STATUS Document Dolvory (Reviewing) REQUEST OATE 04/18/2018 SOURCE PATRON BORROWER HT LENDERS LOCAL. 10 AUTHOR Folowshp of Resgous Humanists TITLE Relgous humanism IMPRINT (Yellow Spungs. Oho Felowshp of Retyous Humansts 1967 ISSN 03:09 FORMAT Sora! EDITION ARTAU GANGEMI, FRANCIS A ART TITLE INDETERMINACY AND HUMAN FREEDOM voLNuM 10 DATE. 1376030 PAGES 55.00 SHIP VIAILDS TU USPS. SHIP TO nal Unwersity ALERT VERIFIED courcesEBSCO Philosophers Index max cosT 0.09 USO LEND CHG LEND RESTRICTIONS FAXNUM EMAIL [AFFILIATION COPYRIGHT SHIPPED BRWR NOTE Please do no fax or use ARIEL We use Aficle Exchange or Ema for articles: Library Rate of IOLS-TIU for returnable tems LVIS, ATLA, CATLA, CL@N, BILL NOTE PLEASE CONDITION IF CHARGES EXCEED MAXCOST, WE CANNOT PAY CHARGES UNLESS CONOITIONALIZED FIRST eu To Roting Library LL “eat International Unwersty 2005 Hat Day Re Deertiets, iL. US 60015 NEED BEFORE o505i2018, TPE copy RECEIVE DATE ocic# 1590577 DUE DATE 187255580 PATRON Lebedev, Vadim PATRONID zviebede PATRON STATUS PATRON PH +1 226-425.2502 PATRON FAX PATRON EMAIL zviebede@tu ed PATRON ADDRESS. us PICKUP PATRON NOTE LNDR NOTE. RETURN VIA RETURN TORELIGIOUS HUMANISM Volume X, No. 2 Spring, 1976 IN THIS ISSUE Liberal Religion in the Post Cheistian Era, by Edward A. Cahill... 50 ‘Transitions: Cycles ofthe Self, by William D. Johnson 53 Indeterminacy and Human Freedom, by Francis A. Gangemi...... 58 An Officer's Rditorial = cree 61 I'm OK, I'm OK . . . Who are You? by David G. Phreaner ....... 63 How Near the Humanist Bullseye? 0.00... 0 ee cose ee eee 68 Asceticism and the Environment, by Rosalie and Paul Anders... 72 Cartoon o.oo eee eee Pree ree tase Bditorially 60. o.oo eevee eee ee eee Brent) ‘The Wolf and I, Poem, by Pat King .. . 80 Communications: C, Lee Hubbell and Frank J. Seibold .. .. 8 What is the Ultimate Basis of Human Morality?by Tom T. Lewis... 87 A Communication: Religious Metaphors and the Secular Mind 92 Cartoon . . Books .INDETERMINACY AND HUMAN FREEDOM By FRANCIS A. GANGEMI In 1927, Werner Heisenberg formulated a principle which occasioned a great deal of controversy and debate. (W. Heisenberg, 2, Physik 43 (1927), p. 172.) In essence the principle states that certain pairs of the variables of motion as defined in funda- mental physics are related to each other in a peculiar way: the more accurately one member of the pair is known, the less pre- cisely is the other member specified. This principle can be shown to follow from the postulates of Quantum Mechanies, and per- haps more importantly, has been confirmed experimentally, as for example, in experi ments measuring the positions of the elec- tron. One finds that the more accurately one measures the position of the electron, the greater is the uncertainty, or lack of pre- cision in the predicted value of the velocity. (W. Heisenberg, The Physical Principles of the Quantum Theory, Chaps. 11, 111 (Unk versity of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1930.) Some have seen in this Principle of In- determinacy, as it has come to be called, some very serious implications for a deter- ministic philosophy. The challenge to deter- minism is, however, quite problematical, for the significance of the Heisenberg Principle is still debated and its meaning not unam- biguously accepted. ‘The Laplacian claim that all future events could be predicted from knowledge of the present is, of course, aban- doned in the quantum description of matter. ‘The requirements of the Heisenberg Principle and the interpretation of quantum mechanies in terms of probabilities demand this. ‘The most serious difficulty in this matter concerns the indeterminacy itself. The ques- tion resolves itself in essence to this: is the ‘uncertainty the result of indeterminacy in nature, or is it merely the admission of human ignorance? Does it mean there is an element of randomness in the sphere of atomic phenomena, or only that we have not yet been able to construct the mathematical formalism adequate for this dimension of natural phenomena? In short, is the indeter minacy in the objective world, or within the knowing subject? We propose to investigate this problem and show that the Heisenberg, Principle does not permit interpretations which would either support or deny the possibility of freedom in human behaviour. Over the years, since the Heisenberg Prin- ciple was postulated and Quantum Mechan- Jes was developed, a number of attempts have been made to resolve this question. ‘The most important of these efforts reduce to perhaps three separate categories, each of which will be briefly discussed, A small number of physicists, among whom are Einstein, Planck, and deBroglie, appear to espouse the point of view that uncertainty is to be attributed to temporary 55human ignorance, in the belief that eventu- ally as science progresses, the precise for- malism will be constructed. They believed that there are indeed detailed mechanisms which are rigidly causal, and deterministic, and will in time yield to further inquiry. Einstein wrote: "The great initial success of quantum theory cannot convert me to believe in that fundamental game of dice . . . I ‘am absolutely convinced that one will eventually arrive at a theory in which the objects connected by law are not probabilities but conceived facts.” (A. Einstein, letter quoted in M. Born, Natural Philosophy of Cause and Chance (London: Oxford University Press, 1949), p. 122) ‘This statement is, of course, not surprising to anyone at all familiar with Einstein's thought. Kinstein had many times expressed his own faith in the order and predictability of the universe. Chance, randomness, uncer- tainty, and indeterminacy in nature would be completely antithetical to Einstein's perspective. A second group of physicists espouses the view that uncertainty is not the result of present ignorance, but rather a fundamental limitation on human knowledge which per- manently prevents us from knowing specif cally and precisely the intricate mechanism of certain phenomena. This inherent limita- tion can arise from one of two sources. In some instances, the process of observation itself introduces the uncertainty. Suppose, for example, we wish to observe an isolated electron and measure its position. To do so, the observation requires that we bombard the electron with a quantum of light. This bombardment itself, however, affects the sit ation, and disturbs the measurement. In principle, it is possible to optimize the meas- urements by using photons of shorter and shorter wavelengths, Some disturbance, how. ever, is unavoidable, since there must be at least a minimal interaction in the process of measuring. (L. Schiff, Quantum Mechanics 56 (McGraw-Hill Book Company, New York, 1955), p. 10.) Others feel that the uncertainty arises not from the perturbation of the system in the measuring process but rather from the in escapable limitation in the concepts and formalism man has constructed. (Von Weizacker, The World View of Physics, p. 57.) (F. Gangemi, “Truth and Modern Sei. ence,” Religious Humanism, Vol. VU, no. 1, (1973) p. 29%.) (F. Gangemi, “A Communi cation. The Laws of Nature and Causality,’ Religious. Humanism, Vol. IX, No. 1, (1975), p. 26f.) Theoretical models of atom. ic and subatomic phenomena depend of necessity upon concepts from common sense experience. requ: these concepts are employed with derived or extended mean- ings. ‘The analogies which result do, to be sure, express or describe the phenomena to fa greater or lesser degree of accuracy. The necessity of resorting to analogy, however, emphasizes the incomplete and limited char- acter of our understanding of a given phenomena. Finallyy the third of the positions we have been able to discern is held by many physi cists, Indeterminacy is, for these physicists, not a limitation of man’s knowledge, nor the result of his having disturbed the system he was observing. Rather, indeterminacy is held to be an objective and intrinsic feature of nature itself. H. Margenau, who is numbered. among those holding this point of view, has written: “The uncertainty does not reside in the Imperfection in our measurements nor in man's ability to know; it has its cause in nature itself.” Furthermore, Margenau continues with some very interesting and illuminating re marks concerning the process of comparison called measurement, “The act of measurement is a human ingression into the state of a physical system which has the consequence of calling position into being, into actu: ality.” (H. Margenau, “Advantagesand Disadvantages of Various Interpre- tations of the Quantum Theory,” Phys- ies Today, Vol. 7 (1954), p. 6f.) The influence of the observer, according to this point of view, is not in disturbing the system. The act Of measurement rather actualizes one of the many possible potenti- alities of the system. On this view, the ob- server's activity in the process of measure. ment becomes itself part of the history of the event. Heisenberg, writing in a somewhat similar vein, states that during the act of measurement, the transition from the "pos- sible” to the “actual” takes place. (W. Heisen- berg, Physics and Philosophy (Harper and Brothers, New York, 1958; PB), p. 54.) Now, if this interpretation is correct, i determinacy becomes an ontological reality, and in no sense the result of a disturbance introduced during the act of measurement, or a conceptual limitation. Though Heisen- berg does not appear to accept the Aristote- lian principles of matter, form and privation, nor the idea of potentiality referring to the tendency of a being to develop ina particu. lar direction, he does perhaps suggest that the “probabilities” characteristics of the Quantum Mechanical description of atomic phenomena may refer to tendencies in nature that include a range of possibilities. ‘This admission of a range of possibilities suggests a merging of aspects of Aristotelian philosophy of nature and Newtonian deter- minism in a way that differs from both previous views. With respect to physical phenomena Barbour writes: “The future is not simply unknown, itis ‘not decided’: but it is not completely ‘open’, since the present determines the range of future possibilities.” (I. Bar- bour, Issues in Science and Religion (Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1966) p. 304.) Problems in logic now arise. Traditional ly, a statement is either true or false, though our knowledge of it may be uncertain. This is what Is called a two-valued logic. Reichen- bach suggests that this two-valued logic requires modification in favor of a three- valued logic in which ‘uncertain’ means ‘not decided’ and hence neither true nor false. (Reichenbach, The Rise of Scientific Philoso- phy, Chap. 11.) If indeterminacy is thus an attribute of nature, more than one alternative is open and there is some opportunity for unpre- dictability and novelty. Time involves a unique historicity and unrepeatability; the world would not repeat its course if it were restored to a former state for at each point fa different event from among the potenti alities might be actualized. Potentiality is objective and not merely subjective. ‘Thus far, we have attempted to give a brief representation of a number of interpre tations of the Heisenberg Principle of inde terminacy. From the world of the atom, where the Principle is most relevant, to the world of man and problems of human free dom is indeed a large step. Yet some scien tists and philosophers have interpreted determinism at the atomic level as excluding freedom and indeterminacy as allowing it with no logical contradictions. The problems of free will and human freedom have com manded considerable attention throughout the years. Here it will be our intention only to show that the categories and the formal: ism of physics are inadequate when applied to this aspect of human behaviour. In attempting to reduce this matter to the essential question, the discussion will be limited to whether free will is possible even if all material activity takes place according to strictly deterministic laws. Casting the question in this form appears justified since whatever the nature of free will, its effects ‘must manifest themselves through the me- dium of matter. This means, therefore, that the activity of free will is 10 be realized in and by virtue of the activity of matter. If these activities are, therefore, deterministic, how then can the will be free? It would appear that the functioning of free will i itself determined by the determinism of mat- ter, We have here, indeed, a problem. ‘An acceptable solution to this dilemma, 87at least according to some, necessitates first that we distinguish as precisely as possible the difference between determinism and free- dom with respect to human actions. What precisely is meant by saying that material activity is deterministic? A guiding principle used by the followers of Aristotelian-Thomistic philosophers isthis: “Operatio sequitur esse.” According to this concept every being acts of necessity accord- ing to its nature, and this applies boty to human and nonhuman beings. (Confer V. E. Smith, Philosophical Physics, (Harper, New York, 1950)) In nonhuman’ beings, the ac. tivity is wholly determined by the nature and circumstances of the actual situation. There is no selfdetermination in the sense that @ material being, confronted with the possibil ities ofits nature and the given circumstances of a particular situation, is able to decide upon the course to be followed. ‘There is no self-determination because there is no self- knowledge. In nonhuman beings, therefore, all activity is the result of deterministic With human beings, the situation is dif ferent. Each human person builds his own being and his own personality. This is pos. sible because of the knowledge man has of the goals and ends available to him. His free will permits him to direct and orient his life toward the goal he chooses. Free will i therefore, according to this view, the facul of self-determination based upon self knowl- edge. It is at this point that one must carefully note that misunderstandings due to termi: nology are likely. An unfortunate residue of the 19th Century approach to the problem of causality restricted the term ‘causality’ to rigidly deterministic causes only. Self-deter- mination does not deny causality but rather implies it. It would be a serious distortion of terminology, therefore, to locate human ac. tions outside the field of causality merely because the type of causality is different from the rigidly deterministic mode of causation of the 19th-Century philosophers. (Confer AG. Van Melsen, The Philosophy of Nature 58 Press, Pittsburgh, (Duquesne Universi 1961), p. 228.) Responsibility for one’s actions, far from implying that they are undetermined, re. quires that the actions be determined by one’s own motives. To say that an act is free means that there is no external com- pulsion or constraint: it does not mean there are no motives for performing the act. Free- dom is not the absence of causation: it is rather the absence of interference in carrying out one’s intentions. During the early decades of the Twentieth Century, before the Quantum Theory was well established as having a definite validity, Charles Pierce, confronted with the apparent spontaneity of the world, and the activity of the human mind, postulated small chanee variations in physical causality as a pos sible explanation. Similarly, William James felt that the idea of a real future requires what he called “looseness” or "disconnected- ness” in the universe, Bergson held that if there is change and becoming in the world, there must be essential novelty and unpre dictability. (Charles Pierce, Chance, Love, and Logie (Harcourt, Brace, New York, 1923); William James, "The Dilemma of Determinism,” The Will to Believe (Long- man’s, Green and Co., New York, 1921, Dover PB); Henri Bergson, Time and Free Will (George Allen and Unwin, London, 1950, Harper PB).) Now these ideas appear as expressions of objective indeterminacy in nature rather than subjective uncertainty in man’s knowl edge. More recently, the Heisenberg Princi- ple has been adduced in support of this point of view. The concepts of Classical Physies had always been adduced in favor of a rigid determinism. Now with the postu- lation of the Heisenberg Principle, some at any rate, try to inject indeterminacy at the most basic level of nature, and connect this basic indeterminacy with human behaviour. Eddington, for example, attempts to link the uncertainties of quantum phenomena to man's consciousness of volition. He states: “At some basic center the course of be:haviour of certain atoms or elements of the physical worldis directly determined for them by mental decision.” (Edding- ton, The Nature of the Physical World, p. 332.) On this view, the act of willing actualizes fone of the many potentialities without vio- lating the laws of physics. Further, Arthur Compton asserts that volition is not itself causally determined by physical states, and in turn, atoms that are identical insofar as the same wave function describes them, will produce differing results, “A knowledge of the initial conditions does not enable us to predict what will happen, for with the same initial condi- tions we cannot consistently produce the same effect... The matter in our brains may occur in conditions which though physically indistinguishable nevertheless corresponds to distinguish- able states of consciousness.” (Comp- ton, The Freedom of Man, pp. 37, 44.) Several questions must be raised about this association of indeterminacy with free- dom. First, do individual atoms play a significant role, or indeed any role at all in the activity of the brain? Most biological phenomena involve large numbers of atoms and for these large numbers of atoms, sta- tistical methods predict behaviour rather accurately. Furthermore, there appear to be various mechanisms which provide stability against random fluctuations in these bio- logical phenomena. For example, there ap- pears to be a certain minimum threshhold for nerve excitation which prevents the trans- mission of spurious signals (noise). (Confer, ‘A. Bachem, “Heisenberg’s Indeterminacy Principle and Life,” Philosophy of Science, Vol. 19 (1952), p. 261.) However, in some cases small variations are amplified, and these signals can, therefore, trigger large ones. It is quite possible, therefore, that Heisenberg Indeterminacy might play a role in helping understand biological activity, and that the atomic or molecular indetermi- nacy predicted by the Heisenberg Principle is significant in processes of biological growth and activity. The present state of Knowledge of biological phenomena does not permit us to rule this out. (Confer J. C. Kecles, The Neurophysiological Basis of Mind (Oxford University Press, London, 1953), pp. 2718.) Secondly, the identification of indetermi- nacy with freedom must be challenged on purely philosophical grounds. The quantum physicist interprets the particular outcome of quantum phenomena as strictly a matter of chance. ‘The electron, for example, de- seribed by its wave function exhibits a range of possible values of position and momenta as limited by the Heisenberg Principle. But this behaviour shows randomness, not free dom. It Is true that both freedom and chance result in unpredictability. It appears, how- ever, that this is the only characteristic that both possess in common. Within physics, the only alternatives are determinate cause, or indeterminate chance. The freedom we associate with human behaviour cannot be equated with either ofthese alternatives. It is reductionistic to seek the clue to hu- ‘man freedom in a property of isolated atoms —a property moreover shared by all atoms whether they occur in animate or inanimate objects. (Confer E. Schrodinger, What Is Life and Other Scientific Essays (Doubleday and Co. Ine., New York, 1956), p. 85.) On the other hand, if one introduces mind as a Aistinetive non-material cause, which has its effect in the material world of atoms and electrons and molecules, one is let into a mind-body dualism, and’ whatever has been said about the indeterminacy of the physical world is really irrelevant. From this point of view, the brain is controlled by the mind or spirit or soul and it is then the freedom and independence of this dimension, and not the physical which would have to be supported. It appears thus that neither determinism, nor the indeterminacy involved in the phe nomena of physics at the atomic level, can provide suitable models or categories for establishing human freedom. The defense of 59front the predominantly deterministic find- freedom must begin not from the properties ings of the natural sciences, of the atom, but rather from the human experience of deliberation and decision. It is only in this way that @ meaningful investi- gation into the nature of freedom can con- (Dr. Gangemi holds a chair of physics at Ohio Northern University. | EVE By LINDA R. FUNICELLO As a girl I fantasized my Eden— mown-grass paths laced with moss and squaw berries and a solitary fireplace hidden among saplings; dense pines spreading prairies, of rusty needles to a well-banked pond where some Adam would be waiting for me. Berrying with father one day I found my garden—all of it there, perfectly in place, even to the apple orchard and the split-rail fence where father and I returned, searching nearly extinct bluebi in springtime, or watching a sunset die on the hills of our mutual birthplace; I, the daughter to engender his race. (Ms Funicello is a young New York poet with roots in both country and city.