A Protection Motivation Theory of Fear Appeals and Attitude Change1

The Journal of Psychology
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A Protection Motivation Theory of Fear Appeals

and Attitude Change1
Ronald W. Rogers
To cite this article: Ronald W. Rogers (1975) A Protection Motivation Theory of

Fear Appeals and Attitude Change1, The Journal of Psychology, 91:1, 93-114, DOI:
10.1080/00223980.1975.9915803
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00223980.1975.9915803
Published online: 02 Jul 2010.
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Published as a separate and in The Journal of Psychology, 1975, 91, 93-114.
A PROTECTION MOTIVATION THEORY OF FEAR

APPEALS AND ATTITUDE CHANGE*l
University of South Carolina
RONALD W. ROGERS2
SUMMARY
A protection motivation theory is proposed that postulates the three
Downloaded by [Australian Catholic University] at 09:43 09 October 2017
crucial components of a fear appeal to be (a) the magnitude of noxiousness

of a depicted event; (b) the probability of that event's occurrence; and (c)
the efficacy of a protective response. Each of these communication vari-
ables initiates corresponding cognitive appraisal processes that mediate
attitude change. The proposed conceptualization is a special case of a more
comprehensive theoretical schema: expectancy-value theories. Several
suggestions are offered for reinterpreting existing data, designing new types
of empirical research, and making future studies more comparable. Final-
ly, the principal advantages of protection motivation theory over the rival
formulations of Janis and Leventhal are discussed.
A. INTRODUCTION
In the research paradigm designed to investigate the effects of fear
appeals upon attitude change, an individual typically is exposed to persua-
sive communications that depict the noxious consequences accruing to a
specified course of action. Recommendations are presented that can avert
the danger if the individual adopts the appropriate attitudes and acts upon
them. Fear-arousing stimuli seek to eliminate response patterns that might
produce aversive consequences (e. g., cigarette smoking) or establish re-
sponse patterns that might prevent the occurrence of noxious events (e. g.,
taking prescribed inoculations).
Fear appeals frequently vary information on one or more of the follow-
... Received in the Editorial Office on June 5, 1975, and published immediately at Prov-
incetown, Massachusetts. Copyright by The Journal Press.
I Preparation of this paper was supported in part by Grant MH 22157-01 from the
National Institute of Mental Health. The author would like to express thanks to Donald L.
Thistlethwaite for his helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper.
Z Requests for reprints should be sent to the 'author at the address shown at the end of this
article.
93
94 JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY
ing topics: (a) the personally relevant consequences of some noxious event;
(b) the likelihood of occurrence of the event; and (c) recommended
prophylactic responses. If fear appeals thus have multiple components, it
should not be surprising that several dependent variables have been found
to covary with the level of fear aroused. Higher levels of fear arousal have
been demonstrated to be more persuasive than lower levels with respect to
measures of the interest value of the communication (7, 13, 68); the severity
or seriousness of the noxious event (13, 46, 47); perceived vulnerability or
susceptibility to the threat (13, 46, 48); the importance of the avoidance
response (13, 46, 47); and concern over the threat (44).
In one of the earliest theoretical analyses of the effects of fear arousal

upon persuasion (29), fear appeals were referred to as the contents of
communications describing the unfavorable consequences that may result
from failure to adopt the communicator's recommendations. It does not
seem surprising that such communication content can be conceptualized in
various ways, or that a fear-arousing communication may be a composite
package of several confounded variables. The experiments cited in the
previous paragraph may be interpreted as suggesting that when the inten-
sity of fear was manipulated, other factors (e. g., interest, importance, etc.)
were also frequently varied; however, it is difficult to determine which
independent variable(s) was effective in producing the theoretically rele-
vant changes in the dependent variables. This confounding effect is not
inherent in any attempt to manipulate fear arousal but may either be the
product of the unwitting simultaneous manipulation of several factors or be
the result of varying definitions of fear appeals among investigators.
While it is generally recognized that fear appeals are multifaceted stimuli
(cf. 26, 43), there has been little progress in formulating theoretical ac-
counts that identify relevant stimulus variables, describe associated cogni-
tive mediational events, and systematically state effects upon attitude
change. Recent reviews of the literature on fear appeals and persuasion
agree that the empirical data are inconsistent and difficult to interpret (26,
32, 43, 52). A major factor contributing to the intractable pattern of
conflicting results may be a reluctance to differentiate components of fear
appeals, develop a theoretical framework to integrate these variables, and
conduct parametric investigations of them. It will be difficult for research
findings to be amenable to systematic cumulation until these definitional
and conceptual issues are addressed.
This paper deals with several conceptual issues that need to be clarified
and extended in order to advance theory relating fear appeals to attitude
RONALD W. ROGERS 95
change. A protection motivation theory will be described that attempts to

specify a limited set of crucial stimulus variables in a fear appeal and the
cognitive processes postulated to mediate acceptance of a communicator's
recommendations. Since research in fear appeals is one part of a larger
terrain that includes the closely related topics of stress, anxiety, instrumen-
tal avoidance learning, and emotion, it would be fruitful wherever possible
to apply conceptual development in these broader based frames of refer-
ence to theory building in attitude change. Furthermore, there are several
more generic or macrolevel theories that contain propositions that can be
applied to a microlevel theory of fear appeals and persuasion. Subsequent
sections will suggest that several variables and empirical findings could be
incorporated into the protection motivation theory. Then the proposed
theory will be contrasted to rival formulations. Finally, several limitations
of the theory will be mentioned in hopes that limitations may point to
directions for future theoretical development. Before proceeding, however,
it may be instructive to consider the nature of fear, selectively focusing
upon those aspects of this concept that might facilitate our understanding
of the relationship of fear appeals to attitude change.
B. FEAR AS A MOTIVATIONAL INTERVENING VARIABLE
Historically, fear has been conceptualized as an affective state protecting

one against danger (22) or a motivational state leading one away from
something (10, 73, 79). More recently, fear has been characterized as an
intervening variable, inferred from stimulus conditions and response vari-
ables, that motivates an organism to escape or avoid a noxious event (el 3,
24, 42, 75). A "motivational theory of emotion," especially the emotion of
fear, is perhaps the most typical conceptualization of the emotions (el 9,
31, 42, 53, 55, 56, 71).
Interpretations of instrumental avoidance learning often employ the con-
struct of fear to account for the emergence and maintenance of an avoid-
ance response. Miller (55), Mowrer (56, 58), and Spence (71) believed that
the occurrence of a noxious unconditioned stimulus conditioned an emo-
tional reaction, fear, to the stimuli associated with it. Two-factor learning
theory (57, 69) states that complex autonomic and skeletal responses are
conditioned to a noxious unconditioned stimulus. (Fear is the conditioned
form of the pain reaction.) These conditioned intereoceptive responses are
said to act as a learned drive to evoke the instrumental avoidance be-
havior. In the initial theoretical formulation of the effects of fear upon
attitude change, Hovland, Janis, and Kelley (29) adopted the fear-as-
acquired-drive model, specifically citing the work of Miller (55) and

Mowrer (58).
Fear may also be considered a relational construct, aroused in response
to a situation that is judged as dangerous and toward which protective
action is taken. This point of view may be traced to, among others, Freud
(22), Tolman (73), and Woodworth (79) who noted that an emotional state
is directly produced by some stimulus in the environment and is directed
towards mobilizing the organism to effect some change in the stimulus.
The prototypic emotion in this type of analysis has been fear. As a type of
emotion, fear is closely related not only to stimulus events, but to response
events as well. The close relationship between emotion and muscular

activity has been postulated in a long and rich tradition (e. g., 10, 15, SO,
66). The emotional distrubance of the viscera facilitates the muscular
activity which protects the organism from the dangerous environmental
stimulus: hence the etiology of the word "emotion" itself from the Latin
emouere, e meaning out, and movere to move. This transactional relation-
ship between environment and organism has been emphasized at recent
symposia on anxiety (72) and stress (1, 51), thus reflecting a conceptual
convergence among these cognate research traditions.
It was previously argued that insufficient attention has been devoted to
specifying the components of a fear appeal and that this may partially
account for the inconsistent empirical findings. Emphasis upon the inter-
vening variable, relational nature of fear, reminds us to consider carefully
not only the emotional response but also the stimulus events producing it.
C. A PROTECTION MOTIVATION THEORY
1. Convergent Formulations
The protection motivation theory to be described below is connected
with a well-established theoretical tradition and may be considered a
special case of a more general category of theories employing "expectancy"
and "value" constructs. Feather (19) identified psychologists in five diverse
areas who use concepts similar to expectancy and value to explain behavior
in a choice situation: Atkinson's (5) conceptualization of achievement moti-
vation, Edwards' (18) decision making theory, Lewin's (49) decision mak-
ing and field theory, Tolman's (74) purposive behaviorism, and Rotter's
(64) social learning theory. For all of these researchers, the tendency to act
in a particular fashion is said to be a function of the expectancy that the
given act will be followed by some consequence and the value of the
RONALD W. ROGERS 97
consequence. The expectancy-value formulations (also referred to as

means-ends and instrumentality theories) have been applied to several
other social psychological phenomena: the structure of attitudes (63, 67,
81); the prediction of behavior from self-report measures (21); and persua-
sion in the social health field (27). Thus, the formulation to be proposed is
not a radical departure from current conceptualizations, but is in the
tradition of a number of psychological theories. Hopefully, linking small
scale theories with more comprehensive schemes will yield a fuller under-
standing of psychological phenomena by reaching a higher-order explana-
tion.
2. Components and Mediating Processes

There is frequently an intimate relationship between taxonomy on the
one hand and theory on the other. Ambiguity in the former may facilitate a
corresponding vagueness in the latter. Since it has been argued that fear
appeals are composite packages of confounding variables, it would be
advantageous to limit the relevant stimulus variables subsumed under the
label "fear appeal." Hovland et al. 's (29) analysis and expectancy-value
theories suggest there are three crucial stimulus variables in a fear appeal:
(a) the magnitude of noxiousness of a depicted event; (b) the conditional
probability that the event will occur provided that no adaptive behavior is
performed or there is no modification of an existing behavioral disposition;
and (c) the availability and effectiveness of a coping response that might
reduce or eliminate the noxious stimulus.
It is apparent that with no more than these three components of a fear
appeal, there are seven possible combinations or different ways to define a
fear appeal operationally. (A fear appeal could present information on any
one of the three components, each of the three pairs of components, or the
combination of all components.) Any effect of a combination of compo-
nents could be caused by anyone or more of the components. Thus, fear
has been manipulated in some studies by varying information on the
seriousness of a depicted harm and the likelihood of exposure (e. g., 11, 30,
33) and in other studies by varying only the former type of information
(e. g., 28, 44). It is a small wonder that it is frequently difficult to interpret and
compare empirical findings, much less specify important functional relation-
ships. One goal of formalization is to render a precise meaning to the theoreti-
cally relevant variables. Specification of the crucial stimulus components of a
fear appeal previously has been passed over too lightly.
It is important to note that recognition of these communication content
variables is not unique to protection motivation theory. Several inves-

tigators have recognized similar variables, among a host of others, but there
are a number of important conceptual differences beween previous
analyses and the proposed formulation that will be examined after the
protection motivation theory has been fully characterized. Doubtless, the
protection motivation theory is a simplified schema. It lacks a novel
theoretical approach, daring and startling speculations, counterintuitive
hypotheses, and similar properties that endear new conceptualizations to
social psychologists. However, there are a number of complementary
strategies for advancing the theoretical understanding of fear appeals and
attitude change. When we refer to the cumulative nature of science, we are

referring typically to the slow, systematic accumulation of empirical data
that builds upon previous findings. Theory construction needs to be
cumulative in the same sense, especially if confusion over the data is
partially attributable to disparities in operationally defining fear appeals.
It is further assumed that each of the three components of a fear appeal
initiates a cognitive mediational process. A schema of the communication
components and mediating processes of the protection motivation theory is
shown in Figure 1. Each of these processes appraises communication
information about noxiousness, probability, or efficacy by placing each
stimulus on dimensions of appraised severity of the depicted event, expec-
tancy of exposure to the event, or belief in efficacy of the recommended
coping response, respectively. It will be taken as a working hypothesis
that these cognitive processes are independent. Each of these appraisal
processes will be roughly proportional to the strength of the associated
environmental variable. The representation will not be exact, since indi-
viduals have different styles of appraising threatening events (cf 40). Thus,
these processes are centrally mediated representations of external and in-
ternal events and are linked to observable stimulus events and measurable
responses. Of course, cognitive appraisal of a fear appeal presupposes that
the environmental input has been attended to and comprehended. One is
not affected by even the direst events when they are not perceived or
understood.
It is also assumed that these three cognitive processes mediate the effects
of the components of fear appeals upon attitudes by arousing what will be
termed "protection motivation." The intent to adopt the communicator's
recommendation is mediated by the amount of protection motivation
aroused. Protection motivation is an intervening variable that has the
typical characteristics of a motive: it arouses, sustains, and directs activity.
RONALD W. ROGERS 99
COMPONENTS OF
A COGNITIVE MEDIATING PROCESSES ATnTUOE CHANGE
FEAR APPEAL
MAGNITUDE
OF NOXIOOSNESS
r----I
PROBABILITY PROTECTION I NTENT TO ADOPT
OF OCCURRENCE I MOTIVATION I REl:OMMENlED RESPONSE

L J
r------ --
EFFICACY OF
t£aMo1ENllEDRESPONSE
I BELIEF IN EFFICACY
OF COPING RESPONSE
I
I
I --
1 ..J
FIGURE 1
SCHEMA OF THE PROTECTION MOTIVATION THEORY
Therefore, a basic postulate is that protection motivation arises from the

cognitive appraisal of a depicted event as noxious and likely to occur, along
with the belief that a recommended coping response Can effectively pre-
vent the occurrence of the aversive event. If an event is not appraised as
severe, as likely to occur, or if nothing can be done about the event, then
no protection motivation would be aroused, and hence there would be no
change in behavioral intentions. Protection motivation (and hence attitude
change) is postulated to be a multiplicative function of the three media-
tional processes for two reasons: (a) no motivation would be aroused if any
of these values equalled zero; and (b) a multiplicative relationship is pos-
tulated in the expectancy-value theories of Atkinson, Edwards, Feather,
Fishbein, and Rosenberg. Thus, this formulation predicts not only sig-
nificant main effects for each variable but also second- and third-order
interaction effects. Only the form of the third-order interaction will be
described, since it incorporates the other hypothesized effects. For each
level of a magnitude of noxiousness manipulation, high probability of
occurrence and high efficacy of coping response should each produce
greater acceptance of the communicator's recommendation than low levels of
these variables. Within a low-noxiousness condition, the superiority of a high

over a low efficacy variable should be more pronounced in a high-probability
condition than in a low-probability condition. Within a high-noxiousness
condition, the same ordering of means should obtain, but the differences
should be more pronounced. Rather than assert that anyone of the three
variables is more important than another, it will be assumed that they are
equally potent in changing attitudes. Thus, in brief, according to the protec-
tion motivation theory, people appraise the severity and likelihood of being
exposed to a depicted noxious event, evaluate their ability to cope with the
event, and alter their attitudes accordingly.
The proposed formulation asserts that attitude change is not mediated by

or a result of an emotional state of fear, but rather is a function of the
amount of protective motivation aroused by the cognitive appraisal pro-
cesses. The emphasis is thus upon cognitive processes and protection moti-
vation, rather than fear as an emotion. Although a currently acceptable
composite definition of fear might define it to be an emotion complex with
physiological, cognitive, and overt motor subsystems (e. g., 37, 39, 41, 72),
the concept of fear has a tradition of being associated almost exclusively
with autonomic activity (e. g., 57, 78). Cognitive components have been
frequently regarded as ancillary, not integral components of fear. Leeper
lamented "the almost universal conceptualization of emotional processes as
lower-level processes" (42, p. 69). Lazarus et at. noted that "It has long
been traditional to associate emotions with the viscera ... " (41, p. 213).
Although visceral and skeletal activity may be cognitively appraised, the
proposed formulation asserts that it is the central events that mediate
protective, adaptive activity. Therefore, the emphasis on "protection moti-
vation" rather than "fear" is designed to emphasize the importance of
cognitive processes to the relative exclusion of visceral ones.
There are numerous advantages to the emphasis on cognitive constructs.
With respect to investigations of animal instrumental avoidance learning
(an area where peripheral explanations might be expected to be preferred
to cognitive ones), Rescorla and Solomon concluded from their review of
the literature that "we have not yet identified any peripheral CRs which
are necessary to mediate avoidance behavior" (60, p. 169). They further
suggest that physiological activity is merely an index of a central state that
mediates the avoidance behavior. Even critics of two-process theory have
stressed the information signalling function of noxious stimuli (e. g., 8, 14,
25). Thus, if psychologists studying avoidance behavior in animals are now
willing to de-emphasize the mediational role of peripheral phenomena
RONALD W. ROGERS 101
relative to central representations, then perhaps social and personality

theorists should consider emulating them again. Indeed, Janis' (32) concept
of reflective fear and Leventhal's (43) danger control process are steps in
this direction. Thus, the de-emphasis of visceral processes is consistent
with empirical data and emerging conceptualizations.
The protection motivation theory also stresses the organization and
integration of cognitive plans (cf. 54). Protection from noxious events
frequently requires long-sustained processes, like cognitive representations,
rather than reflexive responsivity to visceral events. The significance of the
departure from prevailing S-R models of the last several decades has been
termed revolutionary by Dember, who observed that "Psychology has gone

cognitive, and so has motivation" (16, p. 161). Recent symposia on emotion
(4), anxiety (72), and stress (1, 51) reflect this convergence upon the role of
cognition. One wonders if psychology has indeed "gone" anywhere or
simply recycled to St. Thomas Aquinas' (2) view that emotional states are
reactions to intellective apprehension. There has been progress of sorts, for
although we may have lost our Thomistic souls in the recycling, we surely
have found our empirical data.
Not only is the concept of fear too frequently associated with peripheral,
visceral activity, but this association readily lends itself to an emphasis
upon reduction of an emotional state rather than upon avoidance of the
environmental danger. Thus, according to a fear-reduction conceptualiza-
tion, a protective response is viewed as only an epiphenomenon of the
effort to escape the state of fear (e. g., 59, 65). The protection motivation
theory makes it clear that one is coping with and avoiding a noxious event
rather than escaping from an unpleasant emotional state of fear. One
advantage of this distinction is that it directs our attention back to en-
vironmental stimulation (i. e., the components of a fear appeal) where it is
so sorely needed. Another advantage of this distinction is that protection
motivation theory can be applied to automatized forms of coping, such as
crossing a street, in which no emotional state of fear is aroused, yet one
engages in protective activity. Rather than being outside the scope of the
present analysis, protection motivation should be aroused in these types of
situations, since each of the three stimulus variables would be present.
3. Incorporation of Descriptive Variables

One purpose of any theory is to bring order out of seemingly chaotic,
inconsistent findings. This paper has strongly argued that one of the most
important sources of inconsistency in the data relating fear to attitude
change is the nature of a fear appeal itself. The properties of fear appeals
that produce attitude change have not been firmly established, and at
present there is no formulation that can do so. Unfortunately, empirical
consistency cannot be imposed post hoc if fear appeals have been opera-
tionally defined in a variety of ways. Thus, rather than offer a reinterpreta-
tion of the existing literature, protection motivation theory offers a
framework for making comparisons among future studies more
straightforward and interpretable.
Although there have been no empirical tests of protection motivation
theory, several studies have manipulated one or two independent variables
similar to noxiousness, probability, or efficacy. It will be shown briefly

that, in principle, protection motivation theory can account for these data.
In general, the higher the level of fear aroused, the more attitude change
produced (cf 26). The magnitude of noxiousness of a depicted threat (the
first communication variable specified by protection motivation theory) is
perhaps the most common component of a fear appeal and may thus be
inferred to be an important communication variable. More specifically,
several studies (13, 47) have found that manipulations of fear affected
perceived seriousness of a threat and thus facilitated attitude change. With
respect to the probability of occurrence, the second component of a fear
appeal specified by protection motivation theory, several experiments have
found that compared to a low-fear appeal, a high-fear appeal increased
feelings of susceptibility to a threat and thus facilitated attitude change (13,
48). Although Watts (76) found that a vulnerability communication plus a
fear-film was not superior to a control condition, compared to the control
group, the vulnerability communication increased attitude change. Lev-
enthal and Watts (45) blocked cigarette smokers on their feelings of
susceptibility to disease and reported internal analyses showing a main
effect of susceptibility upon behavioral intentions. Perhaps the importance
of the probability of occurrence variable is most clearly shown in role-
playing studies. Janis and Mann (36) reported that compared to a control
group, role players expressed greater expectations that harm would come to
them if they continued to smoke and developed stronger antismoking
attitudes. These authors attributed the effectiveness of the role-playing
technique to making smokers aware of their personal vulnerability. The
evidence on the importance of the third component, the efficacy of the
recommended response, is rather consistent. Although Dabbs and Leven-
thal (13) found no effect of an efficacy manipulation, Chu (11), Rogers and
Deckner (61), and Rogers and Thistlethwaite (62) reported that increments
in efficacy of a coping response increased compliance with the com-

municator's recommendations. Therefore, there is evidence that the three
components of a fear appeal specified by protection motivation theory are
important determinants of attitude change.
With respect to interaction effects, Leventhal and Watts (45) and Snider
(68) attempted to examine a Fear x Probability interaction, but neither
found the type of interaction predicted by protection motivation theory.
However, the manipulations were not completely successful in either
study, Leventhal and Watts reported that more fear was experienced in a
high-susceptible condition than in a low-susceptible condition. Snider com-
bined fear-arousing information and statements of likelihood of occurrence

in a high-threat condition, but omitted the latter type of information in a
low-threat condition. Thus, the combination of the independent variables
in these two studies makes any unequivocal conclusions impossible.
Three studies have attempted to examine the interaction effect of fear
and efficacy. Although Dabbs and Leventhal (13) found no interaction
effect, the low-fear condition described a case history of recovery following
medication while the high-fear condition described a case history of death
despite medication, thereby combining the magnitude of danger and prob-
ability of occurrence variables. Chu (11) found an interaction that reached
the .07 level of significance. However, his high-fear communication argued
that the depicted threat was highly noxious and highly likely to occur, and
his low-fear communication argued that the threat was not noxious and not
likely to occur. Therefore, it is impossible to determine the separate effects
of these combined variables. Rogers and Thistlethwaite (62) successfully
manipulated fear and efficacy and obtained a significant interaction on a
measure of attitudes toward cigarette smoking.
No experiments have been reported that attempted to investigate the
other interaction effects predicted by protection motivation theory. The
scant data that do bear upon the protection motivation formulation (none
of which were designed to test this theory) provide some support. How-
ever, the utility of the proposed theory clearly requires further empirical
investigation.
Furthermore, the protection motivation theory may be able to integrate
many variables lacking a clear connection with substantive theory into a
coherent theoretical framework. As previously noted, fear appeals have
been found to differ in their interest value, seriousness, importance, and
amount of concern elicited. Variations in these dependent measures may be
plausibly interpreted as depending upon variations in magnitude of nox-
iousness, probability of occurrence, and/or efficacy of coping response. For

example, an event may be appraised as more serious and arouse greater
concern as it is appraised as more severe, more likely to occur, and less
amenable to any protective action. Additionally, there are a number of
terms that have been used to describe fear appeals (e. g., "realism,"
"losses," "breaking through invulnerability defenses," "familiarity") that
can be interpreted in terms of manipulations of the components of the
protection motivation theory. To consider one example, it has been pro-
posed that familiarity with the topics of a fear appeal may affect attitude
change (26, 35). Familiarity with a topic may be interpreted as the more or
less correct appraisal of how severe and/or likely an event is to occur.

Thus, treated more analytically, the effects of "familiarity" on attitude
change may be mediated by the theoretical constructs of appraised severity
and expectancy of exposure. Finally, Higbee (26) has suggested that incon-
sistent findings in the fear appeal area may be partially due to differences
between experiments in the topics of communications and the objects of
fear. However, the types of differences that are crucial have not yet been
specified. The proposed theory does specify some of the important differ-
ences. The frequently investigated topics of tooth decay and lung cancer
obviously differ widely on the dimensions of magnitude of noxiousness and
probability of occurrence. If noxious stimuli were to be located on the
dimensions specified in protection motivation theory, comparisons among
studies employing different topics might be more straightforward, and
otherwise inconsistent results might be more readily interpretable.
D. Contrasts with Rival Theories

1. Janis' Curvilinear Formulation of Reflective Fear
Our understanding of fear appeals and persuasion has been greatly
advanced by Irving Janis and his colleagues, who not only performed the
first empirical investigations but have sustained an extensive interest in
emotional phenomena. While there are numerous differences between
Janis' formulation and the protection motivation theory, only three of the
most salient ones will be discussed: (a) the conceptualization of a fear
appeal; (b) the types of mediational processes proposed; and (c) the nature
of the function relating fear to attitude change. [For a thoroughgoing
critique of Janis' model, the interested reader is referred to Leventhal (43).]
In operationalizing fear appeals, Janis and Feshbach combined informa-
tion about the extent of bodily injury (which is similar to a magnitude of
noxiousness variable) and personalized references (which is similar to a

probability of occurrence variable), such as "this can happen to you" (33,
p. 79). Thus, they manipulated both factors conjointly, as Chu (11) and
Snider (68) subsequently did, which produced a strong-fear or high-threat
condition in which the depicted event was described as highly noxious and
likely to occur, and a low-fear or low-threat condition in which the event
was described as less noxious and less likely to occur. More recently, in
diagramming the manipulatable stimulus events that comprise different
levels of intensity of threat, Janis (32, p. 173) combined likelihood, impor-
tance, and resources for coping. Although there is nothing logically incor-
rect about his conceptualization of fear appeals, the rival protection moti-
vation theory argues that much may be gained by treating fear appeals
more analytically. Hence, as has been shown, numerous measures covary
with the level of fear aroused, and it is difficult to identify important
functional relationships. These components must be differentiated and
investigated independently.
A second major contrast is the relative emphasis placed upon cognitive
processes. In 1967 as in 1953, Janis cited the position of the reinforcement
learning theorists (e. g., 58) that whenever fear is aroused, one will be
motivated to ward off the painful emotional state and will persist until this
has been accomplished in some way. Although Janis has not been disposed
explicitly to adopt all of the reinforcement learning theory position, it is
clear that fear retains the functional properties of an acquired drive and
that the effects of fear upon attitude change depend upon the amount of
drive reduction (or reduction of emotional tension) contiguous with rehears-
al of the communicator's recommendations. However, there has been a
growing disenchantment with drive constructs expressed in recent texts on
motivation (6, 8, 12), and several tests of fear-reduction reinforcing attitude
change clearly have not supported that hypothesis (20, 44). Although Janis
might not insist upon retaining these drive and drive-reduction concepts,
he has not explicitly rejected them. Even though he refers to fear as
reflective and anticipatory, involving higher mental processes, the term
fear will continue to connote visceral, lower-level processes to many. As
has been shown, this association of an emotional state of fear with lower-
level processes is not consistent with many emerging theories of emotion,
anxiety, and stress.
For Janis, higher mental processes simply mediate between the emo-
tional state and attitude change, whereas the cognitive processes are the
critical mediational events in protection motivation theory. This differen-
tial emphasis has important consequences for the type of independent

variables that are manipulated and the dependent variables that are mea-
sured. Janis' interpretation thus focuses upon alleviation of an unpleasant
emotional state (resulting in the neglect of the components of a fear appeal
that was previously mentioned), whereas the proposed theory focuses more
explicitly upon protection from the external danger (resulting in a more
exact specification of the parameters of that danger). Another handicap in
dealing with an emotional state of reflective fear is that it must be present
to motivate the acquisition of new responses. Janis (32) asserted that fear
appeals will fail unless they evoke emotional arousal. However, animal
studies (e. g., 70, 80) and human studies (e. g., 39) have shown that
avoidance responses and fear responses can be dissociated. Additionally,
there are the automatized forms of coping (e. g., crossing a street) where
protection motivation is aroused and protective behavior is performed, but
no emotional state of fear is aroused. Although one of Janis' most fre-
quently cited contributions has been his analysis of techniques of defensive
avoidance to reduce unpleasant emotional tension, an equally plausible
interpretation of the lack of covariation between emotional arousal and
attitude change is that they are independent processes and that the cogni-
tive processes specified in protection motivation theory mediate attitude
change and emotional arousal.
The final distinction to be mentioned is Janis' assertion that persuasion is
an inverted If-shaped function of the level of fear aroused. Janis (32)
postulated a family of curves in a three-dimensional space. The level of
fear arousal is plotted on the X axis, probability of acceptance of a
recommendation is represented on the Y axis, and the Z axis represents any
variable that might interact with fear arousal in affecting acceptance (e. g.,
source credibility, personality variables, etc.). Thus, one limitation is im-
mediately apparent. The model can study fear arousal and only one other
independent variable at a time, unless an investigator is willing to consider
curves in four or more dimensions. Leventhal (43) has criticized tren-
chantly Janis' procedures for fitting data to a curvilinear function and
demonstrated that equally plausible procedures would yield entirely different
functions. Since Leventhal's criticism was very incisive, only one addi-
tional example will be given. Janis plotted acceptance as a function of
emotional arousal for two experiments which investigated dispositional
variables. When the Janis and Feshbach (34) study of anxiety was plotted
using the obtained emotional arousal scores, the inverted V-shaped func-
tion emerged. However, the curvilinear function was derived by plotting
Goldstein's (23) data solely on the basis of the scores obtained on the
personality measure of coping versus avoiding (thus ignoring the obtained

emotional arousal scores), so Janis did that.
Leventhal also demonstrated that Janis' family of curves could be used
in a post hoc manner to explain a host of main effects and a variety of
interaction effects simply by shifting the position of the experimental cells
on the emotional arousal dimension. However, as Janis has acknowledged,
it is extremely hazardous to compare fear-arousal scores among experi-
ments in the absence of a reliable and valid method of scaling fear re-
sponses (especially if they employ different dependent measures and differ-
ent topics). In the absence of such a scaling technique, it is difficult to
imagine any set of empirical findings that could falsify Janis' formulation.
Janis' (32) suggestion that a proper use of the curvilinear model is to help
us reinterpret experiments previously conducted should be rejected. De-
spite the plausibility and ubiquity of a curvilinear function, which is the
relationship found between intensity of many motivational variables and
performance (cf 17, 53), Janis' model is not even descriptively adequate.
Janis has acknowledged the difficulty of falsifying such a flexible formula-
tion and suggested that the model's value should also lie in its ability to
generate new hypotheses. However, it seems appropriate to question the
utility of generating new hypotheses if it is impossible to disconfirm them.
It is difficult to specify differential empirical consequences of the Janis
and protection motivation theories because the family of inverted U'-shaped
curves formulation may not be falsifiable and because Janis' conceptualiza-
tion of a fear appeal confounds the three independent components of the
protection motivation formulation. Nevertheless, Janis' formulation did
have the salutary effect of refining the types of research questions that were
posed. He taught us to cease asking the simplistic question of whether fear
facilitated or inhibited attitude change, but rather to seek interacting
variables that might facilitate persuasion. The protection motivation con-
ceptualization offers, in a coherent theoretical framework, three such in-
teracting variables that have been demonstrated to have empirical utility.
Thus, the major advantages of protection motivation theory are (a) a more
analytic conception of the constituent components of a fear appeal; (b) an
emphasis upon cognitive, rather than emotional, mediational processes;
and (c) a set of hypotheses that are falsifiable.
2. Leventhal's Parallel Response Model
The most prolific empirical investigator of fear appeals has been Howard
Leventhal, who is responsible for approximately 50% of the studies pub-
lished in the last decade. His extensive research program led him to reject
the hypothesis that fear-as-acquired-drive produces attitude change. Lev-

enthal (43) postulated instead two independent processes he labeled
danger control and fear control, which process information about the
environment and internal cues, respectively. A cognitive encoder initiates
both instrumental adaptive behavior and the emotional reaction. The
emotional response of fear is not necessary to mediate adaptive behavior.
The same causal sequence has been derived from expectancy-value theory
by Atkinson (6). This position is similar to Rescorla and Solomon's (60)
aforementioned suggestion that avoidance behavior and peripheral CRs
labeled fear may both be mediated by a common central state, and it is
consistent with Lacey's (38) and Lang's (39) position that different
mechanisms may mediate physiological, cognitive, and behavioral activity.
Leventhal (43) noted that fear communications typically present informa-
tion about the causes and consequences of a danger and methods to avoid
the danger, but he did not specifically and systematically relate these
components to his theoretical concepts of fear and danger control. Al-
though he repeatedly referred in a general fashion to aspects of the stimulus
situation that can facilitate or inhibit the danger and fear control processes,
he did not clearly specify what these aspects are or how they affect the two
processes. He did identify three important classes of information as
emanating from external stimulation, internal stimulation, and instrumen-
tal behavior. One gets a bit more guidance in that the danger control
process encodes information about a coping response and information from
the environment. Therefore, a major deficiency of the parallel response
model is that it lacks adequate rules of correspondence to link theoretical
constructs to observable events. The model does not indicate those anteced-
ent conditions (especially the components of a fear appeal) that regulate
its intervening variables, the danger and fear control processes, much less
indicate the interrelationships among these antecedent conditions. (Protec-
tion motivation theory might be viewed as differentiating the danger con-
trol process into three cognitive mediational constructs that do have ob-
servable stimulus antecedents.)
A second inadequacy of the parallel response model is that the logical
relationships of the constructs are not sufficiently precise to generate un-
equivocal hypotheses. While an assumption of the independence of the
danger and fear control processes may predict an independence of verbal,
physiological, and overt behavioral measures, as Leventhal suggests, it is
doubtful that many of the "predictions" are derivable from the model.
After stating that the fear and danger control processes are independent
but may sometimes interact, even competitively, Leventhal asserted that

"the parallel response model clearly leads us to expect that for the most
part there will be positive associations between fear and persuasion" (43, p.
127). Although this statement clearly is consistent with the bulk of the
empirical data, it is not at all clear that it is derivable from the model's
constructs and linking statements. It represents more of an empirical
generalization than a prediction deduced from the model. The relations
between the constructs need to be specified much more carefully.
Leventhal (43) cited the study by Chu (11), which found an effectiveness
of response variable to have a positive effect upon acceptance, as being
compatible with the danger control process of his formulation. This finding
is also compatible with Janis' curvilinear model, protection motivation
theory, and, undoubtedly, a number of others. If a major source of infor-
mational input into the danger control process concerns protective agents,
then the prediction of an effectiveness of response variable facilitating
persuasion may be plausible. However, since the fear control process
sometimes competes with the danger control process, then under some
heretofore unspecified conditions this prediction might not be expected. It
is one thing for an empirical finding to be consistent with a model and
quite another thing for that model clearly to predict that effect (as Leven-
thal would doubtless agree). Protection motivation theory does predict the
main effect of the efficacy variable and, in addition, predicts interactions
with each of the two other component variables of a fear appeal. Further-
more, these predictions are derived from explicitly stated assumptions.
It should be noted that protection motivation theory is a new formula-
tion and thus cannot compare its empirical accomplishments with Janis'
and Leventhal's accomplishments. However, Leventhal's query of Janis'
model might also be applied to the parallel response model: "We may also
wonder whether it is an explanatory and predictive model or strictly a post
hoc descriptive schema" (43, p. 161). However, we should not be overly
critical of the model, since Leventhal has recognized that "It is merely a
first step toward structuring a theory, and it claims to be no more" (p. 181).
Since the relationships between the major theoretical constructs have not
been fully specified, nor have the antecedent controlling variables been
delineated, it must be concluded that, for the present, the parallel response
model has not been sufficiently developed to be evaluated. An important
value of the model is its rejection of the oversimplification of the construct
of an emotional state of fear as the primary process mediating attitude
change. The parallel response model also differentiates processes subsumed
under more global labels. Hopefully, protection motivation theory is even

more precise, specific, and testable.
E. LIMITATIONS OF PROTECTION MOTIVATION THEORY
It is recognized, of course, that other environmental and cognitive vari-

ables may be important determiners of attitude change. The proposed
formulation does not attempt to specify all of the possible factors in a fear
appeal that might effect persuasion, but rather attempts a systematic
exposition of a limited set of components and cognitive mediational pro-
cesses that might account for a large portion of the variance in acceptance of a
communicator's recommendations. A more exhaustive formulation would

have to include, for example, the temporal parameters of the duration of the
noxious stimulus and the interval between presentation of information and
the actual onset of the aversive event. Another important variable that might
affect acceptance of a recommended coping response is a response-cost factor:
that is, the painfulness of the amount of work involved in implementmg the
recommendation. Dispositional factors have been neglected, and one might
wish to consider a number of personality variables, such as anxiety (34) and
defensive style (77), that have been shown to influence appraisal of noxious
stimuli.
No doubt predictive power could be improved by the process of includ-
ing additional variables or finding regression coefficients for the proposed
ones. Protection motivation theory is circumspect, but intentionally so.
Hopefully, the delimitation of the theory will serve to make it amenable to
conceptual and empirical investigation. A broader conceptual framework
can be achieved through an orderly progression of theory building and
empirical research. Hopefully, protection motivation theory can facilitate
our understanding of the effects of fear appeals upon attitude change.
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Department of Psychology
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Columbia, South Carolina 29208

A Protection Motivation Theory of Fear Appeals and Attitude Change1

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A Protection Motivation Theory of Fear Appeals

To cite this article: Ronald W. Rogers (1975) A Protection Motivation Theory of

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A PROTECTION MOTIVATION THEORY OF FEAR

crucial components of a fear appeal to be (a) the magnitude of noxiousness

In one of the earliest theoretical analyses of the effects of fear arousal

change. A protection motivation theory will be described that attempts to

B. FEAR AS A MOTIVATIONAL INTERVENING VARIABLE

Historically, fear has been conceptualized as an affective state protecting

acquired-drive model, specifically citing the work of Miller (55) and

events as well. The close relationship between emotion and muscular

C. A PROTECTION MOTIVATION THEORY

consequence. The expectancy-value formulations (also referred to as

2. Components and Mediating Processes

variables is not unique to protection motivation theory. Several inves-

attitude change. When we refer to the cumulative nature of science, we are

OF OCCURRENCE I MOTIVATION I REl:OMMENlED RESPONSE

Therefore, a basic postulate is that protection motivation arises from the

these variables. Within a low-noxiousness condition, the superiority of a high

The proposed formulation asserts that attitude change is not mediated by

relative to central representations, then perhaps social and personality

termed revolutionary by Dember, who observed that "Psychology has gone

3. Incorporation of Descriptive Variables

similar to noxiousness, probability, or efficacy. It will be shown briefly

in efficacy of a coping response increased compliance with the com-

bined fear-arousing information and statements of likelihood of occurrence

iousness, probability of occurrence, and/or efficacy of coping response. For

less correct appraisal of how severe and/or likely an event is to occur.

D. Contrasts with Rival Theories

noxiousness variable) and personalized references (which is similar to a

tial emphasis has important consequences for the type of independent

personality measure of coping versus avoiding (thus ignoring the obtained

the hypothesis that fear-as-acquired-drive produces attitude change. Lev-

but may sometimes interact, even competitively, Leventhal asserted that

under more global labels. Hopefully, protection motivation theory is even

It is recognized, of course, that other environmental and cognitive vari-

communicator's recommendations. A more exhaustive formulation would

8. BOLLES, R. C. Theory of Motivation. New York: Harper & Row, 1967.

34. Personality differences associated with responsiveness to fear-arousing com-

Handbook of Psychotherapy and Behavior Change: An Empirical Analysis. New York:

56. MOWRER, O. H. A stimulus-response analysis of anxiety and its role as a reinforcing

extinction in dogs deprived of normal peripheral autonomic function. Genet. Psychol,

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