Molo vs.

Molo

Facts:
 Marcos Molo executed 2 wills, one in August 1918 and another in June 1939.
 The latter will contained a revocation clause which expressly revoked the will in 1918.
 He died without any forced heirs but he was survived by his wife, herein petitioner Juana.
 The oppositors to the probate were his nephews and nieces
 Only a carbon copy of the second will was found.
 The widow filed a petition for the probate of the 1939 will.
 It was admitted to probate but subsequently set aside on ground that the petitioner failed to prove its
due execution.
 As a result, the petitioner filed another petition for the probate of the 1918 will this time.
 Again the oppositors alleged that said will had already been revoked under the 1939 will.
 They contended that despite the disallowance of the 1939 will, the revocation clause is valid and thus
effectively nullified the 1918 will.

Issue: WON the 1918 will can still be valid despite the revocation in the subsequent disallowed 1939 will

Ruling:
 Yes.
 The court applied the doctrine laid down in Samson v. Naval that a subsequent will, containing a clause
revoking a previous will, having been disallowed for the reason that it was not executed in accordance
with law cannot produce the effect of annulling the previous will, inasmuch as the said revocatory
clause is void.
 There was no valid revocation in this case.
 No evidence was shown that the testator deliberately destroyed the original 1918 will because of his
knowledge of the revocatory clause contained in the will executed in 1939.
 The earlier will can still be probated under the principle of dependent relative revocation.
 The doctrine applies when a testator cancels or destroys a will or executes an instrument intended to
revoke a will with the intention to make a new testamentary disposition as substitute for the old, and
the new disposition fails of effect for some reason.

Del Rosario vs Ferrer

Facts:
 On August 27, 1968 the spouses Leopoldo and Guadalupe Gonzales executed a document entitled
“Donation Mortis Causa” in favor of their two children, Asuncion and Emiliano, and their
granddaughter, Jarabini (daughter of their predeceased son, Zoilo) covering the spouses’ 126-square
meter lot and the house on it in Pandacan, Manila in equal shares.
 The deed of donation reads:
o It is our will that this Donation Mortis Causa shall be irrevocable and shall be respected by the
surviving spouse.
o It is our will that Jarabini Gonzales-del Rosario and Emiliano Gonzales will continue to occupy
the portions now occupied by them
o It is further our will that this DONATION MORTIS CAUSA shall not in any way affect any other
distribution of other properties belonging to any of us donors whether testate or intestate and
where ever situated.
 o It is our further will that any one surviving spouse reserves the right, ownership, possession
and administration of this property herein donated and accepted and this Disposition and
Donation shall be operative and effective upon the death of the DONORS.
 Although denominated as a donation mortis causa, which in law is the equivalent of a will, the deed
had no attestation clause and was witnessed by only two persons.
 The named donees, however, signified their acceptance of the donation on the face of the document.
 Guadalupe, the donor wife, died in September 1968.
 A few months later or on December 19, 1968, Leopoldo, the donor husband, executed a deed of
assignment of his rights and interests in subject property to their daughter Asuncion. Leopoldo died in
June 1972.
 In 1998 Jarabini filed a “petition for the probate of the August 27, 1968 deed of donation mortis causa”
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila in Sp. Proc. 98-90589.
 Asuncion opposed the petition, invoking his father Leopoldo’s assignment of his rights and interests in
the property to her.

Issue: WON the spouses’ donation to Asuncion, Emiliano, and Jarabini was a donation mortis causa, as it was
denominated, or in fact a donation inter vivos.

Ruling:
 The donation was inter vivos.
 That the document in question in this case was captioned “Donation Mortis Causa” is not controlling.
 The Court has held that, if a donation by its terms is inter vivos, this character is not altered by the fact
that the donor styles it mortis causa.
 In Austria-Magat v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that “irrevocability” is a quality absolutely
incompatible with the idea of conveyances mortis causa, where “revocability” is precisely the essence
of the act.
 A donation mortis causa has the following characteristics:
1. It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor; or, what
amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should retain the ownership (full or naked) and
control of the property while alive;
2. That before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will, ad nutum; but
revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in the donor to
dispose of the properties conveyed; and
3. That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee.
 The Court thus said in Austria-Magat that the express “irrevocability” of the donation is the “distinctive
standard that identifies the document as a donation inter vivos.”
 Here, the donors plainly said that it is “our will that this Donation Mortis Causa shall be irrevocable and
shall be respected by the surviving spouse.”
 The intent to make the donation irrevocable becomes even clearer by the proviso that a surviving
donor shall respect the irrevocability of the donation.
 Consequently, the donation was in reality a donation inter vivos.
 The donors in this case of course reserved the “right, ownership, possession, and administration of the
property” and made the donation operative upon their death.
 But this Court has consistently held that such reservation (reddendum) in the context of an irrevocable
donation simply means that the donors parted with their naked title, maintaining only beneficial
ownership of the donated property while they lived.
 Notably, the three donees signed their acceptance of the donation, which acceptance the deed
required.
  This Court has held that an acceptance clause indicates that the donation is inter vivos, since
acceptance is a requirement only for such kind of donations.
 Donations mortis causa, being in the form of a will, need not be accepted by the donee during the
donor’s lifetime.
 Finally, as Justice J. B. L. Reyes said in Puig v. Peñaflorida, in case of doubt, the conveyance should be
deemed a donation inter vivos rather than mortis causa, in order to avoid uncertainty as to the
ownership of the property subject of the deed.
 Since the donation in this case was one made inter vivos, it was immediately operative and final.
 The reason is that such kind of donation is deemed perfected from the moment the donor learned of
the donee’s acceptance of the donation.
 The acceptance makes the donee the absolute owner of the property donated Given that the donation
in this case was irrevocable or one given inter vivos, Leopoldo’s subsequent assignment of his rights
and interests in the property to Asuncion should be regarded as void for, by then, he had no more
rights to assign.
 He could not give what he no longer had. Nemo dat quod non habet.

Nepomuceno vs CA

Facts:
 In 1974, Martin Jugo died and left a last Will and Testament.
 In said Will, the testator named petitioner as executor of his estate.
 It is clearly stated in the Will that the testator was legally married to a certain Rufina Gomez by whom
he had two legitimate children, Oscar and Carmelita, but since 1952, he had been estranged from his
lawful wife and had been living with petitioner as husband and wife.
 In fact testator and petitioner were married before a Justice of the Peace.
 The testator devised to his forced heirs, his legal wife and children, his entire estate, and the free
portion thereof to petitioner.
 Petitioner filed a petition for the probate of the will and asked for the issuance to her of letters
testamentary.
 Private respondents filed an opposition.
 Lower court denied the probate of the Will.
 Petitioner appealed to respondent court, which set aside lower court’s decision.
 Respondent court declared the Will to be valid except that the devise in favor of the petitioner is null
and void pursuant to Article 739 in relation with Article 1028 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.

Issue:
WON respondent court acted in excess of its jurisdiction in passing upon the intrinsic validity of the
testamentary provision in favor of petitioner

Ruling:
 The respondent court acted within its jurisdiction when after declaring the Will to be validly drawn, it
went on to pass upon the intrinsic validity of the Will and declared the devise in favor of the petitioner
null and void.
 The general rule is that in probate proceedings, the court's area of inquiry is limited to an examination
and resolution of the extrinsic validity of the Will.
 The rule, however, is not absolute. Given exceptional circumstances, the probate court is not
powerless to do what the situation constrains it to do and pass upon certain provisions of the Will.
 In Nuguid v. Nuguid, the testator instituted the petitioner as universal heir and completely preterited
her surviving forced heirs. A will of this nature, no matter how valid it may appear extrinsically, would
be null and void. Separate proceedings to determine the intrinsic validity of the testamentary
provisions would be superfluous.
 Where practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon, even
before it is probated, the court should meet the issue.
 There is no dispute over the extrinsic validity of the Will. Both parties agree it was executed with all the
formalities required by law and that the testator had the mental capacity to execute his Will.
 The only issue, therefore, is the jurisdiction of the respondent court to declare the testamentary
provision in favor of the petitioner as null and void.
 We sustain the respondent court's jurisdiction. As stated in Nuguid v. Nuguid, litigation will be
protracted; probability exists that the case will come up once again before us on the same issue of the
intrinsic validity or nullity of the will.
 We see no useful purpose that would be served if we remand the nullified provision to the proper
court in a separate action for that purpose simply because, in the probate of a will, the court does not
ordinarily look into the intrinsic validity of its provisions.
 Article 739 of the Civil Code provides:
o The following donations shall be void:
1. Those made between persons who were guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time
of the donation;
2. Those made between persons found guilty of the same criminal offense, in
consideration thereof;
3. Those made to a public officer or his wife, descendants and ascendants, by reason of
his office.
 Article 1028 of the Civil Code provides:
o The prohibitions mentioned in Article 739, concerning donations inter vivos shall apply to
testamentary provisions.
 Nepomuceno contends that she acted in good faith for 22 years in the belief that she was legally
married to the testator.
 The records do not sustain a finding of innocence or good faith.
 As argued by the private respondents:
1. Will expressly admits on its face the relationship between testator and petitioner, the devisee;
and
2. Petitioner herself initiated the presentation of evidence on her alleged ignorance of the true
civil status of the testator, which led private respondents to present contrary evidence.
 Instead of limiting herself to proving the extrinsic validity of the will, it was petitioner who opted to
present evidence on her alleged good faith in marrying the testator.
 Clearly, the good faith of petitioner was by option of the parties made a decisive issue right at the
inception of the case.
 Confronted by the situation, the trial court had to make a ruling on the question.
 Moreover, the prohibition in Article 739 of the Civil Code is against the making of a donation between
persons who are living in adultery or concubinage.
 It is the donation which becomes void.
 The giver cannot give even assuming that the recipient may receive.
 The very wordings of the Will invalidate the legacy because the testator admitted he was disposing the
properties to a person with whom he had been living in concubinage.
 Thus, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The decision of the CA is AFFIRMED.
Malabanan vs Republic
Facts:
 On 20 February 1998, Mario Malabanan filed an application for land registration covering a parcel of
land identified as Lot 9864-A, Cad-452-D, Silang Cadastre
 Malabanan claimed that he had purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco, and that he and his
predecessors-in-interest had been in open, notorious, and continuous adverse and peaceful possession
of the land for more than thirty (30) years.
 Apart from presenting documentary evidence, Malabanan himself and his witness, Aristedes Velazco,
testified at the hearing.
 Velazco testified that the property was originally belonged to a twenty-two hectare property owned by
his great-grandfather, Lino Velazco.
 The Republic of the Philippines likewise did not present any evidence to controvert the application.
 Among the evidence presented by Malabanan during trial was a Certification dated 11 June 2001,
issued by the Community Environment & Natural Resources Office, Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (CENRO-DENR), which stated that the subject property was "verified to be within
the Alienable or Disposable land
 The Republic interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals, arguing that Malabanan had failed to prove
that the property belonged to the alienable and disposable land of the public domain, and that the RTC
had erred in finding that he had been in possession of the property in the manner and for the length of
time required by law for confirmation of imperfect title.
 The appellate court held that under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree any period of
possession prior to the classification of the lots as alienable and disposable was inconsequential and
should be excluded from the computation of the period of possession.
 Thus, the appellate court noted that since the CENRO-DENR certification had verified that the property
was declared alienable and disposable only on 15 March 1982, the Velazcos' possession prior to that
date could not be factored in the computation of the period of possession.

Issue: Are petitioners entitled to the registration of the subject land in their names under Section 14(1) or
Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree or both?

Ruling:
 The arguments submitted by the OSG with respect to Section 14(2) are more extensive.
 The OSG notes that under Article 1113 of the Civil Code, the acquisitive prescription of properties of
the State refers to "patrimonial property," while Section 14(2) speaks of "private lands."
 It observes that the Court has yet to decide a case that presented Section 14(2) as a ground for
application for registration, and that the 30-year possession period refers to the period of possession
under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, and not the concept of prescription under the Civil Code.
 The OSG further submits that, assuming that the 30-year prescriptive period can run against public
lands, said period should be reckoned from the time the public land was declared alienable and
disposable.
 Accordingly, there must be an express declaration by the State that the public dominion property is no
longer intended for public service or the development of the national wealth or that the property has
been converted into patrimonial.
 Without such express declaration, the property, even if classified as alienable or disposable, remains
property of the public dominion, pursuant to Article 420(2), and thus incapable of acquisition by
prescription.
 It is only when such alienable and disposable lands are expressly declared by the State to be no longer
intended for public service or for the development of the national wealth that the period of acquisitive
prescription can begin to run.
 Such declaration shall be in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or a Presidential Proclamation
in cases where the President is duly authorized by law.
 It is clear that the evidence of petitioners is insufficient to establish that Malabanan has acquired
ownership over the subject property under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act.
 There is no substantive evidence to establish that Malabanan or petitioners as his predecessors-in-
interest have been in possession of the property since 12 June 1945 or earlier.
 The earliest that petitioners can date back their possession, according to their own evidence the Tax
Declarations they presented in particular is to the year 1948.
 Thus, they cannot avail themselves of registration under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration
Decree.
 Neither can petitioners properly invoke Section 14(2) as basis for registration.
 While the subject property was declared as alienable or disposable in 1982, there is no competent
evidence that is no longer intended for public use service or for the development of the national
evidence, conformably with Article 422 of the Civil Code.
 The classification of the subject property as alienable and disposable land of the public domain does
not change its status as property of the public dominion under Article 420(2) of the Civil Code.
 Thus, it is insusceptible to acquisition by prescription.