this Court in P. Satyanarayana referred supra is applicable only when the plaintiff claimed mesne
profits against the first defendant alleging that he is in wrongful possession of the property.

ii) the first defendant is appointed as a Receiver to manage share of the property of the plaintiff till he
attains majority in the judgment, dated 31.3.1955. Therefore, during minority of the plaintiff, the
plaintiff is bound to manage share of the property and accordingly he managed. The management of the
share of the property by the defendant is not in dispute till the plaintiff attains majority. According to
Order XL Rule 3 C.P.C., every Receiver appointed under this order, shall furnish such security (if any) as
the Court thinks fit, duly to account for what he shall receive in respect of the property; shall submit his
accounts at such periods and in such form as the Court directs; pay the amount due from him as the
Court directs; and be responsible for any loss occasioned to the property by his wilful default or gross
negligence. So, one of the duties of the Receiver appointed by the Court by virtue of the preliminary
decree, dated 31.3.1995, is to render true and correct accounts and pay the amount as directed by the
Court. The first defendant being the Receiver, who is managing the property, under an obligation to
render true and correct account of the profit realized by him from the share of the plaintiff.

Iii) the first defendant is appointed as a Receiver to manage share of the property of the plaintiff till he
attains majority in the judgment, dated 31.3.1955. Therefore, during minority of the plaintiff, the
plaintiff is bound to manage share of the property and accordingly he managed. The management of the
share of the property by the defendant is not in dispute till the plaintiff attains majority. According to
Order XL Rule 3 C.P.C., every Receiver appointed under this order, shall furnish such security (if any) as
the Court thinks fit, duly to account for what he shall receive in respect of the property; shall submit his
accounts at such periods and in such form as the Court directs; pay the amount due from him as the
Court directs; and be responsible for any loss occasioned to the property by his wilful default or gross
negligence. So, one of the duties of the Receiver appointed by the Court by virtue of the preliminary
decree, dated 31.3.1995, is to render true and correct accounts and pay the amount as directed by the
Court. The first defendant being the Receiver, who is managing the property, under an obligation to
render true and correct account of the profit realized by him from the share of the plaintiff.
CONCLUSION:

i)the Coparcener is not entitled to claim mesne profits from another Coparcener, who is managing the
property. In fact, in the present Suit, the plaintiff claimed partition of Suit Schedule Property into three
equal shares and to allot one such share to him and for rendering true and correct accounts of the
profits on the property from the year 1949. On 31.3.1955, the trial Court passed the judgment and
preliminary decree and its operative portion.

ii) the duty of the Receiver is to render true and correct accounts, but when failed to render true and
correct accounts, the remedy of the plaintiff may be different, however, basing on hyper technicalities,
the final decree passed by the trial Court cannot be set aside, since the first defendant is under
obligation to pay the amount as determined by the Receiver.

So far as the interest is concerned, the plaintiff is entitled to interest on the profits of his share, when
the first defendant withholds the amount without rendering the true and correct accounts. Hence, the
plaintiff is entitled to interest on the profits of his share, from the date of his appointment as a Receiver
i.e., 31.3.1955.

iii) n the absence of any documentary proof, the Commissioner is not supposed to deduct any amount
incurred by the first defendant toward maintenance and education expenses. Therefore, the
Commissioner rightly declined to deduct any amount towards maintenance and education expenditure
of the plaintiff allegedly incurred by the first defendant.

CASE NAME:

CITATION:

NAME OF THE COURT:

BENCH COMPOSTION:

FACTS:

ISSUE :

REASONIING:

CONCLUSION: