EDITORIAL The Russian Orthodox Church and the Future of Russia DEREK H. DAVIS The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1990 resulted in much more than a political crisis. It also caused the collapse of Russia’s social foun- dations, creating a vacuum that might be filled by any number of possi- ble ideologies. The atheistic, communist worldview was essentially dead, although the trauma of replacing it with something new for a while caused many Soviet old-timers to call for a return to communism. But since the Marxist-Leninist ideology on which the state was founded in 1917 had long ceased to function as a credible belief system for most Russians, the search for an alternate belief system got underway quickly. Democracy emerged only because of the demise of commu- nism, not because Russians found in it any sort of deeply rooted mean- ing. Not surprisingly, Russians began to look to religion for a credible belief system. Religion offered an attractive alternative worldview, es- pecially since it had been so severely repressed during the Soviet era. In the words of New York Times writer Serge Schmemann, writing in April 1992, “Today the search for spiritual content is everywhere evi- dent... . On television, for every rare program of economic reform, there are at least ten evocative commentaries on the church, the vil- lage, or some other cultural heritage, in which the invariable theme is Russia’s urgent need to recover its dukhocnost, its spirituality.” After experimenting a few years with opening its doors to all manner of reli- gions, including all varieties of Western Protestantism, even welcoming Western missionaries of a seemingly endless variety, Russians soon wearied of this endeavor and began looking to its own traditions, some- thing that better fit the Russian soul. The Russians turned, not surpris- ingly, to the Russian Orthodox Church. How has this strategy, this new dependence on the Russian Ortho- dox Church, fared? Not all Russians, of course, agree that Orthodoxy should “define” Russia, and therefore wait for other more nuanced pos- sibilities to emerge. Nevertheless, there is little question that Russian Orthodoxy is now the center of the emerging ideology of Russia. What does this mean for the new Russia? What specifically is the role of the Russian Orthodox Church in Russia today? What is its political role, and how much influence does it carry in shaping the direction of655 JOURNAL OF CHURCH AND STATE Russia's political fortunes? What is the status of other religions in Rus- sia today? More generally. what is the role of religion in Russia's im- mediate future? For this essay. however. the most important question we ask is, is the renewed presence of the Russian Orthodox Church in Russia adequate to fill the spiritual and ideological vacuum created by the collapse of the Soviet state. or should Russia look elsewhere for it defining ideology? t Orthodoxy has a long history in Russia. Vladimir, Grand Prince of Kiev, was baptized into the Orthodox faith in 988. Having sent ambas- sadors abroad to investigate the major religions of the day. Vladimir was persuaded to embrace Greek Christianity when, reportedly, envoys related that in the liturgy in Constantinople they did not know whether they were in heaven or carth. Moreover. the Bible was by then availa- ble in Slavic translation, and the similarities in the Greek and Slavic languages made Eastern Christianity far more appealing than the Latin dominated Western alternatives. Transporting Eastern Christianity to Russia was politically motivated as well. Vladimir's marriage to the By- zantine princess Anna and his economic dealings with the Byzantine empire also played significantly in his decision to bring the Orthodox faith to the Russian people. Moreover, Vladimir was attracted to the Greek religion's caesaro-papist ‘subordination of the church to the state) political theology. thus ensuring the continuance of his own power. Orthodoxy quickly spread throughout the vast Russian regions. Lm- pressive churches began to dot the Russian landscape; these churches conformed to the Byzantine pattern of architecture, iconography, mo- saic decoration, and liturgy. For the last millennium, minority religions have found a place in Russia. but their presence has always been dwarfed by the dominating presence of Orthodoxy. Eastern Ortho- doxy’s tendency to subordinate itself to state interests also emerged very early in the Russian setting. Indeed, the Russian Orthodox Church throughout its history has exhibited not only political passivity but occasionally even active support for authoritarian regimes, espe- cially during the Soviet era. : After the devastation of Kiev by the Tatars in 1240, the center of Russian ecclesiastical and political life shifted to Moscow. The Tatars were finally subdued just south of Moscow in 1380, and thereafter the Orthodox Church shaped significantly the spiritual, political, and social lives of all Russians. In the fifteenth century, with the fall of Constanti- nople to the Turks (1453), the theory developed that Moscow was the “third Rome,” the last true center of Christianity on earth. Job, theTHE RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH 659 metropolitan of Moscow, was named patriarch by Jeremias II of Con- stantinople in 1589, thus giving the Russian church a status equal to that of the ancient patriarchates of the Christian empire: Rome, Con- stantinople, Alexandria, Antioch, and Jerusalem. The patriarchate lasted in Russia until 1721 when Peter the Great appointed in his place a state functionary, the over-procurator of the Holy Synod, which had the effect of greatly reducing the temporal power of the church. The patriarchate was restored to the Russian church only in late 1917, but this was a rather plastic move, since the Bolshevik power base never intended for the Russian church to play any major role in the Soviet Union. Soviet authorities immediately be- gan confiscating church valuables, nationalizing its Property and clos- ing its schools. Soviet officials also began shutting down churches. There were approximately 77,000 Orthodox churches in 1918, but less than 3,000 were functioning by 1941. Most were converted to muse- ums, gymnasiums, government buildings, or in many cases, simply demolished, Suffice it to say that Soviet rule devastated the church. To survive, the church was forced to echo state policy in all particulars. Whether the church did this willingly or grudgingly is still a matter of some de- bate. Church spokesmen seemed to support suppression of the Hun- garian uprising in 1956, the erection of the Berlin Wall in 1961, the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, the war against Afghanistan in 1979, and are known to have actively shored up Soviet rule in countries where Orthodoxy was especially strong: Romania, Bulgaria, and Yugo- slavia. Church leaders today claim that this backing of Soviet policy was the necessary price of survival, thus enabling them to preserve the ability of the church to minister to the people of the Soviet Union, albeit much of it underground. The real truth about this controversy has yet to be fully uncovered. To be sure, thousands of priests and laity were repressed, and many executed, during the Soviet era. The Soviet period is one of the worst chapters in the history of the Christian church; indeed, the intensity of the attempt to destroy the church is virtually unparalleled in church history. Today the Russian Orthodox Church is experiencing something of a revival. In a state suddenly seeking a defining ideology, the Russian Orthodox Church has filled this void to a large extent. Parish life is being reestablished throughout Russia, and the church is in many ways providing the firm footing on which to stand that Russians so desper- ately need. Eighty-one percent of Russians today identify themselves as Orthodox. There is a saying in Russia: “To be Russian is to be Ortho- dox.” This is in every way true, and Russians today are celebrating the renewal of an institution that has served the faith needs of Russians for660 JOURNAL OF CHURCH AND STA more than a millennium. But the renewal in some ways is more illa- sory than real. The 81 percent figure is deceiving, since by one esti- mate no more than 7 percent of believers actually attend church regularly. Most Orthodox adherents, therefore. are passive believers. Tn many ways, the church is more a cultural institution than a spiritual one. Moreover, even for Russian vouth who have little or no memory of the Soviet period, there do not seem to be many signs of influence of the church on their lives. In a recent poll, only 3.4 percent of school- aged children said they regularly take part in church activiti percent described themselves as passive believers, 20.1 percent said they are not religious but do have an interest in religion, 21.1 percent described themselves as having no interest in religion at all, and 2: percent declined to state anv preference toward any religious view- point. The Russian people may respect the Russian Orthodox Church, but based on these figures. the church has a long wav to go to capture their hearts. I Beginning with the creation of the Russian Federation’s new demo- cratic order in 1990, Orthodoxy’s dominant place in Russian life was challenged. A 1990 statute. “Freedom of Faiths,” passed in the liberal spirit of perestroika and glasnost, made “all denominations and reli- gions . . . equal under the law.” and guaranteed every citizen’s right to “freedom of conscience.” It declared Russia to be a secular state, pro- hibited the establishment of a state religion, and denied to the state any right of intervention in religious affairs. Churches and other religious organizations were permitted to freely engage in worship and mission activities, operate schools and seminaries, own property. and publish and distribute religious literature. all without the requirement of regis- tering with the government. The 1990 law actualized Russia's desire to close the door on relig- ious repression and usher in a new era of religious freedom. Almost overnight. Russia experienced a phenomenal resurgence of religion. Traditional religions such as Islam, Buddhism, and Old Believers (a branch of Russian Orthodoxy) experienced renewal. Christian churches, including Catholic, Baptist, Methodist, Lutheran, and Pente- costal, along with nontraditional groups such as Hare Krishna, the Uni- fication Church, the Church of Scientology, the Great White Brotherhood, and the Mother of God Center, became a part of every- day life in most Russian provinces. Evangelists and missionaries from the West entered the country in surprisingly large numbers, and relig- ious crusades, many of which were nationally televised, became com-THE RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH 661 monplace. Indeed, the variety and intensity of religious expression on Russian soil was unprecedented in the nation’s long history. But the Russian Orthodox Church was always a vocal critic of this new policy of religious freedom, and prevailed upee the Duma to pass a highly restrictive new law in 1997 that put the brakes on Russia's brief experiment with unlimited religious freedom. This law, which comprehensively regulates church-state relations in Russia, specially acknowledges the unique contributions to Russia’s culture and state- hood of several of the nation’s oldest religions—Russian Orthodoxy in particular—but it also discriminates against the Federation’s less tradi- tional religions by requiring special registration procedures and by lim- iting the scope of the activities in which they can lawfully engage. Supporters, especially Orthodox officials, hail the measure as a gna provision that will protect Russia from intrusive and un- wanted religions and even form the core of a new national ideology to replace the atheistic, Marxist ideology of the Soviet era. So strong is the church’s support of the measure that it actually has dismissed priests in parishes and in seminaries for their criticism of the law. Crit- ics charge that the new law denies freedom of conscience, violates in- ternational human rights declarations to which Russia is bound, and promises only to perpetuate the tyranny over religion that character- ized the Soviet period. Long before passage of the 1997 law, officials of the Russian Ortho- dox Church were working feverishly with members of the Russian Par- liament to pass legislation that would significantly alter the 1990 legislation, “Freedom of Faiths.” From the beginning, the proposed legislation was intended to limit the entry of new religions into Russia, and to limit the activity of existing religions with international ties. In a 1993 draft, for example, it was proposed that no person without Rus- sian citizenship be permitted to “engage in missionary, publishing, ad- vertising, and disseminating activities,” thereby virtually eliminating the possibility of foreign missionaries entering the country. Russian Ortho- dox Patriarch Alexis II, in a speech to the Parliament, declared that the new law, if eventually signed by the president, “would open new pos- sibilities for the role of the [Russian Orthodox] Church in the New Russian Society.”. The measure had many critics, of course. Among them was Sergei Kovalyov, the chair of Parliament’s Human Rights Committee, who remarked that the law was “an attempt by the Russian Orthodox Church, which has a centuries-long history as the State church, to once again gain a monopoly for itself in the country and once again claim a place near the leadership of the country.” Before the 1997 law was enacted, many religious groups in Russia formally protested the proposed law, including the Baptist Union, the662 JOURNSL OF CHURCH AND STATE Pentecostal Union, the Seventh-day Adventists. the Union of Councils for Soviet Jews. the Roman Catholic Church, the Russian Orthodox Free Church. the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad, and the Old Be- lievers. In addition, Pope John Panl II wrote a personal letter to Boris Yeltsin protesting the bill) The Russian president also received a fax signed by 160 Senators and Representatives in the U.S. Congress urg- ing Yeltsin to reject the meastre as contrary to fundamental human Influential international organizations also lodged protests with ‘Itsin, including the European Union. Nevertheless, the new law eventually passed through both branches of the Russian legislature, and President Yeltsin signed it into law on 26 September. The law contains a number of discriminatory provisions that patently violate Russia's constitution (as well as international civil and human rights agreements to which Russia is a party). To begin with, the law's preamble. while referring to the Federation as a “secular state.” makes special mention of “Christianity. Islam, Buddhism, Juda- ism and other religions which constitute an inseparable part of the his- torical heritage of Russia's people.” then goes on to trumpet Russian Orthodoxy as the most significant contributor to Russia's history: “Rec- ognizing the special contribution of Orthodoxy to the history of Russia and to the establishment and development of Russia’s spirituality and culture...” While this recital technically is only ceremonial in nature. if indeed Russia is truly a secular state and if all religions are to be equal under the law. why is such a recital even necessary? The Russian Orthodox Church is not the official state church, as it was for much of Russia’s history. but it is significant that Russia’s operative law on relig- ion goes out of its way to acknowledge the special status of Orthodoxy over all other religious traditions in Russia. The law also bars legal status to certain religious organizations with- out a fifteen-year life in Russia. This provision is not unprecedented in the European setting, but it is hardly typical. While it is true that many European countries afford different religious organizations differing levels of recognition, all of those that comply with the European Con- vention and with OSCE (Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe} commitments make some form of legal entity available to all religious organizations whereby they may carry out the full range of their religious commitments. Many religious organizations have al- ready been liquidated under this new law: the law frequently has been used as a tool for officials throughout Russia to remove unwanted relig- ious groups. In the spirit of this sanctioned discrimination, it remains difficult for many religious organizations to buy or even rent property to be used for worship purposes. meet for worship services. conduct schools. disseminate religious literature. or proselytize. The law is ap-THE RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH 663 plied unevenly throughout Russia’s eighty-nine provinces, but gener- ally, when local government officials in many of the provinces receive a complaint about the activities of an a minority religion, the usual practice is for the officials to immediately contact the local Or- thodox priest for consultation. More often than not, his counsel is to proscribe the activity sought by the minority group, and in most cases his counsel is followed. Tl Why was the restrictive 1997 law passed anyway? Among the rea- sons that could be cited is the shock to the Russian way of life that came with the appearance, literally the explosion, of new religions fol- lowing the demise of communism. The 1990 law was perhaps an ideal- istic vision of what Russia might be in theory, but nevertheless an overestimate of what Russia was prepared to be in practice. Three- quarters of a century of official state policy that all re' gion is myth, is unhealthy for human beings, and must be repressed, if not extin- guished, in favor of atheism did not prepare the Russian people for the radical surgery that came in the form of the 1990 law. But is Russia’s future best fortified by restoring the Russian Ortho- dox Church to a status as the legally preferred, indeed the virtually official church of Russia, the status it held for nearly a millennium? Some are speculating that Russia is well on the way to doing exactly this. They suggest that the Russian Orthodox Church, confined to the margins during the long years of communist rule, has already returned to the center of the country’s public life—with the blessing of the Kremlin. Indeed, since Vladimir Putin invited Patriarch Alexis II to bless his accession to the presidency, Orthodox Christianity has increasingly as- sumed the role of a state religion, with even its former adversaries in the intelligence services and the opposition Communist party welcom- ing the trend. As the Keston Institute points out, no major event today is complete without robed Orthodox priests lending their presence, blessing troops on their way to Chechnya, or naming Saint Matthew as the patron saint of tax inspectors. Orthodox officials even blessed the laying of the foundations of a new airport in Moscow, which reportedly will include on-site Orthodox chapels. Putin, a veteran of the former KGB, has declared himself a firm believer, revealing that his mother had him baptized and that he always wore a cross that she gave him. He has been attentive to the church’s leading personalities, frequently meeting the patriarch, sending his personal regards to its most respected spiritual leader, the “starets”664 fOURNAL OF CHURCH AND STATE loan Krestyankin. and decorating priests tor their “contribution to the rebirth of spiritual and moral traditions” in Russia. “The state authorities are using the church to fill the ideological void” that has followed the collapse of communism. commented Yury Korgonyuk of the Indem Foundation political research center. Having already recovered many of the churches and monasteries that were confiscated by Communist officials. the church now hopes the state will hand back the remainder of its assets and introduce lessons ir “Or- thodox culture” in state schools What does all this mean? “The Russian Orthodox Church is already halfway towards becoming a state church.” the business daily Konmer- sant commented in January 2000. Another kind of disquiet was ex- pressed by Anatoly Krasikov. an expert in socio-religious studies at the Russian Academy of Sciences. who warned, “if Orthodoxy becomes a new ideology, we'll be right back to a totalitarian state.” Zoya Svetova. a journalist close to liberal Orthodox circles who warned that Alesis IT “was already patriarch during the communist era and wants to keep close ties with the authorities, as do the influential anti-Western, Slavo- phile forces within the church.” confirmed Krasikov’s fears. IN Is this an accurate picture of the emerging role of the Russian Or- thodox Church in Russia’s immediate future? Yes and no. For the past decade, Patriarch Aleksii I] has attempted to define the position of the church in a changing environment. He is fully aware that Russia is now a democracy. which translates to more pluralism, more freedom. and more rights for religious minorities. Nevertheless. the patriarch’s strategy for maximizing the influence and importance of the Orthodox Church in the new Russia has been consistently followed since the end of the Soviet era. According to scholar Nikolas Gvosdev, the patriarch has carefully mapped a strategy. one that is intended to preserve the Orthodox Church’s dominant position. but one that is far less politically based and more open to church-state separation than many would ex- pect. Gvosdev summarizes the patriarch’s strategy as follows: 1. Removing the Church from Direct Participation in Politics: The patriarch has made it clear that he will not tolerate the formation of any sort of ecclesiastical political party. The church, collectively or individ- ually via its pastors and parishes. inay not endorse any particular party or candidate. This does not prevent members of the laity from taking part in the political process or from forming political associations that mav base themselves on Orthodox principles: in fact, there are a num- ber of Orthodox-based parties that have been active in Russian political affairs in recent years. among them the Russian Christian DemocraticTHE RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH 665 Party, the “All-Russian Christian Union,” and the “Union of Christian Democrats of Russia.” As an institution, however, the church will take no sides in political rivalries. In late 1999, the patriarch declared, “We are open to representatives of any movements and parties except for extremist ones, but we will never support any concrete candidate or an individual party.” 2. Keeping the State Separated from the Church: Aleksii has re- sisted any call to establish the Russian Orthodox Church as the state church of the Russian Federation. In his eves, formal establishment would give the state the ability to control the church and give politi- cians a chance to influence the selection of church leaders and chart the course of church policies. Aleksii wants to retain the independence that enables him to publicly comment on all facets of Russian life. 3. Defining the Church as Pastoral Counselor for the Russian State: The fact that the patriarch has resisted all calls for the re-establishment of the Orthodox Church as the state faith does not mean that he be- lieves in church-state separation as understood in, for example, the United States. He recently remarked, “the Church and the state share many tasks which have to be addressed . . . jointly . . . the Church has been separated from the state but not from society.” Therefore, the church feels that its voice should be heard on a number of issues, in- cluding, says the patriarch, the “social and economic situation in Rus- sia,” “the level of public morality,” and “international relations.” For the patriarch, the most important role for the church in Russian politi- cal life is “the safeguarding of civil peace and accord in society,” since the church’s influence is “pastoral, spiritual, reconciling.” The church takes on this role, as Fr. Vsevolod Chaplin noted, “to promote a dia- logue of public forces and their leaders in the interests of uniting its forces in service to the fatherland and the nation.” This helps to explain the patriarch’s vehement opposition to the proselytizing efforts of Roman Catholics and Protestants within Russia. According to Gvosdev, “the spiritual unity of the nation would be dis- rupted if Orthodoxy ceased to be the principal expression of the values and faith of the Russian people, and the church could no longer act as the moral witness of the people if reduced to one church among many, as is the case in the United States.” This is why Aleksii has identified the “prevention of the activities of sects and cults as the most important task” facing the church in Russia today. In essence, the patriarch holds to the notion that one’s national identity as a Russian is inextricably linked to one’s profession of Orthodoxy. As the late Metropolitan Toann of St. Petersburg once said, “If Russia isn’t your mother, God can’t be your father.” Even if the patriarch wishes Orthodoxy not to be declared the state faith, it is clear that he still seeks a preferred status666, JOURNAL OF CHURCH AND STATE for Orthodoxy in the form of legalized disablements of competing faiths. 4. Recasting the Church as the True Guardian of the Nation: Since most Russians do not attend church on a regular basis. the church. in one sense, could well be seen as irrelevant to the lives of most ordinary Russians. To circumvent this problem. the patriarch has pursned a strategy by which the church becomes identified. in the public's mind. as the true embodiment of the Russian nation and guardian of the col- lective national soul. “The whole world is looking at Russia today. and our country was always marked for spirituality, righteousness. patriot- ism,” the patriarch recently stated. It is the church that endures and holds together the unity of the Russian people. so detined by their pro- fession of Orthodoxy. Thus. the church has endorsed the union treaty that will join together Russia and Belarus as “the start of gathering to- gether the sacred lands of the one and single fatherland.” The religious nationalism espoused by the patriarch, which was clearly evident during the NATO campaign against Yugoslavia and. more recently in his public refusal to support a papal visit to Bus then in orchestrating the denial of visas for some Catholic priests makes some Westerners uncomfortable, and helps to create a culture of intolerance against minority religious groups. Regardless of his motives. the current patriarch has done a great service for the furtherance of democracy in Russia, and thus implicitly in all Orthodox lands. by making it clear that. in political matters, “the Church does not . . . order her flock to support this or that party” and that every Orthodox Christian is “free to have his own point of view on social processes and express it wherever he wants and in a way he pre- fers.” The church has thus recognized that every Orthodox Christian is capable of making an informed choice in political matters. These are encouraging signs that political democracy can continue to take hold in Ru The church's understanding of its role in a secular. pluralistic state is also admirably reflected in “Bases of the Social Concept of the Rus- sian Orthodox Church.” a document issued by the church’s Sacred Bishops’ Council in August 2000, This document, the first of its kind in the history of the Russian Orthodox Church, calls for the mutual inde- pendence of church and state and clearly delineates the civic goals of the state and the spiritual aims of the church. Nevertheless, these salutary provisions are somewhat contradicted by a number of rather bold assertions. e.g.. that “the Church and the state may coincide . . . in the fulfillment of the salvific mission of the Church.” that there exists “the possibility of such a spiritual revival of society as to make natural a religiously higher form of government.” that the church is “the people'sTHE RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH 667 shrine,” and that the vision of the church can be achieved “only in an Orthodox state.” It is probable that the reference to an “Orthodox state” is meant in a cultural rather than a constitutional sense, but even so, the culture which the church aims to create is one truly Orthodox, since nowhere in this otherwise impressive document is there the slightest hint of the presence or role of any other religions in Russia. y What will replace the all-embracing ideology of the now os Soviet regime? Will it be Orthodoxy, or something else? Soviet ideol- ogy always sought to replace religion with a materialist, atheistic worldview. This ideology, while fundamentally antireligious, neverthe- less served as Russia’s civil religion for most of the twentieth century. It provided a comprehensive worldview in which the state was su- preme, and by which humankind might be perfected through eco- nomic equality. The biggest loser in the Soviet period, in terms of the ability to shape Russia’s vision of comprehensive reality, was the Rus- sian Orthodox Church, which formed the Russian worldview dating from the tenth century. Despite attempts by Soviet leaders to elimi- nate over time the influence of Orthodoxy in the lives of the Russian people, “the religious convictions of the population,” notes William Fletcher in his book, The Russian Orthodox Church Underground, 1917-1970, “displayed a surprising tenacity.” Indeed, prior to the So- viet period, “Muscovite ideology,” as James Thrower has called it, saw Russian Orthodox Christianity as the culminating chapter in the sacred history of the world, with Moscow and its rulers divinely chosen as the bearers of that destiny. This “Muscovite ideology” provided a sense of common religion and a feeling of unity and destiny for the Russian people. The demise of communism in recent years has created a vast ideo- logical vacuum that has left the Russian people, so accustomed to the advancement by the Russian government of an absolutist worldview, in a state of confusion and discontent. The chief candidate to fill the vac- uum, to provide a national civil religion, is, undeniably, the Russian Orthodox Church. In asserting its prerogatives, the church successfully lobbied for the provisions in the 1997 law that discriminate against many religions, and for the language that gives special recognition to the Russian Orthodox Church. Whether or not this preferential lan- guage will be interpreted to grant to Russian Orthodoxy a de facto sta- tus as Russia’s state church remains an open question. But in 2002 there were at least two new legislative proposals in the Duma intended to further Orthodox preferentialism. One proposal sought to re-intro- duce the teaching of religion in the public schools, with Orthodox665 JOURNAL OF CHURCH AND STATE priests carrying the teaching load. Another proposal sought to provide state money for charitable work. media services. and education efforts performed by “traditional religious organizations.” The latter legisla- tion is written in such a way that it would be difficult for any religion other than Islam. Buddhism, Judaism. and especially Orthodoxy. to qualify for favored treatment. Whether or not either of these proposals becomes law, they are clearly part of a mounting push by many Russian government officials and members of the Orthodox clergy to make Russian Orthodoxy the core of Russia's new public philosophy. Officially, Russia is now a secular state, as pronounced in its consti- tution and in the 1997 law on religion. In other words. the new regime has adopted a public philosophy that emanates from no theological or epistemological foundations. In the United States and a growing num- ber of nations worldwide, this model serves as the best guarantee of religious liberty for all citizens. What makes things so difficult in the Russian context is that the people are not accustomed to religious and philosophical pluralism; they seemingly would rather the new govern- ment step in and attempt to fill the void with a new public philosophy. Given that Russia’s public philosophy for nearly a millennium prior to the Bolshevik Revolution was centered around Russian Orthodoxy as the national faith, it is hardly surprising that the secular state model. in which religious pluralism is encouraged. is not an easy fit in the Russian context Of course the secular state model is not an easy fit in any national context, In the United States. for example. many faith-oriented citi- zens continually pressure the government to adopt an absolutist public philosophy that is more coherent for them. A growing conservative movement, buoved by recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions that allow increased government funding of religious schools and other religious institutions, seeks to steer the nation away from a public philosophy grounded in the separation of church and state to a philosophy that i grounded in a more religious. even Christian, worldview. The persis- tent advocacy for this adjustment to America’s public philosophy. cou- pled with the prominent role of Christianity through the n history, has led many American scholars to describe Christianity cially in its Protestant form, as the unofficial civil religion of the United States. The vast majority of Americans, of course. are nevertheless comfortable with a loosely defined public philosophy that does not ne- gate divine law. natural law. Christianity. utilitarianism, or any other theological or philosophical worldview ay its central ideology—but. im= portantly, neither does the federal government officially endorse any of these philosophies. Perhaps this is the current advantage that the United States has over Russia: more than two hundred vears of experi-THE RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH 669 ence with a liberal democracy that is constitutionally committed to re- ligious pluralism, and a resulting consensus that has been conditioned to think in dialectical rather than absolutist terms when it comes to formulating a public philosophy. VI Given the complex historical movement in which Russia finds itself, how should it proceed? To begin with, it must recognize that numer- ous international agreements of the last half-century, to which Russia is, bound, acknowledge religious liberty as the common heritage of man- kind. These include the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Helsinki Final Act, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Be- lief, and the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Freedoms. If Russia wishes to be a committed member of the free world, it must take seriously its obligations under these agreements and work toward elimination of all forms of religious discrimination. These agreements establish high standards of religious liberty, and while Rus- sia has every right to take into account its own history, culture, and spiritual traditions, it will hopefully accept the challenge of making real its constitutional commitment to the equality of all religions under the law. The current tendency to elevate the Russian Orthodox Church to preferred status, thereby subordinating all other faith traditions to sec- ond-class status, is a reversion to Soviet ideology rather than an ad- vance toward authentic religious freedom. It will take time for Russia to take all the steps necessary to guaran- tee full religious liberty to its citizens. The progress already made, not only in terms of the constitutional and statutory measures recently adopted, but also in terms of the vitality of religion in the life of the new Russia, are not to be overlooked. According to one Russian offi- cial, before the recent overthrow of communism, only 10 percent of Russians were believers. By 1992, 34 percent were believers, by 1997, 47 percent, and by 2002, 54 percent; thus only 46 percent in 2002 were atheists, agnostics, free thinkers, searchers, and the like. Moreover, most of the church buildings have now been returned to various relig- ious organizations, the great majority of them, of course, to the Russian Orthodox Church, which today claims 55 percent of all religious orga- nizations in Russia. Bibles can be found in most Russian hotel rooms, and all manner of religious materials can be purchased almost any- where. These developments are significant, and. a sure sign of Russia’s genuine, albeit sometimes uneven, commitment to religious liberty.670 HOURNAL OF CHURCH AND 5TATE Russia needs time. As it seeks to make genuine its commitment to civil and religious freedom, it needs encouragement from the commu- nity of nations rather than a relentless stream of criticism. Interna- tional human rights organizations should continue to monitor closely the developments in Russia. calling attention to violations of interna- tional agreements. and to specific acts of religious discrimination exper- ienced by Russian citizens and faith communities. In the end however, it is Russia itself that must confront the task of how best to treat religion and religious institutions within an emerging democratic order. Given Russia's history. the Russian Orthodox Church might expect to have a dominant cultural role long into the future. but it is the Russian people, in democratic course. who must ultimately deny the church the preferred legal position it seeks for itself. Their deci- sion is key to the advance, or decline. of freedom in the new Russia.Copyright © 2003 EBSCO Publishing