2. Cancellation of Union Article 245. Cancellation of registration.

- The certificate of registration of any legitimate

Certificate of labor organization, whether national or local, may be cancelled by the Bureau, after due
Registration hearing, only on the grounds specified in Article 239 (now Art. 245) hereof.

Article 246. Effect of a petition for cancellation of registration. - A petition for cancellation of
union registration shall not suspend the proceedings for certification election nor shall it
prevent the filing of a petition for certification election.

In case of cancellation, nothing herein shall restrict the right of the union to seek just and
equitable remedies in the appropriate courts

Article 247. Grounds for cancellation of union registration.- The following may constitute
grounds for cancellation of union registration:

(a) Misrepresentation, false statement or fraud in connection with the adoption or ratification
of the constitution and by-laws or amendments thereto, the minutes of ratification, and the
list of members who took part in the ratification;
(b) Misrepresentation, false statements or fraud in connection with the election of officers,
minutes of the election of officers, and the list of voters;
(c)  Voluntary dissolution by the members. 

Article 250. Procedure in collective bargaining. The following procedures shall be observed in
collective bargaining:

(j) Every income or revenue of the organization shall be evidenced by a record showing its
source, and every expenditure of its funds shall be evidenced by a receipt from the person to
whom the payment is made, which shall state the date, place and purpose of such payment.
Such record or receipt shall form part of the financial records of the organization.

Any action involving the funds of the organization shall prescribe after three (3) years from the
date of submission of the annual financial report to the Department of Labor and Employment
or from the date the same should have been submitted as required by law, whichever comes
earlier: Provided, That this provision shall apply only to a legitimate labor organization which
has submitted the financial report requirements under this Code: Provided, further, that
failure of any labor organization to comply with the periodic financial reports required by law
and such rules and regulations promulgated thereunder six (6) months after the effectivity of
this Act shall automatically result in the cancellation of union registration of such labor
organization

Article 248. Voluntary cancellation of registration. - The registration of a legitimate labor

organization may be cancelled by the organization itself: Provided, That at least two-thirds of
its general membership votes, in a meeting duly called for that purpose to dissolve the
organization: Provided, further, That an application to cancel registration is thereafter
submitted by the board of the organization, attested to by the president thereof.

IR, Book V, Rule I, Sec. 1(g) &

Rule XIV;

Air Philippines Corporation v. Bureau of Labor Relation

(G.R. No. 155395| June 22, 2006)

S.S. Ventures International, Inc. v. S.S. Ventures Labor Union, G.R. No. 161690, July 23, 2008;

Mariwasa Siam Ceramics, Inc. v. The Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment,
et al., G.R. No. 183317, December 21, 2009;
 The Heritage Hotel Manila v. National Union of Workers in the Hotel, Restaurant and Allied
Industries-Heritage Hotel Manila Supervisors Chapter (NUWHRAIN-HHMSC), G.R. No. 178296,
January 12, 2011;

Takata (Philippines) Corporation v. BLR, G.R. No. 196276, June 4, 2014

E. International Activities of Union LC, Arts. 284-286
F. Union – Member Relations LC, Arts. 250 & 260(a); UST Faculty Union v. Bitonio, G.R. No. 131235, November 16, 1999
1. Admission and Discipline of Article 260 Unfair labor practices of labor organizations. - It shall be unfair labor practice for
Members a labor organization, its officers, agents or representatives:

(a) To restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization. However,
a labor organization shall have the right to prescribe its own rules with respect to the
acquisition or retention of membership

Article 250. Rights and conditions of membership in a labor organization. The following are
the rights and conditions of membership in a labor organization:

(a) No arbitrary or excessive initiation fees shall be required of the members of a legitimate
labor organization nor shall arbitrary, excessive or oppressive fine and forfeiture be imposed;

(e) No labor organization shall knowingly admit as members or continue in membership any
individual who belongs to a subversive organization or who is engaged directly or indirectly in
any subversive activity

Article. 292. Miscellaneous provisions. -

(c) Any employee, whether employed for a definite period or not, shall, beginning on his first
day of service, be considered as an employee for purposes of membership in any labor union. 

Salunga v. CIR, 21 SCRA 216 (1967);

Facts
1. Since 1948, Salunga had been an employee of the SMB. On Oct 2, 1959, SMB entered with
the Union (John de Castillo-President), into a CBA, effective upto June 30, 1962. Section 3
thereof reads:

“The company agrees to require as a condition of employment of those workers covered by

this agreement who either are members of the UNION on the date of the signing of this
agreement, or may join the UNION during the effectivity of this agreement, that they shall not
voluntarily resign from the UNION earlier than thirty (30) days before the expiry date of this
agreement as provided in Article XIII hereof, provided, however, that nothing herein
contained shall be construed to require the company to enforce any sanction whatsoever
against any employee or worker who fails to retain his membership in the UNION as
hereinbefore stated, for any cause other than voluntary resignation or non-payment of regular
union dues on the part of said employee or worker.”

2. Salunga was member of the Union since 1953. On Aug 18, 1961, he tendered his resignation
from the Union, which Union accepted on Aug 26, 1961 and transmitted it to SMB, three days
later, requesting also for the immediate implementation of CBA’s Sec 3 to such employee.

3. SMB informed Salunga that his resignation from the Union would result in the termination
of his employment, pursuant to CBA’s Sec 3. Salunga wrote the Union on Aug 31, 1961,
withdrawing or revoking his resignation and adviced the Union to continue deducting his
monthly union dues. Salunga also sent SMB a copy of his leeter to the Union. SMB notified the
Union of the recipt of Salunga’s letter and noted that “in view thereof, we shall not take any
action on this case and shall consider Mr. Salunga still a member of your union and continue
deducting his union dues.”
4. On Sept 8, 1961, the Union told SMB that Salunga’s membership could not be reinstated
and insisted on his separation from the service. SMB replied, “Nevertheless, if
notwithstanding our foregoing clarification you still consider him as having actually resigned
from your organization, and you insist that we dismiss him from the service in accordance
with Sec. 3, Article II of our agreement, we will have no alternative but to do so.”

5. The Union, again on Sept 20, 1961, reiterated its request for implementation of Sec3, thus,
two days later SMB notified Salunga, “we regret we have to terminate your employment for
cause. You are hereby notified of your dismissal from the service effective as of the close of
business hours, September 30, 1961.”

6. Salunga sought the intervention of PAFLU’s National President (Cipriano Cid), to which the
Union was affiliated, for a review of the Union’s action. PAFLU asked the Company to defer his
dismissal for 2 weeks so that PAFLU’s Executive Board could act on his appeal. On Oct 6, 1961,
Cid advised Salunga that PAFLU found no ground to review the action taken by the Union and
on the expiration of the 15-day grace granted to him by SMB, the decision to terminate his
services would take effect.

7. Salunga notified PAFLU that he was appealing to PAFLU National Convention, PAFLU’s
supreme authority, and requested that action on his case be deferred until such time as the
Convention shall have acted on his appeal. A letter of the same tenor was sent to the Union.

Furthermore, Salunga asked SMB to maintain status quo, in the mean time.

8. These facts notwithstanding, at the close of business hours on Oct 15, 1961, Salunga was
discharged from SMB, through its assistant-secretary and vice-president, Miguel Noel.

9. Salunga filed a complaint of Unfair Labor Practice before the CIR which rendered a decision
in favor of Salunga, ordering his readmission into the membership rolls of the union after
paying all the union dues, reinstatement at work with back wages.

10. Motion for Reconsideration was filed and CIR en banc reversed the previous decision,
dismissing Salunga’s petition. Thus, Salunga appealed before the Supreme Court.

Issue/s: Whether or not the respondents are guilty of Unfair Labor Practice. – SMB Company
was NOT guilty of ULP.

HELD:
1. In the case at bar, the company was reluctant, if not unwilling, to discharge petitioner.
When the union first informed it of petitioner’s resignation and urged implementation of
Section 3 of the bargaining contract, the company advised petitioner of its provisions, thereby
intimating that he had to withdraw his resignation in order to keep his employment. Besides,
the company notified the union that it would not take any action on the case and would
consider petitioner still a member of the union. When the latter, thereafter, insisted on
petitioner’s discharge, the company still demurred and explained that it was not taking sides
and that its stand was prompted merely by “humane” considerations, springing from the
belief that petitioner had resigned from the union without realizing its effect upon his
employment. And, as the union reiterated its demand, the company notified petitioner that it
had no other alternative but to terminate his employment, and dismissed him from the
service, although with “regret.” Under the circumstances, the company was not “unfair” to
petitioner.

The CIR trial Judge found out that the refusal of the Union to continue Salunga’s membership
was due to his critical attitude towards certain measures taken or sanctioned by them: “The
record is clear that feeling dejected by the inaction of the union officials on his grievances and
objections to what he believed were illegal disbursements of union funds, coupled with the
fact that he was later removed from his position as a union steward without his knowledge, as
well as the fact that the union did not honor the power of attorney executed in his favor by
Alejandro Miranda, a co-worker, for the collection of Miranda’s indebtedness of P60.00 to him,
he submitted his letter of resignation from the union on August 18, 1961. It must be stated
here that no evidence was adduced by the respondent union to overcome complainant’s
testimonies about his objections to the disbursements of union funds but only tried to elicit
from him, on cross examination, that the funds of the union are only disbursed upon authority
of the Executive Board of the union. x x .”

2. It should be noted that the Court of Industrial Relations en banc did not reverse these
findings of fact or even question the accuracy thereof. What is more, the officers of the Union
have, in effect, confirmed the fact that their refusal to allow the withdrawal of petitioner’s
resignation had been due to his aforementioned criticisms. Indeed, said officers tried to justify
themselves by characterizing said criticisms as acts of disloyalty to the Union, which, of course,
is not true, not only because the criticism assailed, not the Union, but certain acts of its
officers, and, indirectly, the officers themselves, but also because the constitution and by-laws
of the Union explicitly recognize the right of its members to give their views on “all
transactions made by the Union.”

As a consequence, the resolution appealed from cannot be affirmed without, in effect,

nullifying said right which, independently of the constitution and by-laws of the Union, is part
and parcel of the freedom of speech guaranteed in the Constitution of our Republic, as a
condition sine qua non to the sound growth and development of labor organizations and
democratic institutions.

3. Although, generally, a state may not compel ordinary voluntary associations to admit
thereto any given individual, because membership therein may be accorded or withheld as a
matter of privilege, the rule is qualified in respect of labor unions holding a monopoly in the
supply of labor, either in a given locality, or as regards a particular employer with which it has
a closed-shop agreement. The reason is that “x x x The closed shop and the union shop cause
the admission requirements of trade union to become affected with the public interest.
Likewise, a closed shop, a union shop, or maintenance of membership clauses cause the
administration of discipline by unions to be affected with the public interest.”

Consequently, it is well settled that such unions are not entitled to arbitrarily exclude
qualified applicants for membership, and a closed-shop provision would not justify the
employer in discharging, or a union in insisting upon the discharge of, an employee whom the
union thus refuses to admit to membership, without any reasonable ground therefor.

4. Having been dismissed from the service owing to an unfair labor practice on the part of the
union, petitioner is entitled to reinstatement as member of the union and to his former or
substantially equivalent position in the company, without prejudice to his seniority and/or
rights and privileges, and with back pay, which back pay shall be borne exclusively by the
union. In the exercise of its sound judgment and discretion, the lower court may, however,
take such measures as it may deem best, including the power to authorize the company to
make deductions for petitioner’s benefit, from the sums due to the union by way of check off
or otherwise.

Villar v. Inciong, 121 SCRA 444 (1983)

 Petitioners were members of Amigo Employees Union-PAFLU (AEU-PAFLU), a duly

registered labor organization which was the existing bargaining agent of the employees
in Amigo Manufacturing, Inc. (Company). The Company and Amigo-PAFLU had a
collective bargaining agreement governing their labor relations, which was then about
to expire on February 28, 1977.
 Jan. 5, 1977: upon written authority of at least 30% of the employees, including
petitioners, Federation of Unions of Rizal (FUR) filed a petition for certification election
with the Med-Arbiter.
o This was opposed by Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions (PAFLU) with
 whom the Amigo-PAFLU was at that time affiliated. PAFLU's opposition cited
the "Code of Ethics" governing inter-federation disputes among and between
members of the Trade Unions Congress of the Philippines (TUCP).
o Med-Arbiter indorsed the case to TUCP for appropriate action but before any
such action could be taken, the petitioners disauthorized FUR from continuing
the petition for certification election for which reason FUR withdrew the
petition.
 February 7, 1977: the same employees who had signed the petition filed by FUR signed
a joint resolution in which they withdrew membership from PAFLU, relinquish FUR’s
authority to bargain and negotiate in their behalf and stated that they shall maintain
their union, Amigo Employees Union (Amigo), independent.
 February 9, 1977: petitioner Dolores Villar, representing herself to be the authorized
representative of Amigo, filed a petition for certification election in the Company before
Regional Office No. 4, with Amigo, as the petitioner.
 The AEU-PAFLU intervened and moved for the dismissal of the petition for certification
election, citing as grounds (a) the petition lacked the mandatory requisite of at least
30% of the employees in the bargaining unit; (2) Dolores Villar had no legal personality
to sign the petition since she was not an officer of the union nor is there factual or legal
basis for her claim that she was the authorized representative of the local union; (3)
there was a pending case for the same subject matter filed by the same individuals; (4)
the petition was barred by the new CBA concluded on February 15, 1977; (5) there was
no valid disaffiliation from PAFLU; and (6) the supporting signatures were procured
through false pretenses.
 February 14, 1977: the AEU- PAFLU called a special meeting of its general membership.
A Resolution was unanimously approved which called for the investigation by the PAFLU
national president, pursuant to the constitution and by-laws of the Federation, of all of
the petitioners and one Felipe Manlapao, for "continuously maligning, libelling and
slandering not only the incumbent officers but even the union itself and the federation;"
spreading 'false propaganda' that the union officers were 'merely appointees of the
management', and for causing divisiveness in the union. PAFLU formed a Trial
Committee to investigate the local union's charges against the petitioners for acts of
disloyalty inimical to the interest of the local union.
 AEU-PAFLU and the Company concluded a new CBA which, besides granting additional
benefits to the workers, also reincorporated the same provisions of the existing CBA,
including the union security clause reading: All members of the UNION as of the signing
of this Agreement shall remain members thereof in good standing. Therefore, any
members who shall resign, be expelled, or shall in any manner cease to be a member of
the UNION, shall be dismissed from his employment upon written request of the UNION
to the Company.
 Petitioners were summoned to appear before the PAFLU Trial Committee for the
investigation of the charges filed against them by the AEU-PAFLU. Petitioners, however,
did not attend but requested for a "Bill of Particulars" of the charges.
 The charges were stated by the Chairman of the committee as follows:
1. Disaffiliating from PAFLU and affiliating with the Federation of Unions of Rizal (FUR).
2. Filling petition for certification election with the BLR without the official sanction of the
mother Federation- PAFLU.
3. Maligning, libelling and slandering the incumbent officers of the union as well as of the
PAFLU Federation.
4. By spreading false propaganda among members of the AEU-PAFLU that the incumbent
union officers are 'merely appointees' of the management.
5. By sowing divisiveness instead of togetherness among members of the AEU-PAFLU.
6. By conduct unbecoming as members of the AEU- PAFLU which is highly prejudicial to the
union as well as to the PAFLU Federation.
o All these charges were formalized in a resolution of the incumbent
officers of the Amigo Employees Union-PAFLU dated February 14,
1977.
 Not recognizing PAFLU's jurisdiction over their case, petitioners again refused to
participate in the investigation rescheduled and conducted on March 9, 1979.
 Instead, petitioners merely appeared to file their Answer to the charges and moved
for a dismissal.
 The complainants, who were the then incumbent officers of the AEU-PAFLU
appeared and adduced their evidence supporting the charges against herein
petitioners.
 March 15, 1977: Based on the findings and recommendations of the PAFLU trial
committee, the PAFLU President, rendered a decision finding the petitioners guilty of
the charges. PAFLU requested the Management of the Company to terminate them
from their employment in conformity with the security clause in the collective
bargaining agreement. Further, the Trial Committee is directed to investigate Felipe
Manlapao when he shall have reported back for duty.
 Petitioners appealed the Decision to the PAFLU, arguing that the PAFLU decision
cannot legally invoke a CBA which was unratified, not certified, and entered into
without authority from the union general membership, in asking the Company to
terminate them from their employment. The appeal was, likewise, denied by
PAFLU.After denying petitioner's appeal, PAFLU sent a letter to the Company stating
that the Decision has become final and executory and asking to implement the
provision of the CBA on security clause by terminating the respondents concerned.
 April 29, 1977: Company filed the request for clearance to terminate the petitioners
before the Department of Labor. Petitioners were then informed by memorandum
dated April 29, 1977 that the Company has applied for clearance to terminate them
upon demand of PAFLU, and that each of them were placed under preventive
suspension pending the resolution of the said applications. The security guard was,
likewise, notified to refuse petitioners entry into the work premises.
 Before petitioners were placed under preventive suspension pending clearance for
termination, they filed a complaint with application for preliminary injunction before
the same Regional Office, praying for a preliminary injunction be issued forthwith to
restrain the respondents from dismissing the individual complainants from their
employment.
 October 14, 1977: The Regional Office gave the company clearance to terminate
Dolores D. Villar, Dionisio Ramos, Benigno Mamaraldo, Orlando Acosta, Recitacion
Bernus, Anselma Andan, Rolando de Guzman, and Rita Llagas from employment.
Petitioners appealed to the Office of the Secretary of Labor. By Order dated February 15,
1979, the respondent Amado G. Inciong, Deputy Minister of Labor, dismissed their appeal for
lack of merit. Hence, the instant petition for review

ISSUE(S): W/N PAFLU had the authority to investigate the petitioners and expel them from
the roll of membership of the AEU-PAFLU

HELD: YES.
 It is true that under the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Labor Code, in case
of intra-union disputes, redress must first be sought within the organization itself in
accordance with its constitution and by-laws. However, it has been held that this
requirement is not absolute but yields to exception under varying circumstances.
 PAFLU had the authority to investigate petitioners on the charges filed by their co-
employees in the local union and after finding them guilty as charged, to expel them
from the roll of membership of the Amigo Employees Union-PAFLU is clear under the
constitution of the PAFLU to which the local union was affiliated. And pursuant to the
security clause of the new CBA, reiterating the same clause in the old CBA, PAFLU was
justified in applying said security clause. (see underlined in facts)
 When a labor union affiliates with a parent organization or mother union, or accepts a
charter from a superior body, it becomes subject to the laws of the superior body under
whose authority the local union functions. The constitution, by-laws and rules of the
parent body, together with the charter it issues pursuant thereto to the subordinate
union, constitute an enforceable contract between the parent body and the subordinate
union, and between the members of the subordinate union inter se.
 It is undisputable that the petitioners were members of the Amigo Employees Union at
the time that said union affiliated with PAFLU; hence, under the earlier mentioned
 principle, they are bound by the laws and regulations of PAFLU.
 PAFLU, therefore, correctly and legally acted when, pursuant to its Constitution and By-
Laws, it conducted and proceeded with the investigation of the charges against the
petitioners and found them guilty of acts prejudicial and inimical to the interests of the
Amigo Employees Union- PAFLU, to wit: that of falsely and maliciously slandering the
officers of the union; spreading false propaganda among the members of the Amigo
Employees Union-PAFLU; calling the incumbent officers as mere appointees and robots
of management; calling the union company-dominated or assisted union; committing
acts unbecoming of the members of the union and destructive of the union and its
members.
 Inherent in every labor union, or any organization for that matter, is the right of self-
preservation. When members of a labor union, therefore, sow the seeds of dissension
and strife within the union; when they seek the disintegration and destruction of the
very union to which they belong, they thereby forfeit their rights to remain as members
of the union which they seek to destroy. Prudence and equity, as well as the dictates of
law and justice, therefore, compelling mandate the adoption by the labor union of such
corrective and remedial measures in keeping with its laws and regulations, for its
preservation and continued existence; lest by its folly and inaction, the labor union
crumble and fall.
Correctly and legally, therefore, the PAFLU acted when, after proper investigation and finding
of guilt, it decided to remove the petitioners from the list of members of the Amigo
Employees Union-PAFLU, and thereafter, recommended to the Amigo Manufacturing, Inc.; the
termination of the employment of the petitioners.

Dispositive: Order appealed from affirming the joint decision of the OIC granting clearance to
terminate petitioners as well as dismissing their complaint with application for preliminary
injunction, is hereby AFFIRMED.
Due Process Bugay v. Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa sa MRR, 4 SCRA 487 (1962)
1. Appellant Bugay was formerly an auditor of defendant union. He was at the same time
payroll clerk of Manila Railroad Company. Sometime in March 1953, he was requested
by the secretary-treasurer of the company to deliver certain documents which were in
his possession belonging to the union and in compliance therewith he delivered them
without consulting the officers of the union. Making use of these documents, the
management of the company filed with the City Fiscal of Manila against Olazo,
president of the union, a charge for falsification of commercial document which was
dismissed.
2. Subsequently, charges for disloyalty and conduct unbecoming a union member were
preferred against appellant, and later the corresponding investigation, appellant was
expelled from the union. Hence, the filing of appellant a charge for unfair labor
practice against the union before the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR).
3. After due hearing, it rendered a decision holding that appellant's expulsion was illegal
since it has not been approved by the majority of the chapters of the union as
required by its constitution and by-laws. CIR ordered Bugay’s reinstatement.
a. Both in the investigation and in the board meeting where the committee’s
report recommending expulsion was approved, Bugay was not present.
b. During the board meeting, the committee of 3 board members assigned to
summon Bugay failed to serve notice upon him because he was in Lucena,
Quezon.
c. All these proceedings were continued by respondent Olazo inspite of Bugay’s
absence. Whatever might be the merits of the charge filed by respondent
Olazo against him, Bugay did not have sufficient opportunity to defend
himself. Such proceedings, being violative of the elementary rule of justice
and fair play, cannot give validity to any act done pursuant thereto. (Due
process)
d. Considering that he has been unduly and discriminatorily deprived of such
rights and obligations, the Court finds, and so holds, that the respondents, by
their act and conduct, have engaged in and are engaging in unfair labor
 practice in violation of Section 4(b) (2) of the Act.
4. SC affirmed.
5. Bugay filed an action for moral damages arising out of an unfair labor practice
allegedly committed by said union. He claims that he has suffered moral damages
because of the mental anguish, anxiety, social humiliation and besmirched reputation
he has been subjected among the thousands of employees of the Manila Railroad
Company, which claim is supported by the New Civil Code.
6. The union filed a MTD on the ground that the complaint does not state facts sufficient
to constitute a cause of action contending that the CIR and SC decisions do not contain
any intimation nor statement to the effect that the charges filed against him which
resulted in his separation from the union were "trumped up" or fabricated but were
solely based on procedural defects in the matter of his expulsion. Because of that, he
cannot ask moral damages inasmuch as there is no showing that to effect his
expulsion the officers of the union have acted in bad faith. As a matter of fact, he did
not lose his employment as payroll clerk in the company as a result of his expulsion,
nor did he suffer any change in his status as a consequence thereof. In effect, he was
not awarded any damages by the industrial court. Further, the contention was that he
should have filed his claim before the CIR.
RTC dismissed the complaint and sustained the contention of union. Hence, the present
appeal.

Issue/s: Whether Bugay is entitled to moral damages, as a result of the violation of his right to
due process committed by the union. YES

Ruling: His claim for moral damages finds support in the Civil Code. Thus, Article 2217
provides: "Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury.
Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are the
proximate result of the defendant's wrongful act or omission."

The fact remains that the two courts have found that his expulsion was illegal because of the
irregularities committed in his investigation. In effect, it was found that not only has he not
been given an opportunity to defend himself but his expulsion was not submitted to the
different chapters of the union as required by its constitution and by-laws. The result was that
because of his expulsion he was subjected to humiliation and mental anguish with the
consequent loss of his good name and reputation. This is especially so considering that the
members of the union from which he was expelled amounted to around 20,000 more or less.
It is, therefore, an error for the lower court to hold that the complaint does not state sufficient
cause of action for the relief claimed by appellant.

With regard to the contention that this claim of moral damages should have been included by
appellant in his charge for unfair labor practice filed against the union with the Court of
Industrial Relations, suffice it to state that the same does not come within the jurisdiction of
that court. This is a matter that has to be looked into by the regular courts.

WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is set aside. The case is remanded to the lower court
for further proceedings.
2. Election of Officers LC, Art. 250 (c), (f) & (k); Book V, Rule XII
a. Qualifications LC, Art. 250 (c) & (f)
b. Manner of Election LC, Art. 250 (c)
c. Tenure LC, Art. 250 (c)
d. Compensation LC, Art. 250(k)
e. Who may vote LC, Art. 250 (c);

Tancinco v. Calleja, 157 SCRA 203 (1988)

Emergency Recit:
ITM-MEA organizers, Lacanilao group, file a petition for direct certification of the union as sole
and exclusive bargaining agent of ITM’s bargaining unit. However due to incidences Lacanilao
group lead a strike, while the Tancinco group staged a strike inside the company premises. The
strike ended and an agreement was made. In a Pre-election conference was held but parties
failed to agree on the list of voters. Later 56 employees were ruled to be excluded from the
voting list. Election of officers were conducted, votes of said 56 employees were not counted,
and Lacnilao’s group won with 3 votes more. Tancinco filed a protest for inclusion of the 56
votes. The SC held that the 56 votes should be included. The SC held that eligibility to vote
may be determined through the use of the applicable payroll period and employee's status
during the applicable payroll period. In this case, considering that none of the parties insisted
on the use of the payroll period-list as voting list and considering further that the 51 remaining
employees were correctly ruled to be qualified for membership, their act of joining the
election by casting their votes on after the 1986 agreement is a clear manifestation of their
intention to join the union

Doctrine/s:
Eligibility to vote may be determined through the use of the applicable payroll period and
employee's status during the applicable payroll period. The payroll of the month next
preceding the labor dispute in case of regular employees and the payroll period at or near the
peak of operations in case of employees in seasonal industries

Facts:
1. The respondents are the organizers of Imperial Textile Mills Inc. Monthly Employees
Association (ITM-MEA)
2. While respondents were preparing to file a petition for direct certification of the union as
sole and exclusive bargaining agent of ITM’s bargaining unit, the union’s VP (Dalamaco)
was promoted to Department Head, thereby disqualifying him for union membership
3. This incident, among others, lead to strike headed by the Lacanilao group, while the
Tancinco group staged a strike inside the company premises.
4. After 4 days, strike was settled, agreement was entered between Lacanilao and Tancinco
group
5. Pre-election conference was held but parties failed to agree on the list of voters
6. In another pre-election conference attended by MOLE officers, ANGLO through its
National Secretary, a certain Mr. Cornelio A. Sy made a unilateral ruling excluding some
56 employees consisting of the Manila office employees, members of Iglesia ni Kristo,
non-time card employees, drivers of Mrs. Salazar and the cooperative employees of Mrs.
Salazar.Cooperative employees of Mrs. Salazar
7. MOLE Pampanga protested the ruling but no action was taken
8. Election of officers were conducted, votes of said 56 employees were not counted
9. Lacnilao’s group won, 119 votes (3 votes over Tancinco)
10. Tancinco filed a protest for inclusion of the 56 votes
11. MOLE directed the inclusion of the votes
12. Lacanilao appealed with BLR
a. Iglesia ni Kristo - allowing them to vote will be anomalous since it is their policy
not to participate in any form of union activities
b. non-time card employees, that they are managerial employees
c. employees of the cooperative as non-ITM employees
13. BLR said that exclusion was arbitrary BUT set aside the MOLE order since 51/56 are not
yet union members at the time of election

Issue/s:
Whether or not the 56 votes should be included. YES.

Held:
 Submission of the employees names with the BLR as qualified members of the union is
not a condition sine qua non to enable said members to vote in the election of union's
 officers
 Per public respondent's findings the 1986 list consists of 158 union members only
wherein 51 of the 56 challenged voters' names do not appear. Adopting however a rough
estimate of a total number of union members who cast their votes of some 333 and
excluding therefrom the 56 challenged votes, if the list is to be the basis as to who the
union members are then public respondent should have also disqualified some 175 of the
333 voters
 It is true that under article 242(c) of the LC, as amended, only members of the union can
participate in the election of union officers. The question however of eligibility to vote
may be determined through the use of the applicable payroll period and employee's
status during the applicable payroll period. The payroll of the month next preceding the
labor dispute in case of regular employees and the payroll period at or near the peak of
operations in case of employees in seasonal industries
 In this case, considering that none of the parties insisted on the use of the payroll period-
list as voting list and considering further that the 51 remaining employees were correctly
ruled to be qualified for membership, their act of joining the election by casting their
votes on after the 1986 agreement is a clear manifestation of their intention to join the
union
 They must therefore be considered ipso facto members thereof Said employees having
exercised their right to unionism
 Their names could not have been included in the list of employee submitted on April 24,
1986 to the Bureau of Labor for the agreement to join the union was entered into only on
May 10, 1986. Indeed the election was supervised by the Department of Labor where said
56 members were allowed to vote. Private respondents never challenged their right to
vote then
 It is however the position of private respondents that since a CBA has been concluded
between the local union and ITM management the determination of the legal question
raised herein may not serve the purpose which the union envisions and may destroy the
cordial relations existing between the management and the union
o We do not agree. Existence of a CBA and cordial relationship developed between
the union and the management should not be a justification to frustrate the
decision of the union members as to who should properly represent them in the
bargaining unit

Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for certiorari is GRANTED. The temporary
restraining order issued by this Court on May 13, 1987 is hereby made permanent. The
questioned Resolution of February 12, 1987 and the Decision of December 10, 1986 are
hereby set aside for being null and void and the Order of July 25, 1986 of the Mediator Arbiter
is hereby declared immediately executory.
Cost against private respondents.
SO ORDERED.

F. Effect of election Kapisanan v. Trajano, 134 SCRA 236 (1985)

1. A written request for accounts examination of the financial status of the Kapisanan ng
Manggagawang Pinagyakap Labor Union (KMP), the existing labor union at Franklin Baker
Company, was filed by private respondent Catalino Silvestre and 13 other employees,
who are also members of the said Union.
2. It was found that there have been disallowed expenditures amounting to P1,278 and that
the KMP union officers (petitioners) failed to keep, maintain and submit for verification
the records of union accounts.
3. Thus private respondents filed a petition with the Ministry of Labor and Employment for
the expulsion of the union officers.
4. The Med-Arbiter ordered the holding of a referendum, to be conducted under the
supervision of the Bureau of Labor Relations, to decide on the issue of whether to expel
or suspend the union officers from their respective positions.
 5. Petitioners appealed the said order of Med-Arbiter to the Bureau of Labor Relations. They
demonstrated that there would be a general election, at which time, both the election
and the desired referendum could be undertaken to determine the membership at
minimum expense. They prayed that the resolution on the issue be held in abeyance.
6. Respondents, on the other hand, claimed that the Med-Arbiter erred in calling a
referendum to decide the issue. They reiterated that the appropriate action should be the
expulsion of the herein union officers.
7. The Bureau of Labor Relations affirmed the order of the Med-Arbiter.
8. Petitioners filed an MR. They informed the Bureau of Labor Relations that in the general
election, all of the petitioners except 2 were elected by the overwhelming majority of the
members, while 2 of the respondents who also ran for the position of Auditor, lost.
Thereafter, they moved for the dismissal of the appeal for having been rendered moot
and academic by their re-election.
9. The Bureau of Labor Relations denied the MR.
10. Hence this petition.

Issue: W/N the holding of the referendum to decide the issue on the expulsion of the
petitioners as union officers has been rendered moot by their re-election.

Ruling: YES.
1. The repudiation of the respondents to the highly sensitive position of auditor at election,
is a convincing manifestation and demonstration of the union membership’s faith in the
herein officers’ leadership on one hand and a clear condonation of an act they had
allegedly committed.

2. By and large, the holding of the referendum in question has become moot and academic.

The Court should never remove a public officer for acts done prior to his present term of
office. To do otherwise would be to deprive the people of their right to elect their officers.
When the people have elected a man to office, it must be assumed that they did this with
knowledge of his life and character, and that they disregarded or forgave his faults or
misconduct, if he had been guilty of any. It is not for the court, by reason of such faults or
misconduct to practically overrule the will of the people.

WHEREFORE, the Bureau of Labor Relations order and resolution are SET ASIDE and the
petition for expulsion of herein union officers is hereby DISMISSED.
3. Major policy matter LC, Art. 250 (d)
4. Union funds LC, Arts. 250(a) (b) (c) (g) (h) (i) (j) (k) (l) (m) (n) (o); IR, Book V, Rule XIII
Payment of attorney’s fees LC, Arts. 250 (o) (n) & 228 (b);
and special assessments
Peninsula Employees Union v. Esquivel, G.R. No. 218454, December 1, 2016;
FACTS
1.) Dec 2007 – PEU’s Board of Directors passed a local resolution stating that it was then
affiliated with the NUWHRAIN and the direct membership of its individual members.
2.) Beginning Jan 2009 PEU-NUWHRAIN sought to increase the union dues from 1% to
2% of the rank and file employees, brought about by PEU’s affiliation with
NUWHRAIN, which supposedly requires its affiliates to remit to it 2% of their monthly
salaries.
3.) Oct 2008 – the OSEC resolved the collective bargaining deadlock between PEU-
NUWHRAIN and The Peninsula Manila Hotel (Hotel), ordering the parties to execute a
CBA incorporating therein arbitral award.
4.) Mar 2009 – PEU-NUWHRAIN requested the OSEC for Administrative Intervention for
Dispute Avoidance (AIDA) in relation to the issue of its entitlement to collect the 2%
increase from the non-PEU members.
5.) Non-PEU members averred:
a. The new CBA is unenforceable since there is still no written CBA formally
signed and executed by PEU-NUWHRAIN and the Hotel.
 b. 2% agency fee is exorbitant and unreasonable
c. PEU-NUWHRAIN failed to comply with the mandatory requirements for the
increase.
6.) OSEC – the PEU-NUWHRAIN has the right to collect the union dues from non-PEU
members pursuant to the expired CBA but denied the 2% increase since (a) it failed to
show that its general membership approved the same; (b) the minutes of the
meeting merely stated that there was a need to update the individual check off
authorization to implement the 2% increase.
7.) PEU-NUWHRAIN moved for reconsideration attaching thereto copies of the approval
of the 2%; individual check off authorizations; pay slips of some members showing
the deduction of 2% from the salaries beginning Jan 2009.
8.) OSEC (Mar 2012) – granted the increase. The decision was appealed by the herein
respondents to the CA.
9.) CA – reinstated the previous decision of the OSEC since it failed to comply with the
requisites for a valid check off since Oct 2008 meeting did not show the increase in
union dues and that the document showing the approval of the increase surfaced
only after the OSEC issued its first decision.

ISSUE: W/N the CA erred in ruling that PEU-NUWHRAIN had no right to collect the increase.

HELD: No, the CA was correct.

DOCTRINE
1.) The rule is that the recognized CB union which successfully negotiated with the CBA
with the employer is given the right to collect a reasonable fee called "agency fee"
from non-union members who are employees of the appropriate bargaining unit, in
an amount equivalent to the dues and other fees paid by union members, in case
they accept the benefits under the CBA.
2.) While the collection of agency fees is recognized by Article 259 of the LC the legal
basis of the union's right to agency fees is neither contractual nor statutory, but
quasi-contractual, deriving from the established principle that non-union employees
may not unjustly enrich themselves by benefiting from employment conditions
negotiated by the bargaining union.
3.) The LC mandates the submission of 3 documentary requisites to justify a valid levy of
increased union dues:
a. an authorization by a written resolution of the majority of all the members
at the general membership meeting duly called for the purpose; 
b. the secretary's record of the minutes of the meeting, which shall include the
list of all members present, the votes cast, the purpose of the special
assessment or fees and the recipient of such assessment or fees; 46 and 
c. individual written authorizations for check-off duly signed by the employees
concerned.

RATIO
1.) In the case at bar, PEU-NUWHRAIN failed to show compliance with the foregoing
requirements. It attempted to remedy the "inadvertent omission" of the matter of
the approval of the deduction of two percent (2%) union dues from the monthly basic
salary of each union member through the General Membership Resolution (GMR)
2.) It can be gleaned from the documents that while the matter of implementing the two
percent (2%) union dues was taken up during the PEU-NUWHRAIN's 8 th General
Membership Meeting on Oct 2008, there was no sufficient showing that the same
had been duly deliberated and approved. 
a. The minutes of the Assembly itself belie PEU-NUWHRAIN's claim that the
increase in union dues and the corresponding check-off were duly approved
since it merely stated that "the [two percent (2%)] Union dues will have to
be implemented,"53 meaning, it would still require the submission of such
matter to the Assembly for deliberation and approval Such conclusion is
bolstered by the silence of the October 28, 2008 GMR on the matter of two
percent (2%) union dues, in contrast to the payment of 10% attorney's fees
 from the CBA backwages which was clearly spelled out as having been
"discussed and approved."54 
b. Thus if indeed majority of the members of [PEU-NUWHRAIN] approved the
increase in union dues, the same should have been mentioned in the
minutes of the meeting, and reflected in the GMR of the same date.
3.) Having failed to establish due deliberation and approval of the increase in union dues
from one percent (1%) to two percent (2%), as well as the deduction of the two
percent (2%) union dues during PEU-NUWHRAIN's 8 th General Membership Meeting
on October 28, 2008, there was nothing to confirm, affirm, or ratify through the July
1, 2010 GMR.
4.) The SC held that the GMR, by itself, cannot justify the collection of two percent (2%)
agency fees from the non-PEU members beginning July 2010. The Assembly was not
called for the purpose of approving the proposed increase in union dues and the
corresponding check-off, but merely to "confirm and affirm" a purported prior action
which PEU-NUWHRAIN, however, failed to establish.
5.) Also there was no individual check-off authorizations can proceed therefrom, and the
submission of the November 2008 check-off authorizations 56 becomes
inconsequential. Jurisprudence states that the express consent of the employee to
any deduction in his compensation is required to be obtained in accordance with the
steps outlined by the law, which must be followed to the letter; 57 however, PEU-
NUWHRAIN failed to comply. Thus, the CA correctly ruled that there is no legal basis
to impose union dues and agency fees more than that allowed in the expired
CBA, i.e., at one percent (1%) of the employee's monthly basic salary

FALLO
In fine, the Court finds no reversible error on the part of the CA in granting
petitioner's certiorari petition, and finding that the OSEC gravely abused its discretion in
declaring PEU-NUWHRAIN's entitlement to collect two percent (2%) agency fees from the
non-PEU members beginning July 2010. The OSEC's March 6, 2012 Order is patently contrary
to law, hence, imbued with grave abuse of discretion correctible through certiorari.58

Gabriel v. Secretary of Labor, G.R. No. 115949, March 16, 2000

Doctrine:
Reimbursement for attorney’s fees incurred by the union should be charged to the union's
general fund or account. No deduction can be made from the salaries of the concerned
employees other than those mandated by law.

Facts:
 The Executive Board of SolidBank Union retained the service of Atty. Ignacio P. Lacsina as
union counsel in connection with the negotiations for a new Collective Bargaining
Agreement (CBA). The majority of all union members approved and signed a resolution
confirming the decision of the executive board to engage the services of Atty. Lacsina as
union counsel.

 The resolution provided 10% of the total economic benefits that may be secured through
the negotiations be given to Atty. Lacsina as attorney’s fees. It also contained an
authorization for SolidBank Corporation to check-off said attorneys fees from the first
lump sum payment of benefits to the employees under the new CBA and to turn over
said amount to Atty. Lacsina and/or his duly authorized representative.

 The new CBA was signed. The bank on request of the union, deducted the attorneys fees
from the CBA benefits from payroll as per the resolution.

 Sarmiento et al (members of the union) instituted a complaint against the bank and the
union before the DOLE for illegal deduction of attorneys fees as well as for quantification
of the benefits in the 1992 CBA.
 Med Arbiter ruled for the private respondents and ordered the refund of the deducted
amount. It also directed to pay 5% of the total amount refunded amount in favor of Atty.
Morales in accordance with Section II, Rule VIII of Book II (sic) of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing the Labor Code.

 On appeal, Secretary of Labor issued a resolution modifying the order of the Med Arbiter
as below:
o The ordered refund shall be limited to those union members who have not
signified their conformity to the check-off of attorneys fees; and
o The directive on the payment of 5% attorneys fees should be deleted for lack of
basis.

 On Motion for Reconsideration, Secretary of Labor affirmed the said Order with
modification that the unions counsel be dropped as a party litigant and that the workers
through their union should be made to shoulder the expenses incurred for the attorneys
services. Accordingly, the reimbursement should be charged to the unions general
fund/account.

 Petitioner: The General Membership Resolution authorizing the bank to check-off

attorneys fee from the first lump sum payment of the benefits to the employees under
the new CBA satisfies the legal requirements for such assessment.

 Private Respondents: The claim that the check-off provision in question is illegal because
it was never submitted for approval at a general membership meeting called for the
purpose and that it failed to meet the formalities mandated by the Labor Code.

Issue: Whether the SOLE was correct in ordering the union to shoulder the expenses for
litigation.

Held and Ruling:

 YES. (But the the reimbursement should be charged to the union's general fund or
account. No deduction can be made from the salaries of the concerned employees
other than those mandated by law.)
 Article 222 (b) states: xxx Provided, however, that attorneys fees may be charged
against union funds in an amount to be agreed upon by the parties. Any contract,
agreement or arrangement of any sort to the contrary shall be null and void." xxx
 Article 241 (o) provides: "Other than for mandatory activities under the Code, no special
assessment, attorneys fees, negotiation fees or any other extraordinary fees may be
checked off from any amount due to an employee without an individual written
authorization duly signed by the employee. The authorization should specifically state
the amount, purpose and beneficiary of the deduction."

 Article 241 has three (3) requisites for the validity of the special assessment for unions
incidental expenses, attorneys fees and representation expenses. These are:
1) Authorization by a written resolution of the majority of all the members at the general
membership meeting called for the purpose;
2) Secretary’s record of the minutes of the meeting; and
3) Individual written authorization for check off duly signed by the employees concerned.

 Clearly, attorneys fees may not be deducted or checked off from any amount due to an
employee without his written consent.

 The General Membership Resolution of October 19, 1991 of the SolidBank Union did not
satisfy the requirements laid down by law and jurisprudence for the validity of the ten
percent (10%) special assessment for unions incidental expenses, attorneys fees and
representation expenses.

 There were no individual written check off authorizations by the employees concerned
 and so the assessment cannot be legally deducted by their employer.

5. Mandatory Activity LC, Art. 250 (o);

Galvadores v. Trajano, 144 SCRA 138 (1986)

- Employees of PLDT and members of the Union question the legality of the check-off
for attorney’s fees amounting to more or less 1-million pesos of respondent Atty. Jose
C. Espinas from the monetary benefits awarded to PLDT employees in a deadlocked
CBA negotiations between PLDT and the Union. Atty. Espina has been the legal
counsel of the Union since 1964 and was hired on a case-to-case contingent fee basis
- September 9, 1983, the Minister of Labor and Employment assumed jurisdiction over
the unresolved issues between the parties.
- October 29, 1983, the Executive Board of the Union passed a resolution requesting
PLDT to deduct Php115.00 per employee for the legal services extended to the Union
by Atty. Espina
- November 2, 1983, petitioners filed a letter-complaint before the MOLE assailing the
imposition of Php130.00 (later corrected to Php155.00) per employee as attorney’s
fee. Petitioner Galvadores took the position that the attorney’s fees were not only
unreasonable but also violative of Article 242(o) of the Labor Code; and that the
deductions cannot be given legal effect by a mere Board resolution but needs the
ratification by the general membership of the Union.
- Union and Counsel argued that the attorney’s fees being exacted pertained to his
services during compulsory arbitration proceedings and cannot be considered as
negotiation fees or attorney’s fees within the context of Art. 242(o) and that counsel
surfaced only when the employees themselves engaged in mass action to force a
solution to the deadlock. Petitioners proposed a solution offering to pay Php10.00
per employee, but Counsel refused.
- March 22, 1983, the Union filed a Manifestation to the effect that about 6,067
members of the Union ratified the October 29, 1983 resolution of the legislative
council in a plebiscite called for that purpose. Because of this, Counsel moved for the
payment of his legal fees.
- Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations dismissed petitioners’ complaint for lack of
merit reasoning that “the outcome of the plebiscite negates any further question on
the right of the union counsel to collect the amount of Php115.00 from each of the
employees involved. This decision is assailed by petitioners principally on the ground
that the individual written authorization of the employees must first be obtained
before any assessment can be made against the monetary benefits awarded to
Counsel and that the same should be taken from Union funds.
Union and Counsel argue that compulsory arbitration is a “mandatory activity” and an
exception to Art. 242(o) and that the Union members approved the questioned deduction in
the plebiscite of January 1984.

Issue/s: Is compulsory arbitration a “mandatory activity”?

Ruling: NO.
- Contrary to Union and Counsel’s stand, the benefits awarded to PLDT employees still
formed part of the CBA negotiations although placed under compulsory arbitration,
this NOT the “mandatory activity” under the Code which dispenses with the
requirement of individual written authorization check-offs, notwithstanding its
“compulsory” nature
- It is a judicial process of settling disputes as prescribed by law and Art. 222(b) does
not except a CBA, later placed under compulsory arbitration, from the ambit of its
prohibition; the employees are protected by law from unwarranted practices that
diminish their compensation without their knowledge and consent.
Galvadores, et al. won.
6. Union Information /Obligation LC, Art. 250 (p)
7. Enforcement and remedies – LC, Art. 250 penultimate and last par., and Art. 245; IR, Book V, Rules XI, XII, XIII, XIV & XV;
Intra-union disputes;
jurisdiction; procedure Diokno v. Cacdac, 526 SCRA 440 (2007);
and sanctions:
Facts: The First Line Association of Meralco Supervisory Employees (FLAMES) is a legitimate
labor organization which is the supervisory union of Meralco. Petitioners and private
respondents are members of FLAMES.

On 1 April 2003, the FLAMES Executive Board created the Committee on Election (COMELEC)
for the conduct of its union elections scheduled on 7 May 2000.

On 12 April 2003, the COMELEC rejected Jimmy S. Ong’s candidacy on the ground that he was
not a member of FLAMES. Meanwhile, the certificates of candidacy of Nardito C. Alvarez,
Alfredo J. Escall, and Jaime T. Valeriano were similarly rejected on the basis of the exclusion of
their department from the scope of the existing collective bargaining agreement (CBA). The
employees assigned to the aforesaid department are allegedly deemed disqualified from
membership in the union for being confidential employees.

On 24 April 2003, private respondents Jimmy S. Ong, (Ong, et al.), and a certain Leandro M.
Tabilog filed a Petition before the Med-Arbitration Unit of the Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE).

They prayed, inter alia, for the nullification of the order of the COMELEC which disallowed
their candidacy. They further prayed that petitioners be directed to render an accounting of
funds with full and detailed disclosure of expenditures and financial transactions; and that a
representative from the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR) be designated to act as chairman of
the COMELEC in lieu of petitioner Dante M. Tong.

On 30 April 2003, DOLE-NCR Regional Director Alex E. Maraan issued an Order directing DOLE
personnel to observe the conduct of the FLAMES election on 7 May 2003.

On 2 May 2003, petitioners filed a Petition with the COMELEC seeking the disqualification of
private respondents (Daya et al).

Petitioners alleged that Daya, et al., allowed themselves to be assisted by nonunion members,
and committed acts of disloyalty which are inimical to the interest of FLAMES. In their
campaign, they allegedly colluded with the officers of the Meralco Savings and Loan
Association (MESALA) and the Meralco Mutual Aid and Benefits Association (MEMABA) and
exerted undue influence on the members of FLAMES.

COMELEC: declared Daya, et al., officially disqualified to run and/or to participate in the 7
May 2003 FLAMES elections. The COMELEC also resolved to exclude their names from the list
of candidates in the polls or precincts, and further declared that any vote cast in their favor
shall not be counted.

On 8 May 2003, private respondents Daya, et al., along with Ong, et al., filed with the Med-
Arbitration Unit of the DOLE-NCR, a Petition to: a) Nullify Order of Disqualification; b) Nullify
Election Proceedings and Counting of Votes; c) Declare Failure of Election; and d) Declare
Holding of New Election to be Controlled and Supervised by the DOLE.

On 14 May 2003, another group led by private respondent Gaudencio Jimenez, Jr. (Jimenez,
et al.) filed a Petition with the Med-Arbitration Unit of the DOLE-NCR against petitioners to
nullify the 7 May 2003 election on the ground that the same was not free, orderly, and
peaceful.

Meanwhile, a subsequent election was held on 30 June 2004, which was participated in and
won by herein private respondents Daya, et al. The validity of the 30 June 2004 elections was
assailed by herein petitioners before the DOLE and taken to the Court of Appeals in CAG.R.
SP No. 88264 on certiorari, which case does not concern us in the instant Petition.

CA: upheld the validity of the 30 June 2004 elections, and the declaration of herein private
respondents Daya, et al., as the duly elected winners therein.

Med Arbiter: issued a Decision in favor of private respondents, Daya, et al. However, the
petition of Jimenez, et al., was dismissed because it was premature, it appearing that the
COMELEC had not yet resolved their protest prior to their resort to the Med-Arbiter. Finally,
the Petition of Ong, et al., seeking to declare themselves as bona fide members of FLAMES
was ordered dismissed.

Aggrieved, petitioners filed an appeal before the Director of the BLR.

The Ruling of the BLR Director: affirmed in toto the assailed Decision of the Med-Arbiter.

Petitioners sought a reversal of the 3 December 2003 Resolution, but the BLR Director issued a
Resolution dated 10 February 2003, refusing to reverse his earlier Resolution for lack of merit.

Petitioners elevated the case to the Court of Appeals via a Petition for Certiorari.

CA: The Court of Appeals found petitioner’s appeal to be bereft of merit. The appellate court
held that the provision relied upon by the COMELEC concerns the dismissal and/or expulsion
of union members, which power is vested in the FLAMES Executive Board, and not the
COMELEC. It affirmed the finding of the BLR Director that the COMELEC, in disqualifying
private respondents Daya, et al., committed a procedural shortcut.

Issue: W/N the ruling of the BLR Director and Med-Arbiter, nullifying the COMELEC’s order of
disqualification of private respondents Daya, et al., and annulling the 7 May 2003 FLAMES
elections should be upheld.

Held: YES.
The controversy in the case at bar is an intra-union dispute. There is no question that this is
one which involves a dispute within or inside FLAMES, a labor union. At issue is the propriety
of the disqualification of private respondents Daya, et al., by the FLAMES COMELEC in the 7
May 2003 elections. It must also be stressed that even as the dispute involves allegations that
private respondents Daya, et al., sought the help of non-members of the union in their
election campaign to the detriment of FLAMES, the same does not detract from the real
character of the controversy. It remains as one which involves the grievance over the
constitution and by-laws of a union, and it is a controversy involving members of the union.

Moreover, the non-members of the union who were alleged to have aided private
respondents Daya, et al., are not parties in the case. We are, therefore, unable to understand
petitioner’s persistence in placing the controversy outside of the jurisdiction of the BLR. The
law is very clear. It requires no further interpretation. The Petition which was initiated by
private respondents Daya, et al., before the BLR was properly within its cognizance, it being an
intra-union dispute. Indubitably, when private respondents Daya, et al., brought the case to
the BLR, it was an invocation of the power and authority of the BLR to act on an intra-union
conflict.

Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of

the Court of Appeals dated 17 June 2004, and its Resolution dated 10 June 2005 in CA-G.R. SP
No. 83061 are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

Employees Union of Bayer Phils. v. Bayer Philippines Inc. , G.R. No. 162943, December 6, 2010;
DOCTRINES:
An intra-union dispute refers to any conflict between and among union members, including
grievances arising from any violation of the rights and conditions of membership, violation of
or disagreement over any provision of the unionÊs constitution and bylaws, or disputes arising
from chartering or disaffiliation of the union. Sections 1 and 2, Rule XI of Department Order
No. 40-03,Series of 2003 of the DOLE enumerate the following circumstances as inter/intra-
union disputes.

Jurisdiction; In Silva v. National Labor Relations Commission, 274 SCRA 159 (1997), we
explained the correlations of Article 248 (1) and Article 261 of the Labor Code to mean that for
a ULP case to be cognizable by the Labor Arbiter, and for the NLRC to exercise appellate
jurisdiction thereon, the allegations in the complaint must show prima facie the concurrence
of two things, namely:
(1) gross violation of the CBA; and
(2) the violation pertains to the economic provisions of the CBA.

A legitimate labor organization cannot be construed to have abandoned its pending claim
against the management/employer by returning to the negotiating table to fulfill its duty to
represent the interest of its members, except when the pending claim has been expressly
waived or compromised in its subsequent negotiations with the management.

FACTS:
Petitioner Employees Union of Bayer Philippines. (EUBP) is the exclusive bargaining agent of
all rank-and-file employees of Bayer Philippines (Bayer).

In 1997, EUBP, headed by its president Juanito S. Facundo (Facundo), negotiated with Bayer
for the signing of a collective bargaining agreement (CBA). During the negotiations, EUBP
rejected Bayers 9.9% wage-increase proposal resulting in a bargaining deadlock. Subsequently,
EUBP staged a strike, prompting the Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment
(DOLE) to assume jurisdiction over the dispute.

In November, pending the resolution of the dispute, respondent Avelina Remigio (Remigio)
and 27 other union members, without any authority from their union leaders, accepted Bayers
wage-increase proposal.

In 1998, the DOLE Secretary issued an arbitral award ordering EUBP and Bayer to execute a
CBA retroactive to January 1997 and to be made effective until  2001. 

Meanwhile, the rift between Facundos leadership and Remigios group broadened.

Remigio solicited signatures from union members in support of a resolution containing the
decision of the signatories to:
(1) disaffiliate from FFW,
(2) rename the union as Reformed Employees Union of Bayer Philippines (REUBP),
(3) adopt a new constitution and by-laws for the union,
(4) abolish all existing officer positions in the union and elect a new set of interim officers, and
(5) authorize REUBP to administer the CBA between EUBP and Bayer.

The said resolution was signed by 147 of the 257 local union members and a copy of this was
given to Facundo, FFW and Bayer informing them of the abovementioned.

Facundo, meanwhile, sent similar requests to Bayer requesting for the remittance of union
dues in favor of EUBP and accusing the company of interfering with purely union
matters. Bayer responded by deciding not to deal with either of the two groups, and by
placing the union dues collected in a trust account until the conflict between the two groups is
resolved.

EUBP filed a complaint for unfair labor practice (first ULP complaint) against Bayer for non-
remittance of union dues.

In 1999, while the first ULP case was still pending and despite EUBPs repeated request for a
grievance conference, Bayer decided to turn over the collected union dues amounting
to P254,857.15 to respondent Anastacia Villareal, Treasurer of REUBP.

Aggrieved by the said development, EUBP lodged a complaint  against Remigios group before
the Industrial Relations Division of the DOLE praying for their expulsion from EUBP for
commission of acts that threaten the life of the union.

LA- dismissed the first ULP complaint for lack of jurisdiction because the root cause for Bayers
failure to remit the collected union dues can be traced to the intra-union conflict between
EUBP and Remigios group and that the charges imputed against Bayer should have been
submitted instead to voluntary arbitration. EUBP did not appeal the said decision.

Regional Director of the Industrial Relations Division of DOLE- issued a decision dismissing
the issue on expulsion filed by EUBP against Remigio and her allies for failure to exhaust reliefs
within the union and ordering the conduct of a referendum to determine which of the two
groups should be recognized as union officers.

BLR- reversed the Regional Directors ruling and ordered the management of Bayer to respect
the authority of the duly-elected officers of EUBP in the administration of the prevailing CBA.
(Unfortunately, the said BLR ruling came late since Bayer had already signed a new CBA  with
REUBP on February 21, 2000. The said CBA was eventually ratified by majority of the
bargaining unit.)

LA- dismissed EUBPs second ULP complaint for lack of jurisdiction as the case involves intra-
union disputes, pursuant to Art 226 of the LC.

NLRC- dismissed the second ULP complaint.

CA- sustained LA and NLRC Rulings.

ISSUES:
1. whether the act of the management of Bayer in dealing and negotiating with
Remigios splinter group despite its validly existing CBA with EUBP can be considered
unfair labor practice and, if so, whether EUBP is entitled to any relief
2. whether Bayer, Lonishen and Amistoso liable for unfair labor practice

RULING:

1. The petition is partly meritorious.

It is clear from Sections 1 and 2, Rule XI of Department Order No. 40-03, Series of 2003 of the
DOLE that the issues raised by petitioners do not fall under any of the circumstances therein
constituting an intra-union dispute.

More importantly, the petitioners do not seek a determination of whether it is the Facundo
group (EUBP) or the Remigio group (REUBP) which is the true set of union officers. Instead,
the issue raised pertained only to the validity of the acts of management in light of the fact
that it still has an existing CBA with EUBP. Thus as to Bayer, Lonishen and Amistoso the
question was whether they were liable for unfair labor practice, which issue was within the
jurisdiction of the NLRC. The dismissal of the second ULP complaint was therefore erroneous.

However, as to respondents Remigio and Villareal, we find that petitioners complaint was
validly dismissed.

Petitioners ULP complaint cannot prosper as against respondents Remigio and Villareal
because the issue, as against them, essentially involves an intra-union dispute based on
Section 1 (n) of DOLE Department Order No. 40-03. To rule on the validity or illegality of their
acts, the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC will necessarily touch on the issues respecting the
propriety of their disaffiliation and the legality of the establishment of REUBP issues that are
outside the scope of their jurisdiction. Accordingly, the dismissal of the complaint was validly
made, but only with respect to these two respondents.

2. Yes
Indeed, in Silva v. NLRC, we explained the correlations of Article 248 (1) and Article 261 of
the Labor Code to mean that for a ULP case to be cognizable by the Labor Arbiter, and for the
NLRC to exercise appellate jurisdiction thereon, the allegations in the complaint must
show prima facie the concurrence of two things, namely: (1) gross violation of the CBA; and (2)
the violation pertains to the economic provisions of the CBA.

This pronouncement in Silva, however, should not be construed to apply to violations of the
CBA which can be considered as gross violations per se, such as utter disregard of the very
existence of the CBA itself, similar to what happened in this case. When an employer proceeds
to negotiate with a splinter union despite the existence of its valid CBA with the duly certified
and exclusive bargaining agent, the former indubitably abandons its recognition of the latter
and terminates the entire CBA.

Respondents cannot claim good faith to justify their acts. They knew that Facundos group
represented the duly-elected officers of EUBP. Moreover, they were cognizant of the fact that
even the DOLE Secretary himself had recognized the legitimacy of EUBPs mandate by
rendering an arbitral award ordering the signing of the 1997-2001 CBA between Bayer and
EUBP. Respondents were likewise well-aware of the pendency of the intra-union dispute case,
yet they still proceeded to turn over the collected union dues to REUBP and to effusively deal
with Remigio. The totality of respondents conduct, therefore, reeks with anti-EUBP animus.

Other issue:

Bayer, Lonishen and Amistoso argue that the case is already moot and academic following the
lapse of the 1997-2001 CBA and their renegotiation with EUBP for the 2006-2007 CBA. They
also reason that the act of the company in negotiating with EUBP for the 2006-2007 CBA is an
obvious recognition on their part that EUBP is now the certified collective bargaining agent of
its rank-and-file employees.

We do not agree.

First, a legitimate labor organization cannot be construed to have abandoned its pending
claim against the management/employer by returning to the negotiating table to fulfill its duty
to represent the interest of its members, except when the pending claim has been expressly
waived or compromised in its subsequent negotiations with the management. To hold
otherwise would be tantamount to subjecting industrial peace to the precondition that
previous claims that labor may have against capital must first be waived or abandoned before
negotiations between them may resume. Undoubtedly, this would be against public policy.

Second, that the management of Bayer decided to recognize EUBP as the certified collective
bargaining agent of its rank-and-file employees for purposes of its 2006-2007 CBA
negotiations is of no moment.

It did not obliterate the fact that the management of Bayer had withdrawn its recognition of
EUBP and supported REUBP during the tumultuous implementation of the 1997-2001 CBA.
Such act of interference which is violative of the existing CBA with EUBP led to the filing of the
subject complaint.

Rodriguez v. Director, G.R. Nos. 76579-82, August 31, 1988;

FACTS
Duyag et al. are arrestre checkers of E. Razon, Inc as well as bona fide members of the
Associated Port Checkers and Workers Union
They filed with the DOLE regional Office a complaint containing several charges against the
Manalad et al. who are the president (for more than 20 years), treasurer, vice president and
auditor of the union. The following are the charges:
1. Unauthorized increase in union dues. According to the union’s constitution and by-laws,
the monthly union dues is Php10.00 . Subsequently, there were numerous increases to said
monthly dues. However, those two increases were backed by resolutions which are void
because they were not approved by ¾ of all the members of the board of directors, as
required by the union’s constitution and by-laws. Also, a deduction of Php 8.50 was made
from their mid-year bonus. Such was done without any board resolution authorizing said
deduction.
2. Withholding of union members’ share in the profits amounting to Php 18, 640.09. E.
Razon, Inc. the arrestre operator, paid to the union, several times, sums of money as its share
of the profits (profit-share). Such sums of money were supposed to be wholly distributed
among the union members. However, it was discovered that respondents withheld certain
amounts from numerous profit-shares. During the pendency of the case, however,
respondents submitted a resolution wherein 90% of union members ratified the deductions
from the mid-year bonus and profit-shares. Nonetheless, the Court still pointed out that at the
time the deductions were made, no resolution existed. Hence, such deductions were illegal at
the time they were made.
3. Disbursements exceeding Php 500 which were not authorized by the board of directors.
The board of directors are only allowed to authorize and approve disbursements from union
fund on amounts not exceeding Php500. Documents prove that respondent Manalad made
numerous disbursements of union funds in amounts exceeding Php500 without the requisite
authorization of the board of directors.
4. Misadministration of welfare funds. Manalad allowed the application of the finds of the
union’s Welfare Plan for numerous extraneous purposes, and such were not authorized by the
board of directors. Also, the complainants allege that the 3 employees did not deserve the
retirement benefits because they had been dismissed for prolonged absences and had ceased
to be members of the Welfare Plan.
5. Membership in another union of the respondents. Respondents Manalad, Amparo and
Puerto are also members of the Philippine Technical Clerical Commercial Employees
Association, another labor union. Said membership to another union is violative of the
arrestre checkers’ union constitution. Pieces of evidence also lead to the conclusion that
respondents improperly used the arrestre checkers’ union funds to fund the other union.
6. Conflict of interest on the part of Manalad. Manalad organized a family corporation
(Comet Integrated Stevedoring Services, Inc.) whose rank-and-file employees are also
members of the arrestre checkers’ union. In effect, Manalad is a labor leader while also being
an employer. As head of the union, he issued customs passes for the checkers of his family
corporation in order to facilitate their services to some shipping companies.
- The med-arbiter in his decision ordered the removal of the private respondents as officers of
the union and directed them to reimburse to the members thereof the amounts illegally
collected from them.
- On appeal, the Director of Labor Relations reversed the med-arbiter decision on the
following grounds:
Resort to intra-union remedies is not necessary, Power to remove union officers rests in the
members, The Bureau of Labor Relations has nothing to do with the tenure of union officers
which “is a political question”
However, the Director ruled that his office has jurisdiction to look into the charge of illegal
disbursements of union funds
On MR filed to the SOLE, who denied the same stating that the expulsion of union officers is
the prerogative of the union members. Hence, this petition.

Issue: W/N the Bureau of Labor Relations has the power to remove erring union officers under
the last paragraph of Article 242 of the Labor Code.
 Duyag v. Inciong, 98 SCRA 522 (1980);

Mendoza v. Officers of Manila Water Employees Union, G.R. No. 201595, January 25, 2016
G. Union Chartering and Affiliation:
Local and Parent Union Relations
1. Affiliates and chartered IR, Book V, Rule I, Sec. 1(a) (i) (w) (kk);
locals, national unions and
federations; IR, Book V, Rule III; Progressive Development Corp. v. Secretary of Labor, 205 SCRA 802 (1992)

2. Registration
Progressive Development Corp. v. Secretary of Labor, 205 SCRA 802 (1992); Filipino Pipe &
2. Purpose; nature of relations Foundry Corp. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 115180, November 16, 1999
3. Affiliation of both LC, Arts. 255 & 256
supervisory and rank-and-
file unions with one
mother union
4. Local union disaffiliation: National Union of Bank Employees v. Philnabank Empoyees Association, G.R. No. 174287,
nature of right and legality August 12, 2013;
When a local union Alliance of Nationalist and Genuine Labor Organization v. Samana, 258 SCRA 371 (1996)
should disaffiliate