TRANSPORTATION LAW (HOJILLA)
G.R. No. L-8095; March 31, 1915 involving any "unnecessary or unreasonable preference or advantage to any particular
F.C. FISHER, plaintiff vs. YANGCO STEAMSHIP COMPANY, J.S. STANLEY, as
Acting Collector of Customs of the Philippine Islands, IGNACIO VILLAMOR,
as Attorney-General of the Philippine Islands, and W.H. BISHOP, as
prosecuting attorney of the city of Manila, respondents.
CARSON, J.:
FACTS:
F.C. Fisher is a stockholder in the Yangco Steamship Company, which owns a large number of
steam vessels, engaged in coastwise trade. In 1912, the directors of the company adopted a
resolution "expressly declaring and providing that the classes of merchandise to be carried by
the company in its business as a common carrier do not include dynamite, powder or other
explosives, and expressly prohibiting the officers… from offering to carry...”
Acting Collector of Customs J.S. Stanley demanded and required of the company the
acceptance and carriage of such explosives, the refusal and suspension of the issuance of the
necessary clearance documents of the vessels of the company unless and until the company
consents to accept such explosives for carriage and that should the company decline to
accept, Attorney-General Ignacio Villamor and the prosecuting attorney W.H. Bishop intend
to institute proceedings under the penal provisions of sections 4, 5, and 6 of Act No. 98 of the
Philippine Commission against the company to enforce the requirements.
Yangco contends that they cannot subject themselves to "the ruinous consequences which
would inevitably result" from failure on their part to obey the demands and requirements,
that the Acting Collector of Customs erroneously construes the provisions of Act No. 98, and
that if the Act does in fact require the company to carry such explosives it is to that extent
unconstitutional and void.
Petitioner prays for the issuance of a writ of prohibition. Respondents demurred and the
Court is of the opinion that the complaint does not set forth facts sufficient to constitute a
cause of action.
ISSUES:
Whether a common carrier in the Philippine Islands may decline to accept for carriage any
shipment of merchandise of a class which it expressly or impliedly declines to accept from all
shippers alike, because "the duty of a common carrier to carry for all who offer arises from
the public profession he has made, and limited by it.” YES
HELD:
YES. The provision of the Act which prescribes that, "No common carrier ... shall, under any
pretense whatsoever, fail or refuse to receive for carriage ... to carry any person or property
offering for carriage," is not to be construed in its literal sense and without regard to the
context, so as to impose an imperative duty on all common carriers to accept for carriage,
and to carry all and any kind of freight which may be offered for carriage without regard to
the facilities which they may have at their disposal. Read in connection with its context this,
as well as all the other mandatory and prohibitory provisions of the statute, was clearly
intended merely to forbid failures or refusals to receive persons or property for carriage
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person, company, firm, corporation, or locality, or any particular kind of traffic in any respect
whatsoever," or which would "subject any particular person, company, firm, corporation or
locality, or any particular kind of traffic to any undue or unreasonable prejudice or
discrimination whatsoever."
A carrier may limit his business to the branches thereof that suit his convenience. The only
limitation upon his action that it is competent for the governing authority to impose is to
require him to treat all alike. His limitations must apply to all, and they must be established
limitations. Mere whim or prejudice will not suffice. The grounds for the discrimination must
be substantial ones, such as will justify the courts in holding the discrimination to have been
reasonable and necessary under all circumstances of the case.
As we construe the Philippine statute, the mere fact that violent and destructive explosions
can be obtained by the use of dynamite under certain conditions would not be sufficient in
itself to justify the refusal of a vessel, duly licensed as a common carrier of merchandise, to
accept it for carriage, if it can be proven that in the condition in which it is offered for
carriage there is no real danger to the carrier, nor reasonable ground to fear that his vessel
or those on board his vessel will be exposed to unnecessary and unreasonable risk in
transporting it, having in mind the nature of his business as a common carrier engaged in the
coastwise trade in the Philippine Islands, and his duty as a servant of the public engaged in a
public employment.
The duties and liabilities of common carriers in this jurisdiction are defined and fully set forth
in Act No. 98 of the Philippine Commission, and until and unless that statute be declared
invalid or unconstitutional, we are bound by its provisions.
The nature of the business of a common carrier as a public employment is such that it is
clearly within the power of the state to impose such just and reasonable regulations thereon
in the interest of the public as the legislator may deem proper. Common carriers exercise a
sort of public office, and have duties to perform in which the public is interested. Their
business is, therefore, affected with a public interest, and is subject of public regulation.
There are no allegations in the complaint that for some special and sufficient reasons all or
indeed any of the company's vessels are unsuitable for the business of transporting
explosives. The prayer of the petition in the case at bar cannot be granted unless we hold
that the refusal of the defendant steamship company to accept for carriage on any of its
vessels "dynamite, gunpowder or other explosives" would in no instance involve a violation
of the provisions of this statute. The only question to be determined therefore is whether
such prejudice or discrimination might in any case prove to be undue, unnecessary or
unreasonable. This of course is, in each case, a question of fact, and we are of the opinion
that the facts alleged in the complaint are not sufficient to sustain a finding in favor of the
contentions of the petitioner. It is not alleged in the complaint that "dynamite, gunpowder
and other explosives" can in no event be transported with reasonable safety on board steam
vessels engaged in the business of common carriers.
TRANSPORTATION LAW (HOJILLA)
TRANS-ASIA SHIPPING LINES INC. vs CA
Davide; 1996
FACTS:
Atty. Renato Arroyo, a public attorney, bought a ticket from Trans-Asia Shipping Lines Inc., a
corporation engaged in inter-island shipping, for the voyage of M/V Asia Thailand vessel to
CDO from Cebu City. At 5:30 pm on 12 November 1991, Arroyo boarded the vessel and
noticed that some repair works were being undertaken on the engine.
At about 11 pm, the vessel departed with only one engine running. After an hour of slow
voyage, the vessel stopped near Kawit Island and dropped its anchor. After an hour of
stillness, some passengers demanded they should be allowed to return to Cebu for they were
no longer willing to continue their voyage to CDO. Captain acceded to their request. Vessel
headed back to Cebu. At Cebu, Arroyo, together with other passengers who requested to be
brought back were allowed to disembark. Thereafter, the vessel proceeded to CDO. The next
day, Arroyo boarded M/V Asia Japan for its voyage to CDO, likewise a vessel of Trans-Asia.
On account of the failure of Trans-Asia to transport him on November 12, Arroyo filed before
the trial court a complaint for damages against Trans-Asia. RTC ruled that the action was only
for breach of contract. It dismissed the case, as it did not appear from evidence that Arroyo
was left in the Port of Cebu because of the fault, negligence, malice or wanton attitude of the
Trans-Asia’s employees. CA reversed. It awarded moral and exemplary damages.
ISSUE:
Whether a common carrier is liable for damages to a passenger who disembarked from the
vessel upon its return to the port of origin after it suffered engine trouble and had to stop at
sea, having commenced the contracted voyage on one engine. YES
HELD:
YES. There was a contract of common carriage. The applicable laws are the Civil Code, while
for all other matters not regulated thereby, the Code of Commerce and special laws.
Pursuant to Article 1733, TransAsia was bound to observe EOD in ensuring the safety of
Arroyo, and was bound to carry Arroyo “safely as far as human care and foresight could
provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons with due regard for all the
circumstances.”
TransAsia allowed the vessel to leave on only one functioning engine instead of two. Even
the lone functioning engine is not in perfect condition. This caused the vessel to stop and
remain drift at sea. For a vessel to be seaworthy, it must be adequately equipped for the
voyage and manned with a sufficient number of competent officers and crew.
Arroyo claims actual/compensatory, moral and exemplary damages. Article 1169 is not
applicable in this case because there was in fact no delay in the commencement of the
voyage. As to the rights and duties of the parties strictly arising out of such kind of delay, the
CC is silent but Article 698 of the Code of Commerce provides for such a situation. “In case a
voyage already begun should be interrupted, the passengers shall be obliged to pay the fare
in proportion to the distance covered, without right to recover for losses and damages if the
interruption is due to fortuitous event, but with a right to indemnity if the interruption
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should have been cause by the captain exclusively. If the interruption should have been
caused by the disability of the vessel and a passenger should agree to await the repairs, he
may not be required to pay an increased price of passage, bit his living expenses during the
stay shall be for his own account.”
Article 698 thus should be read together w/ Articles 2199, 2201, 2200, and 2208 in relation
to Article 21 of the CC. So read, it means petitioner is liable for any pecuniary loss/loss of
profits which Arroyo may have suffered by reason thereof. Such would be the loss of income
if unable to report to his office on the day he was supposed to arrive were it not for the
delay. THIS HOWEVER ASSUMES THAT HE STAYED ON THE VESSEL AND WAS WITH IT WHEN
IT RESUMED ITS VOYAGE. BUT HE DID NOT. As he resolved not to complete the voyage, the
vessel had to return to the port of origin and allow them to disembark. Arroyo took another
vessel the ff day, using the same ticket. Any delay then in Arroyo’s arrival at the port of
destination was caused by his decision to disembark. Actual damages must be proved, which
Arroyo failed to do. SC agrees with CA re: award for moral, exemplary damages.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. LORENZO SHIPPING CORP., DANGWA
TRANSPORTATION CO., INC. and THEODORE LARDIZABAL y
MALECDAN, petitioners vs. CA, INOCENCIA CUDIAMAT, et al., all Heirs of
the late Pedrito Cudiamat represented by Inocencia, respondents
REGALADO
FACTS:
In 1985, while Theodore Lardizabal was driving a passenger bus belonging to Dangwa
Transportation Co., Inc. at Benguet, it ran over its passenger, Pedrito Cudiamat. However,
instead of bringing Pedrito immediately to the nearest hospital, the said driver, in utter bad
faith and without regard to the welfare of the victim, first brought his other passengers and
cargo to their respective destinations before bringing said victim to the Lepanto Hospital
where he expired.
The private respondents, heirs of Pedrito, brought this action for recovery of damages.
Dangwa alleged that they had observed extraordinary diligence required in the operation of
the transportation company and the supervision of the employees, even as they add that
they are not absolute insurers of the safety of the public at large. Further, it was alleged that
it was the victim's own carelessness and negligence which gave rise to the subject incident.
The trial court ruled in favor of Dangwa, holding that Pedrito was negligent in trying to board
a moving vehicle, especially with one of his hands holding an umbrella as he was about to
close it after a drizzle, and, without having given the driver or the conductor any indication
that he wishes to board the bus. CA reversed.
ISSUE:
Whether Dangwa is negligent and liable for damages claimed. YES
HELD:
YES. The contention that the driver and the conductor had no knowledge that the victim
would ride on the bus, since the latter had supposedly not manifested his intention to board
the same, does not merit consideration. When the bus is not in motion, there is no necessity
TRANSPORTATION LAW (HOJILLA)
for a person who wants to ride the same to signal his intention to board. A public utility bus,
once it stops, is in effect making a continuous offer to bus riders. It is the duty of common
carriers to stop their conveyances a reasonable length of time in order to afford passengers
an opportunity to board and enter. The premature acceleration of the bus in this case was a
breach of such duty.
Further, even assuming that the bus was moving, the act of the victim in boarding the same
cannot be considered negligent under the circumstances. It is not negligence per se, or as a
matter of law, for one to attempt to board a train or streetcar which is moving slowly. It is a
matter of common practice. The victim, by stepping and standing on the platform of the bus,
is already considered a passenger and is entitled to all the rights and protection pertaining to
such a contractual relation.
It has also been repeatedly held that in an action based on a contract of carriage, the court
need not make an express finding of fault or negligence on the part of the carrier. By the
contract of carriage, the carrier assumes the express obligation to transport the passenger to
his destination safely and to observe extraordinary diligence with a due regard for all the
circumstances, and any injury that might be suffered by the passenger is right away
attributable to the fault or negligence of the carrier. This is an exception to the general rule
that negligence must be proved, and it is therefore incumbent upon the carrier to prove that
it has exercised EOD as prescribed in Articles 1733 and 1755 of the Civil Code.
Moreover, the circumstances under which the driver and the conductor failed to bring the
gravely injured victim immediately to the hospital for medical treatment is a patent and
incontrovertible proof of their negligence.
G.R. No. L-20761
LA MALLORCA vs CA
Barrera
FACTS:
In 1953, at noontime, Mariano Beltran together with his wife and their minor daughters
(Milagros – 13 y.o., Raquel – 4.5 y.o., Fe – 2 y.o.) boarded Pambusco Bus No. 352, owned and
operated by La Mallorca at San Fernando, Pampanga. It was bound for Anao. The Beltran
family was carrying 4 pcs. of baggage. The conductor of the bus issued three tickets to the
Beltrans covering full fares. No fare was charged on Raquel and Fe since both are below the
height at which fare is charged. The conductor is the half-brother of Mariano.
After about an hour's trip, the bus reached Anao and stopped to allow passengers to get off.
Mariano led his family to a shaded spot which was 4 or 5 meters away from the bus. He
returned to the bus to get his other bayong. He was followed by Raquel but Mariano did not
notice that her daughter followed him. While Mariano was on the running board of the bus,
the bus suddenly started moving forward. The bus motor was not shut off while unloading.
Mariano immediately jumped without getting his bayong from the conductor. He landed on
the side of the road almost in front of the shaded place where he left his wife and children.
He saw people gathering around the body of his child Raquel who was run over by the bus.
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Mariano sought to recover P16,000 to cover moral and actual damages. RTC found La
Mallorca liable for breach of contract of carriage. CA held that there could not be a breach of
contract because when the child met her death, she was no longer a passenger of the bus
but it found La Mallorca guilty of quasi-delict under Art. 2180 of the NCC.
ISSUE:
Whether La Mallorca is liable for damages for the death of Raquel. YES
HELD:
YES. Although the Beltrans had alighted from the bus at a place designated for disembarking
or unloading passengers, the relation of passenger and carrier between the parties remains
subsisting when the father had to return to the bus to get his bayong. As a rule, the relation
of carrier and passenger does not cease at the moment the passenger alights from the
carrier's vehicle at a place selected by the carrier at the point of destination, but continues
until the passenger has had a reasonable time or reasonable opportunity to leave the
carrier's premises.
Under the circumstances, the carrier did not exercise the "utmost diligence" of a "very
cautious person" required by Art. 1755 of the NCC. The passengers near the bus are still
considered as passengers of the carrier.
Even if the contract of carriage has already terminated, La Mallorca can still be held liable for
the negligence of its driver pursuant to Art. 2180 (7) of thd NCC. La Mallorca should pay
P3,000 for the death of Raquel and P400 as actual damages.
G.R. No. 84458; November 6, 1989
ABOITIZ SHIPPING CORPORATION, petitioner vs. CA, LUCILA, SPS.
ANTONIO and GORGONIA VIANA, and PIONEER STEVEDORING
CORPORATION, respondents
FACTS:
In 1975, Anacleto Viana boarded the vessel M/V Antonia, owned by Aboitiz, at the port at
San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, bound for Manila for P23.10. Said vessel arrived at Pier 4,
North Harbor, Manila, and the passengers disembarked. A gangplank was provided
connecting the side of the vessel to the pier. After said vessel had landed, the Pioneer
Stevedoring Corporation took over the exclusive control of the cargoes loaded on said vessel
pursuant to the MOA between it and Aboitiz. Anacleto who had already disembarked,
remembered that some of his cargoes were still loaded in the vessel. He then went back, and
it was while he was pointing to the crew the place where his cargoes were loaded that the
crane hit him, pinning him between the side of the vessel and the crane. He was thereafter
brought to the hospital where he later expired 3 days thereafter due to traumatic fracture of
the pubic bone lacerating the urinary bladder.
For his hospitalization, burial, etc., Anacleto's wife spent P9,800. Anacleto who was only 40
years old when he met said fateful accident was in good health. His average annual income
as a farmer or a farm supervisor was 400 cavans of palay annually. His parents, Antonio and
Gorgonia Viana, prior to his death had been recipient of 20 cavans of palay as support or
TRANSPORTATION LAW (HOJILLA)
P120 monthly. Because of Anacleto's death, they suffered mental anguish and extreme worry
or moral damages.
The Vianas filed a complaint for damages against Aboitiz for breach of contract of carriage.
Aboitiz denied responsibility saying that Pioneer as the exclusive stevedoring contractor was
the one completely under control at the time of the accident and that the crane operator
was not an employee of Aboitiz hence Aboitiz cannot be liable under the fellow-servant rule.
Aboitiz filed a third party complaint against Pioneer.
The trial court initially ruled in favor of the Vianas. The trial court then absolved Pioneer from
liability for failure of the Vianas and Aboitiz to preponderantly establish a case of negligence
against the crane operator. CA affirmed. Hence, this petition for review for certiorari.
ISSUES:
1) Whether the La Mallorca ruling is applicable in the case at bar. YES
2) Whether Aboitiz should be held liable for damages. YES
3) Whether Aboitiz may demand reimbursement from Pioneer. NO
HELD:
1) YES. In the La Mallorca case, the rule is that the relation of carrier and passenger continues
until the passenger has been landed at the port of destination and has left the vessel owner's
dock or premises. Once created, the relationship will not ordinarily terminate until the
passenger has, after reaching his destination, safely alighted from the carrier's conveyance or
had a reasonable opportunity to leave the carrier's premises. All persons who remain on the
premises a reasonable time after leaving the conveyance are to be deemed passengers, and
what is a reasonable time or a reasonable delay within this rule is to be determined from all
the circumstances, and includes a reasonable time to see after his baggage and prepare for
his departure. The carrier-passenger relationship is not terminated merely by the fact that
the person transported has been carried to his destination if, for example, such person
remains in the carrier's premises to claim his baggage. Consequently, under the foregoing
circumstances, the victim Anacleto Viana is still deemed a passenger of said carrier at the
time of his tragic death.
2) YES. Under the law, common carriers are, from the nature of their business and for
reasons of public policy, bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the
goods and for the safety of the passengers transported by them, according to all the
circumstances of each case. Thus, where a passenger dies or is injured, the common carrier is
presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently. This gives rise to an action for
breach of contract of carriage where all that is required of plaintiff is to prove the existence
of the contract of carriage and its non-performance by the carrier, that is, the failure of the
carrier to carry the passenger safely to his destination, which, in the instant case, necessarily
includes its failure to safeguard its passenger with extraordinary diligence while such relation
subsists.
The presumption is, therefore, established by law that in case of a passenger's death or injury
the operator of the vessel was at fault or negligent, having failed to exercise extraordinary
diligence, and it is incumbent upon it to rebut the same. As found by the Court of Appeals,
the evidence does not show that there was a cordon of drums (to serve as warning signs to
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the restricted area) around the perimeter of the crane, as claimed by petitioner. There is no
showing that petitioner was extraordinarily diligent in requiring or seeing to it that said
precautionary measures were strictly and actually enforced to observe their purpose of
preventing entry into the forbidden area.
3) NO. Aboitiz joined Pioneer in proving the alleged gross negligence of the victim, hence its
present contention that the death of the passenger was due to the negligence of the crane
operator cannot be sustained both on grounds of estoppel and for lack of evidence on its
present theory. Petition DENIED.
G.R. No. L-10605; June 30, 1958
PRECILLANO NECESITO vs. NATIVIDAD PARAS
Reyes, J.B.L.
FACTS:
In the morning of January 28, 1964, Severina Garces and her one-year old son, Precillano
Necesito, carrying vegetables, boarded passenger auto truck or bus No. 199 of the Philippine
Rabbit Bus Lines at Agno, Pangasinan. The passenger truck, driven by Francisco Bandonell,
then proceeded on its regular run from Agno to Manila. After passing Mangatarem,
Pangasinan, truck No. 199 entered a wooden bridge, but the front wheels swerved to the
right; the driver lost control, and after wrecking the bridge's wooden rails, the truck fell on its
right side into a creek where water was breast deep. The mother, Severina Garces, was
drowned; the son, Precillano Necesito, was injured, suffering abrasions and fracture of the
left femur. He was brought to the Provincial Hospital at Dagupan, where the fracture was set
but with fragments one centimeter out of line. The money, wrist watch and cargo of
vegetables were lost.
Two actions for damages and attorney's fees totalling over P85,000 having been filed in the
CFI Tarlac against the carrier, the latter pleaded that the accident was due to "engine or
mechanical trouble" independent or beyond the control of the defendants or of the driver
Bandonell.
After joint trial, CFI found that the bus was proceeding slowly due to the bad condition of the
road; that the accident was caused by the fracture of the right steering knuckle, which was
defective in that its center or core was not compact but "bubbled and cellulous", a condition
that could not be known or ascertained by the carrier despite the fact that regular thirty-day
inspections were made of the steering knuckle. The trial court, holding that the accident was
exclusively due to fortuitous event, dismissed both actions. Plaintiffs appealed directly to this
Court in view of the amount in controversy.
ISSUE:
Whether the carrier is liable for the manufacturing defect of the steering knuckle. YES
HELD:
In the American law, the rule on the liability of carriers for defects of equipment is thus
expressed: "The preponderance of authority is in favor of the doctrine that a passenger is
entitled to recover damages from a carrier for an injury resulting from a defect in an
appliance purchased from a manufacturer, whenever it appears that the defect would have
TRANSPORTATION LAW (HOJILLA)
been discovered by the carrier if it had exercised the degree of care which under the
circumstances was incumbent upon it, with regard to inspection and application of the
necessary tests. For the purposes of this doctrine, the manufacturer is considered as being in
law the agent or servant of the carrier, as far as regards the work of constructing the
appliance. X X X"
The rationale of the carrier's liability is the fact that the passenger has neither choice nor
control over the carrier in the selection and use of the equipment and appliances in use by
the carrier. Having no privity whatever with the manufacturer or vendor of the defective
equipment, the passenger has no remedy against him, while the carrier usually has. It is but
logical, therefore, that the carrier, while not in insurer of the safety of his passengers, should
nevertheless be held to answer for the flaws of his equipment if such flaws were at all
discoverable.
In the case, the record shows that the only test applied to the steering knuckle was a purely
visual inspection every thirty days, to see if any cracks developed. A visual inspection could
not directly determine whether the resistance of this critically important part was not
impaired. Nor has it been shown that the weakening of the knuckle was impossible to detect
by any known test; on the contrary, there is testimony that it could be detected. The
periodical visual inspection of the steering knuckle as practiced by the carrier's agents did not
measure up to the required legal standard of "utmost diligence of very cautious persons" —
"as far as human care and foresight can provide", and therefore that the knuckle's failure
cannot be considered a fortuitous event that exempts the carrier from responsibility.
G.R. No. L-23733; October 31, 1969
HERMINIO L. NOCUM, plaintiff-appellee vs. LAGUNA TAYABAS BUS
COMPANY, defendant-appellant
BARREDO, J.:
FACTS:
Herminio Nocum, who was a passenger in Bus No. 120 owned by Laguna Tayabas Bus
Company then making a trip within the barrio of Dita, Municipality of Bay, Laguna, was
injured as a consequence of the explosion of firecrackers, contained in a box, loaded in said
bus and declared to its conductor as containing clothes and miscellaneous items by a co-
passenger.
According to witness Severino Anday, a man with a box went up the baggage compartment
of the bus where he already was and said box was placed under the seat. They left Azcarraga
at about 11:30 a.m. and when the explosion occurred, he was thrown out. PC investigation
report states 37 passengers were injured.
The bus conductor, Sancho Mendoza, testified that the box belonged to a passenger whose
name he does not know and who told him that it contained miscellaneous items and clothes.
He helped the owner in loading the baggage which weighed about 12 kilos. From its
appearance there was no indication at all that the contents were explosives or firecrackers.
Neither did he open the box because he just relied on the word of the owner.
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Dispatcher Nicolas Cornista corroborated that he was present when the box was loaded and
the owner agreed to pay its fare. He added that they were not authorized to open the
baggage of passengers because instruction from the management was to call the police if
there were packages containing articles which were against regulations.
There is no question that Bus No. 120 was road worthy when it left its Manila Terminal for
Lucena that morning of December 5, 1960. The injuries suffered by the plaintiff were not due
to mechanical defects but to the explosion of firecrackers inside the bus which was loaded by
a co-passenger.
ISSUE:
Whether the Bus Company is liable for the injuries suffered by Nocum. NO
HELD:
NO. The Bus Company has succeeded in rebutting the presumption of negligence by showing
that it has exercised extraordinary diligence for the safety of its passengers, “according to the
circumstances of the (each) case.” It is undisputed that before the box containing the
firecrackers were allowed to be loaded in the bus by the conductor, inquiry was made with
the passenger carrying the same as to what was in it, since its "opening ... was folded and
tied with abaca." Article 1733 is not as unbending as the trial court has held.
In this case, while it is true the passengers should not be made to suffer for something over
which they had no control, fairness demands that in measuring a common carrier's duty
towards its passengers, allowance must be given to the reliance that should be reposed on
the sense of responsibility of all the passengers in regard to their common safety. It is to be
presumed that a passenger will not take with him anything dangerous to the lives and limbs
of his co-passengers, not to speak of his own. Not to be lightly considered must be the right
to privacy to which each passenger is entitled. He cannot be subjected to any unusual search,
when he protests the innocuousness of his baggage and nothing appears to indicate the
contrary, as in the case at bar. In other words, inquiry may be verbally made as to the nature
of a passenger's baggage when such is not outwardly perceptible, but beyond this,
constitutional boundaries are already in danger of being transgressed.
G.R. No. 52159; December 22, 1989
JOSE PILAPIL vs. CA and ALATCO TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, INC.
FACTS:
Jose Pilapil, on board Alatco Transportation Company, Inc.’s bus was hit above his eye by a
stone hurled by an unidentified bystander. The Company’s personnel lost no time in bringing
him to a hospital, but eventually Pilapil partially lost his left eye’s vision and sustained a
permanent scar. Thus, he lodged an action for recovery of damages in CFI Camarines Sur
which the latter granted. On appeal, CA reversed.
ISSUE:
Whether common carriers assume risks to passengers such as the stoning in this case. NO
HELD:
In consideration of the right granted to it by the public to engage in the business of
TRANSPORTATION LAW (HOJILLA)
transporting passengers and goods, a common carrier does not give its consent to become an
insurer of any and all risks to passengers and goods. It merely undertakes to perform certain
duties to the public as the law imposes, and holds itself liable for any breach thereof. While
the law requires the highest degree of diligence from common carriers in the safe transport
of their passengers and creates a presumption of negligence against them, it does not,
however, make the carrier an insurer of the absolute safety of its passengers.
Article 1763. A common carrier is responsible for injuries suffered by a passenger on account
of the wilful acts or negligence of other passengers or of strangers, if the common carrier's
employees through the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a family could have
prevented or stopped the act or omission.
Clearly under the above provision, a tort committed by a stranger which causes injury to a
passenger does not accord the latter a cause of action against the carrier. The negligence for
which a common carrier is held responsible is the negligent omission by the carrier's
employees to prevent the tort from being committed when the same could have been
foreseen and prevented by them. Further, under the same provision, it is to be noted that
when the violation of the contract is due to the willful acts of strangers, as in the instant
case, the degree of care essential to be exercised by the common carrier for the protection of
its passenger is only that of a good father of a family.
G.R. No. 119756; March 18, 1999
FORTUNE EXPRESS, INC., petitioner vs. CA
FACTS:
Fortune Express, Inc. is a bus company in northern Mindanao. Paulie Caorong is the widow of
Atty. Caorong, while Yasser King, Rose Heinni and Prince Alexander are their minor children.
In 1989, Fortune’s bus figured in an accident with a jeepney in Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte,
resulting in the death of several passengers of the jeepney, including two Maranaos. An
investigation of the accident found that the owner of the jeepney was a Maranao and that
certain Maranaos were planning to take revenge on Fortune by burning some of its buses.
Diosdado Bravo, operations manager, assured that the necessary precautions to insure the
safety of lives and property would be taken.
At about 6:45 pm, three armed Maranaos who pretended to be passengers, seized a bus of
Fortune at Linamon while on its way to Iligan City. Among the passengers of the bus was
Atty. Caorong. The leader of the Maranaos, identified as one Bashier Mananggolo, ordered
the driver, Godofredo Cabatuan, to stop the bus on the side of the highway. Mananggolo
then shot Cabatuan on the arm. One of the companions of Mananggolo started pouring
gasoline inside the bus, as the other held the passenger at bay with a handgun. Mananggolo
ordered the passenger to get off the bus. The passengers, including Atty. Caorong, stepped
out of the bus and went behind the bushes in a field some distance from the highway.
However, Atty. Caorong returned to the bus to retrieve something from the overhead rack.
At that time, one of the armed men was pouring gasoline on the head of the driver.
Cabatuan heard Atty. Caorong pleading with the armed men to spare the driver as he was
innocent of any wrong doing and was only trying to make a living.
6
During this exchange, Cabatuan climbed out of the left window of the bus and crawled to the
canal on the opposite side of the highway. He heard shots from inside the bus. Larry de la
Cruz, one of the passengers, saw that Atty. Caorong was hit. Then the bus was set on fire.
Some of the passengers were able to pull Atty. Caorong out of the burning bus and rush him
to the Mercy Community Hospital in Iligan City, but he died while undergoing operation. The
private respondents brought this suit for breach of contract of carriage. RTC dismissed. CA
reversed.
ISSUE:
Whether Fortune breached the contract of carriage by its failure to exercise the required
degree of diligence. YES
HELD:
YES. It is clear that because of the negligence of Fortune's employees, the seizure of the bus
by Mananggolo and his men was made possible. Despite warning by the Philippine
Constabulary at Cagayan de Oro that the Maranaos were planning to take revenge, Fortune
did nothing to protect the safety of its passengers. Had Fortune and its employees been
vigilant, they would not have failed to see that the malefactors had a large quantity of
gasoline with them. Under the circumstances, simple precautionary measures to protect the
safety of passengers, such as frisking passengers and inspecting their baggages, preferably
with non-intrusive gadgets such as metal detectors, before allowing them on board could
have been employed without violating the passenger's constitutional rights.
From the foregoing, it is evident that the employees failed to prevent the attack on one of
the buses because they did not exercise the diligence of a good father of a family. Hence,
Fortune should be held liable for the death of Atty. Caorong. The seizure of the bus was
foreseeable and, therefore, was not a fortuitous event which would exempt from liabilty.
G.R. No. L-45637; May 31, 1985
ROBERTO JUNTILLA vs. CLEMENTE FONTANAR, FERNANDO BANZON, and
BERFOL CAMORO
GUTIERREZ, JR.
FACTS:
Roberto Juntilla was a passenger of the public utility jeepney bearing plate no. PUJ-717 on
the course of the trip from Danao City to Cebu City, driven by Berfol Camoro, registered
under the franchise of Clemente Fontanar but was actually owned by Fernando Banzon.
When the jeepney reached Mandaue City, the right rear tire exploded causing the vehicle to
turn turtle. In the process, Juntilla who was sitting at the front seat was thrown out of the
vehicle. Upon landing on the ground, Juntilla momentarily lost consciousness. When he came
to his senses, he found that he had a lacerated wound on his right palm. Aside from this, he
suffered injuries on his left arm, right thigh, and on his back. Because of his shock and
injuries, he went back to Danao City, but on the way, he discovered that his “Omega”
wristwatch was lost.
Juntilla filed a civil case for breach of contract with damages before the City Court of Cebu
against Fontanar, Banzon, and Camoro (FBC for brevity). FBC answered that the accident
cause losses to Juntilla was beyond their control taking into account that the tire that
TRANSPORTATION LAW (HOJILLA)
exploded was newly bought and was only slightly used at the time it blew up. The court ruled
in favor of Juntilla. CFI Cebu reversed the judgment. MR was denied. Hence, this petition for
review.
ISSUE:
Whether FBC failed to exercise "utmost and/or extraordinary diligence" required of common
carriers contemplated under Art. 1755 of the Civil Code. (Whether a tire blow-out, as in this
case, is not a fortuitous event.) YES
HELD:
YES. The right rear tire of the passenger jeepney in which the Juntilla was riding blew up
causing the vehicle to fall on its side. There are specific acts of negligence on the part of FBC.
The records show that the passenger jeepney turned turtle and jumped into a ditch
immediately after its right rear tire exploded. The evidence shows that the passenger
jeepney was running at a very fast speed before the accident. A public utility jeep running at
a regular and safe speed will not jump into a ditch when its right rear tire blows up. There is
also evidence to show that the passenger jeepney was overloaded at the time of the
accident. The petitioner stated that there were 3 passengers in the front seat and 14
passengers in the rear.
While it may be true that the tire that blew-up was still good because the grooves of the tire
were still visible, this fact alone does not make the explosion of the tire a fortuitous event.
No evidence was presented to show that the accident was due to adverse road conditions or
that precautions were taken by the jeepney driver to compensate for any conditions liable to
cause accidents. The sudden blowing-up, therefore, could have been caused by too much air
pressure injected into the tire coupled by the fact that the jeepney was overloaded and
speeding at the time of the accident. In the case at bar, the cause of the unforeseen and
unexpected occurrence was not independent of the human will. The accident was caused
either through the negligence of the driver or because of mechanical defects in the tire.
The rationale of the carrier's liability is the fact that the passenger has neither choice nor
control over the carrier in the selection and use of the equipment and appliances in use by
the carrier. Having no privity whatever with the manufacturer or vendor of the defective
equipment, the passenger has no remedy against him, while the carrier usually has.
The source of a common carrier's legal liability is the contract of carriage, and by entering
into the said contract, it binds itself to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and
foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of a very cautious person, with a due regard
for all the circumstances. The records show that this obligation was not met by FBC. The
decision of the City Court of Cebu is REINSTATED.
FRANKLIN GACAL vs. PHILIPPINE AIR LINES
Paras; 1990
FACTS:
In 1976, Spouses Franklin and Corazon Gacal, Bonifacio and Mansueta Anislag, and the late
Elma de Guzman were passengers boarding PAL’s BAC 1-11 at Davao Airport for a flight to
Manila, not knowing that on the same flight, Macalinog, Taurac Pendatum (Commander
Zapata), and 4 others, all members of the MNLF were their co-passengers. 3 of the MNLF
7
members were armed with grenades, two with .45 caliber pistols, and one with .22 caliber
pistol. 10 minutes after take-off (2:30 pm), the hijackers, brandishing firearms, announced
the hijacking of the aircraft and directed its pilot to fly to Libya. The pilot explained to
Commander Zapata of the inherent fuel limitations of the plane and unsuitability for
international flights. The hijackers then directed the pilot to Sabah. The pilot gave the same
explanation. The hijackers directed the aircraft to land at Zamboanga Airport for refuelling.
The plane landed at Zamboanga Airport at 3 pm. When the plane began to taxi at the
runway, it was met by two armored cars of the military with machine guns pointed at the
plane, and it stopped there. Commander Zapata demanded that a DC aircraft take them to
Libya, with the President of PAL as hostage and that they be given $375,000 and 6 armalites,
otherwise, they will blow up the plane if their demands will not be met by the government.
Meanwhile, the passengers were not served any food nor water and it was only later that
they were served a slice of sandwich and 1/10 cup of PAL water. After that, relatives of the
hijackers were allowed to board the plane but immediately after they alighted, an armored
car bumped the stairs. That commenced the battle between the military and the hijackers
which led ultimately to the liberation of the surviving crew and the passengers.
10 passengers and 3 hijackers were dead on the spot while 3 hijackers were captured. City
Fiscal Franklin Gacal was unhurt, while Mrs. Corazon Gacal suffered injuries in the course of
her jumping out of the plane when it was peppered with bullets by the army and after 2 hand
grenades exploded inside the plane. She was hospitalized for 2 days. Assistant City Fiscal
Bonifacio Anislag also escaped unhurt but his wife suffered a fracture for which she was
hospitalized. Elma de Guzman died because of that battle.
Hence, the action of damages before CFI South Cotabato. Trial court dismissed, reasoned out
force majeure. Hence, the petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether HIJACKING or AIR PIRACY during MARTIAL LAW and under these circumstances is a
caso fortuito or force majeure which would exempt an aircraft from payment of damages to
its passengers whose lives were put in jeopardy and whose personal belongings were lost
during the incident. YES
HELD:
YES. It is the duty of a common carrier to overcome the presumption of negligence. It must
be shown that the carrier had observed the required EOD of a very cautious person as far as
human care and foresight can provide OR that the accident was caused by a fortuitous event.
Elements of caso fortuito/ force majeure under Art. 1174 of the NCC: Cause of the breach of
the obligation must be independent of the human will (will of the debtor); Event must be
either unforeseeable or unavoidable; Event must be such as to render it impossible for the
debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner; Debtor must be free from any
participation in or aggravation of the injury to the creditor.
The failure to transport petitioners safely from Davao to Manila was due to the skyjacking
incident staged by six passengers, all members of the MNLF, w/o any connection with PAL,
hence, independent of the will of either PAL or of its passengers. Under normal
circumstances, PAL might have foreseen the skyjacking incident w/c could have been avoided
TRANSPORTATION LAW (HOJILLA)
had there been a more thorough frisking of passengers and inspection of baggage as
authorized by RA 6235. BUT THE INCIDENT IN QUESTION HAPPENED DURING MARTIAL LAW
WHERE THERE WAS A MILITARY TAKE-OVER OF AIRPORT SECURITY INCLUDING THE FRISKING
OF PASSENGERS AND THE INSPECTION OF THEIR LUGGAGE PREPARATORY TO BOARDING
DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL FLIGHTS.
These events rendered it impossible for PAL to perform its obligations in a nominal manner
and obviously it cannot be faulted with negligence in the performance of duty taken over by
the armed forces to the exclusion of the former. The existence of force majeure has been
established exempting PAL from payment of damages. Petition DISMISSED.
G.R. No. L-48757; May 30, 1988
GANZON vs. CA and GELACIO E. TUMAMBING
FACTS:
On November 28, 1956, Gelacio Tumambing contracted the services of Mauro B. Ganzon to
haul 305 tons of scrap iron from Mariveles, Bataan, to the port of Manila on board the lighter
LCT "Batman”. Pursuant to that agreement, Ganzon sent his lighter "Batman" to Mariveles
where it docked in three feet of water. Tumambing delivered the scrap iron to defendant
Filomeno Niza, captain of the lighter, for loading which was actually begun on the same date
by the crew of the lighter under the captain's supervision. When about half of the scrap iron
was already loaded, Mayor Jose Advincula of Mariveles, Bataan, arrived and demanded
P5,000 from Tumambing. The latter resisted the shakedown and after a heated argument
between them, Mayor Jose Advincula drew his gun and fired at Tumambing who sustained
injuries.
After sometime, the loading of the scrap iron was resumed. But on December 4, 1956, Acting
Mayor Basilio Rub, accompanied by three policemen, ordered captain Filomeno Niza and his
crew to dump the scrap iron where the lighter was docked. The rest was brought to the
compound of NASSCO. Later on Acting Mayor Rub issued a receipt stating that the
Municipality of Mariveles had taken custody of the scrap iron.
Tumabing sued Ganzon; the latter alleged that the goods have not been unconditionally
placed under his custody and control to make him liable. The trial court dismissed the case
but on appeal, CA reversed the decision and ordering Ganzon to pay damages.
ISSUE:
Whether a contract of carriage has been perfected. YES
HELD:
YES. By the said act of delivery, the scraps were unconditionally placed in the possession and
control of the common carrier, and upon their receipt by the carrier for transportation, the
contract of carriage was deemed perfected. Consequently, the petitioner-carrier's
extraordinary responsibility for the loss, destruction or deterioration of the goods
commenced. Pursuant to Art. 1736, such extraordinary responsibility would cease only upon
the delivery, actual or constructive, by the carrier to the consignee, or to the person who has
a right to receive them. The fact that part of the shipment had not been loaded on board the
8
lighter did not impair the said contract of transportation as the goods remained in the
custody and control of the carrier, albeit still unloaded.
Before Ganzon could be absolved from responsibility on the ground that he was ordered by
competent public authority to unload the scrap iron, it must be shown that Acting Mayor
Basilio Rub had the power to issue the disputed order, or that it was lawful, or that it was
issued under legal process of authority. The appellee failed to establish this. Indeed, no
authority or power of the acting mayor to issue such an order was given in evidence. Neither
has it been shown that the cargo of scrap iron belonged to the Municipality of Mariveles. The
fact remains that the order given by the acting mayor to dump the scrap iron into the sea
was part of the pressure applied by Mayor Jose Advincula to shakedown Tumambing for
P5,000. The order of the acting mayor did not constitute valid authority for Ganzon and his
representatives to carry out.
G.R. No. L-22272; June 26, 1967
ANTONIA MARANAN vs. PASCUAL PEREZ, et al.
FACTS:
Rogelio Corachea was a passenger in a taxicab owned and operated by Pascual Perez when
he was stabbed and killed by the driver, Simeon Valenzuela. Valenzuela was prosecuted and
found guilty of homicide in CFI Batangas. Pending appeal in the CA, Antonia Maranan,
Rogelio's mother, filed an action in to recover damages from Perez and Valenzuela for the
death of her son. Defendants asserted that the deceased was killed in self-defense, since he
first assaulted the driver by stabbing him from behind. Defendant Perez further claimed that
the death was a caso fortuito for which the carrier was not liable. CFI ruled in favor of
Maranan, as against Perez only.
ISSUE:
Whether Perez should be held liable. YES
HELD:
YES. The killing was perpetrated by the driver of the very cab transporting the passenger, in
whose hands the carrier entrusted the duty of executing the contract of carriage. In other
words, unlike the Gillaco case, the killing of the passenger took place in the course of duty of
the guilty employee and when the employee was acting within the scope of his duties.
The Civil Codes clearly remove from their exempting effect the case where the law expressly
provides for liability in spite of the occurrence of force majeure. Unlike the old Civil Code, the
NCC expressly makes the common carrier liable for intentional assaults committed by its
employees upon its passengers, by the wording of Art. 1759. There, the basis of the carrier's
liability for assaults on passengers committed by its drivers rests either on the doctrine
of respondeat superior (minority view). Under the second view, upheld by the majority and
also by the later cases, it is enough that the assault happens within the course of the
employee's duty. It is no defense for the carrier that the act was done in excess of authority
or in disobedience of the carrier's orders. The carrier's liability here is absolute in the sense
that it practically secures the passengers from assaults committed by its own employees.
TRANSPORTATION LAW (HOJILLA)
Civil Code follows the rule based on the second view: (1) the special undertaking of the
carrier requires that it furnish its passenger that full measure of protection afforded by the
exercise of the high degree of care prescribed by the law, (2) said liability of the carrier for
the servant's violation of duty to passengers, is the result of the formers confiding in the
servant's hands the performance of his contract to safely transport the passenger, and (3) as
between the carrier and the passenger, the former must bear the risk of wrongful acts or
negligence of the carrier's employees against passengers, since it, and not the passengers,
has power to select and remove them.
Accordingly, it is the carrier's strict obligation to select its drivers and similar employees with
due regard not only to their technical competence and physical ability, but also, no less
important, to their total personality, including their patterns of behavior, moral fibers, and
social attitude. The lower court rightly adjudged the defendant carrier liable pursuant to Art.
1759. The dismissal of the claim against the defendant driver was also correct. Plaintiff's
action was predicated on breach of contract of carriage and the cab driver was not a party.
G.R. No. L-8034; November 18, 1955
CORNELIA A. DE GILLACO, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees vs. MANILA
RAILROAD COMPANY, defendant-appellant
FACTS:
About 7:30 a.m., Lieut. Tomas Gillaco, husband of the plaintiff Cornelia Gillaco, was a
passenger in the early morning train of the Manila Railroad Company from Calamba to
Manila. When the train reached the Paco Railroad station, Emilio Devesa, a train guard of the
Manila Railroad Company assigned in the Manila-San Fernando, La Union Line, was in said
station waiting for the same train which would take him to Tutuban Station, where he was
going to report for duty. Devesa, who has a long standing grudge against Gillaco, dating back
from the Japanese occupation, shot Gillaco with the carbine furnished to him by the
Company for his use as such train guard, upon seeing him inside the train coach. Tomas
Gillaco died. Devesa was convicted for homicide by final judgment of the CA. CFI Laguna
sentenced the Company to pay P4,000 damages.
On its defense, the Manila Railroad Company claims that no liability attaches to it as
employer of the killer, Emilio Devesa; that it is not responsible subsidiary ex delicto, under
Art. 103 of the RPC, because the crime was not committed while the slayer was in the actual
performance of his ordinary duties and service; nor is it responsible ex contractu, since the
complaint did not aver sufficient facts to establish such liability, and no negligence on its part
was shown. CA held the Railroad company responsible on the ground that a contract of
transportation implies protection of the passengers against acts of personal violence by the
agents or employees of the carrier.
ISSUE:
Whether the Manila Rail Road Co. could be held liable for the act of its employee Devesa in
shooting passenger Gillaco. NO
HELD:
NO. There can be no quarrel with the principle that a passenger is entitled to protection from
personal violence by the carrier or its agents or employees, since the contract of
9
transportation obligates the carrier to transport a passenger safely to his destination. But
under the law of the case, this responsibility extends only to those that the carrier could
foresee or avoid through the exercise of the degree of care and diligence required of it.
The act of guard Devesa in shooting passenger Gillaco (because of a personal grudge
nurtured against the latter since the Japanese occupation) was entirely unforeseeable by the
Manila Railroad Co. The latter had no means to ascertain or anticipate that the two would
meet, nor could it reasonably foresee every personal rancor that might exist between each
one of its many employees and any one of the thousands of eventual passengers riding in its
trains. The shooting in question was therefore "caso fortuito" within the definition of article
105 of the old Civil Code, being both unforeseeable and inevitable under the given
circumstances; and pursuant to established doctrine, the resulting breach of appellant's
contract of safe carriage with the late Tomas Gillaco was excused thereby.
Also, when the crime took place, the guard Devesa had no duties to discharge in connection
with the transportation of the deceased from Calamba to Manila. Devesa was therefore
under no obligation to safeguard the passenger of the Calamba-Manila train, where the
deceased was riding; and the killing of Gillaco was not done in line of duty. The position of
Devesa at the time was that of another would be passenger, a stranger also awaiting
transportation, and not that of an employee. As a result, Devesa's assault cannot be deemed
in law a breach of Gillaco's contract of transportation by a servant or employee of the carrier.
Judgment REVERSED. Complaint dismissed.
VICENTE CALALAS, petitioner vs. CA, ELIZA JUJEURCHE SUNGA and
FRANCISCO SALVA, respondents
FACTS:
At 10 a.m. of August 23, 1989, Eliza Jujeurche G. Sunga, then a college freshman majoring in
Physical Education at the Siliman University, took a passenger jeepney owned and operated
by Vicente Calalas. As the jeepney was filled to capacity of about 24 passengers, Sunga was
given by the conductor an "extension seat," a wooden stool at the back of the door at the
rear end of the vehicle.
On the way to Poblacion Sibulan, Negros Occidental, the jeepney stopped to let a passenger
off. As she was seated at the rear of the vehicle, Sunga gave way to the outgoing passenger.
Just as she was doing so, an Isuzu truck driven by Iglecerio Verena and owned by Francisco
Salva bumped the left rear portion of the jeepney. As a result, Sunga was injured. She
sustained a fracture of the "distal third of the left tibia-fibula with severe necrosis of the
underlying skin." Her confinement in the hospital lasted from August 23 to September 7,
1989. Dr. Danilo V. Oligario, an orthopedic surgeon, certified she would remain on a cast for
3 months and would have to ambulate in crutches during said period.
Sunga filed a complaint for damages against Calalas, alleging violation of the contract of
carriage by the former in failing to exercise the diligence required of him as a common
carrier. Calalas filed a third-party complaint against Francisco Salva, the owner of the Isuzu
truck. The lower court ruled against Salva and absolved Calalas of liability. CA reversed.
TRANSPORTATION LAW (HOJILLA)
Petitioner contends that the ruling in Civil Case No. 3490 that the negligence of Verena was
the proximate cause of the accident negates his liability and that to rule otherwise would be
to make the common carrier an insurer of the safety of its passengers. He contends that the
bumping of the jeepney by the truck owned by Salva was a caso fortuito.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioner is liable on his contract of carriage. YES
HELD:
YES. Breach of contract or culpa contractual, is premised upon the negligence in the
performance of a contractual obligation. In breach of contract, the action can be prosecuted
merely by proving the existence of the contract and the fact that the obligor, in this case the
common carrier, failed to transport his passenger safely to his destination.
There is, thus, no basis for the contention that the ruling in Civil Case No. 3490, finding Salva
and his driver Verena liable for the damage to petitioner’s jeepney, should be binding on
Sunga. It is immaterial that the proximate cause of the collision between the jeepney and the
truck was the negligence of the truck driver. The doctrine of proximate cause is applicable
only in actions for quasi-delict, not in actions involving breach of contract. The doctrine is a
device for imputing liability to a person where there is no relation between him and another
party. In such a case, the obligation is created by law itself.
In the case at bar, upon the happening of the accident, the presumption of negligence at
once arose, and it became the duty of petitioner to prove that he had to observe
extraordinary diligence in the care of his passengers. Now, did the driver of jeepney carry
Sunga "safely as far as human care and foresight could provide, using the utmost diligence of
very cautious persons, with due regard for all the circumstances" as required by Art. 1755?
We do not think so. Several factors militate against petitioner’s contention.
First, the jeepney was not properly parked, its rear portion being exposed about two meters
from the broad shoulders of the highway, and facing the middle of the highway in a diagonal
angle. Second, it is undisputed that petitioner’s driver took in more passengers than the
allowed seating capacity of the jeepney. The fact that Sunga was seated in an "extension
seat" placed her in a peril greater than that to which the other passengers were exposed.
Therefore, not only was petitioner unable to overcome the presumption of negligence
imposed on him for the injury sustained by Sunga, but also, the evidence shows he was
actually negligent in transporting passengers.
G.R. No. L-37750; May 19, 1978
SWEET LINES vs. TEVES
Santos, J.:
FACTS:
Atty. Leovigildo Tandog and Rogelio Tiro, a contractor by profession, bought tickets for
Voyage 90 on December 31, 1971 from Sweet Lines Inc., a shipping company transporting
inter- island passengers and cargoes, at Cagayan de Oro City. They were to board the vessel,
M/S "Sweet Hope" bound for Tagbilaran City via the port of Cebu. Upon learning that the
10
vessel was not proceeding to Bohol, since many passengers were bound for Surigao, they
went as advised to the branch office for proper relocation to M/S "Sweet Town".
Because the said vessel was already filled to capacity, they were forced to agree "to hide at
the cargo section to avoid inspection of the officers of the Philippine Coastguard." They
alleged that they were, during the trip, "exposed to the scorching heat of the sun and the
dust coming from the ship's cargo of corn grits," and that the tickets they bought at CDO City
for Tagbilaran were not honored and they were constrained to pay for other tickets.
They sued Sweet Lines for damages and for breach of contract of carriage for P10,000 in CFI
Misamis Oriental. Sweet Lines moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of improper
venue, premised Condition No. 14 printed at the back of the tickets, stating that actions must
be brought in Cebu. The motion was denied by the trial court. MR also denied. Hence, this
instant petition for prohibition for preliminary injunction, 'alleging that the respondent judge
has departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceeding" and "had acted
without or in excess or in error of his jurisdiction or in gross abuse of discretion.
ISSUE:
Whether Condition No. 14 is valid and enforceable. NO
HELD:
NO. There is no question that there was a valid contract of carriage entered into and that the
passage tickets, upon which the latter based their complaint, are the best evidence thereof.
It is a matter of common knowledge that whenever a passenger boards a ship for
transportation from one place to another, he is issued a ticket by the shipper which has all
the elements of a written contract.
It should be borne in mind, however, that with respect to the conditions — printed at the
back of the passage tickets, these are commonly known as "contracts of adhesion". In all
contractual property or other relations, when one of the parties is at a disadvantage on
account of his moral dependence, ignorance indigence, mental weakness, tender age and
other handicap, the courts must be vigilant for his protection. Condition No. 14 printed at the
back of the passage tickets should be held as void and unenforceable because first, it is not
just and fair to bind passengers to the terms of the conditions such as Condition No. 14 as
printed in fine letters, and second, Condition No. 14 subverts the public policy on transfer of
venue of proceedings of this nature, since the same will prejudice rights and interests of
innumerable passengers in different parts of the country who, under Condition No. 14, will
have to file suits against petitioner only in the City of Cebu.
Under these circumstances, it is hardly just and proper to expect the passengers to examine
their tickets received from crowded/congested counters, more often than not during rush
hours, for conditions that may be printed much charge them with having consented to the
conditions, so printed, especially if there are a number of such conditions in fine print, as in
this case. Finally, judicial notice may be taken of the fact that the bulk of those who board
these inter-island vested come from the low-income groups and are less literate, and who
have little or no choice but to avail of petitioner's vessels.
TRANSPORTATION LAW (HOJILLA)

Condition No. 14 is subversive of public policy on transfers of venue of actions. Considering PHILIPPINE AMERICAN GENERAL INSURANCE CO., INC. and TAGUM
the expense and trouble a passenger residing outside of Cebu City would incur to prosecute a PLASTICS, INC., petitioners vs. SWEET LINES, INC., DAVAO VETERANS
claim in the City of Cebu, he would most probably decide not to file the action at all. The
condition will thus defeat, instead of enhance, the ends of justice. ARRASTRE AND PORT SERVICES, INC. and CA, respondents
FACTS:
7,000 bags of low density polyethylene (600 bags of polyethylene 641 and 6,400 bags of
MONICO ROLDAN vs. LIM PONZO and CO.
polyethylene 647) were shipped from Baton Rouge, LA to Manila on board SS VishvaYash, a
Carson
vessel belonging to the Shipping Corporation of India (SCI). From Manila, the cargoes were
FACTS:
shipped to Davao on board MV Sweet Love, a vessel owned by Sweet Lines. The consignee
Monica Roldan seeks to recover damages of P3,780.12 for the alleged failure of the Lim
was Far East Bank with arrival notice to Tagum Plastics, Inc., Tagum, Davao City. The cargoes
Ponzo and Co. to live up to its contract for the transportation of 2,244 packages of sugar
were insured by Far East Bank with the Philippine American General Insurance Co
from his hacienda to Iloilo. Lim Ponzo and Co. admits the execution of the contract, the
(Philamgen) and were covered by bills of lading which contained the following stipulation in
receipt and the loss of a part of this sugar. However the company insists that it should not be
paragraph 5: “Claims for shortage, damage, must be made at the time of delivery to
held responsible because the sugar was lost in a wreck in the river of Jalaud, without fault on
consignee or agent, if container shows exterior signs of damage or shortage. Claims for non-
the part of the owner, the patron, or the crew of the vessel. Out of the 2, 244 packages of
delivery, misdelivery, loss or damage must be filed within 30 days from accrual. Suits arising…
sugar, only 1,022 packages were saved in a more or less damaged condition. The trial court
shall be instituted within 60 days from date of accrual of right of action. Failure to file claims
peremptorily dismissed the complaint on the ground that it was neither alleged or proved
or institute judicial proceedings constitutes waiver of claim or right of action. In no case shall
that the plaintiff had complied with the provisions of Section 366 of the Commercial Code.
carrier be liable for any delay, non-delivery, misdelivery, loss of damage to cargo while cargo
After the periods have elapsed, or after the transportation charges have been paid, no claim
is not in actual custody of carrier.”
whatsoever shall be admitted against the carrier with regards to the condition in which the
goods transported were delivered.
In 1977, the shipments were discharged from the interisland carrier into the custody of the
consignee. A survey conducted showed that of the shipment totaling 7,000 bags, originally
ISSUE:
contained in 175 pallets, only a total of 5,820 bags were delivered to the consignee in good
Whether the court erred in dismissing the case on the basis of Section 366 of the Commercial
order condition, leaving a balance of 1,080 bags. Some of the 1,080 bags were either
Code. YES
MISSING OR DAMAGED beyond the point of being useful for the intended purpose.
HELD:
FEBTC and Tagum Plastics sued the international carrier, SCI, the inter-island carriers, Sweet
YES. Article 366 of the Commercial Code is limited to cases of claims for damaged goods
Lines, the arrastre company, Davao Arrastre and FE Zuellig (the shipper). Before trial, a
actually turned over by the carrier and received by the consignee, whether those damages be
compromise agreement was entered into with SCI and F.E. Zuellig. Thus, only Sweet Lines
apparent from the examination of the packages in which the goods are delivered, or of such
and Davao Arrastre remained as defendants. The trial court ruled in favor of Philamgen and
a character that the nature and extent of the damage is not apparent until the packages are
Tagum Plastics. CA reversed on the ground of prescription and denied MR.
opened and the contents examined. It does not apply to cases where the goods entrusted to
the carrier are not delivered by the carrier to the consignee. The purpose of requiring the
ISSUES:
submission of claims in pursuance of this article is to compel the consignee of goods
Was there a prescriptive period? YES
entrusted to a carrier to make prompt demand for settlement of alleged damages suffered
If yes, was the prescriptive period valid and legal? YES
by the goods while in transport, so that the carrier will be enabled to verify all such claims at
If it was valid and legal, did Philamgen act within the prescriptive period? NO
the time of delivery or within twenty-four hours.
HELD:
Also, the necessity for making the claim in accordance with Article 366 did not arise if, as it is
(1) YES. When the complaint was filed, prescription as an affirmative defense was seasonably
alleged, these 1,022 packages of sugar were recovered from the wreck by the plaintiff
raised by Sweet Lines. Though the bills of lading were not presented in evidence, the SC said
himself, in an effort, by his own activities, to save his property from total loss. The measures
that: “As petitioners are suing upon SLI's contractual obligation under the contract of
to be taken under the terms of article 367 of the Code indicate that the necessity for the
carriage as contained in the bills of lading, such bills of lading can be categorized as
presentation of claims under this article arises only in those cases wherein the carrier makes
actionable documents…” Philamgen did not deny the existence of the bill of lading under
delivery and the consignee receives the goods in pursuance of the terms of the contract.
oath. Instead, it asserted that the bills of lading were contracts of adhesion and that such
Hence, the court erred in dismissing the case.
provisions were “contrary to law and public policy”. The SC said that Philamgen’s failure to
deny under oath the existence of the bills of lading was tantamount to an admission of its
G.R. No. 87434; August 5, 1992
existence, together with paragraph 5 containing the prescriptive period. Thus, the existence
of the prescriptive period was duly proved.

11
TRANSPORTATION LAW (HOJILLA)
(2) YES. Contracts of adhesion are not entirely prohibited. The one who adheres to the
contract is in reality free to reject it entirely; if he adheres, he gives his consent. Philamgen,
thus, gave its consent to the contracts – the bills of lading – including consent to the
prescriptive periods. Parties can stipulate a shorter prescriptive period for the filing of suits,
in the absence of any statutory limitation and subject only to the requirement on
reasonableness. Such limitation is not contrary to public policy for it does not in any way
defeat the complete vesture of the right to recover. The shortened period for filing suit is not
unreasonable and has in fact been generally recognized to be a valid business practice in the
shipping industry.
(3) NO. The shipment was discharged into the custody of the consignee on May 15, 1977, and
it was from this date that petitioners' cause of action accrued, with 30 days within which to
file a claim with the carrier for any loss or damage which may have been suffered by the
cargo and thereby perfect their right of action. Claim was filed only on April 28, 1978, way
beyond the period provided in the bills of lading and violative of the contractual provision,
the inevitable consequence of which is the loss of petitioners' remedy or right to sue.
G.R. No. L-61352; February 27, 1987
DOLE PHILIPPINES, INC., plaintiff-appellant vs. MARITIME COMPANY OF
THE PHILIPPINES, defendant-appellee
NARVASA, J.:
FACTS:
The cargo (machine parts) was discharged in Dadiangas unto the custody of the consignee,
Dole Philippines, Inc., in 1971. Dole filed a claim for the damages sustained by the cargo with
the vessel-carrier, Maritime Company of the Philippines, in 1972. In 1973, Dole filed a
complaint in CFI Manila embodying 3 causes of action involving 3 separate and different
shipments. The third cause of action involved the cargo now subject of this present litigation.
It was dismissed but without prejudice as it was not covered by the settlement. As it is
without prejudice, Dole instituted this present complaint in 1975.
Maritime, as affirmative defense, claimed prescription under the Carriage of Goods by Sea
Act. It filed a formal motion to dismiss. CFI ruled in favor of Maritime and dismissed the
complaint. Dole’s MR was denied. Hence, the appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether Article 1155 of the Civil Code (the prescription of actions is interrupted by the
making of an extrajudicial written demand by the creditor) is applicable to actions brought
under the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act. NO
HELD:
NO. Section 3, par. 6 of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act provides that: “…the carrier and the
ship shall be discharged from all liability in respect of loss or damage unless suit is brought
within one year after delivery of the goods or the date when the goods should have been
delivered; Provided, That, if a notice of loss or damage, either apparent or conceded, is not
given as provided for in this section, that fact shall not affect or prejudice the right of the
12
shipper to bring suit within one year after the delivery of the goods or the date when the
goods should have been delivered.”
Dole concedes that its action is subject to the one-year period of limitation prescribed in the
above-cited provision. The provisions of the Civil Code are, by express mandate of said Code,
suppletory of deficiencies in the Code of Commerce and special laws in matters governed by
the latter.
In the case of The Yek Tong Lin Fire & Marine Insurance Co., Ltd. vs. American President
Lines, Inc., SC rejected the contention that an extrajudicial demand toiled the prescriptive
period provided for in the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act. In a case governed by the Carriage of
Goods by Sea Act, the general provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure on prescription
should not be made to apply.
It is desirable that matters affecting transportation of goods by sea be decided in as short a
time as possible; the application of the provisions of Article 1155 of NCC would unnecessarily
extend the period and permit delays in the settlement of questions affecting transportation,
contrary to the clear intent and purpose of the law. Unfortunately, Dole let the new period
lapse without filing action. It instituted the civil case only in 1973, more than one month after
that period has expired and its right of action had prescribed.
Dole's contention that the prescriptive period remained tolled equates tolling with indefinite
suspension. It is clearly fallacious and merits no consideration. Hence, the order of dismissal
appealed from is AFFIRMED.
RAFAEL ZULUETA, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellee vs. PAN AMERICAN WORLD
AIRWAYS, INC., defendant-appellant
FACTS:
On October 23, 1964, the spouses Rafael and Telly Albert Zulueta, as well as their daughter,
Carolinda Zulueta, were passengers aboard a PANAM plane, on Flight No. 841-23, from
Honolulu to Manila, the first leg of which was Wake Island. As the plane landed on said
Island, the passengers were advised that they could disembark for a stopover of about 30
minutes. Shortly before reaching that place, the flight was, according to the plaintiffs, "very
rough."
Rafael Zulueta testified that, having found the need to relieve himself, he went to the men's
comfort room at the terminal building, but found it full of soldiers, in view of which he
walked down the beach some 100 yards away. Meanwhile, the flight was called and when
the passengers had boarded the plane, plaintiff's absence was noticed. The take-off was,
accordingly, delayed and a search for him was conducted by Mrs. Zulueta, Miss Zulueta and
other persons. Minutes later, plaintiff was seen walking back from the beach towards the
terminal.
Heading towards the ramp of the plane, Rafael remarked, "You people almost made me miss
your flight. You have a defective announcing system and I was not paged." He had a
discussion with either the plane captain or the terminal manager. He was told that they
would open his bags which he refused and he warned them that they could open the bags
TRANSPORTATION LAW (HOJILLA)
only by force and at its peril of a law suit. Manager Mr. Sitton then told Rafael that he would
not be allowed to proceed to Manila or board the plane.
The departure of the plane was delayed for about two hours. Though originally all three
plaintiffs had been off loaded, Rafael requested that his wife and daughter be permitted to
continue with the flight. This was allowed but they were required to leave the three bags
behind. Nevertheless, the plane did fly with the fourth bag; it was found among all other
passengers' luggage flown to Manila upon the plane's arrival. Upon arrival at Manila, Mrs.
Zulueta demanded of defendant's Manila office that it re-route Rafael to Manila at the
earliest possible time, by the fastest route, and at its expense; defendant refused. His wife
had to send him money and he was able to leave Wake Island and return to Manila thru
Honolulu and Tokyo after two days.
On December 21, 1964, plaintiffs demanded that defendant reimburse them in the sum of
P1,505,502.85 for damages; but defendants refused to do so; hence this action.
ISSUE:
Whether moral damages may be recovered. YES
HELD:
YES. It is urged that plaintiff is, at most, entitled to actual damages only, because he was the
first to commit a breach of contract, for having gone over 200 yards away from the terminal
where he could not expect to be paged. But PANAM has not pointed out what part of the
contract has been violated thereby, apart from the fact that the award for damages made in
the decision appealed from was due, not to PANAM's failure to so page the plaintiff, but to
the former's deliberate act of leaving at Wake Island, and the embarrassment and
humiliation caused to him and his family in the presence of many other person.
NO CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE IN INSTANT CASE.
The failure of the plaintiff to re-board the plane within the time announced before the
passengers debarked therefrom did not constitute contributory negligence for he had
actually shown up before the plane had taken off. Despite this appearance, he was
nevertheless off-loaded intentionally and with malice aforethought, for his "belligerent"
attitude; for his having dared to answer the captain after being referred to as one of "three
monkeys"; and for his categorical refusal to have his bags opened without a search warrant.
The rude and rough reception that Rafael received at the hands of the airline officers; the
abusive language and highly scornful reference to them as "monkeys" by one of PANAM's
employees; the unfriendly attitude; the ugly stares and unkind remarks to which they were
subjected; their being cordoned by men in uniform as if they were criminals; the airline
officials' refusal to allow Mr. Zulueta to board the plane on the pretext that he was hiding a
bomb in his luggage and their arbitrary and high-handed decision, to leave him in Wake; Mrs.
Zulueta's having suffered a nervous breakdown for which she was hospitalized as a result of
the insults and humiliations to which they were exposed by the conduct of PANAM's
employees; Miss Zulueta's having suffered shame and embarrassment for the treatment
received by her parents at the airport — all justify an award for moral damages.
G.R. No. L-21438; September 28, 1966
13
AIR FRANCE, petitioner vs. RAFAEL CARRASCOSO and CA, respondents
FACTS:
Carrascoso, a civil engineer, was a member of a group of 48 Filipino pilgrims that left Manila
for Lourdes on March 30, 1958. On March 28, Air France, through its authorized agent,
Philippine Air Lines, Inc., issued to Carrascoso a "first class" round trip airplane ticket from
Manila to Rome. From Manila to Bangkok, Carrascoso travelled in "first class", but at
Bangkok, the Manager of the Air France forced Carrascoso to vacate the "first class" seat that
he was occupying because, in the words of the witness Ernesto G. Cuento, there was a "white
man", who, the Manager alleged, had a "better right" to the seat. When asked to vacate his
"first class" seat, Carrascoso refused and told the Manager that his seat would be taken over
his dead body; a commotion ensued, and, according to said Ernesto G. Cuento, "many of the
Filipino passengers got nervous in the tourist class; when they found out that Mr. Carrascoso
was having a hot discussion with the white man [manager], they came all across to Mr.
Carrascoso and pacified Mr. Carrascoso to give his seat to the white man." Carrascoso
reluctantly gave his "first class" seat in the plane. Desiring no repetition of the inconvenience
and embarrassments brought by defendant's breach of contract was forced to take a Pan
American World Airways plane on his return trip from Madrid to Manila.
Point of Controversy – Wrongful expulsion of Carrascoso
Cause of Action – Breach of contract of air carriage
CFI Manila – sentenced petitioner to pay respondent Rafael Carrascoso. CA – slightly reduced
the amount of refund on Carrascoso's plane ticket from P393.20 to P383.10, and voted to
affirm the appealed decision "in all other respects".
ISSUES:
Whether Carrascoso was entitled to the first class seat he claims. YES
Whether there was a finding of bad faith on the part of Air France to entitle Carrascoso for
the payment of moral damages. YES
Whether Air France (the employer) can be held liable for the action of its employee (the
manager). YES
HELD:
1. Yes, he was entitled to the first class seat. Defendant seems to capitalize on the argument
that the issuance of a first-class ticket was no guarantee. We are not impressed by such
reasoning. We cannot understand how a reputable firm like defendant airplane company
could have the indiscretion to give out tickets it never meant to honor at all. It received the
corresponding amount in payment of first-class tickets and yet it allowed the passenger to be
at the mercy of its employees.
2. Yes, there was bad faith. First, That there was a contract to furnish plaintiff a first class
passage covering, amongst others, the Bangkok-Teheran leg; Second, That said contract was
breached when petitioner failed to furnish first class transportation at Bangkok; and Third,
that there was bad faith when petitioner's employee compelled Carrascoso to leave his first
class accommodation berth "after he was already, seated" and to take a seat in the tourist
class, by reason of which he suffered inconvenience, embarrassments and humiliations,
thereby causing him mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings and social
TRANSPORTATION LAW (HOJILLA)
humiliation, resulting in moral damages. It is true that there is no specific mention of the
term bad faith in the complaint. The manager not only prevented Carrascoso from enjoying
his right to a first class seat; worse, he imposed his arbitrary will; he forcibly ejected him from
his seat, made him suffer the humiliation of having to go to the tourist class compartment -
just to give way to another passenger whose right thereto has not been established.
Certainly, this is bad faith.
3. Yes, Air France is liable for the tortious act of its employees. Article 21 of the Civil Code
says: “Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.” A
contract to transport passengers is quite different in kind and degree from any other
contractual relation. And this is because of the relation which an air-carrier sustains with the
public. Its business is mainly with the travelling public. It invites people to avail of the
comforts and advantages it offers. The contract of air carriage, therefore, generates a
relation attended with a public duty. Neglect or malfeasance of the carrier's employees,
naturally, could give ground for an action for damages.
Passengers do not contract merely for transportation. They have a right to be treated by the
carrier's employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and due consideration. They are entitled
to be protected against personal misconduct, injurious language, indignities and abuses from
such employees. Any rule or discourteous conduct on the part of employees towards a
passenger gives the latter an action for damages against the carrier.
Petitioner's contract with Carrascoso is one attended with public duty. The stress of
Carrascoso's action is placed upon his wrongful expulsion. This is a violation of public duty by
the petitioner air carrier — a case of quasi-delict. Damages are proper.
G.R. No. 78656; August 30, 1988
TRANS WORLD AIRLINES, petitioner vs. CA and ROGELIO A.
VINLUAN, respondents
GANCAYCO, J.:
FACTS:
Rogelio A. Vinluan is a practicing lawyer who had to travel to several cities in Europe and the
U.S. He entered into a contract for air carriage for valuable consideration with Japan Airlines
first class from Manila to Tokyo, Moscow, Paris, Hamburg, Zurich, New York, Los Angeles,
Honolulu and back to Manila. He was issued first class tickets for the entire trip.
On April 18, while in Paris, he went to the office of Trans World Airlines (TWA) at the De
Gaulle Airport and confirmed reservation for first class accommodation on board its Flight
No. 41 from New York to San Francisco, scheduled to depart on April 20. It was reconfirmed
at 8 a.m. Vinluan presented his ticket for check-in at JFK International Airport at about 9:45
a.m., the departure being 11:00 a.m. He was informed that there was no first class seat
available for him. He asked for an explanation but TWA employees on duty declined to give
any reason. When he began to protest, one of the TWA employees, a certain Mr. Braam,
rudely threatened him with the words "Don't argue with me, I have a very bad temper."
14
To be able to keep his schedule, Vinluan was compelled to take the economy seat offered to
him and he was issued a “refund application" as he was downgraded from first class to
economy class. While waiting for the departure, Vinluan noticed that white Caucasians who
had checked-in later than him were given preference in some first class seats which became
available due to "no show" passengers.
Vinluan filed an action for damages against the TWA in CFI Rizal alleging breach of contract
and bad faith. CFI ruled in favour of Vinluan. CA affirmed. Hence, the petition for review.
ISSUE:
Whether Vinluan is entitled to moral and exemplary damages. YES
HELD:
YES. Petitioner claims that because of maintenance problems of the aircraft, TWA Flight No.
41 was cancelled and a special Flight No. 6041 was organized. A smaller Boeing 707 with only
16 first class seats was substituted. Hence, passengers who had first class reservations had to
be accommodated on a first-come, first-served basis. The contention is devoid of merit.
The discrimination is obvious and the humiliation to which Vinluan was subjected is
undeniable. Petitioner sacrificed the comfort of its first class passengers for the sake of
economy. Such inattention and lack of care for the interest of its passengers who are entitled
to its utmost consideration, particularly as to their convenience, amount to bad faith which
entitles the passenger to the award of moral damages.
Vinluan was a practicing lawyer, a senior partner of a big law firm in Manila. He was a
director of several companies and was active in civic and social organizations in the
Philippines. Considering the circumstances of this case and his social standing in the
community, the award of moral (300k) and exemplary damages (200k) by the respondent
court is in order.
G.R. No. 88561; April 20, 1990
DR. HERMAN, DORA and JACQUELINE ARMOVIT, petitioners vs. CA
and NORTHWEST AIRLINES, INC., respondents
GANGAYCO, J.:
FACTS:
A Filipino physician and his family residing in the U.S. came home to the Philippines on a
Christmas visit in 1981. They bought 3 round trip airline tickets from Northwest Airlines, Inc.
They were bumped off at the Manila International Airport on their return flight to the U.S.
They arrived at the check-in counter at 9:15 a.m., which is a good 1hr15min ahead of the
scheduled flight time. Petitioners were rudely informed that they cannot be accommodated
since Flight 002 scheduled at 9:15 a.m. was already taking off and the 10:30 a.m. flight
entered in their plane tickets was erroneous. Before date of departure, petitioners re-
confirmed their reservations through their representative, Ernesto Madriaga.
Dr. Armovit protested in extreme agitation that because of the bump-off he will not be able
to keep his appointments with his patients in the U.S. Petitioners suffered anguish, wounded
feelings, and serious anxiety day and night. Petitioners filed an action for damages in RTC
Manila, which ruled in their favour. CA modified saying that the moral damages of P900,000
TRANSPORTATION LAW (HOJILLA)
must be eliminated and lessened the exemplary damages. MR was denied. Both petitioners
and private respondent elevated the matter to the SC for review by certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether the Armovits are entitled to moral and exemplary damages. YES
HELD:
YES. In Air France vs. Carrascoso, Lopez vs. Pan American World Airways, and Zulueta vs. Pan
American World Airways, SC awarded damages for the gross negligence of the airline which
amounted to malice and bad faith and which tainted the breach of air transportation
contract. Passengers do not contract merely for transportation. They have the right to be
treated by the carrier's employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and due consideration.
They are entitled to be protected against personal misconduct, injurious language, indignities
and abuses from such employees. So it is, that any rude or discourteous conduct on the part
of employees towards a passenger gives the latter an action for damages against the carrier.
The gross negligence in the issuance of the tickets with entries as to the time of the flight, the
failure to correct such erroneous entries and the manner by which petitioners were rudely
informed that they were bumped off are clear indicia of such malice and bad faith and
establish a breach of contract which entitles petitioners to moral damages.
CA said the petitioners failed to take the witness stand to testify. The assassination of
Senator Benigno Aquino, Jr. on August 21, 1983 caused turmoil in the country. The violent
demonstrations were sensationalized in the U.S. media so petitioners were advised to refrain
from returning to the Philippines at the time. Nevertheless, Atty. Raymund Armovit, brother
of Dr. Armovit, took the witness stand as he was with them from the time they checked in up
to the time of their ultimate departure. Petitioners are entitled to moral damages of
P100,000 each. The exemplary damages awarded by the CA is adequate. Nominal damages
deleted as it cannot co-exist with actual or compensatory damages.
G.R. No. 50504-05; August 13, 1990
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC. vs. CA, ADELINA BAGADIONG and ROSARIO
STO. TOMAS
REGALADO, JR.
FACTS:
In 1970, Adelina Bagadiong and Rosario Sto.Tomas filed an action for damages against PAL in
CFI Camarines Sur. In 1972, a similar action was filed by Ladislao Santos. It appears that
Bagadiong and Sto. Tomas made reservations with, and bought two plane tickets from, PAL-
Naga City branch station. They went back to PAL and paid the fare for two round trip tickets
and were not only issued their round trips tickets, but also their reservation in the 3:40 pm
Naga-Manila flight were expressly confirmed. They checked in at the Pili airport counter of
Pal and there the latter's agent or employees got the tickets of the plaintiffs allegedly for the
purpose of issuing to them a boarding pass. Few minutes before departure time, Adelina and
Rosario’s luggages were loaded to the plane, but they were not given back their tickets and
were not allowed by PAL’s agent or employees to board the plane and after the plane had
taken off with their luggage, they were only refunded.
15
On the other hand, when Ladislao Santos bought a plane ticket at the same branch for Flight
296 from Naga to Manila scheduled, he was assured by the employees that his reservation
was confirmed. He checked in on and there the employees of PAL asked for his ticket,
allegedly for the purpose of issuing to him a boarding pass and about three minutes before
departure of Flight 296, the ticket was returned to Ladislao by PAL employee, informing him
that there was no more seat available and he could not ride on that flight to Manila. He
alleged that the employees of the PAL acted rudely and discourteously to his embarrassment
in the presence of so many people who were at the airport at that time and it was very
important and urgent for plaintiff to be in Manila because he had an appointment with an
eye specialist for medical treatment of his eye and he and his brother were "to close a
contract they entered into to supply shrimps to some restaurants and market vendors in
Manila and he and his brother failed to close the contract to supply shrimps, as it was on
December 1, 1970, that he was finally able to reach Manila by train.
ISSUE:
Whether PAL is liable for damages for breach of its contractual obligation. YES
HELD:
YES. Moral damages are recoverable in a breach of contract of carriage where the air carrier
through its agents acted fraudulently or in bad faith. In the case at bar, the trial court and the
CA are in agreement that petitioner through its agents acted in bad faith in "bumping off"
private respondents. The failure of petitioner to accommodate private respondents was not
the result of an honest mistake, because its employees knew and were aware that what they
were doing was wrong.
The employees of PAL knew that there was a heavy booking of passengers because of the
coming of the Pope. The Virac station overbooked two passengers, Gov. Alberto and Mayor
Antonio and PAL would be placed in a position to violate its contract of carriage with
passengers with confirmed reservations who would not be accommodated because of Gov.
Alberto and Mayor Antonio.
A contract to transport passengers is quite different in kind and degree from any other
contractual relation. And this is because of the relation which an air-carrier with the public.
Its business is mainly with the travelling public. Neglect or malfeasance of the carrier's
employees naturally could give ground for an action for damages.
The contention of petitioner that its failure to accommodate private respondents was due to
the unlawful acts of third persons and, constitutes caso fortuito, is untenable. One essential
characteristic of a fortuitous event is that it was independent of the will of the obligor or of
his employees, which fact is lacking in this case. The impossibility of their being
accommodated was necessarily foreseeable.