David Warren Kirsch

HIST 4433
Social and Cultural History of the Middle-East
Thursday, December 08, 2005
Term Paper

In the presidential election of 1976 the little known

governor of Georgia, James Earl Carter narrowly defeated the

incumbent President Gerald R. Ford. During the campaign, Carter

harshly criticized Ford for allowing an irresponsible foreign

policy to run by then Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, as a

one-man show. A vote for Carter, thusly, would mean a more

responsible foreign policy based upon substance rather than

style alone. By 1979, the Carter administration had shown no

style in foreign policy making and little substance. In 1979

this author was then a child, a child whose impression of the

president was a weak-willed dullard, not fit to hold the office

of the president. Gas lines, oil shortages, beef shortages, high

interest rates, high unemployment rates and inflation all would

be inextricably linked to Carter in the mind of this author. The

impression was so deep, in fact, that now as an adult I have

only voted for the Democrat presidential candidate once since

Carter's administration (that time I was sorry as well). As if

the domestic situation with Carter was not bad enough, his

foreign policy proved to be just as weak. In 1979, the United

States was being humiliated by some nation in the Middle East

called Iran. Vietnam had been described as a 4th rate power. If

1
this was indeed the case, then Iran was not even an entity that

could be mentioned in the same sentence with the term power, and

yet, American hostages were being held despite any machination

of President Carter. "What was wrong with this guy?" I asked

myself. "Why didn't the president know what was going on?" These

were the impressions of a child, and the questions raised by

those impressions.

As an adult, I have devoted myself to learning. As I have

gained more knowledge and more years I have mellowed somewhat.

However, the images of American hostages being held by a nation

run by an ancient looking man clothed in a black cloak and

wearing a black turban on his head have remained indelible in my

mind. Iran was a "black spot," in many ways, for the American

foreign policy establishment. This was true in 1979 and it is

just as true today. The Middle East has remained an unfathomable

enigma for Americans. However, it is not an enigma that we can

ignore. As the foreign policy of the United States in the post-

Cold War world has now been primarily focused on this area it is

unlikely that we will remove our influences from the Middle

East. As an adult thinker, I can confidently say that Americans

must seek to understand the nations in the Middle East in a deep

and complex manner. Yet despite all my learning and years my

childhood question remains: "What happened in Iran in 1979?"

2
 James A. Bill in his work The Eagle and the Lion: The

Tragedy of American-Iranian Relations, suggests that one of the

reasons that the situation in Iran in 1978 and 1979 never caused

alarm in Washington D.C. was the worldview of the United States

was that of the bipolar construct of the Cold War. Being

preoccupied with the machinations of the Soviet Union, the

United States never gave proper attention to Iranians as

independent actors that could motivate their own destiny.1 The

author points out that the United States has had contact with

Iran since the 1830s and since that time relations, on the part

of the U.S. have always been tinged with a slight arrogance.2

This has made relations between the two nations difficult. By

the time of the Second World War, the U.S. was involved in the

region, placing 30,000 troops within Iran. There was no clear

goal in doing this other than placating British requests for

assistance and protecting what was viewed as American interest

by keeping vigilance on Soviet maneuvers in the nation.3 By the

end of the war the United States had genuine economic interests

in Iran, as well as a real need to promote democracy.4 However,

because of America's alliance with Great Britain, it was not

1 Bill, James. 1988. The Eagle and the Lion: The Tragedy of American-Iranian
Relations. Pgs. 2-3, New Haven: Yale University Press.

2 Bill at 16.

3 Bill at 44-45.

4 Bill at 48.

3
long before the United States was viewed as an imperialist

intervener.5

The role of the United States as an imperialist intervener

is difficult for Americans to accept, but it is just as

difficult to refute. The Anglo-Iranian Oil Company in 1951 made

a profit of 200 million pounds of which Iran only received 16

million pounds as royalties.6 During this same time Muhammad

Mossadegh sought to nationalize Iran's petroleum industry.

Mossadegh had been elected to the Majlis. His political support

came from the National Front, which was made up of modern,

middle-class Iranians.7 Unfortunately for Mossadegh, his

opposition for nationalization of Iranian oil concerns came from

a recalcitrant Great Britain. The United States, at this point

stepped in to try to reach a compromise between Iran and Great

Britain.8 This position seemed to work against the U.S. because

the British did not wish to lose profits and concessions. At the

same time, many American's began to wonder if the same forces of

nationalization would work against their own economic concerns.9

By 1953, Washington, more specifically the Central Intelligence

5 Bill at 50.

6 Bill at 63.

7 Bill at 70.

8 Bill at 75.

9 Bill at 78.

4
Agency, was convinced that the only sufficient outcome in Iran

was to remove Mossadegh from power and create a more cooperative

government.10 One can point to this action as the fountainhead of

the deterioration of the relationship between the United States

and Iran. In the short term the overthrow, of Mossadegh was

viewed as a success. There would be no communist takeover in

Iran and the oil reserves would be available to the United

States and its allies.11

It was after the overthrow of Mossadegh that the United

States actively consolidated its relationship with the Shah

Mohammed Reza Pahlavi.12 The author states that the American

intervention of 1953 was not a direct causal factor of the

revolution of 1979, but the United States was discredited in the

eyes of the Iranian general population.13 In developing a

relationship with the Shah the United States had to depend on

his policies to keep the domestic situation stable. Between the

years of 1954 and 1961 the Shah embarked on a program of

domestic terror to root out all opposition. To this end the

Sazman-i Ittili'at va Amniyat-i Kishvar (SAVAK) was founded in

10 Bill at 79.

11 Bill at 94-95.

12 Bill at 95.

13 Bill at 97.

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1957.14 The Shah actively built a political base with the elites

and the middle-class of the nation.15 The Tudeh Party, the

Iranian Communist Party and the religious hierarchy were

eradicated. Mossadegh's National Front Party was monitored and

harassed. Mossadegh himself was given a three-year jail sentence

and then lived the rest of his life under house arrest.16 Many of

the Islamic clerics feel into line with the Shah's policies

during this period rather than facing arrest or execution.17

Consolidating power in this manner the Shah placed a wedge

between himself and the population of Iran.

Between 1961 and 1963 as President Kennedy was attempting

to lure the people of the globe towards Democracy and away from

Communism, it was recommended to the Shah that he reform his

regime to the end of quelling middle-class resistance that had

grown since the overthrow of Mossadegh.18 On January 9, 1963 the

"White Revolution" came into being. The program promised: land

reform, nationalization of forests, public sale of factories,

profit sharing in industry, electoral power for women and a

14 Bill at 98.

15 Bill at 98.

16 Bill at 101.

17 Bill at 101.

18 Bill at 134.

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literacy corps.19 It should be noted that this program bares a

strong resemblance to Modernization Theories put forth by

supporters in Kennedy's cabinet as blueprints for the formation

of modern, self-sustaining, democracies. Normally this would be

considered to be a general "good." However, the author points

out that the White Revolution was considered by the people of

Iran to be a "Revolution of the Shah against his people.20

The next faux pax of the United States in relation to Iran

would be the passage of the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA).

The essence of this agreement was that American military forces

as well as American diplomats would receive full- diplomatic

immunity status.21 This meant that an American in Iran could not

be tried in an Iranian court. The religious sector of Iran's

public was enraged that Americans were "above the law in Iran."22

In return for the SOFA agreement, the Shah receive a 200 million

dollar loan for military equipment. It was at this time that

Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeni began to attack the Shah for

destroying the integrity and autonomy of Iran.23 According to the

author, Khomeni was exile to Turkey one month later on November

19 Bill at 148.

20 Bill at 148.

21 Bill at 156.

22 Bill at 158.

23 Bill at 159.

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4, 1964.24 Since the exile of Khomeni the Shah ensured the enmity

of any person of religious convictions. In 1970 the SAVAK

tortured to death one of Khomeni's students, Muhammad Reza

Sa'idi.25 Sa'idi was immediately martyred and this further

marginalized the Shah's position.

In 1971 on October 11, the Shah gave a celebration for the

anniversary of 2,500 years of Persian monarchy. Persian monarchy

of that type had not been in effect for many centuries and that

the Pahlavi regime that Mohammed Reza represented had only been

stable since 1953. Nevertheless, the Shah was showing signs of

increasing megalomania and marginalizing more of his own

populace with the passing of each day.26 The hypocrisy of the

Shah was not lost on the Iranian masses. Furthermore, it was not

lost on Khomeni who was now in exile in Iraq. Khomeni remained

steadfast in his criticism of the Shah stating that the

Pahlavi's were plundering Iran. In response to this the Shah

stepped up his campaign of terror against his own people. The

reforms that had characterized the 1960's now were replaced with

outright repression on an unprecedented scale. In 1974 Ayatollah

Hussein Ghaffari was killed by the SAVAK. This was the

culmination of a two-year campaign against the Shi'i religious

24 Bill at 160.

25 Bill at 182.

26 Bill at 185.

8
establishment.27 During this campaign the government closed the

publishing houses that produced books on religion, as well as

those that focused on social problems.28 The more that the SAVAK

created martyrs and the more U.S. arms were delivered to the

Shah, the more that the personage of the Shah was equated with

the United States. This being the case, the U.S. was increasing

viewed as an accomplice to repression, torture and murder. By

1976 the Shah had just begun to se that his hard line approach

to his own nation had created problems. Young revolutionaries

were increasingly willing to risk their own lives and some had

begun to infiltrate the vaunted SAVAK.29 By this time it was too

late.

Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeni returned to Iran from exile in

Paris on February 1, 1979. The return from exile could be

attributed to the Shah fleeing the country in the previous

month. The effect of the return of Khomeni was that Iran

returned to being a nation of Shi'i fundamentalists.30 In the

United States, President Jimmy Carter had characterized his

administration by focusing on the issue of human rights.

However, this policy, it seemed, would not extended to the

27 Bill at 187.

28 Bill at 189.

29 Bill at 214.

30 Bill at 216.

9
nation of Iran. The rationale behind this is the United States

had built a close working relationship with the Shah since 1953

and those who worked within the State Department still supported

the Shah personally as the legitimate ruler of Iran. President

Carter's National Security Adviser was one of these. On the

other hand Carter's Secretary of State Cyrus Vance tried to

communicate the political reality in Iran to Brzezinski and

Carter, but to no avail.31 This being the case, Brzezinski was

able to maneuver Carter into allowing the Shah into the United

States for medical treatment.32 The reaction in Iran to the entry

of the Shah into the U.S. was incredible. On November 4, 1979

protesters stormed the U.S. Embassy in Tehran and hostages were

taken.

To answer the question: "What happened in Iran in 1979?" is

to say that the United States since the 1940's had made several

cardinal errors in analyzing the social landscape in Iran. These

errors show a lack of a long-term strategy for Iran and possibly

for the Middle East as a whole. The Fist error was taking on

Britain's interest, which allowed the U.S. to be viewed as

simply another imperial power. By allying itself closely with

the Shah, who was not as legitimate as was presented, the United

States gave license to whatever policies the Shah might produce.

31 Bill at 245.

32 Bill at 293.

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This meant the U.S. gave tacit approval to SAVAK activities, the

White Revolution and all other repressive actions that the Shah

used against his own peoples. Furthermore, the overthrow of the

National Front under Muhammad Mossadegh was, at best, a short-

term for U.S. problems. The author has pointed out clearly, that

the populace of Iran never figured into the equation. This

allowed the U.S. State Department to willingly walk blindly into

whatever opposition might arise in Iran. This is to say that if

that opposition had not come from Ruhollah Khomeni, it would

have come from someone or somewhere else because the Shah and

the U.S. as his silent partner made conditions ripe for such a

revolution.

Another childhood assumption on my part was that the

Iranian cleric who was the head of this revolution was a

backwards, barbarian, who had somehow tricked an entire nation

into what seemed, at the time, to be a backwards looking view of

the world. This too was an incorrect assumption on my part.

Author Shaul Bakhash in his work The Reign of the Ayatollahs:

Iran and the Islamic Revolution, focuses on Ayatollah Ruhollah

Khomeni as a central figure. In this way this work is at odds

with the previous work in which Khomeni is presented as a ghost-

like figure haunting the Iranian nation from afar. There can be

many reasons for a man to become the focal point of a

revolutionary movement. The rationale presented here is that

11
Khomeni was consistent. This is to say that unlike many of the

clerics who acquiesced to the Shah's actions for fear of

retaliation, Khomeni was critical of the Shah from the period

between 1962 and 1979.33 According to the author the Shah's

increasing tendency to resort to authoritarian solutions brought

Khomeni to the forefront of resistance.34

The first of these authoritarian steps was the Local

Council's Law of 1962. Like other Middle-Eastern nations Iran

does not have a homogeneous Shi'ite population. There are

various Christians, Jews, Baha'is and Zoroastrians.35 The Local

Council's Law was aimed at allowing these groups not having to

swear in by use of the Qu'ran.36 This was also an obvious attempt

to gain a wider range of peoples that could be elected. Khomeni

and others saw this law as an attempt to undermine Islam as a

central feature of life in Iran.37 What is interesting about this

is how Khomeni managed to frame the issue of protest by

including that this law was developed as a part of foreign

33Bakhash, Shaul. 1984. The Reign of the Ayatollahs: Iran and the Islamic
Revolution. Pgs. 23-24, New York: Basic Books, Inc., Publishers.

34 Bakhash at 24.

35 Bakhash at 24.

36 Bakhash at 24.

37 Bakhash at 24-25.

12
intrigue.38 He laid the blame for this law at the feet of the

Jews. While this tactic may seem, at first, to be very obvious,

it is not. By framing the issue in this manner, Khomeni, was

able to create a theme that he knew would resonate with a wide

audience. If he could reach a wider audience his revolutionary

base would become stronger. Far from being obvious this was a

cleverly conceptualized, tactical move. Furthermore, Khomeni

would not compromise on this issue. He showed a strong will and

by not compromising forced the government to abandon the law on

December 1, 1962.39 Once Khomeni learned that he could win the

game against the government by framing issues and not backing of

them he knew that he could beat the Shah. The game would now be

measured not by the word "if," but "when."

The Shah's next move would be towards reform. The most

popular platform of the Shah's "White Revolution" would be land

reform.40 Again, as before, many clerics did not criticize the

Shah. However, Khomeni remained steadfast, stating that the land

reform was a fraud. He continued to state that the Shah's

policies were not in the interest of Islam. They were the

intrigues of Jews and the United States. Khomeni would be able

to capitalize on this theme when the Status of Forces Agreement

38 Bakhash at 26.

39 Bakhash at 26.

40 Bakhash at 27.

13
was passed. Americans got Diplomatic Immunity status in exchange

for a $200 million dollar loan for arms purchases.41 Khomeni used

this as evidence of foreign machinations and that its ultimate

end was destroy Islam. This round of criticism gained widespread

attention and leaflets were distributed that recounted the

Ayatollah's remarks.42 However, this time Khomeni overplayed his

hand. He was arrested and exiled first to Turkey and then to

Iraq. While in exile, Khomeni continued to condemn the Shah

capitalizing on the imprisonment of religious figures,

university students and other elements.43 He, correctly, accused

the Shah of suppression of freedom, tortures and executions.44

Another shrewd move on Khomeni's part was, by tapping into

themes that would resonate with most marginalized Iranian

groups, he left a network of revolutionary movement in Iran that

would respond to his messages from afar. By the time that

Khomeni was exiled from Iraq and went to Paris he was able to

tap into expatriated Iranians for the same purpose and the

French media gave him even wider access to communicate with

Iranians that were increasingly hostile to the Shah. Thusly, it

did not matter whether or not Khomeni was actually present in

41 Bakhash at 34.

42 Bakhash at 34.

43 Bakhash at 35.

44 Bakhash at 35.

14
Iran. He could exert influence on those domestic matters, if not

directly control them. The more that the Shah pressed for

modernization and westernization, the more he marginalized his

own people. The more he sought repressive tactics through

intimidation or the use of the SAVAK the more power the Shah

gave to the voice and ideas of Khomeni.

Despite the power given to the idea of Khomeni, by the

Shah, revolutionary scenarios are always difficult to

consolidate and control. From the time that the Shah had quit

the country the immediate need for order was apparent. Khomeni

chose Medhi Barzagan, to be prime minister of the new government

in Iran.45 However, the revolutionary committee that had formed

since 1978 seemed to be everywhere and quite out of the reach of

anyone's control.46 This is an instance where Khomeni could only

influence, but not ultimately control. On the other hand, when

Khomeni was still in exile in Paris he stated that the Shah's

regime in Iran would stand trial. This simple statement led to

the creation of various revolutionary tribunals. These tribunals

resorted to the harshest of punishments and once the executions

began the Iranian public rejoiced in their bloodlust.47 Another

instance of the wide-ranging control of Khomeni was the

45 Bakhash at 56.

46 Bakhash at 57-58.

47 Bakhash at 59.

15
establishment of the Revolutionary Guard on May 5th of 1979.48

The creation of the guard was meant to be an attempt to control

the armed retainers of the committees.49 However, the existence

of the guard was for the revolutionary clerics to have their own

armed forces.50 This is an instance where the attempt to place

controls on a disorderly situation ended up creating more

disorder.51 One may cite the law of unintended consequences in

situations such as these. Nevertheless, one can see that the

framework of revolution that Khomeni created and supported was

very strong.

Revolutions, as a phenomenon, to be effective must remain

true to the principle upon which they are established. Any

attempt to deviate from these principles will lead to utter

destruction of the movement. It can be said that one would

rather die than to learn that one had become the antithesis of

the principle that one had stood for. This was the lesson that

the interim government of Mehdi Barzagan had failed to learn.

The framework of Khomeni's revolutions was based firmly in

freeing Iran from the intrigues of foreign powers, especially

the United States. Barzagan arranged to meet with Carter's

48 Bakhash at 63.

49 Bakhash at 63.

50 Bakhash at 63.

51 Bakhash at 63.

16
national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski to discuss a

possible rapprochement between Iran and the U.S. Also during

this time the Shah was allowed to enter the U.S. for medical

treatment. When this information about these two factors

circulated in Iran domestically Barzagan was forced to resign

and the interim government that he created collapsed.52

Of course this being the case, a new government would be

necessary. During his exile Khomeni had stated that the new Iran

would be characterized as a democratic-Islamic republic. By the

time of the creation of the Assembly of Experts, Khomeni had

rejected this earlier notion. Khomeni took the very fomenting of

the revolution as a type of popular referendum that the Iranian

people, as a whole, wished to have an Islamic-republic. To this

end, the Assembly was instructed that the new constitution for

the government of Iran must be 100 percent Islamic in nature.53

Thusly, the Assembly created a structure of government that set

clerical power over that of the state and made Islamic

jurisprudence the basis for the legal system.54 The president of

the republic was given power, but it was clear that the

interests of the Ulama were to be given primacy.

52 Bakhash at 70.

53 Bakhash at 81.

54 Bakhash at 83.

17
 The first president of the republic was Abol-Hasan Bani-

Sadr. Bani-Sadr entered office under the mistaken assumption

that he could rescue the revolution from: "a bunch of fascist

clerics)."55 In short, he wanted to assert centralized control of

Iran by reforming the army and reconstituting the police forces.

Furthermore, Bani-Sadr was determined to make Iran a truly

independent state by cutting its dependent ties to the United

States.56 Unlike his predecessor, Barzagan, Bani-Sadr was

initially able to overcome his opponents. Bani-Sadr, with the

full approval of Khomeni and other clerical groups, was able to

create a centralized state from the remnants of the revolution.

Of course, this type of centralization caused purges of

government, if not from society as a whole, of those persons who

had allied themselves with the former regime and "agents of the

East and the West."57 It is also important to note that in a

revolution the revolutionaries also seem to "eat their own."

During these purges, the new government also targeted the

revolutionary groups of the Fedayan and the Mojahedin-e Khalq.58

This type of centralization of the new state put the Hostage

55 Bakhash at 97.

56 Bakhash at 98.

57 Bakhash at 113.

58 Bakhash at 113.

18
Crisis at the center of Iranian politics.59 The purges and

further elimination of political opponents continued even after

Bani-Sadr left the country in 1981 to form a counter-government

in exile. The consequences of this were that the revolutionary

movements of the Fedayan and the Mojahedin-e Khalq were

decimated, but not eradicated. As guerilla rebellions against

Khomeni's government, these movements failed because the

Republican Guard was able to hold the nation together.60

According to the author, the two years of revolutionary struggle

reinforced the extremists in the ruling party, made the use of

terror as a legitimate tool of government and ultimately

consolidated the Islamic government and entrenched it within the

nation.

One can see that Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeni was far from

being a political dullard. He understood how to manipulate and

motivate marginalized sectors of Iranian society. He also

apparently, understood the complexities of framing issues that

he knew would resonate within these marginalized sectors. In

doing so, he did not have to be within the country to influence

the domestic situation in Iran. Furthermore, he did not have to

"plead his case" to the Iranian people. The more the Shah

implemented draconian measures against his own people, the more

59 Bakhash at 114.

60 Bakhash at 222.

19
power Khomeni was awarded. Upon this personal power Khomeni was

able to create a new Iran in his own image. Often history is

related as the work of impersonal forces upon people. In the

case of Khomeni it is the opposite. He proves that personalities

do matter in struggles that have historical significance.

The literature thus far has concentrated upon political or

personal elements that led to the Iranian Revolution of 1979.

The next two works focus more upon placing the revolution into a

sociological rather than a historical context. In Said Amir

Arjomand's work The Turban for the Crown: The Islamic Revolution

in Iran, the revolution is examined within a Weberian scheme

focusing on state authority, modes of conflict and causal

factors rooted in history rather than sociological notions.

In speaking of revolutions in a broad manner, Arjomand

proposes that the Iranian Revolution of 1979 was unique in that

it drew it base of support from the indigenous religion. The

author points out that this was different from revolutions in

Europe such as the Nazi movement or the Communist revolutions,

which focused on eradicating religion to build a new structure

for the state. In short, the co-option of revolution by religion

made the situation in Iran unique.

By using an explanatory model based in the historical-

sociological thought of Max Weber, the author shows that the

conflictual basis for revolution was deeply rooted in the

20
history of Iran going back to the Safavids and the Qajars.

During this period, the forces of tribalism kept the state from

reaching a critical mass for centralization.61 The struggle

between tribal forces and state centralization were transformed

in the 20th Century when the element of constitutional monarchy

was added to this matrix of conflict. According to the author,

the first signs of a strong, modern, Iranian state appears with

the constitutional revolution of 1906-1911.62 The instruments of

social reform from the beginning of the 20th Century to 1906

were secret societies (anjomanha-ye melli).63 The year 1905 was

turbulent with demonstrations against government misdeeds and

bread riots. When various groups sought sanctuary in Abd al-Azim

and demanded the creation of a governmental house of justice the

Majlis was created.64 The creation of the Majlis added an element

of conflict with the notion of a fully centralized Iranian

government, but after the passage of the Fundamental Law of 1906

there was no further need for secret societies.65 From the period

of 1906 to 1911 the primary obstacle to a centralized government

for Iran came from ill-managed economic policies and Russian

61Arjomand, Said. 1988. The Turban for the Crown: The Islamic Revolution in
Iran. Pg. 16, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

62 Arjomand at 35.

63 Arjomand at 36.

64 Arjomand at 36.

65 Arjomand at 38.

21
Imperial ambitions coupled with British non-intervention on

Russian designs.66

A turning point for the nation of Iran came in 1925 when

Reza Khan became Shah. Reza Khan had gained social mobility

rising through the military ranks. He adeptly used the issue of

military reform to gain further power.67 He consolidated his

support from the constitutional elites and the younger

politicians who based their programs on reform and joined

radical parties.68 Once Reza Shah's power was consolidated his

proceeded with a program destined to eradicate tribal power in

Iran.69 Between the years of 1922 and 1925 the Shahsevan, the

Bakhtiyari, the Kurds, the Lors, the Boyr Ahmad and the Turkmen

were all subdued during this period.70 Once these tribal forces

were placed in check, Reza Shah instituted a program of

westernization.71 Between the years of 1926 and 1940, in an

effort to further reduce tribal and religious power, Reza Shah

reformed the judiciary system. The entire system was secular.72

66 Arjomand at 46.

67 Arjomand at 62.

68 Arjomand at 62.

69 Arjomand at 63.

70 Arjomand at 63.

71 Arjomand at 64.

72 Arjomand at 66.

22
 In order to facilitate further centralization of power

under his command Reza Shah between the years of 1923 and 1938

built 14,000 miles of roads, making a new infrastructure in

Iran.73 This allowed the Shah to move troops with increasing

speed to areas in which he felt their presence was necessary.

Under these reforms education was given a lower priority than

military matters or matters concerning infrastructure, but

education was important in the creation of a new middle-class

that could counter-weight religious or tribal forces. In 1935

Reza Shah made a bold move in declaring that women in the nation

would be unveiled. This showed a confidence that the new Pahlavi

regime could withstand opposition from the more traditionally

based areas of authority.74 These programs of modernization

altered the social structure of Ira, as a whole, and thus

weakened competing power structures such as tribalism and

religious hierarchy.75

Reza Shah was removed from power in September of 1941 due

to allied concerns about his pro-German sympathies. At this same

moment in time his son Mohammed Reza Pahlavi became the Shah of

Iran. From the period between 1944 and 1961 the nationalization

73 Arjomand at 67.

74 Arjomand at 68.

75 Arjomand at 69.

23
of oil became the primary issue in Iranian politics.76 The author

is quite correct in pointing to this fact. However, the author

betrays a weakness in his argument in treating Mossadegh's

National Front as a mere interlude between period characterized

by a high degree of centralization.77 During this period the

power of the Majlis contended directly with the power of the

Shah. Thus there is another seed of revolution that was quelled

not by the centralized government but by foreign forces

bolstering the legitimacy of the Shah's government.

Arjomand states, the "White Revolution constituted more

social change with expanding urbanization and expansion of

higher education.78 The effect of the "White Revolution" was to

further marginalize the religious sector of the society. At this

point, those forces could either withdraw from the political

scene or attempt to subjugate political power.79 Furthermore,

Khomeni and other Shi'ite jurists saw an opportunity, at this

juncture, to lead a crusade against foreign domination and

reassert religious power for purposes of survival in the face of

a continuously modernizing state.80

76 Arjomand at 71.

77 Arjomand at 71-72.

78 Arjomand at 74.

79 Arjomand at 75.

80 Arjomand at 76.

24
 The land reforms embedded within the "White Revolution"

weakened the Shi'ite religious community.81 By the 1970's many of

the traditional bond that linked the Ulama to the power of the

nation had been eliminated.82 The complete opposition of the

Shah's government to traditional religious and societal

structures and ideologies gave the Ulama and other marginalized

groups cohesiveness out of the necessity of independence.83

In accordance with Weberian notions of authority and the

legal-rational character of modern states, Ayatollah Ruhollah

Khomeni posses possessed charismatic authority that enabled him

to act in the name of the revolution.84 Khomeni, through his

personal characteristics, could shape or frame issues. In short,

this meant that the revolution would mirror the traits that he

seemed to embody. The hallmark of Khomeni's power was Islamic

traditionalism and thusly, the Islamic revolution would result

in the establishment of an Islamic government. In this manner,

the political notion of revolution itself was co-opted by

Islamic fundamentalism.85

81 Arjomand at 83.

82 Arjomand at 83.

83 Arjomand at 83.

84 Arjomand at 100.

85 Arjomand at 105.

25
 The author laments at the inability of the middle-class

after twenty-five years of modernization and reform to see its

collective interest in claiming the new state. It is important

to note that this lament is a shortcoming of most sociologists.

The ability to understand real class-identity and create a

class-structure that can wield real power is rare and thus, it

is not surprising that it did not manifest itself in this

situation. Rather, this middle-class chose Khomeni's message

because it promised them their traditional identities that was

rooted in their religious background.86

The author comes to the conclusion that the Shah had spent

too much of his political capital in making the Iranian state a

mirror of himself. This, in addition to the programs of

urbanization and modernization had created conditions of Anomie

after the economic downturn of 1974 and 1975. This was the

beginning of the paralysis of the state. Even the army, which

was up to the time of the revolution a cohesive force, could not

act in the absence of the Shah. He had become an integral part

of the power structure of the state. When he left the nation

there was no direction for the remaining structures of power to

follow.87

86 Arjomand at 112-113.

87 Arjomand at 124.

26
 In shaping the revolution, Khomeni liked it inextricably

with Shi'ite fundamentalism. However, Arjomand points out that

the state that he received was a state transformed by years of

modernization and westernization.88 As such, this rationalized

state could not function under traditional Shi'ite concepts of

jurisprudence as conceived from the 7th Century to the 19th

Century. Thus Khomeni had to create a legal adaptation to make

Shi'ite jurisprudence fit the character of the nation as it

stood in the 20th Century.89 The author points out that Khomeni

is not the only revolutionary figure that has had to bow to such

realist goals, but in doing so he did successfully transform the

idea of how revolutions could be conceptualized.

In Charles Kurzman's work The Unthinkable Revolution in

Iran, the author uses the political-sociological work of Theda

Skocpol as a framework for understanding the Iranian Revolution

of 1979. It was James Bill's contention, earlier in this work,

that one the reasons that the United States could not predict or

detect the strength of the revolutionary forces in Iran, was

that the United States viewed geopolitical conditions in the

bipolar construct of the Cold War. Thusly, the United States

never gave enough credit to Iranians to shape their own destiny.

Strangely enough, Kurzman points out in this work that many

88 Arjomand at 184.

89 Arjomand at 185.

27
Iranian expatriates did not give themselves the ability to shape

their own destiny either.90 This estimation, of course, runs

counter to the ideas and myths perpetuated characterizing the

motivational causes of the Iranian Revolution of 1979.The

revolution has often been characterized as highly motivated from

the religious sectors of Iranian society over a twenty-year

period. This political explanation contains certain anomalies

that this author brings to light. This is also true of

organizational, cultural, economic and military explanations.

The point that Kurzman attempts is to determine the viability of

the revolution. This is to ask: "Did the revolution have a

realistic chance for success?" the obvious answer is tersely

stated: "Yes." Once a road is paved, automobiles will naturally

follow. Traffic is a fait accompli. However, looking at certain

evidence that the author brings to light the viability of the

Iranian revolution of 1979 was in question at least until 1977

or 1978.

The emergence of protest within Iran began at the end of

1977.91 In his research, the author does not find any written

proof of mobilization in the way of an order from Khomeni.92 The

90Kurzman, Charles. 2004. The Unthinkable Revolution in Iran.Pg. 13,

Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

91 Kurzman at 24.

92 Kurzman at 24.

28
author also notes that when mobilization of protests did occur

they coincided with the death of the Ayatollah's oldest son,

Mostafa. This occurred on October 24, 1977.93 Many of the

sources, including the ones used in this work have bestowed a

position of legitimacy upon Khomeni as "the face of the

religious revolution." However, Kurzman points out that many

within the religious community felt threatened or insulted by

Khomeni when he was given the title of Imam.94 Thusly, Khomeni

did not have automatic control of the mosque network in Iran, as

some of the literature presented has proposed.95 It is true that

the mosque network was the infrastructure necessary to provide

for collective action.96 However, the even the mosques were not

viewed as completely safe havens for oppositionists.97

Nevertheless, repression was not the only problem for Islamic

radicals. Part of the problem was their ability, or in some

cases inability to cultivate support from the senor religious

scholars, some of whom were willing to work with the Shah's

government in hopes of developing religious education.98 In

93 Kurzman at 25.

94 Kurzman at 28.

95 Kurzman at 38.

96 Kurzman at 38.

97 Kurzman at 39.

98 Kurzman at 42.

29
short, those who were radical Islamicists, were not able to

simply co-opt the mosque network for the purpose of a base of

power for their revolution.99 The network had to be convinced.

This was done in three ways. The first was to publicly challenge

senior scholars and embarrass them into a revolutionary

position.100 The second method was for revolutionaries to expose

themselves to state repression in hopes of gaining sympathy and

radicalizing people of moderate views.101 The third way was to

threaten moderate religious scholars by reminding them that

acquiescence to the Shah's policies would not make them

popular.102 According to the author, the cultivation of the

mosque network is a demarcation between proto-mobilization and

true mobilization. It was by no means an automatic presumption.

It is sometimes easy to appeal to cultural explanations to

show causality of an event. For example, Shi'ite Islam has been

frequently represented as a religion of protest naturally given

to revolution.103 The author points to the anomaly of the

Fortieth day mourning ceremonies to show the flaw in this

explanation. The author states that it may seem like mourning

99 Kurzman at 44.

100 Kurzman at 44.

101 Kurzman at 45.

102 Kurzman at 47.

103 Kurzman at 53.

30
rituals in Iran were always a political act.104 However, the

fortieth day practice had only been in practice since 1963.105

Furthermore, moral entrepreneurs had introduced the practice as

a political exercise.106 Historically the practice was used as an

event for families and friends.107 This could hardly be

classified as a deeply entrenched political practice. It

underwent further transformation after the death of Mostafa

Khomeni.108 This was not the only cultural practice to undergo an

artificial transformation. The month of Ramadan was altered. The

rationale behind this is that the revolution was losing steam in

the summer of 1978.109 The revolutionary Islamicists needed an

event to trigger more protests.110 The event occurred when a

movie theater caught fire in Abadan.111 The doors to the theater

were locked from the outside and the fire department was slow to

respond. Many people blamed the government.112 Nevertheless,

there was not an increase in mosque attendance during this

104 Kurzman at 55.

105 Kurzman at 54.

106 Kurzman at 54.

107 Kurzman at 54.

108 Kurzman at 55.

109 Kurzman at 58.

110 Kurzman at 61.

111 Kurzman at 62.

112 Kurzman at 62.

31
period.113 Furthermore, even at this seemingly late date there

were those that were suspicious of Khomeni's motives when he

called for the formation of an Islamic Republic that had as it

most notable feature a single religious scholar who had ultimate

governmental responsibility.114 According to the author, it

wasn't until Khomeni received the title of Imam that a shift had

been indicated.115

There has also been a tendency for the literature to focus

upon martyrdom as a feature of Shi'ite Islam. This is something

of a deception. Kurzman indicates that Muslims have no monopoly

on the practice. Furthermore, quantitative evidence point to

only 744 martyrs were indicated in Tehran.116 This is a

relatively low number. Also, martyrdom did not match actual

behaviors during the revolution.117 What can be gleaned here is

that the traditional explanations based up Iranian culture and

Shi'ite practices may not be as valid as proposed when

concerning the Revolution of 1979.

113 Kurzman at 68.

114 Kurzman at 65-66.

115 Kurzman at 66.

116 Kurzman at 71.

117 Kurzman at 71.

32
 The economic explanations are based within the Shah's

"White Revolution." The "White Revolution" has been presented as

a type of putsch aimed at the rural dwellers in Iran. Land

reform was the main platform of this program. The typical

economic explanation for revolution has been: "if the nation is

facing economic crisis then it is ripe for revolution." The

author challenges this notion as well, by pointing out that the

land reform did show progress over a period of time when royal

lands were distributed to the peasants of Iran.118 However, the

benefits were not enough. The Shah himself had been questioned

on this matter. He stated clearly: "I want these villages to

disappear. We can buy food cheaper than they can produce it. I

need the people from the villages in our industrial labor

force."119 Iran had been no worse off in the 1970's than any of

their immediate neighbors. What had changed was the emergence of

the protest movement that focused on the economic downturn as

another failing of the government.120

In the previous work, The Turban for the Crown, the author

Said Amir Arjomand proposed that the military complex of Iran

was completely intact by the time that the revolution was

imminent. However, the military could not act because the Shah

118 Kurzman at 81.

119 Kurzman at 82.

120 Kurzman at 104.

33
had fled the country and because he was such an integral part of

the state, whatever structures remained was paralyzed. Kurzman

utterly refutes this idea. In January of 1979, as the Shah was

about to leave the nation, military desertions were relatively

low.121 Normally, the lack of desertions would seem to indicate

that the military was in tact. However, authorized leaves

increased significantly as military personnel requested

furloughs, or early retirement to look after their families

during this tumultuous period.122 Kurzman states that the

military was only at fifty-five percent of their total strength

at this time.123 Thus the military was indeed in danger of

disintegration.124

In explaining the typical myths of the Iranian Revolution

of 1979 away, the author turns to what he considers to be the

real question at hand: "At what point was this revolution

viable?" Kurzman states that the revolution only became viable

in 1977 or 1978.125 He defines viability as a movement that has a

realistic chance of success.126 Viability came to the revolution,

121 Kurzman at 114.

122 Kurzman at 115.

123 Kurzman at 115.

124 Kurzman at 115.

125 Kurzman at 136.

126 Kurzman at 136.

34
to those outside of its inner-circles, as Iranians realized

that: "things were not the same anymore."127 By the fall of 1978

there were not many left who were willing to give voice to any

opposition to the revolution.128 The author points to a

significant body of sociological literature on collective

behavior to come to the conclusion that by 1978 many people

joined the revolution because others were doing it as well.129

This is horribly anticlimactic. Ultimately, the author sees a

flaw in the Pahlavi regime in that it lacked a solidarity that

resonated with the general populace of Iran.130

In conclusion, this body of literature has answered some of

my childhood questions. Firstly, President Carter does not come

out as more impressive, or more in control of the situations,

than he did when I was a child. If anything the criticism of

President Carter as a man who attempted a synthesis between the

viewpoints of his Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and his

National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski and failed

miserably, was confirmed in these readings. The other question

was: "Who was the Ayatollah Khomeni?" Was he some backwards

demagogue seeking his own aggrandizement? The literature in this

127 Kurzman at 137.

128 Kurzman at 137.

129 Kurzman at 134.

130 Kurzman at 139.

35
case proved that he was, by no means, backward. Rather, he was a

completely adept politician who understood opportunities when

they presented themselves and took them as they came.

36