Unity, Identity, and Explanation in Aristotle’s Metaphysics Edited by T, SCALTSAS, D. CHARLES, and M.L. GILL CLARENDON PRESS | OXFORDud ie Pre, Wao Soe, Ot ami ay Cc Mate Kah oar an Ca et fn sone rh of Oe Linn Pes oa ise en Nom Yok Desens lo Odie Pre 3 st rel art we wnt lr at nt oor reer na Gaunt Rice eh cae ‘Son rprednt i sade wth tr of te eee el aarti oe tse “ete ik pn rd ney Bre, ay of Cn Csi abo Das hy a nin arom ac gia ladies ‘eam oy 2. Stn’ py Cogan Megs Conre. Seite cer Secs crs, re Br agen ig PREFACE Earlier drafts of the papers inthis volume were presented at Con fereace on “Aistle® Metaphysics. organired by the editors, sbich took place at Oriel College, Oxford, in Ju T9Sp. We woul ike to exten our thanks fo the following organizations for supporting te fins of the Conference and for their astanee towards te expenses ‘tthe Conference “The Greek Ministry of Catare The Hellenic Foundation The Leventis Foundation The Mare Fitch Foundation and the Brith Academy ‘The Radeie Trost The Rutgers Unversity Endowment for Ancient Philosophy ‘We would also like wo thank Jfey Car for his valuable asisance in copying the volume and erating the Indes ‘One ofthe partipans at the Conference was Montgomery Furth, who was avery active member of cur convertion, and presente {haptr of his book which was the subject of considera dscson. ‘Tit was one of Monty's lst major scholarly appearances before his titimely death, As a Iriend and ava reuder Of Ariotle he Wis Impertant oll of ws, We cherish his iemory and ale the wealth he leftus in is work Das after Michael Woods submited the final version of his conte bution to this volume, he died, while sil dedicated To his varions projets in progres. Michac! was dlighiful to be with. His modest incere isponton, an chantable naire stengthened our adn forbs knowledge of ancent Grock and forthe depth of hs ander Standing of Pato and Aristotle. He wil he dearly mised By all ho Kew him ‘We deat this volume tothe memory of Montgomery Furth and Michas! Wools TS. D.C. MLGCONTENTS ‘Notes on Contbutors Insrodustion 1, The Meaty of Composite Substance A Puzzle Conceming Matter and Form 2. Aristotle on Identity Indiv ana Inevidation in Aristotle MARY LOUISE GILL 1. The Unity of Composite Substance 4 Matter and Form: Unity, Persistence, and Meaty 5. Substantial Hoi 6, Pars, Compounds and Substantial Unity 1H, ‘The Potent andthe Aetuat 1 Aristo’ Notion of Potent In Metaphysics The Acti of Bing in Art's Mets 4, The Prony of Actin Astle so, Exons, Powe and Generic Propstons IV, Matter and Form 1, Arise onthe Relation between & Thing and its Matteri Comens 12, The Essence ofa Homan Being andthe Individal Sout in Metaphies Zand 1 1 The Definon of Generated Competes in Aristotle's Metaphysics \V. Principles of Arstot’s Metaphysics 14. Aristotle’ Conception of Metaphysis asa Selenoe Bibiography Indes Locoram General Indes 9 201 29 su as 3 mS NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS Rowexr Botro% is Professor of Philosophy at Rutgers University and the author of many atcleson Plato and Aristotle Davip Cunntss is Fellow and Tutor of Oriel College, Oxford, and University Lestuer in Philosophy. He is the author of Arsoe's Phitovophy of Action. and eomeditor of Reduction, Explanation and Realism, He bas published articles o Plato, Astti, and philosophy ‘ot mind ‘Wirttae Cnanttow i a Senior Lecturer ia Philosophy atthe Univer. ‘ity of Edinburgh. He & the author of many articles anda umber of books inching. Arse Phice 1 and 11 (1990), Aesthetic, An Inirauction (1990. Philosophy and ht Ble (1988), Weakness (of Wil (1988). Phloponas om Arson Ae nec (199, a The ‘Analy Aiton 1991) Mice PERBONN is Associate Profesor of Philosophy’ at Duke University. He i the author of The Origins of Arstoehan Science (Yale Universiy Press, 149i) a8 well a8 of 4 number of atin on ‘Avsiotelan loge and metaphysics and arly Plone ethic, Ki FNe fs the Pint Profesor of Philosophy at UCLA. He has pb lished! in a variety of fds, including fos, philosophy of language and metaphysics He the author of Reaoning with Arbitary Obje fnd co-author (with A. N. Pring) of World, Tomes and Sees. Micsiatt FREDr is Profesor ofthe History of Philosophy at the Uni ‘erst of Oxford He s the author of Prdkation und Fxutonsausae, of Aritoter'Mewphysik 2, and of Essays in Ancient Philosophy. tnd has published many aicks on ancient philosophy “Many Louse Git is Associate Professor of Cassis and Philosophy at the University of Pitsburg. She the author of Arsiode' on Substance: The Paraiox of Unity, co-editor of Sef-Motion: From Arise ro Newton, ant has vriten nome of ails on Plo and ‘arto Sau Hastanoen Asolate Profesor, University’ of Michigan, Aan Arbor. She has published articles on isues in contemporary mets Discs. focusing In particular on the problem of persistence though ange. She alse works and publishes in feminist theory ‘Avra Koswa his tap at various institutions in the United States since igée he has been at Haverford College, where he i Joho Whitehead Professor of Philosophy. He i te author of a number ofx Notes on Contbutors essays the history of philosophy, mostly on Plato and Aristde, The present esay i taken fom longer workin process to be enitied The Meni of Being A Study im Artoe’s Ontology Frank A. Lewis is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Southern Calfornia. He has published papers on Plato's Ter mets Physics a on various tpice in Arde's metaphysis, and i the Luthor of Sibtance and Predcanon in Aras (Cami. 191) Tunes Moravesk is Profesor of Philosophy at Stanford Universi [He has writen many articles on sncient Greek philosophy ethics, and the philosophy of language. Fis most reeent books are= Thought and Language (Routledge, 1990), and Plato and. Paton (Blackwel 193) Treonone Seattsss is Lecter inthe Philosophy Department of the Unvversty of Edinburgh. He the author of Substance and Uni rsa in arses Metophsis, an of The Golden age of Virtue Tana’: this, He isthe editor of Arastorelian Realism, and bas ‘oniten rites on Pato, Ansttl, and contemporary metaphysis. Tiel Director of Project Archeogos, the eration of electrome com bentarieson ancient Greck philosophical ews Cuantorre Wari Associate Profesor af Philosophy at the University Sf New Hampshige, She tthe author of Substance and Essence in “rie (Cormell Unversity Pres, 1989), ard has published widely Sn topes in Arstol's metaphysics, Carrnty she I working on the Shnecpts of poteniity and scanty ia Book ® ofthe Metaphysics. Micnaet Wooos was a Fellow and Tutor of Brascnose Collen Oxford and Universy Lecturer in Pilsophy. He isthe author of ‘Arie Eudemian Eiki, Books One, Two and Eight with trans- ation and commentary in the Clarendon Aristotle Series (and edn ti). an was the Genera Eitor ofthe Clarendon Plato Series. He isthe author of ales on Pato and Aristotle and on topes netic and philosophical loge Introduction THEODORE SCALTSAS, DAVID CHARLES, "AND MARY LOUISE GILL Prevaing movements in contemporary metaphysics hive fled dca onthe ental books of Arias phys. For instance {cent work on eaenaiom by Saul Kripke and Hilary Pata tas ‘oat creang of Astle t ee whet, off what exten hy account of exes cortesponds fo this But the relur fo [Avoca revealed that understanding his theory an cont. fate new insights to siren dacs. The paper hi ome xamine the hate of essences, how they dlr from ihe com ponent of a butane, snd how they are elated to these other Erwttucns, both onlopcaly and dentally. Addressing these Sesion fe fundamental for understanding the unity of compote SStstincs and ther entity overtime in hs analysis of substance, Aristo wes the concepts of genus and Uitereniac, mater snd form and potently ar actualy, ‘en appeting to-one pa to expiant others I potently and actly ae taken explanatony bes they shold explain iow matter and (ory e-sned, sit ow they conte tthe iad of a subtane. These oneep wil provide 4 concept bridge eouiing oe to explore within Artes metaphyseal pace problems canerning the consitton, development ad perssence {composite sbsanse ‘What oes Antone mcan by ‘poteniiy” and acti” and how do these conceps explicate matter and form? Astle distinguishes ‘ariogs levels of potetaty and actualy” How ia al, are mater ind torn sccomoxated by these inion? What in aban ‘ell o mater potenti and do the sutra potemais ont to i sence? Must they he mentioned sn i denon the acount of ts exsnce? How are they related Yo the atts 8 Stance? Ate they stint fom or determin what they ate i)? I they re stint, can composes be unite? I composts ‘Sit of platy of parte can eps be Mound together 92 7, Seats, D. Charles, and ML, Gil single enity of pratgmatic unity and cobesion? What is the role of seb accounting forthe uy and went of substae” Siar oc about te uty and went of substances can bs eas Sue kes gems and diferente oc utter and Tora the Pose ‘Kpunatony concep. The metaphyseal pues aout substances 30 see tpStCmoloiat questions about how one paps the essence of 2 “sete and ow, fatal. metaphysis linked 0 Arties Swepton of sence in the Anaya, This ange of ses invest ‘Sted hy te papers he pone volume, whigh cme on the role Siuneadaty sad aca) in determining the sent an wn of Siutancee. “ee "Th papers inthis volume were ft presented ata conference we cougniad at Oriel College Onford mJy 198, ened "Ansttle’s etphvsies although th eof the Coterence ui trex the Ahm a tops to be dacs, the conference presentations di ills remarkable ovesap of interest, and we fund te dscusson heraig om coe of queso soncening the nature of mater and foun an thelr constbtion tothe wmty ad entity of compote Stmtances Theft par ofthis volume eal questions conceming the Wentty of subse The paps reveal the imation of mater ‘reform ta determining Meny aad indsdation, and they ako ‘Mh question of Fenty to thse of santa unity hie he tops of the second part Fe papers inthe second part consis both the dchattonal and ontology of substanees, ad oe er ve sltons. Crt os this analysis re Aviston» coeep potent an aay Questo sounding these notion a {hd eatin oe the flocs ofthe paper Pare HL The papers othe thar part examine various sxe to expan thereat between trace and fom, drawing om Rslemorphic counts, al rom ett model Fina the paper inthe lst part turns fo metho baa! conser, sung tat on the epstemologal lve Sein bs methyeea teoy, Arte guded by empiea fae than «pi prope. Th volume bogie wha pu. kn he fst prt, "The Leny of Compost Substance ns paper A use Conceiing Matter and Fm kt Fin obseres that according tothe Arslan poson, the mater of one sbsance can become the mater of ander 169 ‘Shanes ea have the ame form, and iy substance the poste af mater ab for, ut all hs fs, the mater that Somponcs Sores a gen tne might come To compove Cals, Silt rvs that State, who conse ofthe some mater and Tom su Calla, would be ident! to him. But ths sar. Fine ‘ves various was ou of the pul apd pnt ut the cies Irorodueion A associated with each purported sluton, He divides the solutions nto Three hae groups, each of which rejects one of the thre premscs of the puzde, He fist investigates the ejection ofthe cai that mater ‘an mnigeie from one substance to another and sows that this hetier plausible. especaly for the neo-Avistotclian, nor well Sup. Ported bythe txts The rejection ofthe second prem, that Socrates hn! Calli have the stm form, f the vow that Aristotle endorsed individual forms. Fine argues that an Arsiotelian would have (0 skeept a ery thoroughgoing version ofthe view to evade the problem, {nd could ot thereby avoid certain other difiulies i the compos!- ional account. Finally. Fine explores alternatives 10 entying a Substance withthe composite of matter and form including those that introduce Gme asa eifferentating factor between wo substances, But he conelades that none of the ateratves i lly acuptaie to a ‘Adsiotelian or neo- Aristotelian. To that degree the puzzle mains. The identity of sibstanees i also the tople of Wiliam Chaton's contribution, “Aristotle on Identity’. Charlton considers Aristotle's Statement that ‘you and your neighbour are non-identical ecause it ‘Snot the case that both the matter andthe account are ne’, Bu lnm that, according to Anstole, your matter fas to Be oae with Sour neighbours only because it dbcontinuous wi. He argues zat the traomal postion that substances derive thelr idemty fom prior dentifables which have ilemy in ther own right. whether these are fen toe quantities of mater or spatiotemporal ioeations ‘The emits of emits ike human beings prmtives here nodhing ‘which “makes you identical with youself or eter than you Deigh ‘hour hut substances have the sae of primary ieniaes Bec they have form Tn "Indvihils and Indviduation in Aristotle’, Mary Louise Gil foctscs on the questions What makes an Adstottin individual the ‘nivel that t's, and how sone sch individual diferente rom fthes, which may be qualitatively indsingushable? The trationl Interprctave dispute has heen whether Arsttle reatded matter form’ asthe principle of individuation” GH presents dilemma to show tha, whatever Art's soltion was, the project of inavidus tion cannot sacseed, i meant fo locate something that explains indivi” A reasonable strategy to avoid the dilemma ist accept ‘tai entios asthe basic particulars and to indiduate ater things With ference to them. Sueh a strategy is not explanatory, because the particularity ofthe base objects fe assumed in advance Gil calls this steategy "weak iviguation She argues tha the evidence alto Support claims that Arwolle regarded either mater of form a ind Cictor im the song, explanatory sense, but that passages traditionally4 1, Sealias, D. Charles, and M1. Gil taken to show that matter is principle of individuation do support the weaker thesis that mater 3 source of pray. This lem is inadequate, however, beotse 160 objects with the same form might tdiferent mes share the same matter. They would dhe be went ‘Aviston fact recognized the problem, and his solution 10 i ingi- utes that the passages supporting the lam that matter 8 @ weak inaiduator dat rect He considered vie. “The wnity of mater and form the topic of the yond part “The ‘nity of Composite Substance’. and the papers this part adress {qestons congering the definional and ontlogical unity of com ose substances: David Charles, in “Matter and Form: Unity, Per SStences and Ment outlines two diferent ways to understand [Aristo account ofthe unity of» composite substance at a time and ‘ver time. One approach represents him a taking the notion of the Unity of sstange as base and introducing his concep of matter inform, potentiality aid ctualty by abstraction from i On this ‘low his concepts of the mutter and he form ofa comput substance ‘wbeesentay defined asthe mate o form ofthat substance. The {Tterative sees Aristotle as faking one of these later concepts (68 form, of actualy) as bose, ands aiming to explain the unity of @ ‘Composite substance in terms of i. Charles examines the second Spymeuch, taking a his starting-point Artotl’s remarks Met. 2.17 ‘heh involve aspects of the Anas’ method for establishing the Unity of Kind, This lade to the suggestion that in We 2 and. 6, tater and fort, of more fundamentally, potenity and acti fre the subjecematter of explanatonily Baie propositions, yen Ahovdaig) which ndervrie the unity of a composite substance. ‘Ghar’ aim is further to investigate the extent to which Aristotle in these chapters ising wae developed ia the Anofytics 1 establish the tekeologaly based vnity of a compesite sobanee. His conch Sion is that while Aristotle does develop this type of explanatory Spproach fo the nity of substances in the Meuphyc, his mets {he sesuls show signieant, and understandable, changes ftom the ‘Sinple Anatyes made “Theodore Seals poston in ‘Substantial Hoi” canbe encapa luted inthe claim that a substance nt a claser of ditne ees fonnected by yelational bridges between them. Substantial olism = the doctine that the homoayey peinciple applies to all the cm ppoens of substance nied by the form: mame!) incorpration Into the substance involves the reideniication of the incorporated (Gonerete or abstract) componente in terms of thie role in the whole {Stctermined bythe form. According to Scaltss, hiss what Asoc i pointing to when he explains tbe unity ofthe components of & Inroduction 5 substance through the poontil-sctealdsinetion, The potenti ‘ny homonymoel the cua, Deng named afer the ata, witout ‘ing the ac Hs setalzton retention i ferme of the {eu Retemblance, and physic! cont heween bones, re ‘ot explained interme of the sume omponents exiting scualy ‘thin the stances ht in ferme the sae component emerging ‘yang the substances up phyialy or by abracion, Abstraction {imme ere mse nog ata han py Tn her paper ‘Pars, Compounds, and Ssbstntis Unity’ Sally aslngee acs aint the view tht the mar and Com ree thats and albo against the view tat the mater aad for ae iste posterior pars of a suutane, une by both being specs of the Sle sutunce Instead. she develops a schematic account of Stal unty the test the mater an form of sen sshtnce Gistint prior prs of: Drswing om the tea tt pray of em say he tne by sre ofthe relatons) to pepe member of the posaliy, she propose that form, at actsiy, functions ay the prvleged mb! of the seoule compost, and mater ied With srt of ts potently forthe om "The papers in Par Hil "The Potent nthe Acta’ explicate Aso notions of potertay and sua, cones east the aly of uty explore inthe prvaus arn Arto’ Notion ot Poenlty tn Mops 6 Michel Feed, taking up the etm ‘ht Arte ase the noms potent and acta expe tater and form, turns to Me where Ante proposes iy Sinan, and gy Aristotle ocs ws by etlogsing arouse of the expression. Pode argues that i & mistake to suppose that foteniy one of the ind of sp that Astle Bere itn. [uate Atcording Fred pote san of th aro kinds ‘Sas undertood inseam nay. The asc kind of ey 8 omer poe hg ngs. ram th snot etd derives varios drative notions ining the sapaity to rer change, Se nel asst a facies comsitatie of them ‘These various Kinds of Singer cam be understood ah each fo an inlogous way confreng a cetainsegree of realty nh este. “Taken ths way, dos potty To each Kind ofS orcaponds am stay. Ech kind stu also cones i a8 Safogows ay degree of reahty om beat In 0 Tar a6 an iCtuly i opr inti wy called an acti” the Senne ‘elvan wo substances InsThe Atny of Bingin Act's Metaphysics’ Arych Kosa argues th for Aro nots (ubance being) i fue, unde.6 1. Seas, D- Charles, and M. Gilt stood ative being. Kosta comers Avisos sition in De “ima beneeen two senses of fp OF sian actualy ‘tic ban achiceed dapotional apt fora certain sey, and na actu, which the eatin of uch eapaity—and sks hotter stab fst or second etal. Kesman poms oot that ‘in conidrations point im one ition, oer nthe oes 1D fEitihonevers he demand for dvtaon, one nay of the other, ‘sconce, Acorng to Kenan inthe case of substance Being {here no such detmcton, I the distinction fy wed at al ie ‘Soh ant and second acta. But ft cannot be undesiond 38 frat actuate the sense that it might sometimes fall 0 be ate Unie tara nxn, hen somtines fa ecu. whe the capac fr that activity mains, the atv of Being mun ean nese bpse without the eration ofthe human being Suman Being hs he eapacity tobe 8 human Beng nly if she ts setnel beng human “Tae prion of actuality over potent is examined in Carte wits poper The Priory of Actuaity in Aratote’ Aristotle dis gus icrent respect im ih ea bigs prior to poten {le time in Stton, and instance. Wit concentaes on the ti espct and pacts a pute generated hy. She shows thatthe sana exsena or teleological interpretations of pron whl not jestiyArtotl’s contention that aettal being prior 10 Potemtat being in substance. Towards solving this difeuty Wit Froese that we understand the pron in tems of am asym meson betwcen tua and poten. Although both ctl ‘nu potently re fran end potentiality forthe sake of actuality thie Scutty s na for the stke of potent 3 potentiality Tesenaly dependent in some way. on acta, while ati is Sor ceperlenton potently. This soon. however. BNE se 1 TPhanler pus: Row could the potent depend on its fae Stuy? Qt responds tos dicts By proposing that the se teal oe which the potential depends is pot town future actly. batt ataltyof adult members ofthe specie: tus for example RTS potenniy i 4 Become {oot the st, that may become, bute human being ulus Moravsiestgates he semantics f universal genera tion ofthe sot wsed by Aristotle, a wel By conlemporary sien {ai to desribe the hare of members of species—for example Ihmans have eyesight beavers build dams Such generic nents, Moravec argues, eaniot he analysed as expressing necessary ond Tons nor even probubisi ones. Furthermore, tey do no expres chvitnonal a coven but utr wht essen 6 he members Introduction 7 ‘ofthe species Hut, be pints out among the sentences that deseibe the members of specs, some ave exceptiontss (ep the whale 8 ‘amma while others, such asthe previously mentioned generis, reno He coeludes that generics shoul be understod as expressing potenti, which are essential Tetutesof embers of a species. He then uses this interpretation to explain the semantics of some ofthe 'Anelan sentenes tht contain the operator in 20 (sual inmost canes) This account requires potently to be a prmitie Concept, and potential ing fo be irreducible to actual being “The papers in Part IV. "Matter and Form’ examine various models {in exptining the emergence snd complex of composite substances In Aristotle onthe Relation between a Thing and ie Matter, Frank Levis addcesss the question whether the proximate mater of sub Stance i identical with the substance self. f some ofthe mater from ‘which seance ts generate strives in the nse substanee—for {example ibd i both the “before and the eoncutent mater of Tsing snimal—then since part of the blood exists Defoe the animal dogs evidently ease of hater eXsts that fe not identical withthe Tvingsnimal. fe scems to follow tht he animal no dente ith ven is pronimate matter, Lewis tis to square the now den of the animal and the lisng body that isis proximate matter withthe ‘ea thatthe substan form ofthe animal esta a jus tothe tnimal, but sso tos ving bo. He uses te example of blood! ana ‘Antti’ artefact analogy to suggest that the form ofthe animals an ‘external principle of behaviour for is living bods, But an lena Principle of behaviour forthe animal ell Because the form i xterm tthe proximate matter resembles an atelact, whose form ‘likewise essential but exernal to i Responding tothe sugestion ‘han by the definition of uniform” na mater exis below the level fof the uniform pars, beyond the reach of the substantial form, he appeals to Aristotle's theory of ie (miata), and argues that dhe renal of mixture as concurrent matter distinct from the spatially ‘etermined parts ofthe thing. The inital ingredints-earth, water, ‘ete--exst aly potentially i the result of mixture; but the} con bute to the object tir dtnctive properties and powers, and they make up the aeteal concortent matter ofthe mixture ‘Michael Wools examines Astle’ hylomorphism in ‘The Essence ‘of Homan Being andthe Inlvidul Soul in Afeaplyses 2 and H He ienties the objection to the analyst of matter and form in fnganins in terms of the distinction in artefacts, and he devotes his per to showing how these objections can he overcome The Ses Problem that inthe case of artefacts the form cane iastantited a Uiferent kinds of materia (eg. sphere in ronze of wood). Woods8 7, Seats, D- Charles, and ML. Gill stows that in dhe ease of organs the form cannot be instantiated in {erent kinds of materials, becawse the form supervenes directly ipo the body of the animal But his sopervenience he argues Ube por undermine the dine betwee mater and form 1 an “iganiam, Recause there Jr symmetrical dependence between the (itor an he form. Thus. fr example, the Ruman body depends on ‘he human for for being and remamning (despite material renewal, {hs uma ody. whe the hamn form depends onthe human body Fheits dsernibiy. The diferent contributions of matte and frm 19 «Smetrcal pendence taitates the dstinetion Between the tno, a distinction tht i equited by Aristotle's metaphysical commit Tass Woods makes a father diction between the form of @ ‘entaee and the substance’ having the Form, snguing that the form “Tbcunot have instances, but ony being the form does. Thus Socrates nd Callan have the same human form But ths dlleret carers in ‘oceurence in their distinct Bodies, and for that reason Soerates Soul ferent from Calas’ youl ‘Michael Ferejohn’s paper, “The Definition of Generated Compo- sith in Aristotle's Mtaphyicr’,dfends the integrity of the orsaniza on of Mer agans recent charge in Frege and Patri (1988). It ‘Bede t hy aging that Anole's physica? (gm) dseusion of| ‘etter composites in 2.7 contributes importantly to the position Medevelops in. to and c1-on the Bue of whether « mention of Totter (ar addition to fon) inthe formula of the composite ents That the formula ts no sufiely “unitary” to count as a genuine {RnttonFerjohn begin by offering a novel interpretation of Z. 5 seers many passages where Aritone uses the example ofthe er Section mubnen as 3 standin for matter/fonm compesit sub- Sfances"Atcording to this interpretation, the pasage presents the {bilo logical vnc) pzreor qporia. On the one hand, it fh powable to defn snubness (or a composite sibstance) widow Imentoniag its proper subject, wile, on the other hand, explicit ‘Menton of the subject feds oan finite egress thus it appear hat [ih things are not definable at al. Ferejon then interprets a hey ‘Bintage 2) as an endorsement ofthe thesis that one should not [ety speaking aply the name ofthe mater (uch a brazen’), The Flat Sechon of he paper ergues that ths thesis enables Anstte ¢9 Bao t and 1 thet is possible to define a composite by giving a Speen of formula that senion is mater iniecly by defining ein as onmattered™ and that these dvr Jor are MDE 6 the gpon of 2.5 Tee paper in ibe inal pat, Principles of Arsot's Metaphysics soc tamil estos taised by Avisiole’s metaphysics Imvroducion . onoeting how hs metaphysis inked with his conception of science inthe Analyaes. Robert Bolton examines Aristle® methodol in estalishing metaphysical principles in “Arotle' Conception of Metaphysics a Science’ Bolton points our that acordiag trode metaphysics scence. He argues, against curreatl received Views, {hat for Afsote, ingury into ist principles inthe Metaphysics i sharacteriaed by the features which the Aaicsdeseibes atypical ‘of siete inguiy, and doce not introduce any mew procedures Bolton offers deinled examination of Avitole's proot of the ‘most fundamental of all metaphsial pipes, the principle of no Sntrdiction. On Bolton's camstal of the proof Aristotle does no ‘eque for this principe from a priori grounds, or by use of any new form of desta, or other, prook. Rather, Ansttle develops a Peirasicshalectical agument (rom Zo (ooted Beis). which ‘splays the characters of peiratc clonchus, as described by AAnstlleinthe Sopisical Refuaions. Given Aristotle's view ofthe lenehus, Bolton argues, the proof does not by ise provide the proper busi for genuine scenic knowledge, Bolton argues Torher thot the proof estalshes any an instance ofthe principle, on em Pinca grounds However, Aristolles prool procedure ean be gen {rlized, thereby providing an inductive procedure for knowledge of the principle of noncontatiion. Such a procedure would be typical btoahae the Anabyic descrbes az the metho for reaehing scene Principles, wich, according to Bolton, jester Aristotle's clam tha Imetaphysicl principles ae reached Irom experience Tn explicating Arstoile’s theory of substantial unity and identity ‘or coogern in thi volune his ben both exegetical and philosophical, fd the papers range over questions of ontology, explanation, and ‘methodology. Our aim has heen not oly to ge anwwers 10 celta problems in Aristotle's metaphsis, but also to simulate farther esearch on the problems ha defines, and atound the controversies that it embodiesI The Identity of Composite SubstanceA Puzzle Concerning Matter and Form KIT FINE ‘Montgomery Furth has writen sven a suitable par of individuals there is no reason of Avetotciah metaphysics why the Nery fe land earth that this noon composes Calla and distinguishes bi trom Soeeates could not by a set of utterly curious chances, twenty Yeas fom now compose Socrates. He does not speaiy what these “carious chance™ might be. Bot we may suppose that Socrates eats Cala or his lanch an that owing to the superionty of Cala’ lesb fand bone, is the matter of ths which remains in Sorates after the peti of went) year, “That such an exchange of matter is possible # po on which rmany Aristotelian scholars could agree. However I wish fo argu that ‘Sich a case gives rae fo 4 fundamental diol; for is pessiity ons into enact with cvtin asic metaphsial principles Which are ‘commonly attributed fo bit and which would ako be commonly sccepted “The problem consequently ares a8 to how this dificult sto be resolved This problem ill may be regarded in two somewhat dit ferent ights On the one hand, it may te regarded 35 a ditclty fo ‘Aristotle: The question then is whether one ean nd a solaton hich Svould he acceptable to him, either inthe sense that he would oF that he could aesept st On the other hind, it may be regarded as a @kieFne wy " Tahol ke odes hs pp the mors of Monty Fur ened sollesene and nen The pag Eed hee ones appeal i hi ole {ante ahan eepsted ne ok oi te oud te ohn the Inembr of te aby softens on Ase Onn and ofthe 19 a IES etn io ny emo he a i ant espe nd eo Gav Lens or dean of he Creek {Sind ope alton an uy Lae ifr cel an Bed Thoweh mihoutextmne detmsoa Ie my enpunised pope “Anite ot Stet. 27-8a it Fine ica fora ay Arelan eto snone ao sya 1 de rings nto mati and form. The question the & fo ihe sean, reals ot wether ot ot Ht would Be asseptale tw Atstote ces aihh - ar enos part, my concer hasbeen wit te exegcticl gues: tian ene hery ny purpones have been somewhat nite or | fam ame Steptoe on one soon as opposed to aot vs face to map ou te exept space ater tha oete thesis of Atte wih Ten ould be mentioned that T count mye a neo Ait selon and inde, nas ny ow commie oHykmorpin that FeREpeenge Avo’ sews in the st pace). 1 hos there (ea Brom importance fr me to take the pus metaphysical tston into acount 1 THE PUZZLE ‘our tia i simply std. Suppose that Socrates is a ne oe ie eae Cals bes stave tne Then thelr MARES th ames form the same nd ne cack fhe com Mad of mater and form. they themselves are the sie Pert fete sate the punt mote formal crm Let ws se S fot sates ond € for Callan Suppose tat nthe envisaged itu tor Sowa ane the respective te at whi Socrates and als fe vi (ait be the same ater Let be the afr of Sora seamed tbe mater of Calls fine ¢ Let Et the form of ere stand the fom of Calin Given soe mater mad a fxm SEG teomatines aso writen 3s Fim) be the compound of yd Wethen make dhe flowing ssumpsons ws Gh =m GF- () S = Br and C = Gn (sas that Socrates and Calis are distinct, (2) hat Sosrates’ mater (UPR the same as Callin” mater ft, (3) tha Sorates! fom tan es Satin” eum, aed (4 hat Socrates the compound of is vc tar tar) and of his form and tha, tkewise, Calas the com: mui of his matter (at Fad of his for, Peat of these ssumpdions appear 1 be reasonable: and yet tke tothe they lel comradewin. For fom (2) (3). at (4) it {Rlives by tao aprations ofthe Leibniz’ Law (the subst of [A Pucsle Concerning Mater and Form 1s “The shove formulation of he argument isthe aang of bey. Butithas two annoying features The fst ofthese tha he sump tons once specie stato, the one im wh Socrates cas {Citas Ths make the segue eds specie. peraps danger. ‘ly soo we un the ak at he argument aya MO op ner the given shoe of 4 stustion, evn tho ft would Rave eld up Unde some eer cokes One might ty to atid hs ily by taking the argument suitably general one supposes oly that there {poste station n wich the relevant ssumprion hl. Homer, fe then loss the abiby separately to san the premises po Stic ive argument depen sine the ssumpion of several specie Foes ha been replaced by ta of snl general poss. "Me ther detec nthe formulation tht presuppose li ity of ere modal dcoure, Ths tas of the posites fer Sovates and for Callas The (omulaton as preappecs the Ipitincy oe apptaton of Lena: Law within mal coments ‘Thus ts sured. pen tat Socrates and Calas ae the sei he {Gren pose sustn, tha they arn a the sme. Peel wuld fo qeton thse presappotios: bu kf Geary referent to tavelo mate tem Tertantey both ofthese andesable apts ofthe argument can te aveeduaer a longer, but more caret, onan. Ths bat thre remiss which orcpond othe premises 2), (3) and (3) the swt form of the argment, Lat sy tht to thigh ae Coupee they are of the me lowest species The tof the remit then sy Marit Miraton is posible for so cospcie things 1 ex change tei ate, Le forthe mater of on a onetime We he Sins the mater ofthe ether at anther me ‘Thesecon pms sas “Common Form I nessa that any two cospecie substances hhave the same form. " ‘Te hind a Simple Compostion. Wis necessary that anything entered ise to te compound ot what (0 any ime) ts fom and From thee premises contadition then flows in much the sane way as before, Tsou clear that the present formulation removes the defect noted above it proves an aay ofthe sumptions on which the Brgoment ress and avoids all appeal 10 de fe medal Tocutions ‘Marcover. the present version of the argument i as lectilly hve the ealer verdon: any rounds for relectine ts remiss6 Kit Fine vil be equally good grounds for ejecting the other’ premises, We BH Merete adopt the tong form as our offal version of the wtumeat thous we wil usually revert tothe short Fort for pur poser of exposition 11, EQUIVOCATION ‘hare isan obious challenge tthe gi of dhe argument which Treg Sgatcaes on th meaning of mater’. Perhaps foros sal te ambiguity in the motion ofthe mater fa thing Butfor arts, ator comes in leves Ths there the vel oe Bante matter of something: this self may have prosmate cranes hte level two mar fo the oa hig: 8050 ‘Nom the mater of which Socrates i compound is proxinate ngvcr, wie the mater which migrates is presumably some low-level Taaterfucha the semen and sraialy not hs proximate mate TPLGE, hs prowmate matter is Body ap i leary not ea Tassel sutton, tat Sorat and Clas bodes are tho same. ire ois cage ot equmocnton it shou e pind xt shat arabian that tis only the provimate mate of worsen hh sombich eh the fm to proce the crepe cm wc Suppose Soerates i te compound Fn where mi PO pee atte Chess body) and F the complementary Yor and rane sit the compound Gn whete ithe proximate mater of wePeringcomptmetny for, The it eens nara t sppose that ass ake ihe compound Ha wbere Hs some srt of compos SSSTPG Oh the toms and ©. So it scems to be pose in prince {ir the mater oF which Socrates pate 2 ehmpound souk! be the sumer the mater whch migrates ‘Uaforenately such posit il not help defse the objection Fe ees that Socrates the compound of some Towel eGo ie andere) and of some appropiate compesional Rane ota for Cat. THe commoner mates wi then be {pega the mgrrory mae However, we wil lack the reason ‘Meno had before for supposing ha Socrates and Calas have the SC esa form: For the composona frm is more fe-grained 1 asd paper soi ep dey 2 sme Se ag cmpinl nme of see mt ae FO aod FO A Pasle Concerning Mater an Form " than the predominant form (ie, the form which f complementary 10 the prowimate mater) and the coxpecieity of Socrates nd Calls ‘even under a universal conception of frm, wil be, insufient 10 fuarantec tit the compositional form & the sme.” Admittedly, the Emiguty inthe use ofthe term "matter will dsappear: but i will fave reappeared shan ambiguity inthe wse of the term form "There i. however, 4 more succesful way in which the charge of cequivoration may Be resisted, We orginally decribed our posible Situation in way that was meant to makes evident that Socrates and Calls have the same (predominant form. We must now redesrie i so that eis equaly evident that the form oftheir bodies is the same, land 20 om all he ay trough the different levels of mate. Ts generally unclear when the ater of twe things ofthe same form, even when the things themselves are ofthe sme form. Its Unclear for example, what are the necessary and suit conditions for two buman Bodies tobe ofthe same form. All the same, there a ‘ery general sufclent condition which may be given for two things to te of the same form eis hat thy be qualitatively the Sime that there be no qualitative diferences between them, ether of 3 flaional fo of & nonelational srt, For siely part (perhaps all) of what i Itoi by saying thot the form is anvetalftht i can be specied incompletely general terms 1. without reference 19 any particular thing, (This ght aso e though to follow fromthe requtement that form be definable.) Thus we may guarantce tat the mater of Socrates and Cll are ‘of the same form hy sopponing thal they ate qualtatvely the same Now, in general, the supposition of qualtative sameness wil require thatthe universe be eternally yc (in both the backward and forward tiretion). Sosrats and Cals wil then be counterparts under two titfrent cycles. However, such n dristie posits probably not equted. For al hat we ned i that there be no relevant qualitative Aliference berseen Socrates and Cals, Le. no qualitative difference ‘shih relevant to them or thelr mater having iflerent for. ‘Of course, one might adopt Leibizan view on forms oaly exact, signi ter nate ones of Sorts Cas for exe ‘tt gurance tht hbsr re npc Fo Sere ane ee Sef rts were copie, repent Cala each evel Pasian groom peso pean as ie Fine quate counterpart have the same form. An one might combine HEMI Lalbizan sien on posi! no Se thingy ean he exact ‘pena eountrpute The poi of Socrates an Callas ving {SENS rm wal ot then sn, However, Art wuld (ihe adapt ach an exteme poston, either on uablatve frm or tin eaicnc of quate coumterars Se Cae 1-9 and Me. ‘yds would not have Rad comparable reson for rejecting tie pons. : : Hien) event were o reject a qualita eiteron fr sameness oa sl hd Ble, en that poste fo Sostates Shu Cau out te tame form tat ete would ne soe "cf station in which tse rosie mater ao id the se othe nett-ponmate mater had these for (8 1 aly {oun ata nS onal the way down Yo the penultimate eater Dara ach station posable, whether underwriten y 2 ‘eal quate slaty orm the ple cn be restated. For Sistsland Calas are dint By our assumption thei (pred nan orm the same; a a0, by Simple Composition, te only iy cn be distinct for their respective rome mates vad mts be dsine Again by the assumption, eter m ahd Dah iene enor their the same. Inthe ater case. te ony ee and nto be ict fr fer proximate male to De TWelnceProvnding in this way. we ace thatthe mater of Sores SCs pn eave vl (ng ce inate ie ach they ate no lger compte). But also, gen that Sine mateo eta even ve he ae of Srey ‘Su chan ars eels must be tint. So no mater at any eel of ‘he et ada to ang, attr st any Teel of the others and ination ain ald ot te tetormulation, can be supposed tht the componeait “tn agus formalin ofthe agent we ou wae «08 of seta ian forthe mo of spec The love of Common ‘Sheet! neces whan or hive cononereduniant iS eer oy a) a eB ame hh rae ‘aqueous hve done: hat he mati st a ee ‘SSSENG atthe cn ne and ibe mater at the i evel f Callas a he ote SEE"Sagene a ae a ok = fem = my Sn my aan ae ‘emissary eae ae emg epee to ram Prose oamls fet mn he a ni desening seu my ma oF Hes TREE GS ean the neltowndcies fe mote ln A Passle Concerning Mater and Form » ‘mater is only prosimate matter, as long as Simple Composition is taken to have application, not oniy to sensible things, but to anything fenmattered. Thus Simple Composition becomes the assumption tha ‘eceasry, anything enmattered isthe compound off ai [proximate matte. On the other hand, we may allow the migratory fatter eth matte involved i the sumption of migration Be ‘om proximate. I's worth noting. though that if some non proximate matter migrates in the situation above, then so does some proximate Imattr. For take the highest level a which the mater of Sorats migrates to Callas (pehaps this the Teel Blow that of flesh ad bone). Then at the next level up. we ull have to distinct but identically formed things between which there i the migration of proximate matter. So forthe things at this level, something lke our ‘orginal formulation of the puzzle could te given, with the com Pentland the migratory mater both now being primate mater ‘Given the failure to fault the argument on grounds of equivoetion, let us tun to those soltions which challenge ite premises. There arc three auch solutions inal ne fr each of the three premises, Lets onside cach in turn, IH, COMMON FORM “The common fem assumption states that it is necessary tht cospeie fhings hve a common form or. under the more refined formulation, {hit ti necessary tht relevanty sma things have common form ‘This assumption might of couse, be denied on the grounds thet forms ate individual. For presumably. in that case, it would be i possible fortwo dint things to have the sme frm (even it were possible for something diferent to ive had the form the fist Phe) Ti not my intention here f© enter into the debate concerning i livia form But {do seat to make some remarks onthe eelevanee ‘tthe dehate to the resolution ofthe puzzle. should be noted. in the fst place, that ea lot easier to atribute the heli i inva forms fo Arsotle than to old ones. For Arstole seems to have 1 posible basis forthe ele, amely that forms are eal and active Prtocipls inthe worl, which i dened to any ight-minded modes, ‘Ths m the absence ofan alternative conception of individual oem, the neo.Anslotelan must fnd some other solution tothe puzle in rogad to the enspeticl question t shou he observed thatthe ‘su of whether Aristotle heeved inthe mere existence of ndvidua fr anivcral forme is relatively unntereing. For granted That he2 it Fine ‘eieved in universal forms, there would be no fit in supposing Tha he bined in india fun a ome sort of indeed terion ‘the universal fons (someting which we might present as an ‘tdted pir of» wes form and thing whieh Rall hat orm), indie tht fe ved nda a here wou em tay supposing that he believed in universal forms ay some or of sation om idl forms comeing whch we mi ‘epreent as an appropriate eglelence chs of indus fmm) Tie meresting ues the ote of nv univers forms ins thought and hehe, particle father than The ter Tobe scoped ay the sence’ oft serve thing ‘Sher, what flevant fo the resolution of our puzzle i not che cnstence of universal o inva forms, bt the tts ofthe forms Sich emer into compounds Ca thes Be iver” Or must they be Jnoidal The phtosopher who woul wove our puzle Dy appeal t0 Inia forms camer be sontet with their extence” He: must tana tat thse forms, ether tha thei unr cout prt, which eater into compound and this can ony be maintained PSsume. en the grounds tha ithe doi, rather than the tusneral fms which const the esence of his Tb ab imporant 10 diingush Between 4 partial and fu aahoeay of ines! forms. A fll advocate will matin that Siyhing wth form has am inividal oem (ich serves 6 i Ronee); t part avocate wll maintain that thi only teoe for Sie of the things with fos peta forall ng tings of for al ‘Rigs whch need not thomsivs be the mater of sayhing. The fall Sthueate of inal frm ba a general slton to the puzzle, But {he pal advocate myn; for there may be appieatos of the puzdc fo som of the things which he concedes ac thou inva foe Tui gases are of speci intrest. The isis ha ia which cetin hinds of acfac are eed in place of people. Thus may he tat one {ip acguies the ltr of anoter, muchas the Ship of Theseus pure The advocate of ivi forms ay then iy thatthe ships Rive their own india! form (which i Fred's i) oF mus find SEC ee co deh Se Pee Econ is a CS re Graben henna A Passle Concerning Mater and Form x some other solution othe puzzle. Such a case may not be 100 serious, Iemever for someone who was ning fo exten ini fort ateets; for be could abways dispute that the matter migrated to a ‘diner ship. TMe other ease is more serious inthis regard. For as we have ‘observed if the folevel nonproximate matter of man can migrate, then the prosimate mattcr of something like Resk mast sk be ale to Irate; nd hence the pote can he restated for esh or whatever. ‘ich eae the puta advocate of nada fens cannot disp migration. So he mast either dxpete Simple Compenition which presumahiy would provide him wih an alternative general slion t the problem, or he must concede that fesh and the ike have inv form. Thos it sms tht the doctrine of individual form cannot Be ‘confined o senile substances bot mist be extended to their matter the mater ofthat matter and so on We should note inal that even the fall advocate may ran ato problems if he regards his advocacy of individual forme a8 way Of ESving Simple Composition, Fort we sil ltr see there another puzzle whose resolution would scem to require him to give up that sumption, IV. MIGRATION Let us comider whethor the puztle might be solved by rejecting Nari Migration I's eae that thi nota option fr the ne ‘Attell, for there sees to be nobing to prevent the moectes ‘tic om comprise me fom ltr comprising you. But whether & Sn option fr Aratole ot so cles sce cannot e taken fr ranted hat he would have adopted ang ike ou moder seem It form's taken to be universal, then Migration canbe rendered ss the claim that's pole for something tbe the matter of wo tinct tings with he same forms and hs the verson we sl ae. The negton of Migration, which we call Envrapmont, then sats that, neces things with dhe sate matter an form are the same fn escape” of he mateo something ofthe same form fs impasse Its important wo distinguish Entrapment from two sronger cis. The fn Of theses hich we may cll Song Eup sys that things with the sme matter ae the same. Ths Entpment docs not allow the matter of anything to be the matte of anything eve with the sae form, whe tong Entrapment prevents Bing the matter of Snvthing che, wbether‘or not the form isthe same. ‘The second2 it Fine sirengthening. which we may’ call (Material) Individanion, sys that two sentially formed things ste the same i vie of their matter fring the same, Thus Indiiduation ads to Entrapment the reaute tment tha the identity of the matter should be explanatory of the ‘entity the thins There some textual evidence which scems dretly 10 support the view that Arte held to some form of Entrapment. Te three main prstages ate from the Meupiyss, namely 6, 1016%3t~3. Z. fosges-, and I 1os#16+17- Under am innocent rein. the ds {these supports Strong Entrapment, the second supports Inividue tion, and the third supports Entrapment ‘Some elfort has gone into showing that the support for Tndividua- tion, or even some form of Entrapment, & Hyory. 1 myself am Inlined to favour the nmocentfeangs. Tam also inlined! co thik {hat Arstonle's remarks on the uiiatry cole of form in Z. 17 and. {provide some indirect support for Entapment However, iri ot clear fo me, even unde the innocent readings ‘and withthe indtet support, that the present solution remains open to Arote. Tht i partly Recause there i some Turher subtlety in bow Entrapment ta he interpreted. For If the pul sw be sled, then Entrapment matt lest mean citer tha the proximate mater ‘of anything enmaltered is entapped or that the proximate and non- Drowimate mater of ay sensible thing 8 enteapped. But the above passages could be taken to suppor the festitian of Entrapment to The higher level mater of sensible things. ‘More significantly theres tho posiity that Aritotle is gully of| an inconsistency on thi point. For (as {wil ater propose) Be mish teieve in Entrapment fecause of his viens on the mature of ui ation and he might believe in Migration because of his views on the fatare of matters without being aware of the inconsistency between the two. In any ete, we need to consider the evidence on the other ‘dein favour ofthe possbiy of migration Tt wil be helpful to organize the consieration of this question around certain apparent instances of migration. We shall present thrce kinds of example (in order of ineveasing cogeney), and in each ‘Thee sho a pn of dation comeponing Stone En inc Maat tee se een sone crn of Earp Tha might ‘a th pay hte atone hing con eer cep he ‘Shc of ht tng de ss le ote omy th pf he ‘nc of mesg ct vce pao the mater 5 seine chet ip ac par of te mater fe i. alo i Se xin eens un A Pussle Concerning Maner and Form 2s case, we shall consider whether there are any festa intuitively ‘Sompelingresons to suppow that Arse would have aoepted the example But here so doing, fetus make some general remarks om how the example and the responses to them are to be shatscterzed. Any apparent case of migration may be deseibed in neutral terms, tras {orwhich Both "the opponent and the proponent of Migration cin agree. Thus they wil aptee that certain things continue 36 certain ‘ther things: and they wil agree as tothe form ofthese things. But ‘hey wl fier on questions of ideas. The proponent of Mixraion ‘wil bold thatthe things, sx described inthe ete, are distinct bat that {heir matters atthe respective Times, ae the same. The opponent must Rol ether shat the things ae the same or the matters dint, For the proponent of Migration, the prims-facie evince forthe ‘isi of sentity isthe existence of 4 materi Contnuty—the matter ‘tthe one particular continues ina suitable way. as the matter of the lother, and th primate evidence forthe stim of distinctness the fxintnee of « Tormal dseomtinity-the form of the one particule thes not continue in suitable ways he Tor ofthe other "Thus the opponent of Migration must question the prima-fcie svidence for ether the clam of identity of mater or the claim of Sstincness of form. In the one case, he must maintain that the lnderiying material continaty i not siffcent to convey the matter from the one particular tothe ater: somehow the matter gst trapped fn the way (and we have what might be called an instance of ent tment). Inthe other case, he must maintain thatthe formal dion Tuity "no slfiient to prevent the fst particulars reappearance Somehow i gots eensated and we have what might be called an instance of reinstatement, Tet us now turn to the examples.” The fst kind arses from the possiblity of fission and fasion, Fission (which Aristotle aeceps for Plants) oocurs when one thing of given form changes into several of that form, fasion when several things of sven form change ito one thing ofthat form. Ths hoth are canes of intaformal change; the “break” in the form consist, ot in is being diferent, ut in Hs not being a singe thing which has she form. Te seems plausible 19 suppose that Tision is possible justia ease fusions: However, combintions ofthe twa appear ead fo case of migration. For suppose an amoeba 4) split int the amoctas and, hich then fase back into the amoeba (13). Them will bot (2) Be a 5 The ramwork within whch thee guestons hve Neen omer col be made gh move seman pei’ hate no something that ‘emp ee4 it Fine inne particular with the same form and withthe sme matter a Some evel st? The opponent of Migration cul! deny that fsion and fasion ae, in the eure sons pose He nee not dsp te apparent ics re gould conede, for example, that, in a neutal sete of {he term, che one amoeba continues set. ute cou deny hat {he matey pests ne tha the mater ofthe tw the same as the mma he one the apes! to coop in hiss though, fot very pautble {an aate shall ater mayo even ep) What mre plusle {2% any tat thei ateta 1) iflerent frm he sy. The Shaner ie some appopsate fevers the sume, tS does The Thocta and hea we ve a eae ef restatement” ‘Homever, er apparent cass of migration whic ave fom the pons of sion and son aren 30 fel disposed of, We te Incned to think hat something an urvie a fos oe son hat ‘Pantinocnsscombines with sulceny small oF isin rata heh the Tesuling mows can sil he 2 abd tha it 9s icles sm or sigifeat amoeba spits of rom an amocha =. the te emanng ane 8 2 eae ut our opponent of Migation una 10 ok! such a view. For smut nin the Sip of Theseus ese, a amoeba: with mater m may ito age a sal anosha saving the large pas ay then fse wis small mocha, suvvng he sion vd soon nt the venfdnymcba zpos none ofthe engl mates the means the sal amcor that it has shed may ase ito 3 Soca” whose mater om. Oar opment then reauied 1 make Wena wih om arcount of fe sural and ao 10 Mae = sta wth aunt ofr Sono aera ore” itthrcore appar that anyone who would wish ose the pu ty ening Migtion should matin the fllowng ews onceming {Eon and fasion. Fist the mater (a some Tse) sures these frovuses Second, the things themslies do Rok survive, no wae ovina te change all hee tgs which ae part 1a fsion ot INTs must be dnnct Third, anything whi eases 10 ex 8 the ‘ela uch process can aves exstencefstored 6 Fest {Sth'procests. hus the ting snot completely destroyed for 10 ‘Mitelpbie of existing, And he process are not completely dsr {hein elect for wha hey detoy thy ean so restore ‘ar indi case ass ith aac Sppose tht house A Puzee Concerning Mater and Form 25 vrecked ora satu meted down. Then cn we nt erat formal identical house or a statue with the very same matter? = How one eas such cae depends very chon how one under stands Aiole’s dumssve remake cocorng the satan status ‘tania (ein Met 1-2-1034). Unt an exteme interpre tan, atfots ae ony tested things tht own gb forthe purposes of snsogy Sty speaking the state ete ame a he Bronze the house the same 3s stra The pul woul! not then ate snce the requir distinction beiwecn he thing and 1S ter coal nt be den . However is hrf om sich an interpretation how the bronze could be understood even byway of anagy ob the mater of he Statue (which ater al sential tthe brome) A less extreme nd mae pase, sew tat these ad the bronze ae net ‘ut ha hy ony ave th ream of msi fo compound by way of Snalogy Ptbapr sty speaking the tata an aeodentalwnity of the bronze ands aecdeial spe, tm much tbe sane vay that mk Corus an acetal nyo Cores and scaly (et Ment worghectg)"A rtd view ht te statue Mera his the ‘onze i is mater and hence erally hav something sch aa ‘tape, av form. However, the form andthe thing ae bot Meraby ‘tnt toni subetaial y way flog. ‘neither of hese ls twa ins, the pz wl til ai, bt with the alg sn pace ofthe rel maton. The sare Kind of responses Creer heen, Thon tat he ane ae sa fri through the procere'of atgraton, and. reiteration, However, this ner plane, epeial Tor th ae of ee ‘ors it well sppomed ty the text. (For example. in Met 4. Tavesort, anole write, Yor when product fe A fin domingo tea] x made to hese materia the fie matte is prosrved throughout) "Amore ladle lin that andr sitablesitegrton the orginal tooo tt ens (he form mst hen of cours amo 0 sore thon jst beings howe oF tatu). Thaw the proses of ‘Sxmeraton and reintegration would be neon av atalogos to the process of fasion and fusion, They might ren fe tought To be {seni the same land of proce, dilerig onl with respect 0 ‘whether the orp ofthe proces has he se foe the feat"6 it Fine We come now tothe Ist and most cogent putive iste of rgration” This the casein wbich the appatont transfer of he mater fom on ving thing to another and takes place by means of ‘ormal olga or chemi process. or the purposes of theese itis probably better aot eth example of people as me i at he intauction: For the degre of rlvan int wish requied forthe indi to have the sme form might ao endow hem wih Sim memore, sma personality, anda on. Thy wl oa} watever causal connection s rogue forthe mater #0 apparent Ignite Can we be sue, ia suchcromstances, ha the 18 ne Chae gens tint? “To avoid sich problems, it 6 beter £0 tke the case to concern tees eu say ater than people For Lake it ha the ceva Simiaites and causal connections woud then provide no ground for “posing thatthe two nde ae the same" An oak ha mere Fethaps ever mons of years, from the docompose remains of am Sising ok wil surely note he se free, sins in sree, ‘gn, or wbatever notthtanding We may thertore suppose that Socrates and Calis ae es an thats Wck the elemental mater of one ats given ne. wed {hat eines wit he elemental matter of he ocr ate ime Formigraton genuinely to take place the matter mit act out of the ne tre and mus “et ithe other ey the mate ms ao st srs’ from the one tice to the oer. I seems resonate 0 Sppse thatthe mae cam got out andi, then ca ako got Seton if only hess the processes involved in geting sto re ‘Ssentilyno diferent from the involving ints geting cut orn. Nowhere are ony two ay the air Suid get ut eth at the india cessation, and then of our the whol ofthe mater tight et out or before ts cessation, io which cnet plausible 10 Seppe hat nly prt he mate cam gto. Likewise. these are fn wo ways the mater ean etn ether tthe iva ice ton, and the ofcourse the mole tthe mater might ge ino afer ‘te tcetion,n which cae i pauls to suppoce thet oy pat ot the matter can got n- Ths whit at ae af Aitote's teas on ‘stant change anon growth sn dimination T hope to det more fly with hi vcs on growth and diminstion clleee. But there on comment of ig which spel relevant to our present concerns. Ip GUT. 32095 he wrt, TRS how the malfer of fesh grows an addon fe not made To each and every art but some lows ny and ome comes in new Now te stra ‘ray of understanding the phrase some somes in new ha sme Imnr tht epic he matter ofthe Hesh stone ne pst A Puzzle Concering Matter and Form a ofthe matter of the esha later time, This then strongly suggests ‘hat migration could ake place through the complementary proseses of arom and dimination, However these ae at feast 1wo ways in which this concason might be questioned. Fst, the phrase some comes in new" might be ile. Pte 1 mean that Some! matter m that isnot part of the mater oF the Rosh becomes seme matter m (not mecessariy the Sine ym) which sa part ofthe matter ofthe Mesh the later ime. The ogi matter nv would not then erally enter into the es, Second eve if it-were granted that the orginal mater later became. part of the matter of the flesh, i sill might be supposcd that was nly in 9 timetelative sense thar twas part ofthe mater of the Res Thos ‘ven in the eicumstanees that were mot propitios to migration, the ‘most that gould be concluded would be thatthe matter of the esh of ‘ne inva way eomprised atone time of the sme materi pars 8s the mater ofthe flesh ofthe other individual atthe later time, But the fact thatthe two fleshy matter wore comprised ofthe same parts at the two respective times would not he suflent ground for oncluing thatthe two matters were the same, Which ofthese ier Dretations isto he adopted depends, I think, upon fuller unde Standing or his views {Let us now turn to Aristotle’ views on substantial change, Accord ing tothe trationl interpretation of Atti on the op, mieation ‘would then be possible: forthe prime matter ofthe one eco Mou Persist through al the changes and thereby hecome the prime matter Of the other ee. In fact nothing gute as song a6 the traditional interpretation is necessry. For we do not requte that prime mater pets, but only matter at some level and we do aot rege tht i Persist through all changes but only thane meoved in the parent fase of migtation. One might bold, for eximple a variant of the "aitional view according to which elemental matter persisted through nonvelemental change, te. change which was not fom one elment {© another, Migration could then be upheld under the reasonable sumption that the changes valved i some apparent case of migra tion might ll be on clement But the traditional line of interpretation has been questioned in recent times! and this might then scem to lave open the posse of ocking the apparent cases of migration, T msl ant disinclined28 Ku Fine 1o sive up the traditional interpretation. especialy in its relevant ‘weaker forms. But al the sme, tt se what follows ints asonce Take something which i no clemental mater (aor prime mater sould there be such). may then he supposed that i contains ‘lemental mater. For this thing, Uke any ether eamattered thing, wll Salvi to hvlomoephic analysis it will havea proximate master (and a ‘Somplementary form); the proximate matter wil have is ow proX mate matte (and corresponding frm) and so on. all the way down tovsomething which has nd matter. But sorely atthe ltimate level ot this ana i there no prime matter) or al the pena level Lifhere is prime matter), we will each elemental mater ‘Consider now the fst tee atthe juncture at wich dies. Then the living toe thi metre contains cera elemental mater and thes the dead tree. The opponent of Migration mast then contend that this elemental matter not numerical the same"? For suppene it'were. Then the death of the tee woul! be a case of change in which the clement matter stays the same. Bur if he death ofthe ree [sich a case then presumably the same could be rue of the other ‘hamnges involved inthe apparent case of migration Ii the earths, let ws say of the lng tree and The dead tree are not {he same, then t seems to follow thatthe forms the eats ae not ‘he same" For if he Tors were the same, then given thatthe one ‘mater continues asthe other would be hat to See why the earths themelses would no be the same. Moreover, thir ference in form ‘an be no ordinary difference cannot consis, for example, i the fatio of the eontares making up the ert for there no reason why the ratio would have to he altered by the change. Thus we have 10 ‘dsingush two types of earth, one o€ which i “potenia” by nature fan the other of which i atu” ‘What evidence i there that Arisotle would have been prepared accept sich a bfueation nthe form ofthe elements? He Goes hold ‘Soctrine of "homonyny according to whieh deal hand, or example, © nih hr» ra pot arg i eet or ter Unie sch ie would be ones (oy eter tht the earth of he ead tre wor numeri th sae that fhe Wig te or that ae wera ‘tube question eich simply aid ot are" Sch view mht sre ‘etch eat gues et em ee as A Puzzle Concerning Mater and Form » isnot the same, or of the same form, asa fving hand. He & ven Prepared to extend the doctrine to the mater ofthe bel pars Fes and bone, and perhaps furber. (Se, for example, GA tc Zus'ze_r3s'26) But there no Teal indication that he would hive teen wth to extend ial the way down fo the level ofthe clement andi is od, i he had eountenanced the poss of homonymy forthe Tower level of matter, tht ths pority Was never mae expt However, let us rant thatthe elemental matters of the ving and the dead te are nat numerically the same (and we way soppone that, ithe elemental mater not the sae, then nether sth mate a ny'levl). All she same, difiuly remains. For even hugh the tater ofthe living tee dacs aoa exsi when the tee desi tmay still poentaly exit. ie. be capable of einstatement., But Presumably the condition for reinstatement anes favourabe a they ould be inthe cae ofthe second tre. So ven that the matter Eapable of reinstatement, wil actully Be tensa in the second tre: and migration wll agin be secured (hough the mater wil ly ft out inthe sense of hating is potential existence preserved) ‘Let us say that something is denroyed if tees to east iter potentially or actaly ith and ean be no tore. The opponent of Migration must then hold thatthe matter of the tee i desoyed on its death Indeed, whit i typical of death in hi regard that i hang in which che inavidul i destroyed. Ths our opponent mist hoi gute generally that when something is estoned hen 30s matter at every level. He must extend the honsnym doctrine out #8 well as down it must he mantane that no subsequent matter can be mumtcally dental to any the matter of abmething thats desroyed. Ths extension fremonable for bodily parts and hehe; living hand, afte al isiferene both fom a dead hand and from any subsequent reconsitucd ting hand. But fs even more prod ‘ate than the oxginal doctrine aplication a he lower reahes ot Ta conclusion, we see that there ate various diferent grounds upon hich Adsl’ omumitment to Migration might he defended. Tere te the difeulten over fsion and Tuson there are hs vicws on srowth and diminution; and ther she evidence from the tranal2» ‘Kit Fine interpretation of substantial change. But even without a substratum forall change it may be supposed that the elements ae substratum for aonelemental change: and even ‘without 4 substatum for no elemental change, it may be supposed thit migration can he secured Through reinstatement ‘Given the implausiiity of the case against Migration for living thing. one might think of combining the two soltions #0 far given “The puzzle would be solved for animate things onthe proonds that thei orm fs unigue (and hence cannot he shared), oul! be slved {or inanimate things on the grounds tht theie matter is unique (and ‘hence cannot migrate) Thus on this view there would be two fun- amentalyliferent kins of substance (and. two correspondingly Siferent Kinds of substantial fora) those which are lifelike and ‘ndividuated by their form: and those which are mater ke and ind ‘ited within thee specie form, by their mater. i has io be concede that, once a diferent stand on individeat forms is granted, thete s 4 great dil to be stil in favour of & ferential solution. Bu te eae fora differential stand is somenbat mixed. On the onc hand, the “sul” i plausibly taken to. be the fnivalform of living thing: and there ts nothing quite like the Soul which splasibly taken to play the same vole i gard to 3 non living thing. On the other hand, iis upelear what Iti about the sonctal nature of forms which would enable the forms of some things {o be individual and require the forms of other things to be spec {Granted thatthe form ota ving thing i seu, there would have to be something ina ronving thing which was suffenl alike the soul to he speci fs apposed to individual) aod stl suffcently hike ‘he soul to be form, Buti clear what sch a thing would be, Vv. COMPOSITION 1 now wish 0 consider the question of whether the puzzle ean be Solved by sojecting Simple Compontion. The standard interprstition ff Arise (and one which Eyl am iene to old) tate = Eommited to both Common Form and Migration. The snr view (ie the content ofthis standatdiaterpretation) i also one ta which the neo-Aristotctian is tikely to subseribe. The telecon of Simple Composition therefore of special interest under this interpretation for vi, since I costitates the only way of rescuing Aristo or the hneo- Aristotelian from contradiction Teis clear that Aristotle believes, in some sense, that any substance or anything enmattesed i a compound of matter and lors for he A Pacsle Concerning Mater and Form x Fepeately refers to such things as compounds of mater and oem, and is often quite explicit in saying tat they are sch compounds. Let Us cal his uneonstrued belief Composion. Then the question bow this belie ist be construed. The mos straightforward constraal ein terms of Simple Compos: tion; for one most naturally takes the compound t0 he the com: pound of the matter and form at piven ime, an one met tally fakes the relation between the thing andthe compound to Be one ent. ‘The naturales of the construal is suong presumption in its favour. However, there are two guile separite cosieatns tht £0 against i. The fist ie that ft makes the operation of compounding “duly selective or unduly confationay. For granted thatthe mates fof something can be difeent diferent times. one may wonder how the composition of the form with just single one ofthe matters tsapable of selding the even thing, and one may wonder how the composition of the form ith different matters ts capable of Sekine the same hig. “The other consideration arses from te prac; for this shows tat. tundr the slandaed interpretation of Atte, he cannot consistently tdorse Simple Composition. However. the free of this consideration ‘somewhat problematic. For theft tht an nterpetation renders Plilosophoe’s vows inconsktent or subject to some other hind of titel isnot inset a reason fr sejectng the iterpretation. Its reason only to the extent that sis putsible to suppose that the Pihlosopher himself would have recognized the dif. Now inthe Present ease, i aot at all implausible to suppose that Arstote was Unaware of the difeuty For many of Aristotle's commentators have Failed to se the covtesponding cay in ther ow interpretation of him: an ifs not ungenerous, one hopes, to suppose that he hime had no greater logical acumen than his niepecters sn his ego ‘Nor i it dificult te see what might have led Anse or his interpreters to overlook the inconsistency, Fist, they overlooked the somewhat subie argument that if the non-proximate miter of Sulstanee can migrate then the proximate matter of something no Sulstamtl eam also migrate. Second, Aristo ha ew clear examples ‘within his metaphysics things whose proximate matter could migrate {Certainly this would not be possible for ving Things or the higher forms of matter: nor would Ht be possible forthe lower forms of matter. His general line on artefacts was not worked out, and 0, Srauably, migration would be posable at only one fvsl within the Islomogphic hierarchy, namely the one below the Towest level at which homonymy sil hel. But Aste never identified what kind of2 Kit Fine mater ly this level and so was never forced 1 confont a specie ‘rs of what he Would recognize a6 the migration of proximate matter Howover, even if its granted that Atte was inconsistent on this point, is sil important. under a more normative eoneption ofthe Exegetical ask, to ascertain what Aristotle might hive sai it tesponse fo the puzricy je. to awerin whch solution i any, docs Teast ‘olen to his views So let uy consider, both fo this eason and for the ames state eater the various other ways in which Composition night be construed. ‘Gn posible reading isto relatvize the relation of Menity 0 & time (orto subst arelatvied relation of coistence foe Kents). ‘Something enmattered is then taken to he Metical orto coined, at a given time to the compound of matter an form at that time. Te Pizzi would then be avoided by not fequring thatthe object be hotly (he. numerical the same ss the compound with which oincies, This on this view the enmattered things and the com pounds would in general he distinct, thowh they would enjoy the osu feature that any object of one sore woul always Be found in fhe company of an object of the ether sort The compound would fnjoy a kind of errant existence now being associated with tht ‘hing, now wih that. "The main dificuly with this view i that there is no rel evidence tar Aristotle thought there were compounds in addition tothe en- tatere things with which they oinelded. For example, in the Date for substaniliy whichis depued inthe central Books ofthe Meta pis, not i he compounds were a contender in ation to the sensible things. Is clear that Aristotle regards the compounds fd the sensible tings as one and the same 'A second possiblity fs that Aristotle Takes Composition to mean Simple Composition ad yet does not tak Simple Compostion to be ‘cally true But only something that would be tue uPder the st Dilping assumption of sate universe. However, i tod that he ever makes the assumption explicit or considers the question of what Factual ru and itis especialy for someone so sensiane to the enomenon of change "The third reading, which we may’ call Paral Composition, takes something to he the compound of fom and its various matters over time. Ths 8 thing «is taken to be Adenia go the compound Fm pnesssma), where F isthe form of f and my Maeno are ie proximate matters in order of temporal oscurenee “This proposal avoids the ontologal excesses of the ear ones the ontogy is the familar one of substance, mater ad form. Te is algo quite acceptable from 8 laguste standpoint for itis nok [A Puzzle Concerning Mater and Form 3 ‘annual to suppose that the reference 19 mate pla releenee. However, the proposal still unable to reyue’ Aristotle from eon ‘tadiction. For out puzle reappears under the modest excrsion of “Migration to inside the possiblity of Socrates and Calis having the same matter, not ony at feo times, but ove the whole period of thet "The lst eading which we may call Refauve Composition eaves ‘he notion ofa compound to atime. Ansthing enmattred is dena, Jinan absolute sense, to a compound. But the compound i nt. in a absote sense. the compound af mutter and fore, but only relive 10 4m, Thus the enmattred thing xis taken to be identical t0 the Compound Fm), here Fis the form of # alm i the proximate ‘mattor of + aoe, under 3 combination of the plural and relative Feadings is ential to Fm), where the peti of ime throughout which» exit and m,_."my are its proximate matters in ‘otder of appearance “This propos employs the familiar ontology: and again, i 6 not ‘unnatural fo suppose that inthe reference to the compound there i fn impli reference wo tine. The proposal ko saves Aristotle from ontadition. For even though Socrates and Callas have the same ‘matter and form atthe respective times, the compounds can be u- ferent on aeaoant of the times Beng diferent, “The fist eo eeadings can be Ted out on grounds of intrinsic lippausbiy” This Teaves the eviginal constual in terms of Simple ‘Comperition andthe remaining readings in ters of Plural and Rela tive Composition. OF thes, only the thi avouds inconsistency (at leas ander the standard stew) and only the second, the second in sombinaton with the third, avoxs the problem of select and onion. "Ths it might appear fom he evidence reviewed 50 thatthe preferable feagng in terms ofa related version of Plural Composition, However. the exegetical situation is complicated by the fac hat for Arstote, the question of composition cannot te considered in isolation fom his iews on the unifying role of farm. This role is ‘eset with great lity in books 7 and Hf the Mewphysics. Ie. togs'y-10 he writes, “To retumn tothe dificult which as been Stated with respect bath to definitions and to numbers, what the ‘ause of their unity? In the ease ofall things which have several parts and in which the otlty isnot. ast were, a mere heap, but aio Tere hes maa emcee Stace nestor3 it Fine the whole is something hesdes the pats, there i ease” This ease, which he identifies with'a form, isomothing Which makes the pats Into the unity it makes bricks and stones, for example, ino» hose (togt20, [Now there is an intimate somnection etwen unison and om position. This may be roughly deserted by saving thatthe operation ‘t composition must render unification possible: by their jointly fntering ito the compound, in their own distinctive manner, tha the orm i able to make a unity ofthe matter (buts a wayne hope, that fe compatible with Avistl's obscure remarks at 10Gs'7-24) It should be noted that this connection makes al the more smell- sible our earie animadersion against selectivity and confation. I “would e going to far to ist that slo the mater whichis unied should be componental matter, i. that it should directly figure in ‘ny correc account af the compound. Ia the expression “ct, for example. I might be supposed that ll ofthe subexpressions" "ex and at are une by means ofthe Form of justaposition! an sekeitier of 4s and oF anda oee and could Be made the mater of 3 cocrexponding compound. But in sich cscs, mist hs sppaceat how i compounding certain of the mater the sex ets uni and since this ot apparent for things hose mater Wares ‘ver time, ie would seem Yo fellow that allo helt matter wl ener ino the compound Indeed, i a general requirement on any satisfactory account of| companion that i should make cea, oF atleast be compatible with the Unising vole of form. However it hard to see how Relative ‘Compostion, under either the simple or the plural versoa, 50 ‘compatible. The dificult i to wndestand bow thee by which the “Sompesind i indexed stelevant tothe wnifatory process. cannot Inthat me i one of the elements tht i and forthe time tt oF ‘luring which the matter exists nots the requ way 3 part of the resulting unity, Nor ean ibe that unification i elatve tote; for how cam atime, ae such, affect the manner whereby the form makes some given mater into one thing athe than another? “The only reasonable view sems tobe that the proves of wifision isnot many-one, but many-many. The form does not generals make any sven mate into single thing rather i makes ito several Thus the temporal index serves a4 Kind of external devie by which one ofthe resulting plurality of unis i picked out. However i is hard to make sense of such a conception of unis tion, For how ean the form make the matter into something that = ‘ntoloically one ie. a unity, witout thereby making i into some- ‘hing that & numerkally one? Certainly, the analogy of form with A Puzzle Concerning Maner and Form 3s structure (which Aristotle so often uses) is of no help in this regard, Justapoition fo example, makes the letters ‘a and "Tinto the ‘Single Word cat and thee appears to he no reasonable understanding ‘ot how it or an aled operation) could make those letters int several Sch word therefore appears, under the additonal assumption that unica tion shouldbe many~one, thatthe relatized versions of Composition fare no better able than the untlatvized ones to avo the charge of inconsistency. We might also note that. under this assumption the puzzle may he Forrlte! witht bringing in Compositional. Foe Instead of conclding thatthe two compounds ate the same, We ay "ppose that ther common ford must unify their common mater into fe and the same thing ‘We ae thersfore lft ander the standard view, with no consistent interpretation of Aristotle (and with no consistent option forthe neo ‘Arstotlian who accepts the unityng role of form). Moreover. the ontadicton rans deep it depends only upon fundamental asim fons, and thete i no aious way by whic should he removed. ‘Alte same, itmight be though, cven when no attempt s made to remove the contradiction, that the plural reading of Composition i Sllt0 be preferred tothe simple one; for it avoids the problems of Selectivity sn conation; and thereby co-ordinates beter with bat Aisle took to be the unifying roe of form. However, given cur ‘wn previous dlagnoss ofthe catradction, this sao sucka plate linet take, Fort may be srmised that Aristotle was le 0 overho the posits thatthe proximate matter of something could vary over time in meh the same wath he Wis ed to overlook the possi ‘hati coukd migrate. Tt could e conceded that he envisaged the possibly thatthe non-proximate matter ofa ving thing could vary Buti would be claimed! that he was never forced to confront ay specific cases of variation i the proximate matter and that be over Toked the prool that wirtion sn nom-prosnate matter ips ‘ration im proximate matte. (The proa goes 36 follows: take the highest level at which the matter of something varies: then at the ext level up. we wil havea single thing whose proximate matter varies.) ‘We ate therefore left with no reson for prefertng any ofthe oer toe motly one in specs. would ow te umes the same TT sccm mote ikely that Avis peaking of america oneness sil, nothing nthe chapter inate that he ths that mater furattecs the uniguenes ofthe objet whose mater. Met is at length aout snsnuy ax soar ol wait (11536-10167) tnd ments lack of ontinay a8 souee of plurality (HOF7'3-0). So, im saying tat things are numerically one whose mater ove Aine reba means that hinge ect n form are namely Gres tein conswent mater pays & natural Aa COR See ao wren Individuals and Indvidation 6 ‘init. As in Z. 8, mater appears to individuate in the weak seme, Duty not a principe of individuation But if ths Ansto's position. i unsatisfactory. Suppose that a bronze statue of Socrates melted down, and the bronze reworked ‘toa replica ofthe original statue." IFT have characterized Arsttle's| position correctly. the tw states of Sorates, wich sare the same Inuivishe form, willbe numerialy deta, because the matter of the fis penists ss the matter ofthe sccond. Ariston’ theory of not only allows. but apparendy demands, that matter can from one object to another Given the posaality of materia on between jects that share the sme form, and assuming the inividuatve role of matter, tors oat that two abject, hich ‘Aistole would presumably wat t0 distinguish, are numerically one land the sime. How would he addres this objection?” "Arsiotle doesnot directly deal with the problem 35 stated. bathe does adress related sue, concerning non-substatal changes, In Phos. Vsa he considers on what comiions changes re one in gens form, or number He sys thal two changes are one in gens scoring torte scheme of the categories. For example, 2 1comotion is one ia fenus with every other locomotion, but diferent in genus fem an eration. "Two changes are one inform iin addition to being one in-gense, they are also one in indivi form (ijn 0) Foe ample. 4 blckening fers in form from whitening, Det 1 ‘niteings ate the sme in form. noe sient for forma deny {ht the enaponts of the change aze the same, because motion in jiele between two points and motion in a straight fine Between the Sime fwo pony would then count as one inform. To Be one 10 (ostqr 44-7) Chuon neues thse obese A cortsbeed oth Eemiraon of cre it tier rare in ses cone. andy ‘analy re oe oy od we Cake Joined athe se noid a Carona oe fm nome. The rpm !meShetnetais sanly me ne ne Sy ite Evening Sat) me oe in nome, er mate yeti Si ep te sca cen hho and Wo« Mary Louise Git indivisible form, the eatie track (called by Aristotle the & 6) must be the suc To explain onevess in number Anstotle appeals to thre factors, the subject ‘of the change (2). the track (20d. and the time Gia) 227 23-4). Two changes are one in number only if the subject. the tack andthe time ate the same (237!39~32). The solution regres ‘laniication. however (2283-19). Suppose that Socrates recovers from ophthalmia in the morning, suffers relapse at midday, and recivers again in the afternoon. Axe the Iwo recoveries one ih umber? The subjects the same, the tack is the same, an the time {ae forthe recovery i the same, Aristotle dacs not teat ines as Indeted. so he canaot appeal to abot times to distinguish the t40 ‘anges: Time bs simpy the measure a change In Phys. V. 4 he tye {hat at change is qumeceally one if sur in one strech of ime. ‘empl stretch counts as one if he tne i uninerrpted (237°30~1), interruptions being marked by periods of rest (2284-7) Inthe ee lof Socrates two eecoverss, Artotleconsludes that they are muni Cally stint because the time f interpted hetween the two 1 overies the subject undergoes iferent change, which breaks the ontnty of te = ‘Although Arstote doesnot discus substantial generation and es- teuction in PV. 4, he could presumably extend the sctount that ‘chapter to cover the cae of material migration mentioned above. I two statues of Socrates are made oat ofthe same bronze at diferent times. the status ate distinct ecause the time during which the mater constitutes the evo is inteeupted. Inthe interval the bronze survives the destruction of the Hist statue and the generation of the second TT this is Arstou's answer wo the pure about matril migration, ‘hen continuity of matter is ot sufficient evento aesount for weak individuation. Continuity of tine i also require. The passages in Mer. 2.8 and 406 cantot represent Adsiole’s consiered sem on individuation, because his own solution in Phys. V. 4 reveal the inadequacy af hat postion, vl Was Acistoe then committed to foe a the principle of insvidas tion? One immediate objection to this suggestion i the cltim in Met 2:5, which we have already discussed, that Calla and Sovrates ies 2 thse diced Pls. Vn mone el Gl (98: 1-20 Individuals ond Inividuaton 7 fon account of their matter but are the sime in thei invsbe {rowor) form, Callas and Socrates share the. same ‘ndisble form, how can form account for thoi ference? Sill, we should Pethaps ignore ths evidence. since we have seen that matter fais to $ccount even for numerical unity and pluraty. Perhaps Aristotle can ‘do better by appeal to indi ons, ‘Various dowtines of indisidual form have heen attributed to Aisi. Some interpreters think that he sconymted to forms that have been ifferenited Below the species level Resent work on his ‘embryology suggests that to aesount forthe transmission of parental sharacerstics in reprouction, he must differentiate the specs form Int inaividual form” But sich forms, thug indivi the sense that they are immune to futher division fan thus "nds, ate Sill repeatable even they are not la fat repeated. Presumably Arisiotlan reproduction were peeestly successful, the father’s orm ‘would be duplicated in his offspring. On this version ofthe propos Forms not principle of indi ‘A diferent version of the thesis etter sits the slim that form accounts forthe numerical unigueness of a individ, Some intr preters think that your form ahd mine can be exactly alike yet be humeral sine=" These commentators regulary defend ther thesis by appeal 10 passiges nthe Metphysicy in which Arist refers 10 forms ay thie, or this.” These references they Si Fd la 8 mami ees a a mace r es viene w ES Bhar a ace ene Vwon ine i i A ae estes Se en ea rer ere oe scree ere te ei Spices alter aan oererar tabs es SRS ae Se gre sey hs cam, cme thee a Seeds Sica ay SaaS Suh Na ating othr eee re Ie a hac Pct d nsctt ch 25, tape ko OCS SENS6 Mary Louise Gat indicate that he cegatded forms as particular On this view, mater ‘nnot be the indviduating factor, because AVistlle sometimes lenies that matter ee and alow that, at best isa wate inpotntty only. His ase of the expression cee ken 10 indicate that forms ave particular, matter no. Proponents of this vlew of indvidal forms often simply assume tha ssh mics particular, but the assumption remains disputable “There are two general ways to regard the morphology of the expres slon.° "On one interpretation set modelled on such phases fs fads (a eatin man), wih de corresponding 1 dijo, find ton. On the oter interpretation eases Jemonsraiv, and = indicates what the subject Neither interpretation fequies that the pease mean ‘particu, Since the expression tha ladicates the kind Whichever of the two ie, can speaty 4 kind at various levels of ener, the other expression can indicate either a particular that falls under the Kind ora division ofthat wider Kind. For example, the Drase"scetain animal” and the phrase “this animal can each pick Dut a spec typeof animal se well asa particular token. So the Inaning of ie" aot determined hy 48 morphology. ince the ‘meaning of ‘ad sas "particular open to question, Aristotle's {eferenc to forms 3 rt scent reason fo conclude that they fre particulars. He might mean that forms are determinate types fall under as wider determinable Kind, Forms might thas be indvbible but aot particular “The favourite pataze forthe defence of putcuae forms is Met. ‘5. here Aristo sates that different substances have diferent causes nd elements. He sup "The cases and elements of thing i the Same species are different, notin species but because the cause of parila. (oor sal" fannie) is iferent--your mater and form Gnd moving cause and mine—but they are the same universal ‘csount(1o7s'a7-9). Ths pasage provides the best evidence aval ABs ih fA Un ite: so Wig 8 82 a ten tea toara7-8 De An. 3% 1 Se Whi in 984), © oration se cp Za (85. 369-76» Cheri (ee 381-2 sass ps sp Alton (re rea) Deal ise ae Spt ays) gh sas ap 8) MS Fegan ate (SH 1) GH (wy 50) An ener custo gyi Sth a a Paton ae tu Haima (9769-4) A.C yd a8: 8) ee ah lei) rl to a Individuals and Individuation % able that Aristotle was commited to parila forms. Bat i isnot ‘ery good evidence.” Earer in the chapter he claimed that the Soutce (in) of particulars is particular (9 a” eae, saying that, while human being is the source of human being general. Peleus isthe source of Achilles, and your father of you (107120-2). Feathers are soures 2s moving causes. Peleus and your father are inded particulars, just as Ackles and you ste, since the ae pyc ‘objects Inthe later passage, Aristotle does not say that your form “and mine are parcults: he says onl that they. along with Our matter land moving cause ate eiferent (0a). Suppose that you and T ate ‘Shiings Since we share the sme father our moving cause can be tiferent only inthe peculiar sense that soar father yours and my father i mine. IC this hove we must dintingush our moving case, ‘our matter and form should presumably be distinglsied on the same Jvounds. You and I ae the particulars and ou causes and elements Ie indiiduated with eefeence to us. Fat Irom supporting a commit tment to form that are in themselves partic. thik passe appears {0 support a notion of proprietary mater an foem—matter and form Indduated with reference othe objects whose mater and orm they ae. Here physical objects ate treated as te hase particu ‘Sill, lt ue suppose that Aristotle did regard stantial forms &s in themselves particulars. Are they site to be principles of indivi- ‘dation? I form explains an objec’ individuality. we need to know how the form of one object differs from that of another, We are suming that two parteula forms ean be qualtatiely exactly ake Some defenders ofthe thesis will respond thatthe ooms of Calis tnd Socrates differ Because they are realized in diferent parcels of ‘atte But then form isnot ater all he principle of indvaation, Sc the matter, rather thn the form, differentiates the partiulars ‘Alteoatively one might argue tha the spatio-temporal istry of the form determines is distinctness." Again, the form fas to be the source of indvhality. Ara! since, a8 we saw cari, the guestion femains concering the individuation of matter and spatio-temporal locations, sone of these proposae explsns the numerical dhereteness ofthe individuals Alternatively, we could gard the particularity of frm as base. On © My reating ofthe sage sir Leer pt 19¢-) For ern sxe iret that sod para fom soe Medak (99: 596-7) nye boge ss emia (aM 63-2). Fede aos ts lew for sync inition om Set Pree (ony 8-9). who i party inetd ia dsb sons cf Pro shy 7 and Fede sn Paap 0)» Mary Louise Gitt this vow, as on the analogous propa for mater, oe thing can be ‘weakly indvated by another” Bat if we ate to accept tis vie, tre need better evidence for i han the pusage discussed above fom Mort. s and Aristotle’ claims that forms are ose. Furheemore ‘Met. 2.818 not alone in claiming that two objects can share the same Inivible form (isquor dis). At we have seen, Anslole uses the sume phrase in hit treatment of changes in Ph. V4. Soerates! to recoveries from ophthalmi share the same indivisible form. Had [Asie believed thatthe two reaveres are diferentiated by thelr Parca forms, why did he appeal iascad to the discontinuity of ‘The Categorie indicates that, a sme point during his philosophical career, Aristotle regarded pyscal objects—shings like a particular man anda particular horas onologcally basic, He calls them Primary substances ad lam that they are the ultimate subjects on Uthose existence that of everything elke depends. But outide the CCiegorie, when he addceses the problem of substantial change in the Physi, he appears o promote matter to the satus enjoyed th the {Categories by phpial object. As the continuant through substantial ‘Shange, mater isthe base subject. Both the form and the compound inet different ways, depend for ther exitence om it, Rebing 08 this concepion of matter abasic ontologieal subject, Aristo some times appeals to itference of mater t llereniate physical objets find to unity of matter to ently them "But ae we have seen, becuse maller serves as continua in sub ‘santo change, Ht camo succesfully account fr even the numerical ‘entity and ploraity of physical objects If mater ean migrate fom fone objet to another, and ifthe two objects shaee the same ine Uvsible form, they. wil be slenical unless something other than ‘attr accouns for tei diference. Inthe Pie Aristotle diferen tiles the two tems, not by appeal particular forms, but by appeal {othe disci of time. This weatment suggests tht his projet of Indiiation is more a hoc than is commenly believed, involving ‘ifrent exter in ciferent cases. Horses und men ae dferenated by thelr forms, Callas and Socrates by the discontinuity of thelr hatter, and duplicate objects, composed at iflerent times of the Sime miter, bythe discontinuity of ine oR SOG, tes na he te hau tain He 5) Individuals and Individuation ” We may be disappointed by: Arstod's appeal to temporal di ‘oninty to account for vecaletran eaves. Bute sould e serious Troubled by the various passages in which he appeals to mater asthe Source of numerical unty and plurality Not ony wll the propos not work, bu i imps that materi onloogialy basic in Arist’ ‘stem, When he consider the oatlouea primacy of matter in Met sue express serious reservations (1oa9'26- 0), Nevertheless, he “pears tovely om precy that conception in soch passages a6 the ‘One we examined atthe end of Z. 8.1 suggest that the conception of ater in that pasage & notsnomus, but ffl a view whose implications Arstotle explores throughout Met Z." 1 also suggest that iis ew he ultimately rjess. Mer #6 and @ appear to rely ‘ona diferent conception of mater, based on a reasessment ois fole in substantial change. But thit story, and is impheations for Indviduation, must be the topic for anther oscasion. soming) rset 1 sinfrene en Lage aed Bern on Ancient ‘not shi ery of es | Aho Og ‘hone senses a Stn dco Towel thn Pal Comperit ‘The Unity of Composite Substance4 Matter and Form: Unity, Persistence, and Identity DAVID CHARLES | INTRODUCTION In this paper, 1 shall contrast wo ways to interpret the relation be- ‘sven mater and form, potentiality and acral i pats ot Anstotles ‘Meuphysics 2. 11, and_ I shall not argue that ether of these approaches sucessfully cess all he problems raised by Aristotle Iicate dncussion, Nor do I believe that togeter, at Teast in the formulations I shall consider, they exhaust all he relevant exegetical posites. My aim is simply to cxamine the distinctive ways in Ushi they analyse some contrversil texts a problematic ass in {his complex and disputed sre, ‘Aristotle talked of "matter form” and poteniity/acuaity’ in dis using the unity (Goth at atime and over time)! of particular cone [ponte subseances Hence, he must have thought tht tht terminology provided the resources 49 explin, oF atleast give some isi int, the unity of composite swance a a Hime and ite perience (ot ‘ontnuity) as unity overtime, The task ofthe pilnophiel erie is to consider how far he was successful in these projet. But this requires us fist to understand how, in Aritlle's view, talk of matter form or potentaityactualiy® Reiped to achieve these goals. The © Dav Chars 9 "Arte does mot ava ting Decwsen wy ove ide and uty at» tine. Bcog se tay mean ne tg a ele one set Tene, Hower tus of pesence or ne art dace npr 8-7 on Gti hls the a en se) en ‘Att seks to ep he lation between gr: diiron terms of heen anand form igang 3) a he tm fat tncen poten anda Gages. 30-4 1a A al Sect of Aros payment oh poten ata ei abou sn iow tte om fem Pr a* avid Chaves present esay foeuses on the prior task of the interpretation rather than the evaluation of ArStoue’s proposal Consideration of Ariston’ aims allows ust formulate two cond tions of adequacy for an interpretation of is View. Tt should seek sow (A) how matter and form. oF potentiality and etuaity, serve (in ‘Aviso’ view) to account Toe (or perspieuouly describe) the ‘ty of particular compost substances ara me: (8) how matter and form. oF potentiality and actualy, serve (in ‘Ais’ view) to acount for (or perpicuously describ) the tunity of particular composite substances ver sme, tit peste and continuity a 4 unity. 1 shall dseibe (A) as the Unity Requitement, (B) asthe Persistence Reguiement. Arm interpreter might argue that one shoul! im to sauy only one of thee requirement peraps either, But thie ‘would fegute ee to show that Arsttle hill dl not wish to most fe of (A) oF (Bh IL. TWO TYPES OF ANSWER (One attempt to satisy the Unity and Persstnce Requirements runs 28 follows. “Take the nations ofthe Unity of particular composite Sutstance ara tine and over teas base. The hase concept then Just is that of one wed and perssing composite substance (ee Socrates); the unity or persistence of such substances i not farther salable. TH Arsttle adopted this view, maver (potentiality) and form (ectuaity) would best he sen 38 iterconneted atritons dived from the base notion of one untied particular substance. They are what they are in virtue of thei conebution To the ein 3nd per Sistence of that unified composite substance Ths, the mater of hie Juma being 8 defined as that which, togiber wih the appropriate form, pei this untied composite substance: and the form af ts Ia’ beg 8 detne a8 tha which, together with the appropiate mater, ye this unfled composite substance. Ths view offers an fswer tthe question ‘What sit for this mater to have this potentiality? long the following ines ‘Matter and form are one andthe same: they are aspects of one paricolar composite substance. Thus, the mater what poten Sally this human being. while the form is what factually this Mater and Form ” ‘What iis for this mater to have this potentiality & fort toe the ‘ater ofthis particular human being ‘On this account, the unity ofthe particular composite substance is treated as asic, and isnot further explained by the elation between mater and form. More specially (©) the amity ofthe particular composite substance is not iself explained by invoking «elation between matter and form, for hat elation itself adverts to the unity of the particular ompasite substance: and (D) the identity of the elevant maner and form ate themselves fixed by the Meni ofthe one untied substance fom which they are abstracted (what makes this one formone pest of ‘matters contnbution to this one unified substance. 1 one a 1 (C) and (D) the futher claim that the relevant mater and form of a compost substance ae essentially the matte nd form ‘ofthat compenite substance, one arrives at (€) the mater and the form ofa paticular composite substance are ‘only correctly desriable as the matter andthe form of that ‘Smponite substance, and cannot exist sive as The matter or the {orm ofthat composite stance, 11 (E) i accepted, there will be a radical discontinuity between the ‘matir of particular unfed substance and the components into ‘which that Substance it dsslved; the cannot be the same individual (leads naturally to the following view. The proximate matter of a particular human being ii bands. beat, brain, cle One cannot orrey describe what thew are without reference to the particular human being which thoy constitute, namely av fe hands, Beat ct Similary with is form. Further, one cannot specify the non proximate ‘materia components which maie up is bod or Neshwithow treating these in turn as abstractions trom the particular unied eompenite Sutstanee, namely et flesh, ite bloods ete. For one could (and the were present in tis human beng) there would be a new problem fof accountng for the unity oft proximate and nom proximate mater ‘On this view, al the mater components ofa particaae human Beng fare ied necessarily “all the way dow’ to that composite untied Inumam being. They ate all essentially the mater of this compote paruiular man “Thus fa, the discussion as focused on particular substances, ke* David Chaves but of particular composites “taken universly”(1o3s°27=3, 137"5= 4}. Thus, he speaks of man, and not just of ths man, where the former isthe later composite consiered in abstraction from is pat teulasy as his man. There are analogues of (C),(D}, and (E) inthis fase also. Thus, the unity ofthe compete taken universally might be onstrued as base, and its matter and form taken universally under Stood! abstractions from this composite. What makes this type of Form or type of mater the one is would be is contribution to the composite man. If so, one wll the ale to speiy what the form of ‘matter (comidored universally) eseotally ave except a8 the form ot ‘mater of man. If these analogies ean be sustained, not merely could this Resh nt exist save asthe flesh ofthis man, at flesh ic (and fther matter extenialy involsed in man) sould not exist sve a8 the matter of a man. One coud not fly specify what he mater im the Composite taken universally was except asthe matter of & en Ta suitably sinking phrase, all such Avntotlin matter (proximate and nompfoximate alike) would be essentially “pregnant with hhumanity"™-and as such represents a conception which i deeply alien ‘Composite substances (whether particlars or considered eniver: sally) may e compared {on this Mew) wih sentences when under Stood (for example by Frege) as the baie units in Semantic theory Thus, matter and form would be in certain respec, like subject and predicite as Frege defined them: a predicate is that which together fnithasbject sels a sentence while a subject i that which tether Sith & prea ycks sentence. rege thought that apa mistake {ory to explain the unity ofa sentenee by means ofan independently Spoited type of interconnection between subject and predicate (or the relevant interconnection i ise dependent on the unity of the sentence) (C).” What ii to Be a predate i Yo conte to unity ft a sentence in thi way (D). Ostside ofthe contest of sentences, there are no genuine predicates, only “dead” ones (E). What i 00 bea abject or predicate is to play a given rls inv sentence. Finally, what makes predate one predicate ora subject one subject isthe Tole they play im one atomic Sentence. And it would be silat estate some terol hc compel ns an fs fea pe of mater. hae bon fore inthe Teng 80-3 ‘Season wih Aes Bares. Fah are oa Kno 7 sre nt uke lise’ mat al orf ste wana wth 28 other Thea fe move ay cated han he former Master and Form » mistake sscording to this view to try to explain the unity of compo- Site substance by means of an independently speatied type of con rection between matter and form (C), independent conceived (0. Naturally. this view has no difcuty in accommodating the unity or persistence of one composite substance. Indeed, i iakes these phenomena for granted and does not explain them in any way. Ths, i is unclear that can account fr the role of mater ot Form as Arstoclian sarting-points archa Phys, 19e10-13) for the diecton of explanation i proposes rans in the apposite dire tion. In what follows T shall describe this as the: now explanatory theory Thi view is abso radially nom-reductioit. The unity and essential boing of composite substance are no explained ty the unity and eSscntl being oft constituents, Rather, the ater’ unity and esen= {al being ate explained in terms of their contebution to the rele ‘ant unified substance. Thus, nthe cae f the universal composite, [Aritotle would be 20 far removed from the desert indscape of twentct-century materialist reductionism as to revel ia the jungles (Of the vat conception of matter, fom which the philosophers [OF the seventonth cenary srove (ani succes) to dental “The explanatory approach, by contast, sone in which at east one ofthe pate matterdorm (or potentiality stay) f taken to be inde pendent af, nd prior to, the notion of somposite unified subsance "Thus, for example, the type of matter or form (or both) of human being sto be specie independently oftheir being the mater o orm ofthe composite human being, and heir principle of combination be Sted without reference to their eng elements unifed coniposite Substanee An explanatory aecount may take some identity can fr ranted (e.g coneeening the entity of form), prowied that this id ‘ot presuppose the enti of & ued composite substance. Sach an {account vl esd to show how matter and form hs specie are felated sas To constitute and maintain a type of unied compo ‘ite substance. Siar, atthe level of pariula substances (ike Socrates), an explanatory approach will aim to show what makes tis fe particular united composite (eg) by reference tt given type of form, or 4 particular form, being enmattered in parcuae quan tives of matter Once again, the identy of (eg) particular qua tities of mater or particular form. may be presupposed provided ‘thatthe identity ef dis compte substance (oamely Socrates) not, scene. loments of explanatory and non-expanatory vews ae tobe found% David Chartes ina variety of intuentiat contemporary interpretations of Arsotle's ‘Sccount of composite sibstances" While, the final analyst two fpproaches nee heroes and heroines, we should proceed eatiusly before lining up partes to this dispute. The issues ate not always sufiieny clearly defined for worthwtile progres fo be sae sky by challenging the views ofa named author For they too my lack 8 clear perspective on what isa ssue- Nor the controversy il a Single one» Adoption ofan explanatory approach atthe level of pet substance (eg. man, “taken universally) is consistent with aking 2 non-explanatory standpoint view ofthe matte or the fem of par cular substances such a Socrates, Conversely. adopting an expla tory viewpoint concerning particule compost substances i content with thinking that atthe level of «pes of substance there can be no Aefnton of what the form of a human is without reference to the ‘ompenite human being it enforms Z Inthe next sections fshll consider some of the relevant text in Met. 2. 17, 1. 2-3, 6, and 6. 6-9, and suggest that they provide Some evidence that Arstole was proposing anexplantory account of the unity ofboth particular and types of composite substances, I shll ‘also claim that i these chapters. Aristotle formolating the istes concerning unity in ways which are inuenced by his decusion of Sefton, unity, and explanation in the Postenor Amaltier, and that this sin set philosophically spnificant. But both theses are presented in this essay ah conjectures for further sty rather than ts hei 0 be secured here by conclusive argument, ihc ang te than she mums te oe ey hat se, Ber ect sents in cee iy cei igo, Boe a iy 8 Hc ei Die pages inthe works gga some erent scout Es oh eter ane ea ner aa {Titan omer examples rected by Frank Lewin dctng the preps spocehtedeenestictt el lara ‘fins traps samc tro ater and tr its wert Mauer and Form UL THE EXPLANATORY MODEL OF THE ANALYTICS INTRODUCED AND REFINED In the Posterior Anau, Aristotle ries thatthe search for esen 1a properties be conducted in the Tolowing (canomial) way At Some stg the inquirer knows that (in the ese of shader) noisethunderbeloags to the clouds sand so knows that thunder exists At this tae she has preliinary {or incomplete) account of thunder wbich may pick oot 8 necessary but not yer an essential feature of thunder” To find the fatter she need to find a cause which makes tthe case that rnoisethunder belongs to the clouds, The cause, in question, mast be both necessary and sufficient for {thunder fo occu (i. for a given typeof noise to occur inthe clouds. For if ts not so, she has ot found the ease of ecurrence a ‘hander but qua thunder of «given type Fuster, the relevant case ‘most Bring i out that noise thund belongs to the lows by a recognizable form of necessating connaction (e.g, elficient ‘iusation. teleological nevesstation, material. groundsdnes) which wil be asymomenias Ths, eis because fiefs enced that nosethunder belongs tothe clouds, ue eon coe dono a oe may Ao thi ie oc tec leave ofen the possibility of one's possessing defnitions of what "hander mest. se King it dre hs rf, Ree Be or ths mode of argument sz nF, 35-8, oso". ‘hee aie af nt Mara ‘heh oeceay”(nrat-2) and snot contned te mateal Sse, In ee Anais Arata tay onsets one stent tse 9 -, {905° not clear comet whi ora ise sen ace ce fee laren hg i Ton& David Charles Where the effet canse explain the relevant asymimeey Further, the baste cause, constitutive of thunder, one about which no Further {question can Be asked of the foe why does aosethunder Belong to quenching of fie’? [At this point she has reached explanatory bedrock. This isan ins ‘mediate proposition. and no farther mile erm can be introdued explain the somection between thunder and qucaching of fire The felevant noise fs cise (fteenty by fie Beng quenched—without ny farther intermediate (efficient cabal connection. Te hase cause should explin all the other necessary features of thunder” This serves to underte the unity of thunder: al is nec {ssry properties are explained fy oe eicent cause." Tf this were hots thunder would not be one wie Kind. The unity of thunder ‘Spends on the uniy of is eause. At the bass of the. Anais Sccount thre is fr every genuine kind some simple featore which the cause of ts other necessary properties. Thus, the unity of thunder Sh kind depends onthe unity of this basic feature Inthe mules Arsole suggests that He wil apply thi mode suteanccs ae wll ay sistance and thet properties (An. Pos. 13), bu fs to dso in a sjtemaic way” My exegetical supa tion is this in Mevgpsses 2-17. Hand pars of @, Avisos Is nitempting to do presiey what he a filet do in the Analcs, find indates that he vil do ia Met Z. 17. 10gt23~20- apply iis explanatory model to the ce of composte substances. In this sage, he compares his Anafyes question about thunder ‘wy does noise Heong to the clouds? iter Gooner ike "oad wich a I artnet er whole fie’, esther of the terms need te immediares. a sy Soe one aia wea Ss oi ype haa gna aan men Seg rrr See aa on itd tn sas Tee hee oa Mater and Form % with why are thes (e.g bricks and stones) house? (104127. 6-7). and notes that one should search in both cases forthe cause (in one {he efficient. inthe other the teleolopcal). My proposals that we Should fake this comparison asa guiding thread to Tea us through the rave of the remainder of 21) 1nd pats of ©. “Ansole's answer to his own question about houses in 2.17 eh uninformative: he writes that these bricks and stones age a howse fpcase what i tbe a ose belongs to then” (1ngt"=7)- Du docs not expand on how this to be understood. Equally his con menteon the general form ofthe quewton a es than fully sasting ‘While he formulates the question as ‘why isthe mater some dine thing? (1041°7-8), he does not indicate how howselsome definite sing is 0 be under Stood. But (atleast) i seems clea that house and what i is 0 be 4 house must be distinc, and this suggests that while the answer refers {0 the form alone (1048). “house the question refers to something tke" for example the componte, However, in Z. 17 Afstote proceeding at a highly stat level, and these details ate nt speed nf, > Aritote introduces diferente to distinguish mater in terms of composition, position, tme. el (Iog2>Ht= 10433) fa the ‘ise of uss, the relevant illerenia is atranged thus (10g3"7-8), lthoueh the inal cause might he sade (Lo439). which in this case into be a covering for possessons and bodes (1033416-18, 32-3) From these materials We cn formulate the bass for 3 fll etniton of house: Ihowse = planks and stones areanged thus for sake of covering pstessone and bodes (1033-3) Some of the diferentine ar causally more basic, the cause of each thing being what (rag T~3). Ia this case the Hal ease explains snhy the stones and planks ae areanged ina given way. and why being 'posewions-coverer constitutes the form (1o43'33). 80, ome ca fandestand the 2-17 question more precisely 3+ why age these stones and planks @ house, (or better) arranged tu hich sto be answered by 1 daca tee pages farther eben ee (Ch 3 21) ume that Ho orm re Sate fas et in he sameway st adm cn APs TV Ge 9989-48 David Charter because they are so arranged in onder to protect possessions i. fo tea howe. In this case, the basic explanatory feature is the teleological cause, and this fs what makes it the case that this collection of planks i 4 howe, i.e. aranged in A certain way. The ease fe nesessry and Sutiint fr this eiag So, and this connection inher the aeymoetry ofthe teleological cause Further, the preseace ofthis goal (Sing Dossesions-provetor) i what expains the otber necessary features Of hoa: for eximple, hy it needs «rot in most lates). why | ‘made of wood rather than feather, ete. As the essence this plays the Unifying role of explaining the preseace ofthe ether necessary Tetutes lott house, The flevantimmedite proposition boing arranged thus belongs to all belongings protectors cexprescs the immediate teleological lim that this arrangement as {eis in order to protect belongings. No farther teleological claim equred to explain the connection between being aranged this and being a protector of belongings and bodes, and a0 further middle teem is alae ‘What isthe analogous question in the case of human beings? It sppetrein 2-17 88 ‘why is this body ith this feature a man? (1041°6=7), ‘which might be formulae in the Analyte se as ‘why does man belong toa body with this estar? In 2. 17 Aristotle does not comment farther on how man i 0 be lundersto in the question, oe how the answer f 0 he repented Presumably the later shoul efor to what iio be a moe ay in the parti eate of what i isto be a house (rage), but there Ws m0 Indication in Z. 7 of how this phrase is to be understood In 12 ‘he remains reient about which iferentia of matter marks out man (Gr Toot! 1a4°31), and does not spell oot which feature of mas Stape (moyphe) or activity (energela) i 1 play the role of arranged tha inthe house syllogism. The most promising cuidate being ‘worfoted i the shape is 10 be specied (1031, 104520). But ‘Anttle not expt about this, and is once again proceeding at ‘ery absrat level (14i"16fE). Hie clearer of the speciation of Iokar iis 0 e ama. Thi unequivocally dented with soul of sven Kind (104324), which provides answer 0 the Z_17 question ‘why is this boy ith this feature a man? and its #2 rephrased version ‘Mater and Form a The answer tothe fst question would be tha (the compete) man belongs to the body because the composite fs is BoCHse Ht has soul of given Kind, which in turn belongs t0 this Body. Ifthe ‘question is rephrased, the answer would be that eing biped Belongs {0 this body because being a biped is required if we are to have the felevant type of soul, which Betongs to ths body. Being biped i necessary Tor the proper tuetioning and survival f the human soul (On this construal, the distinctive type of sul serves a the teleological tase (marke out by the middle Teen) which explains why the Boy has given properties, he terse log met he conse log the follow ingines Being biped belongs to sul of given kind Soul of given kind belongs to od of wpe S Being a biped belongs to body oF type 8. The fst premis expresses the teleolgieal lam If there sa sou of this type there must be bipedality” There sno further explanation of why the human soul requtes this feature, and we have reached explanatory bedrock. But what of the second promis? In M2 ‘Astote notes tha in the ease of house, the corresponding proposition express form-matter predation ("cing pomsion-coveret De- longs 10 these bricks), where bvicks are the matter withthe relevant Poteaiaty (1aq3'hs- i), Similarly. inthe ease of the manson, {he minor premss would express a form-matter connection” Bat i is-only in i. 6 that Aristotle seeks to spedly the nature of these omections more precisely (ee new! section. ‘On this conception. the unity of composite substance depends on there being one basic feature (speced asthe middle term of the relevant slog eg, soul of 8 given kind) ‘whish belongs im ‘mediately 2 the relevant matter (minor prem). This feature should have te following properties {o} i should be inked immediately tothe relevant matter in such & ‘way ato explain why the matter fee [b1 it shout explain why the matter i posesed of other non asic, bt necessary, proportes (eg being a bined) lel the base featre will coasttute the essence of the composite substances (woe (2) fi bing cnc od the clogs bat Menpymes Ba he Sige that cs ke es (ebay btn to ese mp Be eared% avid Charles [d) its unity (s one feature) should be hase or self-evident." In the Metaphyser the relevant structure of explanation i ekolo- sical unlike inthe Anat, where efficient causation predominates Frrteritineodaces new notions to carry through the project: matter in form, potentiality and actuality The form isthe tleologelly isc feature, and ths explains why the mae ia is (in the com poste substance) and why it possesses non basi, bu teleological ‘equred, properties” The relevant feature i required in both the remiss ofthe man-syllogion, and both are imme propositisns, “Ths account ivan explanatory ne i 190 respects 4 the unity of the composite substance is explained by the ree fon hetwsen mater and form (iy the entity of the form as the basi teleologeal cause is de {ermined without feference 10 the eiy of the composite sateance “The matters present and is ais for the sake of this form. The form {sas itis beeaue itis the teleological base feature which explains the presence and nature of the matter. The ide ofthe form spatially Fred by is tclelogal sole independently of the identity of the Composite substance which st enforms. In ths account. Arsotl’s ‘formation in the carly chapters of 1 of the explanatory questions {his in 217 taken as evidence that hes following the explanatory fpproach to the problem of unity. IF he ad been an advocate of 2 nomenplanatory approach, these chapters would have been an un hecesnty excupion, He should other have argued directly that the {fuestions raised in. 17 were misleading or mistaken, However, is te as fea (oom) appa oe imple (Me, sig scart Soe er Th ne epi ‘Eis sn amore ie sen in tte es dn nich cman or tn ao 0 hey ei oe tea a nals ghen ad Aten oe “ity of types of detons saab the Anais makes two aarp tt Se a tet en vane Et tena nin eas Si) Site io Mal eae san Mel Prints wane ete tac sts sw tw fm 2 Toot. Mt gay rater oe ugh a Re eat a tt ott STC fo Wah ets of ain, nde er ay al pe gest msc os as Sea Say ela an Mater and Form a attempts to articulate them ina way which makes them more realy fnswetablesogget that he developing a version ofthe explanatory IV, TWO APPROACHES TO 11.6 “The explanatory account fice dels inthe interpretation f 1.6 sind pats of 8. At very feast Teads 0 a radially diferent constr ff these chapters than the one favoured by the now-explanatory Tn Il 6 Aristotle takes up directly some of the isues adressed in zor such as what makes a composite ome sing and nota heap? and ens the chapter, i appears, by aiming itis similar to seek for the cause of ome thing boing something fn it ing one thing (104520) ‘But the content of the chapter ill is elusive, Thus in toys" ‘Asote writes ‘t-as we say—one [eg animal i mater and he other shape fg being {bore and the one potently, the eter atl. what ough mould zo fnger su fo bea por (poem). oe the poem woud be the Save tre ithe dentin of slosh were rounded bronze” or ths tame Sout tes sem or ss dfeton In thicase wht sought the ease The trons and hc nunded hog one Bot the posi ts gone avy trause ones the mathe ce te shape Wit the use ot hat pov F emg stay Fin the ene of thingy that come to be—apar fom mh ates, feat ne? For noth ote the cae of sth Je pooniy 2 spee Being scaly apres but Ts [bel the ‘ane et 0 Be orc of hem gh (On the non-expanatory interpretation, be is proposing that if one represents “twefooted animal in the foie attenshane potent actuating 1 fut explanation of ther unity i required. No genuine problem | {ans one hae reached explanatory Bedrock. Nothing mow ean be 2 onic hin as ee hua eto i te fecal gre ay acl pve [sme thee Peg 2 wed {Gisele soil ete one of ch aces ad pte = sltunons eed by shar sonst fo # wd bance8 David Chares ssid to explain the unity of «composite substance, precisely be- “ute these notions are abstractions Hom that of unied eomposte Substance, ‘According 10 the explanatory interpctation, by contrast, Aristotle is sogzestng that i one views the problem of unity his wy st 810 Tonger insuperable (an apora), because one can see ow to rs it ‘The question i sow in am answerable form, so that one can proceed to disover what sought what makes It the case that portal ‘cual ate pated in sch 2 way a8 form a composite unity. To tis the anower iy Because they have the sume estence. The essence in {gestion isthe setualty or shape, and this fixes both is owa nature {hur toe that actuality) and tt ofthe matter which exists for the sake of that actuality. The matter, or pote, 1s What IIs becuse tis the mater for this form or actual The ial ines ofthe chapter (043"17—24) ate also subject to these config ines of interpretation. They run as follows: uta hs be sake final miter andthe shape ae the same and one thon porly te oer teal [nega date), 0 that tis sna 1 investi ‘Sst the cue of one thing ein F at the case of ing one or each inden thing meting, ad what epoca and wt {Stly cone nome Sense Teretoe here nother ene fot Beng ‘Setbeng Fexep at which bigs south there somehing wich ‘moves rom pent Yo ata (On the one hand, it scems that the explanatory question raised in snyshu8=20 i am important and sensible one: what the enuse of Unity? However, the final sentence clearly says that there i 20 other ‘ause ofthe unity of wha s potently F and what & actualy F apart from the effet case. Abd this might reasonably be taken to mean that if one removes the effeent caus, there Is no cause of ui 3t ll the unity of the composite substance is taken as basic (a in the nonexplanator interpretation) However, if the final sentence is fterpreted ia the ltr way. it contradicts the eae passage (Logs) a which Aristotle appears fo make the far more evtiows aim that there sno eause of what potently F being actually F excep this: namely the one essence of oth: For this requires that there is cause ofthe relevant nity ofthe ‘Sompanite substance—the presence of form, whose natures fxed by the relevant goal, which determines the ature ofthe mater. The fal sentences of. wold be eonssten wih this euler passage (thus understood) if hey mere taken to mean that there is no cause of Mater and Form % suiy of substance distinct from the relevant setuality and potentiality ‘cise tse encaplae al the caval Teataresfequited to explain ‘he unity ofthe compte substance. And this would be to understand them in ine with the explanatory approach “This i 4 posible route to resolve the exegetical dilemma in 1.6 But it 4 plausible onc? The argument in 0421-3 bs Very com pressed, but appears to run as follows, 4. Each thing i one thing (hen) ofa given kind (1) The matter the hing in potenti, the form i the ting in staal 1.23. Tr is similar to sek the cause of one thing being something and it being one thing 443 follows fom 1 and 2 since one thing is something because ‘hatter an form ae joined as potentiality an aetaity- But fwhen matter ad form are Joibed in this way there i one thing present But ow to understand P. 2? Tn what way i the form the thing in ‘walt? On one view, this would mean that the form isthe com Penite substance seen avant acualiy. andthe matter i the composite stance sean a potenti. On this understanding the notion of ‘me composite substance woud he assumed as base (a5 inthe non txplanatory approach) By contrast. cconding to the explanatory interpretation, P. 2 weld ca tht the form he dh onactuaiy teeatse the thing fe. man) 8 wlntied (in sinet use of 1. 2, Togs7-3) with the for (a he mani setualty)- On this Wiew, the ‘etal taken as faci and the matter & undetsood as potentially ‘hit actuality, where the latter is teatiied withthe thing self (i.e the man) taken strty."° Buti he matter is potentially the actuality ite the natural question wat ef forthe matter tobe potentially this scaly? And that topic would he raised ia 6, BUC not Te {shed unt the following ook ‘Several considerations appear to favour the explanatory interpre- tation of 6 although none is dace. Fist (as already mention), the question cased in rayei8-30 appear to be genie ones. Indced "wat the cause ofthe unity of the composite” the very question sthich Avisttle Rad set himself in Z. 17 and H. 2-3. Second, thete Tothing to suggest that the Theorists, whose Views ae discussed in = The in iti hs poi determine whether te hie en wing aed whe om rn the compoupd (e'-9) Ne sae