Facts:: Case Digests: Land Titles and Deeds Rizzalyn T. Gonzales Atty. Sirios

Case digests: LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
Rizzalyn T. Gonzales Atty. Sirios
CONSUELO LEGARDA, with her husband MAURO PRIETO,

v N.M . SALEEBY
GR No. L-23268 JUNE 30, 1972
Johnson, J.:
Facts:
Subject property herein is the adjoining lots in the district of Ermita in the city of Manila, wherein in that
lots there was an existing stone wall in between of the lots, Legarda (plaintiff) and Saleeby (defendant), owns and
occupies the lots, and the said wall is located on the lot of the plaintiffs.
Legarda filed a petition of registration of her lot in Court of Land Registration on March 2, 1906. Said
application was granted, hence registered the lot to them and issued Original Certificate of Title, and in that
registration the stone wall was included. Subsequently, on March 25, 1912, Saleeby applied for registration of the lot
he occupied and this was also granted by the Court, and the stone wall was also included herein and registered to
Saleeby.
December 13, 1912 the plaintiffs discovered that the wall which had been included in the certificate granted
to them had also been included in the certificate granted to the defendant. They immediately filed a petition in the
Court of Land Registration for an adjustment and correction of the error committed by including said wall in
the registered title of each of said parties.
Lower court denied the petition on the ground that during the pendency of the petition for the registration
of the defendant’s land, they failed to make any objection to the registration of said lot, including the wall, in the
name of the defendant.
Issue:
Whether or not the lower court is correct in denying the petition.
Ruling:
NO. The decision of the lower court is based upon the theory that the action for the registration of the lot of
the defendant was a judicial proceeding and that the judgment or decree was binding upon all parties who did not
appear and oppose it. SC states that applying the theory to defendant, he had already lost whatever right he had
therein, by permitting the plaintiffs to have the same registered in their name, more than six years before.
A title once registered cannot be defeated, even by an adverse, open, and notorious possession. Registered
title under the torrens system cannot be defeated by prescription (section 46, Act No. 496). The title, once registered,
is notice to the world. All persons must take notice. Thus, to know to whom does the wall and the land occupied by
it belongs, SC ruled that in case of double registration under the Land Registration Act, the owner of the earliest
certificate is the owner of the land. The primary and fundamental purpose of the torrens system is to quiet title. If the
holder of a certificate cannot rest secure in this registered title then the purpose of the law is defeated.
Therefore, it is just and equitable rule, when two persons have acquired equal rights in the same thing, to
hold that the one who acquired it first and who has complied with all the requirements of the law should be
protected.
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CONSTANTINO v ESPIRITU
GR No. L-23268 JUNE 30, 1972
Fernando, J.:
Facts:
July 17, 1963, Pastor Constantino filed the Motion to Reinstate Lis Pendens to TCT 32744 and the
Amending motion dated July 23, 1963 praying that cancellation of lis pendens on TCT 32744 on September 5, 1960
be declared null and void, and reinstate lis pendens not only to TCT 32744 but also to its subsequent title TCT
82798 in the name of Aves.
Background of the case: Constantino filed a complaint against Herminia Espiritu on December 3, 1959,
however this was dismissed on January 8, 1960. A motion to admit amended complaint filed by Constantino was
also denied on February 1, 1960. Motion for reconsideration was also denied on March 23, 1960. Then Constantino
filed a petition for mandamus before the SC to compel the court to approve the record on appeal, and this was
granted on June 29, 1963.
Meanwhile, Espiritu even though aware that mandamus proceeding (involving her land) was still
pending before the SC, caused the cancellation of lis pendens on TCT 32744 by filing with the office of Register
of Deeds of Rizal the true copy of order dismissing the complaint dated January 8, 1960. RD without verifying if
the said Order of January 8, 1960 had really become final, illegally cancelled the lis pendens on September 5, 1960.
Thereafter, Espiritu sold the property to Nicanor Aves on December 31, 1960, thus, TCT 32744 in the
name of Espiritu was cancelled and TCT 82798 was issued in the name of Aves. Then Aves mortgaged the said
property on January 26, 1961 to Phil. Banking Corp.
Lower court ruled that there was bad faith in the cancellation of lis pendens, thus declaring the cancellation
of lis pendens null and void and ordering to inscribe lis pendens to TCT of Aves (December 19, 1963).
Issue:
WON it is proper to inscribe the notice of lis pendens to the TCT of Aves who is an innocent purchaser for value.
Ruling:
NO. Notice of lis pendens is an announcement to the whole world that a particular real property is in
litigation, and serves as warning that one who acquires an interest over said property does so at his own risk, or that
he gambles on the result of the litigation over said property.
However, in the case of Aves, he purchased the property to Espiritu the notice of lis pendens was already cancelled,
it was free from all liens and encumbrances, hence, Aves was an innocent purchaser for value. Being innocent
purchaser for value, he relied on the face of the said title presented by the seller, and having no knowledge about the
pending litigation between Constantino and Espiritu.
Thus, SC ruled in his favor and reversed the order of the lower court to inscribe the lis pendens on his TCT.
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REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the DIRECTOR OF LANDS v HONORABLE

MARIANO M. UMALI, et al.
G.R. No. 80687 April 10, 1989
Cruz, J.:
Facts:
The land in question herein is situated in Tanza, Cavite with an area of 78,865 square meters. It was
originally purchased on installment from the government on July 1, 1910 by Florentina Bobadilla, who allegedly
transferred her rights thereto in favor of Martina, Tomasa, Gregorio and Julio, all surnamed Cenizal, in 1922.
Tomasa and Julio assigned their shares to Martina, Maria and Gregorio.
In 1971, Martina, Maria and Gregorio (Tomasa and Julio assigned their share to them) purportedly signed a
joint affidavit which was filed before Bureau of Lands for the issuance of certificate of title over the property, which
in turn granted hence, Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resource executed Deed No. V-10910, then TCT 55044
was issued by RD of Cavite in their favor.
Petitioners seeks reversion of the said land on October 10, 1985, on the ground that the original sale from
government was tainted with fraud because of forgery in the affidavit that presented by assignees, hence it is void ab
initio. However, property was already transferred to Miclat, Pulido and Naval, respondents herein. Respondents
argued that the subject land was already covered by Torrens system, thus, the action of petitioner was already barred
and that they were innocent trasferees of value. Regional Trial Court granted the said petition of petitioners.
Issue:
Whether or not the titles of respondents are void ab initio given the said fraudulent transfer of land from
government.
Ruling:
NO. SC states that fraud is indeed present because the supposed affiants were already dead at the time they
signed and executed sworn statements and/or affidavit. However, respondents are transferees in good faith and for
value of the subject property and that the original acquisition thereof, although fraudulent, did not affect their own
titles. These are valid against the whole world, including the government.
Their status as innocent transferees was not questioned in the pleading, thereby, their status accords
protection of Torrens system and renders the title s they obtained is indefeasible and conclusive. The land being now
registered under the Torrens system in the names of the private respondents, the government has no more control or
jurisdiction over it. In addition, the Torrens system was adopted in this country because it was believed to be the
most effective measure to guarantee the integrity of land titles and to protect their indefeasibility once the claim of
ownership is established and recognized.
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LETICIA LIGON v CA
GR No. 107751 June 1, 1995
Bellosillo, J.:
Facts:
Subject property herein is the 2 parcels of land situated in Tandang Sora, Barrio Culiat Quezon City and
owned by Islamic Directorate of the Phil. (IDP).
On April 20, 1989, IDP sold the said properties to Iglesia ni Kristo (INK) by virtues of Absolute Deed of
Sale. One of the stipulation therein was that IDP will undertake to evict all the squatter in the property within 45
days. However, IDP failed to do so, thus INK filed with the RTC of QC complaint for specific performance with
damages against IDP on October 19, 1990.
On the other hand, IDP alleged that it was INK was the first to violate the contract by delaying its payment,
and IDP prayed that the contract of sale be rescinded and revoked.
On January 22, 1992, INK filed a motion to the same case praying that Leticia Ligon, mortgagee of IDP,
who has in possession of the certificate of title of the properties to surrender the said certificate to the Register of
Deeds of QC, for the INK to register the Absolute Deed of Sale in their name. Ligon opposed and refused to
surrender the certificate of title on the ground that IDP was seeking to rescind the said sale.
RTC granted the motion of INK and order Ligon to surrender RT 26521 and RT 26520 in open court on
March 2, 1992. Then on April 6, 1992, on motion of Ligon, RTC reconsider its order by ordering her to deliver the
said certificates A to RD of QC. This was affirmed by CA.
Issue(s):
(1) WON INK has superior right to the possession of owner’s copies of certificate of title.
(2) WON the RTC has jurisdiction over the case.
Ruling:
1. YES.
No voluntary instrument shall be registered by the RD unless the owner’s duplicate certificate is presented
together with such instrument, except in some cases or upon the order of the court for cause shown. In case the
person in possession refuses or fails to surrender the same to RD, a new certificate may be issued so that a voluntary
instrument may be registered (Sec. 107, PD 1529). The order directing Ligon to surrender the certificate to RD in
order that the deed be registered in favor of INK cannot in any way prejudice her rights and interests as
mortgagee, because any lien annotated on the previous certificates which subsists shall be carried over to the
new certificates.
2. YES
Pursuant to Sec. 2 of PD 1529, the distinction between the RTC’s general and limited jurisdiction when acting
merely as a cadastral court has been eliminated. Aiming to avoid multiplicity of suits, the change has simplified
registration proceedings by conferring upon the RTC the authority to act not only on applications for original
registration but also over petitions filed after the original registration of title, with power to hear and determine all
questions arising upon such application or petitions.
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SPS. CLOMA v CA
GR No. 100153 August 2, 1994
Puno, J.:
Facts:
Subject property herein is the 2 parcels of land located at Buendia Extension, San Jose, Pasay City,
Metro Manila, registered in the name of spouses Tomas Cloma and Victoria Cloma under TCT 17138 and 171139.
The subject properties were listed as delinquent properties because realty taxes of the said properties from
1983 to 1985 were not paid, then City Treasurer informed spouses Cloma about it on October 21, 1985, and that it
was scheduled to be sold by public auction on November 27, 1985.
On November 28, 1985, City Treasurer informed spouses Cloma that the properties were sold in the public
auction and Mariano Nocom was the highest bidder and that they have until November 26, 1986 to redeem the said
lots. However, spouses Cloma failed to redeem the said lots, thus on July 27, 1989, City Treasurer executed final
deed of sale in favor of Nocom.
Then on October 5, 1989, Nocom filed a petition before the RTC seeking the cancellation of TCTs of
spouses Cloma and issuance of new certificate of title in his name free from liens and encumbrances.
Spouses Cloma filed their answer, alleging the irregularities in the said auction held and that they did not
receive any notice of public auction and that they have not heard of the existence of the newspaper Metropolitan
Mail, and they further alleged that City Treasurer has no authority to conduct the said sale since it is the City
Assessor who has empowered by law.
Lower court ruled in favor of Nocom, and ordered the cancellation of TCTs in the name of spouses Cloma
and issue new title in his name. CA affirmed the decision of RTC.
Issue:
WON the RTC sitting as land registration court has jurisdiction to cancel the certificate of titles of petitioners and
issue new one in favor of respondent.
Ruling:
YES. Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the said petition. Sec 75 of PD 1529 state that application
for new certificate upon the expiration of redemption period, the purchaser may petition the court for the entry of a
new certificate to him. And sec. 108 of the same decree state that in amendment and alteration of certificates, the
court may hear and determine the petition after the notice to all parties interested, and may order the entry or
cancellation of new certificate. And clearly under Sec. 2 of same decree, CFI or RTC has the power to hear and
determine all questions arising upon the original registration application or petitions. Hence, PD1529 abolished the
difference between the general jurisdiction of regular court and limited jurisdiction of registration court.
In addition, spouses Cloma failed to question the jurisdiction of the lower court in their answer, they only
questioned such when they submit the case to appeal in SC and only after the adverse judgment. Tantamount to
voluntary submitting to the jurisdiction of RTC, since they freely participated in all the hearing of the case and
adduced their own evidence.
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JESUS F. IGNACIO v COURT OF APPEALS, et al

G.R. No. 98920 July 14, 1995
Quiason, J.:
Facts:
Subject property is house and lot with an area of 624 sqm located at No. 13 Narra Street, Valle Verde III,
Pasig, Metro Manila, under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 64873 and registered in the name of "Renato G.
Yalung married to Marina Toledano (private respondents herein).
Petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 151, Pasig a petition for consolidation of ownership
on April 19, 1988, after the failure of private respondents to repurchase the property within the agreed period.
Private respondents, on the other hand argued that that the parties only intended to enter into an equitable mortgage
to secure prompt payment of the loan given them by petitioner, they further alleged that the interest rate of the loan
was unconscionable, excessive and unreasonable and that notwithstanding the sale, they had remained in actual
possession of the property.
RTC ruled favor of petitioner and held that parties clearly and unquestionably intended a sale under pacto
de retro, not an equitable mortgage. It thus ordered the Register of Deeds of Rizal to cancel TCT No. 64873 and
issue another transfer certificate of title in the name of petitioner.
Private respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals raising the issue of lack of jurisdiction of the land
registration court over the case. Court of Appeals granted the petition and reversed the decision of the trial court.
The appellate court declared that the Regional Trial Court sitting as a land registration court had no jurisdiction over
the petition for consolidation of title, which is an ordinary civil action.
Issue:
Whether or not RTC has jurisdiction over the said petition.
Ruling:
YES. Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the petition because the distinction between the general
jurisdiction vested in the Regional Trial Court and its limited jurisdiction when acting as a land registration court,
has been eliminated by P.D. No. 1529.
Therefore, Regional Trial Courts now have the authority to act not only on applications for original
registration but also over all petitions filed after the original registration of title, with power to hear and determine
all questions arising from such applications or petitions. Indeed, the land registration court can now hear and decide
controversial and contentious cases and those involving substantial issues.
In addition, private respondents did not move to dismiss the petition before the land registration court. It
was only after the decision of the land registration court and in their appeal before the Court of Appeals that they
challenged the jurisdiction of the trial court. They are now deemed to have waived their right to question the
jurisdiction of said court.
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SALVADOR H. LAUREL v RA MON GARCIA, et al.

G.R. No. 92013 July 25, 1990
DIONISIO S. OJEDA v EXECUTIVE SECRETARY MACARAIG, JR., et al
G.R. No. 92047 July 25, 1990
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
Facts:
Subject property herein is Roppongi property in Japan acquired by the Philippine government under the
Reparations Agreement entered into with Japan.
Petitioner Laurel, objects the alienation of the said property to anyone, after the issuance of Executive
Order No. 296 entitling non-Filipino citizens or entities to avail of separations' capital goods and services in the
event of sale, lease or disposition, the four properties in Japan including the Roppongi. Petitioner further alleged that
the Roppongi property comes under "property intended for public service" and states that being one of public
dominion, no ownership by anyone can attach to it, not even by the State.
On the other hand, respondents even assuming for the sake of argument that the Civil Code is applicable,
the Roppongi property has ceased to become property of public dominion. It has become patrimonial property
because it has not been used for public service or for diplomatic purposes for over thirteen (13) years now and
because the intention by the Executive Department and the Congress to convert it to private use has been manifested
by overt acts.
Issue:
Whether or not the Roppongi property can be alienated.
Ruling:
NO. Roppongi property still property of public dominion and not patrimonial property of government,
thus, it cannot alienated except there is a law or formal declaration withdrawing such from public domain and make
it alienable property.
As property of public dominion, the Roppongi lot is outside the commerce of man. It cannot be alienated.
Its ownership is a special collective ownership for general use and enjoyment, an application to the satisfaction of
collective needs, and resides in the social group. The purpose is not to serve the State as a juridical person, but the
citizens; it is intended for the common and public welfare and cannot be the object of appropriation.
In addition, even though Roppongi site has not been used for a long time for actual Embassy service does
not automatically convert it to patrimonial property. Any such conversion happens only if the property is withdrawn
from public use.
Furhermore, Roppongi property is valuable not so much because of the inflated prices fetched by real
property in Tokyo but more so because of its symbolic value to all Filipinos — veterans and civilians alike.
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THE DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY v RUPERTO A. VILLAREAL

G.R. No. L-32266 February 27, 1989
CRUZ, J.:
Facts:
Subject property is the 178,113 sqm of mangrove swamps in Sapian Capiz. Ruperto Villareal applied for its
registration on January 25, 1949, alleging that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the land
for more than 40 years, and this was granted by Court of First Instance and affirmed by CA.
The Director of Forestry then filed petition for review on certiorari before the SC claiming that the land in
dispute was forestal in nature and not subject to private appropriation. He asks that the registration be reversed.
Issue:
Whether or not the mangrove swamps can be acquired and registered by respondents.
Ruling:
NO. Mangrove swamps are considered as public forest or public domain, therefore, it cannot be owned nor
registered unless government classified it as agricultural land and release as forest land.
Mangrove swamps or manglares should be understood as comprised within the public forests of the
Philippines as defined in Section 1820 of the Administrative Code of 1917. The classification of mangrove swamps
as forest lands is descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually
looks like. Thus, there being classified as forest it could not be the subject of the adverse possession and consequent
ownership claimed by the private respondent in support of his application for registration.
As to the contention of respondent that the subject lots are deemed converted into agricultural lands
because of the survey plan approved by Director of Land. SC states that mere existence of such a plan would not
have the effect of converting the mangrove swamps, as forest land, into agricultural land, and approval of Director
of Land is ineffectual because it is Director of Lands was not authorized to act in the premises.
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REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and HILARIO P. RAMA

G.R. No. 69138 May 19, 1992
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
Facts:
Subject property is the 2 parcels of land situated in Bohol owned and in possession of Hilario Rama,
wherein one parcel thereof was covered by certificate of title (OCT 6148).
Portions of the said lands were bulldozed by Anselmo Logronio, in his official capacity as officer-in-charge
of the Bohol Reforestation Project of the Bureau of Forest Development. Thus, Rama filed a complaint for recovery
of possession, ownership and damages against Logronio before the CFI of Bohol. He alleged that he is the absolute
owners and possessor of the said lands that occupied by Logronio.
Logronio to averred that the two parcels of lands are forest lands and that the acts of bulldozing the portions
of lands were performed by him in regular and lawful performance of his duties
CFI ruled adverse to Rama and declared the properties as timberland part of public domain and ordered the
cancellation of OCT 6148. Intermediate Appellate Court affirmed the decision with modification, that Rama has
right of retention as to the parcel not covered by certificate of title until the necessary expenses awarded to him.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent is entitled to right of retention until the necessary expenses are paid to him.
Ruling:
NO. Good faith is necessary for the possessor to be entitled to necessary expenses with right of
retention until reimbursement. However, in here, the title of Rama is void ab initio, thus Rama should not be
considered possessor in good faith, in addition to this, Rama pursued titling of the parcel of land despite the fact that
District Forestrer suspected that the land is forest land, this negates his good faith.
Furthermore, considering that the parcel of land is forest land, the patent and original certificate of title
covering the said parcel of land to Rama did not confer any validity to his possession or claim of ownership.
Possession of such parcel of land of Rama in the beginning is fraudulent and illegal, thus he was merely a squatter,
thus he is not possessor in good faith.
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REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v CELESTINA NAGUIAT

G.R. No. 134209 January 24, 2006
GARCIA, J.:
Facts:
Subject property herein is 4 parcels of land situated in Panan Botolan, Zambales, owned allegedly by
Celestina Naguiat through sale.
Naguiat filed for application for registration of the said land before the RTC of Zamables on December
29, 1989. She alleged that she purchased and acquired it from the previous owners – Demetria Calderon, Josefina
Moraga and Fausto Monje and their predecessors-in-interest who have been in possession thereof for more than 30
years.
This was opposed by petitioner, on the ground that neither the applicant nor her predecessors-in interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the lands in question since 12
June 1945 or prior thereto and that the parcels of land applied for are part of the public domain belonging to the
Republic of the Philippines not subject to private appropriation.
RTC granted the application of Naguiat and this was affirmed by Court of Appealss
Issue:
Whether or not the property ceased to be forest or inalienable lands of public domain.
Ruling:
NO. Public forest lands or forest reserves, unless declassified and released by positive act of the
Government so that they may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, are not capable of
private appropriation. Here, respondent never presented the required certification from the proper government
agency or official proclamation reclassifying the land applied for as alienable and disposable. Matters of land
classification or reclassification cannot be assumed – it calls for proof.
Thus, the said properties are still classified as forest land. Unclassified land cannot be acquired by adverse
occupation or possession, despite of the length or period of occupation in the concept of owner it cannot ripen into
private ownership and be registered. Moreover, forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not
lose such classification simply because loggers or settlers have stripped it of its forest cover.
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FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ v PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY and AMARI COASTAL BAY

DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
G.R. No. 133250 July 9, 2002
CARPIO, J.:
Facts:
In 1977, President Marcos issued PD 1084, creating Public Estates Authority, tasked to reclaim land,
including foreshore and submerged areas, and to develop, improve, acquire, lease and sell any and all kinds of lands.
Then PD 1085, transferring to PEA the lands reclaimed in Manila Bay under Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and
Reclamation Project (MCCRRP).
Then in 1988, President Aquino issued special patent, granting and transferring to PEA the parcels of land
so reclaimed under MCCRRP, hence, Registry of Deeds of Municipality of Paranaque issued TCTs to PEA covering
the said land also known as Freedom Island. PEA entered into joint venture agreement (JVA) with AMARI, to
develop the Freedom Island, however, AMAR required the reclamation of submerged area for completion of master
plan of southern reclamation project.
Then after the reclamation, PEA sought to transfer to AMARI of 77.34 hectares of Freedom Islands and the
290.156 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay as stipulated in the amended JVA between PEA and AMARI.
Issue:
Whether or not the transfer of reclaimed or to be reclaimed areas is valid.
Ruling:
NO. The foreshore and submerged areas of Manila Bay are part of the lands of the public domain and
consequently owned by the State. As such, foreshore and submerged areas shall not be alienated, unless they are
classified as agricultural lands of the public domain. The mere reclamation of these areas by PEA does not convert
these inalienable natural resources of the State into alienable or disposable lands of the public domain.
PD No. 1085, coupled with President Aquino's actual issuance of a special patent covering the Freedom
Islands, is equivalent to an official proclamation classifying the Freedom Islands as alienable or disposable lands of
the public domain, therefore, Freedom Island classified as alienable and disposable lands of public domain.
However, as to the submerged areas, there is no legislative or Presidential act classifying it as alienable or
disposable lands of the public domain open to disposition, in addition, it is not not covered by any patent or
certificate of title, hence, these submerged areas form part of the public domain, and in their present state are
inalienable and outside the commerce of man.
As to the transfer, AMARI, a private corporation, seeks ownership of 77.34 hectares110 of the Freedom
Islands, the transfer is void for being contrary Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring
any kind of alienable land of the public domain. To allow vast areas of reclaimed lands of public domain is gross
violation of constitution.
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SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, et al. v

MAYOR JOSE S. YAP, et al.
G.R. No. 167707 October 8, 2008
DR. ORLANDO SACAY, et al. v SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND
NATURAL RESOURCES, et al.
G.R. No. 173775 October 8, 2008
REYES, R.T., J.:
Facts:
Boracay Island is the subject property herein. Where respondents Yap, et al. filed a petition for declaratory
relief with RTC of Aklan, claiming that Proclamation 1801 (declaring Boracay Island, among other islands, caves
and peninsulas in the Philippines, as tourist zones and marine reserves under the administration of the Philippine
Tourism Authority (PTA)) and PTA Circular No. 3-82 \precluded them from filing an application fo judicial
confirmation of imperfect title or survey of land for titling purposes.
During the pendency of the case, President Arroyo issued Proclamation 1064, classifying Boracay Island as
partly reserved forest land and partly agricultural land. With this, petitioners Sacay, et al. as landowner in Boracay
filed with SC an original petition for prohibition, mandamus and nullification of Proclamation 1064. They alleged
that such proclamation infringed their vested rights over the portion of Boracay, and that they have been in
possession of their lots since time immemorial.
RTC ruled in the petition of Yap, favoring the respondents and upheld their rights to have their lands title in
their name. This was affirmed by CA, hence, OSG appeal to SC. And SC ordered the consolidation of this two
petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the private claimants have a right to secure titles over their occupied lands in Boracay.
Ruling:
NO. A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required. In keeping with the presumption
of State ownership, the Court has time and again emphasized that there must be a positive act of the government,
such as an official proclamation,80 declassifying inalienable public land into disposable land for agricultural or
other purposes. The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the lands of the public
domain is on the person applying for registration (or claiming ownership), who must prove that the land subject of
the application is alienable or disposable. The applicant may also secure a certification from the government that the
land claimed to have been possessed for the required number of years is alienable and disposable.
In this case, no such proclamation, executive order, administrative action, report, statute, or certification
was presented to the Court. The records are bereft of evidence showing that, prior to 2006, the portions of Boracay
occupied by private claimants were subject of a government proclamation that the land is alienable and disposable.
Furthermore, Boracay was an unclassified land of the public domain prior to Proclamation No. 1064, and
pursuant to PD 705, unclassified lands are considered public forest. Boracay, no doubt, has been partly stripped of
its forest cover to pave the way for commercial development, Boracay appears more of a commercial island resort,
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rather than a forest land. However, forest do not necessarily refer to large tracts of wooded land or expanses covered
by dense growths of trees and underbrushes. As to the contention of claimants that Boracay became agricultural land
because of Proclamation 1801, SC states that Proclamation No. 1801 or PTA Circular No. 3-82 did not convert the
whole of Boracay into an agricultural land.
FIL-ESTATE MANAGEMENT INC., et al. v GEORGE H. TRONO, et al.
G.R. No. 130871 February 17, 2006
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
Facts:
Subject property is the parcel of land located at Bo. Almanza, Las Pinas, City, with an area of 245,586 sqm.
George, Ma. Teresa, Edgardo, Ma. Virginia, Jesse, Ma. Cristina, Inocencio, Jr., Carmen, and Zenaida, all
surnamed Trono, herein respondents, filed with the Regional Trial Court Las Piñas City, an application for
registration of a parcel of land, on November 9, 1994.
Petitioners filed their opposition to alleging that as per Survey Plan Psu-31086, respondents’ property
partly overlaps their lot, and that as early as April 28, 1989, this lot was registered in their names under Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-9182. Then Ayala Land also filed an opposition, on the ground that the land
applied for overlaps the parcels of land covered by TCTs registered in its name. Thus, oppositors claims that trial
court has no jurisdiction over the application since the properties are already registered in the names of petitioners.
Issue:
Whether or not RTC has jurisdiction over the petition.
Ruling:
YES. Regional Trial Court (formerly Court of First Instance) has the authority to act, not only on
applications for original registration of title to land, but also on all petitions filed after the original registration of
title, thus, it has the authority and power to hear and determine all questions arising from such applications or
petition, pursuant to PD 1529. Therefore, RTC has jurisdiction even though the said lots were already registered.
Respondents’ application for registration of a parcel of land already covered by a Torrens title is actually a
collateral attack against petitioners’ title not permitted under the principle of indefeasibility of a Torrens title. It is
well settled that a Torrens title cannot be collaterally attacked; the issue on the validity of title, that is whether or not
it was fraudulently issued, can only be raised in an action expressly instituted for the purpose.
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CAMILO F. BORROMEO v ANTONIETTA O. DESCALLAR

G.R. No. 159310 February 24, 2009
PUNO, C.J.:
Facts:
Wilhem Jambrich, an Austrian, was assigned by his employer here in the Philippines to work a project in
Mindoro, then he met Antonieta Descallar, a separated mother of two boys. The two fell in love and decided to live
together, then they transferred to their own house and lot at Agro-Macro Subdivision, Cabanclan, Mandaue City.
Jambrich name was erased in the Deed of Absolute Sale because he was an alien and prohibited to acquire alienable
lands. However, the two broke up.
Thereafter, Jambrich met petitioner Camilo Borromeo, who was engaged in real estate business, then
Jambrich became indebted to Borromeo, thus, Jambrich sold his rights and interest in the Agro-Macro properties to
pay his debt, they executed Deed of Absolute Sale/Assignment.
Borromeo filed a complaint against Descallar for the recovery of the property before RTC of Mandaue, on
August 2, 1991. He alleged that Descallar did not pay a single centavo when Jambrich and her bought the property
and it was only Jambrich who paid for the properties using his exclusive funds, thus, Jambrich was the real and
absolute owner of the properties, and that he acquired such by virtue of Deed of Absolute Sale/Assignment.
Descallar on her answer, alleged that she solely and exclusively used her personal funds to pay the
purchase price of the properties and that Jambrich as an alien was prohibited to acquire or own real property in the
Philippines.
Issue:
Whether or not the Borromeo validly acquired the property from Jambrich.
Ruling:
YES. Jambrich has all authority to transfer all his rights, interest and participation over the properties to
Borromeo, since he was the one who purchased the said house and lot since Descallar has no financial capability to
buy the properties given her financial distress status as compared to him. In addition, Descallar is not co-owner of
the properties, because when she and Jambrich live together, she was still legally married, with such adulterous
relationship, co-ownership does not exist between them.
Even though the properties was registered in her name alone, it does not make her automatically the
absolute owner because registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership, mere possession of a title does not make
one the true owner of the property.
If land is invalidly transferred to an alien who subsequently becomes a Filipino citizen or transfers it to a
Filipino, the flaw in the original transaction is considered cured and the title of the transferee is rendered valid. Thus,
in here, the sale of Jambrich to Borromeo has cured the defect, thus the sale in between them is valid. As the
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property in dispute is already in the hands of a qualified person, a Filipino citizen, there would be no more public
policy to be protected.
THOMAS C. CHEESMAN v INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and ESTELITA PADILLA

G.R. No. 74833 January 21, 1991
NARVASA, J.:
Facts:
Thomas Cheesman, an American citizen and Criselda P. Cheesman, Filipino, were married on December
4, 1970 but have been separated since February 15,1981.
Cheesman filed a complaint before the CFI of Olongapo City on July 31, 1981, against his wife, Criselda
and Estelita Padilla, praying for the annulment of the sale on the ground that the transaction had been executed
without his knowledge and consent. This was after Criselda sold the property to Estelita, on July 1, 1981.
Lower court ruled favor of Estelita and declared that the sale was valid. IAC affirmed CFIs ruling, and both
court found that on record adequately proved fraud, mistake or excusable negligence by which Estelita Padilla's
rights had been substantially impaired; that the funds used by Criselda Cheesman was money she had earned and
saved prior to her marriage to Thomas Cheesman, and that Estelita Padilla did believe in good faith that Criselda
Cheesman was the sole owner of the property in question.
Issue:
Whether or not Cheesman has capacity to question the subsequent sale of the property.
Ruling:
NO. Fundamental law prohibits the sale to aliens of residential land, assuming that it was his intention that
the lot in question be purchased by him and his wife, he acquired no right whatever over the property by virtue
of that purchase; and in attempting to acquire a right or interest in land, vicariously and clandestinely, he
knowingly violated the Constitution; the sale as to him was null and void.
Therefore, he has no capacity or personality to question the subsequent sale of the same property by
his wife on the theory that in so doing he is merely exercising the prerogative of a husband in respect of conjugal
property. To sustain such a theory would permit indirect controversion of the constitutional prohibition. If the
property were to be declared conjugal, this would accord to the alien husband a not insubstantial interest and right
over land, as he would then have a decisive vote as to its transfer or disposition.
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TESTATE ESTATE OF JOSE EUGENIO RAMIREZ, MARIA LUISA PALACIOS v MARCELLE D. VDA.
DE RAMIREZ, ET AL., JORGE and ROBERTO RAMIREZ
G.R. No. L-27952 February 15, 1982
ABAD SANTOS, J.:

Facts:
Jose Ramirez, a Filipino national, died in Spain on December 11, 1964, with only his widow Marcelle
Demoron de Ramirez;, a French, as his compulsory heirs.
Then the administratix submitted a project of partition, the property of the deceased is to be divided into
two parts. One part shall go to the widow in satisfaction of her legitime; the other part shall go to Jorge and Roberto
Ramirez. Furthermore, one third (1/3) of the free portion is charged with the widow's usufruct and the remaining
two-thirds (2/3) with a usufruct in favor of Wanda de Wrobleski, his companion.
One of the ground of opposition of Jorge and Roberto was usufruct to Wanda is void because it violates the
constitutional prohibition against acquisition of lands by aliens.
Issue:
Whether or not the usufruct in favor of Wanda is void for violating the constitution.
Ruling:
NO. Usufruct in favor of Wanda is valid and not a violation of Constitution because a usufruct, albeit a
real right, does not vest title to the land in the usufructuary and it is the vesting of title to land in favor of aliens
which is proscribed by the Constitution.
Constitution covers not only succession by operation of law but also testamentary succession. The
constitutional prohibition does not extend to testamentary succession for otherwise the prohibition will be for naught
and meaningless. Any alien would be able to circumvent the prohibition by paying money to a Philippine landowner
in exchange for a devise of a piece of land.
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ESTATE OF SALVADOR SERRA SERRA, et al. v HEIRS OF PRIMITIVO HERNAEZ, et al.

G.R. No. 142913. August 9, 2005
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Facts:
Petition for reconstitution of alleged lost original certificate of title and owner’s duplicate copies in the
name of Eleuterio Hernaez covering Lot 1316 of Kabankalan Cadastre and Lot Nos. 2685 and 717 of Ilog Cadastre,
in the Province of Negros Occidental, was filed by his successors-in-interest Primitivo, Rogaciana and Luisa, all
surnamed Hernaez (Hernaez) with then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Bacolod City. This was granted by CFI and
issued reconstituted title.
On the other hand, Salvador Serra Serra, for and in behalf of his co-heirs, registered their adverse claim and
moved for the cancellation of the reconstituted titles, claiming that they are holders of valid and existing certificates
over subject properties.
Trial court denied the motion of Serra Serra and granted instead Hernaez’ prayer that they be placed in
possession of the subject properties. Appellate court issued a writ of preliminary injunction3 which was ordered
lifted in a resolution dated August 3, 1971. Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was denied, hence they filed
before this Court a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus.
Issue:
Whether or not Serra Serra can acquire the property.
Ruling:
NO. As found out by both court, Serra Serra or petitioners are all Spanish Citizens, and under the
constitution aliens cannot acquire private land except by hereditary succession or when they were formerly natural-
born Filipinos who lost their Philippine citizenship. However, in this case, petitioners did not present proof that they
acquired the properties by inheritance. Neither did they claim to be former natural-born Filipinos. On the contrary,
they declare in this petition that they are all Spanish citizens residing in Mallorca, Spain. Therefore, as Spanish
citizens they are disqualified from acquiring lands in the Philippines.
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DIRECTOR OF LANDS v SAMUEL BUYCO and EDGAR BUYCO

G.R. No. 91189 November 27, 1992
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
Facts:
Charles Hankins, an American who was married to Laura Crescini and who resided in Canduyong
Romblon died on May 31, 1937 and was survived by his widow and his son Alexander and William; and his
grandchildren Ismael, Samuel and Edgar all surnamed Buyco, who are legitimate issues of his deceases daughter
Lilia and husband Marcelino Buyco. Laura also died on December 22, 1941.
William sold his shares in the estate of his parent to Marcelino, who in turn donated such to his children.
Then Ismael waived his right to his share in favor of Samuel. Thereafter, Edgar and Samuel became naturalized
citizens.
Buyco brothers filed before the CFI application for registration through their atty-in-fact, Rieven Buyco, of
the parcel of land with an area of 3,194,788 square meters (319.4788 hectares) which spreads across the barangays
of Canduyong, Anahao and Ferrol in the municipality of Odiongan, Province of Romblon, they acquired through
inheritance and donation. CFI granted their application. On appeal, CA dismissed the appeal for lack of merit.
Issue:
Whether or not Buyco brothers can register their lands.
Ruling:
NO. Applicant must prove that (a) the land is alienable public land and (b) his possession, in the concept
abovestated, must be either since time immemorial, in this case, private respondents offered no evidence at all to
prove that the property subject of the application is an alienable and disposable parcel of land of the public domain.
On the contrary, based on their own evidence, the entire property which is alleged to have originally belonged to
Charles Hankins was pasture land.
The applicant must present evidence of an imperfect title such as those derived from the old Spanish grants.
He may also show that he has been in continuous, open and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural
lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership and for the period prescribed under
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. Herein, private respondents evidence miserably failed to establish their
imperfect title to the property in question, and their allegation of possession since time immemorial, which was
conceded by the land registration court and the public respondent, is patently baseless. Moreover, Charles Hankins
was an American citizen, there is no evidence to show the date of his birth, his arrival in the Philippines —
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particularly in Odiongan, Romblon — or his acquisition of the big tract of land; neither is there any evidence to
prove the manner of his acquisition thereof.
Furthermore, since the private respondents became American citizens before such filing, it goes without
saying that they had acquired no vested right, consisting of an imperfect title over to property before they lost their
Philippine citizenship.
JG Summit v Court of Appeals

GR No. 124293 Jan. 31, 2005
Puno,J:
Facts:
National Investment and Development Corporation (NIDC), government corporation, entered into the Joint
Venture Agreement with Kawasaki Heavy Industries, Ltd. (KAWASAKI) of Japan for the construction, operation
and management of Subic National Shipyard, Inc. which subsequently became Philippines Shipyard and
Engineering Corp. (PHILSECO). Under the JVA, NIDC and KAWASAKI will contribute for the capitalization of
PHILSECO in proportion of 60%-40%, respectively, and both parties have the right to first refusal, in case of sale.
PHILSECO’s title and interest transferred to Philippine National Bank (PNB) then subsequently transferred
it to National Government pursuant to an Administrative Order. For the interest of economy National Government
decides to sell it 87.67% share to private entities, for privatization of PHILSECO. After negotiations, it was decided
and agreed that the right of refusal of KAWASAKI will be exchanged to right to top by 5% the highest bid for said
shares. KAWASAKI informed that Philyards Holding, Inc. will be the one who would exercise their right to top.
JG Summit Holding, Inc. was the highest bidder, but because of right to top of KAWASAKI/Philyards,
they was able to top JG Summit’s bid. JG Summit protested, arguing that PHILSECO is a public utility since it is a
shipyard, therefore, 60-40% must observe. JG Summit further adds that if KAWASAKI/Philyards will buy the said
shares 87.67%, they will own more than 40% of shares.
Petitioner filed a petition in CA, but it was dismissed for lack of merit. Afterwards, petitioner filed a
petition for certiorari in SC, and SC ruled in favor of petitioner, and upheld the right of petitioner as highest bidder.
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration, and the in court ruled in favor of respondent, and state that
PHILSECO is not a public utility, and there’s nothing in JVA that prevents KAWASAKI in acquiring more than
40% of share. Again, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration and Motion to Elevate the Case to the Court En
Banc.
Issue:
Whether or not KAWASAKI/Philyards violates Constitutional provision limiting the foreign corporation in owning
land.
Ruling:
NO. The agreement of co-shareholders to mutually grant this right (right of first refusal), by itself, does not
violate the Constitution’s provision with regard to limiting land ownership to Filipinos and Filipino corporations.
The right of first refusal over shares pertains to the shareholders whereas the capacity to own land pertains to the
corporation – this is under the principle that corporation and stockholders are separate juridical entities. There is no
law prohibiting a person from purchasing shares in landholding corporation even if the latter will exceed the allowed
foreign equity, what the law disqualifies is the corporation from owning land.
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In addition to, petitioner cites Article 415 of the Civil Code alleges that PHILSECO continues to violate the
constitution by owning long-term leasehold rights which are real rights. It was correctly observed by the public
respondents that the prohibition in the Constitution applies only to ownership of land. It does not extend to
immovable or real property as defined under Article 415 of the Civil Code which embraces real rights. Otherwise,
we would be confronted with a strange situation where the ownership of immovable property such as trees, plants
and growing fruit attached to the land would be limited to Filipinos and Filipino corporations only. Moreover, since
PHILSECO is not a public utility, it is not covered by the constitutional proscription regarding ownership.
REGISTER OF DEEDS OF RIZAL v UNG SIU SI TEMPLE

GR No. L-6776 MAY 21, 1955
REYES, J.B.L.:
Facts:
Subject property of the case is a parcel of residential land, situated in Caloocan, Rizal. Where Register of
Deeds of Rizal refused to accept for records the deed of donation executed in due form by Jesus Dy, Filipino citizen
conveying the said land, in favor of unregistered religious organization ‘Ung Siu Si Temple’ in which its three
trustees are all Chinese nationality.
The refusal of Registrar was elevated to the Court of First Instance of Manila, where the said court ruled in
favor of Register of Deeds. The deed of donation in question should not be registered for the reason of foreign
corporation ban in acquiring land unless such corporation is at least owned by 60% Filipino citizens. Donee
appealed alleging that land acquisition for religious purpose is authorized by Act No. 271.
Issue:
Whether or not such deed of donation be registered.
Ruling:
NO. Act No. 271 was deemed repealed by Constitution because of its incompatibility. Also, there’s no
exception in favor of religious associations mentioned in the Constitution. The fact that they religious
organization/donee has no capital stock, does not suffice to escape the Constitutional inhibition, since they admitted
that their members are foreign nationality. The spirit of Constitution demands that in absence of capital stock, the
controlling membership should be composed of Filipino Citizens.
To permit religious associations controlled by non-Filipinos to acquire agricultural lands would be to drive
the opening wedge to revive alien religious land holdings in this country.
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ROMAN CATHOLIC APOSTOLIC ADMINISTRATOR OF DAVAO INC. v LAND REGISTRATION

COMMISSION
GR No. L-8451 DEC. 20, 1957
FELIX, J.:
Facts:
Mateo L. Rodis, a citizen and resident of City of Davao, executed a deed of sale of a parcel of land located
in the same city covered by TCT No. 2263, in favor of Roman Catholic Apostolic Administrator of Davao, Inc
(RCADI), a corporation sole organized and existing in accordance with Philippine laws, with Msgr. Clovis Thibault,
a Canadian citizen, as actual incumbent.
Register of Deed of Davao required RCADI to submit an affidavit that 60% of its members are Filipino.
RCADI express its willingness to submit the said affidavit but not in the same tenor of the Carmelite Nuns, because
in the latter they became the owner of the properties donated to them, but in the case of RCADI, the Catholic
population of Davao became the owner of the property to be registered.
Register of Deeds entertained some doubts as to the registrability of the deed of sale, the matter was
referred to Land Registration Commissioner en consulta for resolution. LRC holds that the vendee was not qualified
to acquire private lands in the Philippines in the absence of proof that 60% of their capital, property or asset was
controlled and owned by Filipino citizens, pursuant to provisions of sections 1 and 5 of Article XII of the Philippine
Constitution. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but denied, and therefore filed a petition for mandamus.
Issue:
Whether or not the said deed of sale can be registered.
Ruling:
YES. Branch of the Universal Roman Catholic Apostolic Church, every Roman Catholic Church in
different countries, if it exercises its mission and is lawfully incorporated in accordance with the laws of the country
where it is located, is considered an entity or person with all the rights and privileges granted to such artificial being
under laws of that country, separate and distinct from the personality of the Roman Pontiff or Holy See, without
prejudice to its religious relations with the latter which are governed by the Canon Law or their rules and
regulations.
It has been shown that: (1) the corporation sole, unlike the ordinary corporations, is composed of only one
persons, usually the head or bishop of the diocese, a unit which is not subject to expansion for the purpose of
determining any percentage whatsoever; (2) the corporation sole is only the administrator and not the owner of the
temporalities –estate or properties not exclusively used for religious worship, (3) such temporalities are
administered for and on behalf of the faithful residing in the diocese or territory of the corporation sole; and (4) the
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latter, as such, has no nationality and the citizenship of the incumbent Ordinary has nothing to do with the operation,
management or administration of the corporation sole, nor effects the citizenship of the faithful connected with their
respective dioceses or corporation sole.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v COURT OF APPEALS and CORAZON NAGUIT

G.R. No. 144057 January 17, 2005
TINGA, J.:
Facts:
Subject property herein is parcel of land situated in Brgy. Union, Nabas, Aklan, designated as Lot No.
10049 with an area of 31,374 square meters.
Corazon Naguit filed for petition for registration of title which seeks judicial confirmation of her imperfect
title. She alleged that her predecessors-in-interest have occupied the land openly and in the concept of owner
without any objection from any private person or even the government. Heirs of Rustico Angeles, opposed the
petition, however, they failed to appear during the trial.
MCTC rendered a decision ordering that the subject parcel be brought under the operation of the Property
Registration Decree or Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529 and that the title thereto registered and confirmed in the
name of Naguit.
Republic of the Philippines (Republic), thru the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a motion for
reconsideration. The OSG stressed that the land applied for was declared alienable and disposable only on October
15, 1980, per the certification from Department of Environment and Natural Resources. However, the court denied
the motion for reconsideration. Thus, Republic appeal to RTC, but such appeal was dismissed. On appeal again, CA
dismissed the petition and affirmed RTCs decision.
Issue:
Whether or not it is necessary that the subject land be to be registered be first classified as alienable and disposable
before applicants possession ownership could even start.
Ruling:
NO. What the law requires is that the land should be first classified as alienable and disposable at the time
the applicants file for application for registration.
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There are three requisites for the filing of an application for registration of title under Section 14(1) – that
the property in question is alienable and disposable land of the public domain; that the applicants by
themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation, and; that such possession is under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12,
1945 or earlier.
As to the contention of petitioner that the alienable and disposable character of the land should have already
been established since June 12, 1945 or earlier. SC states that it merely requires the property sought to be
registered as already alienable and disposable at the time the application for registration of title is filed. If the
State, at the time the application is made, has not yet deemed it proper to release the property for alienation or
disposition, the presumption is that the government is still reserving the right to utilize the property.
ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF KALIBO, AKLAN, represented by BISHOP JUAN N. NILMAR v

MUNICIPALITY OF BURUANGA, AKLAN, represented by the HON. PROTACIO S. OBRIQUE
G.R. No. 149145 March 31, 2006
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Facts:
Subject property is Lot 138A, 138-B and 138-C situated in Aklan. Roman Catholic Bishop of Kalibo,
Aklan, filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) thereof a complaint for declaration of ownership and quieting of
title to land with prayer for preliminary injunction against the Municipality of Buruanga, Aklan. Petitioner alleged
that they are the lawful owner and possessor of a parcel of residential and commercial land (Cadastral Lot No. 138)
located at the poblacion of the Municipality of Buruanga, Aklan. And that the construction of municipal building in
the northeastern part of the land is due to permission of Fr. Jesus Patiño, then parish priest of Buruanga. Respondent,
on the other hand, alleged that they are the lawful owner of the said property.
Trial court rendered its declaring the Roman Catholic Bishop of Kalibo as the lawful owner and possessor
of Lot 138-B and the Municipality of Buruanga as the lawful owner and possessor of Lots 138-A and 138-C, the
said lots being public plaza for public use.On appeal, Court of Appeal affirmed the decision of RTC with
modification that Lots 138-A and 138-C are declared property of public dominion not owned by either of the parties.
Issue:
Whether the appellate court correctly declared Lots 138-A and 138-C as property of public dominion, hence, not
susceptible to ownership by either the petitioner and respondent municipality.
Ruling:
YES. Following improvements now stand on Lots 138-A and 138-C: the municipal building, rural health
center, Buruanga community Medicare hospital, basketball court, Rizal monument and grandstand. Except for the
construction of the municipal building, the other improvements were made on Lots 138-A and 138-C, and
continuously used by the public without the petitioner’s objection. Therefore, said lots incontrovertibly that they are
property for public use.
Property for public use of provinces and towns are governed by the same principles as property of public
dominion of the same character. The ownership of such property, which has the special characteristics of a collective
ownership for the general use and enjoyment, by virtue of their application to the satisfaction of the collective needs,
is in the social group, whether national, provincial, or municipal. Their purpose is not to serve the State as a juridical
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person, but the citizens; they are intended for the common and public welfare, and so they cannot be the object of
appropriation, either by the State or by private persons.
SPOUSES ANITA AND HONORIO AGUIRRE v HEIRS OF LUCAS VILLANUEVA

GR No. 169898 OCT. 27, 2006
YNARE-SANTIAGO,J.:
Facts:
Subject property herein is a parcel of residential land designated as Lot 764-A situated in Balabag, Malay,
Aklan with an area of 140 square meters. Heirs of Villanueva alleged that spouses Lucas and Regina Villanueva
possessed the land during their lifetime openly, publicly and continuously, therefore, they are the owner as
evidenced by Tax Declaration (1947) under Lucas Villanueva’s name. And on 1997, respondent fenced the whole
land in question without the knowledge and consent of petitioner.
On the other hand, spouses Aguirre confronted the respondent and alleging that Anita Aguirre is the lawful
owner and actual possessor of the said land, that she inherited it from her deceased parents, who brought the same
from Ciriaco Tirol per Deed of Exchange of Real Property dated December 31, 1971 and registered in the Office of
the Register of Deeds of Aklan, and that such parcel of land included under Tax Declaration (1953) in the name of
Trinidad de Tirol and the same is in possession of Tirol family as owner thereof, continuously, openly and adversely
even before the WWII. And the land was first fenced with bamboos in 1981 and with cement hollow blocks in 1985,
without any opposition from private respondents.
Petitioner further alleged that the respondents are guilty of laches in failing to assert their alleged right of
ownership after the lapse of more than 50 years since it was possessed by the heirs of late Trinidad Vda. de Tirol.
RTC ruled in favor of respondents, stating that tax declarations in the name of Trinidad Vda. de Tirol and
survey plan did not establish the fact that Ciriaco Tirol is the owner and possessor, thus he has no right to transfer
the land to the father of petitioner. CA denied the motion for reconsideration.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent is barred by prescription.
Ruling:
YES. Prescription is a mode of acquiring or losing ownership and other real rights through the lapse of time in the
manner and under conditions laid down by law, namely, that possession should be in concept of an owner, public,
peaceful, uninterrupted and adverse. Acquisitive prescription is either ordinary or extraordinary – ordinary
acquisitive prescription requires possession in good faith, and with just title for 10 years, without good faith and
just title acquisitive prescription can only be extraordinary which requires uninterrupted adverse for 30 years.
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In the instant case, the court find sufficient evidence to support petitioner’s claim of ordinary prescription: petitioner
is in possession of the land uninterruptedly, in the concept of an owner for span of 26 years from the time the land in
question was included in deed of exchange in 1971 up to the time the respondent complained, also there’s no
question that possession of land was with just title –by way of exchange.
While tax declaration and receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership, however, if it is coupled with actual
possession, it constitute evidence of great weight and can be basis of a claim of ownership through prescription. The
petitioner, after buying the property in 1971, possessed the same in concept of owner, peacefully occupied it, built
fences, planted plants, having been in continuous possession of enjoyment of the disputed land in good faith and
with just title since 1971 until 1998, petitioner undoubtedly obtain title by ordinary acquisitive prescription. In
addition to, laches had already set in.
SIMPLICO BINALAY, ET AL v. GUILLERMO MANALO AND CA

‘GR No. 92161 MARCH 18, 1991
FELICIANO, J.:
Facts:
The subject property herein is the parcel of land situated in Tumauini, Isabela, with an estimated area of 20 hectares,
originally owned by late Judge Taccad. The western portion of the land bordering on the Cagayan River has an
elevation lower than that of eastern portion, western portion would periodically go under the water of Cagayan River
and would re-appear during dry season.
Guillermo Manalo, private respondent acquired the 2 lands one from Faustina Taccad, daughter of Judge Taccad and
the other from Gregorio Taguba. Manalo then consolidated the two land into one and designated as Lot 307, as the
survey conducted on a rainy month, a portion of land brought from Faustina then under water was left unsurveyed
and not included in Lot 307.
The sketch plans show this Cagayan River running from south to north, forks at a certain point to form two branches
(western and eastern) and then unites at the other end, further north, to form a narrower strip of land. The eastern
branch of the river cuts through Lot 307, and is flooded during the rainy season. The unsurveyed portion, on the
other hand, is the bed of the eastern branch. Note that the fork exists only during the rainy season while the
“island”/elongated strip of land formed in the middle of the forks becomes dry and perfect for cultivation when the
Cagayan River is at its ordinary depth. The strip of land in the middle of the fork totaled 22.7 hectares and was
labeled Lot 821-822. Lot 821 is directly opposite Lot 307 and is separated by the eastern branch of the river’s fork.
Respondent Manalo claims that Lot 821 belongs to him by accretion to the submerged portion of the property to
which it is adjacent. Petitioners who are in possession of the Lot 821, insist that they own the said lot. They occupy
the outer edges of Lot 821 along the river banks – the fertile portion on which they plant tobacco and other
agricultural products, they also cultivates the western portion of unsurveyed portion during summer.
Manalo filed 2 cases for forcible entry which were both dismissed. Later on, he filed a complaint for quieting of
title, possession, and damages against petitioner. The trial court and the CA ruled in favor of Manalo, saying that Lot
821 and Lot 307 cannot be considered separate and distinct from each other.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent owns Lot 821 by accretion.
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Ruling:
NO. Manalo could not have acquire ownership of the land because Art. 420 of Civil Code states the river are part
of public dominion, and the word river includes running water, beds and banks.
More importantly, the requisites of accretion in Art. 457 were not satisfied. These are: 1) that the deposition of
the soil or sediment be gradual and imperceptible; 2) that it be the result of the action of the waters of the river (or
sea); and 3) the land where the accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks of the rivers (or the sea coast ). The
accretion should’ve been attached to Lot 307 for Manalo to acquire its ownership. BUT, the claimed accretion lies
on the bank of the river; not adjacent to Lot 307 but directly opposite it, across the river. It is the action of the heavy
rains that cause the highest ordinary level of waters of the Cagayan River during the rainy season. The submerged
area (22.72 hectares) is twice the area of the land he actually bought. It is difficult to suppose that such a sizable area
could have been brought about by accretion.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHIL. v CA ET AL.

GR No. 103882
PASAY CITY AND REPUBLIC REAL ESTATE CORP. v CA AND REPUBLIC
GR No. 105276 NOV. 25, 1998
PURISIMA, J.:
Facts:
Pasay City passed an Ordinance No. 121, for reclamation of 300 hectares of foreshore land in the said city, pursuant
to Republic Act 1899 authorized the reclamation of foreshore lands by chartered cities and municipalities. Such
ordinance was amended by Ordinance No. 158, authorizing the Republic Real estate Corporation (RREC) to reclaim
the foreshore lands in Pasay.
Republic of the Philippines filed a complaint questioning the agreement between Pasay and RREC on the grounds
that the subject-matter of the agreement is outside the commerce of man, that it is violative of RA 1899 and that was
executed without public bidding, therefore it is void.
Pasay City and RREC countered that the object in question is within the commerce of man because RA 1899 gives a
broader meaning on the term “foreshore land” than that in the definition provided by the dictionary. RTC and CA
ruled in favor of RREC and Pasay City.
Issue:
Whether or not the reclamation of Pasay City and RREC is valid.
Ruling:
NO. Petitioner argued that there are no foreshore lands along the seaside of Pasay City, what they have are
submerged or offshore areas which are beyond the commerce of man. And CA’s decision unduly expands the term
‘foreshore’ land.
The Court ruled that it is erroneous and unsustainable to uphold the opinion of the respondent court that the term
“foreshore land” includes the submerged areas. Unduly stretched and broadened the meaning of foreshore land is
beyond the intent of the law and against the recognized legal connotation of foreshore land. Foreshore land defines
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as the strip of land that lies between the high and low water marks and that is alternatively wet and dry
according to the flow of the tide.
The duty of the court is to interpret the enabling act, RA 1889, and court cannot broaden its meaning nor widen the
coverage. If the intention of Congress is to include submerged areas, it should have provided expressly.
Therefore, the ordinances of Pasay and agreement between city and RREC are outside the intendment and scope of
RA 1889 and so ultra vires (beyond one’s legal power or authority) and void.
DIRECTOR OF LANDS, et al v HON. SALVADOR REYES as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Nueva
Ecija, Branch III, et al
GR L-27594
ALIPIO ALINSUNURIN, substituted by PARANAQUE INVESTMENT AND DEVELOPMENT CORP. v
DIRECTOR OF LANDS, et al.
GR L-28144 NOV.28, 1975
ANTONIO, J.:
Facts:
February 24, 1964, Alipio Alinsunurin filed an application for registration under Act 496 of a vast tract of
land with an area of 16, 800 hectares more or less, situated in Laur, Nueva Ecija inside the boundary of military
reservation of Fort Magsaysay. Alleging that he acquired ownership thru inheritance from the late Maria Padilla.
Alipio claimed that Maria Padilla acquired the land through her father Melecio Padilla, who acquired it by virtue of
possessory information title during Spanish regime on March 5, 1895 and transmitted it to Maria Padilla, sole heir,
upon his death.
Director of Lands, Director of Forestry and AFP opposed to the said application, claiming that the applicant
was without sufficient title and was not in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
the said land for at least 30 years immediately preceding the filing of the application and that approximately 13,957
hectares of said land consist of military reservation established under Proc. No. 237, dated December 10, 1955 of
the President.
Paranaque Investment and Development Corp. substituted Alipio Alinsunurin as the applicant, having been
acquired the rights, interest, dominion and ownership over the subject property.
The land is largely uncultivated, mountainous and thickly forested with a heavy growth of timber of
commercial quantities. Except for small area cultivated for vegetation by homesteaders issued patents by the
Director of Lands, there were no occupants on the land.
November 19, 1966, lower court rendered decision in favor of applicant and ordered to registered the said
land to Paranaque Investment and Development Corp. as to the 2/3 portion of the said land, and to Roman Tamayo
as to the 1/3 portion.
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Director of Lands et al, filed an Notice of Appeal to SC. However, while pending approval of the appeal,
applicant and Tamayo filed a motion for issuance of decree of registration. And on March 11, 1967, the lower court
ruled that their November decision had become final as to the share of Tamayo, and directed the issuance of decree
of registration for the entire land, while the portion or share of Paranaque Investment and Development Corp., was
subject to the final outcome of the appeal. Pursuant to the order, Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija issued Original
Certificate of Title No. 0-3151. Upon denial of reconsideration, Director of Lands et al, filed petition with the court
seeking for the nullity of the order dated March 11, 1967 and nullity of the decree of registration as well as the OCT
issued.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not the survey plan presented by applicant is sufficient evidence.
(2) Whether or not the applicant has registrable title to the land applied for.
Ruling:
1. NO. The original tracing cloth plan of the land applied for, which must be approved by Director of
Lands was not submitted in evidence by the applicant. The submission of such plan is statutory
requirement of mandatory character. Unless a plan and its technical description are duly approved by
Director of lands, the same are not much of value. Applicant only submits blueprints of 2 survey plan. And
only the plan of the surveyed for Paranaque Investment and Development Corp., submitted as evidence,
however, it lacks the approval of Director of Lands.
Applicant justify the non-submission by alleging that the original tracing cloth plan was with the Land
Registration Commission to check and verify the survey plan and its technical description. However, SC states
that LRC has no function to check the original survey plan and it has no authority to approve such.
It is also asserted that the blueprint copy presented by applicant superimposed into the military plan of
reservation, which was presented evidence by oppositors. However, the sole purpose of the superimposition
of the survey plan as surveyed for applicant in military map, is to show that the land applied for is
situated within the area covered by military reservation of Fort Magsaysay. Still the applicant is not
relieved in presenting original tracing cloth plan duly approved by Director of Land, as it is required by law.
Original tracing cloth plan purpose is to fix the exact or definite identity of the land as shown in the plan
and its technical description. Since of the distinguishing marks of Torrens system is the absolute certainty of
identity of the land. Surveyor’s certificate also required in original land registration proceedings, was also not
offered in evidence.
2. NO. The titulo de informacion posessoria issued in the name of Melecio Padilla, in which the
applicant relies on is deficient because:
(1) the titulo presented is neither the original copy nor a duly authenticated copy; (2) there’s serious flaws
on the faces of copy – the 2 photostat copies presented had different date of issuance, March 5, 1895 and March
5, 1883; (3) according to Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija, there’s no Melecio Padilla listed as holder of
informacion posessoria as of the year of 1898 covering lands situated in Santor (Laur), but only posessoria
informacion over the lands situated in Penaranda Nueva Ecija, with a total of 49 hectares; (4) such alleged
posessoria informacion is contrary to Royal Decrees of November 25, 1880 and October 26, 1881, which states
that no one could acquire public land in excess of 1,000 hectares , since the said titulo covers 16,800 hectares;
and (5) the document allegedly titulo de informacion posessoria is not informacion posessoria, but a
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certification of possession of Melecio over the property, ad was issued without prejudice to the third party or
parties having a better right.
VICENTE DIVINA v CA and VILMA GAJO-SY

GR No. 117734 FEBRUARY 22, 2001
Quisumbing, J.:
Facts:
Subject property herein is Lot 1893 situated at Gubat, Sorsogon, which was originally owned by Antonio
Berosa, with an area of 20,000 sqm., which was sold to Teotimo Berosa. Then on March 23, 1961, Berosa spouses
sold the 20,000 sqm to Jose Gamos, who already acquired the boundary lot of Lot 1893 from heirs of Felix
Arimado, with an area of 20,687 sqm and identified as Lot 1466, on April 26, 1960. June 16, 1961, Gamos had re-
surveyed the land and showed that the consolidated properties contained a total area of 100,034 sqm and was
approved by Acting Director of Lands.
On January 19, 1967, Teotimo Berosa conveyed the portion of Lot 1893 referred as Lot 1893-B to
petitioner, with an area of 54,818 sqm, said sale was registered. Subdivision plan was prepared for petitioner but
without the approval of Bureau of Land, showed that Lot 1893 was divided into Lot 1893-A and Lot 1893-B.
Then on July 24, 1970 Gamos sold the consolidated property to private respondent. Subsequently on
August 28, 1972, she filed for registration of title at the Court of First Instance in Sorsogon. July 29, 1975, the land
registration court ordered the registration of the said to private respondent.
July 13, 1977, petitioner filed Petition for Review with the same court, while the issuance of decree of
registration was still pending. Alleging that he is the owner of portion of Lot 1893 and he was unaware of the
proceedings because of the failure of private respondent to give him notice and post any notice to subject property.
Private respondent opposed the petition and contends that the decision is final and the court has no jurisdiction, and
that the lack of personal notice to petitioner did not constitute actual fraud.
RTC ruled in favor of petitioner and found out that there was deliberate misrepresentation and
amounted to fraud, since private respondent failed to include the fact that Elena, petitioner’s cousin told the sister
of private respondent about her apprehension that their land might be included in her application, therefore, there is
deliberate misrepresentation. On the other hand, CA reversed the RTC’s decision and states that there was no
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misrepresentation, since petitioner did not appear as adjoining owner in survey plan of the subject property, neither
was known claimant or possessor of the questioned portion since it was found to be untouched.
Issue:
WON there was deliberate misrepresentation constituting actual fraud on the part of private respondent when she
failed to give or post notice to petitioner of her application for registration.
Ruling:
YES. Sec 15 of PD 1529 states that in the application for registration “shall also state the full names and
addresses of all occupants of the land and those of the adjoining owners if known, and if not known, it shall state the
extent of the search made to find them”. Mere statement of lack of knowledge of names of the occupants and
adjoining owner is not sufficient but what search has been made to find them is necessary.
Private respondent omission about the conversation of her sister and Elena, prevented the petitioner from
having his day in court. And it is fraud to knowingly omit or conceal a fact which benefit is obtained and prejudice
a third person.
In addition to, petitioner acquire the bigger portion of Lot 1893 long after the initial survey. Petitioner’s
name would not be found on the said survey plan approved by Director of Lands on 1961, years before his
purchase of the portion of Lot 1893 (1967).
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JUAN SEVILLA SALAS, JR. v EDEN VILLENA AGUILA

GR No. 202370 SEPTEMBER 23, 2013
CARPIO, J.:
Facts:
Juan Salas and Eden Aguila were married (September 7, 1985) and have a daughter, Joan Jiselle.
However, 5 months after she gave birth, Juan Salas left their conjugal dwelling and no longer communicated with
them. Then on October 2003, Aguila filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage citing psychological
incapacity, the petition states that they have no conjugal property. May 2007, RTC rendered decision declaring the
nullity of marriage of Salas and Aguila, and further provides for dissolution of their conjugal partnership of gains, if
any.
September 2007, Aguila filed a Manifestation and Motion stating that she discovered properties owned by
Juan Salas married to Rubina Salas. Salas opposed the manifestation and contends that there is no conjugal property
to be partitioned based on Aguila’s petition, and Salas further alleged that the statement of Aguila is judicial
admission and was not made through mistake. Therefore, Aguila’s claim over the discovered properties are
deemed waived.
RTC ruled in favor of Aguila and states that the discovered properties are properties to be partitioned and
distributed between Salas and Aguila, and further adds that Salas failed to prove the existence of waived properties.
CA affirmed the decision of RTC and ruled that Aguila’s statement is not judicial admission, since Aguila no
knowledge of the said properties at the time she made an admission. And likewise held that Rubina cannot
collaterally attack a certificate of title.
Rubina filed a complaint-in-intervention, alleging that she is a widow and unmarried and she owned the
discovered properties (paraphernal property), that Salas did not contribute money in purchasing the discovered
properties and it was her brother that who was not well-versed with legal documentation, who registered the
properties in the name of Juan Salas married to Rubina Salas.
Issue:
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WON the discovered properties that acquired during their marriage are paraphernal property of Rubina.
Ruling:
NO. On the contention of Salas and Rubina, that Rubina owns the discovered property is unmeritorious.
Since the TCT’s states that the name of registered owner is “Juan Salas, married to Rubina Salas. The phrase
‘married to’ is merely descriptive of the civil status of the registered owner. A Torrens title is generally a
conclusive evidence of the ownership of the land referred to, because there is strong presumption that it is valid and
regularly issued.
In addition to, Salas did not dispute the ownership of the discovered properties in his opposition, it was
only when Rubina intervened and he supported her in claiming that Rubina owns the properties.
Therefore, the partitioned of the discovered properties as ordered by RTC and CA sustained but on the
basis of co-ownership and not regime of conjugal partnership of gains.
DIRECTOR OF LANDS v CA and TEODORO ABISTADO substituted by MARGARITA, MARISSA,

MARIBEL, ARNOLD and MARY ANN, all surnamed ABISTADO.
GR No. 102858 JULY 28, 1997
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Facts:
December 8, 1986, Teodoro Abistado filed a petition for original registration of his title over 648 sqm of
lands under PD 1529. Subsequently, he was substituted by Margarita, Marissa, Maribel, Arnold and Mary Ann, all
surnamed Abistado, who represented by Josefa Abistado, their Aunt, since he died. June 13, 1989, land registration
court dismissed the application for want of jurisdiction. The applicant failed to comply to publish the notice of
Initial Hearings in a newspaper of general circulation, and was only published in the Official Gazette . The
court states that they have not legally acquired the jurisdiction over the application for lack of compliance with
mandatory requirement.
Cited Ministry of Justice opinion, the requirement under sec 23 has a two-fold purpose: (1) publication in
Official Gazette and is jurisdictional; and (2) publication also in newspaper of general circulation, and is procedural.
Neither one nor the other is dispensable. Publication in Official Gazette is indispensable because without it, the
court would be powerless to assume jurisdiction over land registration. Publication of notice of initial hearing is
also indispensable, it is necessary requirement of procedural due process, and otherwise the decision
promulgated by court would be legally infirm.
CA set aside the decision of RTC and ruled that failure to comply with publication of notice of initial
hearing in newspaper of general circulation did not deprive the court the authority to grant the application
because it was merely procedural. In addition to, the other requirement such as publication in Official Gazette,
personal notice by mailing and posting at the site and other conspicuous places were complied, and sufficient
enough to notify any party.
Issue:
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WON the absence of publication of notice of initial hearing in newspaper of general circulation the land can be
registered.
Ruling:
NO. Land registration proceeding is a proceeding in rem, being in rem, it requires constructive seizure of
land as against all persons including the state, who have rights or interest in the property. An in rem proceeding may
only be validated through publication, therefore, the process must be strictly complied. Otherwise, persons who
may be interested or whose right may be adversely affected would be barred from contesting an application which
he had no knowledge of. The applicant must prove by satisfactory and conclusive evidence not only his ownership
thereof but the identity of the same, for he is in the same situation as one who institutes an action for recovery of
realty. He must prove his title against the whole world – can only be achieved when all person who have interest
or rights over the property has been notified and effectively invited in the court to show why the application of
registration should not be granted.
Though publication in Official Gazette, mailing and posting are all complied in this case, still publication in
newspaper of general circulation is also mandatorily needed, it is because of (1) due process; (2) the reality that
Official Gazette is not as widely read and circulated as newspaper and oftentimes delayed in circulation; and (3)
such parties may not be owners of neighboring properties, and may in fact not own any other real estate.
In sum, the encompassing in rem nature of land registration cases, the consequences of default orders
issued against the whole world and the objective of disseminating notice in a wide manner as possible demand
a mandatory construction of the requirements for publication, mailing and posting.
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REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v JEREMIAS and DAVID HERBIETO

GR No. 156117 MARCH 26, 2005
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Facts:
September 23, 1998, Jeremias and David Herbieto filed a single application for registration of two parcels
of lands, Lot No. 8422 and Lot No. 8423, located in Cabangahan, Consolacion, Cebu, claiming that they purchased
it from their parents on June 1976.
They submitted (1) advance survey plan of both properties; (2) technical descriptions of the subject lots; (3)
certification by DENR dispensing with the need for Surveyors Certificates for the subject lots; (4) certification by
Register of Deeds of Cebu City on the absence of title covering the lots; (5) certification by CENRO on its findings
that the subject lots are alienable and disposable; (6) certified true copies of assessment of real property of both
property; and (7) deed of definite sale executed by spouses Gregorio Herbieto and Isabel Owatan in favor of their
sons. Petitioner opposed to the respondents application.
MTC set initial hearing on September 3, 1999 at 8:30am. All copies of the Notice of Initial Hearing were
sent to all owners of adjoining lands, and even posted in conspicuous place on the subject lots. Notice was also
published in Official Gazette on August 2, 1999 and the Freeman Banat News on December 19, 1999.
On September 3, 1999, MTC issued an Order of Special Default, with only petitioner Republic opposing
the application for registration of the subject lots.
December 21, 1999, MTC promulgated its decision ordering the registration and confirmation of the title
of respondents. Then on February 2, 2000, issued an order declaring its judgment final and executory and directing
Land Registration Authority to issue decree of registration for the subject lots.
Issue:
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WON the late publication of notice of initial hearing in newspaper of general publication affects the MTC’s
jurisdiction over the case.
Ruling:
YES. A land registration case is a proceeding in rem and jurisdiction in rem cannot be acquired unless there
be a constructive seizure of the land through publication and service notice. In this case, though there was a
publication on both Official Gazette and newspaper of general circulation (The Freeman Banat News), however, the
latter publication was deemed late. The initial hearing was set September 3, 1999, however, the notice in
Freeman Banat News only released on December 19, 1999, more than 3 months after the initial hearing.
Undeniably, the publication of notice, way after the initial hearing, would already be worthless and
ineffective. Because it already deprived the interested parties due process, since it was already too late for him
to appear to MTC on the day of hearing to oppose respondents’ application for registration . Late publication
of Notice of Initial Hearing in newspaper of general circulation is tantamount to no publication at all, having
the same ultimate result. Owing to such defect in publication of the notice, MTC failed to constructively seize the
subject lots and to acquire jurisdiction over respondents registration.
HEIRS OF EUGENIO LOPEZ, SR. v HON. ALFREDO ENRIQUES, in his capacity as Administrator of LRA
and REGISTER OF DEEDS OF MARIKINA CITY
GR No. 146262 JAN. 21, 2005
CARPIO,J.:
Facts:
Sandoval and Ozaeta filed an application for registration before RTC of Pasig docketed as LRC No. N-
18887, thereafter, the land registration court issued and order of general default. May 31, 1966, the land registration
court granted the application and on March 8, 1991, the court decision became final and executory and the land
registration court issued certificate of finality. On October 20, 1977, Decrees Nos. N-217643 and N-217644 issued
by LRA in the names of Sandoval and spouse and Ozaeta and spouse.
On July 16, 1997, heirs of Eugenio Lopez Sr., filed a motion in LRC No. N-18887 praying the court
consider in land registration case the Deed of Absolute Sale over the lots executed by Sandoval and Ozaeta in favor
of Eugenio Lopez Sr., invoking Sec 22 of PD 1529 and also praying for the issuance of decree of registration in their
names as the successor-in-interest of Eugenio Sr. They are alleging that the said lots were sold to Eugenio Sr. on
September 23, 1970.
August 18, 1998, Register of Deeds of Marikina, issued an OCT in favor of Sandoval and Ozaeta pursuant
to May 21, 1966 decision.
Petitioner filed another motion to declare the Decrees and OCTs void on November 25, 1998, alleging that
there is inconsistencies as to the date, however LRA denied the request. Then again they filed to Register of Deeds
of Marikina an application to annotate the notice of lis pendens at the OCT of Sandoval and Ozaeta on the ground
that they filed with land registration court a motion to declare the OCTs void.
Issue:
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WON the petitioner can file the motion to declare void the decrees issued by land registration court despite the fact
that the court has not lifted the Order of General Default.
Ruling:
NO. Petitioners are not mere interested parties in this case, by filing the motion to declare the decrees and
OCTs void, they became oppositors to the application for land registration.
Petitioners file their motion to consider the deed of sale and motion to declare the decrees and certificates
void, was filed long after the decision in LRC No. N-18887 became final and executory, neither the applicants nor
the petitioners from whom they base their claim presented the deed of sale before the land registration court while
the action was pending.
`The motion filed by petitioners is insufficient to give them standing in land registration proceedings for
purpose of filing a notice of lis pendens. However, SC disagree with the LRA and CA’s observation that petitioners
need to file a motion to lift the order of general default. A motion to lift the order of general default should be
filed before entry of final judgment. Thus even if the petitioners filed a motion to lift the order of general default,
such order could not be set aside because the motion was filed out of time.
DIGNA VERGEL, et al. v CA and DOROTEA TAMISIN GONZALES

GR No. 125154 SEPT. 28, 2001
PARDO, J.:
Facts:
On May 26, 1994, petitioners filed before the Regional Trial Court the application for registration of a
parcel of land, for titling.
RTC issued Order of General Default against the whole world except to the Republic of the Philippines,
who represented by Director of Lands who opposed to the said application on December 1994.
On October 3, 1995, private respondent filed with RTC an “Urgent Motion to Set Aside the Order of
General Default”, claiming that she is the owner of the subject land. Such motion was denied by RTC. Then again
private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration, but then again denied. However, CA ruled in favor of private
respondent and set aside the order of general default of RTC.
Issue:
WON the CA erred in setting aside the RTC’s order of general default without making a specific finding of fraud,
negligence, accident or excusable excuse.
Ruling:
YES. The CA arbitrarily set aside the order of general default without factual basis. Private respondent’s
failure to file timely opposition because she missed reading the publication of notice in the Official Gazette or in the
Malaya newspaper, may not be considered as excusable negligence.
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In addition to, she also alleged that the petitioners were aware of his claim over the land, but did not give
her personal notice upon filing of the application, she only learned about it through accident. In her petition she filed
with the CA alleging that petitioners filed the application in bad faith, surreptitiously and without notice to her. CA
did not make a finding on this.
CA erred in setting aside the order of general default of trial court, without making a specific finding of
fraud, accident or excusable neglect that prevent the respondent from timely opposing the application.
SPOUSES RODOLFO YABUT LEE and LYDIA LISCANO v FLORENCIO PUNZALAN

GR No. L-50236 AUG. 29, 1980
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J:
Facts:
On May 14, 1968, Spouse Lee and Liscano filed before the RTC of Tarlac an application for registration of
two parcels of land. No opposition having been interposed, thus, trial court issued Order of General Default.
Applicants were able to present their evidence before Clerk of Court, the latter submitted his report to the court,
however, and this was unacted upon due to transfer of presiding judge.
November 26, 1968, Punzalan filed a Petition for Reopening and/or Review, claiming that the applicants
committed fraud in not disclosing that he is the owner of the house standing on the lots applied for, that he has
usufructuary rights over said properties.
RTC and CA both denied the petition, because of lack of merit and the order in question being interlocutory
in character was not appealable, respectively.
Issue:
1. WON the court erred in not lifting the order of general default instead.
2. WON the remedy filed by Punzalan is correct.
Ruling:
1. YES. If the trial court had resorted to the simple expedient/practical of lifting the order of general
default and allowing Punzalan to file his opposition, this case could have not reached the SC.
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Though Punzalan committed an error of procedure, but it was evident that his objective was to be given a
chance present evidence to substantiate his allegation of ownership. The interest of substantial justice, speedy
determination of controversy, should impelled the lower court to lift the Order of General Default in respect of
oppositor-appellant and allowed him to file an Opposition to the Application.
An order of General Default is interlocutory in character, subject to the control of the court, and
may be modified or amended as the court may deem proper at any time prior to the rendition of final
judgment.
2. No. Petition for Review contemplated in Sec 38 of Act 496 clearly envisages the issuance of decree of
registration and presupposes the rendition of court’s decision. In the case, there’s no judgment yet
been rendered by the RTC and much less decree of registration, therefore, Punzalan’s petition for
review is premature, since there is nothing to be reviewed or reopened.
REPUBLIC v ZENAIDA GINTO-ALDANA et al.

GR No. 175578 AUG. 11, 2010
PERALTA, J.:
Facts:
Zenaida Guinto-Aldana et al, filed with the RTC of Las Pinas City an application for registration of title
over Lot No. 4 and Lot No. 5 situated in Talango, Pamplona Uno, Las Pinas with an area of 1,509 sqm and 4,649
sqm, respectively. They professed that they are co-owners of the said lands. Having acquire them through
succession from their Zenaida’s parents Sergio and Lucia, who in turn acquired the said land through a document
Kasulatan sa Paghahati ng Lupa na Labas sa Hukuman na may Pagpaparaya at Bilihan (1969), Such document
states that Sergio and Lucia acquired for consideration the shares on the property of Pastor Guinto et al, who had
derived the same from Romulado Guinto.
Respondents also alleged that they and their predecessors-in-interest have been in actual, open, peaceful,
adverse, exclusive and continuous possession of the land, in the concept of owner and they declared the property
in their name of taxation.
Respondents also submitted the following as evidence (1) blueprint plan (conversion consolidation
subdivision plan); (2) technical descriptions of each lot; (3) certification from Geodetic Engineer; and (4) tax
declaration with receipts of payment.
As to the original tracing cloth plan, they averred that they submitted it to RTC in connection to the
previous proceeding of registration, which was dismissed.
Republic through Office of City Prosecutor of Las Pinas opposed the said application contending that the
subject lots are inalienable lands, and that neither the predecessors-in-interest had been in prior possession of the
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land and the muniment of title and tax declaration submitted did not constitute sufficient and competent evidence of
bona fide acquisition.
RTC ruled in against the applicants for failing to comply with the requirements of PD 1529. CA reversed
and ruled in favor of applicants.
Issue:
WON the copy of blueprint of survey plan suffice for the compliance in requirement.
Ruling:
YES. SC states that if the reason for requiring an applicant to adduce the original tracing cloth plan is
merely to provide convenient and necessary means to afford certainty as to the exact identity of the property
applied for registration and to ensure the same does not overlap with the boundaries of adjoining lots, there
stand to be no reason why a registration application must be denied for failure to present said plan, especially where
it is accompanied by pieces of evidences such as duly executed blueprint of the survey plan and duly executed
technical description of the property which may likewise prove the limit and extent of property of the property
sought to be registered with certainty.
In the case the applicants did not present the original tracing cloth plan but only the blueprint copy of
survey plan, since they submitted it to LRA for previous registration proceeding. Despite the failure of applicants to
present the original tracing cloth plan, neither the oppositor nor the LRA questioned this deficiency nor raise
objection when the blueprint presented as evidence, their silent can be deemed as implied admission that original
tracing cloth plan and blueprint copy thereof, are one and the same, free from defects and clearly identify the
land sought to be registered. It is deemed tantamount to substantial compliance with the requirements of law.
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HEIRS OF LUIS GONZAGA v SPOUSES JOSE LEELIN and LILIA SEVILLA

GR No. 96259
GUILLERMO MACARIAS v SPOUSES JOSE LEELIN and LILIA SEVILLA
GR No. 96274 SEPT. 3, 1996
HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:
Facts:
Present controversy arose when private respondents filed on October 14, 1981, a complaint for annulment
of Gonzaga Torrens Title that embraced the Lot No. 3619 and 3620 which are identical with those described in
private respondents own title as Lot Nos. 65 and 66.
On Gonzaga’s Torrens title – Jose Eugenio once the registered owner of Lot Nos. 3619 and 3620 of
Cadastral Survey of Caloocan (Cadastral Case No. 34) under TCT No. 17519, then sold (1960) it to deceased Luis
Gonzaga under TCT 81338 (Nov. 29, 1960) and subsequently sold (Sept. 28, 1981) it to petitioner Macarias under
TCT 48078.
On the other hand, the identical lands also registered under the subsisting title TCT C-26086 (Aug. 2,
1979) on the name of Lilia Sevilla, married to Jose Seelin, covers the Lots No. 65 and 66. TCT of Sevilla came from
OCT No. 994 which originally in the name of Maria de la Concepcion Vidal, in which after the Civil Case
substituted in the name of Bartolome Rivera. Where the respondents purchased (deed of absolute sale) from heirs of
Bartolome Rivera (January 14, 1977). The two conflicting TCTs were derived from one common OCT, OCT
994. Both court found that OCT 994 was registered on May 3, 1917. SC found out on the other hand that,
petitioner’s title indicate original registration to have been made on May 3, 1917 while private respondents title
indicate original registration to have been made on April 19, 1917.
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RTC ruled in favor of respondents and states that petitioners title were registered under Cadastral
Proceeding while the title of respondents derived from OCT 994 issued in Land Registration Case, pursuant to
Decree 36455 in 1917. In addition to, the undivided share of Maria de la Concepcion Vidal (includes OCT 994), has
never been sold or disposed by her, and her said share now belongs to Bartolome Rivera et al. Thus, the sale of
property of Eugenio to Gonzaga on November 29, 1960 has no valid basis. CA affirm the ruling of RTC.
Issue:
WON in cases of overlapping titles, earlier certificates prevails.
Ruling:
YES. Certificate is not conclusive evidence of title if it is shown that the same land had already been
registered and an earlier certificate for the same is in existence. Since the land had already been registered under
OCT No. 994 dated April 19, 1917, the subsequent registration of the same land on May 3, 1917 is null and
void. In cadastral case the court has no jurisdiction to decree again the registration of land already decreed in an
earlier land registration case. Where two certificates (of titles) purport to include the same land, the earlier in date
prevails. In successive registrations, where more than one certificate is issued involving the same property or land,
the person claiming under the prior certificate is entitled to the said estate or interest ; and the person is deemed to
hold under the prior certificate who is the holder of, or whose claim is derived directly or indirectly from the person
who was the holder of the earliest certificate issued in respect thereof.
PEDRO SANTIAGO v SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY

GR No. 156888 NOV. 20, 2006
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Facts:
The case stemmed from Complaint for Recovery of Possession of Property filed by Victoria Rodriguez,
Armando Mateo, and petitioner Pedro Santiago against Subic Bay Metropolitan authority (SBMA) on March 12,
2002 before RTC of Olongapo City, Zamables with a prayer for issuance of writ of preliminary injunction and/or
TRO.
Case commenced when Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA) informed petitioner Santiago to vacate
the parcels of land he was occupying with an area of 2.5 hectares. SBMA is claiming possessory if not proprietary
rights over the said lands, since they are using the 2 parcels of land for its own commercial and other purposes. And
that the reason why Santiago occupying the said land was because of his wife Liwanag, who was former employee
of SBMA thus availed housing privilege, however, when his wife ceased to be employee of SBMA, it also
concluded her housing privilege, therefore, they must vacate the said land.
However, Santiago alleged that his occupancy in said land was by virtue of leased for 50 years from
Victoria Rodriguez, the sole heir and administrator of estate of Hermogenes, who was the registered owner of the 2
parcels of land under the certificate of title Titulo de Propriedad de Terrenos.
March 13, 2002, RTC issued TRO against SBMA from ousting petitioner, however on December 3, 2002
denied and dismissed the application for issuance of Writ and complaint, on the ground that the Spanish Title
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Titulo de Propriedad de Terrenos of 1891 can no longer utilized as evidence of ownership since said title was
never registered under Act 496 (later PD1529).
Issue:
WON can still be used as evidence.
Ruling:
NO. Spanish Title can no longer be countenanced as indubitable evidence of land ownership , as cited
in Evangelista Case, which involves the same Spanish Title of Hermogenes, it was established that predecessor-in-
interest of Hermogenes, failed to comply with PD 892 (to register Spanish Title under Act 496, 6 months from the
effectivity of PD 892 or August 14, 1976).
To the contention of Santiago that Titulo de Propriedad de Terrenos can still be used in this case since it is
not a proceeding for land registration. SC states that registration proceedings under Torrens system do not create or
vest title but only confirm and record the title already created and vested. The courts are prevented from accepting
and indirectly confirming Spanish Titles in some other form of action brought before them, because it would
circumvent PD 892 and give rise to the existence of title, recognized and confirmed by the court but never be
recorded under Torrens systems. Since the Titulo of Hermogenes was already divested of its value in Evangelista
case, by principle of stare decisis, the case at bar should be resolve sane with Evangelista case, since it involves
same facts, issue, applicable laws and testimonial and documentary evidence.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHIL. v HON. SOFRONIO SAYO, Judge, Br. I, CI, Nueva Vizcaya, et al.
GR No. L-60413 OCT. 31, 1990
NARVASA, J.:
Facts:
Spouses Casiano filed an original application for registration over Lot 7454 of Cadastral Survey of
Santiago on July 17, 1961, with an area of 33,950 hectares, situated in Nueva Vizcaya.
December 11, 1961, order of general default issued against the whole world except the oppositor
government through Dir. of Land and Dir. of Forestry as well as the heirs of Liberato Bayaua. After 20 years, on
March 3, 1981, the parties – heirs of Casiano and the oppositors, entered into compromise agreement, in the said
agreement heirs of Casiano (as applicants) renounced and ceded their claims to the following:
- 4,109 hectares in favor of Bureau of Lands

- 12,341 hectares in favor of Bureau of Forestry
- 4,000 hectares in favor of heirs of Bayaua
- 8,000 hectares in favor of Phil. Cacao and Farm Product Inc.
- 5,500 hectares in their favor (but the 1,500 hectares of their share, they assigned it to Jose Reyes, their
counsel as atty. fees)
And they all mutually waived and renounced all their prior claims to Lot 7454.
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March 5, 1981, Judge Sayo approved the compromised agreement and confirmed the title and ownership
of the parties in accordance with its terms. Solicitor General sought to annul the said decision by Judge Sayo in
land registration contending that: the said judge rendered decision in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion and the parties were not even presented evidence to support their petition of registration.
Respondents on the other hand contends that: Lot 7454 is not public land as evident to certification of
National Library (Estadistica de Propriedades), the said land was owned and registered under Don Liberato Bayaua;
and the proceeding of registration presupposes that there is already a title to be confirmed by the court.
Issue:
WON the compromise agreement suffice as evidence to support their claim for registration.
Ruling:
NO. Compromise agreement as proof of title of parties is not totally unacceptable proposition, it is
tantamount to adjudication of lands to person who had not submitted any substantiation of their ownership, but only
founded their rights and interest over the land thru compromise agreement – it is contrary to law. Also, the
applicants needs to overcome the presumption that the land sought to be registered is not part of public land
or do not belong to state and it can only be overcome by presenting competent and persuasive proof.
In addition to, the photocopy of certification from National Library cannot be considered as title to the
property (certification certifying that the said land was owned and registered under the name of Don Liberato
Bayaua – according to Government Estadistica) since it is not one of the grants made during Spanish regimes, thus it
does not constitute primary evidence of ownership. And initiation of application under Torrens system is not a proof
that the land is private property, since it is precisely the obligation of applicants to prove that said land is not part of
public domain.
SPOUSES MARIANO and ERLINDA LABURADA v LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY

GR No. 101387 MARCH 11, 1998
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Facts:
January 8, 1991, land registration court confirms and orders the registration of Lot 3A Psd-1372 (portion
of Lot 3, Block 159, Swo 7237) located in Mandaluyong City, in favor of Spouses Laburada. However, LRA
refused to issue decree of registration after the finality of decision and upon motion of petitioners. With that
petitioner filed action for mandamus against LRA to compel them to issue the said decree.
Refusal of LRA was to prevent duplication of title over the same parcel of land, since it contravene the
policy and purpose of Torrens registration system.
LRA found out after plotting the land sought to be registered in Municipal Index Sheet, that the Lot 3A
might be a portion of parcels of land decreed in Court of Land Registration (CLR) Case No. 699, 875 and 817
as per plotting of the subdivision plan LRC Psd-319932. And that decree of registration of the said cases was
already issued – Decree Nos. 240 (Aug. 25, 1904), 696 (Sep 14, 1905) and 1425 (April 26, 1905).
After verification of records in Register of Deeds of Rizal, it was further found out that Lot 3-B of
subdivision plan Psd-1372 being portion of Lot No. 3, Block 159, Plan S.W.O 7237 is covered by TCT 29337
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issued in the name of Pura, and it is transfer from TCT 6595. However, the Lot 3A of subdivision plan Psd 1372
cannot be located because TCT 6595 consist of several sheets are incomplete.
Issue:
WON mandamus can compel LRA to issue decree of registration.
Ruling:
NO. First, the judgment they seek to enforce is not yet executory and incontrovertible, thus they do not
have legal right to implement it. Judgment in land registration proceeding does not become final and executory
until after the expiration of 1 year after the entry of final decree of registration.
Second, there is possibility that judgment of trial court is void, since it is settled that land registration
court has no jurisdiction to order registration of land already decreed in the name of another in an earlier land
registration case. Second decree for the same land would be null and void. LRA refusal to issue decree of
registration is because of possible duplication of titles over the same land. Thus if it is proven that the land which
petitioners seeks to register has already been registered in 1904 and 1905, judgment in petitioners land registration
case will be null and void.
Third, the issuance of decree of registration is part of judicial function and not mere ministerial act
(mandates by legal authority or law) which may be compelled by mandamus, and so it involves the exercise of
discretion.
EUFEMIA VILLANUEVA VDA. DE BARROGA et al v ANGEL ALBANO et al.

GR No. L-43445 JANUARY 20. 1998
Narvasa, J.:
Facts:
Lot 1821 was adjudicated in favor of Delfina Aquino in Cadastral Proceeding on July 31, 1941 by CFI of
Ilocos Norte. However, only on October 14, 1955 (after 14years) when the decree of registration was issued and on
November 17, 1979 (after 24years) OCT was issued in her name.
On August 11, 1970, after the issuance of decree of registration, Barroga and Pacada brought suit against
the heirs of Delfina Aquino – Angel Albano et al. They are alleging that their mother Ruperta Pascual (oppositor
in Cadastral Case of Aquino) had been in possession of Lot 1821 since 1941 thus they are real owners , and
they are praying for the cancellation of Aquino’s title and issuance of new title in their name.
Trial court ruled against Barroga and Pacada, and dismissed the complaint. And states that doctrine of res
judicata operated to blot the hope of success of them to recover the Lot 1821, since their action was clearly barred
by prior judgment in cadastral proceeding, affirming Aquino’s ownership over the lot and in which their
predecessor in interest Ruperta Pascual, was declared in default as oppositor. CA also dismissed the case.
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CFI ordered the execution of judgment on December 6, 1973, but Barroga and Pacada moved to quash the
writ of execution, arguing that there was nothing to execute, but their motion was never developed. Then again they
filed a Motion to Nullify Order to Lift Writ of Execution Issued and to Revoke Writ of Possession Issued, arguing
that they could not be ejected since they are the possessor of the lot. This was denied.
Issue:
WON Barroga and Pacada can be ejected from the said lot by writ of possession.
Ruling:
YES. Writ of possession issued in land registration proceeding implies delivery of the land to the
successful litigant, and writ of demolition must likewise issue, without writ of demolition would writ of possession
would be ineffective, as cited in Lucero v Loot case.
Angel Albano as the successor-in-interest of Aquino must be declared to be entitled to a writ of

possession over Lot 1821, which was adjudicated to Aquino in Cadastral case, and such writ may be enforced
against Barroga and Pacada as successor-in-interest of Ruperta Pascual, oppositor in Cadastral case of Aquino;
despite the lapse of many many years, Albano’s right over the land is imprescriptible at least as against the
persons who were parties to the cadastral case or even their successor-in-interest.
SC states that fundamental rule that writ of possession can be issued not only against the original
oppositors, to their representative or successor-in-interest but also against the person unlawfully and adversely
occupying said lot at any time before and up to the issuance of final decree.
A party in whose favor a decree of registration is issued by a cadastral court or his successor-in-
interest has (1) perfect right not only to the title of the land but also to its possession; (2) he has right to writ of
possession as against any party to the registration proceeding and who is directly and personally affected and
reached by decree; and (3) right to obtain writ of possession is not subject to the provision of Code of Civil
Procedure regarding execution of judgment since the decree is to exist forever.
FIDEL SILVESTRE v CA et al
GR No. L-32694 JULY 16, 1982
Teehankee, Acting C.J.:
Facts:
Lot 1185 of Cadastral survey of Hermosa, Bataan, containing an area of 124,135 sqm was allegedly
owned by Silvestre by virtue of Homestead Patent No. 72493 issued by Sec. of Agriculture and Natural Resources
on November 27, 1956 and for the certificate of title issued on December 8, 1956. And he further alleged that he
has been in possession of the said land since 1927 in actual and open possession and has been paying taxes thereof.
On May 2, 1959, Dimson filed an action in CFI of Bataan against Silvestre for cancellation of home
patent and certificate of title, on the ground that the said property was private land, since it was already
adjudicated in cadastral case in favor of spouses Mariano Batungbakal and Hilaria Vergara before the WWII,
however there was no decree of registration issued because of the outbreak of war. That he acquired the said
land from spouses Batungbakal, by virtue of “Compromiso de Venta” executed by said spouses in his favor
sometime in 1927.
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Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources as a petitioner, contends that the said Homestead
patent was duly issued in favor of Silvestre, after considering the investigation of Director of Lands and found out
that the said land was public land disposable under Homestead Law.
CFI dismissed the complaint and declared the OCT 292 as valid, legal and subsisting in the name of
Silvestre. However, CA reversed the decision of CFI and held that the property was private property adjudged in
favor of Batungbakal spouses in cadastral proceeding, thus declaring the homestead patent as well as the OCT to be
null and void ab initio.
Issue:
WON Dimson can claim ownership over the Lot 1185.
Ruling:
NO. Dimson’s action has already prescribed, since the title of Lot 1185 had already been registered
under Torrens system in the name of Silvestre since December 8, 1956 and such decree can no longer be
impugned, even on ground of fraud, since more than 1 year had already elapsed when he filed a complaint on May
2, 1959. And also he failed to establish even by preponderance that he has better right over the land and he also
failed to establish private ownership of spouses Batungbakal.
SC states that assuming that the said land was adjudicated in favor of spouse Batungbakal, but still the
conveyance of the property to him is invalid, since there is no title or decree was ever issued. Act of registration
is the operative act of which conveys and affects the land. The mere existence of decision rendered by court in a
cadastral case does not settle once and for all the ownership of the property, issuance of a decree is still necessary
and such decree may still be subject to review within 1 year from date of issuance. Compromiso de Venta executed
by Spouses Batungbakal and Dimson is a mere promise by spouses to Dimson to sell the lot to him, however, it
did not materialize, since they failed to register the land in question and it prevented the alleged promise to sell from
ripening into a consummated sale.
In addition to, Dimson allegedly owned the adjoining lot of Lot 1185, with that when Silvestre filed his
homestead patent he could filed his objection or opposition, but he never lifted a finger or raised voice to dispute
the government action.
ALFONSO ACEDO et al v CA et al
GR No. L-24771 JUNE 30, 1970
Barredo, J.:
Facts:
Homestead patent and OCT R-827 was issued in the name of Carolina Aggasid on July 26, 1916 covering
parcel of land in Barrio Cuccub, Solano, Nueva Vizcaya. The lot was broken into two, Lot 984 and Lot 985. Then
Aggasid sold the one-half pro-indiviso portion of land to Tomas Marcos, said sale was recorder at the back of
OCT R-827 (April 29, 1925). Agassid claimed Lot 984. Then Victoria Paculla, sole heir of Agassid executed
Affidavit of Extrajudicial Settlement adjudicating unto herself the entire ½ unsold portion of Agassid’s land covered
by OCT 827, such affidavit was annotated to the said OCT.
Victoria Paculla later on sold the same land to her son Alberto Crisostomo (married to Rosita Rolluda)
(May 30, 1952), again this was annotated to OCT. Thereby, spouses Crisostomo sold the same land to Teresa
Soriano married to Ubaldo Dumlao (June 12, 1952). Then Lot 985 was listed to different Cadastral proceeding, no
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claim was filed, thus declared as public land. Then Trinidad Agsunod, obtained Homestead Patent of Lot 985,
was issued OCT 420 (January 26, 1932).
Agsunod sold the said land to spouses Acedo, OCT 420 was cancelled and TCT 3788 was issued to spouses
Acedo. Then here comes, Teresa Soriano and other filed a suit against Acedo, for recovery of ownership of Lot 985.
Tomas Marcos heirs intervened and joined the plaintiffs.
RTC ruled against Acedo and ordered them to surrender the Lot 985 to respondents and cancellation of
OCT 420 as well as the TCT3788. RTC awarded the ½ western portion of Lot 984 to spouses Dumlao and Soriano,
while the ½ eastern portion of said lot was given to the heirs of Marcos. And the ½ western portion of Lot 985 was
declared to be owned by spouses Crisostomo and Rolluda, while the ½ eastern portion was given to heirs of Marcos.
CA also ruled against Acedo and states that Lot 985 was part of homestead previously placed under operation
of Torrens system, therefore the subsequent adjudication of said lot is null and void. And revised the division
of lot, awarded the ½ western portion of Lot 985 to spouses Dumlao and Soriano and not to spouses Crisostomo.
Issue:
WON Acedo has claim over Lot 985.
Ruling:
NO. Original patent title of Aggasid must prevail over the later patent and title in favor of Agsunod,
they have no interest nor right of any kind to the said land, thus Acedo cannot claim ownership over the lot 985. Lot
985 was part of a bigger land that originally owned and registered in the name of Aggasid, as early as July
1916. Agsunod, predecessor-in-interest of Acedo, obtained patent only in 1932, because Lot 935 was declared as
public land, since there was no opposition from the holder of title.
However, the consequence of such Torrens grant is that a cadastral court will never have jurisdiction to declare such
as public land. With or without opposition, cadastral court had absolutely no jurisdiction to declare Aggasid
land as public land, since it was already registered under the Torrens Systems. It is direct consequence of the
indefeasibility of Torrens title. A Torrens title was already provided in the past, the non-claiming of the land will not
in any way defeat the Torrens.
CASIMIRIO DEVELOPMENT CORP v RENATO MATEO

GR No. 175485 JULY 27, 2011
Bersamin, J.:
Facts:
In 1967, Laura Mateo, applied for land registration, after the Lara-Mateo family (including the respondent)
agreed to execute deed of sale in her favor. Thus OCT 6386 was issued in her name. The land was situated in
Barrio Pulang Lupa, Las Pinas City, with an area of 6,693 sqm, which was originally owned by Isaias Lara,
Laura and respondents grandfather. Then OCT 6386 was used as collateral to secure loans: first loan obtained from
Bacoor Rural Bank (1), to repay such loan, Laura borrowed from Parmenas Perez (2) who required that the title
be transferred to his name – cancellation of OCT 6386 and issuance of TCT 438959 in the name of Perez. Then
Laura able to pay the obligation from Perez, when she obtained another loan from Rodolfo Pe (3) – cancellation of
TCT 438959 and issuance of TCT S-91595 in the name of Laura. However, Laura decided to execute deed of sale
47 | P a g e
Rodolfo Pe (TCT S-91738). Thereafter, Pe mortgaged the property to China Bank, to secure loan. Pe failed to
redeem the property, then it was foreclosed by China Bank – TCT T-11749 issued in the name of China Bank.
1988, China Bank and CDC executed a deed of conditional sale, then on March 4, 1993, China Bank
executed a deed of absolute sale in favor CDC, thus TCT T-34640 was issued in the name of CDC on March 29,
1993.
June 6, 1991, CDC brought an action for unlawful detainer of the property against the respondent’s
siblings (Cesar, Candido and Leonardo) in Metropolitan Trial Court. The defendants claimed that MEtc has no
jurisdiction since the said land classified as agricultural land therefore DARAB has jurisdiction. However, this case
was decided in favor of CDC, as affirmed by CA. Simultaneously, on June 29, 1994, respondent Mateo brought an
action for quieting of title, reconveyance of 4/5 of land and damages against CDC and Laura in RTC of Las
Pinas, in behalf of himself and his brothers (Cesar, Candido and Leonardo), claiming that they are co-owners of the
said parcel of land.
May 9, 2001, RTC ruled against Mateo and dismissed the complaint and upheld the validity and
indefeasibility of title of CDC. CA ruled in favor of Mateo and states that CDC was buyer in bad faith since CDC
had knowledge of defects and flaws of the title and the possession of the property by the respondent and his siblings.
Issue:
WON the title in the name of Laura is indefeasible.
Ruling:
YES. Respondent assailed the title of Laura, as basis for recovering the possession of the land. However,
SC states that Torrens system guarantee the integrity of land titles and protects the indefeasibilty of such once
claim of ownership is established and recognized. The property was already been placed under Torrens system,
when Laura applied for land registration and was granted, before it was acquired by CDC. OCT has already been
issued to attest to the fact that the person named in the certificate is the owner of the property , subject to liens
and encumbrances as thereon noted or what the law warrants or reserves. The respondent nor his siblings opposed to
the transactions made by Laura that cause various transfer, in fact they as well as the entire Lara-Mateo family
had knowledge and agreed to the sole registration of Laura.
Moreover, the respondent suit is a collateral attack on the title of Laura, and thus it should never
prosper. Registration under Torrens system aside from being indefeasible after lapse of period allowed by law, is
also immune from collateral attack.
J.M. TUASON & CO. INC v CA and GUILLERMO RENOSA

GR No. L-23480 SEPTEMBER 11, 1979
Concepcion Jr., J.:
Facts:
Petitioner JM Tuason & Co. filed an action for recovery of possession (ejectment) as against respondent
Guillermo Renosa, before CFI of Rizal, Branch V, Quezon City.
Petitioner Corporation is the registered owner of the parcel of land covered by TCT 1267, and this was
also admitted by Renosa. On the said parcel of land, Renosa constructed his residence on February 6, 1967,
consisted of 100sqm out of 360sqm, he bought from Capt. Faustino Cruz on April 14, 1956. Renosa argued that
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Capt. Cruz acquired the said land by virtue of compromise agreement in Civil Case of CFI of Rizal, Quezon City
Branch, and he was awarded 3,000 sqm on April 10, 1953.
RTC ruled in favor of Petitioner Corporation on the ground that petitioner is the registered owner of the
questioned land. In addition to, Capt. Cruz the supposed owner by virtue of compromise agreement, is without legal
basis since he was not party in interest in the compromise agreement and even such agreement created beneficial
rights in favor of Capt. Cruz, the “deudors” the other party in compromise agreements failed to fulfilled the
suspensive condition (payment to petitioner P250,000 and delivery of lots marked ‘refund’ as well as the
subdivision plan duly approved) therein.
CA reversed the decision of RTC and ruled in favor of Renosa, and upheld the validity of compromise
agreement and that by virtue of such Capt. Cruz has valid right of possession over the said land, thus Renosa as
successor-in-interest of Capt. Cruz, also have valid right of possession, and there’s no evidence to prove that
Deudors did not complied with the said suspensive condition.
Issue:
WON the Renosa has valid right over the property as against the registered owner.
Ruling:
NO. The mere possession of whatever length cannot defeat the imprescriptible title to the holder of
registered torrens title to real property, and the registered real property cannot be acquired by acquisitive
prescription.
Petitioner corporation as registered owner has a right to possess and recover the said land, as against
Renosa merely acquired the right of possession from Capt. Cruz, who never acquired the right to possess over
the disputed property. Capt. Cruz and Renosa cannot be considered as possessors in good faith since they both knew
that at the time of possession that the petitioner was the registered owner.
The certificates of title in the name of beneficiaries of compromise agreement can only be issued after the
fulfillment of suspensive condition. Capt. Cruz never acquired the right of possession over the property because
the beneficiaries of compromise agreement failed to fulfill the suspensive conditions (as per the cases of JM Tuason
Co. v Hernandez and JM Tuason Co. v San Diego), and he never acquired title over the disputed property, thus
he could not assigned a better right to Renosa.
SPOUSES MARIANO AVILA and MAGDALENA AVILA v HON. LAURO TAPUCAR, Presiding Judge,
Branch I, CFI of Agusan del norte and Butuan City, et al
GR No. L-45947 AUGUST 27, 1991
Bidin, J.:
Facts:
Spouses Pedro Bahan and Dominga Exsaure acquired a parcel of land situated at Tabangao, Victory,
Tubay, Agusan del Norte¸with an area of 1.3485 hectares. Then on 1965, the said property was inherited by
private respondent Julito Bahan et al as successors-in-interest. On November 3, 1971, Julito Bahan (in behalf of
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other heirs of Pedro Bahan) applied for Free Patent for an area of 2.2400 hectares of Lot 2383 which has total area
of 6.9027 hectares in entirety, situated in Tabangao, Victory, Tubay, Agusan del Norte.
On October 11, 1960, petitioner Magdalena Avila, bought a parcel of land situated at Tabangao,
Victory, Tubay, Agusan del Norte containing an area of 4,371 sqm from Luis Cabalan under Deed of Absolute
Sale of Unregistered Land.
June 27, 1973, private respondents Bahans filed an action for quieting of title and damages before the
CFI of Agusan del Norte and Butuan City, Branch I. Alleging that they were successors-in-interest of parcel of
coconut land containing an area of 1.3485, but sometime on 1968, he discovered that the northwestern portion of the
said land containing 1/3 of a hectare was in possession of the Avilas. However, the Avila defensed that they
purchased the said portion of land and that they had been in open, continuous, public, peaceful and uninterrupted
possession of the same.
December 6, 1973, the Bahans application for patent was approved for 6.9027 hectares, and thus
issuance of Free Patent 552571 and OCT P-8424 in the name of Heirs of Pedro Bahan, represented by Julito Bahan.
October 17, 1974, 11 months after the issuance of Patent and 7 months after the registration of OCT in Registration
Book of Register of Deeds of Agusan del Sur, Avila filed an administrative protest against the Bahan before the
Bureau of Land, alleging that their land was erroneously included in the free patent and OCT of Bahans.
Bureau of Land, ruled in favor of Avila and order the cancellation or amendment of patent and
certificate of Bahan since it erroneously includes the portions rightfully belong to the Avilas. February 8, 1977,
Judge Tapucar dissolved the writ of preliminary injunction issued, after the Bahan presented their OCT, and
despite the supplemental manifesto filed by Avilas, that the Patent and OCT was erroneous.
Issue:
WON the OCT of Bahan becomes indefeasible despite of being erroneous.
Ruling:
NO. The simple possession of a certificate of title does not necessarily make the holder a true owner
of all property described therein. Thus if a person obtain title under the torrens system, which includes by mistake
or oversight land which can no longer be registered under the system, he does not by virtue of said certificate
alone, become the owner of the lands illegally included. The free patent and OCT of Bahan is erroneous as it
embraced the portions of land rightfully belong to Avilas, the subsequent registration of land belonging to Avilas
by Bahan could not make Bahan the owner of the latter. In registration proceeding, cadastral court has no
authority to award a property in favor of person who have not asserted any ownership nor claims thereon.
Registration does not vest title. It is not mode of acquiring ownership but is merely evidence of such title over a
particular property. It does not give the holder any better right than what he actually has, especially if the
registration was done in bad faith.
FORTUNATO HALILI, doing business under the name and style Halili Transit v COURT OF INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS and HALILI BUS DRIVERS AND CONDUCTORS UNION
GR No. L-24864 MAY 30, 1996
Hemosisima,Jr., J.:
Facts:
50 | P a g e
On January 6, 1975, Administratrix of estate of Fortunato Halili executed Deed of Conveyance of

Real Property, after the demise of Halili, over the tract of land covered by TCT 36389, with an area of
approximately 33,952 hectares situated in Barrio of San Bartolome, Caloocan, Province of Rizal, was
transferred to Halili Bus Drivers and Conductors Union, as per the Agreement dated December 23, 1974. The said
land was registered under the name of Union of February 14, 1975 under TCT 205755, without encumbrance.
September 23, 1982 and February 9, 1983, Labor Arbitrer Raymundo Valenzuela through Ministry of
Labor and Employement (MOLE), granted the two motions to sell and dispose the property of Union, through Atty.
Benjamin Pineda. However, when Atty. Pineda request the authority of SC to sell the said property, SC merely
noted the said motion in a Resolution dated December 8, 1982.
Then on June 17, 1983 the sale of property held in trust by the seller-Union to the buyer Manila Memorial
Park Cemetery Inc (MMPCI) was consummated. TCT 205755 of Union was cancelled and issued TCT 301151 in
the name of MMPCI, issued by RD of Quezon City, on the basis of the Order of Arbiter Valenzuela on June 14,
1983.
On October 18, 1983, SC set aside the in Resolution, the orders of Labor Arbiter dated September 23, 1982
and February 9, 1983, and declared that the said orders were issued without due process therefore null and void.
Union filed before the NLRC, after the nullification of the Orders of MOLE, seeking to compel MMPCI to reconvey
the said property to the Union, in which they bought from Atty. Pineda, on the ground that such transaction was
done without the proper authority from SC. NLRC refused to take cognizance of the said case for lack of
jurisdiction.
Issue:
WON the Union can still validly recover the property to MMPCI.
Ruling:
NO. SC ruled that the instant petition is dismissible, since the property was already registered under the
Torrens system and under the name of MMPCI, such certificate of title is the best proof to ownership of a piece
of land. Sec. 48 of PD 1529, prohibits the collateral attack of the certificate of title. In this petition of Union, it is
evident that their objective is to nullify the title of MMCPI, therefore it is collateral attack on the title of MMCPI,
and it must not be permitted since Torrens title is indefeasible.
The certificate in the absence of fraud, is the evidence of title and shows exactly the real interest of its
owner. Once the title is registered, with few exceptions, it cannot be impugned, altered, changed, modified,
enlarged, or diminished except in some direct proceeding permitted by law.
In addition to, the said property was already sold out to individual lot buyers in Holy Cross Memorial
Park, and contain interred remains of lot owners and/or their relatives. They are considered innocent purchasers
in value, and thus when they relied on the correctness of the Certificate of Title issued, the court cannot disregard
their rights acquired over the said land. Cancellation of Certificate of title of MMPCI, would impair the purpose
of law and the confidence of public to Torrens system.
DOMINGO NEYPES et al v CA et al
Corona, J.:
Facts:
51 | P a g e
Petitioners Domingo Neypes, Luz Faustino, Rogelio Faustino, Lolito Victoriano, Jacob Obania and
Domingo Cabacungan filed an action for annulment of judgment and titles of land and/or reconveyance and/or
reversion with preliminary injunction before RTC Branch 43 of Roxas, Oriental Mindoro as against the
Bureau of Forest Development, Land Bank of the Phil., and heirs of Bernardo del Mundo, namely Fe, Corazon,
Josefa, Salvador and Carmen.
February 12, 1998, RTC dismissed the petitioner’s complaint on the ground that such action had already
been prescribed. Petitioner allegedly received the copy of the order of dismissal on March 3, 1998, then on the 15th
day (March 18, 1998) filed a motion for reconsideration. On July 1, 1998, RTC issued another order dismissing the
MR which petitioners received on July 22, 1998. Then five days later, on July 27, 1998 petitioners filed a notice of
appeal and paid appeal fees on August 3, 1998.
Thereafter, on August 4, 1998, RTC denied the notice of appeal, holding that it was filed 8 days late, and
this was received by petitioners on July 31, 1998. Petitioners MR was denied in an order dated September 3, 1998.
Then they filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus before the CA assailing the dismissal of notice of appeal.
They are contending that they filed their notice of appeal within the reglementary period, and they contend that 15-
day reglementary period to appeal will only run on July 22, 1998, when they received the order of RTC denying
their MR, and this was the final order. And when they filed their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998 only 5 days had
elapsed thus they were well within the reglementary period.
CA ruled against the petitioners and held that the 15-day period to appeal had been reckoned from March 3,
1998 or the day they received order dismissing their complaint on February 12, 1998, and this was the ‘final order’.
Issue:
WON the petitioners appeal was filed out of time.
Ruling:
NO. A party litigant may either file his notice of appeal within 15 days from receipt of RTC decision or
file it within 15 days from receipt of final order denying his motion for reconsideration or motion for new trial.
Since the petitioners were able to file their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998, within the 15 days period when they
received the order denying their MR, thus, their notice of appeal was well within the fresh appeal period of 15
days therefore it was filed on time.
To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to
appeal their cases, the Court deems practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of
appeal in RTC, counted from the receipt of order dismissing a motion for new trial or motion for
reconsideration. Such pronouncement is not inconsistent with Rule 41, Sec 3 of Rules which states that the
appeal shall be taken within 15 days from notice of judgment or final order appealed from . The disjunctive or
signifies disassociation and independence of one thing from another.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHIL. v CA and EMILIO BERNABE, SR. et al

GR No. L-40402 MARCH 16, 1987
Paras, J.:
Facts:
52 | P a g e
Lot 622 of the Mariveles Cadastre was declared public land in a decision rendered before the last war in
Cadastral Case No. 19, LRC Cadastral No. 1097. The on July 6, 1965 it was segregated from forest zone and
released and certified by Bureau of Forestry as an agricultural land for disposition.
On April 26, 1967, Respondents Bernabe filed in CFI of Bataan a petition to reopen Cadastral Case No.
19, LRC Cadastral No. 1097, to perfect their rights and register their title to the lots that are portion of Lot 622
(they presented segregation plan duly approved by Director of Land). They are alleging that they acquired
ownership over the properties by purchase from original owner thereof, and such owner as well as the respondent
themselves has always been continuous, active, exclusive, public, adverse and in the concept of owners for more
than 30 years. RTC ruled in favor of respondent, thereby granted the application of perfection of title, thus on
May 7, 1969 Commissioner of Land Registration issued Decrees No. N-124813-124818.
The on May 7, 1970 petitioner Republic, through Solicitor General filed a petition for review of decrees
of registration, on the ground that the entire proceeding was vitiated by lack of notice to Sol-Gen, and that the
lower court without jurisdiction to decree the confirmation of registrable title to respondents over portion of public
domain.
May 29, 1970, respondents moved to dismiss the petition for review on the ground that the review was
filed out of time, and that the parcels of land were already transferred into innocent purchasers for value. RTC and
CA ruled in favor of respondent and denied the petition of petitioner.
Issue:
WON the petition for review filed by petitioner is valid.
Ruling:
YES. The basic elements for the allowance of the reopening or review of a decree are: (1) the
petitioner has real or dominical right; (2) he has been deprived thereof through fraud; (3) the petition is filed within
1 year from the issuance of the decree; and (4) the property has not yet been transferred to an innocent purchaser.
The petition for review of decrees issued in favor of respondent was filed by Sol-Gen on May 7, 1970, one year after
the issuance of Decrees No. N-124813-124818 on the ground of fraud. Though in this case respondents cannot be
said that they employed actual fraud in acquiring titles over the land since the said land was already opened
disposition on July 6, 1965. However, SC states that if a decree in pursuance of valid decision obtained by fraud,
may be annulled, the same is true if it is entered in compliance with decision suffering from fatal infirmity such as
want of due process or lack of jurisdiction of the court.
There is fatal infirmity in the decision because (1) it was shown that Solicitor-General was not properly
furnished the requisite notice and copy of assailed decision, thus they are deprived a day in court and (2) lower court
had no jurisdiction to re-open the cadastral proceeding in Cadastral Case No. 19 LRC Cadastral Record No. 1097,
since in the said case the subject land was already declared as public land
In addition to, SC ruled that possession of forest lands, however long cannot ripen into private ownership.
A parcel of forest land is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forestry and beyond the power and
jurisdiction of the cadastral court to register under the Torrens System.
SPOUSES PRISCO CAL JR. and ALICE CANOY CAL v MARIANO ZOSA et al
GR No. 152518 JULY 31, 2006
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J.:
53 | P a g e
Facts:
Vidal and Salud Jimeno died intestate and they were survived by their 4 children – Jaime, Jesus, Oscar, and
Annie, and they inherited parcel of land located in Bulongan, Toledo City covered by Tax Declaration No. 03320.
August 28, 1957, they executed a Deed of Assignment in favor of Atty. Mariano Zosa, whom they hired when they
filed a Petition for Letter Administration over their parents estate. In that Deed of Assignment, Jimeno children
conveyed all their rights and interest over the parcel in land situated in Bulongan, as payment for Zosa’s legal
service. Such deed of assignment was approved by the court (December 18, 1964).
Then on various dates, Jimeno children sold their pro-indiviso shares in the same lot to Felix and Pacita
Barba.
Bureau of Land effected a cadastral survey of the lots located in Toledo, and the parcels of land under Tax
Declaration No. 03320 (land sold by Jimeno siblings to Atty. Zosa and spouses Barba) was identified as Lot 3616.
Petition for registration was instituted by Director of Land before RTC Branch 10 Cebu City. And
both Atty. Zosa and spouses Barba filed an answer claiming ownership over the said land. However, spouses Barba
sold the lot to Tango-an and Conchita Dacalus, who in turn sold it to the petitioners spouses Prisco Cal Jr. and Alice
Canoy. RTC ruled in favor of Atty. Zosa, thus issued an order adjudicating Lot 3616 to Atty. Zosa. Barba
interposed an appeal to CA but appellate court affirmed the decision of RTC.
November 28, 1992, Land Registration Commission issued Decree No. N-199584 in the name of Atty.
Zosa, then on December 9, 1992, OCT O-203 was issued in his name.
On November 30, 1993, petitioners filed a Petition for Review or Reopening of the Decree before RTC
Branch 29, Toledo City, and they are alleging that Zosa acquired the decree through extrinsic fraud. RTC
dismissed the petition of petitioners, and this was affirmed by CA.
Issue:
WON the petitioners can still reopen the case.
Ruling:
NO. Sec. 32 of PD 1529 recognized the right of person deprived of land or interest therein by adjudication
or confirmation of title obtained by actual fraud or extrinsic fraud. Thus in review of decree of registration there
must be an actual – intentional deception practiced by means of the misrepresentation or concealment of a material
fact and extrinsic fraud – where it prevents a party from having trial or from representing his entire case to the court.
In this case, petitioner failed to prove that Zosa committed acts constituting extrinsic fraud in obtaining
OCT o-203, and there is no showing that Felix Barba was prevented by Zosa in presenting his case.
ILDEFONSO AGREDA, et al (appellants). v SANTIAGO AGREDA (appellee)

GR No. L-22312 MAY 31, 1971
Dizon, J.:
54 | P a g e
Facts:
In Cadastral Case no. 85, GLRO Record No. 1563, appellee Santiago Agreda filed an answer claiming
an ownership of Lot 3400, and appellants Ildefonso Agreda (in behalf of several co-heirs) also filed an answer
making the same claim.
Cadastral court held that the claimants failed to prove any registrable title over Lot 3400 thus declared it
as public land. However, CA reversed the decision of cadastral court, and ruled in favor of Santiago Agreda, thus
declaring that Lot 3400 as property of Santiago on October 31, 1962.
State and Ildefonso Agreda, appealed the said decision by filing a petition for review, but such petition
was dismissed without prejudice to a separate action, if proper, against Santiago Agreda. March 23, 1963, dismissal
of petition for review and decision of CA became executory.
June 7, 1963 the court issued an order directing the Land Registration Commission to issue corresponding
decree of registration for Lot 3400 in the name of Santiago Agreda.
April 1, 1963, Ildefonso Agreda filed an action for reconveyance before the CFI of Iloilo, 2 months
before the order directing the issuance of decree of registration, to compel appellee Santiago Agreda to reconvey to
them their alleged respective share in Lot 3400 – 4/12 to appellant Ildefonso Agreda, 7/12 to his co-appellants
Socorro, Francisco, Rosario, Armando, Felipe, Antonio, David and Ernesto all surnamed Habana, and the remaining
1/12 is the only portion belongs to Santiago.
CFI dismiss the complaint of Ildefonso Agreda and held that the appellant Ildefonso should have first
exhaust the remedy in cadastral proceeding since the 1 year period provided for petition to review had not yet filed
and to set aside the decree of registration in favor of Santiago, instead of filing the action for reconveyance.
Issue:
WON the action for reconveyance may be filed even before issuance of decree of registration.
Ruling:
YES. An action for reconveyance may be filed even before the issuance of the decree of registration.
There is no reason, indeed, why one has to wait until the land is actually registered before he can sue for
reconveyance. SC ruled that petition for review as a remedy is not exclusive, and it does not bar any other
remedy which the aggrieved party may be entitled. There is no valid reason to bar an action for reconveyance,
before the issuance of decree.
In addition to, the action for reconveyance filed by appellants Ildefonso et al constitute a cause of action
against appellee Santiago, because they purport to show that appellee Santiago is a mere trustee of his co-heirs in
respect to their share in Lot 3400.
CATALINA VDA. DE RETUERTO surviving widow of late Panfilo Retuerto, et al. v ANGELO P. BARZ
and MERLINDA BARZ
55 | P a g e
GR No. 148180 December 19, 2001
Kapunan, J.:
Facts:
September 5, 1989, respondent (heirs of Pedro Barz) filed a complaint against Catalina Retuerto and other
heirs of Panfilo Retuerto and spouses Jose Gesalem with RTC of Mandaue, for Quieting of Title, Damages and
Attys Fees. After their confrontation between themselves, when heirs of Panfilo Retuerto claims ownership over
subdivision Lot 896-A and part of Lot 896-B, which are covered by OCT 521 under the name Pedro Barz/Teofilo
Barz.
Heirs of Panfilo Retuerto alleged that Panfilo Retuerto was the lawful owner of the said lots that it was sold
by Juana Perez (married to Numeriano Barz), their predecessor to Panfilo Retuerto on April 16, 1929 (Lot 896-A
with an area of 2,505sqm); the court declared Panfilo Retuerto as the lawful owner in the LRC Case No. 3 on
August 1937 (when San Carlos Seminary filed a petition for issuance of title for parcel of lot in Hacienda de Mandaue) , though there was no decree issued
because of WWII; and that they were not aware of LRC Case No. 529, that their property had been included in OCT
521 under the name of Barz.
Spouses Gesalem averred that the lot they purchased from Retuerto with an area of 440sqm, Lot 896-B,
formerly Lot 896-A (because there was new subdivision created after the issuance of OCT 521) was the lot which had been sold by Juana Perez
Barz to Panfilo Retuerto thus he is the lawful owner, and that the inclusion of the said property into the OCT 521 did
not vest ownership over the title in favor of Pedro Barz but constituted merely as a trustee under constructive trust
with the obligation to convey the said property to the heirs of Panfilo Retuerto and Spouse Gesalem.
RTC and CA ruled in favor of respondent, declaring them as the absolute owners.
Issue:
WON action for reconveyance on the ground of fraud can progress.
Ruling:
NO. Constructive trust are created in equity to prevent unjust enrichment, arising against one who by
fraud, duress of abuse of confidence, obtains or holds the legal right to property which he ought not, in equity and
good conscience to hold. Petitioners failed to substantiate their allegation that their predecessor-in-interest had
acquired any legal right to the property and they also failed to present any evidence showing that the certificate
of title of Pedro Barz obtained through fraud.
In addition to, action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust prescribes within 10
years from the time of its creation or upon alleged fraudulent registration of the property. Registration of real
property is considered constructive notice to all persons, then the 10-year prescriptive period is reckoned from time
of such registering, filing or entering. Thus, petitioners should have filed an action for reconveyance within 10 years
from issuance of OCT 521 in November 16, 1968, they failed to do so.
FELICISIMA PINO v CA and DEMETRIA GAFFUD et al.
56 | P a g e
GR No. 94114 JUNE 19, 1991

Paras, J.:
Facts:
The subject property herein is Lot 6-B containing an area of 11,095sqm situated in Echague, Isabela.
Lot 6 with an area of 12,799sqm was acquired by Spouses Juan Gaffud and Rafaela Donato in 1924. OCT
4340 was issued in the names of Rafaela Donato, and their sons Raymundo and Cicero Gaffud as co-onwers thereof
on January 11, 1938, two years after the death of Juan Gaffud. Then the said lot was sold to Rafaela Donato, OCT
4340 was cancelled and TCT T-30407 was issued in her name alone.
February 25, 1967, Rafaella Donato sold portion of Lot 6 to Fortunato Pascua with an area of 1,704sqm
designated as Lot 6-A. Then TCT T-30407 was cancelled and TCT T-32683 was issued in the name of Donato for
Lot 6-B with an area of 11,095sqm. June 10, 1970 she sold Lot 6-B to petitioner Felicisima Pino, TCT T-49380 was
issued in the name of Pino.
Demetria, wife of Cicero and sons Romualdo and Adolfo, all Gaffud filed a complaint of nullity of sale and
reconveyance against Pino on March 9, 1982, after the death of Cicero. RTC and CA ruled in favor of respondent
Gaffud, and declaring the sale null and void insofar as the share of Cicero and Raymundo Gaffud, which is one-half
of the Lot 6-B, approximately 5,547.5sqm.
Issue:
WON the action for reconveyance of respondent is already barred by prescription.
Ruling:
YES. Pino is an innocent purchaser for value, in contrary to the ruling of RTC and CA, since she is in
good faith relied on the certificate of titles in the name of Rafaella Donatao. Innocent third persons relying on the
correctness of the certificate of title issued, the court cannot disregard the right acquired over the property.
Therefore, the private respondents have no cause of action against her.
If an action for reconveyance based on constructive trust cannot reach an innocent purchaser for value, the
remedy of defrauded party is to bring an action for damages against those who caused the fraud or were instrumental
in depriving him of property, and that such action prescribes in 10 years from issuance of the torrens title.
TCT was issued in the name of Rafaella Donato on March 2, 1967, the present action for reconveyance was
filed only on March 9, 1982 – 15 years, and thus the action has already prescribed. Even if the period were to be
reckoned from the registration of deed of absolute sale in favor of petitioner on July 13, 1970, the action still
prescribed since 11 years has already elapsed.
SPOUSES FRANCISCO and AMPARO DE GUZMAN JR. v THE NATIONAL TREASURER OF THE
REP. OF THE PHIL. and REGISTER OF DEEDS OF MARIKINA CITY
57 | P a g e
GR No. 143281 AUGUST 3, 2000

Kapunan, J.:
Facts:
Urlan Milambiling and Asuncion Velarde purchased a parcel of land situated in Antipolo from Sta. Lucia
Realty and Development, Inc. (July 1, 1985). Then after their wedding they left for abroad, but they entrusted the
Deed of Sale and certificate of title still in the name of Sta. Lucia Realty to their friend Marilyn Belgica – who
volunteered to register the sale and transfer the title in their names.
Then Milambing was informed that the certificate of title was transferred into their names however it was
subsequently transferred in the names of Spouses De Guzman. And that they found out that while they are in Saudi
there was impostor-couple posing to be Spouses Milambing, who somehow obtained the possession of owner’s
duplicate copy of certificate of title, thus able to convince Spouses De Guzman to buy the property. And that on
November 20, 1985 the impostor-couple executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of spouses de Guzman, who
paid P99,200.00. On April 30, 1986, spouses De Guzman registered the sale, thereby cancelled the TCT in the name
of Milambings and issued TCT N-117249 in their names.
Spouses Milambing filed an action against Spouses De Guzman before RTC of Antipolo for declaration of
nullity of sale and title with damages. RTC, CA and SC ruled in their favor, thus annulling the sale and title. Spouses
De Guzman filed an action for damages against the Assurance Fund before RTC of Pasig, impleading the National
Treasurer of the RP and Register of Deeds of Marikina. RTC ruled in favor of spouses De Guzman, however, CA
reversed the decision of RTC.
Issue:
WON spouses De Guzman is entitled to be compensated for the damages under Assurance Fund.
Ruling:
NO. Petitioner’s claim is not supported by the purpose for which the Assurance Fund is established.
Assurance Fund is intended to relieve innocent persons from the harshness of the doctrine that a certificate is
conclusive evidence of an indefeasible title to land. They did not suffer prejudice because of the operation of the
said doctrine.
Moreover, petitioner do not fall under in the two circumstances stated in Sec 95 of PD 1529 and Sec
101 of Act 496. First, they did not alleged that the loss or damage they sustained was through any omission, mistake
or malfeasance of the court personnel, or Registrar of Deeds, his deputy, or other employees of the Registry in the
performance of their respective duties. They are negligent in not ascertaining whether the impostor-couple who
executed deed of sale were really the owners of the property. Second, they were not deprived of their land as a
consequence of the bringing of his land or interest therein, neither due to registration by any other person as owner
of such land nor by mistake, omission or misdescription in any certificate of title, owner’s duplicate, or in any entry
or memorandum un the register or other official book or by any cancellation. Government is not insurer of the
unwary citizen’s property against chicanery of scoundrels. Thus, petitioner recourse is against the scoundrels or
impostor couple and not against the Assurance Fund.
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SPOUSES HADJI ALI MAMADSUAL and HADJI SALIKA MAMADSUAL v HON. COROCOY
MONSON, et al.
Gancayco, J.:
Facts:
Petitioner spouses Mamadsual filed a complaint against respondent spouses Macarapan for quieting of title
to property, annulment of OCT P-122 and P-138 and damages with application for writ of preliminary injunction
before Shari’a District Court at Cotabato City on Nov. 14, 1988.
The case was set for trial on May 22, 1989, but postponed at the instance of private respondent. Then on
July 4, 1989, filed a pleading designated as ‘Amplification of Affirmative or Special Defense with prayer for
dismissal of complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
RTC dismissed the complaint (Nov. 7, 1989), averred that petitioner/plaintiffs have no legal or equitable
title to land in question, thus there is no cloud to be removed or to be prevented from being cast upon and that action
had already prescribed. MR was also denied by RTC.
Issue:
WON the action for quieting title is already prescribed.
Ruling:
NO. An action to quiet title is imprescriptible if the plaintiff/petitioner are in possession of the
property. It is alleged that the petitioners are in actual, continuous and adverse possession of the land in question
since time immemorial in the concept of owners.
It is also allege that private respondent have disturbed their possession of the property by constructing dikes
– the rule is that the petitioner may wait until their possession is disturbed or their title is attacked before
they may take steps to vindicate their right. The statute of limitation is not available as a defense to an action to
remove a cloud from title over property in possession of petitioners.
In addition to, it is not necessary that the person seeking to quiet his title is the registered owner of the
property. Title to property does not necessarily mean original transfer certificate of title, it may connote acquisitive
prescription by possession in the concept of an owner thereof.
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MARIANO PAJOMAYO et al. v RODRIGO MANIPON and PERFECTA ZULUETA

GR No. L-33676 JUNE 30, 1971
Zaldivar, J.:
Facts:
June 5, 1963, Plaintiffs Pajomayo et al. filed a complaint before RTC of Pangasinan alleging that they are
owner’s pro-indiviso of the parcel of land covered by OCT 1089 (issued on November 27, 1931) in the name of
Diego Pajomayo, their father issued under Free Patent. That such land was inherited by them, and that their
predecessor-in-interest had been in actual, peaceful and uninterrupted possession of the land in the concept of owner
for more than 70 years, until 1956 when defendant Manipon dispossessed them of such. They are praying that
they be declared as the lawful owner of the said property.
Defendant on the other hand alleged that they are the exclusive owner of the property covered by OCT
14043 (issued on April 1, 1957) in the name of Rodrigo Manipon (defendant), adjudicated to them in cadastral
proceeding. They also alleged that the property was inherited by them from their father Pioquinto Manipon, and
their predecessor-in-interest had been in actual, peaceful and adverse possession for more than 70 years. They
alleged that plaintiffs’ action is barred by res judicata or prescription. They also prayed to be declared as lawful
owner of said property. RTC ruled in favor of plaintiffs, because OCT of plaintiffs was issued earlier than the
defendants.
Issue:
WON plaintiffs’ action is already barred by res judicata.
Ruling:
NO. The doctrine of res judicata is not applicable in the case because plaintiffs base their claim of title over
the land on OCT 1089 by virtue of free patent is already irrevocable and indefeasible since 1 year from its
issuance has already expired, just like the certificate issued in registration proceeding.
Once a homestead patent granted in accordance with Public Land Act registered, the said certificate of title
issued by virtue of said patent has the force and effect of a Torrens Title under the Land Registration Act.
It is settled rule that where there is 2 certificates of title are issued to different persons covering the same
land in whole or in part, the earlier in date must prevail as between the original parties. And in the case of successive
registration where, more than 1 certificate is issued over the land the person holding under the prior certificate is
entitled to the land as against the person who relies on the second certificate.
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REPUBLIC OF THE PHIL. v BENJAMIN GUERRERO

GR No. 133168 MARCH 28, 2006
Garcia , J.:
Facts:
Miscellaneous Sales Patent No. 8991 was issued in favor of respondent Benjamin Guerrero on August 16,
1982, then OCT O-28 issued on August 27, 1982, covering 174 sqm of land situated at Pugad Lawin, Quezon City.
On July 29, 1983, Angelina Bustamante filed a protest with Bureau of Lands claiming that the sales patent of
Guerrero was obtained through fraud, considering that her house is situated in the land awarded to Guerrero and that
she has been residing in the said land since 1961. Director of Lands dismissed the protest which was affirmed by
Minister of Natural Resources and Office of President, but after the Motion of Reconsideration the Office of
President ordered that the case be remanded to DENR for investigation. After such investigation, it was found out
that 83 sqm of the titled property of Guerrero is under the actual possession of Bustamante and only 91 sqm under
the physical possession of Guerrero.
November 7, 1989, Director of Lands in behalf of RP, instituted a petition for amendment of plan and
technical description of OCT 0-28, as per order by OP. RTC ruled in favor of Guerrero and declared that OCT O-
28 is already indefeasible and that Republic failed to prove the allegation of fraud and misrepresentation, this was
affirmed by CA, MR of Republic was also denied by CA.
Issue:
WON the action of state is already barred by prescription.
Ruling:
YES. Republic failed to avail the remedy within the prescribed period. Petition for reopening and review of
decree of registration must be filed within 1 year from the date of entry of said decree (Sec. 38 of Act 496), in the
case of public land grants or patents, 1 year period commences from the issuance of the patent by the
government.
Sales patent of Guerrero was issued on August 16, 1982, while Republic commences an action to amend
only on November 7, 1989, after more than 7 years. Prescription does not run against the State, and that State can
still bring an action even after the lapse of a year for the reversion to the public domain of lands which have been
fraudulently granted. Republic cannot availed the remedy of reversion because they failed to prove that
Guerrero’s title and patent were obtained through actual fraud or other illegal means. Remedy of reversion
can only be availed by State in cases of fraudulent or unlawful inclusion of the land in patents or certificate of titles.
In addition to, the protest filed by Bustamante before Bureau of Lands on July 29, 1983, cannot be
considered in the context of a petition for review of decree of registration though it was filed within the 1-year
prescriptive period. The law expressly state that petition of review of decree of registration shall be filed in the
proper CFI/RTC, the law did not say that such petition may be filed with an administrative agency like Bureau of
Lands. What the law contemplates is a full-blown trial before a regular court where each party could be afforded
full opportunity to present the case, and where each of them must establish his case by preponderance of evidence
and not by substantial evidence, the usual quantum of proof required in administrative proceedings.
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Review of decree of registration constitutes an attack on the very integrity of land titles and torrens system.
CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY LANDLESS RESIDENTS ASSOC., INC (COCLAI) v CA

GR No. 106043 MARCH 4, 1996
Hermosisima, J.:
Facts:
The subject lot herein is the Lot 1982 of Cadastral 237 with an area of 12.82 hectares located in Macabalan,
Cagayan de Oro City.
July 24, 1990, NHA filed a complaint for Quieting of title with application of Preliminary injunction
against COCLAI (CC No. 90-337) at Branch 25 of RTC CDO, after COCLAI moved for the execution of
judgment in CC No. 11204.
Civil Case 11204, forcible entry and damages filed by COCLAI against NHA before the Municipal Trial
Court Branch 3, CDO, when NHA demolished the structures erected by COCLAI members sometime in
November 1986. COCLAI basing their possession and occupation of Lot 1982 with Miscellaneous Sales
Application they filed August 13, 1970. COCLAI was able to obtain affirmative ruling when MTC and RTC ruled
in their favor, and ordering the restoration of actual possession of portions of Lot 1982 to COCLAI members.
However, while such case was pending, President issued on July 1, 1988 Special Patent No. 3551
covering the entire Lot 1982, by virtue of such OCT P-3324 was issued in the name of NHA on January 3, 1990.
RTC ruled denying the preliminary injunction of NHA to restrain the enforcement of the decision of CC
No. 11204. MR was also denied. However, CA reversed RTC and ordered the issuance of PI to respect the
possession of NHA over the land.
Issue:
WON COCLAI has right over Lot 1982.
Ruling:
NO. NHA basing their claim on Free Patent and OCT. OCT of NHA was issued under an administrative
proceeding pursuant to Special Patent, thus it is as indefeasible as certificate of title issued under judicial registration
proceeding since the land covered by said certificate is disposable public land within the contemplation of Public
land Law. Certificate of title vested not only ownership over the lot but also the right of possession as a
necessary consequence of the right of ownership.
In addition to, NHA is not merely administrator because Proclamation 2290 gave NHA authority to
develop, administer and dispose Lot 1982. On the other hand, COCLAI only basis for claiming the land is lawful
entry and possession for an extended period of time and the final judgment in the case of forcible entry.
Judgment in ejectment case is effective only with respect to possession and in no wise bind the title or affect
ownership of land. Also the Miscellaneous Sales Application of COCLAI was not acted upon, the RD of
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Bureau of Lands even rejected their subdivision survey. With such, the occupation of COCLAI on the
disputed lot is illegal, and they became mere squatters who have no legal right over the land they occupying.
MENESES v CA
GR No. 82220 July 14. 1995
Quiason, J.:
Facts:
April 17, 1919, Quisumbing filed Civil Case No. 07049 before CFI of Laguna Branch VI. Against Pablito
and Lorenzo Meneses, Braulio darum and Cesar Almendral for nullification of free patents and titles issued to
Pablito Meneses. They are alleging that such patents and titles were obtained by fraud, Lorenzo as Mayor of Los
Banos used his brother Pablito as dummy to illegally occupied the subject property herein the ‘private accretion
land’. And that they confederated with District land officer Darum and Land Inspector Almendral for the issuance of
the said patents and OCTs in favor of Meneses.
Pablito alleged that Free Patent No. (IV-5) P-12807 and OCT P-1268 covering Lot 1585 with an area of
417sqm and Free Patent No. (IV-5) 12808 and OCT P-1269 for Lot 190 with an area of 515 sqm, both located in
Los Banos, Laguna on March 1, 1977, were issued legally. And that he had been occupying the property since
1956, and further said that he acquired the property through Deed of Waiver and Transfer of Rights from Silverio
Bautista on May 5, 1975, and that Baustista acquired the same from his aunt Sergia Almeda.
While heirs of Quisumbing (respondent in GR 82220), traced their ownership over the said property since
September 6, 1919, when their matriarch Ciriaca Arguelles Vda. de Quisimbing was issued OCT 989 covering lot
with an area of 859sqm, with Laguna de Bay as its northwestern boundary. And that the ‘accretion land’ was
awarded to them in Civil case B-350, where the court sustained their right over the 2,387 sqm which had
gradually accrued to their property by natural actions of the waters of Laguna de Bay. CFI of Binan even
ordered the confirmation and registration of title in their favor when they applied for registration and confirmation of
title over the said property.
RTC ruled in favor of Quisumbing and found that the free patents issued to Pablito Meneses had been
procured through fraud, deceit and bad faith (deed of waiver executed by Bautista to Pablito Meneses was simulated
contract for lack of consideration; said instrument was sworn before Mayor Lorenzo who had no authority to
notarize deeds of conveyance; Mayor Meneses exercised right of ownership over the property; District land Officer
Darum approved free patent applications and issued title without the required cadastral survey approved by Director
of Land, and other), thus declaring the OCTs and Free Patents null and void. MR was denied by RTC, and CA
affirmed the decision of RTC and subsequently denied the MR filed.
Issue:
WON the free patent and OCT of Pablito Meneses prevails over the accession right of Quisumbing.
Ruling:
NO. Accretion is a mode of acquiring property, and in Civil Case No. B-350, the court upheld the right of
Quisumbing, that the accretion land could only benefit the Quisumbing who own the property adjacent to Lot 190
and Lot 1585. On the contention of Meneses that their titles are already indefeasible since 1 year period already
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lapsed and that their title is superior as it were granted by the State. This assertion was beaten when fraud was
confirmed in the case Meneses v People.
FIDEL SILVESTRE v CA et al
GR No. L-32694 JULY 16, 1982
Teehankee, Acting C.J.:
Facts:
Lot 1185 of Cadastral survey of Hermosa, Bataan, containing an area of 124,135 sqm was allegedly
owned by Silvestre by virtue of Homestead Patent No. 72493 issued by Sec. of Agriculture and Natural Resources
on November 27, 1956 and OCT 292 issued on December 8, 1956. And he further alleged that he has been in
possession of the said land since 1927 in actual and open possession and has been paying taxes thereof.
On May 2, 1959, Dimson filed an action in CFI of Bataan against Silvestre for cancellation of home
patent and certificate of title, on the ground that the said property was private land, since it was already
adjudicated in cadastral case in favor of spouses Mariano Batungbakal and Hilaria Vergara before the WWII,
however there was no decree of registration issued because of the outbreak of war. That he acquired the said
land from spouses Batungbakal, by virtue of “Compromiso de Venta” executed by said spouses in his favor
sometime in 1927.
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources as a petitioner, contends that the said Homestead
patent was duly issued in favor of Silvestre, after considering the investigation of Director of Lands and found out
that the said land was public land disposable under Homestead Law.
CFI dismissed the complaint and declared the OCT 292 as valid, legal and subsisting in the name of
Silvestre. However, CA reversed the decision of CFI and held that the property was private property adjudged in
favor of Batungbakal spouses in cadastral proceeding, thus declaring the homestead patent as well as the OCT to be
null and void ab initio.
Issue:
WON the homestead patent and certificate of title of Silvestre shall prevail.
Ruling:
YES. The deed, grant or instrument of conveyance from the government to the grantee shall not take effect
as a conveyance or bind the land, but shall operate as contract between government and the grantee and as evidence
of authority to the clerk of register of deeds to make registration. The act of registration (of patent) is the
operative act which conveys and affects the land.
Dimson’s action has already prescribed, since the title of Lot 1185 had already been registered under
Torrens system in the name of Silvestre since December 8, 1956 and such decree can no longer be impugned,
even on ground of fraud, since more than 1 year had already elapsed when he filed a complaint on May 2, 1959.
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The homestead patent having been registered, it was brought under the operation of the Land
Registration Act which provides, that upon expiration of 1 year within which a petition to review the decree of
registration may be filed, said decree and the title issued pursuant thereto become incontrovertible and may no
longer be changed , altered, or modified, much less set aside.
JOSE GARCIA v CA, SPS. LUISITO AND LUISA MAGPAYO

GR No. 133140 August 10, 1999
Puno, J.:
Facts:
Subject property herein is Lot 17 situated at Bel Air II Village, Makati, registered in the name of Atty.
Pedro Garcia (TCT S-31269). Atty. Pedro sold the lot with his wife consent to their daughter Luisa Magpayo and
her husband Luisito Magpayo (Magpayos).
Magpayos then mortgaged the land to Phil. Bank of Communications (PBCom) on March 5, 1981. Then
on March 9, 1981 TCT S-108412/545 was issued in the name of Magpayos. Deed of Real Estate Mortgage was
registered at Makati Register of Deed and annotated on the title of Magpayos.
Magpayos failed to pay the loan, mortgage was extrajudicially foreclosed, PBCom the highest bidder
bought the land in public auction. Spouses Magpayos were not able to redeem the property, hence, TCT in their
name was cancelled and TCT 138233 was issued in PBCom’s name.
Writ of possession was granted to PBCom by Branch 148 (RTC of Makati). Thereby, Jose Garcia who was
in possession of the land, refused to honor the writ of possession. Subsequently, Jose Garcia filed a suit for
recovery of realty and damages against PBCom, Magpayos and RTC Sheriff. He alleged that he inherited the
land from his mother Remedios Garcia and that PBCom has no right. Garcia and PBCom both motion for summary
judgment. RTC invalidated the mortgaged executed by Magpayos because they were not yet owners of property
when they executed the mortgage, since TCT in their name issued 4 days after the said mortgaged. CA reversed
RTC.
Issue:
WON the mortgage is valid.
Ruling:
YES. SC upheld CA in holding that the mortgage executed by Magpayos to PBCom is valid
notwithstanding the TCT over the property was issued to them after the mortgage contract was entered.
Registration does not confer ownership, it is merely evidence of such ownership over particular property.
The deed of sale operate as formal or symbolic delivery of property sold and authorizes the buyer to use the
document as proof of ownership. With that, Magpayo spouses were already the owners when they mortgaged
the property to PBCom.
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ATTY. PLARIDEL MINGOA v LAND REGISTRATION ADMINISTRATOR

GR No. 97282 AUGUST 16, 1991
Gancayco, J.:
Facts:
July 15, 1987, deed of donation was executed by Atty. Mingoa in favor of his children, and such deed was
forwarded to the Register of Deeds of Romblon for registration by registered mail on September 9, 1988. It was
received and entered in the primary book of RD on September 20, 1988. RD suspended the registration of donation
until Atty. Mingoa secured a clearance from DAR as per RA 6657 Sec. 6 – any disposition of private agricultural
lands made prior to June 15, 1988 (effectivity of RA 6657), must be registered within 3 months from said date or
before September 13, 1988 to be valid.
The matter was elevated in en consulta to Land Registration Authority, LTA sustained the Register of
Deeds that clearance must first secured.
Atty. Mingoa filed petition for certiorari in CA, contending that Sec 1, Rule 13 of Rules of Courts shall
apply as suppletory.
Issue:
WON date of mailing of instrument is the date of registration.
Ruling:
YES. SC holds that date of mailing of an instrument to RD for purposes of registration should be
considered the date of filing and receipt thereof by RD, this date that should be entered in the primary entry book
of RD which shall be regarded as date of its registration.
Sec. 56 of PD 1529 requires RD to enter in the primary book of entry (after payment), all instruments, date,
hour and minute shall be noted in the said book which shall be regarded as date of registration of the instrument.
Sec. 34 of PD 1529, states that Rule of Court shall be applicable provided it is not inconsistent with the
decree, and Sec. 1, Rule 13 of Rules of Court provides that the date of mailing of motion, pleading or any papers,
which may include instruments as the deed of donation, is considered the date of filing as shown by the post office
stamp on the envelope or registry receipt.
The deed of donation was sent by registered mail to RD on September 9, 1988, said date is the date of
filing, receipt and registration of the instrument, although received on September 20, 1988, thus there’s no need
for securing clearance from DAR such disposition is valid.
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HENRY MUNAR CHAN ET AL v CA and TEOVILLE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION

GR No. 118516 NOVEMBER 18, 1998
Purisima, J.:
Facts:
Teoville Dev. Corp is the owner of several parcels of land in Muntinlupa Rizal covered by TCT 268165,
S-27367, 188445. 188447 and 188437. Teoville acquired such from spouses Augusto and Rosario Posadas, who in
turn acquired the same from Juan Posadas, and Juan acquired the same from El Colegio de San Jose. OCT 2553 was
issued in the name of El Colegio de San Jose on May 17, 1919, pursuant to Decree 76377 [should be 76477] (typo
error, already corrected when Teoville filed petition for correction in CFI of Rizal).
In 1974, Henry Munar Chan applied for registration of certain parcels of land located in Muntinlupa,
Paranaque, such application was approved and OCTs 10161/2/3/4/5/6 were issued.
October 1978 Teoville discovered that TCT 26815 was intruded into by third parties, who claimed
ownership over the land and even exhibited certificates of title. After investigation, it was discovered that there
was overlapping of titles both in the names of Teoville and defendant-appellants Henry Chan, et al.
February 2, 1979 Teoville filed a complaint for quieting of title, alleging that all titles emanating from
application of Henry Chan are null and void, since titles in the said property was already issued in favor of El
Colegio de San Jose as ealy as 1919. Henry Chan et al, alleged that the title of Teoville was fake because Decree
76377 pertains to lot in Albay.
April 30, 1981 Phil. Machinery Parts Manufacturing Co., Inc, filed an action against Teoville for quieting
of title alleging that it is the owner of parcels of land in Muntinlupa, covered by TCT 103218, and alleged further
that petition for correction filed by Teoville is null and void since only Xerox of OCT 2553 was presented.
The both case of quieting of title was consolidated. And in both case, RTC ruled in favor of Teoville,
upholding the OCT 2553, prior certificate of title, this was affirmed by CA.
Issue:
WON it is a case of double registration.
Ruling:
YES. There is double registration since the parcels of land were subject of land registration instituted
separately by Henry Chan and El Colegio de San Jose, predecessor-in-interest of Teoville. When two
certificates of title are issued to different persons covering the same land in whole or in part, the earlier in date
must prevail, and in case of successive registration where more than one certificate is issued over the same land, the
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person holding a prior certificate is entitled to the land as against a person who relies on a subsequent
certificate.
Teoville’s title being prior in registration than that of Henry Chan must prevail. And petitioners failed to
prove that OCT 2553 never existed and/or fake, it requires preponderance of proof.
HEIRS OF LUIS GONZAGA v SPOUSES JOSE LEELIN and LILIA SEVILLA

GR No. 96259
GUILLERMO MACARIAS v SPOUSES JOSE LEELIN and LILIA SEVILLA
GR No. 96274 SEPT. 3, 1996
HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:
Facts:
Present controversy arose when private respondents filed on October 14, 1981, a complaint for annulment of
Gonzaga Torrens Title that embraced the Lot No. 3619 and 3620 which are identical with those described in
private respondents own title as Lot Nos. 65 and 66.
On Gonzaga’s Torrens title – Jose Eugenio once the registered owner of Lot Nos. 3619 and 3620 of Cadastral
Survey of Caloocan (Cadastral Case No. 34) under TCT No. 17519, then sold (1960) it to deceased Luis Gonzaga
under TCT 81338 (Nov. 29, 1960) and subsequently sold (Sept. 28, 1981) it to petitioner Macarias under TCT
48078.
On the other hand, the identical lands also registered under the subsisting title TCT C-26086 (Aug. 2, 1979) on the
name of Lilia Sevilla, married to Jose Seelin, covers the Lots No. 65 and 66. TCT of Sevilla came from OCT No.
994 which originally in the name of Maria de la Concepcion Vidal, in which after the Civil Case substituted in the
name of Bartolome Rivera. Where the respondents purchased (deed of absolute sale) from heirs of Bartolome Rivera
(January 14, 1977).
The two conflicting TCTs were derived from one common OCT, OCT 994. Both court found that OCT 994 was
registered on May 3, 1917. SC found out on the other hand that, petitioner’s title indicate original registration to
have been made on May 3, 1917 while private respondents title indicate original registration to have been made on
April 19, 1917.
RTC ruled in favor of respondents and states that petitioners title were registered under Cadastral Proceeding while
the title of respondents derived from OCT 994 issued in Land Registration Case, pursuant to Decree 36455 in 1917.
In addition to, the undivided share of Maria de la Concepcion Vidal (includes OCT 994), has never been sold or
disposed by her, and her said share now belongs to Bartolome Rivera et al. Thus, the sale of property of Eugenio to
Gonzaga on November 29, 1960 has no valid basis. CA affirm the ruling of RTC.
Issue:
WON in cases of overlapping titles, earlier certificates prevails.
Ruling:
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YES. Certificate is not conclusive evidence of title if it is shown that the same land had already been registered and
an earlier certificate for the same is in existence. Since the land had already been registered under OCT No. 994
dated April 19, 1917, the subsequent registration of the same land on May 3, 1917 is null and void. In cadastral
case the court has no jurisdiction to decree again the registration of land already decreed in an earlier land
registration case and a second decree for the same is NULL and VOID.
Where two certificates (of titles) purport to include the same land, the earlier in date prevails. In successive
registrations, where more than one certificate is issued involving the same property or land, the person claiming
under the prior certificate is entitled to the said estate or interest; and the person is deemed to hold under the prior
certificate who is the holder of, or whose claim is derived directly or indirectly from the person who was the holder
of the earliest certificate issued in respect thereof.
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HEIRS OF SARILI v PEDRO LAGROSA

GR No. 193517 January 15, 2014
Perlas-Bernabe, J.:
Facts:
Respondent represented by his atty-in-fact Lourdes Mojica via SPA dated November 25, 1999, filed a
complaint against Sps. Sarili and RD of Caloocan before RTC. He alleged that he is the owner of parcel of land
covered TCT 55979. He claimed that he is resident of California USA, and that during his vacation in Phil. he
discovered that new certificate of title to his prop erty was issued by RD in the name of Victorino Sarili married
to Isabel Sarili, TCT 262218, by virtue of falsified Deed of Absolute Sale dated February 16, 1978 purportedly
executed by him and his wife Amelia Lagrosa.
Sps. Sarili maintained that they are innocent purchasers from value, having purchased the property from
Ramon Rodriguez who possessed SPA to sell/dispose the said property, executed a Deed of Absolute Sale dated
November 20, 1992 in their favor. They also denied any participation in preparation of February 16, 1978 deed of
sale.
RTC ruled in favor of Sps. Sarili, declaring the Nov. 20, sale as valid, genuine, lawful and binding. CA
reversed RTC, reinstate the TCT 55979 in the name of petitioner and state that the signature of petitioner and his
wife were forged. MR was denied by CA.
Issue:
WON there is valid conveyance of subject property to spouses Sarili.
Ruling:
NO. General rule is that every person dealing with registered land may safely rely on the correctness of
certificate of title, however, higher degree of prudence is required from the one who buys from a person who is not
the registered owner, although the land object of transaction is registered. The buyer has the duty to ascertain the
identity of the person with whom he is dealing with and the latter’s legal authority to convey the property.
Sps. Sarili still purchased the property despite the fact that SPA of Ramon readily indicates flaws in
notarial acknowledgment since the respondent’s community tax certificate number was not indicated. Despite this
irregularity, Sps. Sarili failed to show that they conducted an investigation beyond the subject SPA, thus they
cannot be considered as innocent purchaser for value.
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Article 1874 of Civil Code provides that when a sale of piece of land or any interest therein is through an
agent, the authority of the latter shall be in writing, otherwise, the sale shall be void. Since the subject SPA herein
was not proven to be duly executed and authentic, then the requirement has not been complied, thus the sale is void.
When the instrument presented is forged, even if accompanied by owner’s duplicate certificate of
title, the registered owner does not thereby lose his title and neither does the assignee in the forged deed
acquire any right or title to the property.
SPS. VILBAR v OPINION

GR No. 176043 January 15, 2014
Del Castillo, J.:
Facts:
Subject of property herein are Lot 20 and Lot 21, both are situated at Airmens Village, Las Pinas City
where there are 2 claimants of the said parcels of land.
The first one is spouses Vilbar who alleged that they acquired the said properties by Contract to Sell with
Dulos Realty and Development Corp. They first acquired Lot 20-B (108 sqm) covered by TCT S-39849 for P19,440
on July 10, 1979. Lot 20-A covered by the same TCT, was subject to another Contract to Sell between Elena
Guingon and Dulos Realty.
June 1, 1981, upon full payment of Lot 20, Dulos eceuted a duly notarized Deed of Absolute Sale in favor
of spouses Vilbar and co-purchaser Elena. However, they were not able to register and transfer the title in their
names, although Dulos Realty already surrendered and delivered the owner’s duplicate copy of TCT. They alleged
that Dulos Realty failed to formally subdivide the lot, until its President Juan Dulos died.
As for the Lot 21, spouses Vilbar and Dulos Realty executed Contract to Sale on July 10, 1979 for Lot 21,
with an area of 216 sqm covered by TCT S-39850 for P128,880. Spouses Vilbar obtained housing loan from
Development Bank of Phil. (DBP), and Dulos Realty approved such. In 1991, spouses Vilbar able to settle the loan
then DBP issued the Cancellation of Mortgage on March 25, 1991. DBP surrendered TCT 36777/TCT-17725-A in
the name of Bernadette Vilbar to Spouses Vilbar.
The second claimant is Angelito Opinion, and he claimed that he acquired Lot 20 covered by TCT T-44797
and Lot 21 covered by TCT T-44796 via extra-judicial foreclosure of mortgage constituted over the said properties
by Otilio Gorospe, Sr. and Otilio “Lito” Gorospe, Jr. (Gorospes). A certificate of sale was issued in his favor on
December 18, 1995 as the highest bidder in a public auction and subsequently annotated on the said TCTs. Thereby,
TCT T-59011 for Lot 20 and TCT T-59010 for Lot 21 were issued in his name on January 22, 1997.
Then Opinion filed a complaint for Accion Reinvindicatoria (action to recover the ownership over real property) (Civil Case 98-
0302 at Branch 255 of RTC of Las Pinas, for him to be declared as the lawful owner and possessor of the properties
and his titles be declared authentic, after his writ of possession was quashed when Spouses Vilbar and Elena
interposed and presented their title and deed of absolute sale.
RTC ruled in favor of Opinion, and declared that he is the lawful owner and his titles are valid. And CA
affirmed RTC that Opinion validly acquired the titles over Lot 20 and 21 through valid mortgage, extrajudicial
foreclosure and eventual consolidation proceedings instituted. MR was denied.
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Issue:
WON the conveyance of the lots in favor of spouses Vilbar is valid.
Ruling:
NO. The proof of ownership of spouses Vilbar over Lots 20 and 21 are insufficient.
As for Lot 20 – The deed of absolute sale for Lot 20 and copy of TCT S-39849 is insufficient because they did not
cause the transfer of the certificate in their name nor annotate or register the sale in the original title in the name of
Dulos Realty. A certificate of title serve as evidence of indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the property in
favor of the person whose name appears therein. Having no title issued in their names spouses Vilbar have no
indefeasible and incontrovertible title over Lot 20 to support their claim.
In addition to, court ruled that registration is the operative act which gives validity to the transfer or creates a
lien upon the land, (any buyer or mortgagee of realty covered by Torrens certificate of title is charged with
notice only of such burdens and claims as are annotated on the title). Failure of spouses Vilbar to cause the
annotation of deed for eventual transfer of title over Lot 20 in their names, they cannot claim greater right over
Opinion, who acquired the property with clean title in good faith and registered the same in his name by going
through legally required procedure.
As for the Lot 21 – TCT 36777 in the name of Vilbar does not indicate where it came from, only Contract to Sell
which is insufficient proof of legal transfer of title was presented, there was no Deed of Sale presented and even
spouses Vilbar do not know if Deed of Sale was executed in their favor. Absent of corresponding inscription or
annotation of the required transfer document in the original title issued in the name of Dulos Realty, third
parties are not charged with notice of said burden and/or claim over the property. There is no showing that
deed of absolute sale between Dulos and Vilbar had been registered nor annotated at the back of TCT 39850.
There is no proof of conveyance showing how they acquired ownership over Lot 21 to justify the issuance of TCT in
their name.
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DE LA MERCED v GSIS
Ynare-Santiago, J.:
Facts:
Subject lots herein are Lot 6, 7, 8 and 10, Block 2 (formerly Block 4) Antonio Subdivision covered by TCT
26105 owned by Gov. Jose Zulueta and his wife Soledad Ramos.
Spouses Zulueta obtained loans from GSIS on September 25, 1956 (amounting to P520,000), March 6,
1957 (amounting to P190,000), April 4, 1957 (amounting to P1,000,000) and October 15, 1957 (amounting to
P1,398,000) and they mortgaged the lands covered by TCT 26105, TCT 50256, TCT 37177. However, there was
stipulation that certain lots within TCT 26105 shall be excluded (one of those are Lots Nos. 1-11, Block No. 2 as
found out by RTC) since they have been either sold to third parties or donated to government.
In between of those loans obtained by Zulueta, on September 3, 1957, spouses Zulueta executed Contract
to Sell in favor of Francisco dela Merced and Evarista Mendoza for Lots 6, 7, 8 and 10, Block 2 covered by TCT
26105. Then on October 26, 1972, Deed of Absolute Sale was executed in favor of dela Merced after his full
payment of purchase price.
Zuluetas defaulted in payment of their loans, thus GSIS extrajudicially forecloses the mortgages and
foreclosure sale held on August 16, 1974, GSIS as the highest bidder. Zulueta failed to redeem the properties within
reglementary period. Thus on March 25, 1982, GSIS held a public sale and Elizabeth Manlongat and Ma.
Therese Manlongat, children of Victor and Milagros Manlongat (respondent), purchases Lot 6, Block 2.
September 7, 1984, Col. Dela Merced instituted Civil Case 51470 with RTC of Pasig Branch 154, against
GSIS and spouses Zulueta, praying that foreclosure sale insofar as his lot were concerned be declared null and void.
And dela Merced also filed a complaint-in-intervention in Civil case 51410 (dated August 22, 1984) instituted by
Victor Lemonsito et al against Benjamin Cabusao et al including spouses Victor and Milagros Manlongat. Civil
Case 15410 was dismissed but the complaint-in-intervention of dela Merced was allowed to proceed against Suarez
and Manlongat. Upon motion, the court consolidated the 2 cases.
Then on December 27, 1996, RTC (of Pasig Brach 160) ruled in favor of dela Merced (after the CA
remanded the case) declared him as true and lawful owner of the lots. However, CA reversed RTC and MR was also
denied.
Issue:
WON dela Merced is the lawful owner of the disputed lots.
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Ruling:
YES. Petitioners right of ownership over properties in dispute, although unregistered are superior to
the registered mortgage rights of GSIS over the same. The reason behind this is that if the original owner had
parted his ownership of the thing sold then he no longer had ownership and free disposal of that thing as as to be
able to mortgage it again [State Investment House, Inc vs. CA].
The contract to sell was entered into by the parties before the third mortgage was constituted on October
15, 1957 on the properties covered by TCT 26105, which included the said lots, dela Merced was able to pay the full
price and later deed of absolute sale was executed in his favor.
GSIS as financing institution is an exception (he was aware of sufficient facts to induce a reasonably
prudent man to inquire into the status of the property in litigation) in the general rule that the purchaser is not
required to explore further than the Torrens Title when there is nothing in the certificate of title to indicate any cloud
or vice in the ownership of property. As a financing institution the court presumed as an experienced in its business,
ascertainment of the status and condition of the properties offered to it as security for the loans it extends must be
standard and indispensable part of its operations. In the case at bar, there is nothing in the record that indicates that
GSIS conducted ocular inspection. In addition to, GSIS had full knowledge of the claim of ownership of dela
Merced over the disputed lots.
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SAJONAS v CA et al
GR No. 102377 July 5, 1996
Torres, Jr., J.:
Facts:
Subject property herein is the residential land located in Antipolo, Rizal registered in the name of spouses
Ernesto Uychocde and Lucita Jarin under TCT N-79073. Then on, September 22, 1983, spouses Uychocde
agreed to sell the said land to spouses Alfredo Sajonas and Conchita Sajonas on installment (Contract to Sell).
August 24, 1984, spouses Sajonas caused the annotation of adverse claim on the said title based on the
Contract to Sell executed, which was inscribed as Entry No. 116017.
September 4, 1984, Uychocdes executed Deed of Absolute Sale involving the said property in favor of
Sajonas upon full payment. Meanwhile, without the petitioners’ knowledge, there has been a compromise
agreement between Uychocde and Domingo Pilares dated June 25, 1980 (after civil case for collection of money
against Uychocde). Then a Notice of Levy was issued on February 21, 1985 after Pilares moved for the issuance
of writ of execution to enforce compromise agreement after Uychocde failed to comply. Sheriff Roberto Garcia
presented the said notice of levy on execution before Register of Deeds of Marikina and the same was annotated at
the back of TCT N-79073 as Entry No. 123283.
Only on August 28, 1985 when the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Uychocde and Sajonas was
registered, then TCT N-79073 was cancelled and TCT N-109417 was issued in the name of Sajonas, the notice of
levy annotated was carried over to the new title of Sajonas.
Sajonas filed a complaint in RTC of Rizal (Branch 71) against Pilares, after he refused to cause the
cancellation of notice of levy on execution. RTC ruled in their favor, and ordered the cancellation of the said
annotation, however, CA reversed RTC and upheld the annotation of the notice of levy on execution.
Issue:
WON the adverse claim inscribed still in force when the notice of levy on execution was annotated or registered.
Ruling:
YES. Annotation of adverse claim is a measure designed to protect the interest of a person over a piece of
real property where the registration of such interest or right not otherwise provided for by the Act 496 or PD 1529
75 | P a g e
and serves as warning to third parties dealing with the said property that someone is claiming an interest on the same
or a better right than that of the registered owner thereof.
The adverse claim inscripted in the TCT N-79073 was still in effect when Sheriff Garcia annotated the
notice of levy on execution on February 12, 1985. The adverse claim does not automatically terminated by mere
lapse of time, the law requires hearing for the cancellation of adverse claim to render it ineffective. The inscription
remain annotated and shall continue as a lien upon the property even the lapse of 30 day period if there is no court
order the cancellation of such. Thus, the court ordered the cancellation of inscription of notice of levy on execution
on TCT N-109417.
HEIRS OF EUGENIO LOPEZ, SR. v HON. ALFREDO ENRIQUES, in his capacity as Administrator of LRA
and REGISTER OF DEEDS OF MARIKINA CITY
GR No. 146262 JAN. 21, 2005
CARPIO,J.:
Facts:
November 25, 1998, petitioners filed with the Register of Deeds of Marikina City an application to
annotate the notice of lis pendens at the back of OCT O-1603 and O-1604 in the name of Alfonso Sandoval and
Roman Ozaeta (issued to them in LRC Case No. 18887), on the ground that petitioners have filed with land
registration court a motion to declare the said OCTs void.
Register of Deeds denied the said application for being bereft of original petition or complaint. LRA also
denied the application after it was elevated to them in consulta, and ruled that such notice of lis pendens based on
motion is not registrable. CA also dismissed the appeal for lack of merit.
Issue:
WON the notice of lis pendens is registrable.
Ruling:
NO. Notice of lis pendens literally means a pending suit, doctrine of notice of lis pendens refers to
jurisdiction, power or control which a court acquires over property involved in a suit, pending the continuance of the
action and until final judgment.
The purpose of lis pendens are (1) to protect the rights of the party causing the registration of lis pendens
and (2) to advise third persons who purchase or contract on the subject property that they do so at their peril and
subject to the result of the pending litigation.
Sec 76 of PD 1529 enumerates the requisites of lis pendens, such as: (a) contain a statement of the
institution of an action or proceeding, (b) the court where the same is pending and (c) date of its institution, and also
(d) contain reference to the number of the certificates of title of the land, (e) adequate description of the land
affected and (f) its registered owner.
76 | P a g e
Petitioners have not complied with the requisites, since petitioners are mere movants and not original
parties in LRC No. N-18887. Thus, the motion of petitioners to declare void the decrees and titles issued are not
registrable as notice of lis pendens.
REBECCA VDA. DE ALCANTARA, et al v CA

GR No. 114762 January 29, 1996
Davide, Jr., J.:
Facts:
Subject property are Lots 4399 and 4400 under TCT 19232 registered in the names of Leona Vda. de
Alfonso, ½ and Ernesto Alcantara married to Rebecca Desamito and Gerondina Alcantara, ½, issued on May 6,
1975. The said title was derived from TCT (38601) 4821 registered in the name of Leona Vda. de Alfonso and
Dolores Cifra, the latter being the predecessor of interest of defendants.
Norberto Santiago (plaintiff-respondent) claiming ownership over ½ undivided portion of 2 lots covered by
subject title by virtue of Pacto de Retro Sale executed in their favor by Leona Vda. de Alfonso on September 7,
1983. That Leona failed to redeem the said property within 3 months period provided for, and Leona delivered the
original owner’s duplicate of TCT 19232 to them. And that a survey was taken to subdivide the properties, which
was agreed upon by the petitioners, however, for unknown reasons, petitioners backed out. That is why respondent,
filed an action for specific performance against the petitioners.
On the other hand, petitioners alleged that the said pacto de retro sale is null and void, because at the time it
was executed, Leona was not the owner of ½ portion of the lots, as it was already transferred by her in a documents
entitled Deed of Extra-judicial Partition of the estates of Dolores, Simeona and Eladia all surnamed Cifra and Deed
of Partition of Co-ownership of property on March 13, 1972. The deed of extra-judicial partition was registered
with Register of Deeds of Pasay on November 23, 1983.
RTC ruled in favor of respondent, and ruled that the pacto de retro sale is real pacto de retro sale and not
equitable mortgage. Further ruled that, the registration of Deed of Partition, where the alleged deed of sale executed
by Leona in favor of petitioners over ½ share in the properties was mention, cannot be said as registration of deed of
sale too. Registration of partition agreement is valid only insofar as such partition is concerned but not in a way
transcend the effect of its registration in favor of alleged sale mentioned therein. CA affirmed the decision of RTC.
Issue:
WON the duly registered deed of extrajudicial partition shall prevail over the pacto de retro sale.
Ruling:
77 | P a g e
NO. The act of registration that transfer the ownership of the land sold, and it is the act that operates to
convey registered land and affect title thereto and creates constructive notice to the whole world. The owner desiring
to convey his registered land in fee simple shall execute and register a deed of conveyance in a form sufficient in
law.
Although the partition agreement was registered much earlier on November 16, 1983 than the pacto de
retro sale which was registered on October 27, 1987, however, such partition agreement did not rise to the level
of valid instrument of conveyance of the ½ share of Leona in favor of Ernesto Alcantara and Gerondina Alcantara,
since it merely mentions of an alleged sale executed by Leona in their favor. It is not the sufficient form of deed of
conveyance required by law. The registration of such did not operate as registration of deed of sale.
Moreover, although the deed of extra-judicial partition was registered, there was no corresponding
annotation thereof was made in TCT 19232. In fact, there were only 2 annotation thereon, the extra-judicial
settlement of the estate of deceased spouses Tomas Alcantra and Dolores Cifra (May 6, 1975) and the Pacto De
Retro Sale in favor of respondents (October 27, 1987).
In addition, the petitioner failed to adduce the alleged deed of sale, without such, the registration of Deed of
Extra-Judicial Partition was an idle ceremony or an exercise of futility insofar as the transfer of Leona’s ownership
is concerned.
78 | P a g e
ORTIGAS & COMPANY LIMITED PARTNERSHIP. v JUDGE VELASCO and DOLORES MOLINA
GR No. 109645 July 25, 1994
DOLORES MOLINA v HON. PRESIDING JUDGE OF RTC, QC and MANILA BANKING CORP.
GR No. 112564 July 25, 1994
Narvasa, C.J.:
Facts:
Consolidated case involving 13 hectare residential land situated in Quezon City. Under TCT 124088 (TCT
RT-58287 in the name of Dolores Molina) reconstituted in the name of Dolores Molina. [TCTs 77652 and 77653 (in
the name of Ortigas)]
The first case GR 109645, was originated when Dolores Molina filed for reconstitution of her TCT 124088
before RTC of QC on November 14, 1991, alleging that the original copy of the said title was lost during the fire in
the office of Register of Deeds of Quezon City. However, this was dismissed because Molina withdraw her petition,
averred that she needs to go to US.
April 3, 1992, Molina filed a motion for revival of her petition for reconstitution, and amended her petition.
She averred that the owner’s duplicate copy of TCT 124088, was missing and that she only discovered such on
September 1991 – this was contrary to her first statement on November 14, 1991 petition, where she stated that
owner’s duplicate copy was in her possession. Such revival was granted by respondent Judge Velasco.
Office of Solicitor General opposed the said petition of Molina on the ground that there was no actual
notice had been given to adjacent owners. Then on July 16, 1992, notice of hearing issued by Clerk of Court were
addressed only to President of the Corinthian Neighborhood Association thru Barangay Chairman of Barangay
Corinthian, Director of Bureau of Lands and City Engineer of QC, owners of adjacent lots were not served copies of
Notice of Hearing.
Ortigas allegedly learned about Molina’s petition for reconstitution by accident, and thus, they filed
opposition thereto because of the irregular character of her petition. Ortigas further alleged that the claim of
ownership of Molina in the instant petition – acquired such property by purchase from Eusebia Molina and her heirs,
was contrary to her claim in the case of WIDORA , involving the same property wherein Molina filed opposition
therein, and that her claim of ownership was through acquisitive prescription.
79 | P a g e
In addition, the plan relied upon by Molina appears to be derived from 2 different surveys, and neither of
which have been subject of original registration, thus it is presumed that no original title had been issued from which
TCT 124088 could have been emanated, as per the report of LRA.
Manila Mission of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints, Inc or Mormons, also opposed the said petition, on the
ground that portion of the property was acquired by them in good faith (sold to them by Ortigas).
Despite of such opposition and irregularities, Judge Velasco ruled in favor of reconstitution of Molina’s
title on September 23, 1992. Notice of appeal of Ortigas was denied by Judge Velasco, and state that Ortigas has no
vested justiciable interest to be a party since it already sold all the subdivisions lots which it claims to overlap the
disputed two lots. (October 14, 1992). TCT RT-58287 was issued to Molina, her reconstituted title.
Thus, Ortigas & Company instituted on April 20, 1993 special civil action of certiorari and mandamus,
praying to declare the reconstituted title as void ab initio.
Issue:
WON the order of reconstitution is valid.
Ruling:
NO. The reconstitution of Molina’s title are tainted with serious, and invalidating defects and must be
nullified and set aside. RA 26, specifies the requisites in order for a court to acquire jurisdiction of petition for
reconstitution of title (Sec 13), Notice of petition of hearing must be:
(a) published at the expense of petitioner, twice in s successive issues of Official Gazette;
(b) posted on main entrance of provincial building and municipal building where the land is situated, at
least 30 days prior to the date of hearing;
(c) must be sent, by registered mail or otherwise, at the expense of petitioner, to every person named
therein (occupants, or persons in possession of the property, owner of adjoining properties and all interested
parties) whose address is known, at least 30 days prior to the date of hearing;
(d) must state the following: number of lost or destroyed certificates if known, name of registered owner,
name of occupants, persons in possession of the property, owner of adjoining properties and all interested
parties, location, area and boundaries of properties and date on which all persons having any interest
therein must appear and file their claim of objection to the petition; and
(e) proof of publication, posting and service of the notices must be submit by petitioner at the hearing.
In this case, there was no notice sent to the adjoining owners and interested parties, the notice were
only sent to President of Corinthian Homeowners Association, Director of Bureau of Land and City Engineer of QC.
With regard to the three who received the notice of hearing, the court said that whatever interest they may have in
the case, are not the adjoining owners contemplated by law, on whom the notice of reconstitution proceeding
must be served. Such notice is indispensable, having no notice of the date of hearing of reconstitution case, the
possessor or person who have interest in the property has deprived of his day in court, thus such reconstitution is
null and void.
In addition, reviving the reconstitution petition of Molina by Judge Velasco was legally inefficacious
because the dismissal of the case and lapse of reglementary period to reconsider or set aside the dismissal,
80 | P a g e
effectively operated to remove the case from court’s docket, revival could not be done except through
commencement of new action, by filing another complaint and payment of docketing fees.
More importantly, the land being claimed by Molina lies within that titled in the name of Ortigas and
its predecessor-in-interest. The existence of decades-old Torrens title covering the land subject of reconstitution
case, should have deterred Judge Velasco from proceeding. The lands already covered by duly issued existing
Torrens title cannot be subject of petitions for reconstitutions of allegedly lost or destroyed titles filed by third
parties without first securing by final judgment the cancellation of such existing titles.
ELIZABETH LEE, et al. v REPUBLIC

GR No. 128195 October 3, 2001
Pardo, J.:
Facts:
Subject property herein is the Lot 398 covered by OCT 3389 situated at the corner of Roxas Avenue and
Pavia Street, Roxas City.
Dinglasans, the owners of the property sold the property to Lee Liong, Chinese citizen on March 1936,
however, the Dinglasans filed an action for annulment of sale and recovery of land in 1948 on the ground of
constitutional prohibition for alien to acquire agriculture land (including residential, commercial or industrial land).
Dinglasans appeal to SC after adverse decision of RTC and CA. Then on June 27, 1956, SC declared that the said
sale is null and void and state that both party are equally guilty (pari delicto), and neither of them can claim the title.
September 7, 1993, Elizabeth Manuel-Lee and Pacita Yu Lee filed with the RTC a petition for
reconstitution of title for Lot 398. They averred that they were the widows of the sons/heirs of Lee Liong, the owner
of the lot. Elizabeth claimed that she acquired her share in the property through extra-judicial settlement and
donation executed in her favor by her deceased husband Lee Bong Hoo. And Pacita acquired her share through
succession by her deceased husband Lee Bun Ting, as evidenced by extra-judicial settlement.
June 10, 1994, ruled in favor of petitioners and ordered the reconstitution of the lost or destroyed
certificate of title in the name of Lee Liong on the basis of approved plan and technical description.
January 25, 1995, Solicitor General filed with CA a petition for annulment of judgment in reconstitution
case of Elizabeth and Pacita, on the ground that they were not the proper parties in the reconstitution since their
predecessor-in-interest Lee Liong did not acquire the lot because of constitutional prohibition, not qualified to own
land.
CA declared the reconstitution void on April 30, 1996.
Issue:
81 | P a g e
WON the reconstitution is void.
Ruling:
YES. Reconstitution of title is reissuance of a new certificate of title lost or destroyed in its original form
and condition. It does not pass upon the ownership of the land covered by lost or destroyed title.
However, the reconstitution of original certificate of title must be based on an owner’s duplicate, secondary
evidence thereof, or other valid sources of title be reconstituted. In this case, reconstitution was based only on the
plan and technical description approved by LRA. Such reconstitution is void for lack of factual support.
JESUS SAN AGUSTIN v CA and MAXIMO MENEZ, JR

GR No. 121940 December 4, 2001
Quisumbing, J.:
Facts:
Lot 13, Block 7 is the subject lot in this case, situated in Rosario, Pasig City with an area of 168 sqm
owned by GSIS (in its proprietary capacity), that sold by GSIS to Macaria Vda. de Caiquep (TCT 436465) on
February 11, 1974.
That in turn sold by de Caiquep to private respondent Maximo Menez, Jr, on February 20, 1974, as
evident by Deed of Sale, however, such deed was not registered immediately upon its execution because of
prohibition of GSIS (because of the five-year prohibition to sell during the period).
December 1990, when Menez discovered that TCT 436465 was missing, thus he filed Affidavit of Loss
with Register of Deeds of Pasig, and certified copy of such was issued.
July 8, 1992, he filed petition for issuance of owner’s duplicate copy of TCT 436465 with RTC of Pasig
for the replacement of lost TCT. To support his claim of ownership of the property he presented the Deed of
Absolute Sale executed by Caiquep in his favor. Before the said hearing, the court order for the publication of said
hearing and it was published once in Malaya – nationally circulated newspaper in Philippines. Despite such
publication, no person opposed the petition, hence the court granted the petition of Menez in its decision dated
September 30, 1992.
Herein petitioner Jesus San Agustin filed his “Motion to Reopen Reconstitution Proceedings” on October
27, 1992, after he received the RTC’s decision, since he was the occupant of the said land, and he claim that he was
the heir (nephew) of Caiquep and that his aunt died in 1974. And he alleged that he never received the notice of the
said hearing. This motion was denied by RTC on December 3, 1992. CA also denied his appeal on May 19, 1995.
Issue:
WON petitioner is entitled to the notice as the actual possessor of the land.
82 | P a g e
Ruling:
NO. Actual possessor or occupant is not entitled to be notified in the petition for replacement of duplicate
of title. As pointed out by CA, the reliance of petitioner to the case of Alabang Development Corporation v
Valenzuela is misplaced, because the cause of action therein is not similar in the case at bar. In Alabang case the
cause of action is based on Republic Act 26, because they are petitioning for reconstitution of original copy of
certificate of title with Register of Deeds that is lost or destroyed.
While the case at bar is not reconstitution but merely for replacement of lost duplicate certificate based
on Section 109 of PD 1529. And according to Section 109 of PD 1529 notice shall be sent to the Register of
Deeds and to those person who have or appear to have an interest in the property as shown in the
Memorandum of encumbrances. San Agustin does not appear to have an interest in the property based on the
Memorandum of encumbrances, because his claim as the heir of original owner was not annotated at the back of the
title. Thus, he is not entitled to the said notice. In addition, SC state that the publication of the petition in
newspaper of general circulation as ordered by RTC is sufficient notice to the public at large.
83 | P a g e

Facts:: Case Digests: Land Titles and Deeds Rizzalyn T. Gonzales Atty. Sirios

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Facts:: Case Digests: Land Titles and Deeds Rizzalyn T. Gonzales Atty. Sirios

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Case digests: LAND TITLES AND DEEDS

Rizzalyn T. Gonzales Atty. Sirios

CONSUELO LEGARDA, with her husband MAURO PRIETO,

Whether or not the lower court is correct in denying the petition.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the DIRECTOR OF LANDS v HONORABLE

JESUS F. IGNACIO v COURT OF APPEALS, et al

Whether or not RTC has jurisdiction over the said petition.

SALVADOR H. LAUREL v RA MON GARCIA, et al.

Whether or not the Roppongi property can be alienated.

THE DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY v RUPERTO A. VILLAREAL

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and HILARIO P. RAMA

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v CELESTINA NAGUIAT

FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ v PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY and AMARI COASTAL BAY

Whether or not the transfer of reclaimed or to be reclaimed areas is valid.

SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, et al. v

Whether or not RTC has jurisdiction over the petition.

CAMILO F. BORROMEO v ANTONIETTA O. DESCALLAR

THOMAS C. CHEESMAN v INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and ESTELITA PADILLA

ABAD SANTOS, J.:

ESTATE OF SALVADOR SERRA SERRA, et al. v HEIRS OF PRIMITIVO HERNAEZ, et al.

Whether or not Serra Serra can acquire the property.

DIRECTOR OF LANDS v SAMUEL BUYCO and EDGAR BUYCO

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

Whether or not Buyco brothers can register their lands.

JG Summit v Court of Appeals

REGISTER OF DEEDS OF RIZAL v UNG SIU SI TEMPLE

Whether or not such deed of donation be registered.

ROMAN CATHOLIC APOSTOLIC ADMINISTRATOR OF DAVAO INC. v LAND REGISTRATION

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v COURT OF APPEALS and CORAZON NAGUIT

ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF KALIBO, AKLAN, represented by BISHOP JUAN N. NILMAR v

SPOUSES ANITA AND HONORIO AGUIRRE v HEIRS OF LUCAS VILLANUEVA

SIMPLICO BINALAY, ET AL v. GUILLERMO MANALO AND CA

REPUBLIC OF THE PHIL. v CA ET AL.

Whether or not the reclamation of Pasay City and RREC is valid.

VICENTE DIVINA v CA and VILMA GAJO-SY

JUAN SEVILLA SALAS, JR. v EDEN VILLENA AGUILA

DIRECTOR OF LANDS v CA and TEODORO ABISTADO substituted by MARGARITA, MARISSA,

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v JEREMIAS and DAVID HERBIETO

DIGNA VERGEL, et al. v CA and DOROTEA TAMISIN GONZALES

SPOUSES RODOLFO YABUT LEE and LYDIA LISCANO v FLORENCIO PUNZALAN

REPUBLIC v ZENAIDA GINTO-ALDANA et al.

HEIRS OF LUIS GONZAGA v SPOUSES JOSE LEELIN and LILIA SEVILLA

WON in cases of overlapping titles, earlier certificates prevails.

PEDRO SANTIAGO v SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY

WON can still be used as evidence.

- 4,109 hectares in favor of Bureau of Lands

SPOUSES MARIANO and ERLINDA LABURADA v LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY

WON mandamus can compel LRA to issue decree of registration.

EUFEMIA VILLANUEVA VDA. DE BARROGA et al v ANGEL ALBANO et al.

Angel Albano as the successor-in-interest of Aquino must be declared to be entitled to a writ of

CASIMIRIO DEVELOPMENT CORP v RENATO MATEO

J.M. TUASON & CO. INC v CA and GUILLERMO RENOSA

On January 6, 1975, Administratrix of estate of Fortunato Halili executed Deed of Conveyance of

WON the petitioners appeal was filed out of time.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHIL. v CA and EMILIO BERNABE, SR. et al

WON the petitioners can still reopen the case.

ILDEFONSO AGREDA, et al (appellants). v SANTIAGO AGREDA (appellee)

GR No. 148180 December 19, 2001

WON action for reconveyance on the ground of fraud can progress.

FELICISIMA PINO v CA and DEMETRIA GAFFUD et al.

GR No. 94114 JUNE 19, 1991

WON the action for reconveyance of respondent is already barred by prescription.