Gender Violence 1

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VAWXXX10.1177/1077801215624790Violence Against WomenGould and Agnich
Article
Violence Against Women
2016, Vol. 22(11) 1343–1370
Exploring the Relationship © The Author(s) 2016
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DOI: 10.1177/1077801215624790
and State Failure: A Cross- vaw.sagepub.com
National Comparison
Laurie A. Gould1 and Laura E. Agnich1
Abstract
The concept of state failure has only recently emerged in the political science and
legal literature. Although state failure has been used to predict violent conflicts, and
all citizens are affected by violence in failed/fragile states, women are especially at risk.
Using data from the WomanStats project, this study’s findings reveal that the physical
security of women is lower in failed/fragile states compared with more sustainable
nations. The characteristics of failed states that increase the likelihood of various
forms of violence against women are identified, including high levels of militarization,
countries with neighboring states at war, and massive movement of refugees.
Keywords
gender violence, failed states, state security, domestic violence, comparative
Worldwide, violence against women takes many forms and can include, but is cer-
tainly not limited to, domestic violence, sexual and psychological abuse, forced pros-
titution, and femicide. Article 2 of the United Nations Declaration on the Elimination
of Violence against Women defines violence against women as
Physical, sexual and psychological violence that occurs in the family, including battering;
sexual abuse of female children in the household; dowry-related violence; marital rape;
female genital mutilation and other traditional practices harmful to women; non-spousal
violence; and violence related to exploitation; Physical, sexual and psychological violence
that occurs within the general community, including rape; sexual abuse; sexual harassment
1Georgia Southern University, Statesboro, USA
Corresponding Author:
Laurie A. Gould, Department of Criminal Justice and Criminology, Georgia Southern University, P.O.
Box 8105, Statesboro, GA 30460, USA.
Email: lgould@georgiasouthern.edu
1344 Violence Against Women 22(11)
and intimidation at work, in educational institutions and elsewhere; trafficking in women;

and forced prostitution; Physical, sexual and psychological violence perpetrated or
condoned by the State, wherever it occurs. (United Nations, 1993, para. 16)
The above forms of violence can stem from a variety of factors, but feminists and other
scholars largely recognize that the underlying causes of violence against women are
social, stemming from patriarchal power structures in which men are in control, par-
ticularly over the sexual and reproductive lives of women, from the apparatus of the
state to the family unit (e.g., Farr, 2005; Fauveau & Blanchet, 1989; Sanday, 1981).
Societal factors that are known to promote violence against women include cultural
(e.g., gender-specific socialization or belief in male superiority), economic (e.g., lim-
ited education and employment opportunities), legal (e.g., laws favoring males in mat-
ters of divorce or lesser legal status for women), and political (e.g., limitations in
political participation; Kapoor, 2003) factors. In addition to these factors, one must
also consider broader issues of governance and a given state’s capacity to deliver
essential goods and services (see also Ward, 2002). The level of social support for citi-
zens that can be provided by governments, and other characteristics of failed and fail-
ing states have been linked to homicide, violent conflicts, and economic decline
worldwide, but have not been examined as predictors of violence against women.
A growing body of literature links the treatment of women in society with large-
scale issues such as civil violence, state security, and willingness to use military force
to resolve disputes (Caprioli, 2000, 2003, 2005; Hudson, Caprioli, Balliff-Spanvill,
McDermott, & Emmett, 2009; Marshall & Marshall, 1999; Melander, 2005). The idea
that there is a relationship between micro-level relationships and macro-level state
functioning is certainly not a new idea, as sociologists have been interested in, and
have debated these linkages for decades (Jaeger, Webler, Rosa, & Ortwin, 2001; Liska,
1980). The debate essentially stems from a central question: “how can we theoretically
integrate the agency of individual social actors with the social and institutional struc-
tures that mediate or condition agency?” (Jaeger et al., 2001, p. 28). Within the inter-
national relations literature, the micro–macro link is explained as “states that typically
exhibit discrimination and violence in their domestic affairs will, theoretically, rely on
the same tools in the international arena” (Caprioli, 2000, p. 52). An extensive body of
literature emerged over the last decade solidifying the link between domestic and
international tools and tactics (Caprioli, 2003).
Much of the work on gender and state violence is contained in the political science
and international relations literature. Few studies have linked gender violence with
overall state fragility and failure, and fewer still have examined variations between
states in levels of violence against women to identify the particular characteristics of
failed and fragile states that increase the likelihood of gendered forms of violence.
Because violence is integral to issues surrounding state failure, the relationship
between characteristics of failed states and violence against women deserves examina-
tion. This study serves as an extension of Hudson and colleagues (2009) and other
scholars (see also Caprioli, 2000, 2003, 2005; Melander, 2005), and holds that there is
a relationship between state fragility/failure and violence against women. In addition,
Gould and Agnich 1345
the present study determines what specific characteristics of failed/fragile states pre-
dict various forms of violence against women, so that international interventions can
be better targeted in the interest of reducing the vulnerability of women to violence
internationally.
State Failure Defined

Although the concept of failed states (variously termed imploded states, collapsed
states, quasi states, de facto states, difficult environments, low income countries under
stress) has been discussed at length in the political science and international relations
literature, few studies exist regarding the relationship between types of crimes and
state failure within the criminological literature. Because of this, it is necessary to
define state failure and discuss the various components of failed states.
Helman and Ratner (1993) are largely credited with coining the term “state failure.”
They define a failed state as one that is “utterly incapable of sustaining itself as a mem-
ber of the international community” (Helman & Ratner, 1993, p. 3). Failed or collaps-
ing states have also been defined as states characterized by state-level institutions that
have ceased functioning, have lost the power to ensure security among citizens, and
are no longer perceived as legitimate (von Einsiedel, 2005). In other words, failed
states do not have the ability (or are unwilling) to effectively govern or deliver core
political and social goods. Failed states often experience high levels of violence, inter-
nal displacement of citizens, and warfare (Helman & Ratner, 1993). In addition, failed
states do not (or cannot) provide basic protection of citizens’ rights and personal safety.
Governmental protection is a basic expectation of the citizenry (Englehart, 2009), and
when states fail this expectation is often not met.
Total governmental failure is a relatively rare event, with only about two to three
complete state failures occurring each year (Marshall & Cole, 2009). Instead of clas-
sifying states as either failed or successful, it is more appropriate to examine where
states fall on a continuum of failure (von Einsiedel, 2005). Given that states can be
classified according to their degree of success or failure, it is helpful to differentiate
between strong states and weak states. Rotberg (2003) describes a strong state as one
that controls its borders, delivers high quality governmental goods and services, has a
well-developed infrastructure, provides security for its citizenry, has an independent
judiciary, and upholds essential civil liberties and personal freedoms. Weak states, in
contrast, exist on the opposite end of the continuum and are typically characterized by
high levels of violence (Rotberg, 2003). Rotberg (2003) goes on to describe weak
states those wherein the
ability to provide adequate amounts of other political goods is diminishing. Physical

infrastructural networks are deteriorated. Schools and hospitals show signs of neglect,
particularly outside the main cities. GDP per capita and other critical economic indicators
have fallen or are falling, sometimes dramatically; levels of venal corruption are embarrassingly
high and escalating. Weak states usually honor rule of law precepts in the breach. They harass
civil society. Weak states are often ruled by despots, elected or not. (p. 5)
The concept of weak/fragile states, or state failure, has been utilized by numerous
governmental and non-governmental organizations to assess nations’ risk of violent
conflicts and economic instability (see also Davies & Gurr, 1998; Goldstone, 2008;
Gurr & Marshall, 2000; Marshall & Gurr, 2005). Several characteristics of state failure
have been identified and used in risk assessment models including measures of nations’
security, political stability, economic and trade characteristics, and social/demographic
factors (see also Marshall, 2008). Although a variety of models of state failure have
been posited, factors such as poverty, population size, and weakened state bureaucra-
cies characterized by political instability (Fearon & Laitin, 2003); grievances such as
high levels of inequality, and ethnic and racial divisions (Gurr & Marshall, 2000);
neighboring states at war, high infant mortality rates, state-led political discrimination,
factionalism, and trade openness (Goldstone et al., 2005); and a stagnant economy
characterized by a lack of gross domestic product (GDP) growth (Ulfelder & Lustik,
2005), are commonly discussed in the state failure literature.
Literature Review
Characteristics of Failed States and Violence Cross-Nationally
The literature on failed, fragile, and failing states is almost exclusively concerned with
state failure as the dependent variable. Very little research has examined links between
specific characteristics of failed/failing states and types of violence. On the contrary,
violence in the forms of war, genocide, and other large-scale conflicts are often con-
sidered characteristics that can be used to identify failed and failing states, or to predict
states’ failure (Barnett, 2005; Brown, Cote, Lynn-Jones, & Miller, 2001; Nafziger,
Stewart, & Väyrynen, 1997; O’Brien, 2002; Poe, Rost, & Carey, 2006; Rotberg, 2003).
A few studies have examined state failure as an independent variable, and have linked
failed states to transnational terrorism (Crocker, 2003; Fukuyama, 2004; Piazza,
2008), states’ use of corporal punishment (Gould & Pate, 2011), and the diffusion of
civil war, political instability, unrest, and interstate conflict with neighboring states
(Iqbal & Starr, 2008).
There are two mechanisms by which state failure is conducive to violence, and thus
should be considered as an independent variable in research on violence. First, accord-
ing to Max Weber’s (1919/1946) definition of a nation-state, the state is an entity that
has a monopoly on the legitimate deployment of power in the form of violence or the
use of force. Failed/failing states have lost their legitimacy to utilize their power as
nation-states, can no longer effectively enforce laws, and therefore cannot control
escalating violence within their own borders. Therefore, failed states exhibit civil war
and violent internal struggles for power (e.g., Rotberg, 2003). Second, failed states
produce environments that are conducive to violence due to the close relationship
between social support and interpersonal violence. Social support is generally concep-
tualized as the level of social cohesion within nation-states, including shared values
and the willingness to aid others (see Pridemore & Trent, 2010). It is measured in
numerous ways—often as welfare provisions provided by the government; and the
cohesion of communities, neighborhoods, and kinship networks — and has found

empirical support in cross-national studies of homicide (Altheimer, 2008; Messner &
Rosenfeld, 1994; Pampel & Gartner, 1995; Pratt & Godsey, 2002, 2003). Because a
state with a stagnant economy or high levels of poverty cannot provide adequate social
support to its citizens, state failure can lead to violence and victimization among failed
and failing states’ inhabitants.
In the criminological literature, homicide is typically examined as a dependent vari-
able in cross-national studies due to its reliability as a measure of interpersonal vio-
lence across national contexts. Cross-national measures of poverty have been
associated with higher homicide rates just as widespread national poverty has been
found to predict state failure (e.g., Fearon & Laitin, 2003; Gurr & Marshall, 2000).
Several studies have found a positive relationship between poverty and homicide
across nations (Conklin & Simpson, 1985; Jacobs & Richardson, 2008; Pridemore,
2008, 2011). Other indicators of poverty such as infant mortality have been linked
with high rates of homicide (see Cole & Gramajo, 2009; Conklin & Simpson, 1985;
Jacobs & Richardson, 2008; Lee, 2001; Lee & Bankston, 1999; Messner & Rosenfeld,
1997; Neapolitan, 1994; Pratt & Godsey, 2003), as well as states’ economic controls
on trade that increase the incentive for illegal activities (see Prasad, 2012). These mea-
sures have also been found to be strong identifiers of state failure (Goldstone et al.,
2005; Nafziger et al., 1997; O’Brien, 2002; Stewart, 2002).
Relative state stability has been used to assess nations’ risk of violent conflicts,
transnational terrorism, and economic decline. Furthermore, some aspects of failed
states have been associated with homicide in the cross-national criminological litera-
ture. However, little attention has been paid to the risks that failed and failing states
pose to the problem of violence against women specifically. Although states’ lack of
equal rights for women has been examined as a predictor of state failure (Brown et al.,
2001), very little research has explored the effects of state failure on violence against
women; also, the characteristics of failed and failing states that are associated with
specific forms of violence against women have not been identified. As governments
worldwide recognize the security risks posed by failed and failing states, the charac-
teristics of state failure most associated with violence must be identified and should be
examined in relation to violence against women, in particular.
Gender Violence Cross-Nationally

Whereas state failure is more frequently examined as a dependent variable, violence
against women has typically been examined as an independent variable in the political
science and state failure literature. Although characteristics of state failure have not
been readily examined as predictors of violence against women, a body of literature
examining the relationship between the role of women in society and state behavior in
the realms of civil violence, interstate conflict, and war has been emerging for more
than a decade. Specifically, gender empowerment and equality have been linked to
governments’ use of military force (Caprioli, 2000; Marshall & Marshall, 1999). In
one of the earliest studies, Marshall and Marshall (1999) examined how gender
empowerment (principally measured by the United Nations Gender Empowerment

Measure [GEM]) influenced a nation’s willingness and decision to use military force.
The GEM is a composite measure that includes a variety of variables that speak to
women’s participation in society, including the percentage of seats in parliament held
by women, the percentage of female professional and technical workers, the ratio of
estimated female to male earned income, the year women received the right to vote
and to stand for election, and the percentage of women in ministerial positions. The
findings indicated that the greater the gender empowerment, the less likely it was that
a country would utilize military force to resolve disputes. Of course, gender empower-
ment does not exist in a vacuum. As Marshall and Marshall (1999) indicate “gender
empowerment itself appears to be a conscious corollary policy to a political develop-
ment process that is characterized by (i.e., strongly, positively correlated with) eco-
nomic prosperity, military power, and active gender development policies” (p. 24).
They ultimately concluded, “there appears to be a very real and robust relationship
between the quality of gender empowerment and the unwillingness of states to use
force” (Marshall & Marshall, 1999, p. 35).
Caprioli (2000) examined the relationship between three dimensions of gender
equality and the amount of military violence used by a country. Social equality was
measured by the fertility rate, political equality was measured by the percentage of
female parliament members and the year that women gained the right to vote, and
economic equality was measured by the percentage of females participating in the paid
labor force. The findings revealed that each dimension significantly contributed to the
level of militarization of disputes. As Marshall and Marshall (1999) found, higher
levels of gender equality were related to lower levels of nations’ use of military actions
to settle international disputes, and this was the case even when controlling for factors
such as wealth and democracy (Caprioli, 2000).
Other studies have linked gender equality with states’ willingness to use force first
during interstate conflicts (Caprioli, 2003), conflict within nations (Caprioli, 2005),
and external armed conflicts (Melander, 2005). Caprioli (2003) measured gender
equality as the percentage of women participating in the paid labor force and the fertil-
ity level, and found “states characterized by higher levels of gender equality are less
likely to use force first in interstate disputes” (p. 205). This was the case even when
controlling for a variety of relevant variables including “major power in dispute, num-
ber of allies, contiguity, economic growth, GDP, single day disputes, democratic
homogeneity, and democracy on state behavior during interstate disputes” (Caprioli,
2003, p. 205). Furthermore, Caprioli (2005) found that greater gender inequality (mea-
sured by fertility rates and labor force participation) resulted in higher levels of inter-
nal armed conflict, as “states characterized by gender discrimination and structural
hierarchy are permeated with norms of violence that make internal conflict more
likely” (p. 172). Finally, Melander (2005) found that countries with a higher percent-
age of female members of parliament and those with a more equal ratio of males and
females in higher education were less likely to engage in armed conflict, again indicat-
ing an association between gender inequality and national levels of violence and use
of military force.
In what is perhaps the most salient article for the current study, Hudson et al. (2009)
linked the security of states to the physical security of women, using data collected as
part of the WomanStats project. Measures of state security included the Global Peace
Index made up of 24 measures of peace (e.g., conflict with neighboring states and
internal wars), the degree of compliance with international treaties, and level of
democracy. Economic wealth, as measured by the GDP, and the degree to which the
country adheres to tenants of the Islamic faith were also included in the analysis,
which revealed that the physical security of women was significantly related to the
security of nation-states. Economic wealth, compliance with international treaties,
level of democracy, and the degree of adherence to Islam were also important factors,
though much less significant than the gender variable.
In many ways, these findings serve as the departure point for the current study. If
the physical security of women is the single best predictor of state security, what then
does that relationship portend for state failure? That is, do measures of state failure
also predict violence against women, and if so, what characteristics of state failure
matter most? Given the dearth of research on the effects of state failure on violence
against women, the present study seeks to answer two research questions:
Research Question 1: What is the relationship between violence against women

and state failure?
Research Question 2: What characteristics of failed states increase the likelihood
of violence against women cross-nationally?
Method
Study Sample
This study examines the relationship between violence against women and state fail-
ure using a sample of 174 countries. Countries were chosen for inclusion in the study
based on data availability and completeness of the data for each country.
Independent Variables
As the previous discussion of state failure highlights, the indicators of state failure are
myriad. Although there are many available measures of state failure, the Peace and
Conflict Instability Ledger as well as the Failed States Index are included in the analy-
sis. These two indices were selected for inclusion because they each capture unique
aspects of state failure. The Failed States Index has been examined in other crimino-
logical research that has explored the relationship between punishment modalities and
state failure (Gould & Pate, 2011) and gender inequalities and state failure (Gould,
2014). Gould and Pate (2011) found that the Failed States Index is a robust predictor
of a nation’s use of corporal punishment as a criminal sanction for adult and/or juve-
nile offenders. Gould (2014) found that some dimensions of the Failed States Index,
namely suspension or arbitrary application of the rule of law, widespread violation of
human rights, and criminalization and/or delegitimation of the state and the rise of
factionalized elites, were important factors contributing to gender disparities in soci-
ety. Although it covers a variety of societal, political, and economic forces that are
associated with state failure, the Failed States Index does not cover every facet of
failure. As such, the Peace and Conflict Instability Ledger has been included because
it provides a robust measure of instability (Rice & Patrick, 2008) and it includes a criti-
cal measure of social support, namely, infant mortality.
The Peace and Conflict Instability Ledger

The Center for International Development and Conflict Management (CIDCM; 2012),
housed at the University of Maryland, developed the Peace and Conflict Instability
Ledger. The index is comprised of seven measures of instability, all of which are
included in our analysis: regime consistency, infant mortality, economic openness,
militarization, neighborhood war, risk category, and an overall risk score. Regime con-
sistency contains a ranking of countries according to how consistently governmental
institutions remain autocratic or democratic. Infant mortality is considered a proxy for
the government’s ability to deliver social welfare services as well as economic devel-
opment. Countries are then ranked according to whether they have the best record
(lowest 25th percentile), worst record (highest 25th percentile), or fall somewhere in
between (middle 50th percentile). Economic openness is defined as “the proportion of
a country’s GDP accounted for by the value of all trade (exports plus imports)”
(CIDCM, 2012, p. 16). Militarization is a measure of the number of individuals active
in the armed services, relative to the rest of the population. This measure is included
because the greater the number of armed service members, the greater the state’s abil-
ity to engage in conflict. Neighborhood war refers to the presence of conflict in neigh-
boring states, a factor that can contribute to instability. This variable is a dichotomous
variable, where 1 = at least one neighbor is involved in war and 0 = no neighboring
countries are at war. Based on the aforementioned categories, countries are then clas-
sified as highest risk, high risk, moderate risk, some risk, or low risk.
The Failed States Index

One of the most commonly used measures of state failure is the Failed States Index,
compiled by the Fund for Peace (2011). The index includes 12 measures along three
dimensions: social, economic, and political. Social indicators include mounting demo-
graphic pressures, massive movement of refugees or internally displaced persons cre-
ating complex humanitarian emergencies, legacy of vengeance-seeking group
grievance or group paranoia, and chronic and sustained human flight. Economic indi-
cators include uneven economic development along group lines, and sharp and/or
severe economic decline. Finally, political indicators include criminalization and/or
delegitimization of the state, progressive deterioration of public services, suspension
or arbitrary application of the rule of law and widespread violation of human rights,
security apparatus that operates as a “state within a state,” a rise of factionalized elites,
and intervention of other states or external political actors. Higher scores in each area
are associated with higher degrees of failure.
Dependent Variables
The primary dependent variable in the analysis is the physical security of women. Data
are derived from the WomanStats Project Database (2013), a large-scale cross-national
project that has compiled quantitative and qualitative data on 310 indicators for 174
countries. The following dimensions of physical security are included in the analysis:
murder, sexual assault, suicide, domestic violence, and female trafficking. All dimen-
sions are then combined to form the Physical Security of Women Scale.
Murder
The prevalence of female murder is measured through a scale comprised of two vari-
ables. The first murder variable consists of an ordinal scale “designed to scale the
sanction of or pressure for female murder in a given state, examining cultural/social
practices that condone murder and/or injuring of women” (Hudson et al., 2013, Part
IIA, Section ii, Subsection d). Values on the scale range from 0 (no evidence of cul-
tural/social practices that condone murder and/or injuring of women) to 2 (substantial
evidence of cultural/social practices that condone murder and/or injuring of women).
The second murder variable provides an ordinal measure of the female murder rate in
each country, wherein 0 corresponds to relatively low female murder rate (0-1.29 per
100,000 of the female population aged 15-44) and 2 corresponds to a relatively high
female murder rate (higher than 3 per 100,000 of the female population aged 15-44).1
These scores are then combined to form an overall score. Higher scores are indicative
of countries that condone murder and have a high female murder rate, and lower scores
reflect lower rates of female murder and cultures that do not condone female murder.
Rape
Data on both the incidence of reported rapes and the rates of conviction for perpetra-
tors of rape were obtained from the WomanStats Project Database (2013) and are
included in the analysis. Incidence of rape is reported as the rate of sexual assault per
100,000, and rates of conviction are reported as the conviction rate per 1,000. We
acknowledge that sexual assault data are problematic even in countries with transpar-
ent crime reporting mechanisms. Underreporting of sexual assault occurs across the
globe, in stable and unstable nations. For example, in the United States, only 29% of
sexual assaults and rapes were reported to the police in 1995 (Berzofsky, Krebs,
Langton, Planty, & Smiley-McDonald, 2013). Reported rapes and sexual assaults
reached their highest rate in 2003 (56%), but reporting declined to just 35% in 2010
(Berzofsky et al., 2013). Underreporting of sexual assaults and rapes occurs for a vari-
ety of reasons, some of which include shame, guilt, embarrassment, or a belief that the
criminal justice system is not effective (National Institute of Justice, 2010). Women in
some fragile nations may not report sexual assaults for many of the aforementioned
reasons, but many may be discouraged from reporting for fear of bringing dishonor to
their families. Reporting of rape in fragile nations may be further hindered because
penal codes in some nations “define sexual violence very narrowly, with many still
framing the problem in terms of indecency or immorality, or as a crime against the
family or society, rather than a violation of an individual’s bodily integrity” (United
Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women, 2011. p. 33). In
addition, women face significant institutional barriers when attempting to access the
criminal justice system (United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the
Empowerment of Women, 2011). In some countries, criminal justice professionals
hold discriminatory views toward women, which limits a woman’s access to the crimi-
nal justice system (United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment
of Women, 2011). In other countries, a lack of trained personnel presents the biggest
barrier to reporting sexual assault. For example, “only one doctor in Timor-Leste has
reportedly been trained to collect evidence in rape cases” (United Nations Entity for
Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women, 2011, p. 53). Despite these limita-
tions, we include sexual assault as a dependent variable because its absence would
represent a glaring omission in any examination of violence against women. We
acknowledge the limitations of these data and are cautious about interpreting the
results of the analysis of the relationship between sexual assault and state failure.
Suicide
A suicide scale consisting of two variables is also included in the analysis. The first
variable provides an ordinal measure of cultural/social practices that condone or pres-
sure women to commit suicide (e.g., honor suicides). The scale ranges from 0 (no
evidence of cultural practices that support suicide or pressure suicide) to 2 (substan-
tial evidence of cultural practices that support suicide or pressure suicide). The sec-
ond variable provides an ordinal measure of the female suicide rate where 0 corresponds
to low rates of female suicide (0-0.99 per 100,000 of the female population aged
15-44) and 2 indicates a high female suicide rate (above 3 per 100,000 of the female
population aged 15-44). These variables are combined so that higher scores on the
scale indicate countries where women may be pressured to commit suicide and coun-
tries that have a high female suicide rate.
Suicide has been included as a measure of violence against women because honor
suicides have replaced honor killings in some parts of the world. For example, in Turkey
evidence suggests that a growing number of girls considered to be dishonored are being
locked in a room for days with rat poison, a pistol or a rope, and told by their families that
the only thing resting between their disgrace and redemption is death. (Bilefsky, 2006, p.
9)
Clearly, the line between honor killings and honor suicides is becoming increasingly
blurred. We have included both the quantitative measure of suicide, as well as the
cultural measure in an effort to gain the most comprehensive picture of suicide as an

act of violence against women.
Domestic Violence
One domestic violence measure has been included in the analysis to capture women’s
reported lifetime experience with physical, sexual, psychological, verbal, or financial
abuse. The domestic violence scale provides a quantitative measure of the percentage
of women who have experienced the aforementioned forms of abuse at some time in
their life.
Female Trafficking
The extent to which females are legally protected from trafficking across borders or
within their country for sexual purposes, slavery, and/or for barter purposes (i.e., debt
payment) has also been included. The scale ranges from 0-4, with lower values being
associated with more national legal protection and enforcement. Specifically, 0 indi-
cates there are laws against trafficking in the country and into or from other countries,
there is enforcement of the laws, the country is in compliance with the Trafficking in
Persons Act of 2000, and trafficking of women is rare. A value of 4 indicates that there
are no laws against trafficking in the country, or from or into the country, the country
is not in compliance with the Trafficking in Persons Act of 2000, victims are not sup-
ported in any way, and the government may even benefit from and therefore facilitate
trafficking.
The link between state failure and human trafficking has been well documented.
The Council on Foreign Relations (2006) notes that state failure is among the most
important factors that contribute to human trafficking. Although any person, whether
male or female, can potentially fall victim to human traffickers, the United Nations
notes that women and children are among the most vulnerable populations (United
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2012). Furthermore, most women and children
are trafficked for the purposes of sexual exploitation (United Nations Office on Drugs
and Crime, 2012).
Physical Security of Women Scale

The Physical Security of Women Scale, which is a combination of the preceding vio-
lence variables from the WomanStats Project Database (2013), is also included in the
analysis. This ordinal scale provides a measure of the legal protection against domestic
violence, rape, and honor killings. Lower values are associated with more legal protec-
tions, such that a value of 0 indicates “there are laws against domestic violence, rape,
and marital rape; these laws are enforced; there are no taboos or norms against report-
ing these crimes, which are rare. There are no honor killings” (Hudson et al., 2013,
Part IA, subsection a). A value of 4 corresponds to countries where “there are no or
weak laws against domestic violence, rape, and marital rape, and these laws are not
generally enforced. Honor killings may occur and are either ignored or generally
accepted” (Hudson et al., 2013, Part IA, Subsection a). Examples of weak laws include
the need for four male witnesses to prove rape, or where rape is only defined as sex
with girls below 12, or where all other sex is by definition consensual (Hudson et al.,
2013).
Control Variables
Six control variables—political rights, civil liberties, GDP per capita, the Gini Index,
sex ratio, and the percentage of the population living in urban areas—have been
included in the analysis. Previous research has found the level of democracy, GDP per
capita, and the Gini Index to be important predictors of the physical security of women
(see also Hudson et al., 2009). The sex ratio of a nation is likely an important contrib-
uting factor to violence against women, as we would expect countries with an even
gender distribution to have lower levels of violence. Furthermore, the percentage of
the population living in urban areas also likely plays a role in levels of violence, with
greater urbanization being associated with higher levels of violence. The percentage of
the population living in cities also serves as a proxy measure of relative
development.
Political rights and civil liberties are measured by Freedom House’s (2012) Freedom
in the World Report. Freedom House provides a comprehensive measure of democ-
racy and freedom throughout the world for 195 countries and 14 territories. Political
rights are measured through 10 questions that gauge the following: “the right to vote
freely for distinct alternatives in legitimate elections, compete for public office, join
political parties and organizations, and elect representatives who have a decisive
impact on public policies and are accountable to the electorate” (Freedom House,
2012, para. 1). Measures of civil liberties are based on 15 questions about freedom of
expression, freedom of association/organization, rule of law, and personal autonomy
(Freedom House, 2012). Based on the findings for each country, Freedom House
assigns a score ranging from 1 (the highest level of political rights and civil liberties)
to 7 (the lowest level of political rights and civil liberties). Data from Freedom House
have been used in a multitude of comparative research studies in criminal justice (see,
for example, Gould & Pate, 2010, 2011; Greenberg & West, 2008; Kent, 2010; Ruddell
& Urbina, 2007; Sung, 2006) and are a reliable measure of the level of freedom
throughout the world.
GDP per capita and the Gini Index provide two measures of a country’s economic
development. Hudson et al. (2009) found GDP to be an important predictor of the
physical security of women; therefore, it is included for comparison purposes in the
current study. The relative distribution of wealth is also likely an important consider-
ation, and the Gini Index provides perhaps the best measure of income inequality. Low
values on the index correspond to more equal wealth distribution, whereas a high Gini
value is indicative of more unequal distribution.
The sex ratio of males to females between the ages of 15 and 64, obtained from the
CIA World Factbook (2013) provides a measure of gender disparities in society. Many
studies utilize sex ratio at birth as an indicator of discrimination (CIA World Factbook,
2013). Because infant mortality has already been included in the analysis, we include
the sex ratio in older groups as an additional measure of gender inequities. The per-
centage of the population living in urban areas was obtained from the United Nations
Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2011). The United
Nations provides raw data on the number of people living in rural areas and urban
areas, and also provides a percentage of the population living in urban areas (United
Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, 2011).
Analysis
The analysis begins with an examination of the bivariate relationships between the
violence variables and the Peace and Conflict Instability Ledger (Table 1). As shown,
regime consistency is significantly associated with higher scores on the murder scale
(r = .280, p < .05), higher rates of lifetime experience with domestic violence (r = .321,
p < .000), higher rates of female trafficking (r = .186, p < .05), and the overall physical
security of women (r = .339, p < 000).
Higher rates of infant mortality are likewise associated with many of the gender
violence variables, including murder (r = .587, p < .000), domestic violence (r = .321,
p < .000), trafficking (r = .439, p < .000), and the overall security of women (r = .574,
p < .000). Interestingly, militarization is inversely related to the conviction rate for
rape (r = −.364; p < .000). However, this can likely be attributed to high levels of
underreporting and/or countries that stigmatize the reporting of such crimes.
Furthermore, the overall physical security of women is not significantly related to
militarization as has been found in previous research.
Neighborhood war is significantly associated with female trafficking (r = .244, p <
.000) and the overall physical security of women (r = .286, p < .000). Finally, a coun-
try’s risk score is strongly associated with female murder (r = .495, p < .000), domestic
violence (r = .375, p < .000), trafficking (r = .232, p < .000), and the overall physical
security of women (r = .425, p < .000).
Bivariate relationships between violence against women and the Fund for Peace
Failed States Index are reported in Table 2. As shown, the Failed States Index, which
contains all measures of state failure, is significantly related to female murder (r =
.576, p < .000), domestic violence (r = .260, p < .05), trafficking (r = .606, p < .000),
and the overall physical security of women (r = .741, p < .000). Furthermore, all 12 of
the individual measures of state failure are also related to many of the gender violence
variables.
In particular, mounting demographic pressures is strongly associated with higher
rates of female murder (r = .632, p < .000), increased likelihood of domestic violence
(r = .266, p < .05), female trafficking (r = .557, p < .000), and the overall physical
security of women (r = .703, p < .000); massive movement of refugees is related to
higher rates of murder (r = .477, p < .000), trafficking (r = .463, p < 000), and the
overall physical security of women (r = .619, p < .000); group grievance is correlated
with higher rates of female murder (r = .449, p < .000), greater likelihood of
1356
Table 1. Peace and Conflict Instability Ledger Zero-Order Correlations.
x1 x2 x3 x4 x5 x6 x7 y1 y2 y3 y4 y5 y6 y7
Regime consistency (x1) 1
Infant mortality (x2) .514** 1
Economic openness (x3) .085 .126 1
Militarization (x4) −.275** −.345** −.128 1
Neighborhood war (x5) .102 .157* .283** .167* 1
Risk category (x6) .644** .665** .382** −.396** .194* 1
Risk score (x7) .656** .696** .318** −.393** .246** .942** 1
Murder (y1) .280* .587** .230 −.025 .176 .438** .495** 1
Rape incidence (y2) −.019 −.072 .075 −.087 −.149 −.116 −.125 −.143 1
Rape conviction (y3) −.057 −.027 .128 −.291* −.191 .034 −.001 .037 .639** 1
Domestic violence (y4) .321** .321** .014 .042 .130 .409** .375** .072 −.183 −.294 1
Suicide (y5) −.017 .003 −.029 −.004 .121 .029 −.054 .246 .030 −.201 .036 1
Trafficking (y6) .186* .439** .058 .104 .244** .211** .232** .356** .053 −.070 .020 −.081 1
Physical security of .339** .574** .093 .010 .286** .428** .425** .386** .021 −.048 .303** −.036 .581** 1
women (y7)
*p < .05. **p < .01.

Table 2. FSI Zero-Order Correlations.
x1 x2 x3 x4 x5 x6 x7 x8 x9 x10 x11 x12 x13 y1
FSI total (x1) 1

Mounting demographic .929** 1
pressures (x2)
Massive movement of .832** .750** 1
refugees (x3)
Group grievance (x4) .861** .732** .789** 1
Human flight (x5) .829** .769** .621** .638** 1
Uneven economic .875** .825** .712** .796** .761** 1
development (x6)
Severe economic decline .852** .837** .638** .607** .735** .681** 1
(x7)
Criminalization and/or .946** .852** .721** .789** .758** .799** .772** 1
delegitimization of the
state (x8)
Deterioration of public .923** .944** .709** .687** .773** .797** .890** .851** 1
services (x9)
Violation human rights .925** .838** .747** .806** .680** .778** .741** .926** .838** 1
(x10)
Arbitrary rule of law (x11) .943** .838** .766** .837** .740** .820** .750** .898** .841** .890** 1
Factionalized elites (x12) .920** .790** .743** .851** .690** .771** .707** .918** .778** .892** .893** 1
Intervention of other .881** .800** .708** .698** .756** .682** .799** .832** .797** .748** .814** .799** 1
states (x13)
Murder (y1) .576** .632** .477** .449** .542** .648** .440** .526** .611** .564** .569** .409** .332** 1
Rape incidence (y2) −.043 −.008 −.048 −.062 −.022 .038 −.059 −.048 −.031 −.087 −.041 −.068 −.013 −.143
Rape conviction (y3) −.088 .049 .034 −.122 −.130 .064 −.044 −.136 −.049 −.116 −.121 −.098 −.252 .037
Suicide (y4) .033 .081 −.134 −.003 .112 −.109 .054 .059 .067 .089 .011 .041 .069 .246
Domestic violence (y5) .260* .266* .202 .243* .207 .251* .251* .233 .276* .229 .226 .227 .282* .072
Trafficking (y6) .606** .557** .463** .512** .477** .515** .470** .640** .540** .665** .593** .577** .514** .356**
Physical security of .741** .703** .619** .599** .591** .634** .624** .763** .668** .740** .682** .689** .650** .386**
women (y7)
Note. FSI = Failed States Index.
1357
*p < .05. **p < .01.
experience with domestic violence (r = .243, p < .05), female trafficking (r = .512, p <
.000), and the overall physical security of women (r = .599, p < .000); human flight is
positively associated with female murder (r = .542, p < .000), trafficking (r = .477,
p < .000), and the overall security of women (r = .591, p < .000); uneven economic
development is correlated with female murder (r = .648, p < .000), domestic violence
(r = .251, p < .05), trafficking (r = .515, p < .000), and the overall physical security of
women (r = .634, p < .000); sharp economic decline is likewise related to female mur-
der (r = .440, p < .000), domestic violence (r = .251, p < .05), trafficking (r = .470,
p < .000), and overall physical security (r = .624, p < .000); violation of human rights
is associated with high rates of female murder (r = .546, p < .000), trafficking (r =
.665, p < .000), and the overall physical security of women (r = .740, p < .000); lastly,
the intervention of other states is associated with female murder (r = .332, p < .000),
domestic violence (r = .282, p < .05), trafficking (r = .514, p < .05), and the overall
physical security of women (r = .650, p < .000).
Bivariate relationships between the control variables and the violence variables are
displayed in Table 3. Although there are some significant relationships noted, many of
the control variables are not strongly associated with violence against women. For
example, the percentage of the population living in urban areas is inversely related to
murder (r = −.306, p < .000), suicide (r = −.232, p < .000), domestic violence (r =
−.284, p < .05), and the overall physical security of women (r = −.397**, p < .000).
The strongest relationships are found between political rights and the physical security
of women (r = .651, p < .000) and between civil liberties and the physical security of
women (r = .717, p < .000).
Ordinal logistic regression models were computed to determine which indicators of
state failure provide the best prediction of violence against women. First, a series of
ordinal regression models were computed to assess the relationship between indicators
in the Peace and Conflict Instability Ledger and the Physical Security of Women Scale.
For each of the model runs, the most insignificant variables were removed and the
model rerun to determine the model with the most predictive capacity. As shown in
Table 4, Model 1, which includes all indicators, is statistically significant, and explains
a moderate amount of variance (Cox and Snell r2 = .412 and Nagelkerke r2 = .453).
Three variables in the model are statistically significant including: infant mortality
lowest 25th percentile (OR = 24.66; 95% CI = [−4.778, −1.632]), militarization mid-
dle 50th percentile (OR = 3.747; 95% CI = [−2.151, −0.490]), and neighborhood
war—no neighboring states at war (OR = 2.052; 95% CI = [−1.437, −0.001]).
As shown, Model 2 includes risk score, infant mortality, militarization, neighbor-
hood war and regime consistency. Infant mortality lowest 25th percentile (OR =
28.022, 95% CI = [−4.876, −1.790]) and militarization lowest 25th percentile (OR =
3.827; 95% CI = [−2.465, −0.218]) and middle 50th percentile (OR = 3.394; 95%
CI = [−2.038, −0.405]) are significantly associated with violence against women.
Neighborhood war approached statistical significance in the model (p = .059).
Although the overall model was statistically significant, the amount of variance
explained was similar to Model 1 (Cox and Snell r2 = .402 and Nagelkerke r2 = .442).
Table 3. Control Variables Zero-Order Correlations.
x1 x2 x3 x4 x5 x6 y1 y2 y3 y4 y5 y6 y7
% urban Population (x1) 1
Sex ratio (x2) .183* 1
Gini (x3) −.224* −.106 1
GDP (x4) .543** .382** −.446** 1
Political rights (x5) −.314** .137 .201* −.370** 1
Civil liberties (x6) −.330** .128 .260** −.418** .946** 1
Murder (y1) −.306* −.322** .612** −.579** .302* .366** 1
Rape conviction (y2) .150 −.049 .268 −.076 −.113 −.131 −.044 1
Rape incidence (y3) .077 .007 .037 .080 −.051 −.080 −.143 .057 1
Suicide (y4) −.232** .046 .111 −.191* .200** .204** −.172 .156 .113** 1
Domestic violence (y5) −.284* −.074 .057 −.297* .246* .278* .072 −.006 −.183* .155 1*
Trafficking (y6) −.113 −.014 .300** −.117 −.014 .031 .356** .015 .053 .095 .020 1
Physical security of −.397** .127 .367** −.525** .651** .717** .386** −.134 .021** .265 .303** .036** 1
women (y7)
Note. GDP = gross domestic product.

*p < .05. **p < .01.
1359
Table 4. Physical Security of Women and Peace and Conflict Instability Ledger Ordinal Logistic Regression Models.
1360
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Predictor variable OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI
Risk score 0.935 [−0.020, 0.154] 0.954 [−0.034, 0.127] 0.96 [−0.024, 0.106]
Infant mortality (lowest 24.66*** [−4.778, −1.632] 28.022*** [−4.876, −1.790] 35.76*** [−5.077, −2.077] 59.8*** [−5.364, −2.817]
25th)
Infant mortality (middle 2.257 [−1.980, 0.352] 2.537 [−2.078, 0.216] 2.88 [−2.165, 0.049] 4.03** [−2.367, −0.421]
50th)
Infant mortality (highest 25th)
Militarization (lowest 3.943 [−2.512, −0.233] 3.827** [−2.465, −0.218] 3.684* [−2.422, −0.187] 2.965* [−2.136, −0.038]
25th)
Militarization (middle 3.747** [−2.151, −0.490] 3.394** [−2.038, −0.405] 3.353** [−2.015, −0.406] 3.29** [−1.991, −0.392]
50th)
Militarization (highest 25th)
No neighboring states 2.052* [−1.437, −0.001] 1.944 [−1.356, 0.026] 1.752 [−1.235, 0.112] 1.94* [−1.315, −0.009]
at war
At least one neighboring state at war
Highly consistent 0.666 [−1.124, 1.936] 0.7866 [−1.247, 1.727]
democracies
Partial autocracies 0.488 [−0.557, 1.992] 0.52 [−0.580, 1.887]
Inconsistent partial democracies
Economic openness 0.695 [−0.676, 1.404]
(lowest 25th)
Economic openness 1.332 [−1.190, 0.616]
(middle 50th)
Economic openness (highest 25th)
−2 log likelihood 282.178 273.547 273.547 104.871
Cox and Snell r2 .412 .402 .394 .388
Nagelkerke r2 .453 .442 .433 .427
Significant .000 .000 .000 .000
Note. OR = odds ratio; CI = confidence interval.

*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
Model 3 contains risk score, infant mortality, militarization, and neighborhood war.
As shown, infant mortality lowest 25th percentile (OR = 35.76; 95% CI = [−5.077,
−2.077]) and militarization lowest 25th percentile (OR = 3.353; 95% CI = [−2.422,
−0.187]) and middle 50th percentile (OR = 3.353; 95% CI = [−2.015, −0.406]) are
significantly associated with violence against women. The overall model is signifi-
cant, but the amount of variance explained slightly decreased from the previous model
runs (Cox and Snell r2 = .394 and Nagelkerke r2 = .433). Model 4, which contains
infant mortality, militarization, and neighborhood war is significant and all variables
in the models are significant predictors. Infant mortality lowest 25th percentile (OR =
59.8; 95% CI = [−5.364, −2.817]) and middle 50th percentile (OR = 4.03; 95% CI =
[−2.367, −0.421]), militarization lowest 25th percentile (OR = 2.965; 95%
CI = [−2.136, −0.038]) and middle 50th percentile (OR = 3.29; 95% CI = [−1.991,
−0.392]) and neighborhood war—no neighboring states at war (OR = 1.94; 95% CI =
[−1.315, −0.009]) are significantly related to violence against women. The amount of
variance explained is similar to previous model runs (Cox and Snell r2 = .388 and
Nagelkerke r2 = .427).
Overall, each of the models containing Peace and Conflict Instability Ledger vari-
ables produced statistically significant results (p < .000) and was similarly fitted. The
first two models produced slightly better results; however they contained some non-
significant variables. Although slight decreases in explained variance are noted in
Model 4, this model produced the most statistically sound results. Results from this
model reveal that for every one unit increase in infant mortality, we expect a 4.03
increase in the ordered log odds of a country scoring higher on the Physical Security
of Women Scale; likewise, for each one unit increase in militarization, we expect a
3.29 increase in the ordered log odds of a nation-state scoring higher on the Physical
Security of Women Scale; finally, for each one unit increase in neighborhood war, we
expect a 1.94 increase in the ordered log odds of a country scoring higher on the
Physical Security of Women Scale. Taken together these findings suggest that coun-
tries with high rates of infant mortality, high levels of militarization, and close proxim-
ity to other nations engaged in conflict present serious threats to women’s personal
safety.
Next, a series of ordinal logistic regression models were computed to assess the
relationship between the Physical Security of Women Scale and the Failed States
Index. The Failed States Index variables are strongly inter-correlated, which presents
significant potential for introducing collinear error into the models. As such, a two-
stage process was selected. First, a single-variable model containing only the Failed
States Index composite score was computed. As shown in Table 5 (Model 1), the
model was significant (p > .000) and the amount of variance explained by the model
is high (Cox and Snell r2 = .521 and Nagelkerke r2 = .574). For every one unit increase
in the Failed States Index composite score, we expect a 2.56 increase in the ordered
log odds of a nation-state scoring higher on the Physical Security of Women Scale.
For the series of model runs containing the individual variables that comprise the
Failed States Index, collinear variables were identified and eliminated. To identify and
select the proper variables to eliminate, each of the Failed States Index variables was
Table 5. Physical Security of Women and Failed States Index Ordinal Logistic Regression
Models.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Predictor variable OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI
Failed States Index 2.56*** [0.070, 0.111]

Criminalization and/ 2.529*** [0.574, 1.282] 2.19*** [0.543, 1.029]
or delegitimization
of the state
Intervention of .881 [−0.449, 0.198]
other states
Uneven economic 1.22 [−0.111, 0.519]
development
Massive movement 1.42** [0.099, 0.604] 1.285** [0.046, 0.457]
of refugees
or internally
displaced persons
creating complex
humanitarian
emergencies
Group grievance .838 [−0.485, 0.130]
Human flight .855 [−0.442, 0.127]
−2 log likelihood 255.453 250.448 254.538
Cox and Snell r2 .521 .568 .557
Nagelkerke r2 .574 .626 .614
Significant .000 .000 .000
Note. OR = odds ratio; CI = confidence interval.

*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
ranked by their correlation to one another and any variable with a correlation greater
than .85 was eliminated. Model 2 in Table 4 displays the ordinal regression results
between the Physical Security of Women Scale and criminalization and/or delegitimi-
zation of the state, intervention of other states or external political actors, sharp and/or
severe economic decline, massive movement of refugees or internally displaced per-
sons creating complex humanitarian emergencies, legacy of vengeance-seeking group
grievance or group paranoia, and chronic and sustained human flight. Overall, the
model was statistically significant (p < .000); however, as shown, only two variables
in the model were statistically significant: massive movement of refugees or internally
displaced persons creating complex humanitarian emergencies (OR = 1.42; 95% CI =
[0.104, 0.607]) and criminalization and/or delegitimization of the state (OR = 2.529;
95% CI = [0.609, 1.308]). Overall, the amount of variance explained by the model was
high (Cox and Snell r2 = .568 and Nagelkerke r2 = .626).
Next, the non-significant variables were removed from the model and the ordinal
regression was re-computed (see Model 3 in Table 5). This also produced a statistically
significant model (p < .000), but the amount of variance explained by the model
decreased slightly, compared with the first model (Cox and Snell r2 = .557 and Nagelkerke
r2 = .614). Both variables, criminalization and/or delegitimization of the state (OR =

2.19; 95% CI = [0.543, 1.029]) and massive movement of refugees (OR = 1.285; 95%
CI = [0.046, 0.457]), are significant in the model. As such, this provides the best model
of the physical security of women, as it only includes those variables that are statistically
significant. This model shows that for each one unit increase in massive movement in
refugees, we expect a 1.285 increase in the ordered log odds of a country scoring higher
on the Physical Security of Women Scale and for each one unit increase in criminaliza-
tion and/or delegitimization of the state, we expect a 2.19 increase in the ordered log
odds of a nation-state scoring higher on the Physical Security of Women Scale.
Last, we attempted to compute an ordinal logistic regression model containing the
statistically significant Peace and Conflict Instability Ledger and Failed States Index
variables, along with the six control variables. Unfortunately, multicollinearity, resid-
ual variance, and the presence of too many outliers precluded any successful model
runs. The GDP, Gini Index, and sex ratio all proved to be too interactive to include in
the model. In addition, the residual variance of the percentage of the population living
in urban areas variable was very high, which made its inclusion into the model unac-
ceptable. Last, the political rights variable contained many outliers, thus artificially
inflating its predictive power. Given these issues, as well as the fact that most of the
correlations between the control variables and the violence were not strong, we con-
clude that state failure is a better predictor of violence against women, compared with
the control variables (percentage of the population living in urban areas, sex ratio,
GDP, the Gini Index, political rights, and civil liberties).
Discussion
A great deal is known about the role of patriarchal institutions and the propagation of
violence against women. For example, Russo and Pirlott (2006) state,
Gender-based entitlements, power, objectification, and status are now recognized as

playing critical roles in the dynamics of gender-based violence. Major institutions
(including criminal justice, health, academic, scientific, military, athletic, and religious
institutions) are seen as reinforcing patriarchal values that encourage and maintain those
entitlements, foster gender-based violence, and encourage stigmatization of voices that
challenge the status quo. (p. 183)
Although these institutions do indeed foster gender violence, results from the present
study highlight that if these systems are failing or fragile, heightened gender violence
is a by-product. Analysis of the bivariate correlations and the multivariate analyses
reveal that violence against women is indeed related to state failure, and further identi-
fies the characteristics of state failure that increase women’s risk of violent
victimization.
The Peace and Conflict Instability Ledger ordinal regression models demonstrate
that countries with high rates of infant mortality, greater numbers of military forces,
and countries that border war-torn areas are the most dangerous places for women.
Thus, an inability to deliver core social services and a propensity to engage in violence
on the world stage are clear predictors of gender violence. These findings partially
echo previous research from Hudson et al. (2009), and cross-national homicide studies
that link low levels of social support provided by the state to high levels of violence
(e.g., Altheimer, 2008; Pratt & Godsey, 2002, 2003).
The Failed States ordinal regression models demonstrate that, although the Failed
States Index composite score is an important predictor of violence against women, mas-
sive movement of refugees or internally displaced persons creating complex humanitar-
ian emergencies and criminalization and/or delegitimization of the State are the two
single most important issues as far as gender violence is concerned. When a large per-
centage of the population is displaced and many are forced either to live in adjacent
countries or in refugee camps, the risk of security threats increase (Fund for Peace,
2013), as does the risk of violence against women. This finding is supportive of our
earlier supposition that a lack of social support contributes to violence. Widespread
population displacement undermines the social support system and creates an environ-
ment that promotes violence against women. Criminalization and/or delegitimization of
the state occur when there is widespread corruption and a lack of representation of the
populace in the governmental process (Fund for Peace, 2013). When democracy is
undermined and the government is rendered ineffective, women appear to be adversely
affected, as the likelihood of violence is increased. In fragile and failing states, the gov-
ernment no longer has a monopoly on coercive power and they are unable or unwilling
to enforce laws. This appears to be the case particularly where women are concerned.
In terms of policy implications, this study has highlighted several key areas that
influence violence against women. Infant mortality, militarization, and neighborhood
war are all strongly associated with violence against women. To address these issues,
more humanitarian efforts should be put in place to assist women in fragile and failing
states. Because a high rate of infant mortality is a significant predictor of violence
against women cross-nationally, women’s reproductive health including pre- and post-
natal care should take priority in international interventions in failed/failing states.
Addressing the issues associated with high levels of militarization and neighbor-
hood war will require a much more complex solution. To fully address these problems,
the international community ultimately needs to address the core problem of failed
states, which is certainly not easy to accomplish. A potentially more manageable solu-
tion comes in addressing issues associated with population displacement and govern-
mental corruption. International organizations desiring to make changes that would
decrease violence against women should consider options that would reduce the num-
ber of displaced persons and/or devise strategies that would make travel to refugee
camps less fraught with danger.2 Furthermore, the international community should
examine policies and strategies designed to lessen governmental corruption and
increase citizen participation in the political process.3
Limitations
Although the present study provides a valuable contribution to the literature by examin-
ing aspects of state failure as independent variables that affect levels of violence against
women worldwide, there are several limitations of this research. First, measures of rape
are notoriously unreliable, particularly in cross-national research, as rape is underre-
ported (National Institute of Justice, 2010; United Nations Entity for Gender Equality
and the Empowerment of Women, 2011). Future research should explore more reliable
ways to measure rape and sexual violence across nations. Second, because the erosion of
social support can be conceptualized as a mechanism by which state failure is conducive
to violence, future research should examine multiple measures of support. Finally, it was
beyond the scope of the present research to determine how international interventions
such as economic aid, economic sanctions, or stabilization policies including military
interventions might reduce or exacerbate the levels of violence against women in failed/
failing states. Thus, these specific potential policy interventions should be examined in
future research on violence against women and state failure.
Conclusion
The findings of the present study have important policy implications for governmen-
tal, international aid organizations’, and other non-governmental organizations’ inter-
ventions in failed and failing states to decrease the risks of violent victimization for
women who are particularly vulnerable in the national contexts identified here. Nations
with high infant mortality rates, that are increasing militarization, border war-torn
areas, and have massive movements of refugees are most in need of humanitarian
interventions on behalf of women. Furthermore, nations that have become criminal-
ized and delegitimized among its citizens also require interventions from other nations,
or non-governmental organizations, working on behalf of women’s safety. Where
nation-states are unable to protect women through state-level means, legal or other-
wise, or are generally unable to prevent violence against women, the international
community may need to step in to provide resources that can supplement the inabili-
ties of failed and failing states to provide much-needed social support for women.
In conclusion, results from this study demonstrate a clear relationship between gen-
der violence and state failure, and further identify the characteristics of failed states
that render women the most vulnerable. Although the likelihood of violence is
increased for the entire populace in fragile and failing states, women are especially at
risk due to patriarchal constraints at the state level, as well as in the private sphere.
Considerations of state fragility and failure are rare within the criminological literature
and it is hoped that this research will represent a crucial step in the examination of
what state failure portends for women.
Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship,
and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of
this article.
Notes
1. Data from the United Nations, World Health Organization, and other international sources
reveal that the worldwide average female murder rate per 100,000 of the total female popu-
lation is approximately 3.33 (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2012). Given that
the WomanStats murder data include murder victims aged 15-44 and not all female murder
victims, we are confident that the scores for the low, medium, and high categories provide
an accurate representation of female murder.
2. The recent unrest in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) illustrates the relationship
between internally displaced persons and gender violence. According to Human Rights
Watch, at least 1.8 million people have been displaced in the Eastern Congo. Although the
area has been tumultuous since the early 1990s, the most recent bout of troubles stems from
2008 when alliances in the area shifted and Rwanda and the DRC engaged in a joint mili-
tary operation against a Rwandan Hutu group operating in the Eastern DRC. These mili-
tary operations brought attacks against civilians by the government and rebel forces and
resulted in the internal displacement of countless people, in addition to numerous accounts
of rape amid the unrest (see Simpson, 2010).
3. The case of Guinea provides a ready example of how the criminalization of the state can
lead to gender violence. In 2008, the authoritarian President of Guinea, Lansana Conté, died
and a bloodless coup led by Captain Moussa Dadis Camara brought a regime change to the
country (Dufka, Bouckaert, Habimana, & Wells, 2009). Initially, Camara promised to hold
free and open elections; however, that pledge was quickly reversed. In response to this,
numerous protests took place, the largest of which was to take place in a stadium located in
Conakry, where hundreds of citizens were killed by government forces, and numerous sex-
ual assaults were witnessed after security forces stormed the stadium (Dufka et al., 2009).
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Author Biographies
Laurie A. Gould is an associate professor of Criminal Justice and Criminology at Georgia
Southern University. Her primary areas of expertise focus on state fragility, comparative penol-
ogy, and gender disparities. Her work has been published in a variety of journals including the
British Journal of Criminology, Women & Criminal Justice, and International Criminal Justice
Review. Additionally, she is the co-author of two books, Corporal Punishment Around the
World (2012, Praeger) and State Fragility Around the World: Fractured Justice and Fierce
Reprisal (CRC Press, forthcoming Spring 2016).
Laura E. Agnich is an assistant professor of criminal justice and criminology at Georgia
Southern University. Her research focuses on school violence, specifically bullying and school
shootings in cross-national contexts. In addition, she researches the related issues of gender and
sexual orientation-related victimization, and the association of victimization and social inequal-
ities with drug use. Her research has been published in journals such as Deviant Behavior, the
Journal of Crime and Justice, Journal of School Violence, and Addictive Behaviors.

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Laurie A. Gould1 and Laura E. Agnich1

1Georgia Southern University, Statesboro, USA

and intimidation at work, in educational institutions and elsewhere; trafficking in women;

State Failure Defined

ability to provide adequate amounts of other political goods is diminishing. Physical

cohesion of communities, neighborhoods, and kinship networks — and has found

Gender Violence Cross-Nationally

empowerment (principally measured by the United Nations Gender Empowerment

Research Question 1: What is the relationship between violence against women

The Peace and Conflict Instability Ledger

The Failed States Index

cultural measure in an effort to gain the most comprehensive picture of suicide as an

Physical Security of Women Scale

*p < .05. **p < .01.

FSI total (x1) 1

Note. FSI = Failed States Index.

Note. GDP = gross domestic product.

Predictor variable OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI

Note. OR = odds ratio; CI = confidence interval.

Predictor variable OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI

Failed States Index 2.56*** [0.070, 0.111]

Note. OR = odds ratio; CI = confidence interval.

r2 = .614). Both variables, criminalization and/or delegitimization of the state (OR =

Gender-based entitlements, power, objectification, and status are now recognized as

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

Neapolitan, J. L. (1994). Cross-national variation in homicides: The case of Latin America.

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