Articles 774-782 (General Provisions)

ALVAREZ V. IAC

Under our law, therefore, the general rule is that a party's contractual rights and obligations are
transmissible to the successors. The rule is a consequence of the progressive 'depersonalization' of
patrimonial rights and duties that, as observed by Victorio Polacco, has characterized the history of these
institutions.

Petitioners being the heirs of the late Rosendo Alvarez, they cannot escape the legal
consequences of their father's transaction, which gave rise to the present claim for damages. That
petitioners did not inherit the property involved herein is of no moment because by legal fiction, the
monetary equivalent thereof devolved into the mass of their father's hereditary estate, and we have ruled
that the hereditary assets are always liable in their totality for the payment of the debts of the estate. It
must, however, be made clear that petitioners are liable only to the extent of the value of their inheritance.

GEVERO V. IAC

The rights to the succession were transmitted from the moment of her death. It is therefore
incorrect to state that it was only in 1966, the date of extrajudicial partition, when Ricardo received his
share in the lot as inheritance from his mother Teodorica. Thus, when Ricardo sold his share over lot
2476 that share which he inherited from Teodorica was also included unless expressly excluded in the
deed of sale.

EMNACE V. CA

The surviving spouse does not need to be appointed as executrix or administratrix of the estate
before she can file the action. She and her children are complainants in their own right as successors of
the deceased. From the very moment of the latter’s death, his rights insofar as the partnership was
concerned were transmitted to his heirs, for rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of
death of the decedent.

Whatever claims and rights which the decedent had against the partnership and petitioner were
transmitted to respondents by operation of law, more particularly by succession, which is a mode of
acquisition by virtue of which the property, rights and obligations to the extent of the value of the
inheritance of a person are transmitted. Moreover, respondents became owners of their respective
hereditary shares from the moment of death of the decedent.

A prior settlement of the estate, or even the appointment of another person as executrix or
administratrix, is not necessary for any of the heirs to acquire legal capacity to sue. As successors who
stepped into the shoes of their decedent upon his death, they can commence any action originally
pertaining to the decedent. From the moment of his death, his rights as a partner and to demand
fulfillment of petitioner’s obligations as outlined in their dissolution agreement were transmitted to
respondents. They, therefore, had the capacity to sue and seek the court’s intervention to compel
petitioner to fulfill his obligations.

RABADILLA V. CA

Under Article 776 of the New Civil Code, inheritance includes all the property, rights and
obligations of a person, not extinguished by his death. Conformably, whatever rights Dr. Jorge Rabadilla
had by virtue of subject Codicil were transmitted to his forced heirs, at the time of his death. And since
obligations not extinguished by death also form part of the estate of the decedent; corollarily, the
obligations imposed by the Codicil on the deceased Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, were likewise transmitted to his
compulsory heirs upon his death.

NHA V. ALMEIDA

To the extent of the interest that the original owner had over the property, the same should go to
her estate. The decedent had an interest in the property and that interest should go to her estate upon her
demise so as to be able to properly distribute them later to her heirs—in accordance with a will or by
operation of law. The death of the decedent does not extinguish her interest over the property. She had
an existing Contract to Sell with NHA as the seller. Upon her demise, this Contract to Sell was neither
nullified nor revoked. This Contract to Sell was an obligation on both parties—the decedent and NHA.
Obligations are transmissible. The obligation to pay became transmissible at the time of her death either
by will or by operation of law.

Articles 783-819 (Wills, Capacity, Intent, Forms)

CONDE V. ABAYA

With regard to the question at issue, that is, the transmission to the heirs of the presumed parents of
the obligation to admit the legitimate filiation, or to recognize the natural filiation, there exists the most
radical difference in that the former continues during the life of the child who claims to be legitimate, and
he may demand it either directly and primarily from the said presumed parents, or indirectly and
secondarily from the heirs of the latter; while the second does not endure for life; as a general rule, it only
lasts during the life of the presumed parents. Hence the other difference, derived as a consequence, that
an action for legitimacy is always brought against the heirs of the presumed parents in case of the death
of the latter, while the action for acknowledgment is not brought against the heirs of such parents, with the
exception of the two cases prescribed by Article 137.

Usually the right of action for legitimacy devolving upon the child is of a personal character and
pertains exclusively to him, only the child may exercise it at any time during his lifetime. As an exception,
and in three cases only, it may be transmitted to the heirs of the child, to wit, if he died during his minority,
or while insane, or after action had been already instituted. But as such action for the acknowledgment of
a natural child can only be exercised by him. It cannot be transmitted to his descendants, or to his
ascendants

The right of action pertaining to the child to claim his legitimacy is in all respects superior to that of the
child who claims acknowledgment as a natural child. And it is evident that the right of action to claim his
legitimacy is not one of those rights which the legitimate child may transmit by inheritance to his heirs; it
forms no part of the component rights of his inheritance. If it were so, there would have been no necessity
to establish its transmissibility to heirs as an exception in the terms and conditions of Article 118 of the
code. So that, in order that it may constitute a portion of the child’s inheritance, it is necessary that the
conditions and the terms contained in article 118 shall be present, since without them, the right that the
child held during his lifetime, being personal and exclusive in principle, and therefore, as a general rule
not susceptible of transmission, would and should have been extinguished by his death. Therefore, where
no express provision like that of article 118 exists, the right of action for the acknowledgment of a natural
child is, in principle and without exception, extinguished by his death, and cannot be transmitted as a
portion of the inheritance of the deceased child.

YAP TUA V. YAP CA KUAN

While the rule is absolute that one who makes a will must sign the same in the presence of the
witnesses and that the witnesses must sign in the presence of each other, as well as in the presence of
the one making the will, yet, nevertheless, the actual seeing of the signature made is not necessary. It is
sufficient if the signatures are made where it is possible for each of the necessary parties, if they so
desire, to see the signatures placed upon the will.

TESTATE ESTATE OF PILAPIL V. CA

The purpose of the law to establish the formalities required in a will is undoubtedly ensure and
guarantee their authenticity against the bad faith and fraud, to prevent those who are not entitled to
succeed the testator, leaving it happen and benefit from the legalization of same. It has fulfilled that
purpose in the event that has been talked about because, in the same body of the will and the same
pages where the attestation clause, or the third, it expresses the will consists of three pages, and
because each one of the first two takes in part the note in letters, and in part the note in figures, that are
respectively the first and second pages of it. These facts clearly exclude all fear, suspicion, or shadow of
a doubt that it has replaced some of its pages to another.

The wording of the attestation clause in this will is not technically free repairs, but is substantially
a sufficient compliance with the law. We maintain the view that should be enforced strict substantive
requirements of the will to ensure its authenticity, but at the same time we believe should not be
considered defects that cannot affect this purpose and the other part taken into account, could thwart the
will of the testator. It should not allow the legal formalities hinder the use of good common sense in
consideration of wills which frustrate the wishes of the dead solemnly expressed in their wills, as to the
granting of which there is not even a shadow of bad faith or fraud.

TESTATE ESTATE OF ABADA V. ABAJA

There is no statutory requirement to state in the will itself that the testator knew the language or
dialect used in the will. This is a matter that a party may establish by proof aliunde. An attestation clause
is made for the purpose of preserving, in permanent form, a record of the facts attending the execution of
the will, so that in case of failure of the memory of the subscribing witnesses, or other casualty, they may
still be proved. A will, therefore, should not be rejected where its attestation clause serves the purpose of
the law. The question on the number of the witnesses is answered by an examination of the will itself and
without the need for presentation of evidence aliunde. The Court explained the extent and limits of the
rule on liberal construction. Precision of language in the drafting of an attestation clause is desirable.
However, it is not imperative that a parrot-like copy of the words of the statute be made. It is sufficient if
from the language employed it can reasonably be deduced that the attestation clause fulfills what the law
expects of it.

CANEDA V. CA

An attestation clause refers to that part of an ordinary will whereby the attesting witnesses
certify that the instrument has been executed before them and to the manner of the execution of the
same. It is a separate memorandum or record of the facts surrounding the conduct of execution and once
signed by the witnesses, it gives affirmation to the fact that compliance with the essential formalities
required by law has been observed. Under the 3rd paragraph of Article 805, such a clause, the complete
lack of which would result in the invalidity of the will, should state:

1. The number of pages used upon which the will is written;

2. That the testator signed, or expressly cause another to sign, the will and every page thereof in
the presence of the attesting witnesses; and

3. That the attesting witnesses witnessed the signing by the testator of the will and all its pages,
and that the said witnesses also signed the will and every page thereof in the presence of the testator and
of one another.

It will be noted that Article 805 requires that the witness should both attest and subscribe to the will in the
presence of the testator and of one another. “Attestation” and “subscription” differ in meaning. Attestation
is the act of sense, while subscription is the act of the hand. The attestation clause herein assailed is that
while it recites that the testator indeed signed the will and all its pages in the presence of the three
attesting witnesses and states as well the number of pages that were used, the same does not expressly
state therein the circumstance that said witnesses subscribed their respective signatures to the will in the
presence of the testator and of each other. What is then clearly lacking, is the statement that the
witnesses signed the will and every page thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another.

The absence of the statement required by law is a fatal defect or imperfection which must
necessarily result in the disallowance of the will that is here sought to be admitted to probate. Petitioners
are correct in pointing out that the defect in the attestation clause obviously cannot be characterized as
merely involving the form of the will or the language used therein which would warrant the application of
the substantial compliance rule, as contemplated in Article 809 of the Civil Code.
 The defects and imperfection must only be with respect to the form of the attestation or the
language employed therein. Such defects or imperfection would not render a will invalid should it be
proved that the will was really executed and attested in compliance with Article 805. These considerations
do not apply where the attestation clause totally omits the fact that the attesting witnesses signed each
and every page of the will in the presence of the testator and of each other. In such a situation, the defect
is not only in the form or language of the attestation clause but the total absence of a specific element
required by Article 805 to be specifically stated in the attestation clause of a will. That is precisely the
defect complained of in the present case since there is no plausible way by which it can be read into the
questioned attestation clause statement, or an implication thereof, that the attesting witness did actually
bear witness to the signing by the testator of the will and all of its pages and that said instrumental
witnesses also signed the will and every page thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another.

CODOY V. CALUGAY

Article 811 of the Civil Code is mandatory. The word "shall" connotes a mandatory order. We
have ruled that "shall" in a statute commonly denotes an imperative obligation and is inconsistent with the
idea of discretion and that the presumption is that the word "shall," when used in a statute is mandatory.
Laws are enacted to achieve a goal intended and to guide against an evil or mischief that aims to prevent.
In the case at bar, the goal to achieve is to give effect to the wishes of the deceased and the evil to be
prevented is the possibility that unscrupulous individuals who for their benefit will employ means to defeat
the wishes of the testator. So, we believe that the paramount consideration in the present petition is to
determine the true intent of the deceased. An exhaustive and objective consideration of the evidence is
imperative to establish the true intent of the testator. It will be noted that not all the witnesses presented
by the respondents testified explicitly that they were familiar with the handwriting of testator.

In the case of Ajero vs. Court of Appeals, we said that "the object of the solemnities surrounding
the execution of wills is to close the door against bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and
testaments and to guaranty their truth and authenticity. Therefore, the laws on this subject should be
interpreted in such a way as to attain these primordial ends. But on the other hand, also one must not
lose sight of the fact that it is not the object of the law to restrain and curtail the exercise of the right to
make a will.
However, we cannot eliminate the possibility of a false document being adjudged as the will of the
testator, which is why if the holographic will is contested, that law requires three witnesses to declare that
the will was in the handwriting of the deceased.

AJERO V. CA

Section 9, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court, and Article 39 of the Civil Code provides the cases when
the will shall be disallowed. These lists are exclusive; no other grounds can serve to disallow a will.

For purposes of probating non-holographic wills, these formal solemnities include the
subscription, attestation, and acknowledgment requirements under Articles 805 and 806 of the New Civil
Code. In the case of holographic wills, on the other hand, what assures authenticity is the requirement
that they be totally autographic or handwritten by the testator himself, as provided under Article 810 of the
New Civil Code. Failure to strictly observe other formalities will not result in the disallowance of a
holographic will that is unquestionably handwritten by the testator.

A reading of Article 813 of the New Civil Code shows that its requirement affects the validity of
the dispositions contained in the holographic will, but not its probate. If the testator fails to sign and date
some of the dispositions, the result is that these dispositions cannot be effectuated. Such failure,
however, does not render the whole testament void.

Likewise, a holographic will can still be admitted to probate, notwithstanding noncompliance with
Article 814. In the case of Kalaw vs.  Relova, this Court held the will is not as a whole, but at most only as
respects the particular words erased, corrected or interlined. Thus, unless the unauthenticated alterations,
cancellations or insertions were made on the date of the holographic will or on testator's signature, their
presence does not invalidate the will itself.
 Also, the requirements of authentication of changes and signing and dating of dispositions
(Articles 813 and 814) are separate from that which provides for the necessary conditions for the validity
of the holographic will (Article 810).

RIVERA V. IAC

The petitioner, being a mere stranger, had no personality to contest the wills and his opposition
thereto did not have the legal effect of requiring the three witnesses. The testimony of two witnesses who
authenticated the wills as having been written and signed by their father, was sufficient.

LABRADOR V. CA

The law does not specify a particular location where the date should be placed in the will. The
only requirements are that the date be in the will itself and executed in the hand of the testator. These
requirements are present in the subject will.

Articles 820-839 (Witnesses, Revocation, Republication, Revival, Allowance & Disallowance)

AJERO V. CA

In the case of holographic wills, what assures authenticity is the requirement that they be totally
autographic or handwritten by the testator himself, as provided under Article 810 of the NCC. Failure to
strictly observe other formalities will not result in the disallowance of a holographic will that is
unquestionably handwritten by the testator. A reading of Article 813 of the NCC shows that its
requirement affects the validity of the dispositions contained in the holographic will, but not its probate. If
the testator fails to sign and date some the dispositions, the result is that these dispositions cannot be
effectuated. Such failure, however, does not render the whole testament void.

Likewise, a holographic will can still be admitted to probate, notwithstanding non-compliance with
the provisions of Article 814. Thus, unless the unauthenticated alterations, cancellations or insertions
were made on the date of the holographic will or on testator’s signature, their presence does not
invalidate the will itself. The lack of authentication will only result in disallowance of such changes.

NEPOMUCENO V. CA

The court’s area of inquiry is limited to the extrinsic validity of the will for its probate. The
testator’s testamentary capacity and the compliance with the formal requisites or solemnities prescribed
by law are the only questions presented for the resolution of the court. Any inquiry into the intrinsic validity
or efficacy of the provisions of the will or the legality of any devise or legacy is premature.

The rule, however, is not inflexible and absolute. Given exceptional circumstances, the probate
court is not powerless to do what the situation constrains it to do and pass upon certain provisions of the
Will. Invoking practical considerations, the probate of a will becomes an idle ceremony if on its face it
appears to be intrinsically void. Where practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will
be passed upon, even before it is probated, the court should meet the issue. If the case were to be
remanded for probate of the will, nothing will be gained. The result will be waste of time, effort, expense,
plus added anxiety. These are practical considerations that induce us to a belief that we might as well
meet head-on the issue of the validity of the provisions of the will in question.