QATAR GENERAL PETROLEUM CORPORATION

SAFETY ENGINEERING GUIDE

TECHNICAL SAFETY DIVISION

SAFETY AND FIRE DEPARTMENT

EG. S. 01

GUIDE FOR HAZARD & OPERABILITY STUDIES

(HAZOPS)

A 25.05.1997 ISSUED FOR APPROVAL SFE/1 SFE/3 SFE

0 01.09.196 ISSUED FOR COMMENT SFE/1 SFE/2 SFE

REV DATE DESCRIPTION ISSUED BY CHECKED BY APPROVED

BY

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 SAFETY ENGINEERING GUIDE
FOR HAZOP AND OPERABILITY STUDY EG. S. 01

CONTENTS

1. PURPOSE ……………………………………………………………………………. 3

2. APPLICABILITY …………………………………………………………………….. 3

3. STRUCTURE AND RESPONSIBILITIES ………………………………………… 3

3.1 TEAM STRUCTURE…………………………………………………………….. 3

3.2 CHAIRMAIN……………………………………………………………………… 4
3.3 PROGRAMME ………………………………………………………………….. 4

4. GUIDE ………………………………………………………………………………… 4

4.1 PREPARATION………………………………………………………………………. 4
4.1.1 Training / Briefing ……………………………………………………………. 4
4.1.2 Data Collection ……………………………………………………………….. 4
4.1.3 Data Presentation …………………………………………………………….. 5
4.1.4 Phasing the Work …………………………………………………………….. 5
4.1.5 Scheduling the Meetings …………………………………………………….. 5

4.2 STUDY SESSIONS …………………………………………………………………. 5

4.3 DELIVERABLES …………………………………………………………………….. 6

4.3.1 Records ……………………………………………………………………….. 6

4.3.2 Actions ………………………………………………………………………… 6
4.3.3 Reporting ……………………………………………………………………… 7

5. APPENDIX A ………………………………………………………………………… 8

5.1 HAZOP GUIDE WORDS ………………………………………………………. 8

5.2 EXPANSION OF GUIDE WORDS ……………………………………………. 9

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1. PURPOSE

The technique of hazard and operability studies (HAZOP) has been developed to provide a
systematic method of analysing the causes and effects of abnormal plant operation.

The guide describes the organisation, study methods and recording requirements for the HAZOP
studies. Its purpose is to advise both HAZOP team members and other members of a Project, of
the methods to be used and the other contributions required from individuals. It is based on the
publication “A Guide to Hazard and Operability Studies” produced by the Chemical Industry
Safety and Health Council of the Chemical Industries Association Ltd.

2. APPLICABILITY

The guide is applicable to plant, process, and utility systems. Coverage shall include all lines
containing hydrocarbons or fluids which could pose a hazard, and utilities including the flare and
closed drainage system, the electrical generation and distribution system, and the emergency
systems cause and effects logic.

HAZOP is a paper exercise, involving a review of the latest, most up-to date, process plant
specifications and operational control intentions.

It seeks to disclose plant and process hazards and operational problems; it is concerned with
safety and efficiency. It may be formally defined as:

“The application of a systematic critical examination to the process and engineering intentions of
any new facility to assess the hazard potential of mal-operation or malfunction of individual items
of equipment and the consequential effects on the facility as a whole.”

3. STRUCTURE AND RESPONSIBILITIES

3.1 Team Structure

The HAZOP shall be led by an independent third party chairman assisted by an independent
secretary.

The HAZOP core team shall include members from the following QGPC
Departments/disciplines:-

Operations
Maintenance
Safety Fire : Safety Engineering
Engineering : Process
Instruments/Loss Prevention

Other discipline representatives shall be available on call as necessary.

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3.2 Chairman

Responsibility for the conduct of the HAZOP lies with the Chairman. He should be an
experienced engineer with relevant knowledge in the industry but a generalist rather than an
"expert". His task is to ensure that the HAZOP proceeds smoothly, expeditiously, and
comprehensively. He maintains the essential flow of the study and its vigour. He produces the
HAZOP report and Action sheets, with the assistance of the Secretary, for agreement by the
team before formal issue.

3.3 Programme

HAZOP( 'S) can commence as soon as P&ID's are issued. It is often beneficial to undertake a
preliminary HAZOP at the initial "issue for comment" stage. It is always desirable to have
completed the detailed design stage HAZOP so that its recommendations may be included in
the "approved for design" (AFD) issue of documents. It is essential that HAZOP
recommendations are incorporated prior to "design freeze".

4. Guide
4.1 Preparation

A significant amount of preparatory work is required both by the HAZOP team and by the
discipline engineers concerned, prior to each session. This work, typically comprises:

• Training/briefing of team members;

• Collecting the relevant data;
• Converting the data into a suitable form;
• Planning the sequence of the study;
• Arranging the necessary meetings

4.1.1 Training / Briefing

It is important that members of the team are familiar with HAZOP techniques. When individual
members of the team have been identified and their previous experience is known, training
will be considered. This may involve attendance at an internal or external course or consist of a
briefing by the Independent Chairman, prior to the first session.

4.1.2 Data Collation

The HAZOP Secretary will be responsible for assembling the relevant data to meet the
requirements of the Independent Chairman. Individual discipline Lead Engineers will be
responsible for supplying the data to the HAZOP Secretary and where necessary, advising him
of the data available, latest issues etc.

The following documents will be required by the HAZOP team. Other documents may also be
called for, to amplify or verify information on the P&ID's:

• PFD's;
• P&ID's for Process, Utilities and Vendors;
• Plot Plans;

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• Material Specifications and Selection Charts;

• Single Line Diagrams;
• Equipment Specifications;
• Cause and Effect Charts;
• Hazardous Area Classification Drawing.

4.1.3 Data Presentation

To save time during the study meetings, some documents used during the review may be
marked up with additional information, e.g. P&ID's annotated with normal and design
conditions, instrument set points etc. Any marking shall be done by the relevant discipline
engineer either on his own behalf or at the request of the Independent Chairman"

4.1.4 Phasing the Work

The Independent Chairman will plan the sequence of the study, dividing each P&ID into
discrete parts, which can be examined in a logical fashion, so that the results of earlier studies
contribute to subsequent studies.

4.1.5 Scheduling the Meetings

The Chairman, in consultation with the Project Management, will be responsible for
arranging the study sessions and any other relevant meetings. Booking of the venue and
alerting personnel to their attendance requirements shall be undertaken by the HAZOP
Secretary, who will also arrange for the necessary visual aids, black/(white) boards or flip-
over pads, and computer printout facilities to be available.

It is a prerequisite that the HAZOP should maintain continuity, therefore the sessions should
follow on, on a daily basis, weekends included if necessary. Sessions are intensive and more
than 5 hours per day become counter productive. Breaks for coffee and lunch are essential.

4.2 Study Sessions

The basic requirement is for the HAZOP team to question every aspect of the design to
determine how deviations from normal operations can lead to hazardous situations.

This section outlines the procedure for a study session.

The study session will be controlled by the HAZOP Chairman. The strategy involves a brief
description of the system by the Process Engineer, after which the Chairman selects the first
item of equipment or process path to be examined.

The function of the equipment or system is explained and its explicit purpose agreed by the
team. The Chairman selects the process parameters and "guide words" or deviations, in
sequence to examine progressively all parts of the system.

The examination proceeds orally and as each plant item / process parameter / guide word
/ deviation is resolved a written note is made of the potential hazards or operational
concerns and their causes. Usually reporting is "by exception" in which case only those items

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requiring Actions are noted.

Problem-solving during the sessions is discouraged. However, simple problems may well
be solved and decisions taken to modify the design. Such actions shall be recorded.
Normally the problem will be merely recorded and an Action listed for further examination
outside the main study session.

4.3 Deliverables
HAZOP Record Sheets and Actions Log Sheets are prepared at the end of each HAZOP
session by the Chairman, assisted by the Secretary. During the HAZOP, the Secretary will
record all potential hazards, their causes, any solutions agreed and all actions required.
Immediately after the session the Chairman will check the Record sheets to ensure that all
actions are numbered and action addressees nominated. The Record sheets will then be
copied and distributed to all team members, action addressees.

The nominated project engineer will maintain the overall progress schedule, the outstanding
Actions Log and pass a copy of the record sheets for word processing. He will be responsible
for updating the record sheets following evaluation and action meetings..

Team members are to pass any comments on the Record sheets to the Chairman within two
days. The Chairman shall make any amendments, if necessary, after discussion with the
HAZOP team.

4.3.1 Records
All the drawings, reference data, evaluations, Record sheets, Action Log sheets etc., used or
developed during the course of the HAZOP are reproduced and filed for future reference by the
Secretary. A master copy of each P&ID is to be signed and dated by the Chairman when all
systems on that drawing have been examined and marked up.
4.3.2 Actions

Follow-up actions by discipline engineers are to be passed back to the nominated project
engineer under cover of dated memoranda.

Once a hazard has been identified a wide range of actions may be possible. These fall into
three broad categories:

• Actions which remove the cause of the hazard;

• Actions which break the chain of events between cause and consequences;
• Actions which reduce the consequences.

The nominated project engineer is responsible for nominating an individual to follow up all
actions agreed at HAZOP sessions. He will also state the target time by which the actions
shall be completed. The action addressee will normally be the discipline engineer who
attended the HAZOP session at which the particular problem was discussed. The discipline
engineer should inform his Lead Engineer should additional assistance be required.

The nominated project engineer will hold follow-up meetings (Evaluation and Action Meetings),
probably covering several HAZOP sessions, to discuss and agree the completed "Actions".
The nominated project engineer will be responsible for progress chasing during this phase. He

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will track the progress of all follow-up actions and maintain an "Outstanding Actions Log",
giving the status of any action at any time.

The follow up meetings are complete when all Actions have been satisfactorily resolved, i.e.
the final Actions can be listed as:

• Recommended design changes;

• Amendments to operating procedures; or
• No further action required.

These requirements will then be passed to the discipline concerned. The discipline Lead
Engineer will be responsible for raising the necessary variation order(s) for approval prior to
incorporating the change into the design.

Note that any design alteration agreed by the team should be examined in a similar
fashion to the original design, to ensure that no new hazard is introduced.

Whilst a HAZOP study proceeds without reference to event probabilities, events with very low
probability may be disregarded unless the consequences are extremely serious. In areas
where doubt exists a HAZAN may be appropriate. This involves hazard analysis, using QRA
where relevant, to identify the risk quantitatively.
4.3.3 Reporting

On completion of the HAZOP, the Chairman shall compile a report, describing the scope of
the work and containing copies of the main documents and drawings used. The report
typically will contain an introduction, list of team members, dates of meetings, assumptions
made, actions summary, recommendations and contain principal documents, record sheets
and important minutes of meetings in an Appendix.

The report should be circulated and agreed to by all team members.

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5. APPENDIX

5.1 Hazop Guide Words

GUIDE WORDS MEANINGS COMMENTS

NO, NOT OR The complete negation of the design No part of the intentions is
NONE intentions. achieved and nothing else
happens.

MORE OF Quantitative increase of any relevant These refer to quantities +

physical parameters relevant physical properties such
as flow rates and temperatures
as well as activities like “HEAT”
and “REACTION”.

LESS OF Quantitative decreases

AS WELL AS A qualitative increase All the design and operating

intentions are achieved together
with some additional activity.

PART OF A qualitative decrease Only some of the intentions are

achieved; some are not.

REVERSE The logical opposite of the intention This is mostly applicable to

activities, for example reverse
flow or chemical reaction. It can
also applied to substances, e.g.
“POISON” instead of
“ANTIDOTE’ or “D” instead of “L”
optical isomers.

OTHER THAN Complete substitution No part of the original intention is

achieved. Something quite different
happens.

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5.2 EXPANSION OF GUIDE WORDS

No flow :- Wrong routing - blockage - incorrect slip plate - incorrectly fitted N.R.V. -
burst pipe - large leak - equipment failure (C.V., isolation valve, pump,
vessel, etc ) incorrect pressure differential - isolation in error -etc. )

Reverse flow :- Defective N.R.V.- syphon effect -incorrect differential pressure -two way
flow -emergency venting -incorrect operation - etc.

More flow :- Increased pumping capacity - increased suction pressure - reduced

delivery head - greater fluid density - exchanger tube leaks - restriction
orifice plates deleted - cross connection of systems - control faults - etc.

Less flow :- Line restriction - filter blockage - defective pumps - fouling of vessels,
valves, restrictor or orifice plates - density of viscosity problems - incorrect
specification of process fluid - etc.

More pressure :- Surge problems - leakage from interconnected H.P.System gas

breakthrough (inadequate venting) - isolation procedures for relief valves
defective - thermal overpressure - positive displacement pumps - failed
open P.C.V’s - etc.

Less pressure :- Generation of vacuum condition - condensation - gas dissolving in liquid -

restricted pump/compressor suction line - undetected leakage - vessel
drainage - etc.

More temperature :- Ambient conditions - fouled or failed exchanger tubes - fire situation -
cooling water failure - defective control - fired heater control failure -
internal fires - reaction control failures - etc.

Less temperature :- Ambient conditions - reducing pressure - fouled or failed exchanger tubes -
loss of heating - etc.

More viscosity :- Incorrect material specification - incorrect temperature

Less viscosity :- Incorrect material specification - incorrect temperature

Composition CH. :- leaking isolation valves - leaking exchanger tubes - phase change -
incorrect feedstock/specification - inadequate quality control - process
control procedures - etc.

Contamination :- Leaking exchanger tubes or isolation valves - incorrect operation of system

-interconnected systems -effect of corrosion - wrong additives - ingress of
air - shutdown and start-up conditions etc.

Relief :- Relief philosophy - type of relief device and reliability - relief valve
discharge location - pollution implications - etc.

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