Rodelas v.

Aranza
119 SCRA 16
FACTS:

Rodelas filed a petition with the CFI of Rizal for the probate of the holographic will of
Ricardo B. Bonilla and the issuance of letters testamentary in her favor.
Aranza, et al. filed a MTD on the grounds of:

1.Rodelas was estopped from claiming that the deceased left a will by failing to produce
the will within twenty days of the death of the testator as required by Rule 75, section 2
of the Rules of Court;

2.The copy of the alleged holographic will did not contain a disposition of property after
death and was not intended to take effect after death, and therefore it was not a will, it
was merely an instruction as to the management and improvement of the schools and
colleges founded by the decedent;

3. The holographic will itself, and not an alleged copy thereof, must be produced,
otherwise it would produce no effect because lost or destroyed holographic wills cannot
be proved by secondary evidence unlike ordinary wills.

4. The deceased did not leave any will, holographic or otherwise, executed and attested
as required by law.

MTD was denied. Aranza et al. filed an MR, Rodelas filed an opposition.

The CFI set aside its order and dismissed the petition for the probate of the will stating
that “in the case of Gam vs. Yap, 104 Phil. 509, 522, the Supreme Court held that ‘in the
matter of holographic wills the law, it is reasonable to suppose, regards the document
itself as the material proof of authenticity of said wills.”

And that the alleged holographic will was executed on January 25, 1962 while Ricardo
B. Bonilla died on May 13, 1976. The lapse of more than 14 years from the time of the
execution of the will to the death of the decedent and the fact that the original of the will
could not be located shows to that the decedent had discarded the alleged holographic
will before his death.

Rodelas filed an MR which was denied. Rodelas appealed to the CA. Aranza et al.
moved to forward the case to the SC as it involves a question of law not of fact.

ISSUE:

W/N a holographic will which was lost or cannot be found can be proved by means of a
photostatic copy.
HELD:

General Rule: If the holographic will has been lost or destroyed and no other copy is
available, the will cannot be probated because the best and only evidence is the
handwriting of the testator in said will. It is necessary that there be a comparison
between sample handwritten statements of the testator and the handwritten will.

Exception: But, a photostatic copy or xerox copy of the holographic will may be allowed
because comparison can be made by the probate court with the standard writings of the
testator. The probate court would be able to determine the authenticity of the
handwriting of the testator.

In the case of Gam vs. Yap, 104 PHIL. 509, the Court ruled that “the execution and the
contents of a lost or destroyed holographic will may not be proved by the bare testimony
of witnesses who have seen and/or read such will. The will itself must be presented;
otherwise, it shall produce no effect. The law regards the document itself as material
proof of authenticity.” But, in Footnote 8 of said decision, it says that “Perhaps it may be
proved by a photographic or photostatic copy. Even a mimeographed or carbon copy; or
by other similar means, if any, whereby the authenticity of the handwriting of the
deceased may be exhibited and tested before the probate court,”

Ajero v. CA
236 SCRA 488
FACTS:

The holographic will of Annie Sand was submitted for probate.

Private respondent opposed the petition on the grounds that:

1. Neither the testament’s body nor the signature therein was in decedent’s
handwriting;

2. It contained alterations and corrections which were not duly signed by

decedent; and

3. The will was procured by petitioners through improper pressure and undue
influence.

The petition was also contested by Dr. Ajero with respect to the disposition in the will of
a house and lot. He claimed that said property could not be conveyed by decedent in its
entirety, as she was not its sole owner.
However, the trial court still admitted the decedent’s holographic will to probate.
The trial court held that since it must decide only the question of the identity of the will,
its due execution and the testamentary capacity of the testatrix, it finds no reason for the
disallowance of the will for its failure to comply with the formalities prescribed by law nor
for lack of testamentary capacity of the testatrix.

On appeal, the CA reversed said Decision holding that the decedent did not comply with
Articles 813 and 814 of the NCC. It found that certain dispositions in the will were either
unsigned or undated, or signed by not dated. It also found that the erasures, alterations
and cancellations made had not been authenticated by decedent.

ISSUE:

Whether the CA erred in holding that holographic will should not be admitted to probate.

HELD:

YES. A reading of Article 813 shows that its requirement affects the validity of the
dispositions contained in the holographic will, but not its probate. If the testator fails to
sign and date some of the dispositions, the result is that these dispositions cannot be
effectuated. Such failure, however, does not render the whole testament void.
Likewise, a holographic will can still be admitted to probate notwithstanding non-
compliance with the provisions of Article 814.

Unless the authenticated alterations, cancellations or insertions were made on the date
of the holographic will or on testator’s signature, their presence does not invalidate the
will itself. The lack of authentication will only result in disallowance of such changes.

It is also proper to note that the requirements of authentication of changes and signing
and dating of dispositions appear in provisions (Article 813 and 814) separate from that
which provides for the necessary conditions for the validity of the holographic will
(Article 810).

This separation and distinction adds support to the interpretation that only the
requirements of Article 810 of the NCC – and not those found in Articles 813 and 814 –
are essential to the probate of a holographic will.

Section 9, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court and Article 839 of the Civil Code enumerate the
grounds for disallowance of wills. These lists are exclusive; no other grounds can serve
to disallow a will.

In a petition to admit a holographic will, the only issues to be resolved are:

1. Whether the instrument submitted is, indeed, the decedent’s last will and testament;

2. Whether said will was executed in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law;
3. Whether the decedent had the necessary testamentary capacity at the time the will
was executed; and

4. Whether the execution of the will and its signing were the voluntary acts of the
decedent.

The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door
against bad faith and fraud; accordingly, laws on this subject should be interpreted to
attain these primordial ends.

In the case of holographic wills, what assures authenticity is the requirement that they
be totally autographic or handwritten by the testator himself. Failure to strictly observe
other formalities will not result in the disallowance of a holographic will that is
unquestionable handwritten by the testator.

As a general rule, courts in probate proceedings are limited to pass only upon the
extrinsic validity of the will sought to be probated. However, in exceptional instances,
courts are not powerless to do what the situation constrains them to do, and pass upon
certain provisions of the will.

Nepomuceno v. CA Digests

Facts:
1. Martin Hugo died on 1974 and he left a will wherein he instituted Sofia Nepomuceno as the sole
and only executor. It was also provided therein that he was married to Rufina Gomez with whom he
had 3 children.

2. Petitioner (Sofia) filed for the probate of the will but the legal wife and her children opposed
alleging that the will was procured through improper and undue influence and that there was an
admission of concubinage with the petitioner.

3. The lower court denied the probate on the ground of the testator's admission of cohabitation,
hence making the will invalid on its face. The Court of Appeals reversed and held that the will is valid
except the devise in favor of the petitioner which is null and void in violation of Art. 739 and 1028.

Issue: Whether or not the court can pass on the intrinsic validity of a will

RULING: Yes, as an exception. But the general rule is that the court's area of inquiry is limited to the
an examination and resolution of the extrinsic validity of the will. This general rule is however not
inflexible and absolute. Given exceptional circumstances, the probate court is not powerless to do
what the situation constrains it to do and may pass upon certain provisions of the will. The will itself
admitted on its face the relationship between the testator and the petitioner
Cayetano v. Leonidas,

G.R. No. L-54919,

[GUTIERREZ, JR., J.]
FACTS
The testatrix was an American citizen at the time of her death and was a permanent resident of
Pennsylvania, U.S.A.; that the testatrix died in Manila while temporarily residing with her sister; that during
her lifetime, the testatrix made her last will and testament according to the laws of Pennsylvania, U.S.A.;
that after the testatrix death, her last will and testament was presented, probated, allowed, and registered
with the Registry of Wills at the County of Philadelphia, U.S.A. An opposition to the reprobate of the will
was filed by herein petitioner alleging among other things that the intrinsic provisions of the will are null
and void. The petitioner maintains that since the respondent judge allowed the reprobate of Adoracion’s
will, Hermogenes C. Campos was divested of his legitime which was reserved by the law for him.

ISSUES
[1]Whether or not the Philippine law will apply to determine the intrinsic validity of a will executed by an
undisputed foreigner.

[2] Whether or not Philippine law will apply to determine the capacity to succeed of Adoracion’s heirs.

RULING
[1] NO. It is a settled rule that as regards the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will, as provided for
by Article 16(2) and 1039 of the Civil Code, the national law of the decedent must apply. This was
squarely applied in the case of Bellis v. Bellis (20 SCRA 358).“It is therefore evident that whatever public
policy or good customs may be involved in our system of legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend
the same to the succession of foreign nationals. For it has specifically chosen to leave, inter alia, the
amount of successional rights, to the decedent’s national law. Specific provisions must prevail over
general ones.”

[2] NO. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the decedent. (Article 1039, Civil
Code) The law which governs Adoracion Campo’s will is the law of Pennsylvania, U.S.A., which is the
national law of the decedent. Although the parties admit that the Pennsylvania law does not provide for
legitimes and that all the estate may be given away by the testatrix to a complete stranger, the petitioner
argues that such law should not apply because it would be contrary to the sound and established public
policy and would run counter to the specific provisions of Philippine Law.

Vda de Molo vs Molo

Bautista Angelo, J. (Ponente)
Doctrine of Dependent Relative Revocation

Facts:
1. Marcos Molo executed 2 wills, one in August 1918 and another in June 1939. The latter will
contained a revocation clause which expressly revoked the will in 1918. He died without any forced
heirs but he was survived by his wife, herein petitioner Juana. The oppositors to the probate were
his nephews and nieces.

2. Only a carbon copy of the second will was found. The widow filed a petition for the probate of the
1939 will. It was admitted to probate but subsequently set aside on ground that the petitioner failed
to prove its due execution. 

3. As a result, the petitioner filed another petition for the probate of the 1918 will this time. Again the
oppositors alleged that said will had already been revoked under the 1939 will. They contended that
despite the disallowance of the 1939 will, the revocation clause is valid and thus effectively nullified
the 1918 will

Issue: Whether or not the 1918 will can still be valid despite the revocation in the subsequent
disallowed 1939 will

RULING: Yes.The court applied the doctrine laid down in Samson v. Naval that a subsequent
will,containing a clause revoking a previous will, having been disallowed for the reason that it was
not executed in accordance with law cannot produce the effect of annulling the previous will,
inasmuch as the said revocatory clause is void.

There was no valid revocation in this case. No evidence was shown that the testator deliberately
destroyed the original 1918 will because of his knowledge of the revocatory clause contained in the
will executed in 1939.The earlier will can still be probated under the principle of dependent
relative revocation.The doctrine applies when a testator cancels or destroys a will or
executes an instrument intended to revoke a will with the intention to make a new
testamentary disposition as substitute for the old, and the new disposition fails of effect for
some reason.

HEIRS OF LATE JESUS FRAN v. SALAS

FACTS:
Remedios Vda. De Tiosejo died with neither descendants nor ascendants. She left real
and personal properties which she bequeathed to her collateral relatives, and
designated Rosario Tan or upon the latter’s death, Jesus Fran, as executor. Jesus filed
a petition for the probate of Remedios’ last will and testament. The petition alleged that
Rosario Tan was not physically well, the court then appointed Jesus as special
administrator. Private respondents filed a manisfestation alleging that they needed time
to study the petition. However, private respondents did not file any petition, instead they
filed a withdrawal of opposition stating that they have no objection to the will. After the
hearing the probate court rendered decision admitting to probate the will and appointed
Jesus as executor. Subsequently a Project of Partition was submitted, after the hearing
on the project the court ordered the administrator to deliver to said parties their
respective share and decreed the proceedings closed. Then the CFI of Cebu Branch 8
was converted to a Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court. Branch 17 of Danao
presided over the case.
Private respondents then filed with the new Branch 8 an Omnibus Motion for
Reconsideration of the probate judgment and asked the court to declare the
proceedings still open and admit their opposition. Petitioners objected to the motion but
respondent Judge Salas issued an Order setting for hearing the said Omnibus Motion.
Petitioners claim that respondents are in estoppel to question the will because of their
withdrawal and that private respondents Maria Gandiongco, signed the Project of
Partition, and Concepcion Epsia submitted a certification stating that she received the
notice of hearing therefore and has no objection to its approval. The probate judgment
had long become final and had in fact been executed.
Private respondent on the other hand claim that that they were not furnished with a copy
of the will, and that they were not notified of any resolution or order closing the
proceedings. Hence, they were deprived of the opportunity to examine the will as
petitioner Jesus did not attach it to the petition, what was attached was only the English
translation of the will.

ISSUE:
Whether or not it is necessary that the original copy of the will be presented for the court
to acquire jurisdiction for the allowance of the will.

HELD:
The Court ruled that it is not necessary that the original of the will be attached to the
petition. The annexing of the original will to the petition is not a jurisdictional requirement
as stated in Rule 76 of the ROC which allows the filing of a petition for probate by the
person named therein regardless of whether or not he is in possession of the will, or the
same is destroyed. It is not likewise disputed that the original of the will was submitted
in evidence and marked as Exhibit "F". It forms part of the records of the special
proceedings — a fact which private respondents admit in their Omnibus Motion for
Reconsideration. Assuming for the sake of argument that private respondents did not
receive a formal notice of the decision as they claim in their Omnibus Motion for
Reconsideration, these acts nevertheless constitute indubitable proof of their prior
actual knowledge of the same. A formal notice would have been an idle ceremony. In
testate proceedings, a decision logically precedes the project of partition, which is
normally an implementation of the will and is among the last operative acts to terminate
the proceedings. If private respondents did not have actual knowledge of the decision,
they should have desisted from performing the above acts and instead demanded from
petitioner Fran the fulfillment of his alleged promise to show them the will. The same
conclusion refutes and defeats the plea that they were not notified of the order
authorizing the Clerk of Court to receive the evidence and that the Clerk of Court did not
notify them of the date of the reception of evidence. Besides, such plea must fail
because private respondents were present when the court dictated the said order. The
probate judgment of 13 November 1972, long final and undisturbed by any attempt to
unsettle it, had inevitably passed beyond the reach of the court below to annul or set the
same aside, by mere motion, on the ground that the will is a forgery. Settled is the rule
that the decree of probate is conclusive with respect to the due execution of the will and
it cannot be impugned on any of the grounds authorized by law, except that of fraud, in
any separate or independent action or proceeding.
Remedies:
1.

Caneda v. CA
222 SCRA 781

FACTS:

On December 5, 1978, Mateo Caballero, a widower without any children and already in
the twilight years of his life, executed a last will and testament at his residence before 3
witnesses.

He was assisted by his lawyer, Atty. Emilio Lumontad.

In the will, it was declared that the testator was leaving by way of legacies and devises
his real and personal properties to several people all of whom do not appear to be
related to the testator.

4 months later, Mateo Caballero himself filed a case seeking the probate of his last will
and testament, but numerous postponements pushed back the initial hearing of the
probate court regarding the will.

On May 29, 1980, the testator passed away before his petition could finally be heard by
the probate court.

Thereafter one of the legatees, Benoni Cabrera, sought his appointment as special
administrator of the testator’s estate.
Thereafter, the petitioners, claiming to be nephews and nieces of the testator, instituted
a second petition for intestate proceedings. They also opposed the probate of the
testator’s will and the appointment of a special administrator for his estate.

Benoni Cabrera died and was replaced by William Cabrera as special administrator and
gave an order that the testate proceedings for the probate of the will had to be heard
and resolved first.

In the course of the proceedings, petitioners opposed to the allowance of the testator’s
will on the ground that on the alleged date of its execution, the testator was already in
poor state of health such that he could not have possibly executed the same. Also the
genuineness of the signature of the testator is in doubt.

On the other hand, one of the attesting witnesses and the notary public testified that the
testator executed the will in question in their presence while he was of sound and
disposing mind and that the testator was in good health and was not unduly influenced
in any way in the execution of his will.

Probate court then rendered a decision declaring the will in question as the last will and
testament of the late Mateo Caballero.

CA affirmed the probate court’s decision stating that it substantially complies with Article
805. Hence this appeal.

ISSUE:

W/N the attestation clause in the will of the testator is fatally defective or can be cured
under the art. 809.

HELD:

No. It does not comply with the provisions of the law.

Ordinary or attested wills are governed by Arts. 804 to 809. The will must be
acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the attesting witnesses. The
attestation clause need not be written in a language known to the testator or even to the
attesting witnesses.

It is a separate memorandum or record of the facts surrounding the conduct of

execution and once signed by the witnesses it gives affirmation to the fact that
compliance with the essential formalities required by law has been observed.

The attestation clause, therefore, provides strong legal guaranties for the due execution
of a will and to insure the authenticity thereof.
It is contended by petitioners that the attestation clause in the will failed to specifically
state the fact that the attesting witnesses witnessed the testator sign the will and all its
pages in their presence and that they, the witnesses, likewise signed the will and every
page thereof in the presence of the testator and of each other. And the Court agrees.

The attestation clause does not expressly state therein the circumstance that said
witnesses subscribed their respective signatures to the will in the presence of the
testator and of each other.

The phrase, “and he has signed the same and every page thereof, on the space
provided for his signature and on the left hand margin,” obviously refers to the testator
and not the instrumental witnesses as it is immediately preceded by the words” as his
last will and testament.”

Clearly lacking is the statement that the witnesses signed the will and every page
thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another. That the absence of the
statement required by law is a fatal defect or imperfection which must necessarily result
in the disallowance of the will that is here sought to be probated.

Also, Art. 809 does not apply to the present case because the attestation clause totally
omits the fact that the attesting witnesses signed each and every page of the will in the
presence of the testator and of each other. The defect in this case is not only with
respect to the form or the language of the attestation clause. The defects must be
remedied by intrinsic evidence supplied by the will itself which is clearly lacking in this
case.

Therefore, the probate of the will is set aside and the case for the intestate proceedings
shall be revived.

Article 809 cannot be used to cure the defects of the will when it does not pertain to the
form or language of the will. This is because there is not substantial compliance with
Article 805.

Agapay v. Palang
G.R. No. 116668, 28 July 1997

FACTS:

Miguel Palang married his first wife Carlina in 1949. In 1972, Miguel returned to the
Philippines for good but did not choose to leave with his wife and daughter Herminia. In
July 1973, then 63 years old Miguel contracted his second marriage with 19 years old
Erlinda Agapay.
In May 1973 or two months prior to their marriage Miguel and Erlinda jointly purchased
a parcel of agricultural land located at San Felipe, Binalonan, Pangasinan. Upon the
death of Miguel in 1981, Carlina and Herminia filed a case to recover the ownership and
possession of the Agricultural land in Pangasinan.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the property acquired during the illicit cohabitation or subsequent void
marriage (Erlinda and Miguel) belongs to conjugal property of the first and valid
marriage (Carlina and Miguel).

RULING:

Yes. The provision of law applicable here is Article 148 of the Family Code providing for
cases of cohabitation when a man and woman who are not capacitated to marry each
other live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of
marriage or under a void marriage. While Miguel and Erlinda contracted marriage, said
union was patently void because earlier marriage of Miguel and Carlina was still
subsisting and unaffected by the latter’s de facto separation.

Under Article 148, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their
actual joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned by them in
common in proportion to their respective contributions. It must be stressed that actual
contribution is required by this provision, in contrast to Article 147 which states that
efforts in the care and maintenance of the family and household, are regarded as
contributions to the acquisition of common property by one who has no salary or income
or work or industry. If the actual contribution of the party is not proved, there will be no
co-ownership and no presumption of equal shares.

Erlinda tried to establish by her testimony that she is engaged in the business of buy-
and-sell and had a sari-sari store but failed to persuade the SC that she actually
contributed money to buy the riceland. Since petitioner failed to prove that she
contributed money to the purchase price of the riceland, SC finds no basis to justify her
co-ownership with Miguel over the same.

REYES V. CA 281 SCRA 277

FACTS:
This case involves a 383 sq.m. parcel of land owned by pettitioner’s and respondents’
father. Petitioner alleges that a Deed of Exrajudicial Partition (Deed) was entered into
between him and the respondents. Petitioner managed to register 335 sq.m. of the land
under his name; while 50 sq.m. of the land was registered under the name of his sister,
Paula (one of the respondents). After discovering the registration of the Deed,
respondents denied having knowledge of its execution and disclaimed having signed
the same; nor did they ever waive their rights, shares and interest in the subject parcel
of land. According to respondents, subject Deed was fraudulently prepared by petitioner
and that their signatures thereon were forged. They also assert that one Atty. Jose
Villena, the Notary Public who notarized the said Deed was not even registered in the
list of accredited Notaries Public of Pasay City. Thereafter, petitioner executed a Deed
of Absolute Sale selling 240 square meters of the land to his children. After the property
was partitioned, petitioner, his children and private respondent Paula allegedly executed
a Deed of Co-owners’ Partition dividing the property among themselves. This led the
respondents to file a Complaint for “Annulment of Sale and Damages With Prayer for
Preliminary Injunction/Restraining Order” before the RTC, which ruled that private
respondents’ signatures on the questioned Deed of Extrajudicial Partition and
Settlement were indeed forged and simulated. The CA affirmed. Hence, this petition.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the Deed was forged.
2. Whether petitioner(s) had become absolute owners of the subject property by virtue
of acquisitive prescription.
RULING:
1. YES. Petitioner(s) cast doubt on the findings of the lower court as affirmed by the
Court of Appeals regarding the existence of forgery. Factual findings of the trial court,
adopted and confirmed by the Court of Appeals, are final and conclusive and may not
be reviewed on appeal. Petitioners’ ludicrous claim that private respondents imputed no
deception on his part but only forgery of the subject Deed and the simulation of their
signatures is nothing short of being oxymoronic. For what is forgery and simulation of
signatures if not arrant deception! The allegation made by petitioner that the execution
of a public document ratified before a notary public cannot be impugned by the mere
denial of the signatory is baseless. It should be noted that there was a finding that the
subject Deed was notarized by one Atty. Villena who at that time was not commissioned
as a notary in Pasay City.
2. NO. Petitioners cannot justify their ownership and possession of the subject parcel of
land since they could not ave been possessors in good faith of the subject parcel of land
considering the finding that at the very inception they forged the Deed of Extrajudicial
Partition and Settlement which they claim to be the basis for their just title. Having
forged the Deed and simulated the signatures of private respondents, petitioners, in
fact, are in bad faith. The forged Deed containing private respondents’ simulated
signatures is a nullity and cannot serve as a just title. There can be no acquisitive
prescription considering that the parcel of land in dispute is titled property, i.e., titled in
the name of the late Bernardino Reyes, the father of both petitioner Florentino and the
private respondents.
SANCHEZ ET AL. V. CA
G.R. NO. 108947 SEPTEMBER 29, 1997
FACTS:
Rosalia Lugod is the only child of Juan Sanchez and Maria Villafranca. Her father had
illegitimate children, herein petitioners. When Maria Villafranca died, Rosalia petitioned
for letters of administration over the estate of her mother and father. Before the
proceedings could be closed, Juan Sanchez died. His illegitimate children filed a petition
for letters of administration of Sanchez’s properties , which was opposed by Rosalia.
On October 30, 1969, Rosalia and the illegitimate children of her father executed a
compromise agreement, assisted by their counsels, wherein they agreed to divide the
properties. They did so after four drafts. However, on January 19, 1970, petitioners
required Rosalia to deliver a deficiency of 24 hectares and/or to set aside the
compromise agreement. They contended that the agreement was invalid because it had
not been approved by the court. Later, on April 13, 1970, the parties entered into a
memorandum of agreement.

ISSUE:
Was the compromise agreement valid even without the approval of the court?

RULING:
Yes. A compromise agreement is defined by Article 2028 of the Civil Code as a contract
whereby the parties avoid litigation or end one that has already been commenced by
making reciprocal concessions. Since it is a consensual contract, it is perfected upon
the meeting of the minds of the parties, and judicial approval is not needed for its
perfection. The parties clearly knowingly entered into the contract, it having been signed
only after four drafts. In addition, they even entered into a memorandum of agreement
that amended the compromise agreement when they realized there were errors in the
latter. This clearly shows that they entered into the contract voluntarily

URSULINA GANUELAS, et al. v. HON. ROBERT T. CAWED, et

al.

G. R. No. 123968, 24 April 2003

Donation inter vivos differs from donation mortis causa in that in the former, the act is
immediately operative even if the actual execution may be deferred until the death of
 the donor, while in the latter, nothing is conveyed to or acquired by the donee until the
death of the donor-testator.

FACTS:

Celestina Ganuelas Vda. de Valin executed a Deed of Donation of Real Property in

favor of petitioner Ursulina Ganuelas. The pertinent portion of the Deed of Donation
reads: ―That for and in consideration of the love and affection which the DONOR has
for the DONEE, and of the faithful services the latter has rendered in the past to the
former, the said DONOR does by these presents transfer and convey, by way of
DONATION, unto the DONEE the property above, described, to become effective upon
the death of the DONOR; but in the event that the DONEE should die before the
DONOR, the present donation shall be deemed rescinded and of no further force and
effect.‖

However, more than a month before Celestina died, she executed a document revoking
such donation. After her death, Ursulina claimed ownership over the donated properties
and refused to give private respondents Leocadia G. Flores, et al., niece of Celestina
any share in the produce of the properties despite repeated demands. Thus, prompting
Flores, et al. to file a complaint before the San Fernando, La Union Regional Trial Court
(RTC), challenging the validity of the Deed of Donation. They alleged that such donation
is void for failure to comply with the formalities of wills and testaments, which is
necessary in a disposition mortis causa.

On the other hand, Ursulina maintains that there is no need to comply with the
formalities of wills and testaments because such donation was inter vivos.
The RTC ruled that the Deed of Donation is a disposition mortis causa, thus, void for
failure to comply with the formalities of wills and testaments.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the donation is inter vivos or mortis causa

HELD:

Crucial in the resolution of the issue is the determination of whether the donor intended
to transfer the ownership over the properties upon the execution of the deed. Donation
inter vivos differs from donation mortis causa in that in the former, the act is immediately
operative even if the actual execution may be deferred until the death of the donor,
while in the latter, nothing is conveyed to or acquired by the donee until the death of the
donor-testator.

If the donation is made in contemplation of the donor‘s death, meaning that the full or
naked ownership of the donated properties will pass to the donee only because of the
donor‘s death, then it is at that time that the donation takes effect, and it is a donation
mortis causa which should be embodied in a last will and testament.
But if the donation takes effect during the donor‘s lifetime or independently of the
donor‘s death, meaning that the full or naked ownership (nuda proprietas) of the
donated properties passes to the donee during the donor‘s lifetime, not by reason of his
death but because of the deed of donation, then the donation is inter vivos.

The distinction between a transfer inter vivos and mortis causa is important as the
validity or revocation of the donation depends upon its nature. If the donation is inter
vivos, it must be executed and accepted with the formalities prescribed by Articles 748
and 749 of the Civil Code, except when it is onerous in which case the rules on
contracts will apply. If it is mortis causa, the donation must be in the form of a will, with
all the formalities for the validity of wills, otherwise it is void and cannot transfer
ownership.

The distinguishing characteristics of a donation mortis causa are the following:

1. It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor;
or, what amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should retain the ownership (full
or naked) and control of the property while alive;

2. That before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will, ad
nutum; but revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in
the donor to dispose of the properties conveyed;

3. That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee.

In the donation subject of the present case, there is nothing therein which indicates that
any right, title or interest in the donated properties was to be transferred to Ursulina
prior to the death of Celestina. The phrase ―to become effective upon the death of the
DONOR‖ admits of no other interpretation but that Celestina intended to transfer the
ownership of the properties to Ursulina on her death, not during her lifetime.
More importantly, the provision in the deed stating that if the donee should die before
the donor, the donation shall be deemed rescinded and of no further force and effect
shows that the donation is a postmortem disposition.
As stated in a long line of cases, one of the decisive characteristics of a donation mortis
causa is that the transfer should be considered void if the donor should survive the
donee. More. The deed contains an attestation clause expressly confirming the
donation as mortis causa: To classify the donation as inter vivos simply because it is
founded on considerations of love and affection is erroneous. That the donation was
prompted by the affection of the donor for the donee and the services rendered by the
latter is of no particular significance in determining whether the deed constitutes a
transfer inter vivos or not, because a legacy may have an identical motivation. In other
words, love and affection may also underline transfers mortis causa.
As the subject deed then is in the nature of a mortis causa disposition, the formalities of
a will under Article 728 of the Civil Code should have been complied with, failing which
the donation is void and produces no effect.
THE INCOMPETENT, CARMEN CANIZA, REPRESENTED BY
HER LEGAL GUARDIAN, AMPARO EVANGELISTA V. COURT
OF APPEALS (SPECIAL FIRST DIVISION), PEDRO ESTRADA
AND HIS WIFE, LEONORA ESTRADA G.R. NO. 110427.
FEBRUARY 24, 1997 NARVASA, C.J.
FACTS:
Being then ninety-four (94) years of age, Carmen Caniza was declared incompetent by
judgment in a guardianship proceeding instituted by her niece, Amparo A. Evangelista.
Caniza was the owner of a house and lot. Her guardian Amparo Evangelista
commenced a suit to eject the spouses Pedro and Leonora Estrada from said premises.
The complaint was later amended to identify the incompetent Caniza as plaintiff, suing
through her legal guardian, Amparo Evangelista. The amended Complaint pertinently
alleged that plaintiff Caniza was the absolute owner of the property in question; that out
of kindness, she had allowed the Estrada Spouses, their children, grandchildren, and
sons-in-law to temporarily reside in her house, rent-free; that Caniza already had urgent
need of the house on account of her advanced age and failing health, “so funds could
be raised to meet her expenses for support, maintenance and medical treatment;”
among others. The defendants declared that they had been living in Caniza’s house
since the 1960’s; that in consideration of their faithful service they had been considered
by Caniza as her own family, and the latter had in fact executed a holographic will by
which she “bequeathed” to the Estradas the house and lot in question. The Estradas
insist that the devise of the house to them by Caiza clearly denotes her intention that
they remain in possession thereof, and legally incapacitated her judicial guardian,
Amparo Evangelista, from evicting them therefrom, since their ouster would be
inconsistent with the ward’s will. Such will has not been submitted for probate.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the alleged will may be given effect

HELD:
No. A will is essentially ambulatory; at any time prior to the testator’s death, it may be
changed or revoked; and until admitted to probate, it has no effect whatever and no
right can be claimed thereunder, the law being quite explicit: “No will shall pass either
real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of
Court” An owner’s intention to confer title in the future to persons possessing property
by his tolerance, is not inconsistent with the former’s taking back possession in the
meantime for any reason deemed sufficient. And that, in this case, there was sufficient
cause for the owner’s resumption of possession is apparent: she needed to generate
income from the house on account of the physical infirmities afflicting her, arising from
her extreme age.
CUA v. VARGAS

FACTS:
A parcel of residential land with an area of 99 square meters was left behind by the late
Paulina Vargas. A notarized EJS among the heirs was executed, partitioning and
adjudicating upon themselves the lot in question. The heirs Florentino, Andres,
Antonina, and Gloria, however did not sign the EJS. Another EJS was executed this
time by Ester, Visitacion, Juan, Zenaida, and Rosario, who signed the document to the
exclusion of the former heirs. They then sold the property to Joseph Cua. Gloria then
came to know the transaction between Cua and the other heirs and Gloria tried to
redeem the property but Cua refused. Gloria filed a case for annulment of the EJS and
Legal Redemption of the lot against Cua.
ISSUE:
Whether heirs are deemed constructively notified and bound, regardless of their failure
to participate therein, by an EJS and partition when said document has been duly
published.

HELD:
No, the procedure outlined in Rule 74, Sec.1 is an ex parte proceeding. The rule plainly
states, however, that persons who do not participate or had no notice of an EJS will not
be bound thereby. It contemplates a notice that has been sent out or issued before any
deed of settlement and/or partition is agreed upon and not after such an agreement has
already been executed as what happened in the instant case with the publication of the
first deed of EJS.

RODRIGUEZ v. RODRIGUEZ

FACTS:
Juanito Rodriguez owned a five-door apartment. On October 1983, he executed a
“Huling Habilin at Testamento” giving:
1. Apartments D and E to Petitioner, Cresenciana Rodriguez, his live-in partner;
2. Apartment A to his child Benjamin, the deceased husband of Evangeline;
3. Apartment B to his child Buenaventura Rodriguez, respondent; and
4. Apartment C to his child Belen Rodriguez.
However, on June 1984, Juanita executed a DAS over the property in favor of
petitioner. Petitioner then filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against respondents,
alleging that she was the lawful and registered owner of the property and she only
allowed the respondents, Evangeline, Buenaventura, and Belen, out of kindness and
tolerance to occupy the units A, B, and D. However, without her knowledge, respondent
subleased the properties, who despite repeated demands, failed and refused to vacate
the premises and pay rentals.
Respondents on the other had claimed ownership over the property by succession and
alleged that the DAS executed in favor of petitioner is simulated and void. They also
alleged that petitioner exerted undue influence over their father, who at the time of the
sale was seriously ill, to agree to the sale for only P20, 000. Moreover they alleged that
petitioner has no cause of action against them for being a party to the Partition
Agreement wherein they recognized each other as co-owners and partitioned the
property in accordance with the provision of the will.
MTC rendered a decision in favor of respondents holding that the DAS was simulated.
RTC reversed the decision stating that petitioner’s TCT is a conclusive evidence of
ownership. The RTC also held that MTC erred when it relied heavily on the will which
was not probated hence has no effect and no right can be claimed therein. The Partition
Agreement which was entered into in accordance to the will also has no effect.
CA reversed the decision of the RTC holding that the will transmitted ownership of the
specific apartments not only to the respondents but also to the petitioner, and pursuant
thereto the Partition Agreement was entered into by the parties.

ISSUE:
Whether the respondents have right of possession over the subject property in the
absence of the probate of the will.

HELD:
No, respondents failed to prove their right of succession, as the Huling Habilin at
Testamento and the Partition Agreement have no legal effect since the will has not been
probated. Before any will can have force or validity it must be probated. This cannot be
dispensed with. Art. 838 mandates that “no will shall pass either real or personal
property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court.” As the
will was not probated, the Partition Agreement which was executed pursuant thereto
cannot be given effect.