X.

PATERNITY AND FILIATION

A. Concept of paternity, filiation and legitimacy

FC 163 The filiation of children may be by nature or by adoption. Natural filiation may be legitimate or illegitimate.

B. Legitimate children
FC 164 Children conceived or born during the marriage of the parents are legitimate.
Children conceived as a result of artificial insemination of the wife with the sperm of the husband or that of a donor or both are likewise legitimate children of the husband and his wife,
provided, that both of them authorized or ratified such insemination in a written instrument executed and signed by them before the birth of the child. The instrument shall be recorded in
the civil registry together with the birth certificate of the child.
FC 165 Children conceived and born outside a valid marriage are illegitimate, unless otherwise provided in this Code
In rel to NCC 256 The child shall be presumed legitimate, although the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress.
NCC 257 Should the wife commit adultery at or about the time of the conception of the child, but there was no physical impossibility of access between her and her husband as set forth
in Article 255, the child is prima facie presumed to be illegitimate if it appears highly improbable, for ethnic reasons, that the child is that of the husband. For the purposes of this article,
the wife's adultery need not be proved in a criminal case.
NCC 166 Unless the wife has been declared a non compos mentis or a spendthrift, or is under civil interdiction or is confined in a leprosarium, the husband cannot alienate or encumber
any real property of the conjugal partnership without the wife's consent. If she refuses unreasonably to give her consent, the court may compel her to grant the same.
This article shall not apply to property acquired by the conjugal partnership before the effective date of this Code.
NCC 167 . In case of abuse of powers of administration of the conjugal partnership property by the husband, the courts, on petition of the wife, may provide for receivership, or
administration by the wife, or separation of property.
NCC 168 The wife may, by express authority of the husband embodied in a public instrument, administer the conjugal partnership property.
NCC 169 The wife may also by express authority of the husband appearing in a public instrument, administer the latter's estate.

TAN v TROCIO
Facts:
- April 1971 – when as Felicidad said, Galileo Trocio raped her which begot a son,
Jewel
o Didn‘t immediately tell the police since Trocio was thereatening to have her alien
husband and to tell authrorities that she was violating the Anti-Dummy Law in
operation of her vocational school
- Nov 1979 – Felicidad filed case of disbarment against Atty. Trocio
o Trocio denied allegation of rape, only testifying that he dealt her and her family‘s
cases and said she was only doing this because he declined on her request to
increase his fee so that she may get the extra.
- Feb 13 1986 – since Trocio failed to attend the hearings etc, Provincial fiscal of
Lanao Del Norte, on prima facie evidence presented, held Trocio administratively
liable.
ISSUE: WON Trocio should be disbarred for gross immoral conduct
HELD: NO, there is lack of evidence
- After incident, she still asked him to be the lawyer for her cases such as a robbery
case
and her claim for indeminity when a fire burned down the school
- The fear that her alien husband would be deported has actually been an absent fear
since she said she lost contact of her husband on the night the tryst happened.
- Keeping her peace for 8 years could be construed as a condonation of his alleged
immoral conduct. Testimony of household help that they heard her cries for help is
negated by fact that she said it happened in school premises. How could the help have
been there then?
- INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SHOW IT WAS HIS SON: (1) unusual closeness as
testified by her household help (2) pictures of Jewel and Trocio together = not enough
ground to establish paternity
Presumption is Jewel is the child of the alien husband since he was born on 1972
when husband and Felicidad were living together.

ANGELES v MAGLAYA
Facts:
- Nov 20, 1939 – when Aleli Maglaya was born
- 1948 – when deceased Francisco married Belen Angeles
- 1988 – when her mother Genoveva died
- March 1998 – when Aleli Maglaya filed in Rtv –Caloocan petition to be made
administratix of late Francisco Angeles‘ estate since she is sole legitimate daughter of
Francisco. This was contested by his wife Belen Angeles.
- RTC: Aleli failed to prove filiation
- CA: reversed decision and said that Aleli was indeed a legitimate child of Francisco
and Genoveva
ISSUE: WON CA erred in declaring Aleli as a legitimate child
HELD: YES
- Law applied: FC 164 – ―children conceived or born during the marriage of parents
are legitimate‖
- Aleli never showed any evidence of a marriage existing between Francisco and
Genoveva. In fact, if they did marry, it would have rendered Francisco‘s marriage to
Belen as bigamouse. However, Aleli herself recognized Belen as the surviving spouse
in her petition for letters of administration
o Without evidence of marriage, one can’t presume Aleli to be legitimate child
- CA erred in declaring that birth certificate indubitably establishes legitimacy
o In order for legitimacy to be established, birth certificate must bear the signatures of
BOTH mother and father. Only attending physician‘s signature was in the certificate.
Thus it only showed the fact of birth of a child and not legitimacy
- Papers and photogrpahs that show Francisco Angeles as her father is not sufficient
enough to prove filiation.
RESULT: at best, could only be declared a natural child and NOT a legitimate child.
- SSS vs. Aguas
ISSUE: WON Janet and Jeylynn are legitimate daughters of Pablo?
HELD: Only Jeylynn is
- Jeylynn – proven by birth certificate where signature of Pablo is present and the fact
that she was born on 1991 when marriage between Pablo and Rosana who were
married on 1977 was still susbsisting
o Pablo never once questioned legitimacy of Jeylynn
o Presumption of legitimacy, conditions that husband may contest (398)
- Janet – birth certificate shown was only photocopy with no confirmation by civil
register regarding her date of birth. Thus if one can‘t show that one is born during the
marriage then can‘t be presumed legitimate
Said that she was adopted but no papers to prove it and only legally adopted children
are considered dependent children. Thus she can‘t be a beneficiary.

SAYSON v CA
DOCTRINE: Adopted child/ children has no right of representation
FACTS:
Eleno and Rafaela Sayson begot five children, namely, Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa,
Remedios and Teodoro. Eleno died on November 10, 1952, and Rafaela on
May15,1976. Teodoro, who had married Isabel Bautista, died on March 23, 1972. His
wife died nine years later. Their properties were left in the possession of Delia,
Edmundo, and Doribel, all surnamed Sayson, who claim to be their children. Mauricio,
Rosario, Basilisa, and Remedios, together with Juana C. Bautista, Isabel's mother,
filed a complaint for partition and accounting of theintestate estate of Teodoro and
Isabel Sayson. Delia, Edmundo and Doribel filed their own complaint, this time for the
accounting and partition of the intestate estate of Eleno and Rafaela Sayson, against
the couple's four surviving children. Both cases filed on the Lower Court were decided
in favor Delia, et al. on the basis of practically the same evidence. The Lower Court
declared that Delia and Edmundo were the legally adopted children of Teodoro and
Isabel Sayson by virtue of the decree of adoption. Doribel was their legitimate
daughter as evidenced by her birth certificate. Consequently, the three children were
entitled to inherit from Eleno and Rafaela by right of representation. Both cases were
appealed to the Court of Appeals, where they were consolidated. The appellate court
affirmed that Delia, et al. are entitled to the intestate estate of spouses Teodoro and
Isabel Sayson. However, Delia and Edmundo are disqualified from inheriting from the
estate of the deceased spouses Eleno and Rafaela Sayson.
ISSUE: W/N CA is correct in holding that Delia and Edmundo are disqualified to inherit
from the estate of the deceased spouses Eleno and Rafaela Sayson.
HELD:
A different conclusion must be reached in the case of Delia and Edmundo, to whom
the grandparents were total strangers.
While it is true that the adopted child shall be deemed to be a legitimate child and have
the same right as the latter, these rights do not include the right of representation. The
relationship created by the adoption is between only the adopting parents and the
adopted child and does not extend to the blood relatives of either party. In sum, we
agree with the lower courts that Delia and Edmundo as the adopted children and
Doribelas the legitimate daughter of Teodoro Sayson and Isabel Bautista, are their
exclusive heirs and are under no obligation to share the estate of their parents with the
petitioners. The Court of Appeals was correct, however, in holding that only Doribel
has the right of representation in the inheritance of her grandparents' intestate estate,
the other private respondents being only the adoptive children of the deceased
Teodoro.

SSS v AGUAS
FACTS: Pablo Aguas, SSS member and pensioner, died 12/8/96. Pablo‘s surviving
spouse, respondent Rosanna filed a claim with SSS for death benefits. She indicated
in her claim that Pablo was likewise survived by his minor child, Jeylynn, born
10/29/91 4/97, SSS received a sworn letter from Pablo‘s sister Letecia contesting
Rosanna‘s claim for death benefits, alleged that Rosanna abandoned the family abode
more than 6 years before the and lived w/ another man, de la Pena; Pablo had no
legal children w/ Rosanna. Letecia enclosed birth cert of Jefren – born 11/15/96 to
Rosanna and de la Pena and that the 2 were married 11/1/90 Rosanna contends that
Jeylynn was a legitimate child of Pablo as evidenced by her birth cert bearing Pablo‘s
signature as father Janet, who also claimed to be the child of deceased and Rosanna,
joined as claimant. It appears in her birth cert that her father was Pablo and her
mother was Rosanna. SSS summoned several persons; some stated that spouses‘
real child was Jeylynn, Janet was only an adopted child but there were no legal
papers. SSS ruled that Rosanna was no longer qualified as claimant. As for Jeylynn
and Janet, they were not Pablo‘s legitimate children.
ISSUE: WON Jeylynn ad Janet are legitimate children of deceased (thus entitled to
death benefits)
HELD: YES (Jeylynn); NO (Janet) Jeylynn‘s claim is justified by her birth cert w/c
bears Pablo‘s signature (showing she was born 10/29/91; Rosanna and Pablo were
married 12/4/77 and marriage subsisted until latter‘s death on 12/8/96). Under A164,
FC, children conceived or born during the marriage of parents are legitimate.
Presumption of legitimacy can‘t extend to Janet because her date of birth wasn‘t
substantially proven. Under RA1161, only ―legally adopted‖ children are considered
dependent children.

RIVERA v HEIRS OF VILLANUEVA

FACTS: Petitioners are allegedly half-brothers, half-sis-in-law and children of a half-
brother of deceased PACITA. Respondents are allegedly siblings, full and half-blood of
ROMUALDO; respondents are denominated as heirs of Romualdo. Respondent
Angelina is allegedly the daughter of Pacita and Romualdo. From 1927 until her death
in 1980, Pacita cohabited w/ Romualdo w/out the benefit of marriage because the
latter was married to Musngi who died on 4/20/63. In the course of their cohabitation,
they acquired several properties. Pacita died 7/3/80 without leaving a will. 8/8/80,
Romualdo and respondent Angelina executed a deed of extrajudicial partition w/sale
(an extrajudicial settlement of Pacita‘s estate). Petitioners filed a case for partition of
Pacita‘s estate and annulment of
titles. RTC made 2 findings 1) Pacita was never married to Romualdo 2) respondent
Angelina was her illegitimate child by Romualdo
ISSUE: WON respondent Angelina was illegitimate daughter of Pacita
HELD: NO, a closer examination of the birth cert reveals that respondent Angelina was
listed as ―adopted‖ by both Pacita and Romualdo. And mere registration of a child in
his birth cert as the child of the supposed parents is not a valid adoption, it does not
confer upon the child the status of an adopted child and the legal rights of such child.
Thus, she can‘t inherit from Pacita. Pacita was 44 y.o., on the verge of menopause at
the time of the alleged birth; Pacita had been living childless w/Romualdo for 20 years

1. Who are considered legitimate children

a. Conceived during marriage
i. Valid marriage
ii. Terminated marriage under FC 42 in rel to FC 43 (1)
FC 42 The subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding Article shall be automatically terminated by the recording of the affidavit of reappearance of the absent spouse, unless there
is a judgment annulling the previous marriage or declaring it void ab initio.
A sworn statement of the fact and circumstances of reappearance shall be recorded in the civil registry of the residence of the parties to the subsequent marriage at the instance of any
interested person, with due notice to the spouses of the subsequent marriage and without prejudice to the fact of reappearance being judicially determined in case such fact is disputed.
FC 43 (1) The termination of the subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding Article shall produce the following effects: (1) The children of the subsequent marriage conceived prior
to its termination shall be considered legitimate;
iii. Void marriages under FC 53, 36
FC 53 Either of the former spouses may marry again after compliance with the requirements of the immediately preceding Article; otherwise, the subsequent marriage shall be null and
void.
FC 36 Psychological incapacity
iv. Voidable marriages FC 45
FC 45 A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing at the time of the marriage:
(1) That the party in whose behalf it is sought to have the marriage annulled was eighteen years of age or over but below twenty-one, and the marriage was solemnized without the
consent of the parents, guardian or person having substitute parental authority over the party, in that order, unless after attaining the age of twenty-one, such party freely cohabited with
the other and both lived together as husband and wife;
(2) That either party was of unsound mind, unless such party after coming to reason, freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife;
(3) That the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless such party afterwards, with full knowledge of the facts constituting the fraud, freely cohabited with the other as husband
and wife;
(4) That the consent of either party was obtained by force, intimidation or undue influence, unless the same having disappeared or ceased, such party thereafter freely cohabited with the
other as husband and wife;
(5) That either party was physically incapable of consummating the marriage with the other, and such incapacity continues and appears to be incurable; or
(6) That either party was afflicted with a sexually-transmissible disease found to be serious and appears to be incurable.

b. Born during marriage

c. Conceived by artificial insemination
NCC 40 Birth determines personality; but the conceived child shall be considered born for all purposes that are favorable to it, provided it be born later with the conditions specified in the
following article.
FC 164 Children conceived or born during the marriage of the parents are legitimate.
Children conceived as a result of artificial insemination of the wife with the sperm of the husband or that of a donor or both are likewise legitimate children of the husband and his wife,
provided, that both of them authorized or ratified such insemination in a written instrument executed and signed by them before the birth of the child. The instrument shall be recorded in
the civil registry together with the birth certificate of the child.

d. Adopted children
e. Legitimated Children

2. Rights of legitimate children

FC 173 The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child during his or her lifetime and shall be transmitted to the heirs should the child die during minority or in a state of
insanity. In these cases, the heirs shall have a period of five years within which to institute the action.
FC 174 Legitimate children shall have the right:

(1) To bear the surnames of the father and the mother, in conformity with the provisions of the Civil Code on Surnames;
(2) To receive support from their parents, their ascendants, and in proper cases, their brothers and sisters, in conformity with the provisions of this Code on Support; and
(3) To be entitled to the legitimate and other successional rights granted to them by the Civil Code.
NCC 364 Legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the surname of the father.
NCC 374 In case of identity of names and surnames, the younger person shall be obliged to use such additional name or surname as will avoid confusion.
NCC 376 No person can change his name or surname without judicial authority.
NCC 888 The legitime of legitimate children and descendants consists of one-half of the hereditary estate of the father and of the mother.
NCC 979 Legitimate children and their descendants succeed the parents and other ascendants, without distinction as to sex or age, and even if they should come from different
marriages. An adopted child succeeds to the property of the adopting parents in the same manner as a legitimate child.

MOORE v REPUBLIC
Facts: Petitioner Elaine Moore (American citizen) is married with Joseph Velarde (also
American) had a son out of wedlock William Michael Velarde (now 14 yrs old) born
also at US.
Said marriage however was dissolved through a decree of divorce from SC of
California on 5/31/49. Elaine had 2nd marriage with Don Moore on 9/29/56 at LA, CA.
William (minor) lived with them.
Elaine filed @ CFI Rizal a motion to have her child‘s surname be changed into Moore
instead of Velarde. TC denied such petition therefore this appeal.
Issue: Government of the Phil. Opposed such petition with the following issues a)
WON law permits minor to adopt surname of the 2nd husband of his mother b) WON
justifiable reason exists to allow change of name c) WON mother has the authority to
ask such
Held: Regarding the 1st issue, RP said that through NCC 364 legitimate child should
use the surname of his father. NCC 369 moreover cites that in case of annulment,
child conceived before such decree shall use the surname of his/ her father. Likewise,
same concept rules over decree of divorce; therefore law does NOT sanction such
change of name. SC upheld such position, saying that confusion may arise wrt (with
respect to) paternity and that said change may even redound to the prejudice of the
child. Moreover, the child is still a minor and therefore aforesaid action is premature.
Said child may in his mature age decide for himself to instigate such change of name.

NALDOZA v REPUBLIC
Facts: Zosima Naldoza married Dionesio Divinagracia on 5/30/70. They had 2
children: Jr. and Bombi Roberto. Dionesio abandoned conjugal home after Zosima
confronted him about his previous marriage. Also, he allegedly swindled 50k from Rep.
Maglana and 10k from a certain Galagar, etc.
Classmates of Jr. and Bombi were teasing them because of their swindler father. To
obliterate any connection between her children and Dionesio (thereby relieving the
kids of the remarks of classmates), Zosima filed @ CFI Bohol on 4/10/78 a petition to
change surname of her 2 children from Divinagracia into Naldoza (her maiden name).
TC dismissed pet. saying that aforementioned reasons (swindling, abandoning,
previous marriage of Dionesio <but their marriage has not yet been annulled nor
declared bigamous> ) were not sufficient grounds to invoke such change of surname.
Furthermore, change of name would give false impression of family relations.
Issue: WON two children‘s prayer to drop their father‘s surname is justified
Held: NO. Following NCC 364, since Jr. and Bombi are LC (legitimate children),
therefore they should use their father‘s surname. Said minors and their father should
be consulted about such, mother‘s desire should not only be the sole consideration.
Change of name is allowed only upon proper and reasonable cause (Rule 103 Sec 5
ROC). Change of name may even redound to the prejudice of the children later on,
may cause confusion as to the minor‘s parentage and might also create the
impression that said minors are ICs, which is inconsistent with their legal status.
In Oshita v. Republic and in Alfon v. Republic, their petition to change names have
been granted, but petitioners in said cases have already attained mature age. In this
case, when these minors have attained the right age, then they can already file said
action for themselves.

ONG v CA
FACTS:
-Respondents Alferdo Ong Jr. and Robert Ong are children of Saturnina Caballes
allegedly by Manuel Ong.
-Manuel (representing himself as Alfredo Go) was introduced to Saturnina by Vicente
Sy and Constancia Lim (in 1953 at a night club in cebu). They had a relationship and
lived together for 4 months. It was also established that prior to meeting Manuel,
Saturnina cohabited with a paralytic.
-Alfredo Ong Jr. (registered as Alfredo Go Jr.) was born in 1955 and Robert Ong
(registered as Roberto Caballes) 1956. Roberto is surnamed Caballes because the
midwife informed Saturnina that it should be the case since she weren‘t married with
Manuel. Manuel‘s support dwindled. He stopped seeing her. She discovered his
identity and asked for support but he refused.
-In 1961 they asked for support but Manuel denied them. In two occasions Dolores Dy,
Manuel‘s commonlaw wife, treated private respondents like close relatives of Manuel
Ong by giving them on November 2, 1979 and January 6, 1977 tokens of affection,
such as family pictures of Dolores Dy and Manuel Ong and by visiting them in their
house on A. Lopez Street in 1980.
-Manuel Ong also gave money to Alfredo, first, as the latter‘s high school graduation
gift and second, for the latter‘s educational support. Manuel Ong even told Alfredo to
comeback with a list of what he needs for school but when he came back with some
friends in September 1982, Manuel turned down his request and ordered him to leave
and threatened to call the police if he did not leave.
-September 30, 1982, Alfredo filed a complaint for recognition and support against
Manuel Ong. The complaint was amended on November 25, 1982 to include Robert
as co-plaintiff. Manuel died in May 1990 while the case is pending.
TC-declared Alfredo and Robert illegitimate children of Manuel in accordance with Art.
283, pars. 2 and 4 of the Civil Code.
CA-affirm TC, cited Art. 283, par. 3 as an additional ground for ordering the recognition
of private respondents as illegitimate children.
Issue: WON Alfredo and Roberto are illegitimate children of Manuel
Held/Ratio:
Yes. Alfredo and Roberto are sons of Manuel.
Using Article 283 Paragraph. 4 (The father is obliged to recognize) When the child has
in his favor any evidence or proof that the defendant is his father .
Art. 283 operates as a blanket provision covering all cases in the preceding ones, so
that evidence, even though insufficient to constitute proof under the other paragraphs,
may nonetheless be enough to qualify the case under par. 4.
In this case, the testimony of Saturnina Caballes that she had illicit sexual relation with
Manuel Ong over a long period (1954-1957) which, had it been openly done, would
have constituted cohabitation under par. 3 is proof that private respondents were
conceived and born during such relationship and constitutes evidence of Ong‘s
paternity. This relationship was further established through the testimony of
Constancia Lim. The evidence for private respondents is not negated by the admission
of Saturnina Caballes that she had relation with another man before, because the
relationship terminated at least a year before the birth of Alfredo Ong, Jr. and two
years before the birth of the second child Robert Caballes.
SC agree that this DOES NOT fall in Art 283 (2) When the child is in continuous
possession of status of a child of the alleged father by the direct acts of the latter or his
family--- the times during which Manuel Ong met Alfredo and gave the latter money
cannot be considered proof of continuous possession of the status of a child. The
father‘s conduct toward his son must be spontaneous and uninterrupted for this
ground to exist.
Does NOT fall in Art 283 (3) When the child was conceived during the time when the
mother cohabited with the supposed father----------While Saturnina Caballes testified
that she and Manuel Ong lived together for four months as husband and wife in order
to justify a finding of cohabitation, the relationship was not open and public so as to
constitute cohabitation.
Petitioner claims that Manuel is sterile (due to illness during World War). For despite
living with 2 other women, Dolores and Victoria Veloria (later established as Victoria
Balili) but they didn‘t have a child. CA dismissed this for there is no medical proof and
Manuel acknowledged a Lourdes Balili (born 1939) as his natural child with a Victoria
Balili.
An adult male is presumed to have normal powers of virility and the burden of
evidence to prove the contrary rests upon him who claims otherwise. Petitioner has
not overcome this presumption
 REPUBLIC v CA
Facts :
The petitioner was born at Capitol Medical Center in Quezon City on January 19, 1971
to parents Pablo Castro Vicencio and Fe Esperanza de Vega Leabres. On January 10,
1927, after a marital disagreement, Vicencio left their Meycauayan Bulacan conjugal
property and never returned nor gave support to his family. Leabres found an ally in
Ernesto Yu who would later end up as her husband. On June 29, 1976, Leabres filed a
petition , known as Civil case number E-02009 with the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court for the dissolution of her conjugal partnership with Vicencio. In a
decision given by Hon Regina C. Ordoñez Benitez dated July11, 1977, the petition
was granted. The petitioner’s mother filed another petition in 1983 to drop the surname
of her husband there from and this, known as Special Proclamation 8316346 was
again approved in a decision rendered by Hon. Emeterio C. Cui of Branch XXV. Yet
again, under Special Proclamation number 84-22605, Leabres filed a petition to
declare Pablo Vicencio an absentee. Hon. Corona Ibay- Somera decided in favour of
the petitioner’s mother on April 26,1984. The positive results of these petitions paved
the way for the marriage of the petitioner’s mother and Ernesto Yu on April 15,
1986.Evidence was established that the petitioner had not remembered much her real
father, Pablo Vicencio, and that in his absence, it was Ernesto Yu who had taken
Vicencio’s place. Although petitioner uses the surname Vicencio in her school and
other related activities, she contends that in such situations, confusion arose as to her
parentage leading to inquiries as to why she is using Vicencio as surname; causing
much embarrassment on her part. In two occasions when she ran as a beauty
contestant for Lion’s Club Affair and Manila Red Cross, her name was registered as
Cynthia L. Yu. His stepfather had given his consent thereto upon prior consultation
with him. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) , having participated in the cross
examination of Cynthia Vicencio and her witnesses, manifested opposition over the
petition. The court argued that there was no valid cause for the denial of the petition
and that taking into account the fact that the court cannot compel the stepfather of the
petitioner to consider adoption, failure to observe the process should not be a cause
for disallowing petitioner to legally change her name, in addition to the opportunity of
the respondent to improve her personality and welfare under a socially recognized
surname, that of her stepfather. On August 31, 1987, the Manila Regional Trial Court
Branch 52 granted private respondent Cynthia Vicencio’s petition for change of
surname from Vicencio to Yu. The same was affirmed by the decision of the Court of
Appeals dated April 28, 1989.
CONTINENTAL STEEL v MONTANO
Facts:
 Hortillano, and employee of Continental Steel Manufacturing Corporation and
member of the Union, filed a claim for Paternity Leave, Bereavement Leave and
Death and Accident Insurance for dependent, pursuant to the Collective
Bargaining Agreement (CBA).
 The claim was based on the death of Hortillano’s unborn child. Hortillano’s wife
had a premature delivery while she was in the 38th week of pregnancy.
 Continental Steel immediately granted Hortillano’s claim for paternity leave but
denied his claims for bereavement leave and other death benefits.
 The Union and Continental Steal submitted for voluntary arbitration the sole
issue of whether Hortillano was entitled to bereavementleave and other death
benefits pursuant to the CBA.
 The parties proceeded to submit their respective position papers, replies and
rejoinders to the arbitrator they chose, Atty. Montano.
 The Union argued that Hortillano is entitled to bereavement leave and other
death benefits because it did not specifically state that a dependent should have
first been born alive or must have acquire juridical personality so that his/her
death could be covered by the CBA death benefits. On the other hand,
C. Illegitimate Children
1. Who are considered illegitimate
a. Under NCC
b. Under FC 165
FC 165 Children conceived and born outside a valid marriage are illegitimate, unless otherwise provided in this Code.
SURPOSA UY v NGO CHUA
FACTS:
 Joanie Surposa Uy filed on 27 October 2003 before the RTC a Petition for the
issuance of a decree of illegitimate filiation against Jose Ngo Chua.
 Uy alleged that Chua who was then married, had an illicit relationship with Irene
Surposa.who was then married, had an illicit relationship with Irene Surposa.
 Joanie denied that he had an illicit relationship with Irene, and that petitioner
was his daughter. Hearings then ensued during which petitioner testified that
respondent was the only father she knew; that he took care of all her needs until
she finished her college education; and that he came to visit heron special family
Issue :
Whether or not the appellate court made a mistake or violated standards in affirming
the decision of the trial court to allow the change in private respondent’s surname to
that of her stepfather’s surname.
Decision :
Recognized inter alia in Republic vs. Hernandez, the following are sufficient grounds to
warrant a change in name; a) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely
difficult to write or pronounce, b) when the change is a legal consequence of
legitimation or adoption , c. ) when the change will avoid confusion, d) when one has
continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name and was
unaware of an alien parentage, e) when the change is based on sincere desire to
adopt a Filipino name to erase sign of former alienage, in good faith without prejudice
to anybody and f) when the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing
that desired change of name was far a fraudulent purpose or would prejudice public
interest. Private respondent asserts that she falls under one of the justifiable grounds,
specifically under avoidance of confusion since she has been recognized by society as
the daughter of Ernesto Yu although she admits to having used Vicencio in beauty
pageants and in her debut. In the argument of the Solicitor General , it argues that
change in surname might give rise to legal complications since her stepfather has two
other children with her mother and such complications may affect even the issue of
inheritance should the stepfather die. The OSG further argues that change of name
would be easy through adoption which Ernesto Yu did not opt for. The court contends
that though confusion may arise with regard to parentage, more confusion with grave
legal consequences could arise if private respondent is to use his stepfather’s
surname even if she is not legally adopted by him. Legal constraints lead the court to
reject private respondent’s desire to use her step-father’s surname and no assurance
exists that the end result would not be even more detrimental to her person, as it may
trigger deeper inquiries regarding her parentage. It is also noteworthy that as a result
of Republic Act 6809, the private respondent although already 18 when the appellate
court rendered its decision, was still considered a minor. The court reversed and set
aside the appealed decision to allow private respondent’s change of name from
Vicencio to Yu and granted the instant petition to retain surname due to lack of legally
justifiable cause for allowing such change.
Continental Steal claimed that there are two elements for the entitlement to the
benefits, namely: death and status as legitimate dependent, none of which
existed in Hortillano’s case.
 Atty. Montano found that there was no dispute that the death of an employee’s
legitimate dependent occurred. The fetus had the right to be supported by the
parents from the very moment he/she was conceived. Thus, the complaint was
dismissed.
 Continental Steal filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Review on
Certiorari but it was denied.
Issues:
 Whether or not only one with juridical personality can die.
 Whether or not an unborn child can be considered as a dependent.
Held and Ratio:
 One need not acquire civil personality first before he/she could die. Even a child
inside the womb already has life.
 Even an unborn child is dependent of its parents. Hortillano’s child could not
have reached 38-39 weeks of its gestational life without depending upon its
mother for sustenance.
occasions. She also presented documentary evidence to prove her claim of
illegitimate filiation.
 Petitioner JOANIE SURPOSA UY declares, admits and acknowledges that there
is no blood relationship or filiation between petitioner and her brother Allan on
one hand and [herein respondent] JOSE NGO CHUA on the other. This
declaration, admission or acknowledgement is concurred with petitioners brother
Allan, who although not a party to the case, hereby affixes his signature to this
pleading and also abides by the declaration herein.
 As a gesture of goodwill and by way of settling petitioner and her brothers
(Allan) civil, monetary and similar claims but without admitting any liability,
 [respondent] JOSE NGO CHUA hereby binds himself to pay the petitioner the
sum of TWO MILLION PESOS (P2,000,000.00) and another TWOMILLION
PESOS (P2,000,000.00) to her brother, ALLAN SURPOSA. Petitioner and her
brother hereby acknowledge to have received in full the said compromise
amount.
 Petitioner and her brother (Allan) hereby declare that they have absolutely no
more claims, causes of action or demands against [respondent] JOSE NGO
CHUA, his heirs, successors and assigns and/or against the estate of Catalino
Chua, his heirs, successors and assigns and/or against all corporations,
companies or business enterprises including Cebu Liberty Lumber and Joe Lino
Realty Investment and Development Corporation where defendant JOSE NGO
CHUA or CATALINO NGO CHUA may have interest or participation. Chua
hereby waives all counterclaim or counter-demand with respect to the subject
matter of the present petition.
 Pursuant to the foregoing, petitioner hereby asks for a judgment for the
permanent dismissal with prejudice of the captioned petition. [Respondent] also
asks for a judgment permanently dismissing with prejudice his counterclaim.
ISSUE: Whether or not filiation can be the subject of judicial settlement?
HELD:
2. Rights of Illegitimate children
FC 173 The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child during his or her lifetime and shall be transmitted to the heirs should the child die during minority or in a state of
insanity. In these cases, the heirs shall have a period of five years within which to institute the action.
FC 172 The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
FC 175 Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children.
The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except when the action is based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action may be
brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent.
FC 176 Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. The legitime of
each illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child. Except for this modification, all other provisions in the Civil Code governing successional rights shall
remain in force.
OSMENA de VALENCIA v RODRIGUEZ
Facts:
- Plaintiffs say that they are the legitimate children of the defendant Pio Valencia in the
latter‘s lawful wedlock with plaintiff Catalina Osmena
- Defendants on the otherhand are the illegitimate children of defendant Pio Valencia
with Emilia Rodriguez his common-law wife.
- Plaintiffs allege that they alone have the right to the surname ―Valencia‖
UYGUANGCO v CA
Facts: Apolinario Uyguangco died intestate in 1975, leaving his wife, four legitimate
children and properties which they divided among themselves. Graciano Uyguangco
filed a complaint for partition against the petitioners, claiming that as the illegitimate
son of the deceased and a Anastacia Bacjao, he must not be left out of the
extrajudicial settlement of the estate. He also claims that he received support from his
father while in high school and was also assigned by his father as storekeeper at the
Uyguangco store.
Petitioners moved to dismiss the case on the ground that Graciano could not prove his
alleged filiation having none of the documents required in Art. 278 of the NCC (i.e.
record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record or in any authentic writing.
Neither may he resort to Art. 285 of the NCC because he was already an adult when
his alleged dad died.
Graciano insists however, that he is ―in continuous possession of the status of a child
of his alleged father by the direct acts of the latter or of his family‖ as is under Art. 283
of the NCC.
Issue: WON Graciano may adequately prove filiation.
Held: NO
Ratio:
The Civil Code provisions they invoke have been superseded or at least modified by
the corresponding articles n the FC.
MANGULABNAN v ACERO
Facts: Edna Padilla Mangulabnan filed an action for damages and support for her child
Alfie Angelo. The TC ordered Ambrocio Tan Chew Acero to pay monthly support. He
then moved for a reconsideration but was denied on December 5, 1984. CA annulled
the orders of the TC on the ground that even as to illegitimate children who are not
natural children, there is a need for the latter class of children (spurious children) to be
recognized either voluntarily or by judicial decree, otherwise they cannot demand
support as in the case of an acknowledged child.
 It is settled, then, in law and jurisprudence, that the status and filiation of a child
cannot be compromised. Public policy demands that there be no compromise on
the status and filiation of a child. Paternity and filiation or the lack of the same, is
a relationship that must be judicially established, and it is for the Court to declare
its existence or absence. It cannot be left to the will or agreement of the parties.
 Being contrary to law and public policy, the Compromise Agreement dated 18
February 2000 between petitioner and respondent is void ab initio and vests no
rights and creates no obligations. It produces no legal effect at all. The void
agreement cannot be rendered operative even by the parties' alleged
performance (partial or full) of their respective presentations.
Issues: WON the illegitimate children could use the surname Valencia
Held: Yes
Ratio: This cannot happen since if plaintiffs were correct then they could stop
numerous inhabitants from using the surname Valencia as well. Moreover, Pio
Valencia has acquiesced to this as well. Finally, there is no law granting the exclusive
ownership over a surname.
Since illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and
on the same evidence as legitimate children (Art 175), Graciano may establish his
filiation by the means given in Art. 172. Thus while he has no record of birth appearing
in the civil registrar or a final judgment or an admission of legitimate filiation in a public
document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned, he
insists that he has nevertheless been ―in an open and continuous possession of the
status of an illegitimate child,‖ which is admissible as evidence of filiation under Art.
172.
As proof to this open and continuous possession—he claims that he lived with his
father from 1967 until 1973, received support from him, used the name Uyguangco
without objection, a special power of attorney executed in his favor by Apolinario‘s
wife, and another one by Suplcio Uyguangco, shared in the profits of the copra family
business of the Uyguangco‘s and was even given a share in his deceased father‘s
estate as found in the addendum to the original extrajudicial settlement concluded by
the petitioners.
However, since his father has already died, his action is now barred as Art. 172
specifically requires that when the action is based on other proofs of filiation such as
open and continuous possession, the action must be brought during the lifetime of the
alleged parent.
Ruling: Petition Granted.
Issue: WON recognition of an illegitimate child like the minor Alfie whose father is
married and had no legal capacity to contract marriage at the time of his conception is
required before support may be granted.
Held: NO
Ratio: The requirement for recognition by father or mother jointly or by only one of
them as provided by law refers in particular to a natural child under Article 276 of the
NCC. Such child is presumed to be the natural child of the parents recognizing it who
had the legal capacity to contract marriage at the time of conception. Thus, an
illegitimate child like Alfie is not a natural child but an illegitimate child or spurious child
in which case recognition is not required before support may be granted.
However, under Article 887 of the NCC, in all cases of illegitimate children, their
filiation must be proved. The status of the minor child had been provisionally
BRIONES v MIGUEL
Facts:
1) Review of CA decision awarding custody of minor child to mother (custody until
child reaches age 10 then he is to choose w/c parent he wants to stay with) w/
visitation rights to the Father, Joey D. Briones.
2) Mar 5, 02‘ - Petitioner files for Habeas Corpus claiming the child was visited by
Respondentss Maricel and Francisca Miguel relatives of the mother of the child,
Respondent Loreta Miguel, under the pretext of taking the child to SM, then they did
not return.
3) Petitioner claims that he extensively looked for the child but failed so he was
compelled to file for habeas corpus.
4) Respondent mother Loreta alleges that the child was not taken as he was fetched
by her w/ the petitioner’s consent.
5) Respondent and Briones met in Japan and had a relationship together w/c bore the
child Michael Kevin Pineda (relationship eventually soured according to Respondent
Loreta because of Petitioner’s illicit relationship w/ another woman, я now married to
Japanese national).
6) Briones petitions for joint custody when the mom я Loreta is away.
MONTEFALCON v VASQUEZ
Facts:
1999 – Dolores Montefalcon filed with RTC-Naga for acknowledgment and support by
Ronnie Vasquez of their son Laurence as his illegitimate child
3 summons were delivered to Vasquez all of which remained unanswered
2001 – court, taking Vasquez‘ silence as truth to the allegations, declared Laurence as
his illegitimate child and ordered him to support the child. Vasquez resurfaced after
this decision and appealed it. Thus the case.
ISSUE: WON Laurence is the illegitimate child of Vasquez
HELD: YES, and is thus entitled to support.
FC Article 172, the filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
(1) through record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final order
This is evidenced by Laurence‘ record of live birth which Vasquez signed and supplied
the data.
FC Article 195 - parent is obliged to support his illegitimate child.
Support comprises everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing,
medical attendance, education and transportation, in keeping with the financial
capacity of the family
HEIRS OF MARAMAG v DE GUZMAN
FACTS:
 Loreto Maramag designated as beneficiary his concubine Eva de Guzman
Maramag
 Vicenta Maramag and Odessa, Karl Brian, and Trisha Angelie (heirs of Loreto
Maramag) and his concubine Eva de Guzman Maramag, also suspected in the
killing of Loreto and his illegitimate children are claiming for his insurance.
 Vicenta alleges that Eva is disqualified from claiming
RTC: Granted - civil code does NOT apply
CA: dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction for filing beyond reglementary period
ISSUE: W/N Eva can claim even though prohibited under the civil code against
donation
HELD: YES. Petition is DENIED.
 Any person who is forbidden from receiving any donation under Article 739
cannot be named beneficiary of a life insurance policy of the person who cannot
make any donation to him
o If a concubine is made the beneficiary, it is believed that the
insurance contract will still remain valid, but the indemnity must go
DE LA CRUZ v GARCIA
Facts:
For several months in 2005, then 21-year old petitioner Jenie San Juan Dela Cruz
(Jenie) and then 19-year old Christian Dominique Sto. Tomas Aquino(Dominique) lived
together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage. They resided in the
house of Dominique’s parents Domingo B. Aquino and Raquel Sto.Tomas Aquino at
Pulang-lupa, Dulumbayan, Teresa, Rizal. On September 4, 2005,Dominique died.
After almost two months, or on November 2, 2005, Jenie, who continued to live with
Dominique’s parents, gave birth to her herein co-petitioner minor child Christian Dela
Cruz “Aquino” at the Antipolo Doctors Hospital, Antipolo City. Jenie applied for
registration of the child’s birth, using Dominique’s surname Aquino, with the Office of
the City Civil Registrar, Antipolo City, in support of which she submitted the child’s
Certificate of Live Birth, Affidavit to Use the Surname of the Father (AUSF) which she
established as affidavits of petitioner and 2 witnesses, and the birth certificate were
presented to prove the paternity of the child.
Issues:
WON the natural father of an illegitimate child may be denied custody of his own child.
Held:
Yes, the child being born outside of a legitimate marriage is considered illegitimate
since his illegitimacy is not cured by his parent‘s later marriage. As such he is covered
by Art 176 of the family code that mentions among other things that a mother shall
have ―parental authority‖ over the illegitimate child, regardless of whether the father
acknowledges paternity over the child. Acknowledgment of paternity is only a means
of compelling support for the child not entitling custody. Moreover the Family Code
does not distinguish b/w the natural and spurious nature of the illegitimate child as
they are treated in the same category. Furthermore absent any compelling reason for
depriving я Loreta custody over the child (such as neglect or abandonment,
unemployment, immorality, habitual drunkenness, drug addiction, maltreatment of the
child, insanity, and affliction w/ a communicable disease) custody shall remain w/ the
mother, with the father granted visitation rights.
(action moot since child off to Japan during the pendency of the action)
RESULT: decision of RTC on legitimacy and support is reinstated.
Art. 166. Legitimacy of a child may be impugned only on the following grounds:
(1) That it was physically impossible for the husband to have sexual intercourse with
his wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately preceded the birth
of the child because of:
(a) the physical incapacity of the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife;
(b) the fact that the husband and wife were living separately in such a way that sexual
intercourse was not possible; or
(c) serious illness of the husband, which absolutely prevented sexual intercourse;
(2) That it is proved that for biological or other scientific reasons, the child could not
have been that of the husband, except in the instance provided in the second
paragraph of Article 164; or
(3) That in case of children conceived through artificial insemination, the written
authorization or ratification of either parent was obtained through mistake, fraud,
violence, intimidation, or undue influence.
to the legal heirs and not to the concubine, for evidently, what is
prohibited under Art. 2012 is the naming of the improper
beneficiary.
 SECTION 53. The insurance proceeds shall be applied exclusively to the proper
interest of the person in whose name or for whose benefit it is made unless
otherwise specified in the policy.
o GR: only persons entitled to claim the insurance proceeds are either
the insured, if still alive; or the beneficiary, if the insured is already
deceased, upon the maturation of the policy.
o EX: situation where the insurance contract was intended to benefit
third persons who are not parties to the same in the form of
favorable stipulations or indemnity. In such a case, third parties may
directly sue and claim from the insurer
 It is only in cases where the insured has not designated any beneficiary, or
when the designated beneficiary is disqualified by law to receive the proceeds,
that the insurance policy proceeds shall redound to the benefit of the estate of
the insured
had executed and signed, and Affidavit of Acknowledgment executed by Dominique’s
father Domingo Butch Aquino. Both affidavits attested, inter alia, that during the
lifetime of Dominique, he had continuously acknowledged his yet unborn child, and
that his paternity had never been questioned. Jenie attached to the AUSF a document
entitled “AUTOBIOGRAPHY” which Dominique, during his lifetime, wrote in his own
handwriting, the pertinent portions of which read: AQUINO, CHRISTIAN DOMINIQUE
S.T.AUTOBIOGRAPHY I’M CHRISTIAN DOMINIQUE STO. TOMAS AQUINO, 19
YEARS OF AGE TURNING20 THIS COMING OCTOBER 31, 2005.[5] I RESIDE AT
PULANG-LUPA STREETBRGY. DULUMBAYAN, TERESA, RIZAL. I AM THE
YOUNGEST IN OUR FAMILY. IHAVE ONE BROTHER NAMED JOSEPH BUTCH
STO. TOMAS AQUINO. MYFATHER’S NAME IS DOMINGO BUTCH AQUINO AND
MY MOTHER’S NAME ISRAQUEL STO. TOMAS AQUINO. x x x
 AS OF NOW I HAVE MY WIFE NAMED JENIE DELA CRUZ. WE MET EACH
OTHERIN OUR HOMETOWN, TEREZA RIZAL. AT FIRST WE BECAME GOOD
FRIENDS,THEN WE FELL IN LOVE WITH EACH OTHER, THEN WE BECAME
GOODCOUPLES. AND AS OF NOW SHE IS PREGNANT AND FOR THAT WE
LIVETOGETHER IN OUR HOUSE NOW. THAT’S ALL. By letter dated November 11,
2005,[7] the City Civil Registrar of Antipolo City, Ronald Paul S. Gracia (respondent),
denied Jenie’s application for registration of the child’s name. In summary, the child
cannot use the surname of his father because he was born out of wedlock and the
father unfortunately died prior to his birth and has no more capacity to acknowledge
his paternity to the child (either through the back of Municipal Form No.102 – Affidavit
of Acknowledgment/Admission of Paternity – or the Authority to Use the Surname of
the Father). (Underscoring supplied) Jenie and the child promptly filed a complaint for
injunction/registration of name against respondent before the Regional Trial Court of
Antipolo City, docketed as SCA Case No. 06-539, which was raffled to Branch 73
thereof. The complaint alleged that, inter alia, the denial of registration of the child’s
name is a violation of his right to use the surname of his deceased father under Article
176 of the Family Code, as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9255,[10] which
provides: Article 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under
the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with
this Code.However, illegitimate children may use the surname of their father if their
filiation has been expressly recognized by the father through the record of birth
appearing in thecivil register, or when an admission in a public document or private
handwritten instrument is made by the father. Provided, the father has the right to
institute an action before the regular courts to prove non-filiation during his lifetime.
The legitime of each
illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child.
Issue: WHETHER OR NOT THE UNSIGNED HANDWRITTEN STATEMENT OF
THEDECEASED FATHER OF MINOR CHRISTIAN DELA CRUZ CAN BE
CONSIDEREDAS A RECOGNITION OF PATERNITY IN A “PRIVATE
HANDWRITTENINSTRUMENT” WITHIN THE CONTEMPLATION OF ARTICLE 176
 .
MANUNGAS v LORETO
DOJ OPINION NO. 11 SERIES OF 1990
DOJ OPINION No. 4, Series of 1998
D. Action to impugn legitimacy
REYES v MAURICIO
1. Grounds
FC 166 Legitimacy of a child may be impugned only on the following grounds:
(1) That it was physically impossible for the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately preceded the birth of the child
because of:
(a) the physical incapacity of the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife;
(b) the fact that the husband and wife were living separately in such a way that sexual intercourse was not possible; or
(c) serious illness of the husband, which absolutely prevented sexual intercourse;
(2) That it is proved that for biological or other scientific reasons, the child could not have been that of the husband, except in the instance provided in the second paragraph of Article
164; or
(3) That in case of children conceived through artificial insemination, the written authorization or ratification of either parent was obtained through mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation, or
undue influence.
a. Physical impossibility of access
ANDAL v MACARAIG
Facts:
- Jan 1941 – Emiliano Andal ,who was married to Maria Duenas, became sick with
tuberculosis. His brother Felix went to live with them to help them with the farm.
- Sept 10 1942, Maria eloped with Felix and lived together from 1942-1943
- Jan 1, 1943 Emiliano died. Maria didn‘t attend the funeral 
- June 17, 1943 – Maria gave birth to Mariano Andal
- Maria then filed for recovery of land that was originally given to Emiliano by his
mother upon his marriage to Maria. Maria said that the land is her son‘s since he is the
legitimate heir of Emiliano.
ISSUE: WON Mariano is the legitimate son and can thus inherit the land
MACADANGDANG v CA
FACTS:
o Mejias is married to Anahaw
o Majias allegedly had intercourse with Macadangdang sometime in March 1967
o Due to the affair, she and her husband separated in 1967
o October 30, 1967: Mejias gave birthday to a boy (Rolando Macadangdang)
o April 25, 1972: Mejias filed a complaint for recognition and support against
Macadangdang
o Macadangdang opposed claim and prayed for its dismissal
o Court dismissed the complaint
o CA reversed the judgment and declared Rolando to be an illegitimate son of Antonio
Macadangdang.
ISSUES:
OF THE FAMILYCODE, AS AMENDED BY R.A. 9255, WHICH ENTITLES THE SAID
MINOR TO USEHIS FATHER’S SURNAME.
Held:
 Petition granted. Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by R.A. 9255,
permits an illegitimate child to use the surname of his/her father if the latter had
expressly recognized him/her as his offspring through the record of birth
appearing in the civil register, or through an admission made in a public or
private handwritten instrument. The recognition made in any of these documents
is, in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgment of the child’s paternity;
hence, no separate action for judicial approval is necessary.
 Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended, does not, indeed, explicitly state
that the private handwritten instrument acknowledging the child’s paternity must
be signed by the putative father. That a father who acknowledges paternity of a
child through a written instrument must affix his signature thereon is clearly
implied in Article 176 of the Family Code. Paragraph 2.2, Rule 2 of A.O. No. 1,
Series of 2004, merely articulated such requirement; it did not “unduly expand”
the import of Article 176 as claimed by petitioners.
 First, Dominique died about two months prior to the child’s birth.
 Second, the relevant matters in the Autobiography, unquestionably handwritten
by Dominique, correspond to the facts culled from the testimonial evidence
Jenie proffered.
 Third, Jenie’s testimony is corroborated by the Affidavit of Acknowledgment of
Dominique’s father Domingo Aquino and testimony of his brother Joseph Butch
Aquino whose hereditary rights could be affected by the registration of the
questioned recognition of the child. These circumstances indicating Dominique’s
paternity of the child give life to his statements in his Autobiography that “JENIE
DELA CRUZ” is “MY WIFE” as “WE FELLIN LOVE WITH EACH OTHER” and
“NOW SHE IS PREGNANT AND FOR THAT WELIVE TOGETHER.”In the eyes
of society, a child with an unknown father bears the stigma of dishonor. It is to
petitioner minor child’s best interests to allow him to bear the surname of the
now deceased Dominique and enter it in his birth certificate
HELD: YES
- Art 108 of NCC - Children born after the one hundred and eighty days next following
that of the celebration of marriage or within the three hundred days next following its
dissolution or the separation of the spouses shall be presumed to be legitimate.
o Emiliano is presumed to be legitimate sine he was born within 300 days following the
dissolution of marriage.
- Evidence did not show that Emiliano, even when he was sick of tuberculosis, could
not sexually perform so even if Maria was having an affair even before eloping with
Felix, it is still presumed that Mariano is Emilianos‘ son.
RESULT: son is the legit heir and thus inherits the land of his father
o Whether or not the child Rolando is conclusively presumed the legitimate issue of
the spouses Elizabeth Mejias and Crispin Anahaw; and
o Whether or not the wife may institute an action that would bastardize her child
without giving her husband, the legally presumed father, an opportunity to be heard.
HELD:
o YES
 The birth of Rolando came more than one hundred eighty 180 days following the
celebration of the said marriage and before 300 days following the alleged separation
between aforenamed spouses.  Art. 255: Rolando is conclusively presumed to be the
legitimate son of Mejias and Anahaw
 Rolando was born on October 30, 1967. Between March, 1967 and October 30,
1967,
the time difference is clearly 7 months. The baby Rolando could have been born
prematurely. But such is not the case. Respondent underwent a normal nine-month
pregnancy.
 Presumption of legitimacy becomes conclusive in the absence of proof that there was
physical impossibility of access between the spouses in the first 120 days of the 300
which preceded the birth of the child
 the fact remains that there was always the possibility of access to each other  same
province
 Physical impossibility:
(1) impotence of husband;
 inability of the male organ to copulation, to perform its proper function
CONCEPCION v CA
FACTS:
Gerardo Concepcion, the petitioner, and Ma. Theresa Almonte, private respondent,
were married in December 1989, and begotten a child named Jose Gerardo in
December 1990. The husband filed on December 1991, a petition to have his
marriage annulled on the ground of bigamy since the wife married a certain Mario
Gopiao sometime in December 1980, whom according to the husband was still alive
and living in Loyola Heights, QC. Trial court ruled that the son was an illegitimate child
and the custody was awarded to the wife while Gerardo was granted visitation rights.
Theresa argued that there was nothing in the law granting “visitation rights in favor of
the putative father of an illegitimate child”. She further wanted to have the surname of
the son changed from “Concepcion to Almonte”, her maiden name, since an
illegitimate child should use his mother’s surname. After the requested oral argument,
trial court reversed its ruling and held the son to be not the son of Gerardo but of
Mario. Hence, the child was a legitimate child of Theresa and Mario.
.
b. Biological or other scientific grounds
Rule on DNA Evidence
FC 170 The action to impugn the legitimacy of the child shall be brought within one year from the knowledge of the birth or its recording in the civil register, if the husband or, in a proper
case, any of his heirs, should reside in the city or municipality where the birth took place or was recorded.
If the husband or, in his default, all of his heirs do not reside at the place of birth as defined in the first paragraph or where it was recorded, the period shall be two years if they should
reside in the Philippines; and three years if abroad. If the birth of the child has been concealed from or was unknown to the husband or his heirs, the period shall be counted from the
discovery or knowledge of the birth of the child or of the fact of registration of said birth, whichever is earlier.
FC 171 The heirs of the husband may impugn the filiation of the child within the period prescribed in the preceding article only in the following cases:
(1) If the husband should died before the expiration of the period fixed for bringing his action;
(2) If he should die after the filing of the complaint without having desisted therefrom; or
(3) If the child was born after the death of the husband.
AGUSTIN v CA
FACTS:
Respondents Fe Angela and her son Martin Prollamante sued Martin‘s alleged
biological father, petitioner Arnel L. Agustin, for support and support pendente lite
Arnel supposedly impregnated Fe on her 34th birthday on November 10, 1999
The baby‘s birth certificate was purportedly signed by Arnel as the father. Arnel
shouldered the pre-natal and hospital expenses but later refused Fe‘s repeated
requests for Martin‘s support despite his adequate financial capacity and even
suggested to have the child committed for adoption. Arnel also denied having fathered
the child
Arnel is actually married and has a family of his own at the time he impregnated Fe
Arnel claimed that the signature and the community tax certificate (CTC) attributed to
him in the acknowledgment of Martin‘s birth certificate were falsified. The CTC
erroneously reflected his marital status as single when he was actually married and
that his birth year was 1965 when it should have been 1964
July 23, 2002, Fe and Martin moved for the issuance of an order directing all the
parties to submit themselves to DNA paternity testing pursuant to Rule 28 of the Rules
of Court
ISSUE: WON DNA testing is self-incriminatory and violates privacy of person
HELD: NO
Being the first case where DNA testing was the focal issue the court examines the
history of DNA testing
HERRERA v ALBA
ESTATE OF ROGELIO ONG v MINOR JOANNE DIAZ
Facts:
- Nov 1993 – Rogelio and Jinky got acquainted, and the friendship blossomed into
love.
- Jinky however, was already married to Hasegawa Katsuo, a Japanese national, in
spite of this, the lovers lived together out of which Joanne Diaz was born on Feb 25,
1998
- Rogelio initially recognized Joanne as his, only to abandon the family on Sept 1998,
Jinky thereafter files a complaint
- Judgment rendered in favor of Jinky , Rogelio files a new motion and is granted
(2) living separately in such a way that access was impossible; and
(3) serious illness of the husband.
o NO.
 Art. 256 provides that the child is presumed legitimate although the mother may have
declared against its legitimacy
 Art. 257: adultery on the part of the wife, in itself, cannot destroy the presumption of
legitimacy of her child, because it is still possible that the child is that of the husband
 Only the husband can contest the legitimacy of a child born to his wife
 Art. 220
PETITION GRANTED. JUDGMENT REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.
HELD:
Considering that Theresa’s marriage with Gerardo was void ab initio, the latter never
became the former’s husband and never acquired any right to impugn the legitimacy of
the child. Theresa’s contention was to have his son be declared as not the legitimate
child of her and Mario but her illegitimate child with Gerardo. In this case, the mother
has no right to disavow a child because maternity is never uncertain. Hence, she is
not permitted by law to question the son’s legitimacy. Under Article 167 of the Family
Code, “the child shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have declared
against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress”. Having the best
interest of the child in mind, the presumption of his legitimacy was upheld by the Court.
As a legitimate child, the son shall have the right to bear the surnames of Mario and
Theresa, in conformity with the provisions of Civil Code on surnames. Gerardo cannot
then impose his surname to be used by the child, since in the eyes of the law, the child
is not related to him in any way
The court opened the possibility of admitting DNA as evidence of parentage, as
enunciated in Tijing v. Court of Appeals
In People v. Vallejo[24] where the rape and murder victim‘s DNA samples from the
bloodstained clothes of the accused were admitted in evidence. We reasoned that
―the purpose of DNA testing (was) to ascertain whether an association exist(ed)
between the evidence sample and the reference sample. The samples collected
(were) subjected to various chemical processes to establish their profile
The right against self-incrimination is simply against the legal process of extracting
from the lips of the accused an admission of guilt. It does not apply where the
evidence sought to be excluded is not an incrimination but as part of object evidence.
right to privacy does not bar all incursions into individual privacy. The right is not
intended to stifle scientific and technological advancements that enhance public
service and the common good... Intrusions into the right must be accompanied by
proper safeguards that enhance public service and the common good.
where the power is exercised in an arbitrary manner by reason of passion, prejudice,
or personal hostility, and it must be so patent or gross as to amount to an evasion of a
positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in
contemplation of law.
No evidence to show this
If criminal can be subject to it at expense of death, what more in a civil case for
paternity?
- RTC again rules for Jinky given the Rogelio‘s admission that he was the one who
shouldered hospital bills during Joanne‘s birth and that on some instances he
continued visiting Jinky after the birth of Joanne
- Rogelio goes to the Court of Appeals, during the pendency of the trial, however he
dies, and is substituted by the Estate of Rogelio Ong.
- CA remands the case to the RTC for DNA analysis to finally determine the paternity
of Joanne, hence the petition
Issue: W/n the court erred in remanding the case for DNA analysis despite the fact that
said
analysis is no longer feasible given that Rogelio Ong is dead
Held: No, decision of the appellate court is affirmed.
- Case discusses DNA testing again, see Herrera vs Alba.
- The new rules on DNA testing allows for the application of DNA testing for as long as
biological samples of Rogelio Ong is present
o Biological samples – any organic material originating from the person‘s body, even if
found on inanimate objects
- Thus, even if Rogelio is dead, biological samples may be available and used for DNA
testing
- As held in Tecson vs Comelec: ―Any physical residue of the long dead parent could
be resorted to‖
Presently, DNA testing has evolved into a dependable and authoritative form of
evidence gathering, the Court therefore reiterates its stand that DNA testing is a valid
means of determining paternity

LUCAS v LUCAS

c. FC 166 (3) Legitimacy of a child may be impugned only on the following grounds: That in case of children conceived through artificial insemination, the written
authorization or ratification of either parent was obtained through mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation, or undue influence.
2. Effect of mother’s declaration
FC 167 The child shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress.

CHUA KENG GIAP v IAC

FACTS: b. Mother‘s testimonials: SY Kua herself testified that she is not her son.
1. Chua Keng Giap filed on May 19, 1983, a petition for the settlement of the estate of Petitioner:
the late Sy Kao in the regional trial court of Quezon City. He claims that he is the son a. paternity and not the maternity of the petitioner is to be decided. Therefore, the
of Chua Bing Guan and Sy Kao. testimony of the mother should not be credited.
2. The private respondent, moved to dismiss for lack of a cause of action and of the ISSUE:
petitioner's capacity to file the petition. No cause of action because he is not the son of W/N Chua Keng Giap is the son of Chua Bing and Sy Kua.
the abovementioned couple as testified by the mother herself. HELD:
CONTENTIONS: Yes.
Respondent: Who better than Sy Kao herself would know of Chua Keng Giap was really her son?
a. Res judicata: The latter, it was claimed, had been declared as not the son of the More than any one else, it was Sy Kao who could say ---- as indeed she has said
spouses Chua Bing Guan and Sy Kao in S.P. No. Q-12592, for the settlement of the these many years ---- that Chua Keng Giap was not begotten of her womb.
estate of the late Chua Bing Guan. Petition Denied.

3. In subsequent marriages
FC 168 If the marriage is terminated and the mother contracted another marriage within three hundred days after such termination of the former marriage, these rules shall govern in the
absence of proof to the contrary:
(1) A child born before one hundred eighty days after the solemnization of the subsequent marriage is considered to have been conceived during the former marriage, provided it be born
within three hundred days after the termination of the former marriage;
(2) A child born after one hundred eighty days following the celebration of the subsequent marriage is considered to have been conceived during such marriage, even though it be born
within the three hundred days after the termination of the former marriage.
FC 169 The legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child born after three hundred days following the termination of the marriage shall be proved by whoever alleges such legitimacy or illegitimacy.

PEOPLE v QUITORIANO
FACTS: ISSUE:
1. Quitoriano was charged of the crime of rape. Whether or not the child could have been the accused‘s.
2. He allegedly raped the victim, Edna Pergis, on December 24, 1992 HELD:
3. in June 1993, her aunt, Teresa Pergis, discovered that Edna was pregnant. Yes.
4. On August 2, 1993, private complainant filed a complaint for rape against accused- The fact that private complainant gave birth more than ten months after the alleged
appellant rape does not discredit her testimony. Dr. Honesto Marquez, a physician from the
5. She gave birth on October 31, 1993. Marinduque Provincial Hospital, explained that the normal gestation period is 40
CONTENTIONS: weeks or 280 days, but it can also extend beyond 40 weeks if the woman is having her
Accused: first pregnancy. It is undisputed that the child delivered by private complainant on
private complainant gave birth more than ten months after the alleged rape; therefore, October 31, 1993 was her first. Hence, it is not impossible that the child was conceived
the child could not have been the accused‘s in December, 1992, the date of the alleged rape.

4. Presumptions
FC 170 The action to impugn the legitimacy of the child shall be brought within one year from the knowledge of the birth or its recording in the civil register, if the husband or, in a proper
case, any of his heirs, should reside in the city or municipality where the birth took place or was recorded.
If the husband or, in his default, all of his heirs do not reside at the place of birth as defined in the first paragraph or where it was recorded, the period shall be two years if they should
reside in the Philippines; and three years if abroad. If the birth of the child has been concealed from or was unknown to the husband or his heirs, the period shall be counted from the
discovery or knowledge of the birth of the child or of the fact of registration of said birth, whichever is earlier.
FC 171 The heirs of the husband may impugn the filiation of the child within the period prescribed in the preceding article only in the following cases:
(1) If the husband should died before the expiration of the period fixed for bringing his action;
(2) If he should die after the filing of the complaint without having desisted therefrom; or
(3) If the child was born after the death of the husband.

5. Prescription of action to impugn legitimacy

GASPAY v CA
Facts: Flaviano Gaspay died intestate on 10/14/83, then married to Agueda Denoso
(childless). On 7/6/88 priv resp Guadalupe Gaspay Alfaro alleged @ TC that she‘s
acknowledged IC of Flaviano with Claudia Pason, prayed for issuance of letters of
admin of Flaviano‘s estate.
Petitioners are Jr. (adopted son) and Eriberta (next of kin) who filed for an MTD
(motion to dismiss) saying that Guadalupe is a stranger.
TC denied the MTD saying that such was based on indubitable grounds but TC
nonetheless dismissed petition saying that testimonial and documentary evidence
failed to prove status of Guadalupe, failed to show Guad consenting to the
acknowledgement as IC and that such action should have been filed in the lifetime of
Flaviano.
CA reversed TC on 9/30/91 saying that:
 Evid is ample to prove filiation as IC
 Evid is sufficient to show that Guad consented to the acknowledgement as IC
 Action can be instituted after death of putative father
Issue: WON Guadalupe is an IC
Held: YES. TC did not discount the testimony of Martin Garin (agent to logging
concessionaire of Flaviano for 18 years) who verified handwriting and signature of
Flaviano in a letter addressed to Lupe and Toming (Guad and his husband Bartolome
Alfaro) regarding the hospitalization expenses of Guad‘s daughter. CA said that TC
must have assumed that Flaviano‘s handwriting must have metamorphosed during the
years but it could be possible that handwriting of Flaviano never changed at all. Also
when Guadalupe filed said action, she still used Gaspay affixed to her legal surname
as married to Alfaro, thereby shouting to the world her consent to the acknowledgment
of an IC. As to the action being instituted after death of putative father, CA said
―action based on acknoweldgement may be brought even after death of putative
6. Who may impugn
BENITEZ-BADUA v CA
Facts: Vicente Benitez married Isabel Chipongian, acquired many props in Laguna.
Isabel predeceased Vicente, former died on 4/25/82 while latter died intestate on
11/13/89.
On 9/24/90 Vicente‘s sis and nephew Victoria (priv resps) Benitez Lirio and Feodor
Benitez Aguilar filed @ RTC for issuance of letter of admin for Aguilar, saying that
Vicente had no legal heirs since Marissa Benitez Badua was never a related by blood
and not legally adopted therefore not a legal heir.
On 11/2/90 Marissa opposed saying that she‘s sole heir and she‘s capable of
managing estate. She presented the ff evids:
 Cert of live brith
 Baptismal cert
 ITR and Info Sheet for Members of Gsis of late Vicente naming her as daughter
 School records
Private resps (Victoria) presented testimonial evids:
 That spouse failed to beget a child
 Isabel (then 36) was even referred to an ob-gyne for treatment
 Victoria Benitez Lirio (then 77 years old and about to die) elder sis of Vicente
categorically declared that Marissa is not a biological child
TC on 12/17/90 dismissed petition of Victoria. Ruled that Marissa is legitimate
daughter and sole heir (relying on FC 166 and 170)
CA reversed on 5/29/92 saying that Marissa is NOT biological child and therefore not
legal heir. CA said that TC failed to apply FC 166 and 170.
LIYAO JR v TANHOTI-LIYAO
Facts: CA reversed RTC w/c declared William Liyao Jr as IC of William Liyao and
ordered Juanita et al to recognize jr as compulsory heir of the deceased William
(successional rights to be granted thereof).
On 11/29/76 Jr (represented by mother Corazon Garcia) filed for said action for
compulsory recognition as IC of William Liyao, being in continuous possession of
status as child and recognized as such child by decedent.
Corazon had been legally married but was de facto separated with husband Ramon
Yulo for 10 years and was said to have cohabited with William from 1965 up to his
death in 1975. She has 2 other daughters by 1st marriage and it was claimed that Jr
(Billy) was born during said cohabitation. This was supposedly with the knowledge of
William‘s LC by wife Juanita Tanhoti-Liyao, Tita Rose and Chritina who were both
employed in Far East Realty Investment where William and Corazon are Pres and VP
respectively. Both sides have virtually different stories.
TC was convinced of the preponderance of evidence that William sired Jr (billy)
because he was conceived during said cohab of William and Corazon and he has
been in continuous possession and enjoyment of status of a child of William through
his overt acts of:
 Securing birth certificate through confidential secretary Mrs. Rodriguez
 Openly and publicly acknowledging billy as son
 Providing sustenance and introducing him even to his LCs
REPUBLIC v MAGPAYO
E. Proof of Filiation
1. Of legitimate children
FC 172 The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
FC 173 The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child during his or her lifetime and shall be transmitted to the heirs should the child die during minority or in a state of
insanity. In these cases, the heirs shall have a period of five years within which to institute the action.
DIAZ v COURT OF APPEALS
Facts:
1) In 1911 Isidro Azarraga dies leaving 10 children the first 7 of who are illegitimate
born to his mistress Valentina Abarracoso.
2) The legitimacy of the 8th child is in question in this suit namely Leodegario, (the 9th
Filomena was the only one established as legitimate being born to the valid marriage
of Isidro and his lawful wife Calixta Lozada)
3) Sept 10, 49‘ Leodegario dies intestate(no will) in an accident in Manila he leaves
behind no spouse and no children to inherit his property amounting to P28,000 worth
of real estate in Capiz.
father‖. She thereby proved entitlement to the admin of estate. Moreover, the
petitioners neglected to apply for a letter admin 30 days after the death of Flaviano
Gaspay.
Issue: WON Marissa is a biological child of Vicente and Isabel and WON TC
misapplied FC 166 and 170
Held: NO. Marissa is not a biological child and yes, TC misapplied said FC provisions.
SC said that reliance on FC 164, 166, 170 and 171 are misplaced since said
provisions show situation where husband denies own child with wife and not a
situation where a child is alleged not to be a natural child of a couple.
SC only sustained CA findings on ruling that Marissa is not a biological child Vicente
and Isabel based on the ff:
 Isabel Chipongian never became pregnant, as substatntiated by his brother Dr. Nilo
Chipongian, saying that she‘s been married already for 10 years but at age 36 was not
yet pregnant and so she was even brought to the attention of Dr. Manahan who was a
well known ob-gyne. Many other people (neighbors) corroborated this point that Iabel
never became pregnant. Had she been, it would have been noticed by people around
her.
 Marissa‘s birth certificate is highly dubious because it showed that she was born in
the Benitez household in Nagcarlan when she would have been born in the hospital
and in the skillful hands of Dr. Manahan who was the ob-gyne of her putative mother.
 Extrajudicial settlement of Nilo and Vicente after Isabel‘s death saying that they are
the sole heirs of the deceased Isabel for she has no other ascending or descending
heirs
Letter of Isabel to Vicente pleading him to give Marissa her share – which she would
not have need to do had Marissa been their legal heir
CA reversed saying that:
 Law favors legitimacy
 Gave credence to marriage of Corazon with Ramon Yulo (legally married with no
legal separation)
 That Corazon and Ramon were seen in each other‘s arms during the time that
Corazon and William were supposed to be cohabiting
 Birth cert and baptismal cert not enough proof of paternity in the case where William
had a hand in preparing such docs
 Neither family pix would prove filiation
 Passbook presented did not show that William opened such for Billy and Corazon
because it does not bear William‘s signature and name
Issue: WON Jr (billy) is an IC and WON he can impugn his own legitimacy to claim
from estate of his supposed father
Held: NO. presumption of legitimacy is strong. Even if Jr. insists that Ramon and
Corazon have been separated already for 10 years such that there is physical
impossibility for sexual union, de facto separation is of no bearing. Impugning
legitimacy under NCC 255 can only be invoked by husband and only in qualified
situations, his heirs. Petition cannot prosper because child born within valid marriage
is deemed LC even though mother may have declared against said legitimacy or has
been sentenced as an adulteress.
4) Oct 15, 49‘ original ℗ Maria Diaz, daughter of the decedent‘s sister Filomena, (she
died during the pendency of the case and was replaced by her heirs) files for letters of
Administration w/ the CFI.
5) Oct 25, 49‘ Amador Azarraga (4th illegitimate child of Isidro, half brother of
decedent) files an opposition to the petition citing that the deceased is an illegitimate
son of Isidro via Valentina Abarracoso and thus is his brother rather than the ℗
mother‘s.
6) Mar 1, 50‘ CFI rules in favor of ℗
7) Aug 17, 70‘ 20 years after ℗ granted admin, я Eduardo Azarraga (heir of Amador)
files for the removal of admin from ℗ citing failure to render a final accounting of the
estate and a project of partition. He also requests to be granted admin.
8) Я s cite that the decedent is not a legitimate child of Isidro and thus is not the full
blooded sibling of the ℗ mother who was a legitimate child.
9) ℗ asserts the opposite, that decedent Leodegario is legitimate
10) CFI again rules for ℗
11) Я files with CA and is upheld and is granted admin to the prejudice of ℗
Issues:
TISON v COURT OF APPEALS
Facts:
1) Mar 5, 83‘Teodora Dezoller Guerero dies w/ no children leaving the prop in question
to her husband and the heirs of her brother(who died in 73‘), the Petitioner.
2) Jan 2, 88‘ After her death, her husband Martin Guerero adjudicates the house to
him and sells it to Respondent Teodora Domingo.
3) Martin dies on Oct 25, 88‘ and petitioner’s Tison and Dezoller file for reconveyance
Nov. 2, 88 for 1/2share of the prop.
4) During the hearing the Petitioner birth cert.s marriage cert.s w/c prove the filiation to
the decedent Teodora through their common link to their father Teodora‘s brother
Hermogenes Dezoller. More importantly they present the testimony of one of the
Petitioner Corazon Dezoller Tison attesting that some time in 1946 the decedent had
actually acknowledged her as her niece (declaration of filiation).
5) Respondent files a demurrer to the evidence citing that they fall short of the
requirements set by Art 172 of the Family Code and that the testimony
of Corazon Dezoller Tison was self serving and uncorroborated.
6) Dec 3, 92‘ TC rules for Respondent granting the demurrer and dismissing the action
for reconveyance.
7) CA affirms citing the evidence presented was inadmisible.
Issues:
TRINIDAD v COURT OF APPEALS
Facts:
Arturio Trinidad was born on July 21, 1943 from Felicidad Molato and Inocentes
Briones, who allegedly married on May 5, 1942. Upon the death of Inocentes, Arturio
lived with his aunt Lourdes in the property of Patricio Briones (father of Inocentes,
Lourdes and Felix) until he grew up and got married. When Arturio returned to the
property upon Lourdes‘ invitation and sought to claim the share of his father on the
land, Lourdes refused to partition the property and claimed that Inocentes never
married, died single, and has no child. On the other hand, Arturio claimed that his
parents were legally married but failed to provide their marriage certificate and his birth
certificate to show his relationship with Inocentes because these were lost during the
war.
Issue: WON Arturio is the legitimate child of Inocentes
Held: Yes
1. The parents of Arturio, Inocentes and Felicidad, were validly married
LABAGALA v SANTIAGO
Facts:
1. Siblings Nicolasa, Amanda and Jose Santiago owned a parcel of land, which was
registered in Jose‘s name alone
2. February 6, 1984: Jose died intestate
a. Nicolasa and Amanda, as his legal heirs, sought the recovery of title, ownership,
and possession of his 1/3 share in the property
b. The case was filed against Ida C. Labagala who claimed
i. To be Jose‘s legitimate child with Esperanza Cabrigas
1. His income tax return listed Ida as his daughter
ii. To have been the donee of his 1/3 share of the property
1. A Deed of Sale, covering the entire parcel of the property, was executed on March
1979 in Ida‘s favour BUT
2. The sale was actually a donation
iii. To had caused the issuance of a title in her name over the entire parcel of
land by virtue of the sale in order to prevent the property from being sold by
public auction for Nicolasa and Amanda‘s failure to pay its realty taxes
iv. To have always been staying on the property
1. Previous ejectment cases by Nicolasa and Amanda were instituted against her in
1985
2. Cases were resolved in Ida‘s favour
3. Contentions of Nicolasa and Amanda
a. Ida is a child of Leo Labagala and Cornelia Cabrigas
i. Leo Labagala signed and prepared the birth certificate of Isa Santiago as her father
ii. Birth certificate of Ida Santiago had the same birth date and place as the claimed
day and place of Ida Labagala (1969, Manila)
iii. Ida did not present a birth certificate of an ‗Ida Santiago‘ and only alleged that she
had been using the surname since her childhood
WON Leodegario is a legitimate child of Isidro and his legal wife Calixta Lozada
Held:
YES, the ℗ proved the legitimacy of Leodegario through his school records (UST Law)
which cited the decedent‘s name as Leodegario Azarraga y Lozada. It was further
strengthened by the preponderance of the will of Pastora Azarraga which stated that
the decedent and the ℗ mother Filiomena are fullMar 1, 50‘ (granting admin to the ℗)
also acknowledges this fact of legitimacy.
CA set aside CFI affirmed.
WON the ℗ satisfy of the quantum of proof mandated by Art 172 of the FC.
Held:
YES, the court held that legitimacy cannot be attacked collaterally in an action for
reconveyance, as such the court held that there being a presumption of legitimacy in
relation to the status of the petitioners the Respondent‘s failure to adduce evidence
disproving such a fact renders the presumption effective. Thus his choice to file a
demurrer rather than adduce evidence to controvert the Petitioner assertions comes
as a implied admission of the fact of legitimacy.
More importantly the testimony of Corazon Dezoller Tison fell within the definition of a
declaration about pedigree that is exempt form the rule on hearsay based on the
following conditions: 1) that the declarant is either dead or unable to testify; 2) that the
declarant be related to the person whose pedigree is subject of inquiry, 3) that such
relationship be shown by evidence other than the declaration 4) that the declaration
was made ante litem motum (before the commencement of the suit). Moreover the
declaration may stand only if it pertains to the claimant‘s right over the declarant‘s own
estate (as in this case). If however the declaration is to claim a right from another
family member other than the declarant‘s estate the declaration may not be deemed
credible.
Judgment reversed and set aside.
a. Office of the Civil Registrar of Aklan certified that all its records of marriages and
birth, among others, were either lost, burned or destroyed during the Japanese
occupation
b. Isabel Meren and Jovita Gerardo testified that his parents‘ were married and
cohabited as husband and wife
i. Meren was one of the witnesses to the nuptials
ii. Jovita was the barangay captain who had attended the birth and baptismal parties of
Arturio
2. Arturio was born during their marriage and cohabitation
a. The baptismal certificate of Arturio show his parents to be Inocentes and Felicidad
and his birth to be on July 21, 1943, after the legitimate and legal wedding of
Inocentes and Felicidad
Family photos of Lourdes and Felix with Arturio‘s wife and children substantiate his
claim that they had lived together in the property, contrary to Lourdes‘ claim that they
had not
iv. Jose stated in a Civil Case (No. 56226) that he did not have any child.
b. The Deed of Sale was forged
i. It was not signed by Jose but only thumbmarked, which Jose had never done
ii. Ida was unemployed then and could not have afford the price of P150k
iii. Ida concealed the sale as she registered the deed only on Jan. 26, 1987 or 8 years
after the sale
Issue: WON Ida Labagala is Jose‘s child
Held: NO
1. NCC 263 does not apply
a. Applies only for situations where doubt exists that a child is indeed a
man‘s child by his wife (issue of legitimacy)
b. Not for situations where a child is alleged not be the child at all of a
particular couple
2. Birth certificate of Ida Labagala is conclusive proof of her filiation with Leo and
Cornelia
a. BC was signed and prepared by the father, Leo
b. Ida did not present any birth certificate in the name of a ―Ida
Santiago‖
c. Baptismal and Income Tax Return are not proofs of filiation but only of
the fact that a baptism had been administered and that tax has been paid
in a certain amount, respectively
3. Use of a family name does not establish pedigree
4. Ida contradicted herself in relation to her filiation with Cornelia
a. In her testimony, she denied knowing Cornelia
In her petition, she admitted that Cornelia is her mother, Esperanza‘s sister
 DE JESUS v ESTATE OF JUAN GAMBOA DIZON
Facts:
- Aug 23, 1964 – Danilo Jesus and Carolina Jesus were married. Their union produced
two children, Jacqueline (March 1, 1979) and Jinky Jesus (July 6, 1982).
- June 7 1991, Juan G. Dizon acknowledged Jacqueline and Jinkie de Jesus as his
own illegitimate children with Carolina Aves de Jesus
- 12 March 1992 – Juan Dizon died. Jacqueline and Jinky then filed an action to be
part of the heirs of his estate as his illegitimate children in a notarized document.
- TC: ulitimately dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of action and for being
improper since it‘s not the proper forum to question their paternity and filiation. Thus
the present case
ISSUE: WON Jinky and Jacquelin are the illegitimate children of Juan Dizon
HELD: NO
ONG v DIAZ
Facts:
- Nov 1993 – Rogelio and Jinky got acquainted, and the friendship blossomed into
love.
- Jinky however, was already married to Hasegawa Katsuo, a Japanese national, in
spite of this, the lovers lived together out of which Joanne Diaz was born on Feb 25,
1998
- Rogelio initially recognized Joanne as his, only to abandon the family on Sept 1998,
Jinky thereafter files a complaint
- Judgment rendered in favor of Jinky , Rogelio files a new motion and is granted
- RTC again rules for Jinky given the Rogelio‘s admission that he was the one who
shouldered hospital bills during Joanne‘s birth and that on some instances he
continued visiting Jinky after the birth of Joanne
2. Of illegitimate children
FC 175 Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children.
The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except when the action is based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action may be
brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent.
REYES v CA
Facts:
Certiorari of CA decision reversing CFI dismissal of action for reconveyance by the я.
1) Respondent file w/ CFI for order compelling the Petitioner Irene Reyes aka Irene
Ramero to execute a deed of reconveyance on several props to the Respondent.
Respondent allege that petitioner acquired the props in question through fraud, deceit
and misrepresentation by registering herself as the sole child of decedent Franciscoo
Delgado and thus entitled to inherit.
2) Respondent who are the sisters and brother of the decedent claim otherwise since
they allege the petitioner was born during the legal marriage of her mother Genoveva
Ramero and the latter‘s husband Justino Reyes.
3) Petitioner claims that she was the fruit of the cohabitation b/w her mother and the
decedent during the time subsequent to the separation of her mother w/ Justino
Reyes. She also claims continuous possession of the status of illegitimate child since
she mentions that decedent supported her financially through her education.
4) CFI rules against я dismissing the order for reconveyance.
5) Respondent appeal to CA which rules in their favor reversing the CFI declaring that
the TCTs of the Petitioner on the said props are null and void.
6) CA rules that though Petitioner was a spurious child of the decedent she was never
recognized and thus cannot inherit.
7) in her motion for reconsideration w/ the CA , petitoner cites how she was in fact
acknowledged by the
CASTRO v CA
Facts:
- Background love story: Pricola Maregmen after marrying one Felix de Maya on May
23, 1913 realized the mistake she made and went back to her real love, Eustaquio
Castro whom she lived with until her death on Sept 11, 1924. Their illicit affair bore
them a daughter , Benita Castro on May 27, 1919.
- Two earlier civil cases were filed against Benita Castro. The first by her uncle and
aunt Juan and Feliciano Castro that they and not Benita should be the forced heirs of
Pedro Castro who died on May 27, 1923 and the second by Marcelina Bautista, the
wife of her alleged father Eustaquio Castro who died on August 24, 1961. Marcelina
also alleges that she and not Benita should be the compulsory heir of the property of
Euestaquio.
- TC: consolidated the cases and ruled Benita is indeed the acknowledged and
recognized child of Eustaquio Castro and is entitled to participate in the partition of the
properties left by him.
- CA: affirmed the decision of TC and held that Eustaquio Castro voluntarily
recognized Benita through the records of birth he registered himself.
ISSUE: WON Benita Castro Naval is the acknowledged and recognized illegitimate
child of Eustaquio Castro
HELD: YES
- Presumption of law is that of legitimacy. Those who are born in wedlock without
conclusive
proof that there was physical impossibility for the parents to conceive the child are
considered legitimate. Upon the expiration of periods found in FC 170 and 171, this
presumption of civil status becomes fixed and unassailable. It is only when the
legitimacy of the child has been disputed can paternity of the husband be rejected.
While the recognition of illegitimacy by Dizon was made in accordance with the rules
on recognizing illegitimacy, this does not negate the legitimacy they hold with Danilo
Jesus. Petitoners were born during the marriage of their parents. The certificates of
live birth also identify Danilo de Jesus as their father. Thus, before they can be
recognized as illegitimate children, they must first contest their status as legitimate
children of Danilo Jesus.
- Rogelio goes to the Court of Appeals, during the pendency of the trial, however he
dies, and is substituted by the Estate of Rogelio Ong.
- CA remands the case to the RTC for DNA analysis to finally determine the paternity
of Joanne, hence the petition
ISSUE: WON DNA testing is applicable when Rogelio has already died
HELD: YES
- death of the petitioner does not ipso facto negate the application of DNA testing for
as long as there exist appropriate biological samples of his DNA.
- Def of biological sampling - any organic material originating from a person‘s body,
even if found in inanimate objects, that is susceptible to DNA testing. This includes
blood, saliva, and other body fluids, tissues, hairs and bones.
o Any physical residue left by deceased
RESULT: case is remanded to RTC for DNA testing
decedent as proven by the latter‘s consent noted on the petitioner marriage certificate.
Issues:
WON ℗ is a recognized child of the decedent and is thus able to inherit.
Held:
NO, it is a well established doctrine that for an illegitimate child to inherit he/she must
first be recognized by the putative parent through voluntary or compulsory means. In
this case the ℗ was never validly recognized by Francisco Delgado contrary to her
assertions. The evidence she presented was not compelling to establish her filiation to
the decedent. For instance her birth certificate was not signed by Francisco.
Furthermore it cannot be said that her baptismal certificate is credible evidence
regarding filiation since the statements contained therein only attest to the
administration of the said sacrament on the said date. In addition to this her permanent
student records and her written consent to her father‘s operation both being unsigned
and not written in her father‘s handwriting cannot suffice as proof of filiation. Moreover
the pictures she present did not give weight to her arguments as they are not
constitutive of proof of filiation. Finally the alleged consent stipulated by Francisco in
the ℗ marriage certificate cannot be given weight since it is not signed and does not
appear in the decedent‘s handwriting.
Decision affirmed in toto
- Since FC is now the law being used and no vested rights will be prejudiced, FC 172
can be used to prove that Benita possessed an open and continuous possession of
the status of an legitimate child which action can be brought in her lifetime
o Evidence:
 lived with Eustaquio for 42 years, even when she was already married
 Aunt and Uncle Juan Castro and Feliciana Castro admitted that she was the
daughter in Civil Case no 3762.
 Eustaquio himself reported and registered Benita‘s birth. Plus there was no indication
that he should have signed certificate or taken judicial action in order for her to be
recognized as his illegitimate child
 Eustaquio gave away Benita during her wedding to Cipriano Naval
 certificate of baptism and the picture of the Castro family during the wake for
Eustaqui
o rule on separating the legitimate from the illegitimate family isn‘t necessary because
Benita and her mother Pricola Maregmen were the only immediate family of
Eustaquio.
OBITER: Unless she asks about NCC
- diff between voluntary and compulsory recognition – IN THIS CASE, Eustaquio
voluntarily recognized her since he himself took care of and registered her record of
birth in the municipality. Thus even if his signature was missing, his actions clearly
show his voluntary recognition of her.
o voluntary recognition: natural child merely asks for a share in the inheritance in virtue
of his having been acknowledged as such, and is not trying to compel the father or his
heirs to make the acknowledgment
 NCC 131 – law thspat applies for voluntary recognition: ―The acknowledgment of a
natural child must be made in the record of birth, in a will or in some other public
document‖
 acknowledgment has been formally and legally accomplished because the public
character of the document makes judicial pronouncement unnecessary
o compulsory recognition - requires judicial pronouncement of illegitimacy since
recognition was made in a private document.
BALUYUT v BALUYUT
Facts:
Victoria, Ma. Theresa and Ma. Flordeliza were minors when they filed this petition.
They were represented by their mother and guardian ad litem, Norma Urbano.
The petition is filed against Felicidad Baluyut and the CA. Felicidad is the wife of the
deceased, who had an illegal relationship with Norma Urbano because he was already
married at the time. The petition states that the minors are his illegitimate children and
therefore have a legal interest on the estate of the deceased Enrique Baluyut.
They further allege that they were in continuous possession and enjoyment of the
status of children of the decease during his lifetime b direct overt acts. (he supported
them and maintained them.
They added to having been deliberately excluded from the estate of Enrique Baluyut.
Felicidad, who is the widow and appointed administratrix of the estate, opposed the
petition.
Trial Court: declared that the minors were the forced heirs of the deceased (under
NCC 887(5)) and ordered Felicidad to provide monthly support for the minors.
CA: reversed the decision; the petition was dismissed (although the CA did recognize
them as Enrique‘s illegitimate children)
Issue:
W/N the petitioners are the illegitimate children of the deceased and are therefore
entitiled to monthly support.
Held: Proof of filiation is not sufficient to confer upon them any hereditary rights in the
estate of the deceased. The decision appealed from is affirmed.
Ratio
The illegitimate child must be acknowledged by the putative parent. (as was decided
by SC in a previous case: Reyes, et al. v. Zuzuarregul, et al.)
The illegitimate child, to be entitled to support and successional rights from his
parents, must prove his filiation through this means - Voluntary or compulsory (NCC
283) recognition through:
Record of birth
Parent‘s will
MENDOZA v CA
Facts:
1981: Private Respondent, Teopista Toring claims to be the illegitimate child of the
petitioner, Casimiro Mendoza.
She alleges that she was born on Aug. 20, 1930 to a Brigida Toring who was then
single while Casimiro was married to Emiliana Barrientos
Her mother was the one who told her that she was his child.
She added that growing up, she was recognized because she was treated as such.
Called him ―Papa Miroy‖, she used to visit him at his house, Casimiro helped her and
her husband: he bought a truck for him to drive and when he sold it, gave the
proceeds to the spouses, PR‘s son, Lolito, was allowed to build a house on his lot, He
opened a joint savings account with her as co-depositor
She had two witnesses:
Gaudencio Mendoza (cousin of Casimiro) was informed by petitioner himself that he
and Brigida Toring were sweethearts. Gaudencio was the one whom Casimiro would
send to give money to Toring when Teopista was born.
Isaac Mendoza (nephew of Casimiro) was informed by his father (Hipolito, Casimiro’s
brother) and his grandmother, Brigida Mendoza. He also delivered money to Teopista.
Petitioner denied her claims up to his dying day. (May, 1986)
Vicente Toring, who is the recognized illegitimate child of Petitioner and Brigida Toring,
says that petitioner is only his half-sister because she has a different father.
He substitutes for Mendoza in this case after petitioner died.
RTC: rules for petitioner because private respondent failed to show enough evidence
to prove of her filiation.
CA: reversed decision. The two witnesses showed truthfulness, there is no reason for
them to testify falsely. Vicente Toring would obviously have more to lose if petitioner
wins this case so he has a motive.
JISON v CA
Facts:
1. Francisco Jison was married to Lilia Lopez Jison in 1945 and together, they had
Lourdes
 NCC 135-136 apply.
 recognition is yet to be ordered by the courts because a private writing, lacking the
stronger guaranty and higher authenticity of a public document is not self- executory.
based on an express recognition so found and declared by the court after hearing
- diff between natural and spurious – IN this case, she was a natural child of Eustaquio
but a spurious child of Pricola
o natural - those born outside of lawful wedlock of parents who, at the time of
conception of the child, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other
o spurious – had legal impediment to marry when child was conceived and born.
in case the recognition is made by only one of the parents, it will be presumed that the
child is natural if the parents recognizing it had the legal capacity to contract marriage
at the time of the conception
Statement before a court of record
Any authentic writing (NCC 278)
In the case at bar, there was no evidence to show voluntary recognition.
The records of birth were not signed by the father even if it was in the name of Enrique
Baluyut
There is no evidence of authentic writing or statement before a court
With regard to compulsory recognition, the petitioners relied on testimonies by the
mother and another witness:
“The combined testimony of Norma Urbano and her witness Liberata Vasquez insofar
as the issue of recognition is concerned tends to show that Norma was kept by the late
Enrique M. Baluyut as his mistress first in the house of Liberata and then in a house
supposedly rented from one Lacuna. But this Lacuna was not even presented to testify
in support of the claim of Norma and Liberate that Baluyut rented his house for Norma.
And, according to Norma and Liberata, Baluyut visited Norma some twice a week in
the house where she kept her as his mistress; that Baluyut paid the hospital bills for
the delivery of the two younger children of Norma. But, according to Liberata herself, it
was not Baluyut who personally paid the hospital bills but he gave the money for the
payment of the hospital bills to Liberato and he requested her to pay the money to the
hospital. This only shows that Baluyut was hiding his Identity as the father of the
children of Norma, an act which is inconsistent with recognizing such children as his
own.”
The SC is very strict in applying the law for compulsory recognition, much more than
with voluntary recognition.
NCC 283 enumerates the cases where the father is obliged to recognize the child:
b.) when the child is in continuous possession of the status of a child of the alleged
father by the direct acts of the latter or his family.
c.) when the child was conceived during the time when the mother cohabited with the
supposed father
… these enumerations are inconsistent with the testimonies of the witnesses. Baluyut
appeared to be hiding the fact that he was the father of the minors.
Issue: W/N Teopista is Casimiro Mendoza‘s illegitimate child?
Held: YES.
Ratio:
Although Teopista failed to show that she was in an open and continuous possession
of the status of an illegitimate child of Casimiro, she has nevertheless established that
status by another method.
FC 175 grants the right of illegitimate children to establish their filiation in the same
way as legitimate children. FC 172(2) allows them to prove filiation by ―any other
means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws‖.
In the case at bar, the RTC failed to consider the testimony of Isaac Mendoza as
another method of establishing status.
Rule 130, Sec. 39, of the Rules of Court discusses the act or declarations about
pedigree being allowed as evidence. It has to conform to 4 requisites so it won‘t be
considered hearsay:1.The declarant is dead or unable to testify Brigida and Hipolito
Mendoza passed away at the time Isaac testified in court.
2.The pedigree must be in issue
Main issue of case!
3.The declaration must be made before the controversy arose
Isaac knew about this before PR filed in court
4.The relationship between the declarant (Brigida/Hipolito) and person whose pedigree
is in question
Casimiro) must be shown in evidence other than declaration.
Presentation of extrajudicial partition of the estate of Florencio Mendoza where
Casimiro is an heir.
This, including the other evidence presented by PR and witnesses shows that she is
the illegitimate daughter of Casimiro
2. Francisco impregnated Esperanza F. Amolar, Lourdes‘ nanny, who gave birth to
Monina Joson on August 4, 1946
3. March 13, 1985: Monina filed a petition for recognition as Francisco‘s illegitimate
child
a. That Esperanza was still employed by Francisco at the time Monina was conceived
in 1945
b. That sexual contact between Francisco and Esperanza was not impossible
i. Castellanes, Sr., a worker in the Nelly Garden that Lilia managed testified that Lilia
spent her evenings in the Nelly Garden, working from 6PM to 3AM
c. That the affidavit she signed on September 21, 1971 where she denounced her
filiation with Francisco was acquired under duress
i. Bilbao, the procurement officer, hacienda overseer and administrator testified that he
was present during the event
d. That Francisco fathered Monina and recognized her as his daughter and
That Monina has been enjoying the open and continuous possession of the status as
Francisco‘s illegit child where Francisco
i. Sent her to school
Paid for her school expenses
Defrayed her hospitalization expenses
1. Testified to by Monina herself and Ledesma, a banker and former mayor
ii. Gave her monthly allowances which he instructed his office personnel to do
Paid for her mother‘s funeral expenses
Acknowledged her paternal greetings and
Called her his ―Hija‖ or child
1. Testified to by Tingson, Nelly Garden‘s paymaster
a. who recorded its expenses and issued vouchers and
b. who knew the persons receiving money from Francisco‘s office and
HEIRS OF GABATAN v CA
JENIE SAN JUAN DELA CRUZ v RONALD PAUL GARCIA, supra
LUCAS v LUCAS, supra
3. Rights of illegitimate children
FC 176 Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. The legitime of
each illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child. Except for this modification, all other provisions in the Civil Code governing successional rights shall
remain in force.
DAVID v CA
FACTS:
1. Petitioner Daisie T. David worked as secretary of private respondent Ramon R.
Villar, a rich businessman.
2. Private respondent is a married man and a father.
3. However, despite this, Daisie and Ramon cohabited
4. Out of this union, Christopher J., was born (on March 9, 1985).
5. Christopher J. was followed by two more children, both girls, namely Christine, born
on June 9, 1986, and Cathy Mae on April 24, 1988.
6. The relationship became known to private respondent's wife when Daisie took
Christopher J, to Villar's house at Villa Teresa in Angeles City sometime in 1986 and
introduced him to Villar's legal wife.
7. the children of Daisie were freely brought by Villar to his house as they were
eventually accepted by his legal family.
8. In the summer of 1991, Villar asked Daisie to allow Christopher J., then six years of
age, to go with his family to Boracay.
9. Daisie agreed.
10. but after the trip, Villar refused to give back the child.
11. Daisie filed a petition for habeas corpus.
Respondents:
a. Law and jurisprudence wherein the question of custody of a minor child may be
decided in a habeas corpus case contemplate a situation where the parents are
married to each other but are separated
b. respondent-appellant is financially well-off, he being a very rich businessman;
whereas, petitioner-appellee depends upon her sisters and parents for support. In fact,
he financially supported petitioner-appellee and her three minor children. It is,
therefore, for the best interest of Christopher J that he should temporarily remain
under the custody of respondent-appellant
ISSUE:
Whether or not the child should be given back to Daisie.
HELD:
Yes.
REASON 1:
Christopher J. is an illegitimate child since at the time of his conception, his father,
private respondent Ramon R. Villar, was married to another woman other than the
child's mother. As such, pursuant to Art. 176 of the Family Code, Christopher J. is
under the parental authority of his mother, the herein petitioner, who, as a
consequence of such authority, is entitled to have custody of him.
TONOG v CA
c. who kept Monina‘s accounts in a separate book to hide it from Lilia, as instructed by
Francisco iii. Recommended her for employment in Merchant Financing Corporation
that is managed by the wife of his first cousin
iv. Allowed her to use his house in Bacolod
Paid for her long distance telephone calls
1. Testified to by the houseboy, Duatin, that
a. Monina was introduced to him as Francisco‘s child when she stayed there
b. Monina calls Francisco ―Daddy‖
c. Francisco instructed him to treat Monina just like the rest of his children
d. He hid Monina whenever Francisco and Lilia were there, as instructed by Francisco
v. Had her vacation in his apartment in Manila
vi. Allowed her to use his surname
Issue: WON Monina is the illegitimate child of Francisco
Held: YES
1. The preponderance of evidence mentioned above sufficiently established her
filiation despite
a. the Affidavit dated Sept. 21, 1971, attesting that Francisco is not her father, because
it would not have been necessary if it were not true; Francisco had gone to such great
lengths in order that Monina denounce her filiation
b. Monina‘s birth and baptismal certificates were not signed by Francisco because
these are not conclusive evidence of filiation
c. Notes of Francisco‘s relatives attesting to Monina‘s filiation are without merit since
i. they are not shown to be dead or unable to testify
ii. they are not family possessions
Rule 130, Secs. 39, 40 require that family possessions to be regarded as evidence of
pedigree should be articles representing, in effect, the family‘s joint statement of its
belief as to the pedigree of a person
The fact that private respondent has recognized the minor child may be a ground for
ordering him to give support to the latter, but not for giving him custody of the child.
REASON 2:
Under Art. 213 of the Family Code, "no child under seven years of age shall be
separated from the mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to order
otherwise." 3
In the case at bar, as has already been pointed out, Christopher J., being less than
seven years of age at least at the time the case was decided by the RTC (reckoning
time), cannot be taken from the mother's custody.
Even now that the child is over seven years of age, the mother's custody over him will
have to be upheld because the child categorically expressed preference to live with his
mother. Under Art. 213 of the Family Code, courts must respect the "choice of the
child over seven years of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit" and here it has not
been shown that the mother is in any way `unfit to have custody of her child.
Rebuttals of respondnets’ arguments
On A. Rule 1021 §1 (the rule on habeas corpus) makes no distinction between the
case of a mother who is separated from her husband and is entitled to the custody of
her child and that of a mother of an illegitimate child who, by law, is vested with sole
parental authority, but is deprived of her rightful custody of her child.
Rule 102, §1 of the Rules of Court provides that "the writ of habeas corpus shall
extend to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived
of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person
entitled thereto."
On B. Nor is the fact that private respondent is well-off a reason for depriving petitioner
of the custody of her children, especially considering that she has been able to rear
and support them on her own since they were born. Petitioner is a market vendor
earning from P2,000 to P3,000 per month in 1993 when the RTC decision was
rendered. She augments her income by working as secretary at the Computer System
Specialist, Inc. earning a monthly income of P4,500.00. She has an arrangement with
her employer so that she can personally attend to her children. She works up to 8:00
o'clock in the evening to make up for time lost during the day. That she receives help
from her parents and sister for the support of the three children is not a point against
her. Cooperation, compassion, love and concern for every member of the family are
characteristics of the close family ties that bind the Filipino family and have made it
what it is.
FACTS:
1. September 23, 1989, petitioner Dinah B. Tonog gave birth to Gardin Faith Belarde
Tonog, her illegitimate daughter with private respondent Edgar V. Daguimol.
2. A year after the birth of Gardin Faith, petitioner left for the United States of America
to work as a registered nurse
3. Gardin Faith was left in the care of her father (private respondent herein) and
paternal grandparents.
4. On January 10, 1992, private respondent filed a petition for guardianship over
Gardin Faith and it was approved
5. Petitioner opposed. on October 4, 1993, a motion to remand custody of Gardin Faith
to her.
6. The trial court granted the motion and the case to determine custody of Gardin Faith
is now pending.
7. The respondent filed a petition for review on certiorari asserting that temporary
custody should be awarded to him because the child has lived with him all her life and
―It would certainly wreak havoc on the child‘s
psychological make-up to give her to the custody of private respondent, only to return
her to petitioner should the latter prevail in the main case. Subjecting the child to
emotional seesaw should be avoided‖
ISSUE:
W.N. temporary custody should be granted to the father.
HELD:
Yes.
In custody disputes, it is axiomatic that the paramount criterion is the welfare and well-
being of the child.
Insofar as illegitimate children are concerned, Article 176 of the Family Code provides
that illegitimate children shall be under the parental authority of their mother. Likewise,
Article 213 of the Family Code provides that ―[n]o child under seven years of age
shall be separated from the mother, unless the court finds compelling reasons to order
otherwise.
The exception allowed by the rule has to be for ―compelling reasons‖ for the good of
the child. If she has erred, as in cases of adultery, the penalty of imprisonment and the
divorce decree (relative divorce) will ordinarily be sufficient punishment for her.
Moreover, moral dereliction will not have any effect upon the baby who is as yet
unable to understand her situation.
This is not intended, however, to denigrate the important role fathers play in the
upbringing of their children. While the bonds between a mother and her small child are
special in nature, either parent, whether father or mother, is bound to suffer agony and
pain if deprived of custody. One cannot say that his or her suffering is greater than that
of the other parent. It is not so much the suffering, pride, and other feelings of either
parent but the welfare of the child which is the paramount consideration.
In the case at bar, we are being asked to rule on the temporary custody of the minor,
Gardin Faith, since it appears that the proceedings for guardianship before the trial
court have not been terminated, and no pronouncement has been made as to who
should have final custody of the minor. Bearing in mind that the welfare of the said
minor as the controlling factor, we find that the appellate court did not err in allowing
her father (private respondent herein) to retain in the meantime parental custody over
her. Meanwhile, the child should not be wrenched from her familiar surroundings, and
GO v RAMOS
FACTS: These petitions stemmed from the complaint-affidavit for deportation initiated
by Luis T. Ramos against Jimmy T. Go alleging that the latter is an illegal and
undesirable alien. Luis alleged that while Jimmy represents himself as a Filipino
citizen, Jimmy’s personal circumstances and other records indicate that he is not so.
Luis argued that although it appears from Jimmy’s birth certificate that his parents,
Carlos and Rosario Tan, are Filipinos, the document seems to be tampered, because
only the citizenship of Carlos appears to be handwritten while all the other entries were
typewritten.
ISSUE: Did we adopt the jus soli or jus sanguinins principle? Does the principle of res
adjudicata apply to decisions on citizenship?
HELD: We adopted the jus sanguinis principle. The doctrine of jus soli was never
extended to the Philippines. The doctrine of jus soli was for a time the prevailing rule in
4. Compulsory recognition
RPC 345 Civil liability of persons guilty of crimes against chastity. — Person guilty of rape, seduction or abduction, shall also be sentenced:
1. To indemnify the offended woman.
2. To acknowledge the offspring, unless the law should prevent him from so doing.
3. In every case to support the offspring.
The adulterer and the concubine in the case provided for in Articles 333 and 334 may also be sentenced, in the same proceeding or in a separate civil proceeding, to indemnify for
damages caused to the offended spouse.
RPC 46 Penalty to be imposed upon principals in general. — The penalty prescribed by law for the commission of a felony shall be imposed upon the principals in the commission of such
felony. Whenever the law prescribes a penalty for a felony is general terms, it shall be understood as applicable to the consummated felony.
RPC 59 Penalty to be imposed in case of failure to commit the crime because the means employed or the aims sought are impossible. — When the person intending to commit an
offense has already performed the acts for the execution of the same but nevertheless the crime was not produced by reason of the fact that the act intended was by its nature one of
thrust into a strange environment away from the people and places to which she had
apparently formed an attachment.
COMMENT: The court never expounded on what these compelling reasons are. The
best answer I could find is stated in the next paragraph saying that the SC cannot
decide on questions of fact. And the determination of w/n the mother is a good mother
is indeed a question of fact. But it still does not answer why custody was granted to the
father.
Is the compelling reason the fact that her mother is in the states? Is it the fact that the
child is already staying at the father‘s house and moving the child to and fro would
cause the child distress? Are these reasons compelling enough for the court to award
temporary custody to the father? I don‘t know
Are cases regarding temporary custody exceptions to Articles 176 and 213? I don‘t
know.
For reference, I also posted the full text of the case.
Whether a mother is a fit parent for her child is a question of fact to be properly
entertained in the special proceedings before the trial court. It should be recalled that
in a petition for review on certiorari, we rule only on questions of law. We are not in the
best position to assess the parties‘ respective merits vis-à-vis their opposing claims for
custody. Yet another sound reason is that inasmuch as the age of the minor, Gardin
Faith, has now exceeded the statutory bar of seven years, a fortiori, her preference
and opinion must first be sought in the choice of which parent should have the custody
over her person.
A word of caution: our pronouncement here should not be interpreted to imply a
preference toward the father (herein private respondent) relative to the final custody of
the minor, Gardin Faith. Nor should it be taken to mean as a statement against
petitioner‘s fitness to have final custody of her said minor daughter. It shall be only
understood that, for the present and until finally adjudged, temporary custody of the
subject minor should remain with her father
WHEREFORE, The trial court is directed to immediately proceed with hearing Sp.
Proc. No. Q-92-11053 upon notice of this decision
OBITER: Parental Authority and its Renunciation
Parental authority or patria potestas in Roman Law is the juridical institution whereby
parents rightfully assume control and protection of their unemancipated children to the
extent required by the latter‘s needs. It is a mass of rights and obligations which the
law grants to parents for the purpose of the children‘s physical preservation and
development, as well as the cultivation of their intellect and the education of their heart
and senses. As regards parental authority, ―there is no power, but a task; no complex
of rights, but a sum of duties; no sovereignty but a sacred trust for the welfare of the
minor.‖
GR: Parental authority and responsibility are inalienable and may not be transferred or
renounced except in cases authorized by law. The right attached to parental authority,
being purely personal, the law allows a waiver of parental authority only in cases of
EXC: adoption, guardianship and surrender to a children‘s home or an orphan
institution.
When a parent entrusts the custody of a minor to another, such as a friend or
godfather, even in a document, what is given is merely temporary custody and it does
not constitute a renunciation of parental authority. Even if a definite renunciation is
manifest, the law still disallows the same.
the acquisition of one’s citizenship. However, the Supreme Court abandoned the
principle of jus soli in the case of Tan Chong v. Secretary of Labor. Since then, said
doctrine only benefited those who were individually declared to be citizens of the
Philippines by a final court decision on the mistaken application of jus soli.
In citizenship proceedings, res judicata does not obtain as a matter of course. Res
judicata may be applied in cases of citizenship only if the following concur: 1. a
person’s citizenship must be raised as a material issue in a controversy where said
person is a party; 2. the Solicitor General or his authorized representative took active
part in the resolution thereof; and 3. the finding or citizenship is affirmed by this Court.
impossible accomplishment or because the means employed by such person are essentially inadequate to produce the result desired by him, the court, having in mind the social danger
and the degree of criminality shown by the offender, shall impose upon him the penalty of arresto mayor or a fine from 200 to 500 pesos.
PEOPLE v ABELLA
DOCTRINE: RTC: Rapist Accused is likewise directed to recognize [xxx] as his illegitimate daughter, and provide for her support as soon as his financial means permit.
Facts: Sometime in December 1999, the accused Marlon Abella, while armed with a
knife and under the influence of liquor, entered the house of herein complainant [AAA]
(real name of the victim was withheld by the court in its decision to protect her
identity), and then and there have sexual intercourse with [AAA], a 38-year old woman
of feeble mind (“moderate mental retardation” or intellectual quotient of a 7 to 8-year
old child”), against her will. During the pendency of the case, [AAA] gave birth to a
child. Accused stated that [AAA] was coached to testify against him in furtherance of
the hostility between their families. He claims that [AAA]’s mental disability made he so
subservient to her parents that she would believe everything that they tell her. The
RTC convicted the accused of the crime of rape. The case was elevated to the CA
which affirmed the decision of the lower court. Hence, the decision is under automatic
review by this court.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the prosecution failed to prove the guilt of the accused of the crime
charged.
2. Whether or not the testimony of the victim is credible to convict the accused.
3. Whether or not the denial of the accused was not given due credit by the court.
Held: The high court in affirming the decision of the lower court and the CA stated the
following:
1. Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code provides that the crime of rape is
committed by a man having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances: (1) through force, threat or intimidation; (2) when the offended party is
deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; (3) by means of fraudulent machination
or grave abuse of authority; and (4) when the offended party is under 12 years of age
or is demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present.
In People v. Andaya, [25] it was held that “sexual intercourse with a woman who is a
F. Legitimated Children
1. Who may be legitimated
FC 177 Only children conceived and born outside of wedlock of parents who, at the time of the conception of the former, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other may
be legitimated.
RA 9858
ABADILLA v TABILIRAN
FACTS:
 Complaint filed by Ma Blyth B. Abadilla, a Clerk of Court assigned at the sala of
respondent Judge Jose Tabiliran
 Respondent charged with gross immorality, deceitful conduct and corruption
unbecoming of a judge
 Complainant‘s allegations:
o respondent had scandalously and publicly cohabited with a certain Priscilla
Baybayan during the existence of his legitimate marriage with Teresita Banzuela
o that respondent shamefacedly contracted marriage with said Priscilla
o that respondent falsely represented himself as ―single‖ in the marriage contract
and dispense with the requirements of a marriage contract by invoking cohabitation for
5 years
 Earlier: wife filed a complaint for abandonment of family home and living with a
certain Leonora Pillarion with whom he had a son
 Charge of Deceitful Conduct:
o Complainant claims that respondent caused to be registered as legitimate his three
illegitimate children with Priscilla by falsely executing separate affidavits
 Other charge: Corruption
 Respondent:
o Declared that his cohabitation with Priscilla is not and was neither bigamous nor
immoral because he started living with her only after his 1st wife had already left and
abandoned the family home in 1966
o Since then, 1st wife‘s whereabouts is not known and respondent has had no news of
her being alive
o Further avers that 25 years had already elapsed since the disappearance of his 1st
wife when he married Priscilla in 1986
2. How legitimation takes place
FC 178 Legitimation shall take place by a subsequent valid marriage between parents. The annulment of a voidable marriage shall not affect the legitimation.
FC 180 The effects of legitimation shall retroact to the time of the child's birth.
3. Retroactivity and effects
FC 180, supra
FC 181 The legitimation of children who died before the celebration of the marriage shall benefit their descendants.
DOJ OPINION NO. 106 Series of 1991
4. Action to impugn legitimation
mental retardate with the mental age of a child below 12 years old constitutes statutory
rape” with or without the attendance of force, threat, or intimidation.
2. By well-entrenched jurisprudence, the issue of credibility of witnesses is “a question
best addressed to the province of the trial court because of its unique position of
having observed that elusive and incommunicable evidence of the witnesses'
deportment on the stand while testifying which opportunity is denied to the appellate
courts” and “[a]bsent any substantial reason which would justify the reversal of the trial
court's assessments and conclusions, the reviewing court is generally bound by the
former's findings, particularly when no significant facts and circumstances are shown
to have been overlooked or disregarded which when considered would have affected
the outcome of the case.”
3. It has been stressed, moreover, that the bare denials and uncorroborated alibis of
an accused cannot overcome the positive identification of the accused and
straightforward recounting of the accused’s commission of a crime. In People v. Nieto,
this Court held:
It is an established jurisprudential rule that a mere denial, without any strong evidence
to support it, can scarcely overcome the positive declaration by the victim of the
identity and involvement of appellant in the crimes attributed to him. The defense of
alibi is likewise unavailing. Firstly, alibi is the weakest of all defenses, because it is
easy to concoct and difficult to disprove. Unless substantiated by clear and convincing
proof, such defense is negative, self-serving, and undeserving of any weight in law.
Secondly, alibi is unacceptable when there is a positive identification of the accused by
a credible witness. Lastly, in order that alibi might prosper, it is not enough to prove
that the accused has been somewhere else during the commission of the crime; it
must also be shown that it would have been impossible for him to be anywhere within
the vicinity of the crime scene.
 Judge Angeles found respondent guilty only on 2 counts of corruption
ISSUES:
 WON Tabilaran is guilty of deceitful conduct
HELD:
 YES
o Children were born in 1970, 1971 and 1975 and prior to the marriage of respondent
to Priscilla, which was in 1986
o As a lawyer and a judge, respondent ought to know that, despite his subsequent
marriage to Priscilla, these 3 children cannot be legitimated nor in any way be
considered legitimate since at the time they were born, there was an existing valid
marriage between respondent and his first wife, Teresita
o Applicable Provision  Art. 269 of NCC: Only natural children can be legitimated.
Children born outside of wedlock of parents who, at the time of the conception of the
former, were not disqualified by any impediment o marry each other, are natural.
o Legitimation is limited to natural children and cannot include those born of adulterous
relations
o Reasons:
 1. The rationale of legitimation would be destroyed
 2. It would be unfair to the legitimate children in terms of successional rights;
 3. There will be the problem of public scandal, unless social mores change;
 4. It is too violent to grant the privilege of legitimation to adulterous children as it will
destroy the sanctity of marriage
 5. It will be very scandalous, especially if the parents marry many years after the birth
of the child.
It is clear, therefore, that no legal provision, whether old or new, can give refuge to the
deceitful actuations of the respondent.
FC 182 Legitimation may be impugned only by those who are prejudiced in their rights, within five years from the time their cause of action accrues.
5. Rights of legitimated children
FC 179 Legitimated children shall enjoy the same rights as legitimate children
RULE ON DNA EVIDENCE
SECTION 1. Scope. This Rule shall apply whenever DNA evidence, as defined in
Section 3 hereof, is offered, used, or proposed to be offered or used as evidence in all
criminal and civil actions as well as special proceedings.
SEC. 2. Application of other Rules on Evidence. In all matters not specifically covered
by this Rule, the Rules of Court and other pertinent provisions of law on evidence shall
apply.
SEC. 3. Definition of Terms. For purposes of this Rule, the following terms shall be
defined as follows:
(a) Biological sample means any organic material originating from a person body, even
if found in inanimate objects, that is susceptible to DNA testing. This includes blood,
saliva and other body fluids, tissues, hairs and bones;
(b) DNA means deoxyribonucleic acid, which is the chain of molecules found in every
nucleated cell of the body. The totality of an individual DNA is unique for the individual,
except identical twins;
(c) DNA evidence constitutes the totality of the DNA profiles, results and other genetic
information directly generated from DNA testing of biological samples;
(d) DNA profile means genetic information derived from DNA testing of a biological
sample obtained from a person, which biological sample is clearly identifiable as
originating from that person;
(e) DNA testing means verified and credible scientific methods which include the
extraction of DNA from biological samples, the generation of DNA profiles and the
comparison of the information obtained from the DNA testing of biological samples for
the purpose of determining, with reasonable certainty, whether or not the DNA
obtained from two or more distinct biological samples originates from the same person
(direct identification) or if the biological samples originate from related persons (kinship
analysis); and
(f) Probability of Parentage means the numerical estimate for the likelihood of
parentage of a putative parent compared with the probability of a random match of two
unrelated individuals in a given population.
SEC. 4. Application for DNA Testing Order. The appropriate court may, at any time,
either motu proprio or on application of any person who has a legal interest in the
matter in litigation, order a DNA testing. Such order shall issue after due hearing and
notice to the parties upon a showing of the following:
(a) A biological sample exists that is relevant to the case;
(b) The biological sample: (i) was not previously subjected to the type of DNA testing
now requested; or (ii) was previously subjected to DNA testing, but the results may
require confirmation for good reasons;
(c) The DNA testing uses a scientifically valid technique;
(d) The DNA testing has the scientific potential to produce new information that is
relevant to the proper resolution of the case; and
(e) The existence of other factors, if any, which the court may consider as potentially
affecting the accuracy or integrity of the DNA testing.
This Rule shall not preclude a DNA testing, without need of a prior court order, at the
behest of any party, including law enforcement agencies, before a suit or proceeding is
commenced.
SEC. 5. DNA Testing Order. If the court finds that the requirements in Section 4
hereof have been complied with, the court shall
(a) Order, where appropriate, that biological samples be taken from any person or
crime scene evidence;
(b) Impose reasonable conditions on DNA testing designed to protect the integrity of
the biological sample, the testing process and the reliability of the test results,
including the condition that the DNA test results shall be simultaneously disclosed to
parties involved in the case; and
(c) If the biological sample taken is of such an amount that prevents the conduct of
confirmatory testing by the other or the adverse party and where additional biological
samples of the same kind can no longer be obtained, issue an order requiring all
parties to the case or proceedings to witness the DNA testing to be conducted.
An order granting the DNA testing shall be immediately executory and shall not be
appealable. Any petition for certiorari initiated therefrom shall not, in any way, stay the
implementation thereof, unless a higher court issues an injunctive order. The grant of a
DNA testing application shall not be construed as an automatic admission into
evidence of any component of the DNA evidence that may be obtained as a result
thereof.
SEC. 6. Post-conviction DNA Testing. Post-conviction DNA testing may be available,
without need of prior court order, to the prosecution or any person convicted by final
and executory judgment provided that (a) a biological sample exists, (b) such sample
is relevant to the case, and (c) the testing would probably result in the reversal or
modification of the judgment of conviction.
SEC. 7. Assessment of probative value of DNA evidence. In assessing the probative
value of the DNA evidence presented, the court shall consider the following:
(a) The chain of custody, including how the biological samples were collected, how
they were handled, and the possibility of contamination of the samples;
(b) The DNA testing methodology, including the procedure followed in analyzing the
samples, the advantages and disadvantages of the procedure, and compliance with
the scientifically valid standards in conducting the tests;
(c) The forensic DNA laboratory, including accreditation by any reputable standards-
setting institution and the qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests. If the
laboratory is not accredited, the relevant experience of the laboratory in forensic
casework and credibility shall be properly established; and
(d) The reliability of the testing result, as hereinafter provided.
The provisions of the Rules of Court concerning the appreciation of evidence shall
apply suppletorily.
SEC. 8. Reliability of DNA Testing Methodology. In evaluating whether the DNA
testing methodology is reliable, the court shall consider the following:
(a) The falsifiability of the principles or methods used, that is, whether the theory or
technique can be and has been tested;
(b) The subjection to peer review and publication of the principles or methods;
(c) The general acceptance of the principles or methods by the relevant scientific
community;
(d) The existence and maintenance of standards and controls to ensure the
correctness of data generated;
(e) The existence of an appropriate reference population database; and
(f) The general degree of confidence attributed to mathematical calculations used in
comparing DNA profiles and the significance and limitation of statistical calculations
used in comparing DNA profiles.
SEC. 9. Evaluation of DNA Testing Results. In evaluating the results of DNA testing,
the court shall consider the following:
(a) The evaluation of the weight of matching DNA evidence or the relevance of
mismatching DNA evidence;
(b) The results of the DNA testing in the light of the totality of the other evidence
presented in the case; and that
(c) DNA results that exclude the putative parent from paternity shall be conclusive
proof of non-paternity. If the value of the Probability of Paternity is less than 99.9%, the
results of the DNA testing shall be considered as corroborative evidence. If the value
of the Probability of Paternity is 99.9% or higher, there shall be a disputable
presumption of paternity.
SEC. 10. Post-conviction DNA Testing. Remedy if the Results Are Favorable to the
Convict. The convict or the prosecution may file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus
in the court of origin if the results of the post-conviction DNA testing are favorable to
the convict. In case the court, after due hearing, finds the petition to be meritorious, it
shall reverse or modify the judgment of conviction and order the release of the convict,
unless continued detention is justified for a lawful cause.
A similar petition may be filed either in the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court, or
with any member of said courts, which may conduct a hearing thereon or remand the
petition to the court of origin and issue the appropriate orders.
SEC. 11. Confidentiality. DNA profiles and all results or other information obtained
from DNA testing shall be confidential. Except upon order of the court, a DNA profile
and all results or other information obtained from DNA testing shall only be released to
any of the following, under such terms and conditions as may be set forth by the court:
(a) Person from whom the sample was taken;
(b) Lawyers representing parties in the case or action where the DNA evidence is
offered and presented or sought to be offered and presented;
(c) Lawyers of private complainants in a criminal action;
(d) Duly authorized law enforcement agencies; and
(e) Other persons as determined by the court.
Whoever discloses, utilizes or publishes in any form any information concerning a
DNA profile without the proper court order shall be liable for indirect contempt of the
court wherein such DNA evidence was offered, presented or sought to be offered and
presented.
Where the person from whom the biological sample was taken files a written verified
request to the court that allowed the DNA testing for the disclosure of the DNA profile
of the person and all results or other information obtained from the DNA testing, the
same may be disclosed to the persons named in the written verified request.
SEC. 12. Preservation of DNA Evidence. The trial court shall preserve the DNA
evidence in its totality, including all biological samples, DNA profiles and results or
other genetic information obtained from DNA testing. For this purpose, the court may
order the appropriate government agency to preserve the DNA evidence as follows:
(a) In criminal cases:
i. for not less than the period of time that any person is under trial for an offense; or,
ii. in case the accused is serving sentence, until such time as the accused has served
his sentence;
and
(b) In all other cases, until such time as the decision in the case where the DNA
evidence was introduced has become final and executory.
The court may allow the physical destruction of a biological sample before the
expiration of the periods set forth above, provided that:
(a) A court order to that effect has been secured; or
(b) The person from whom the DNA sample was obtained has consented in writing to
the disposal of the DNA evidence.
SEC. 13. Applicability to Pending Cases. Except as provided in Sections 6 and 10
hereof, this Rule shall apply to cases pending at the time of its effectivity.
SEC. 14. Effectivity. This
Rule shall take effect on October 15,
2007, following publication in a newspaper of general
circulation.