EU Lamar
Pa
Operation EUNAVFOR MED IRIN!
Application of the concep of Savercign Imnnunity to the event of M¥ CIRKIN
1. PURPOSE
This Note aims to provide a legal analysis on the possible application of the concept of sovereign
immunity of merchant vessels pursuant to the law of the sea to the event of MV CIRKIN
(Tanzanian flag — IMO nv 7728699),
The analysis is based only on the information provided by the Turkish warships at the moment
when the event occurred. Confirmation of the above information has been requested to the
Tanzanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and East African Cooperation and to the Permanent
Delegation of Turkey to the European Union,
This Legal Note might be used for futute similar cases.
»
EVENT
10 June 2020, sailing from
MV CIRKIN, flagged in Ta
gseorted by three Turkish
HAYDARPASA (istanbul, Turkey)
warships.
The frigate SPHTSAI. naval asset: D IRINI, proceeded to several
: Co VHF exchanges the outcome
interrogations speci
were:
a) No answer was given by I
b) To the querries, a TU wa
Republic of Turkey":
e) To a second hailing the
information MV
supplies to Libya to |
Tunis after Litya,eu LIMITE
a) do net apply with respect (0 Vessel
292 - 2016, Paragraph 7)
Pe well. It is important to
cannot ignore its
The high seas off the coast of Libys
itled to sovereign immunity under international law oe eee
constraint is ineluded in the Rules of Engagement of the Ope}
, = nity
underline that the correct application of the sovereign ae u
Treeat Pamework of International Law. :
eral legat framework of Internati cectors of international
Contextualization with the get pea on
In particular. the principle of sovercign immunity is reflected in different
law:
tion an the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS - 1982);
* Art. 96 of the United Nation c ees
+ Ar. 3 of the Brussels Convention (1926) and Art. I of its Additional Brotnes! a 343i ache
ited Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States an
* Art 16 of the
Property (UNCHISTP - 2004),
Article 96 of UNCLOS lays down four conditions for a ship to be considered as covered by
sovereign immunity:
¥ Owned or operated by a State;
Y Governmental nature of the service;
Y Exclusive non-commercial nature of the serviee.
All conditions must be fulfilled in order to consider the ship under sovereign immunity.
Owned or operated by a State
Axticle 3 of the Brussels ity from jurisdiction of a foreign
State in relation to its employed exclusively at the time
when the cause of action a ial servic”.
The meaning of the term “ope ined in Article I of the Additional
ssels Convention “extends or could be
r time er voyage”.
85 well. in fact, in accordance to
The aforementioned provi
the International Law Ce is
encompasses the “poss “charter” of ships by a State,
whether the charter is for
In this matter, it is impo
Commission of 24 Febru
by US armed forces. withon
In the case of MV
of Turkey on the
written answer of the European
‘civilian merehant ships chartered
or foreign flagged vessels).
st communication MV
did not in any wayBU LIMITE,
‘The Turkish control of 5]
‘ontrol of MV CIRKIN can be supported also by the fact that the ship was sailing
escorted by. chi i
hree Turkish warships when the event occurred
d. Goveramenta) nature of the service
The G i
‘he Governmental nature of the service requirement of MY CIRKIN is endorsed by three
different aspects:
1. The two affirmations made by Turkish warships saying first that MV CIRKIN was “under
control and protection of the Republic of Turkey” and then by specifying that the “vessel was
chartered by Turkey”. The answers received by Turkish warships can be considered 8S
atimmations of the Turkish Goverment. :
2. No tefutation was given by MY CIRKIN conceming the communication of the ‘Turkish
warships.
3. MY CIRKIN was sailing escorted by three Turkish warships.
ixelusive non-commiercial nature of the service
‘The critesia of exclusivity of the governmental non-commercial service (“used only”) must be
analysed in accordance with the provisions stated in Article 3 of Brussels Convention (1926),
including through the interpretation provided in Aaticles I of the Additional Protocol (1934), and
16 of UNCJISTP (2004), In fact, the exclusis nt has to be assessed in reference to the
specific time frame (for the time b srvice and net for example to the
chartering contract,
‘The transportation of medical supplies:
COVID-19 can, if so claimed, consti
immunity. Furthermore, this immunity,
also in the Note Verbale of BU Del
2017, where the vessel Al Luffy, operated d only on government non-
commercial _service (humanitarian AVEORMED Operation
Sophia to be entitled to sovereign it mature of the service can be
deduced from the nature of the ca Convention sets out
government vessels as
for use exclusively for
ary includes, for
government_non-commercia
instance, “cargo involved in é
supplies”. In other words, the
covered by immunity and u
date: O1/07/2EFU LIMITE
seed
Tor MSC" foreign
‘as a matter of law ~ a
(ge immuni
Ii follows that —
State to be covered by sovereign immunity
‘ional law provision, In fact, it is « pare
munity of a forcign-flagzed
ant
the U.S, does not claim soverci
I vessels.
‘As a matter of policy,
voyage or MSC foreign-fagged time chartered
foreign-flagaed chartered vessel can be claimed by
Such claim would not constitute a breach of any internat
auerion of policy a Sse can test claim or not the sovercign im
veer anes fo govern on-comimerval service. Ta this regard howevss it is impor
itega answer of the Commission dated 24 February 2012 confirming the niauniy
for civilian merchant ships chartered by US armed forces.
CONCLUSION
Based on .
eastern oe aw of the sea concept of sovereign immunity could be
Se ears tem Hen event, The MV wats chartered by the Government
peace oe sek ere eae {coutro! and protection) and allegedly
aeseserlan escheat a non-commercial service (government procured
eet nad nuse tae ieee of the veracity of the claim fo soverign
Re ee ae ing, visit and search of the vessel by Op Irini assets
comsticuted a'vicisiion oti baths accompanying Turkish naval forees, would have
¢ provisions of the UNSCR, the RoE and the Law of the Sea.