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Olga Tellis & Ors. V - Bombay Municipal Corporation: National Law University Jodhpur
Olga Tellis & Ors. V - Bombay Municipal Corporation: National Law University Jodhpur
VS.
SUBMITTED BY
VARUN MISHRA
Olga Tellis & Ors Vs. Bombay Municipal Corporation & Ors
CITATION
AIR 1986 SC 18
(1985) 3 SCC 545
PARTIES
Petitioner
Ms. Olga Tellis (A Lady Journlist & Social Activist)
Vayyapuri Kuppusami
Respondent
Bombay Municipal Corporation
State of Maharashtra
BENCH
LAW INVOLVED
Constitution of India, 1950: Articles 14, 15, 16, 19, 19(1), 21, 22, 25, 29, 32, 37, 39, and
Article 41
Indian Penal Code, 1860: Section 441.
Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, 1888: Sections 312, 313, 314.
This was a Writ Petition filed under Article 32 of the Constitution. Olga Tellis, a lady journalist
along with People‟s Union For Civil Liberties and other organizations challenged the order of
eviction passed by Mr. A.R. Antulay, the then Chief Minister of Maharashtra. Pavement dwellers
and Public Interest Organizations claimed that order of eviction of pavement dwellers is violative
of fundamental rights. Eviction deprives them, inter alia, of their Fundamental Rights enshrined
in Article 19 and Right to Life guaranteed under Article 21.
The state of Maharashtra in 1981 and the Bombay Municipal Corporation decided to evict
the pavement dwellers and those who were residing in slums in Bombay.
Pursuant to that, the then Chief Minister of Maharashtra Mr. A. R. Antulay ordered on July
13 to evict slum dwellers and pavement dwellers out of Bombay and to deport them to their
place of origin.
The eviction was to proceed under Section 314 of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act
1888.
On hearing about the Chief Minister‟s announcement they filed a writ petition in the High
Court of Bombay for an order of injunction restraining the officers of the state government
and the Bombay Municipal Corporations from implementing the directive of the Chief
Minister.
The High Court of Bombay granted an ad interim injunction to be in force until July 21 1981.
Respondents agreed that the huts will not be demolished until October 15, 1981. Contrary to
agreement, on July 23 1981, petitioners were huddled in to State Transport buses for being
deported out of Bombay.
They respondents action was challenged by the petitioner on the ground that it is violative of
Articles 19 and 21 of the Constitution. They also ask for a declaration that Section 312, 313
and 314 of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act 1888 are violative of Article 14, 19 and
21 of the Constitution.
To direct the government officials to withdraw the decision to demolish the pavement
dwellings and the slum hutments; and
To restore possession of the sites to the former occupants, where they are already
demolished.
ISSUES INVOLVED
The issues which were considered by the Hon‟ble court in this case were as follows:
Respondent argued that pavement dwellers had conceded in the High Court that they did not
claim any fundamental right to put up huts on pavements or public roads and that they will
not obstruct the demolition of the huts after due date.
Court Observed, there can neither estoppel against the Constitution nor waiver of fundamental
rights. Court observed: “No individual can barter away the freedoms conferred upon him by the
Constitution. A concession made by him in a proceeding whether under a mistake of law or
otherwise that he does not possess or will not enforce any particular fundamental right, cannot
create an estoppel against him in that or any subsequent proceedings. Such a concession if
enforced would defeat the purpose of the Constitution.”
Petitioners submitted that „right to life‟ guaranteed by the art. 21 includes right to livelihood
and since, they will be deprived of their livelihood if they are evicted from their slum and
pavement dwellings, their eviction would be tantamount to deprivation of their life and hence
unconstitutional.
Court observed, “The sweep of the right to life conferred by Article 21 is wide and far reaching.
It does not mean merely that life cannot be extinguished or taken away except according to
Petitioner argued that the procedure prescribed by Section 314 of the Act, 1888 for the
removal of encroachment from pavement is arbitrary and unreasonable since, not only does it
not provide for the giving of notice before the removal of an encroachment but, it provides
expressly that the Municipal Commissioner may cause the encroachment to be removed
„without notice‟.
Court Held; the Constitution does not put an absolute embargo on the deprivation of life or
personal liberty. By Article 21 such deprivation has to be according to procedure established law.
Section 314 is in the nature of an enabling provision and not of a compulsive character. It confers
on the commissioner the discretion to cause an encroachment to be removed with or without
notice. It is so designed as to exclude the principles of natural justice by way of exception and
not as a general rule. The sections 312(1), 313(1)(a), and 314 empowers the Municipal
Commissioner to cause to removed encroachment on footpaths over which the public has the
right of passage, cannot be regarded as unreasonable, unfair or unjust.
Chinnappa Reddy, J. Said: In our view the principles of natural justice know of no
exclusionary rule dependent on whether it would have made any difference if natural justice had
been observed. The non-observance of natural justice is itself prejudice to any man and proof of
prejudice independently of proof of denial of natural justice is unnecessary. It will come from a
person who has denied justice that the person who has been denied justice is not prejudiced.
HELD
Though the Court declined to hold that evicted dwellers had a right to an alternative site but
instead made orders that:
No person has the right to encroach on footpaths, pavements or any other place reserved
or ear marked for public purpose.
The provision contained in Section 314 of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act is not
unreasonable in the circumstances of the case.
Sites should be provided to residents censused in 1976.
Slums in existence for 20 years or more were not to be removed unless land was required
for public purposes and in that case, alternative sites must be provided.
High priority should be given to resettlement.
EVALUATION
The decision of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in this case is influenced by the values of humanity.
The eviction orders were held valid under Article 14, and 19 of the Constitution, but the right to
life was widened enough so as to bring the „right to livelihood‟ within the purview of „right to
life‟ under Article 21 of the Constitution. The Hon‟ble court held that the respondents (Bombay
Olga Tellis case has helped the propertied classes a much. Lawyers often cite the case to justify
eviction of tenants. But it also helped the slum dwellers and pavement dwellers. The Government
cannot evict them summarily. The case also spawned a lot of interest in fighting for housing as a
fundamental right but if you were a pavement dweller, it is just not enough. This case is widely
quoted as exemplifying the use of civil and political rights to advance social rights but it is also
viewed as problematic due to its failure to provide for the right to resettlement.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
This judgment reflects very much the „Principle of Utility‟ propounded by Jeremy Bentham.
Principle of Utility incorporates that aim of a state action should be “the greatest happiness of the
greatest number”. According to Bentham happiness can be maximized only if instances of pain
are lighter and fewer. The judgment delivered by the Hon‟ble Court can be said to be the replica
of the idea embodied in the „Principle of Utility‟. Slum and pavement dwellers constitute almost
half of the total population of the Bombay. Involvement of interests of such a large number of
peoples compelled the Court to pen down in their favour despite of the existence of the specific
law for the eviction of pavement dwellers. According to chief justice Y.V.Chandrachud,
although the petitioners are using pavements and public properties unauthorizedly, but they are
in no way “criminal trespassers” under section 441 of the Indian Penal Code since their object or
reason behind doing so is not to commit any offence or intimidates, insult or annoy any person,
rather they are compelled by inevitable circumstances and are not guided by choice. They just
manage to find a habitat in filthy or marshy places. This decision where widened the scope of the
term „life‟, has also paved the way for reformation of substantive law.