RULE 36

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 170026               June 20, 2012

SHIMIZU PHILIPPINES CONTRACTORS, INC., Petitioner,

vs.
MRS. LETICIA B. MAGSALIN, doing business under the trade name "KAREN'S TRADING," FGU INSURANCE
CORPORATION, GODOFREDO GARCIA, CONCORDIA GARCIA, and REYNALDO BAETIONG, Respondents.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

We resolve the petition for review on certiorari1 filed by Shimizu Philippines Contractors, Inc. (petitioner) to challenge the twin
resolutions of the Court of Appeals (CA)2 in CA-G.R. CV No. 83096 which dismissed the appeal of the petitioner on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction3 and denied the petitioner’s subsequent motion for reconsideration. 4 The appeal in CA-G.R. CV No. 83096 had
sought to nullify the December 16, 2003 order5 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) dismissing the petitioner’s complaint for sum of
money and damages on the ground of non prosequitur.

The Antecedents

The antecedent facts of the petition before us are not disputed.

An alleged breach of contract was the initial event that led to the present petition. The petitioner claims that one Leticia Magsalin,
doing business as "Karen’s Trading," had breached their subcontract agreement for the supply, delivery, installation, and finishing of
parquet tiles for certain floors in the petitioner’s Makati City condominium project called "The Regency at Salcedo." The breach
triggered the agreement’s termination. When Magsalin also refused to return the petitioner’s unliquidated advance payment and to
account for other monetary liabilities despite demand, the petitioner sent a notice to respondent FGU Insurance Corporation (FGU
Insurance) demanding damages pursuant to the surety and performance bonds the former had issued for the subcontract.

On April 30, 2002, the petitioner filed a complaint docketed as Civil Case No. 02-488 against both Magsalin and FGU Insurance. It
was raffled to Branch 61 of the RTC of Makati City. The complaint sought Two Million Three Hundred Twenty-Nine Thousand One
Hundred Twenty Four Pesos and Sixty Centavos (₱2,329,124.60) as actual damages for the breach of contract.

FGU Insurance was duly served with summons. With respect to Magsalin, however, the corresponding officer’s return declared that
both she and "Karen’s Trading" could not be located at their given addresses, and that despite further efforts, their new addresses
could not be determined.

In August 2002, FGU Insurance filed a motion to dismiss the complaint. The petitioner filed its opposition to the motion. The motion
to dismiss was denied as well as the ensuing motion for reconsideration, and FGU Insurance was obliged to file an answer.

In October 2002, in an effort to assist the RTC in acquiring jurisdiction over Magsalin, the petitioner filed a motion for leave to serve
summons on respondent Magsalin by way of publication. In January 2003, the petitioner filed its reply to FGU Insurance’s answer.

In February 2003, FGU Insurance filed a motion for leave of court to file a third-party complaint. Attached to the motion was the
subject complaint,6 with Reynaldo Baetiong, Godofredo Garcia and Concordia Garcia named as third-party defendants. FGU
Insurance claims that the three had executed counter-guaranties over the surety and performance bonds it executed for the
subcontract with Magsalin and, hence, should be held jointly and severally liable in the event it is held liable in Civil Case No. 02-
488.

The RTC admitted the third-party complaint and denied the motion to serve summons by publication on the ground that the action
against respondent Magsalin was in personam.
In May 2003, the RTC issued a notice setting the case for hearing on June 20, 2003. FGU Insurance filed a motion to cancel the
hearing on the ground that the third-party defendants had not yet filed their answer. The motion was granted.

In June 2003, Baetiong filed his answer to the third-party complaint. He denied any personal knowledge about the surety and
performance bonds for the subcontract with Magsalin.7 Of the three (3) persons named as third-party defendants, only Baetiong filed
an answer to the third-party complaint; the officer’s returns on the summons to the Garcias state that both could not be located at
their given addresses. Incidentally, the petitioner claims, and Baetiong does not dispute, that it was not served with a copy of
Baetiong’s answer. The petitioner now argues before us that FGU Insurance, which is the plaintiff in the third-party complaint, had
failed to exert efforts to serve summons on the Garcias. It suggests that a motion to serve summons by publication should have
been filed for this purpose. The petitioner also asserts that the RTC should have scheduled a hearing to determine the status of the
summons to the third-party defendants. 8

The Order Of Dismissal

With the above procedural events presented by both parties as the only backdrop, on December 16, 2003 the RTC issued a tersely
worded order9 dismissing Civil Case No. 02-488. For clarity, we quote the dismissal order in full:

ORDER

For failure of [petitioner] to prosecute, the case is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

The RTC denied the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration,10 prompting the latter to elevate its case to the CA via a Rule 41 petition
for review.11

The Ruling of the Appellate Court

FGU Insurance moved for the dismissal of the appeal on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. It argued that the appeal raised a pure
question of law as it did not dispute the proceedings before the issuance of the December 16, 2003 dismissal order.

The petitioner, on the other hand, insisted that it had raised questions of fact in the appeal. 12 Thus -

While, the instant appeal does not involve the merits of the case, the same involves questions of fact based on the records of
the case. It must be emphasized that the lower court’s dismissal of the case based on alleged failure to prosecute on the part of
plaintiff-appellant was too sudden and precipitate. This being the case, the facts [sic] to be determined is whether based on the
records of the case, was there a definite inaction on the part of plaintiff-appellant? A careful examination of all pleadings filed as well
as the orders of the lower court vis-à-vis the rules should now be made in order to determine whether there was indeed a "failure to
prosecute" on the part of plaintiff-appellant[.] 13 (emphases supplied)

The CA agreed with FGU Insurance and dismissed the appeal, and denied as well the subsequent motion for reconsideration. 14 The
petitioner thus filed the present petition for review on certiorari.

The Present Petition

The petitioner pleads five (5) grounds to reverse the CA’s resolutions and to reinstate Civil Case No. 02-488. In an effort perhaps to
make sense of the dismissal of the case (considering that the trial court had not stated the facts that justify it), the petitioner draws
this Court’s attention to certain facts and issues that we find to be of little materiality to the disposition of this petition:

Grounds/ Statement of Matters Involved

I. The Appellate Court has jurisdiction to determine the merits of the Appeal as the matters therein involve both questions
of law and fact.

II. The lower court erred in declaring that petitioner failed to prosecute the case despite the fact that petitioner never
received a copy of the Answer of Third-party defendant-respondent Reynaldo Baetiong.

III. The lower court erred in declaring that petitioner failed to prosecute the case despite the fact that there is no joinder of
indispensable parties and issues yet because defendant-respondent Leticia B. Magsalin as well as third-party defendant-
respondents Godofredo and Concordia Garcia’s whereabouts were unknown, hence no service yet on them of the copy of
the summons and complaint with annexes[.]
 IV. The lower court erred in declaring that Petitioner failed to prosecute the case despite the fact that it was party
respondent FGU which caused the cancellation of the hearing.

V. It is evident that the lower court’s dismissal of the case is a clear denial of due process. 15

In our Resolution dated February 13, 2006,16 we required the respondents to comment. FGU Insurance’s comment17 alleges that the
present petition is "fatally defective" for being unaccompanied by material portions of the record. It reiterates that the appeal in CA-
G.R. CV No. 83096 was improperly filed under Rule 41 and should have been filed directly with this Court under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court. Baetiong, in his comment, 18 asserts that the dismissal of the appeal was in accord with existing laws and applicable
jurisprudence.

The Ruling Of The Court

Preliminarily, we resolve the claim that the petition violates Rule 45 of the Rules of Court on the attachment of material portions of
the record. We note that FGU Insurance fails to discharge its burden of proving this claim by not specifying the material portions of
the record the petitioner should have attached to the petition. At any rate, after a careful perusal of the petition and its attachments,
the Court finds the petition to be sufficient. In other words, we can judiciously assess and resolve the present petition on the basis of
its allegations and attachments.

After due consideration, we resolve to grant the petition on the ground that the December 16, 2003 dismissal order is null and void
for violation of due process. We are also convinced that the appeal to challenge the dismissal order was properly filed under Rule 41
of the Rules of Court. We further find that the dismissal of Civil Case No. 02-488 for failure to prosecute is not supported by facts, as
shown by the records of the case.

The Dismissal Order is Void

The nullity of the dismissal order is patent on its face. It simply states its conclusion that the case should be dismissed for non
prosequitur, a legal conclusion, but does not state the facts on which this conclusion is based.

Dismissals of actions for failure of the plaintiff to prosecute is authorized under Section 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court. A plain
examination of the December 16, 2003 dismissal order shows that it is an unqualified order and, as such, is deemed to be a
dismissal with prejudice. "Dismissals of actions (under Section 3) which do not expressly state whether they are with or without
prejudice are held to be with prejudice[.]"19 As a prejudicial dismissal, the December 16, 2003 dismissal order is also deemed to be
a judgment on the merits so that the petitioner’s complaint in Civil Case No. 02-488 can no longer be refiled on the principle of res
judicata. Procedurally, when a complaint is dismissed for failure to prosecute and the dismissal is unqualified, the dismissal has the
effect of an adjudication on the merits.20

As an adjudication on the merits, it is imperative that the dismissal order conform with Section 1, Rule 36 of the Rules of Court on
the writing of valid judgments and final orders. The rule states:

RULE 36
Judgments, Final Orders and Entry Thereof

Section 1. Rendition of judgments and final orders. — A judgment or final order determining the merits of the case shall be in writing
personally and directly prepared by the judge, stating clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based, signed by him,
and filed with the clerk of the court.

The December 16, 2003 dismissal order clearly violates this rule for its failure to disclose how and why the petitioner failed to
prosecute its complaint. Thus, neither the petitioner nor the reviewing court is able to know the particular facts that had prompted the
prejudicial dismissal. Had the petitioner perhaps failed to appear at a scheduled trial date? Had it failed to take appropriate actions
for the active prosecution of its complaint for an unreasonable length of time? Had it failed to comply with the rules or any order of
the trial court? The December 16, 2003 dismissal order does not say.

We have in the past admonished trial courts against issuing dismissal orders similar to that appealed in CA-G.R. CV No. 83096. A
trial court should always specify the reasons for a complaint’s dismissal so that on appeal, the reviewing court can readily determine
the prima facie justification for the dismissal.21 A decision that does not clearly and distinctly state the facts and the law on which it is
based leaves the parties in the dark and is especially prejudicial to the losing party who is unable to point the assigned error in
seeking a review by a higher tribunal.22

We thus agree with the petitioner that the dismissal of Civil Case No. 02-488 constituted a denial of due process. Elementary due
process demands that the parties to a litigation be given information on how the case was decided, as well as an explanation of the
factual and legal reasons that led to the conclusions of the court.23 Where the reasons are absent, a decision (such as the December
16, 2003 dismissal order) has absolutely nothing to support it and is thus a nullity.24
For this same reason, we are not moved by respondent FGU Insurance’s statement that the disposition of the present petition must
be limited to the issue of whether the CA had correctly dismissed the appeal in CA-G.R. CV No. 83096. 25 This statement implies that
we cannot properly look into the validity of the December 16, 2003 dismissal order in this Rule 45 petition. A void decision, however,
is open to collateral attack. While we note that the validity of the dismissal order with respect to Section 1, Rule 36 of the Rules of
Court was never raised by the petitioner as an issue in the present petition, the Supreme Court is vested with ample authority to
review an unassigned error if it finds that consideration and resolution are indispensable or necessary in arriving at a just decision in
an appeal.26 In this case, the interests of substantial justice warrant the review of an obviously void dismissal order.

The appeal was properly filed

under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court

While the nullity of the December 16, 2003 dismissal order constitutes the ratio decidendi for this petition, we nevertheless rule on
the contention that the appeal was erroneously filed.27

In dismissing the appeal, the CA relied on the premise that since the facts presented in the petitioner’s appeal were admitted and
not disputed, the appeal must thereby raise a pure question of law proscribed in an ordinary appeal. This premise was effectively
the legal principle articulated in the case of Joaquin v. Navarro,28 cited by the CA in its April 8, 2005 resolution. Respondent FGU
Insurance thus contends that the proper remedy to assail the dismissal of Civil Case No. 02-488 was an appeal filed under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court.

The reliance on Joaquin is misplaced as it is based on the conclusion the appellate court made in its April 8, 2005 resolution — i.e.,
that the pleading of undisputed facts is equivalent to a prohibited appeal. The reliance is inattentive to both the averments of the
subject appeal and to the text of the cited case. The operative legal principle in Joaquin is this: "[W]here a case is submitted upon
an agreement of facts, or where all the facts are stated in the judgment and the issue is the correctness of the conclusions drawn
therefrom, the question is one of law which [is properly subject to the review of this Court.]" 29 In this case, as already pointed out
above, the facts supposedly supporting the trial court’s conclusion of non prosequitur were not stated in the judgment. This defeats
the application of Joaquin.

At any rate, we believe that the filing of the appeal in CA-G.R. CV No. 83096 under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court was proper as it
necessarily involved questions of fact.

An authority material to this case is the case of Olave v. Mistas.30 Directly addressed in Olave was the CA’s jurisdiction over an
ordinary appeal supported by undisputed facts and seeking the review of a prejudicial order of dismissal. In this case, a complaint
was filed before the RTC in Lipa City to nullify an instrument titled "Affidavit of Adjudication By The Heirs of the Estate of Deceased
Persons With Sale." The RTC dismissed the complaint, with prejudice, after the plaintiffs had moved to set the case for pre-trial only
after more than three (3) months had lapsed from the service and filing of the last pleading in the case. The plaintiffs thereafter went
to the CA on a Rule 41 petition, contending, among others, that the trial court had erred and abused its discretion. As in the present
case, the defendants moved to dismiss the appeal on the ground that the issues therein were legal; they pointed out that the
circumstances on record were admitted.31 They argued that the proper remedy was a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court.

The CA denied the motion and entertained the appeal. It rendered a decision reinstating the complaint on the ground that there was
no evidence on record that the plaintiffs had deliberately failed to prosecute their complaint.

When the case was elevated to this court on a Rule 45 petition, we squarely addressed the propriety of the plaintiffs’ appeal.
Though mindful that the circumstances pleaded in the appeal were all admitted, we categorically held in Olave that the appeal was
correctly filed. We observed that despite undisputed records, the CA, in its review, still had to respond to factual questions such as
the length of time between the plaintiffs’ receipt of the last pleading filed up to the time they moved to set the case for pre-trial,
whether there had been any manifest intention on the plaintiffs’ part not to comply with the Rules of Court, and whether the plaintiffs’
counsel was negligent.

Significantly, in Olave, we agreed with the plaintiffs that among the critical factual questions was whether, based on the records,
there had been factual basis for the dismissal of the subject complaint. This same question is particularly significant in the present
case given that the order appealed from in CA-G.R. CV No. 83096 does not even indicate the factual basis for the dismissal of Civil
Case No. 02-488. Due to the absence of any stated factual basis, and despite the admissions of the parties, the CA, in CA-G.R. CV
No. 83096, still had to delve into the records to check whether facts to justify the prejudicial dismissal even exist. Since the dismissal
of Civil Case No. 02-488 appears to have been rendered motu proprio (as the December 16, 2003 dismissal order does not state if it
was issued upon the respondents’ or the trial court’s motion), the facts to be determined by the CA should include the grounds
specified under Section 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court. A court could only issue a motu proprio dismissal pursuant to the grounds
mentioned in this rule and for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. 32 These grounds are matters of facts. Thus, given that the
dismissal order does not disclose its factual basis, we are thus persuaded that the petitioner had properly filed its appeal from the
dismissal order under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.

The Dismissal of Civil Case No. 02-488 is not Supported by the Facts of the Case
We also find that the dismissal of Civil Case No. 02-488 is not warranted. Based on available records and on the averments of the
parties, the following events were chronologically proximate to the dismissal of Civil Case No. 02-488: (a) on March 24, 2003, the
court admitted FGU Insurance’s third-party complaint; (b) the trial court cancelled the June 20, 2003 hearing upon FGU Insurance’s
motion; and (c) on June 16, 2003, Baetiong filed his Answer to the third-party complaint but did not serve it upon the petitioner.

None of these events square with the grounds specified by Section 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court for the motu proprio dismissal of
a case for failure to prosecute. These grounds are as follows:

(a) Failure of the plaintiff, without justifiable reasons, to appear on the date of the presentation of his evidence in chief;

(b) Failure of the plaintiff to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time;

(c) Failure of the plaintiff to comply with the Rules of Court; or

(d) Failure of the plaintiff to obey any order of the court.

In our view, the developments in the present case do not satisfy the stringent standards set in law and jurisprudence for a non
prosequitur.33 The fundamental test for non prosequitur is whether, under the circumstances, the plaintiff is chargeable with want of
due diligence in failing to proceed with reasonable promptitude. 34 There must be unwillingness on the part of the plaintiff to
prosecute.35

In this case, the parties’ own narrations of facts demonstrate the petitioner’s willingness to prosecute its complaint.1âwphi1 Indeed,
neither respondents FGU Insurance nor Baetiong was able to point to any specific act committed by the petitioner to justify the
dismissal of their case.

While it is discretionary on the trial court to dismiss cases, dismissals of actions should be made with care. The repressive or
restraining effect of the rule amounting to adjudication upon the merits may cut short a case even before it is fully litigated; a ruling
of dismissal may forever bar a litigant from pursuing judicial relief under the same cause of action. Hence, sound discretion
demands vigilance in duly recognizing the circumstances surrounding the case to the end that technicality shall not prevail over
substantial justice.36

This court is thus of the opinion that the dismissal of Civil Case No. 02-488 is not warranted. Neither facts, law or jurisprudence
supports the RTC’s finding of failure to prosecute on the part of the petitioner.

Wherefore, premises considered, the instant petition is Granted. The resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated April 8, 2005 and
October 4, 2005 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The order dated December 16, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 61,
Makati City, in Civil Case No. 02-488 is declared NULL and VOID, and the petitioner’s complaint therein is
ordered REINSTATED for further proceedings. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
G.R. No. 215072, September 07, 2016

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, Petitioner, v. HEIRS OF THE LATE IRENEO AND CARIDAD ENTAPA, NAMELY: ROSARIO
ENTAPA-ORPEZA, JULIANNE E. HAMM,1 CERINA G. ENTAPA, WINSTON G. ENTAPA (DECEASED) REPRESENTED BY HIS
SPOUSE, NINFA LAMISTOZA-ENTAPA, FRANKLIN G. ENTAPA, MARINA E. SCHACHT, AND ELVIRA G.
ENTAPA, Respondents.

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

The Constitution requires that a court must state the factual and legal grounds on which its decisions are based. Any decision that
fails to adhere to this mandate is void.

The Philippine National Bank, through a Petition for Review on Certiorari,2 assails the Decision3 dated June 4, 2013 and
Resolution4 dated October 2, 2014 of the Court of Appeals, which nullified the Decision5 of Branch 54 of the Regional Trial Court of
Bacolod City. The Court of Appeals nullified the Regional Trial Court Decision for failing to state the facts and law on which it was
based.6chanrobleslaw

On December 5, 1973, Caridad Entapa (Entapa) and her children, Julianna E. Hamm and Winston Entapa, executed a Special
Power of Attorney authorizing Joseph Gonzaga (Gonzaga) to enter into legal transactions on their behalf. 7chanrobleslaw

Entapa owned Lot No. 2665 with an area of 16.067 hectares and covered by Original Certificate of Title No. P-6497. 8 On January 3,
1974,9 Gonzaga executed a real estate mortgage over Lot No. 2665 in favor of the Philippine National Bank to guarantee his loan of
P30,600.00.10chanrobleslaw

Gonzaga failed to pay the loan.11 The property was foreclosed and was sold at a public auction. The Philippine National Bank
emerged as the winning bidder. 12 A Certificate of Sale was issued in the bank's favor on December 29, 1983. 13chanrobleslaw

Entapa's other heirs had no knowledge of Gonzaga's Special Power of Attorney. They learned of the foreclosure sale only after the
public auction.14chanrobleslaw

Rosario Entapa Orpeza (Orpeza), representing Entapa's other heirs, went to the Philippine National Bank at Lacson Street, Bacolod
City to ask about the repurchase of the property. 15 Despite knowledge that the property had already been foreclosed, she wrote a
letter dated March 15, 1995 to Raul Topacio, Assistant Vice President and Branch Manager, requesting a restructuring and
recomputation of Gonzaga's loan in accordance with the guidelines of Republic Act No. 7202. 16chanrobleslaw

On May 2, 1996, the Philippine National Bank informed Orpeza that its Branch Credit Committee approved her request and stated
the terms and conditions of the Thirteen-Year Plan of Payment. 17 Two (2) of the seven (7) conditions were to deposit 20% of the
total recomputed amount and to pay the arrears of the realty taxes on the property. 18chanrobleslaw

In compliance, Orpeza sent a bank transfer of 9,797 German Deutschmark equivalent to P178,336.19, 20% of the recomputed
amount.19 She also paid the realty taxes on the property.20chanrobleslaw

Orpeza alleged that after she deposited the amount, she discovered that five (5) families were already residing and planting crops
on Lot No. 2665, by virtue of Certificates of Land Ownership (CLOA) issued by the Department of Agrarian Reform. 21 She went to
the Philippine National Bank to ask for an explanation and to request the bank to file a case to annul the CLOAs. 22 The bank did not
offer an explanation but only issued a certification declaring that according to their records, there had been no transfer of Lot No.
2665 to the Department of Agrarian Reform.23chanrobleslaw

Orpeza went to the Department of Agrarian Reform, where she was able to secure copies of the Deed of Sale, Deed of Transfer,
and Voluntary Offer of Sale of Lot No. 2665 by the Philippine National Bank to the Department of Agrarian Reform. 24 Moreover, she
was informed by Assistant Regional Director Homer Tobias that Lot No. 2665 was already covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program, and CLOAs had been issued according to the law.25cralawred He also explained that the lot was voluntarily
offered for Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program coverage by Philippine National Bank on September 30, 1989. 26chanrobleslaw

As a result, Orpeza demanded the return of the downpayment she made with the Philippine National Bank and asked for the
annulment of the CLOAs.27 "[The Philippine National Bank] did not take any action."28 As the bank still refused to refund the amount
despite demand, Orpeza and her siblings instituted a complaint for collection of sum of money against the Philippine National Bank
on October 5, 1998.29chanrobleslaw

In its defense, the Philippine National Bank insisted that before it approved Orpeza's request for restructuring and recomputation, it
verified that Lot No. 2665 was not included in the transfer of properties to the Department of Agrarian Reform. 30 It also alleged that
when Lot No. 2665 was offered to the Department of Agrarian Reform on September 30, 1989, it had no knowledge nor information
as to the status of its application as it had not received any payment from the Land Bank of the Philippines. 31chanrobleslaw

The Philippine National Bank alleged that while there was a Voluntary Offer to Sell Lot No. 2665, it did not acquire a record of the
Voluntary Offer to Sell until 1998 and only came to know of the existence of the CLOAs when Orpeza informed its
officers.32chanrobleslaw

On April 31, 2006, the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City ordered the Philippine National Bank to return the initial downpayment of
P178,336.10, realty taxes of P56,421.30, exemplary damages at P50,000.00, moral damages at P50,000.00, and attorney's fees of
15% of the amount due, with legal interest. 33chanrobleslaw

The Regional Trial Court Decision reads:

This is a case for collection of sum of money with claims for damages, instituted by the heirs of Ireneo and Caridad Entapa, namely:
Rosario Entapa-Oropeza [sic], Julianna E. Warn, Cerina G. Entapa, Winston G. Entapa represented . . . by his Spouse Ninfa
Lamistoza-Entapa, Franklin G. Entapa, Marina E. Schacht and Elvira Entapa.

Ireneo Entapa, deceased, died on December 7, 1967 in the city of Bago, survived by his widow, Caridad Entapa and legitimate
children herein before named. Ireneo Entapa was the registered owner of two parcels of lands located in Barangay Ilijan, City of
Bago, denominated as Lot No. 2664 covered by TCT No. T- and Lot No. 2666 covered by TCT No. T-[sic]. The wife and widow,
Caridad Entapa, now deceased was also a registered owner of Lot No. 2665, covered by TCT OCT No. R-6497.

When Ireneo Entapa died, the lands devolved upon his heirs, the surviving wife, Caridad Entapa, and their children.

During the lifetime of the wife, Caridad Entapa, together with the children: namely, Juliana E. Ham and Winston Entapa as heirs-
owners of the aforementioned lots, executed a Special Power of Attorney in favor of Joseph Gonzaga, to mortgage the lot to
banking institutions.

Joseph Gonzaga mortgaged the properties to the Philippine National Bank-Bacolod Branch.

The other children except the two who signed the Special Power of Attorney were working abroad and they were unaware of the
execution of the Special Power of Attorney in favor of Joseph Gonzaga.

The loan was not paid by Joseph Gonzaga and the Philippine National Bank sold the lands in a public auction. The bid was awarded
to the mortgagee-bank, the Philippine National Bank. A certificate of Sale issued to the Philippine National Bank marked in evidence
as Exhibit [sic].

When the children heirs learned of the foreclosure of the properties while they were abroad, the heirs headed by Rosario Entapa
Orpeza, made representation with the Philippine National Bank to purchase back the properties via restructuring of the loan under
Republic Act No. 7202 otherwise known as the Sugar Restitution Law.

Pursuant to the Sugar Restitution Law, the Philippine National Bank through its Vice President[,] Mr. Topaciof,] accepted in principle
the restructuring of the loan and for the heirs to purchase back the properties with 20% percent [sic] down payment of the
recomputed value which amounted to Php 178,336.50. In addition, the heirs were also required to update the realty taxes of the lots.
The heirs obliged by paying the realty taxes. The heirs through Rosario Entapa Orpeza paid the required deposit of Php 178,336.50.
It was paid in German Currency converted to Philippine peso prevailing at the time. The heirs were happy that they could get back
their ancestral lots where they grew up.

Rosario Entapa Orpeza who spearheaded the repurchase of the properties was based in the United States of America working as
an accountant. She stayed in the country abandoning meanwhile her work in the USA just to consummate the repurchase of the
properties and she lost income while staying in the Philippines.

When Rosario Entapa Orpeza had paid for the realty taxes and the 20% downpayment for the repurchase, she wanted to visit the
lands located on the mountainside in Upper Maao, Bago City. She discovered that the properties are occupied by several families
who are CARP beneficiaries and are holding CLOA[s] issued by the Department of Agrarian Reform.

She confronted the PNB official, Mr. Raul Topacio on the alleged CARP coverage of the lots but she was reassured that the PNB
shall take care of it.

It was sometime on March 15, 1995 when Rosario Entapa Orpeza formally applied for restructuring under the Sugar Restitution
Law. On May 22, 1995, the Assistant Vice President Raul G. Topacio informed Rosario Entapa Orpeza of the total obligations which
required twenty (20%) percent down payment and the account shall be payable in[ ] 13 years.

The restructuring of the loan was officially approved by the Branch Committee on April 16, 1996.

Before approving the restructuring of the Entapa loan, the PNB verified if the properties have been turned over to the Department of
Agrarian Reform as required by[ ] law on acquired agricultural assets of the bank. There was a list of properties transferred to the
DAR (Exhibit 7) and the properties of Caridad Entapa were not in the list indicating that the subject properties have not been
transferred for CARP coverage. The owner's duplicate of the title is still with the PNB.

Rosario Entapa Orpeza signed "ACCEPTANCE" in the May 1996 letter of the PNB on the terms of restructuring of the loan.

When the alleged CARP coverage was verified with the Department of Agrarian Reform, documents cropped up indicating that the
lot was sold by the PNB to the Department of Agrarian Reform way back on September 30, 1989. The DAR sent a notice of Land
Valuation (Exhibit 0) dated March 6, 1992. The Department of Agrarian Reform processed the awards of the land and CLOA[s] were
issued and given to the beneficiaries.

From the evidence adduced, it appears that the Philippine National Bank was not meticulous in allowing the Entapa Heirs to avail of
the Sugar Restitution Law to repurchase their property. The PNB agreed to grant the restitution because from the record they looked
into, the Entapa property was not among those transferred to the Department of Agrarian Reform, actually the property had been
offered to the DAR under the Voluntary Offer to Sell (VOS), and the valuation [had] been determined and communicated to the
Philippine National Bank as shown by subsequent check of record.

The Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) have [sic] been issued and distributed to the awardees; thus, it became legally
impossible to go on with the repurchase of the property by the Entapa Heirs under the Sugar Restitution Law or plain repurchase of
the property.

With the situation that the Entapa Heirs could no longer work and hope to reacquire their property, the plaintiffs-heirs formally
demanded for the return of the 20% initial deposit paid to the PNB and also the real property taxes paid when the property had
already been divided and awarded to the beneficiaries covered by CLOA[s].

The Philippine National Bank did not return the amount paid by the Entapa Heirs which led to the filing of the instant case. Likewise,
the Entapa Heirs suffered for the vain hope that they could get back the properties with so much attachment or sentimental value.

The repurchase had not materialized; thus, the demand to return the amounts paid.

In a nutshell, the Entapa Heirs, who were working abroad in the United States and Germany, came to know that the lot of the
mother had been foreclosed and the redemption period had lapsed. The heirs wanted to recover the property and one option was to
repurchase the property under the Sugar Restitution Law. The heirs were allowed in principle to repurchase the property under the
Restitution Law. The Philippine National Bank was under the impression that the subject property still belonged to the PNB because
the owner's duplicate of the title was still on file and a check on the list of properties transferred to the Department of Agrarian
Reform, the Entapa property was not among them — the acquired agricultural lands shall be turned over to the DAR for purposes of
the Land Reform program. The Philippine National Bank formally communicated to the Entapa Heirs of the approval of the
repurchase and the valuation wherein the former owners were required initially the 20% of the valuation and the Entapa heirs did
pay. The heirs were likewise required to update the real property taxes which they complied.

When the Entapa heirs came to know that the subject lot had been earlier offered to the Department of Agrarian Reform under the
Voluntary Offer to Sell (VOS) scheme of the CARP, they were aghast and their hope to be able to get back the property came to
naught. The PNB tried to reassure the heirs that the Certificate of Title is still in the name of the PNB and it would push through the
repurchase under the Sugar Restitution Law.

With the granting of the CLOA[s] to the beneficiaries who had been in actual occupation and cultivation, there was no more
possibility for the heirs to get back the land.

The Entapa heirs demanded for the return of the money they had paid for the value of the land and the real property taxes they
paid, for they could not repurchase the land. The PNB refused to timely return the amounts paid by the heirs which finally led to the
instant suit. Rosario Entapa Orpeza had to delay her return to her work to the United States of America in order to consummate the
repurchase and getting back of the property. In the USA, she had a work which earned regularly for her in dollars. Rosario claims
moral and actual damages for the failure to get back the property which has sentimental value to the children.

With the repurchase not carried, there is the duty to return the amounts paid by the Entapa heirs.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant:

1. The defendant is ordered to return to the plaintiff the following amounts:

a. Php 178,336.10 - representing initial downpayment for the repurchase of the lot plus legal interests
until paid;

b. Php 56,421.30 representing realty taxes paid on the lot plus legal interests until paid;

c. Php 50,000.00 as exemplary damages;

d. Php 50,000.00 as moral damages; and cralawlawlibrary

e. Attorney's fees of 15% of the amount due; and cralawlawlibrary

f. To pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.34chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The Philippine National Bank appealed to the Court of Appeals and argued that (1) the trial court's Decision violated the Constitution
and the Rules of Civil Procedure when it failed to state the facts and law on which its ruling was based, and (2) the trial court erred
in ordering it to return the payments. 35chanrobleslaw

On June 4, 2013, the Court of Appeals nullified the Regional Trial Court Decision and remanded the case to it for the rendition of
judgment under the Constitution and Rules of Court.36chanrobleslaw

The Court of Appeals found that after a careful reading of the trial court's Decision, the Decision did not contain analysis of the
evidence of the parties or reference to any legal basis to reach its conclusions, contrary to the requirements of Article VIII, Section
1437 of the Constitution and Rule 36, Section 138 of the Rules of Court.39chanrobleslaw

However, the Court of Appeals also pointed out that the Philippine National Bank could not raise new arguments on appeal as its
argument that it was entitled to apply Orpeza's downpayment to Gonzaga's outstanding loan constituted a change of theory, which
should be disallowed on appeal.40 The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals Decision reads:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the appeal is GRANTED. The assailed 31 August 2006 Decision of the Regional Trial
Court Branch 54 of Bacolod City in Civil Case No. 98-10510 is NULLIFIED as it does not conform with Section 14 Article VII [sic] of
the 1987 Constitution and Section 1 Rule 36 of the Rules of Court.

The records of the case are hereby remanded to the said Regional Trial Court for the rendition of judgment in accordance with the
mandate of the Constitution and the Rules of Court, with dispatch.

SO ORDERED.41 (Emphasis in the original)

The Philippine National Bank moved for reconsideration, but the Motion was denied in the Resolution dated October 2,
2014.42chanrobleslaw

Aggrieved, petitioner Philippine National Bank filed before this Court a Petition for Review on Certiorari arguing that the Court of
Appeals erred in rendering judgment on the merits despite nullifying the Regional Trial Court Decision and remanding the case. 43 It
also argues that the Court of Appeals should not have held them liable to pay respondents Heirs of Ireneo and Caridad
Entapa:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
II. The Court of Appeals seriously erred when it held petitioner PNB liable to return the amount of Phpl78,336.10 representing initial
downpayment of respondents plus legal interest effective 14 October 1998 until paid.

III.  The Court of Appeals seriously erred when it held petitioner PNB liable to return the amount of Php56,421.30 representing the
realty taxes paid by respondents plus legal interest until paid.

....

IV. The Court of Appeals seriously erred when it held the Bank liable to pay moral damages, exemplary damages, attorney's fees
and cost of suit to respondents.44chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In their Comment,45 respondents argue that the Court of Appeals did not make any adjudication on the merits of the case since the
dispositive portion of the Decision did not actually state that petitioner was liable to respondents for the stated
amounts.46 Respondents further assert that the Court of Appeals discussed the other issues because petitioner raised these issues
before the Court of Appeals, and if petitioner did not want the Court of Appeals to discuss these issues, then it should not have
raised them.47 Respondents argue that even assuming that there was an adjudication on the merits, the Court of Appeals would not
have erred in finding petitioner liable since its bad faith was clear from the facts and the evidence. 48chanrobleslaw

The issues before this Court are:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryFirst, whether the Court of Appeals erred in nullifying the Regional Trial Court Decision;
and cralawlawlibrary

Second, whether the Court of Appeals adjudicated on the merits of the case despite ordering its remand to the trial court.

The Petition is denied.

A court must state the factual and legal basis for its decisions; otherwise, its decisions are void.

Article VIII, Section 14 of the Constitution provides:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
ARTICLE VIII
Judicial Department
....

SECTION 14. No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on
which it is based.

No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of the court shall be refused due course or denied without stating
the legal basis therefor.
Rule 36, Section 1 of the Rules of Court provides:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
 RULE 36
Judgments, Final Orders and Entry Thereof

SECTION 1. Rendition of judgments and final orders. — A judgment or final order determining the merits of the case shall be in
writing personally and directly prepared by the judge, stating clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based, signed
by him, and filed with the clerk of the court.
The Court of Appeals, in nullifying the Decision of the trial court, stated that it "contained no reference to any legal basis in reaching
its conclusions"49 nor did it "cite any legal authority or principle to support its conclusion that [the] bank is liable." 50 The Court of
Appeals found that the "trial court merely narrated the factual circumstances of the case and directly declared the liability of the
[bank] to pay [respondents] the amount she paid as downpayment for the re-purchase of the subject land." 51chanrobleslaw

The Regional Trial Court Decision52 dated August 31, 2006 is four (4) pages long. Its first three (3) pages state the facts of the case.
The fourth page states:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The Entapa heirs demanded for the return of the money they had paid for the value of the land and the real property taxes they
paid, for they could not repurchase the land. The PNB refused to timely return the amounts paid by the heirs which finally led to the
instant suit. Rosario Entapa Orpeza had to delay her return to her work to the United States of America in order to consummate the
repurchase and getting back of the property. In the USA, she had a work which earned regularly for her in dollars. Rosario claims
moral and actual damages for the failure to get back the property which has sentimental value to the children.

With the repurchase not carried, there is the duty to return the amounts paid by the Entapa heirs.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant:

1. The defendant is ordered to return to the plaintiff the following amounts:

a. Php 178,336.10 — representing initial downpayment for the repurchase of the lot plus legal interests
until paid;

b. Php 56,421.30 representing realty taxes paid on the lot plus legal interests until paid;

c. Php 50,000.00 as exemplary damages;

d. Php 50,000.00 as moral damages; and cralawlawlibrary

e. Attorney's fees of 15% of the amount due; and cralawlawlibrary

f. To pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.53chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The trial court failed to cite any legal basis for declaration of petitioner's liability. The Decision merely contained a recitation of facts
and a dispositive portion. Yao v. Court of Appeals54 nullified a similar decision for failure of the court to state the legal basis for its
ruling:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Faithful adherence to the requirements of Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution is indisputably a paramount component of due
process and fair play. It is likewise demanded by the due process clause of the Constitution. The parties to a litigation should be
informed of how it was decided, with an explanation of the factual and legal reasons that led to the conclusions of the court. The
court cannot simply say that judgment is rendered in favor of X and against Y and just leave it at that without any justification
whatsoever for its action. The losing party is entitled to know why he lost, so he may appeal to the higher court, if permitted, should
he believe that the decision should be reversed. A decision that does not clearly and distinctly state the facts and the law on which it
is based leaves the parties in the dark as to how it was reached and is precisely prejudicial to the losing party, who is unable to
pinpoint the possible errors of the court for review by a higher tribunal. More than that, the requirement is an assurance to the
parties that, in reaching judgment, the judge did so through the processes of legal reasoning. It is, thus, a safeguard against the
impetuosity of the judge, preventing him from deciding ipse dixit. Vouchsafed neither. the sword nor the purse by the Constitution
but nonetheless vested with the sovereign prerogative of passing judgment on the life, liberty or property of his fellowmen, the judge
must ultimately depend on the power of reason for sustained public confidence in the justness of his decision.

Thus the Court has struck down as void, decisions of lower courts and even of the Court of Appeals whose careless disregard of the
constitutional behest exposed their sometimes cavalier attitude not only to their magisterial responsibilities but likewise to their
avowed fealty to the Constitution.55 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
In Yao, the assailed decision was nullified and the records of the case were remanded to the trial court. The Court of Appeals in this
case did the same.

The constitutional requirement that the basis of the decision of our courts should be clearly articulated and made legible to the
parties does not merely assure fairness . . . . It is likewise crucial to assure the public that the judiciary arrives at its conclusions on
the basis of reasonable inference from credible and admissible evidence and the text of law and our jurisprudence. Decisions of all
courts should not be based on any other considerations. Not only will fully coherent and cogent reasons have greater chances to
convince the litigants of their chances on appeal; they also make appeals possible. After all, appellate courts cannot be assumed to
have so much omniscience that they can read what the trial judge has not written.
Petitioner likewise argues that the Court of Appeals should not have ruled that it was liable to respondents.

This is erroneous.

Nothing in the Court of Appeals Decision ordered petitioner to return to respondents their downpayment and pay: them damages.
Petitioner brought the appeal before the Court of Appeals, arguing, among others, that it should not have been held liable since it
already applied Orpeza's downpayment to Gonzaga's outstanding loan.56 The Court of Appeals, in addressing petitioner's
arguments, explained that it could not rule on these arguments since it was brought for the first time on
appeal:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
While it is true that [petitioner] has the right to recover the deficiency of Gonzaga's loan obligation under the well-entrenched rule
that a creditor is not precluded from recovering any unpaid balance on the principal obligation if the extrajudicial foreclosure sale of
the property subject of the real estate mortgage results in a deficiency, still, such defenses could not be countenanced because it
was belatedly raised only on appeal, not during the trial before the court a quo.

Added to that, [petitioner] did not present any proof to substantiate its allegations. Their factual allegations clearly required the
presentation of additional evidence in order to properly address the issues raised in the new theory. This, [petitioner] failed to do.
Hence, this Court cannot give due course to the new issues raised in the appeal for lack of evidence. Justice and fair play dictate
that [petitioner's] change of theory of their case on appeal be disallowed.57 (Emphasis supplied)
Strangely, petitioner now comes before this Court and argues that the Court of Appeals should not have adjudicated on the
arguments that it had raised before it.

Even if the Court of Appeals had adjudicated upon the merits of the case, any discussion would have been considered obiter
dictum since the entire case was remanded to the trial court.

Obiter dictum is "an opinion expressed by a court upon some question of law which is not necessary to the decision of the case
before it."58 It is a "a remark made, or opinion expressed . . . upon a point not necessarily involved in the determination of the cause,
or introduced by way of illustration, or analogy or argument." 59 It "lacks the force of an adjudication and should not ordinarily be
regarded as such."60chanrobleslaw

It was not necessary for the Court of Appeals to discuss the other issues that petitioner raised in order to determine that the case
must be remanded to the trial court. In any case, petitioner is not precluded from presenting the same arguments before the trial
court.

We take this opportunity to remind judges and justices of their solemn duty to uphold and defend the Constitution and the principles
it embodies. This duty is so basic that it appears in the Oath of Office of every public officer and employee 61 and is stated only in the
third whereas clause of the New Code of Judicial Conduct. 62 When the law is basic and the rules are elementary, the duty of a judge
is simply to apply it.63 Failure to do so constitutes gross ignorance of the law.64 It entails additional expenses on the part of the party-
litigants and creates an undeserved public impression of the lack of competence of the entire judiciary.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision dated June 4, 2013 and the Resolution dated October 2, 2014 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 01895 are AFFIRMED.

A copy of this Decision shall be served on the Office of the Court Administrator, who is DIRECTED to initiate proceedings against
Presiding Judge Demosthenes L. Magallanes of Branch 54 of the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City for gross ignorance of the law
and any other violation of our Rules.

SO ORDERED.
 G.R. No. 206451, August 17, 2016

ELPIDIO MAGNO, HEIRS OF ISIDRO M. CABATIC, NAMELY: JOSE CABATIC, RODRIGO CABATIC, AND MELBA CABATIC;
AND ODELITO M. BUGAYONG, AS HEIR OF THE LATE AURORA MAGNO, Petitioners, v. LORENZO MAGNO, NICOLAS
MAGNO, PETRA MAGNO, MARCIANO MAGNO, ISIDRO MAGNO, TEODISTA MAGNO, ESTRELLA MAGNO, BIENVENIDO M.
DE GUZMAN, CONCHITA M. DE GUZMAN, SILARY M. DE GUZMAN, MANUEL M. DE GUZMAN AND MANOLO M. DE
GUZMAN, Respondents.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari, assailing the Decision1 dated July 23, 2012 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV- No.
90846, which reversed and set aside the Decision2 dated November 15,2007 of the Regional Trial Court of Alaminos City,
Pangasinan, Branch 54, in Civil Case No. A-1850, and dismissed the complaint for partition on the ground of res judicata.

The facts are as follows:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryPetitioners Elpidio Magno, heirs of Isidro M. Cabatic, namely: Jose Cabatic, Rodrigo Cabatic, and
Melba Cabatic, and Odelito M. Bugayong, as heir of the late Aurora Magno, (Elpidio Magno, et al. ) are the successors-in-interest
of Doroteo Magno, who is the legitimate child of Nicolas Magno by his first wife, Eugenia Recaido. On the other hand, respondents
Lorenzo, Nicolas, Petra, Marciano, Isidro, Teodista, Estrella, all surnamed Magno, and Bienvenido M., Conchita M., Silary M.,
Manuel M. and Manolo, all surnamed De Guzman, are the successors-in-interest of Nicetas Magno, Gavino Magno and Nazaria
Magno, (Lorenzo Magno, et al. ), who are the legitimate children of Nicolas by her second wife, Camila Asinger.

For easy reference, the following are the successors-in-interest of the late Nicolas Magno: 3

I. Children of the First Marriage with Eugenia Recaido (+)

A. Doroteo Magno, survived by:
1. Teofilo Magno, survived by Jacinta Magno (wife)
2. Jose Magno, survived by Nicanor and Lolita Magno
3. Angela Magno, survived by:
a. Isidro M. Cabatic, survived by
i. Jose Cabatic
ii. Rodrigo Cabatic
iii. Melba Cabatic
b. Felicitas Cabatic
c. Milagros Cabatic
d. Herminio Cabatic.
4. Espiridion Magno, survived by:
a. Tomas Magno
b. Elpidio Magno
c. Aurora Magno, survived by:
i. Odelito M. Bugayong
B. Eduardo Magno (died without issue)

II. Children of the Second Marriage with Camila Asinger (+)

A. Nicetas Magno,  survived by Lorenzo Magno, who was in turn survived by:

1. Antonia Magno (widow)
2. Sheila Magno-Arandia (daughter)
3. Lorelyn Magno-Benas (daughter)
4. Arvin Ray M. delos Santos (grandson)
B. Gavino Magno, survived by:
1. Nicolas Magno, survived by:
a. Teresita M. Magno (widow)
b. Joselito Magno (son)
2. Petra Magno
3. Marciano Magno, survived by:
a. Rolando Magno (son)
b. Rosita M. Fernandez (daughter)
c. George Magno (son)
d. Gloria M. Ocampo (daughter)
e. Josefa M. Garcia (daughter)
f. Perlita M. Abarra (daughter)
g. Nenita Magno (daughter)
4. Leonido Magno
 5. Isidro Magno
6. Teodista Magno
7. Estrella Magno
C. Nazaria Magno, survived by:
1. Bienvenido M. de Guzman
2. Conchita M. de Guzman-Lopez, survived by:
a. Benjamin Lopez (widower)
b. Leila Lopez Tamina (daughter)
c. Edgar Lopez (son)
d. Joshua Lopez (son)
e. Daisy Lopez (daughter)
f. Bernardino Lopez (son)
g. Abes Lopez (son)
h. Dejobe Lopez (son)
3. Silary M. de Guzman
4. Manuel M. de Guzman
5. Manolo M. de Guzman

Gavino Magno, Nicetas, and Nazaria,4 all surnamed Magno, (Gavino Magno, et al.), who are the predecessors-in-interest of
Lorenzo Magno, et al, filed an Amended Complaint dated January 30, 1964 before the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Alaminos,
Pangasinan, which was docketed as Civil Case No. A-413. In their complaint for partition with damages, Gavino Magno, et al.
sought the partition of the following properties left by Nicolas Magno who died intestate in 1907:
(a) A parcel of land (unirrigated riceland) located at Lucap, Cayucay, Alaminos, Pangasinan, bounded by the properties of the
following: x x x; consisting of Two Hundred Seventy-Seven Thousand Twenty-Six (277,026) Square Meters, more or less, and
declared for taxation purposes under Tax Declaration No. 4236 in 1951 in the Office of the Provincial Assessor of Pangasinan, in
the name of Doroteo Magno;

(b) A parcel  of land  (unirrigated riceland)  located at Lucap, Alaminos, Pangasinan, bounded by the properties of the following: x x
x; consisting of Four Thousand Four Hundred Seventeen (4,417) Square Meters, more or less, and declared for taxation purposes
under Tax Declaration No. 4235 in 1951 in the Office of the Provincial Assessor of Pangasinan, in the name of Doroteo Magno;

(c) A parcel of land (residential lot) located at Poblacion, Alaminos, Pangasinan, bounded by the properties of the following: x x x;
consisting of Two Thousand Seven Hundred Five (2,705) Square Meters, more or less, and declared for taxation purposes
under Tax Declaration No. 4238, in 1951 in the Office of the Provincial Assessor of Pangasinan, in the name of Doroteo Magno;

(d) A parcel of land (unirrigated riceland) located at San Jose Dive, Poblacion, Pangasinan, bounded by the properties of the
following: x x x; consisting of Five Thousand Four Hundred (5,400) Square Meters, more or less, and declared for taxation purposes
under Tax Declaration No. 4237 in 1951 in the Office of the Provincial Assessor of Pangasinan, in the name of Doroteo Magno;

(e) A parcel of land (unirrigated rice, sugar, and forest lands), located at Lucap, Alaminos, Pangasinan, bounded by the properties of
the following: x x x; consisting of One Hundred Fifty-Six Thousand Five Hundred Forty (156,540) Square Meters, more or less, and
declared for taxation purposes under Tax Declaration No. 4233 in 1951 in the Office of the Provincial Assessor of Pangasinan, in
the name of Doroteo Magno;

(f) A parcel of land (coconut land) located at Lucap, Cayucay, Alaminos, Pangasinan, bounded by the properties of the following: x x
x; consisting of Three Thousand Two Hundred Forty-Five (3,245) Square Meters, more or less, and declared for taxation purposes
under Tax Declaration No. 4234 in 1951 in the Office of the Provincial Assessor of Pangasinan, in the name of Doroteo Magno;

(g) A parcel of land (unirrigated Riceland) located at Balangobong, Alaminos, Pangasinan, bounded by the properties of the
following: x x x; consisting of Eleven Thousand One Hundred Thirty-Two (11,132) Square Meters, more or less, and declared for
taxation purposes under Tax Declaration No. 4241 in 1951 in the Office of the Provincial Assessor ofPangasinan, in the name
of Espiridion Magno; 5
In their Amended Answer to the Amended Complaint with a Counter-claim6 dated March 4, 1964, Teofilo Magno, Isidro, Herminio
and Felicidad, all surnamed Cabatic, Aurora, Elpidio, Tomas, Nicanor and Lolita, all surnamed Magno (Teofilo Magno, et  al. ),
who are the predecessors-in-interest of Elpidio Magno, et al, denied the material allegations of the amended complaint. By way of
counterclaim, Teofilo Magno, et al. also sought the partition of three (3) parcels of land originally owned by Nicolas Magno, as
shown by Original Tax Declaration No. 2221 in his name, and described as follows:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Tax Declaration No. 4246 in the name of GAVINO MAGNO and is actually in the possession of Gavino Magno, plaintiff:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryA parcel of land containing an area of 84,988 square meters in area situated in the Barrio Lucap,
Municipality of Alaminos, Pangasinan, Philippines, x x x.

Tax Declaration No. 13385 assessed at P390.00 in the name of plaintiff, Necitas Magno described as follows:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryA parcel of land situated in the Barrio of Lucap, Municipality of Alaminos, Pangasinan, containing an
area of about 38,385 sq. m. x x x.

Tax Declaration No. 4249 in the name of plaintiff NAZARIA MAGNO and also under her actual possession, to wit:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryA parcel of land situated in the Barrio of Lucap, Mun. of Alaminos, Pangasinan containing an area of
41,023 sq. m. more or less, x x x.7
On October 5, 1972, CFI of Pangasinan, Branch VII,8 granted the amended complaint of Gavino Magno, et al., but failed to include
in the dispositive portion of its Decision9 three (3) real properties covered by Tax Declaration Nos. 4246, 4249, and 13385 subject of
the counterclaim of Teofilo Magno, et al. The fallo of the Decision reads:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
WHEREFORE,  in view of all the  foregoing  considerations, judgment is hereby declared as follows:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

  a) Declaring the plaintiffs  [Gavino Magno, et al. ] and the defendants [Teofilo Magno, et al. ] as legal heirs of
the deceased Nicolas Magno and consequently, the absolute and exclusive owners of the properties
described in the amended complaint, except the parcel of land described in paragraph (3), sub-paragraph (e)
of said amended complaint.
     
  b) Ordering the partition of said properties in four (4) equal parts as follows: one share each of the plaintiffs, Gavino,
Nicetas and Nazaria, all surnamed Magno, and the fourth share to thedefendants who represent the deceased
Doroteo Magno;
     
  c) Declaring the property described in paragraph (3), sub-paragraph (e) as the exclusive property of the heirs of the
deceased spouses, Doroteo Magno and Monica Romero;
     
  d) Ordering the defendants to account for the annual income or produce of the above-mentioned properties with the
exception of the property described in the preceding paragraph, and to divide the same into four (4) equal parts in
the manner above-described, commencing from 1957 until the accounting is made and the shares corresponding to
the plaintiffs delivered;
     
  e) Ordering the defendants to pay, jointly and severally, the plaintiffs in the sum of P3,000.00 as attorney's fees. And
the costs.
     
  SO ORDERED.10
On June 30, 1981, the Court of Appeals (CA), 9th Division, rendered a Decision11 affirming the decision of the CFI. The CA ruled,
among other matters, that the lands covered by Tax Declaration Nos. 4246, 4249, and 13385 were owned by the late Nicolas
Magno and must be brought into the mass of his estate. But, the CA also failed to order their partition in the dispositive portion of its
decision which reads:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from, being in accord with evidence and law, is hereby affirmed in all parts. With costs
against the defendants-appellants.

SO ORDERED.12
In an Entry of Judgment13 dated September 25, 1981, the Clerk of Court certified that the CA Decision has become final and
executory on September 22, 1981.

Meanwhile, on October 14, 1981, Gavino Magno, et al. filed a Motion for Execution, which the CFI granted. Teofilo Magno, et
al. filed a motion for reconsideration which the CFI denied on October 19, 1981.

Aggrieved, Teofilo Magno, et al. filed a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction before the Supreme Court which issued a
temporary restraining order against the CA and Gavino Magno, et al. on January 6, 1982. In a Decision14 dated July 31, 1987, the
Court dismissed the petition for lack of merit and lifted its restraining order. The Court ruled that the CA committed no error in
ordering the issuance of the entry of judgment, and that the CA decision has become final and executory, there being no appeal
taken therefrom. On November 2, 1987, it issued an Entry of Judgment in G.R. No. 58781 entitled Teofilo Magno, et al. v. Court of
Appeals, et al.

On December 8,1987, Gavino Magno, et  al. filed a Motion for Issuance of Alias Writ of Execution. On December 15, 1987, the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pangasinan, Branch 54,15 ordered the issuance of an alias writ of execution.

On January 27, 1988, Gavino Magno, et al. filed an Urgent Motion for Partition and Accounting. On May 4, 1989, the RTC ordered
the setting of the case for hearing on the urgent motion for partition and accounting, and for purposes of appointing commissioners
which shall make the necessary partition of the lands.

On August 23, 1989, Teofilo Magno, et al. filed a Motion to Reopen, alleging that there are real properties of Nicolas Magno in the
possession of Gavino Magno, et al. that have not been reported to the court, and should be collated so that the whole inheritance
can be partitioned by the heirs. On February 8, 1990, Teofilo Magno, et al. filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration with respect
to the true nature of the inventory of the properties left by Nicolas Magno, and for them to be allowed to submit an inventory thereof.
On June 8, 1990, the RTC issued an Order which, among other matters, ruled that the only portion of the decision that becomes the
subject of execution, is that ordained in the dispositive portion of the decision; thus, he denied the motion for reconsideration filed by
Teofilo Magno, et al. On June 11, 1990, the RTC also denied for lack of merit the motion to reopen filed by them.

Meanwhile, Elpidio Magno, et al. ,16 the successors-in-interest of Teofilo Magno, et al, filed before the RTC of Alaminos,
Pangasinan, a Complaint17 dated May 24, 1990 for partition, accounting and damages. In their complaint docketed as Civil Case No.
A-1850, Elpidio Magno, et al. alleged that aside from the real properties subject of Civil Case No. A-413, Nicolas Magno also left
three (3) real properties covered by Tax Declaration Nos. 4246, 4249 and 13385, which were in the possession of Gavino, Nazaria
and Necitas, all surnamed Magno, and now in possession of their respective successors-in-interest, Lorenzo Magno, et
al.  18 Claiming to be among the coheirs of Nicolas Magno, Elpidio Magno, et al. averred that Lorenzo Magno, et al. refused to
partition the said three (3) properties, and to account for their fruits since 1957 up to present, despite repeated demands.

In their Motion to Dismiss19 dated August 4, 1990, Lorenzo Magno, et al. contended that the cause of action of Elpidio Magno, et
al. is barred by a prior final judgment in Civil Case No. A-413, prescription and laches. In an Order 20 dated April 3, 1991, the RTC
denied the motion for lack of merit.

In their Answer with Counterclaim21 dated September 3, 1991, Lorenzo Magno, et al. averred that their refusal to partition the
properties is founded on the open, continuous, exclusive and adverse possession in the concept of owner by their predecessor-in-
interest, Gavino, Nazaria and Necitas, all surnamed Magno. By way of special defense, Lorenzo Magno, etal. reiterated that the
cause of action of Elpidio Magno, et al. is barred by res judicata, prescription and laches.

In the Amended Complaint 22 dated July 1, 1992, Elpidio Magno, et al. stressed that the three (3) real properties described in their
complaint were all acquired during the first marriage of Nicolas with Eugenia Recaido.

In their Motion to Dismiss23 dated December 7, 1995, Lorenzo Magno, et al. argued that the trial court has no jurisdiction to correct
or amend the decision in Civil Case No. A-413 which had already become final and executory, pursuant to the doctrine of res
judicata.

On November 15, 2007, the RTC of Alaminos City, Pangasinan, Branch 54, granted the amended complaint of Elpidio Magno, et
al. The fallo of its Decision reads:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing premises, considering that these three parcels of land were acquired by the
deceased Nicolas Magno and his first wife, Eugenia Recaido, the plaintiffs, therefore, are entitled to one-half of each of the three
parcels of land as the share of his first wife, Eugenia Recaido, or her heirs while the other half owned by Nicolas Magno be divided
into four shares, three shares to the defendants and one share to the plaintiffs.

Further, the Court finally orders the accounting of all the total value of fruits and produce of the three described parcels of land from
1957 up to the present time and to deliver to the plaintiffs their respective shares pertaining to them.

Finally, the court orders the defendants to pay severally and jointly the plaintiffs actual damages and attorney's fees in the total sum
of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND (Php100,000.00) PESOS.

IT IS SO ORDERED.24
On July 23, 2012, the CA Sixth Division rendered a Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 90846, the dispositive portion of which
states:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is GRANTED and the appealed Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A new one is
entered DISMISSING the complaint.

SO ORDERED.25cralawred
Aggrieved, Elpidio Magno, et al. filed this petition for review on certiorari.

Elpidio Magno, et al. submit that the CA committed grave and serious reversible errors, thus:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
a- in holding that the finality of the decision in Civil Case No. A-413 operates as res judicata in the second case (Civil Case
No. A-1850), despite that there is no identity of the subject matter between the two cases.
   
b-   in concluding that the decision in the first case, which has become final and executory, should have been executed to
effect the partition of the subject properties, notwithstanding that only the dispositive portion, of the fallo is its decisive
resolution, and is thus the subject of execution.
   
c- in dismissing Civil Case No. A-1850, without regard to the right to demand partition of the thing owned in common, as
mandated in Art. 494 of the New Civil Code. 26
Elpidio Magno, et al. admit that the subject three (3) properties covered by Tax Declaration Nos. 13385, 4246 and 4249 were
among those stipulated as properties of Nicolas Magno, and lengthily discussed in the body of the CFI Decision in Civil Case No. A-
413, but were not included in the dispositive portion of its decision. They stress that while the said decision was affirmed by the CA
in G.R. CV No. 52655-R when it ruled inter alia that such properties ought to be brought into the mass of Nicolas Magno's estate,
the CA likewise failed to include the said properties in the dispositive portion of its decision. Thus, Elpidio Magno, et al. submit
that res judicata cannot be applied because there is no identity of subject matter between Civil Case No. A-413 where their
predecessors-in-interest, Teofilo Magno, et al. had sought by way of counterclaim for partition of the said properties, and Civil Case
No. 1850 where they prayed for partition of the same properties, which were omitted in the dispositive portion of the decisions of the
CFI and the CA.

Elpidio Magno, et al. further argue that to deny their right to demand partition of properties which remain co-owned by them and
Lorenzo Magno, et al. on the ground of res judicata would sacrifice justice to technicality. Citing Article 494 27 of the New Civil Code,
they also claim to have the right to demand partition of said properties at any time. They likewise invoke Article 1103 28 of the same
Code in support of their claim that a decision or order of partition does not really become final in the sense that it leaves something
more to be done for the complete disposition of the case. They insist that Lorenzo Magno, et al. should not be allowed to exclusively
appropriate the properties owned in common for they hold the same in trust for the other co-owners; otherwise, there would be
unjust enrichment at the expense of their co-owners. Finally, they submit that the finding of the CA to the effect that the subject
properties were owned by the late Nicolas Magno and must be brought to the mass of his estate, becomes the law of the present
case which must not be disturbed as a matter of judicial comity.

On the other hand, respondents argue that the filing of another complaint for partition [Civil Case No. A-1850] cannot be sanctioned
without doing violence to the doctrine of res judicata, but also to the rule on immutability of judgments.

The petition lacks merit.

The Court has explained29 the doctrine of res judicata and its two (2) concepts, thus:
Res judicata means "a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon or decided; a thing or matter settled by judgment." It lays the
rule that an existing final judgment or decree rendered on the merits, without fraud or collusion, by a court of competent jurisdiction,
upon any matter within its jurisdiction, is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies, in all other actions or suits in the same
or any other judicial tribunal of concurrent jurisdiction on the points and matters in issue in the first suit.

It must be remembered that it is to the interest of the public that there should be an end to litigation by the parties over a subject fully
and fairly adjudicated. The doctrine of res judicata is a rule that pervades every well-regulated system of jurisprudence and is
founded upon two grounds embodied in various maxims of the common law, namely: (1) public policy and necessity, which dictates
that it would be in the interest of the State that there should be an end to litigation — republicae ut sit litium; and (2) the hardship on
the individual that he should be vexed twice for the same cause — nemo debet bis vexari pro una et eadem causa. A contrary
doctrine would subject public peace and quiet to the will and neglect of individuals and prefer the gratification of the litigious
disposition on the part of suitors to the preservation of public tranquility and happiness.

Res judicata has two concepts. The first is bar by prior judgment under Rule 39, Section 47(b), and the second is conclusiveness of
judgment under Rule 39, Section 47(c). These concepts differ as to the extent of the effect of a judgment or final order as
follows:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
SEC. 47. Effect of judgments or final orders. – The effect of a judgment or final order rendered by a court of the Philippines, having
jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or final order, may be as follows:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryx x x x

(b) In other cases, the judgment or final order is, with respect to the matter directly adjudged or as to any other matter that could
have been raised in relation thereto, conclusive between the parties and their successors-in-interest by title subsequent to the
commencement of the action or special proceeding, litigating for the same thing andunder the same title and in the same capacity;
and cralawlawlibrary

(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors-in-interest, that only is deemed to have been adjudged in a
former judgment or final order which appears upon its face to have been so adjudged, or which was actually and necessarily
included therein or necessarythereto.
Jurisprudence taught us well that res judicata under the first concept or as a bar against the prosecution of a second action exists
when there is identity of parties, subject matter and cause of action in the first and second actions. The judgment in the first action is
final as to the claim or demand in controversy, including the parties and those in privity with them, not only as to every matter which
was offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim or demand, but as to any other admissible matter which might have been
offered for that purpose and of all matters that could have been adjudged in that case. In contrast, res judicata under the second
concept or estoppel by judgment exists when there is identity of parties and subject matter but the causes of action are completely
distinct. The first judgment is conclusive only as to those matters actually and directly controverted and determined and not as to
matters merely involved herein.30
In order for res judicata to bar the institution of a subsequent action, the following requisites must concur: (1) the judgment sought to
bar the new action must be final; (2) the decision must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and
the parties; (3) the disposition of the case must be a judgment on the merits; and (4) there must be, as between the first and second
actions, identity of parties, subject matter, causes of action as are present in the civil cases below. 31 All four requisites of res
judicata under the concept of bar by prior judgment are present in this case.

As correctly noted by the CA, the presence of the first two requisites of res judicata, as well as the requisite identity of parties in the
first action (Civil Case No. A-413) and the second action (Civil Case No. A-1850), are undisputed:
xxx [R]ecords show that herein parties do not dispute the fact that the trial court has jurisdiction over the first case (Civil Case
No. A-413) and that such decision in the first case has long become final and executory on September 22, 1981 by virtue of
the Entry of Judgment dated September 25, 1981. There is also no question with respect to the identity of parties in both civil cases.
Obviously there is also a community of interest between the parties in both the first and the present case [Civil Case No. A-
1850], being the legitimate heirs of Nicolas Magno, although, the parties in the present case, by right of representation, merely
substituted some of the original parties in the first case who already died, x x x.32
With respect to the third requisite of res judicata, there is no question that the Decision33 of the CFI, dated October 5, 1972, granting
the amended complaint for partition docketed as Civil Case No. A-413, is a judgment on the merits, because it was rendered based
on the evidence and stipulations submitted by the parties and the witnesses they presented at the trial of the case.

Anent the fourth requisite of res judicata, there is also no doubt as to the identity of the subject matter and causes of action between
the first action and the second action. Contrary to the contention of Elpidio Magno, et al., the subject matters of partition in both
actions are the same three (3) real properties originally owned by the late Nicolas Magno, and later declared for taxation purposes
under Tax Declaration Nos. 4246, 4249 and 13385. In their Amended Answer to the Amended Complaint with a Counterclaim in
Civil Case No. A-413, Teofilo Magno, etal., the predecessors-in-interest of Elpidio Magno, et al., alleged by way of counterclaim as
follows:
2. That the deceased NICOLAS MAGNO was the original owner of the following parcels of land as shown by Original Tax
Declaration No. 2221 in his name, and which parcels of lands are hereby described as follows:
Tax Declaration No. 4246 in the name of GAVINO MAGNO and is actually in the possession of Gavino Magno, plaintiff:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryA parcel of land containing an area of 84,988 square meters in area situated in the Barrio of Lucap,
Municipality of Alaminos, Pangasinan, Philippines, x x x.

Tax Declaration No. 13385 assessed at P390.00 in the name of plaintiff, Necitas Magno described as follows:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryA parcel of land situated in the Barrio of Lucap, Municipality of Alaminos, Pangasinan, containing an
area of about 38,385 sq. m. x x x.

Tax Declaration No. 4249 in the name of plaintiff NAZARIA MAGNO and also under her actual possession, to wit:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryA parcel of land situated in the Barrio of Lucap, Mun. of Alaminos, Pangasinan containing an area of
41,023 sq. m. more or less, x x x.34
3. That the three parcels of land of about 16 hectares total area being the original property of the deceased NICOLAS MAGNO
common ancestor of both parties in this case, under law, should be divided into four equal parts, and all the defendants, being
descendants by the first wedlock, and therefore should be considered full blood and entitled to double that of the descendants of the
second wedlock, it being now difficult to determine under which wedlock, the said properties were acquired, the partition therefrom
which would equitative (sic) to the parties would be that 3/4 pro-indiviso to the defendants; and 1/4 pro-indiviso thereof to the
plaintiffs.35
On the other hand, in their Amended Complaint in Civil Case No. A-1850, Elpidio Magno, et al, as successors-in-interest of Teofilo
Magno, et al., prayed, among other matters, that judgment be rendered "[o]rdering the partition of the above-described parcels of
land among the plaintiffs and the defendants, taking into consideration that these parcels of land were acquired during the first
marriage; x x x."36 Indeed, the subject matters of the first and second actions for partition, accounting and damages, docketed as
Civil Case Nos. A-413 and A-1850, respectively, are the three (3) real properties originally owned by the late Nicolas Magno, which
were later declared for taxation purposes under Tax Declaration Nos. 4246, 4249 and 13385. Since all the requisites of res
judicata under the concept of bar by prior judgment are present, the CA correctly dismissed the amended complaint for partition
docketed as Civil Case No. A-1850.

However, while the CA correctly ruled that res judicata has already set in, it erred in stating that what Elpidio Magno, et al. should
have done is to file a writ of execution in the trial court to enforce its final and executory decision in Civil Case No. A-413. It is well
settled that a writ of execution must substantially conform to the dispositive portion of the promulgated decision, and cannot vary or
go beyond the terms of the judgment; otherwise, it becomes null and void.37 Here, it is undisputed that both the bodies of the CFI
Decision in Civil Case No. A-413 and the CA Decision upholding the CFI, confirmed that the three (3) undivided properties belong to
the late Nicolas Magno, but they were not included in the dispositive portions of said decisions as part of the properties that were
ordered to be partitioned among his heirs. Thus, it would be pointless to require Elpidio Magno, et al. to file a motion for execution,
because the trial court will simply deny it for the reason that the only portion of its final decision that becomes the subject of
execution, is that ordained in the dispositive portion.

Needless to state, when a final judgment becomes executory, it thereby becomes immutable and unalterable. The judgment may no
longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of
fact or law, and regardless of whether the modification is attempted to be made by the court rendering it or by the highest Court of
the land.38 The underlying reason for the rule is two-fold: (1) to avoid delay in the administration of justice and thus make orderly the
discharge of judicial business, and (2) to put judicial controversies to an end, at the risk of occasional errors, inasmuch as
controversies cannot be allowed to drag on indefinitely and the rights and obligations of every litigant must not hang in suspense for
an indefinite period of time.39 Be that as it may, there are three (3) recognized exceptions to the rule on the immutability of final and
executory judgments, namely, (a) the correction of clerical error; (b) the making of so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no
prejudice to any party; and (c) where the judgment is void.40chanrobleslaw

The Court explained the concept of nunc pro tunc judgment in this wise:
The office of a judgment nunc pro tunc is to record some act of the court done at a former time which was not then carried into the
record, and the power of a court to make such entries is restricted to placing upon the record evidence of judicial action which has
been actually taken. It may be used to make the record speak the truth, but not to make it speak what it did not speak but ought to
have spoken. If the court has not rendered a judgment that it might or should have rendered, or if it has rendered an imperfect or
improper judgment, it has no power to remedy these errors or omissions by ordering the entry nunc pro tune of a proper judgment.
Hence a court in entering a judgment nunc pro tune has no power to construe what the judgment means, but only to enter of record
such judgment as had been formerly rendered, but which had not been entered of record as rendered. In all cases the exercise of
the power to enter judgments nunc pro tunc presupposes the actual rendition of a judgment, and a mere right to a judgment will not
furnish the basis for such an entry. (15 R. C. L., pp. 622-623.)

xxx                                        xxx                                        xxx

The object of a judgment nunc pro tunc is not the rendering of a new judgment and the ascertainment and determination of new
rights, but is one placing in proper form on the record, the judgment that had been previously rendered, to make it speak the truth,
so as to make it show what the judicial action really was, not to correct judicial errors, such as to render a judgment which the court
ought to have rendered, in place of the one it did erroneously render, nor to supply nonaction by the court, however erroneous the
judgment may have been. (Wilmerding vs. Corbin Banking Co., 28 South., 640, 641; 126 Ala., 268.)

A nunc pro tunc entry in practice is an entry made now of something which was actually previously done, to have effect as of the
former date. Its office is not to supply omitted action by the court, but to supply an omission in the record of action really had, but
omitted through inadvertence or mistake. (Perkins vs. Haywood, 31 N. E., 670, 672.)

xxx                                        xxx                                        xxx

It is competent for the court to make an entry nunc pro tunc after the term at which the transaction occurred, even though the rights
of third persons may be affected. But entries nunc pro tunc will not be ordered except where this can be done without injustice to
either party, and as a nunc pro tuncorder is to supply on the record something which has actually occurred, it cannot supply omitted
action by the court. . .   (15 C.J., pp. 972-973 .)41]
Guided by the foregoing principles, the Court finds that the interest of justice would be best served if a nunc pro tunc judgment
would be entered in Civil Case No. A-413 by ordering the partition and accounting of income and produce of the three (3) properties
covered by Tax Declaration Nos. 4246, 4249 and 13385, under the same terms as those indicated in the dispositive portion the CFI
Decision dated October 5, 1972. It is undisputed that the said properties are still undivided and considered as part of the estate of
Nicolas Magno, pursuant to the final decision in Civil Case No. A-413. There is also no doubt that the CFI failed to include in the
dispositive portion of its Decision dated October 5, 1972 in Civil Case No. A-413 its ruling that the said three (3) properties remain
undivided and should be partitioned among the heirs of Nicolas Magno. Pertinent portions of the CFI Decision state:
The following facts are undisputed: that Nicolas Magno, common ancestor of the parties died in 1907; that he died intestate,
leaving properties one of which is described under Tax Declaration No. 2221; that Nicolas Magno married twice; that during
his first marriage with one Eugenia Recaido, he had two sons, Doroteo Magno and Eduardo Magno but the latter died without issue;
that Doroteo Magno died in 1937; that he had four children, namely: Teofllo, Jose, Angela and Esperidion, all surnamed Magno; that
of the four, only Teofilo is still living. While Jose was survived by one daughter Lolita and one son, Nicolas Magno. Angela was
survived by three children, Isidro, Herminio, and Felicidad, all surnamed Cabatic; Espiridion Magno who is also deceased was
survived by his three children Tomas, Elpidio and Aurora, all surnamed Magno. While in his second marriage with Camila Asinger,
said Nicolas Magno had three children, Gavino, Nicetas and Nazaria, all surnamed Magno.

The principal issue in this case is whether the properties of the deceased Nicolas Magno have been partitioned.

From the evidence thus adduced, the Court is convinced that said properties of the deceased Nicolas Magno, common
ancestor of the parties remain undivided up to present. This view is supported by the testimonies of the plaintiffs and their
witnesses, as well as that of the defendants and their witnesses. Custodio Rabina, a witness for the plaintiffs testified that after
the death of Nicolas Magno, his son, Doroteo Magno took possession of the twenty-seven hectare Lucap property on condition that
he would give three "baars" to the plaintiffs in the form of rentals; that Rabina used to see Doroteo deliver the shares of the plaintiffs;
that after the death of Doroteo Magno in 1937, his son Teofilo continued in the possession of the same under the same condition as
his father until 1957; that on the said date, Teofilo failed to deliver the shares of the plaintiffs, hence, the latter demanded the return
of the land. That in view, thereof, plaintiffs went to Atty. Tomas Rapatalo who advised them to divide the properties in question
instead of fighting each other. However, no partition was effected.

Nicolas Magno, another witness for the plaintiffs declared that in 1957, he went to Atty. Rapatalo together with Teofilo Magno,
purposely to effect the partition of the properties in question, but no partition was effected due to the refusal of Teofilo's nephews
and nieces.

Isidro Cabatic, one of the defendants testified that the properties of Nicolas Magno have not been partitioned and that is the reason
why the heirs have no titles in their respective names. He further declared that while they agreed to divide the properties in 1946,
nevertheless, since some of them were in Mindanao and others in Quezon City, the partition was not effected, that instead an oral
partition was made, but as the witness himself said, it was not approved. Cabatic also declared that subsequently, the heirs from
Mindanao came but insisted on the partition according to the Certeza Survey. It is to be noted that in their proposed partition, the
heirs hires the services of Surveyor de Asis.

The mere fact that the Lucap property is covered by four tax declarations (Exhibits G, F, E and D) is not evidence to show that it has
been partitioned. Mere tax declarations are not evidence of ownership.

Likewise, the fact that the plaintiffs possessed certain portions of the Lucap property does not prove that said property had been
partitioned because, as satisfactorily explained by Nicetas Magno, it was the practice of the heirs to occupy portions of the
hereditary estate and harvest the corresponding produce thereof. This has not been contradicted or rebutted by the defendants.
The inequality of the areas possessed by the plaintiffs and Doroteo Magno involving the Lucap property which was not explained by
the defendants is another irrefutable sign of non-partition. Defendants failed to explain satisfactorily why twenty-seven (27) hectares
would belong to Doroteo Magno while the plaintiffs should have only sixteen (16) hectares among themselves from the Lucap
property.

Another evidence to show that the properties of Nicolas Magno are still undivided is the testimony of the defendant Teofilo Magno
that in 1957, he went to see Atty. Rapatalo for the purpose of asking him to register the properties in Lucap and Kiskis in the name
of Doroteo Magno, however, Atty. Rapatalo was not able to file the supposed application for land registration because of the
objections of the plaintiffs who were also present when he (Teofilo) approached Atty. Rapatalo. Teofilo also declared that the
plaintiffs objected because they claimed they are co-owners of the same; that due to the same objections of the plaintiffs, Teofilo
was not able to get the tax declaration in his name covering the Lucap property.

Defendants claimed and they tried to prove that the properties in litigation are the exclusive properties of Doroteo Magno and
therefore, they are entitled to inherit the same to the exclusion of the plaintiffs. This contention of the defendants is untenable.
Defendants in the course of the trial, have failed to present any document or writing to show that Nicolas Magno conveyed the
properties in question solely to Doroteo.

No partition having been effected among the heirs, it follows that the pro-indiviso character of the lands in question
continue. It is a familiar doctrine that when an inheritance is undivided, possession by one of the co-heirs, and prescription,
however long may be the lapse, do not run against the latter's right of action to demand the partition of the pro-indiviso property, for
the simple reason that the possessor thereof is not a third person, nor does he hold it by such adverse possession as will become
legalized by prescription. (Dimagiba vs, Dimagiba, 34 Phil. 357). Such possession is always understood to be exercised by the heir
himself and in the name of his co-heirs (Lampitoc vs. Lampitoc, CA-G.R. No. 9200-R, April 30, 1953).

The only exception to the rule that prescription does not run against the co-heirs is when the co-heirs or co-owners, having
possession of the hereditary community property, hold the same in his own name, that is, under claim of exclusive ownership. In
such case, he may acquire the property by prescription if his possession meets the other requirements of the law (De los Santos vs.
Sta. Teresa, 44 Phil. 811). However, this exception does not apply in this case. In the first place, neither the defendant Teofilo
Magno nor his father Doroteo Magno could be considered to have possessed the lands in question in the concept of an owner to the
exclusion of his co-heirs. The evidence to the effect is insufficient and inconclusive. As can be clearly gleaned from the evidence,
the defendants were all the while aware of the plaintiffs' claim of ownership over said properties.

In view of the foregoing, there is nothing more left for the Court to resolve than to order the partition of the properties in
question except the parcel of land described in par. 3, sub-par, (e) of the amended complaint, otherwise, denominated as
Kiskis property, the same having been satisfactorily shown by the defendants to be the paraphernal property of Monica Romero,
wife of Doroteo Magno (Exhibit 6). Clearly therefore, plaintiffs have no right to inherit any portion thereof.

In effecting the partition among the heirs of the decedent, Article 2263 of the New Civil Code should be applied. Under the said
provision, rights to an inheritance of a person who dies, with or without a will, before the effectivity of this code, shall be [governed]
by the Civil Code of Spain of 1889, by other [previous] laws, and by the Rules of Court. In other words, Nicolas Magno, having died
in 1907, the distribution of his estate shall be [governed] by the Civil Code of Spain of 1889.

To properly distribute his estate, the important consideration should be to determine the date of the acquisition of the properties
subject of partition in order to be able to [pinpoint] which properties belong to his first marriage and which properties pertain to his
second marriage. In this case, however, evidence is clear that all the properties subject of partition belong to both marriages
of the decedent, Nicolas Magno, with the exception of that parcel described in paragraph (3), sub-paragraph (e) of the
amended complaint as previously stated. Therefore, applying Article 931 of the Civil Code of Spain of 1889, the law [in force] at
the time of the decedent's death, his children, Doroteo, Gavino, Nicetas and Nazaria should inherit in equal shares. Accordingly, the
children of the late Doroteo Magno, namely: Teofilo, Angela, Jose and Espiridion should succeed to the estate of Nicolas Magno by
right of representation and pursuant to law, they cannot inherit more than what their father would inherit if alive.

As regards the disposition made by Doroteo Magno during his lifetime, the same are valid to the extent of his share and insofar as
the same are not inofficious.

In brief, the properties in question which by agreed preponderance of evidence were shown to be owned by the decedent,
Nicolas Magno, except parcel (e) under par. 3 of the amended complaint as previously mentioned, should be partitioned as
follows: one fourth (1/4) share each child shall be for the three-plaintiffs, and the fourth share shall pertain to the defendant to
represent the deceased, Doroteo Magno.42chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In affirming in toto the CFI Decision, the CA likewise failed to indicate in the dispositive portion of its Decision dated June 30, 1981 in
CA-G.R. No. 52655-R, its definitive ruling that the said three (3) real properties were owned by Nicolas Magno and must be brought
into the mass of his estate for partition, thus:
What are the lands inherited by the parties from the common ancestor, the late Nicolas Magno, and what are the lands, if any, not
owned by Nicolas Magno but inherited by the defendants-appellants [Teofilo Magno, et al. ] from their respective parents, as alleged
in their answer? Were some of these lands including those described in the counterclaim, acquired by either party through
acquisitive prescription or adverse possession after the required number of years? We decide.

Land subject-matter of defendants' [Teofilo Magno, et al. ] counterclaim. - As  admitted by the defendants in their answer, there
existed a property used to be covered by Tax Declaration No. 2221 in the name of Nicolas Magno. In the pre-trial conference of
October 8, 1964, the parties stipulated that the land covered by Tax Declaration No. 2221 was one of the properties left by Nicolas
Magno (pp. 14-15,20-21, R.A.). In the stipulation of the parties, dated November 16, 1965, the parties admitted that Tax No. 2221
was revised in 1917 and four tax declarations were issued in lieu of Tax No. 2221 to wit: Tax No. 7819, in the name of Doroteo
Magno; Tax No. 7820 in the name of Nicetas Magno; Tax No. 7821 in the name of Gavino Magno, and Tax No. 7822 in the name of
Nazaria Magno (see also Exh. A.) In their counterclaim, defendants disclosed that the same land originally declared under Tax No.
2221 are now covered by Tax No. 4246 in the name of Gavino Magno, No. 13385, in the name of Nicetas Magno, and No. 4249, in
the name of Nazario Magno (pp. 15-16 Record on Appeal).

The lands covered by Tax Declaration Nos. 4246, 4249 and 13385 were owned by the late Nicolas Magno and must be
brought into the mass of his estate.

xxxx

After a careful analysis of the evidence, We uphold the lower court's findings. We repeat, in 1946, according to defendant Isidro
Cabatic, all the heirs have demanded the division of their common properties; and in 1957 another defendant, Teofilo Magno,
disclosed that plaintiffs [Gavino Magno, et al. ] have asked for partition of the lands in question. There is no evidence to show that
between 1946 and 1957, defendants have categorically apprised the plaintiffs of their repudiation of the co-ownership because they
have found out that the late Doroteo Magno was the exclusive owner of all the properties by valuable or other considerations from
Nicolas Magno and/or they and their predecessors have acquired ownership over the lands in question through adverse possession
to the exclusion of plaintiffs and their mother. The complaint for partition was filed on January 23, 1963 or before the lapse often (10)
years from 1957 when a chance confrontation between Teofilo Magno and plaintiffs took place in the office of Atty. Tomas Rapatalo
and when defendants refused to share with the plaintiffs the harvest of the properties. 43
Concededly, Elpidio Magno, et al. failed to raise the issue of nunc pro tunc entry at any stage of the proceeding, in order to include
the subject three (3) properties among the other real properties of Nicolas Magno subject to partition, pursuant to the CFFs final
decision in Civil Case No. A-413. The interest of justice, however, impels the Court to consider and resolve an issue even though
not particularly raised, because it is necessary for the complete adjudication of the rights and obligations of the parties and it falls
within the issues already found by them. 44 Such omission on the part of Elpidio Magno, et al. does not preclude the Court from
appreciating the said issue, because to ignore the same would result in a situation where the said three (3) properties would remain
under co-ownership, despite the clear intention of the successors-in-interest of Nicolas Magno to partition them among themselves.

Elpidio Magno, et al. and Lorenzo Magno, et al, as successors-in-interest of Teofilo Magno, et al. and Gavino Magno, et
al., respectively, cannot be compelled to remain in the co-ownership, pursuant to Article 494 45 of the New Civil Code. There being
neither an agreement or condition to keep the three (3) real properties undivided, nor a law prohibiting partition of the said
properties, much less a showing that any of the co-owners has acquired them by prescription, each co-owner may demand at any
time the partition of the things owned in common, insofar as her share is concerned. No prejudice to any party would be caused by
a nunc pro tunc entry in this case inasmuch as Article 494 of the same Code explicitly states that no co-owner shall be obliged to
remain in the co-ownership, and each co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the thing owned in common, insofar as his
share is concerned. Having in mind the concept of a nunc pro tunc entry, it bears stressing that the said properties should be
subject to partition and accounting of fruits and income, strictly under the same terms as those applied to the other real properties of
Nicolas Magno, as stated in the dispositive portion of the CFI Decision in Civil Case No. A-413, namely:
b) Ordering the partition of said properties in four (4) equal parts as follows: one share each of the plaintiffs, Gavino, Nicetas and
Nazaria, all surnamed Magno, and the fourth share to the defendants who represent the deceased Doroteo Magno;

xxxx

d) Ordering the defendants to account for the annual income or produce of the above-mentioned properties with the exception of the
property described in the preceding paragraph, and to divide the same into four (4) equal parts in the manner above-described,
commencing from 1957 until the accounting is made and the shares corresponding to the plaintiffs delivered; 46
On a final note, partition is a right much favored, because it not only secures peace, but also promotes industry and
enterprise.47 The rule of the civil as of the common law that no one should be compelled to hold property in common with another
grew out of a purpose to prevent strife and disagreement, to facilitate transmission of titles and avoid the inconvenience of joint
holding.48 The reason of the law in recognizing in favor of a co-owner the right to ask under certain limitations the partition of the
property held in common is that the good faith and harmony which the law regards as necessary to exist among co-owners may
sometimes be broken by one who, against the wish of others, is opposed to the further continuance of the co-ownership. 49 By
reason thereof, the law allows, as a general rule, the pro-indiviso condition to cease and to proceed with the partition of the party,
adjudicating as a result thereof to each of the co-owners their respective interest in the community property. 50chanrobleslaw

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED for lack of merit, and the Decision dated July
23, 2012 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 90846 is AFFIRMED. In the interest of justice, however, the Decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Alaminos City, Pangasinan, Branch 54, in Civil Case No. A-1850, is MODIFIED in the sense that a nunc pro
tunc judgment is hereby entered as follows:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrarya) Declaring petitioners Elpidio Magno, et al. 51  and respondents Lorenzo Magno, et al.52 as the
respective successors-in-interest of Teofilo Magno, et al. and Gavino Magno, et al., who are the legal heirs of Nicolas Magno and,
thus, the absolute and exclusive owners of the three (3) real properties covered by Tax Declaration Nos. 4246, 4249 and 13385;
and cralawlawlibrary

b) Ordering the said three (3) properties to be subject of partition and accounting of annual income and produce, in accordance with
the terms of the dispositive portion of the Decision dated October 5, 1972 of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan in Civil Case
No. A-413.

SO ORDERED.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
RULE 37
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 212860, March 14, 2018

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. FLORIE GRACE M. COTE, Respondent.

DECISION

REYES, JR., J.:

This is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which seeks to reverse and set aside the Decision 1 dated January
21, 2014 and Resolution2 dated June 11, 2014 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 122313.

The Facts

As culled from the records, the antecedent facts are as follows:

On July 31, 1995, Rhomel Gagarin Cote (Rhomel) and respondent Florie Grace Manongdo-Cote (Florie) were married in Quezon
City. At the time of their marriage, the spouses were both Filipinos and were already blessed with a son, Christian Gabriel
Manongdo who was born in Honolulu, Hawaii, United States of America (USA).3

On August 23, 2002, Rhomel filed a Petition for Divorce before the Family Court of the First Circuit of Hawaii on the ground that their
marriage was irretrievably broken. This was granted on August 23, 2002 by the issuance of a decree that states among others:
A decree of absolute divorce is hereby granted to [Rhomel], the bonds of matrimony between [Rhomel] and [Florie] are hereby
dissolved and the parties hereto are restored to the status of single persons, and either party is permitted to marry from and after the
effective date of this decree.4
Seven years later, Florie commenced a petition for recognition of foreign judgment granting the divorce before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC). Florie also prayed for the cancellation of her marriage contract, hence, she also impleaded the Civil Registry of
Quezon City and the National Statistics Office (NSO). The Office of the Solicitor General, representing Republic of the Philippines
(petitioner), deputized the Office of the City Prosecutor to appear on behalf of the State during the trial. 5

On April 7, 2011, the RTC granted the petition and declared Florie to be capacitated to remarry after the RTC's decision attained
finality and a decree of absolute nullity has been issued. The RTC ruled, inter alia, that Rhomel was already an American citizen
when he obtained the divorce decree, 6viz.:
[Florie] has sufficiently established that she is a Filipino citizen and married to an American citizen. Her husband obtained a Divorce
Decree on 22 August 2002 and was authenticated and registered by the Consulate General to the Philippines in Honolulu, Hawaii,
U.S.A. [Florie] being a Filipino citizen and is governed by Philippine laws, she is placed in an absurd, if not awkward situation where
she is married to somebody who is no longer married to her. This is precisely the circumstances contemplated under Article 26,
paragraph 2 of the Family Code which provides a remedy for Filipino spouses like [Florie].

Under the above-cited provision, [Florie] is allowed to contract a subsequent marriage since the divorce had been validly obtained
abroad by her American husband, capacitating her to remarry. In this line, the court holds that this petition be, as it is, hereby
GRANTED.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered declaring [Florie] capacitated to remarry pursuant to Article 26
paragraph 2 of the Family Code, in view of the Divorce Decree which had been validly obtained abroad by her American spouse,
dissolving their marriage solemnized on 31 July 1995 in Quezon City, Philippines. 7
Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal on May 17, 2011. However, the RTC, believing that the petition was covered by A.M. No. 02-11-
10-SC or the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, applied Section 20 of
said Rule and denied the appeal because the notice was not preceded by a motion for reconsideration. 8

Petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari with the CA claiming that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion.

In a Decision9 dated January 21, 2014, the CA denied the petition. The pertinent portions read as follows:
The fact that even the Solicitor General and private respondent were confused as to the true nature of the petition and the
procedure that must be followed only shows that We cannot attribute a whimsical and capricious exercise of judgment to the RTC.

xxxx
Besides, petitioner's omission, by itself, is a ground for dismissing the petition. The last paragraph of Section 3, Rule 46 of the Rules
of Court allows the dismissal of a petition for certiorari if the material parts of the records were not attached to the petition.
"Certiorari, being an extraordinary remedy, the party seeking it must strictly observe the requirements for its issuance." Although it
has been ruled that the better policy is for petitioner to be accorded, in the interest of substantial justice, "a chance to submit the
same instead of dismissing the petition" We cannot allow petitioner to benefit from this rule because the need to submit the
transcript of stenographic notes and all other pieces of evidence is quite obvious for petitioner which is questioning the sufficiency of
the evidence presented. Hence, it would be bending the rules too far if We still allow petitioner to be excused from this lapse. 10
Hence, this present petition.

The Issues

I. THE CA ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE TRIAL COURT JUDGE DID NOT COMMIT GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION IN APPLYING THE PROCEDURAL RULES FOR NULLITY OF MARRIAGE PROCEEDINGS
UNDER A.M. NO. 02-11-10-SC IN A PROCEEDING FOR RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN DECREE OF
DIVORCE;

II. THE CA GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT THE STATE HAS NO PERSONALITY TO INTERVENE IN
PROCEEDINGS FOR RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN DECREE OF DIVORCE;

III. THE CA ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE FAILURE OF THE PETITIONER TO APPEND COPIES OF THE
TRANSCRIPT OF STENOGRAPHIC NOTES OF FLORIE'S DIRECT EXAMINATION AND HER JUDICIAL
AFFIDAVIT IS FATAL, NOTWITHSTANDING THAT THE VERY SAME DOCUMENTS WERE
INCORPORATED AND QUOTED BY FLORIE IN HER COMMENT; and

IV. THE CA ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION DATED APRIL 7, 2011 GRANTING
FLORIE'S PETITION FOR RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN DECREE OF DIVORCE DESPITE LACK OF
SHOWING THAT HER FORMER FILIPINO HUSBAND WAS ALREADY AN AMERICAN CITIZEN AT THE
TIME HE PROCURED THE DECREE OF DIVORCE. 11

Ruling of the Court

The core issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the provisions of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC12 applies in a case involving
recognition of a foreign decree of divorce.

It bears stressing that as of present, our family laws do not recognize absolute divorce between Filipino husbands and wives. Such
fact, however, do not prevent our family courts from recognizing divorce decrees procured abroad by an alien spouse who is
married to a Filipino citizen.

Article 26 of the Family Code states:

Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were
solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6),
36, 37 and 38.

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to
remarry under Philippine law.
The wordings of the second paragraph of Article 26 initially spawned confusion as to whether or not it covers even those marriages
wherein both of the spouses were Filipinos at the time of marriage and then one of them eventually becomes a naturalized citizen of
another country.

In the landmark case of Republic v. Orbecido III,13 the Court ruled that the reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the
time of the celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating the latter to remarry.14

Although the Court has already laid down the rule regarding foreign divorce involving Filipino citizens, the Filipino spouse who
likewise benefits from the effects of the divorce cannot automatically remarry. Before the divorced Filipino spouse can remarry, he or
she must file a petition for judicial recognition of the foreign divorce.

The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the acknowledgment that our courts do not take judicial notice
of foreign judgments and laws. Justice Herrera explained that, as a rule, "no sovereign is bound to give effect within its dominion to
a judgment rendered by a tribunal of another country." This means that the foreign judgment and its authenticity must be proven as
facts under our rules on evidence, together with the alien's applicable national law to show the effect of the judgment on the alien
himself or herself. The recognition may be made in an action instituted specifically for the purpose or in another action where a party
invokes the foreign decree as an integral aspect of his claim or defense. 15
To clarify, respondent filed with the RTC a petition to recognize the foreign divorce decree procured by her naturalized (originally
Filipino) husband in Hawaii, USA. By impleading the Civil Registry of Quezon City and the NSO, the end sought to be achieved was
the cancellation and or correction of entries involving her marriage status.

In Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas, et al.,16 the Court briefly explained the nature of recognition proceedings vis-a-vis cancellation of entries
under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, viz.:
Article 412 of the Civil Code declares that no entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected, without judicial order. The Rules
of Court supplements Article 412 of the Civil Code by specifically providing for a special remedial proceeding by which entries in the
civil registry may be judicially cancelled or corrected. Rule 108 of the Rules of Court sets in detail the jurisdictional and procedural
requirements that must be complied with before a judgment, authorizing the cancellation or correction, may be annotated in the civil
registry. It also requires, among others, that the verified petition must be filed with the RTC of the province where the corresponding
civil registry is located; that the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest must be made parties to the
proceedings; and that the time and place for hearing must be published in a newspaper of general circulation. x x x.

We hasten to point out, however, that this ruling should not be construed as requiring two separate proceedings for the registration
of a foreign divorce decree in the civil registry one for recognition of the foreign decree and another specifically for cancellation of
the entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. The recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108
proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the
status or right of a party or a particular fact. Moreover, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court can serve as the appropriate adversarial
proceeding by which the applicability of the foreign judgment can be measured and tested in terms of jurisdictional infirmities, want
of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. 17
The RTC, in its Decision18 dated January 21, 2014 ruled that Florie had sufficiently established that she is married to an American
citizen and having proven compliance with the legal requirements, is declared capacitated to remarry.

The confusion arose when the RTC denied petitioner's appeal on the ground that no prior motion for reconsideration was filed as
required under Section 20 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. Petitioner posits that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC do not cover cases involving
recognition of foreign divorce because the wording of Section 1 thereof clearly states that it shall only apply to petitions for
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages and annulment of voidable marriages, viz.:
Section 1. Scope - This Rule shall govern petitions for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages and annulment of voidable
marriages under the Family Code of the Philippines. [Underscoring Ours]
Rule 41 of the Rules of Court applies; Motion for Reconsideration not a condition precedent to the filing of an appeal

The CA is correct when it ruled that the trial court misapplied Section 20 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.

A decree of absolute divorce procured abroad is different from annulment as defined by our family laws. A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC only
covers void19and voidable20marriages that are specifically cited and enumerated in the Family Code of the Philippines. Void and
voidable mmTiages contemplate a situation wherein the basis for the judicial declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of the
marriage exists before or at the time of the marriage. It treats the marriage as if it never existed. Divorce, on the other hand, ends a
legally valid marriage and is usually due to circumstances arising after the marriage.

It was error for the RTC to use as basis for denial of petitioner's appeal Section 20 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. Since Florie followed
the procedure for cancellation of entry in the civil registry, a special proceeding governed by Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, an
appeal from the RTC decision should be governed by Section 321 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court and not A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.

As culled from the records, petitioner received a copy of the RTC Decision on May 5, 2011. It filed a Notice of Appeal 22 on May 17,
2011, thus complying with the 15-day reglementary period for filing an appeal.

An appeal is a statutory right that must be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law. Having
satisfactorily shown that they have complied with the rules on appeal, petitioners are entitled to the proper and just disposition of
their cause.23

This now brings the Court to the issue whether or not the RTC's denial of petitioner's appeal is tantamount to grave abuse of
discretion. The Court rules in the negative.

No grave abuse of discretion

Although the Court agrees with petitioner that the RTC erroneously misapplied A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, such error does not
automatically equate to grave abuse of discretion. The Court has ruled time and again that not all errors attributed to a lower court or
tribunal fall under the scope of a Rule 65 petition for certiorari.

Jurisprudence has defined grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in this wise:
Grave abuse of discretion is defined as capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The
abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty
enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by
reason of passion and hostility.24
After a careful consideration of the evidence presented and Florie having sufficiently complied with the jurisdictional requirements,
judgment was rendered by the lower court recognizing the decree of foreign divorce. It likewise declared Florie legally capacitated to
remarry citing the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code. Thus, the CA is correct in denying the Rule 65 petition
for certiorari, notwithstanding the RTC's dismissal of petitioner's appeaL The dismissal, albeit erroneous, is not tainted with grave
abuse of discretion.

The Court finds no indication from the records that the RTC acted arbitrarily, capriciously and whimsically in arriving at its decision.
A petition for certiorari will prosper only if grave abuse of discretion is alleged and proved to exist. The burden is on the part of the
petitioner to prove not merely reversible error on the part of private respondent, but grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated January 21, 2014 and Resolution dated
June 11, 2014 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 122313 are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

RULE 39
RULE 39
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 195654, November 25, 2015

REYNALDO INUTAN, HELEN CARTE, NOEL AYSON, IVY CABARLE, NOELJAMILI, MARITES HULAR, ROLITOAZUCENA,
RAYMUNDO TUNOG, ROGER BERNAL, AGUSTEV ESTRE, MARILOU SAGUN, AND ENRIQUE LEDESMA,
JR., Petitioners, v. NAPAR CONTRACTING & ALLIED SERVICES, NORMAN LACSAMANA, *** JONAS INTERNATIONAL, INC.,
AND PHILIP YOUNG, Respondent.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

A judicially approved compromise agreement has the effect and authority of res judicata.2 It is final, binding on the parties, and
enforceable through a writ of execution. Article 2041 of the Civil Code, however, allows the aggrieved party to rescind the
compromise agreement and insist upon his original demand upon failure and refusal of the other party to abide by the compromise
agreement.

This Petition for Review on Certiorari2 assails the August 27, 2010 Decision3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
106724, which dismissed the Petition for Certiorari filed by Reynaldo Inutan (Inutan), Helen Carte (Carte), Noel Ayson (Ayson), Ivy
Cabarle (Cabarle), Noel Jamili (Jamili), Maritess Hular (Hular), Rolito Azucena (Azucena), Raymundo Tunog (Tunog), Jenelyn
Sancho, Wilmar Bolonias, Roger Bernal (Bernal), Agustin Estre (Estre), Marilou Sagun (Sagun), and Enrique Ledesma, Jr.
(Ledesma), against respondents Napar Contracting & Allied Services (Napar), Norman Lacsamana (Lacsamana), Jonas
International, Inc. (Jonas), and Philip Young (Young), and affirmed the June 26, 2008 Decision 4 and October 14, 2008 Resolution5 of
the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC CA No. 041474-04 dismissing the consolidated complaints against
respondents for illegal dismissal with money claims on the ground of res judicata. Likewise assailed is the CA's February 10, 2011
Resolution6 which denied the Motion for Reconsideration.

Factual Antecedents

Petitioners Inutan, Carte, Ayson, Cabarle, Jamili, Hular, Azucena, Tunog, Bernal, Estre, Sagun, and Ledesma were employees of
respondent Napar, a recruitment agency owned and managed by respondent Lacsamana. Napar assigned petitioners at respondent
Jonas, a corporation engaged in the manufacture of various food products with respondent Young as its President, to work as
factory workers, machine operator, quality control inspector, selector, mixer, and warehouseman.

Sometime in September of 2002, petitioners and other co-workers (complainants) filed before the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC
three separate complaints for wage differentials, 13th month pay, overtime pay, holiday pay, premium pay for holiday and rest day,
service incentive leave pay, and unpaid emergency cost of living allowance (ECOLA) against respondents, docketed as NLRC NCR
Case Nos. 09-76698-2002, 09-08152-2002, and 09-08046-2002, which complaints were consolidated before Labor Arbiter Jaime M.
Reyno (LA Reyno).

On January 13, 2003, complainants and respondents entered into a Joint Compromise Agreement 7 which
reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

JOINT COMPROMISE AGREEMENT

COMPLAINANTS and the RESPONDENTS, through their' respective counsel, respectfully submit the following Compromise
Agreement.

WHEREAS, the parties (except Susana Larga) deciding to finally write "finis" to the instant case, have agreed to settle the instant
case and to enter into a Compromise Agreement.

NOW THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the terms and conditions herein below stipulated, the parties do hereby agree:

1. That the complainants should be considered regular employees of Napar Contracting and Allied Services
reckoned from their date of hire and are entitled to all the benefits under the law due to regular employees;

2. That the complainants shall be re-assigned by Napar Contracting and Allied Services and shall ensure that they
will be given work within forty five days (45) or until February 26,2002;
 3. That in case Napar Contracting and Allied Services failed to re assign or provide them work, complainants shall
be reinstated in their payroll or be given their salary equivalent to the existing minimum wage x x x;

4. That the complainants shall each receive the amount of SEVEN THOUSAND PESOS as payment for their
monetary claims and which amount shall be considered in any future litigation;

5. That upon signing of this agreement and compliance with the stipulations herein provided, the cases shall be
deemed and considered fully and completely satisfied and the complainants hereby release, remiss and forever
discharge the herein respondents, from any and all claims arising from the above cases;

6. The parties herein respectfully pray unto this Honorable Commission to approve this Compromise Agreement
and thereafter an Order be issued declaring the judgment in the above-entitled cases fully and completely
satisfied.

IN WITNESS WHEREFORE, the parties have hereunto set their hands this 13th day of January 2003.8ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
cralawlawlibrary

In an Order9 dated January 16, 2003, LA Reyno approved the Joint Compromise Agreement, enjoined the parties to fully comply
with its terms and dismissed the case without prejudice.

In accordance with the Joint Compromise Agreement, complainants, on several instances, reported to Napar. They were paid
P7,000.00 each as part of the agreement but were required by Napar; (1) to submit their respective bio-data/resume and several
documents such as Police Clearance, NBI Clearance, Barangay Clearance, Mayor's Permit, Health Certificate, drug test results,
community tax certificate, eye test results and medical/physical examination results; (2) to attend orientation seminars; (3) to
undergo series of interviews; and (4) to take and pass qualifying examinations, before they could be posted to their new
assignments. These requirements, according to Napar, are needed to properly assess complainants' skills for new placement with
the agency's other clients.

Complainants failed to fully comply, hence they were not given new assignments.

Proceedings before the Labor Arbiter

Sensing Napar's insincerity in discharging its obligation in reassigning them, complainants filed anew before the Arbitration Branch
of the NLRC four separate Complaints10 for illegal dismissal, non-payment of 13th month pay, wage differentials, overtime pay,
service incentive leave pay, holiday pay, premium pay for holiday and rest day, and moral and exemplary damages against
respondents, docketed as NLRC NCR Case Nos. 00-0505557-2003, 00-05-06187-2003, 00-05-06605-2003, 11 and 00-07-07792-
2003. These complaints were consolidated.

In their Position Paper,12 complainants averred that Napar's failure to reinstate or provide them work without any condition, in
consonance with the terms of the Joint Compromise Agreement, constitutes illegal constructive dismissal. They prayed for
backwages plus separation pay in lieu of reinstatement.

Respondents, in their Position Paper,13 claimed that they have fulfilled their obligation under the agreement when Napar required
complainants to report for work, to submit documentary requirements, to undergo seminars and training, and to pass qualifying
exams. They contended that complainants were the ones who violated the agreement when they refused to comply with the
foregoing requirements in order to assess their working capabilities and skills for their next posting. As such, they were deemed to
have waived their right to be reassigned. They argued that complainants should not have filed new complaints but should have
instead moved for the execution of the Joint Compromise Agreement. They then argued that the Labor Arbiter who approved the
said Joint Compromise Agreement or LA Reyno has exclusive jurisdiction to act on the complaints.

In a Decision14 dated July 29, 2004, Labor Arbiter Pablo C. Espiritu, Jr. (LA Espiritu) held that the conditions of the Joint
Compromise Agreement particularly regarding reinstatement/reassignment of complainants were violated thereby justifying
rescission of the Joint Compromise Agreement. LA Espiritu noted that complainants were correct in re-filing the complaints as this
was an available remedy under the NLRC Rules of Procedure when their previous complaints were dismissed without prejudice. He
struck down respondents' contention that a motion for execution of the compromise agreement was the proper remedy, ratiocinating
that the dismissal of the cases was approved without prejudice and therefore cannot be the subject of an execution.

LA Espiritu then ruled that complainants were constructively dismissed as they were placed on temporary off-detail without any work
for more than six months despite being regular employees of Napar. Doubting respondents' intention of reinstating complainants, LA
Espiritu observed that the submission of requirements and compliance with the procedures for rehiring should not be imposed on
complainants who are not newly-hired employees. Thus, Napar and Lacsamana were held jointly and severally liable to pay
complainants their separation pay in lieu of reinstatement due to the already strainedrelations of the parties.

Respondents Jonas/Young, as indirect employers of complainants, were held jointly and severally liable with Napar/Lacsamana for
wage differentials, 13 month pay differentials, service incentive leave pay, unpaid ECOLA, and holiday pay to some complainants,
less the P7,000.00 already received from respondents. The claims for premium pay for holiday, rest day, overtime pay, and moral
and exemplary damages were denied for lack of merit.
Proceedings before the National Labor Relations Commission

All parties appealed to the NLRC.

Complainants filed a partial appeal, arguing that LA Espiritu erred in not awarding backwages as well as wage and 13 th month pay
differentials to nine of them.

Respondents, for their part, argued that LA Espiritu erred in failing to recognize the final and binding effect of the Joint Compromise
Agreement, contending that complainants are barred from rescinding the agreement for having received P7,000.00 each as partial
compliance and refusing to comply with the requirements for their reassignment. Respondents Napar and Lacsamana, in their
Memorandum on Appeal,15 vehemently denied having illegally dismissed complainants and averred that they have the prerogative to
impose certain requirements in order to determine their working skills vis-a-vis their new postings. And since they refused to comply,
they have waived their right to be reassigned. Respondents Jonas/Young, meanwhile, in its Notice of Appeal Memorandum of
Appeal,16 asserted that they cannot be held solidarity liable with respondents Napar and Lacsamana since only Napar is obligated to
reassign complainants under the Joint Compromise Agreement.

In a Decision17 dated June 26, 2008, the NLRC granted respondents' appeal. It ruled that the approval of the Joint Compromise
Agreement by LA Reyno operates as res judicata between the parties and renders it unappealable and immediately executory. It
held that complainants had no cause of action when they re-filed their complaints for being barred by res judicata. The NLRC, in
disposing of the case, ordered the issuance of a writ of execution to enforce the Joint Compromise Agreement,
thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal of respondents is GRANTED, while that of the complainants is DISMISSED for
lack of merit. The Decision of Labor Arbiter Pablo C. Espiritu, Jr. dated July 29, 2004 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and a new
one is rendered DISMISSING the above-entitled complaints for having been barred by res judicata. The Order of Labor Arbiter
Jaime Reyno dated January 16, 2003 finding the Compromise Agreement entered into by the parties on January 13, 2003 to be in
order and not contrary to law and approving the same, stands valid, effective and should be enforced. Let the records of this case
be forwarded to the Labor Arbiter for the issuance of a writ of execution to enforce the said Compromise Agreement.

SO ORDERED.18ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
cralawlawlibrary

Complainants filed a Motion for Reconsideration, 19 averring that the NLRC gravely erred in ordering the issuance of a writ of
execution despite the absence of a final judgment or a judgment on the merits. They stand on their right to rescind the Joint
Compromise Agreement and to insist on their original demands when respondents violated the compromise agreement and on their
right to re-file their cases as sanctioned by the rules in cases of provisional dismissal of cases,

Napar and Lacsamana, on the other hand, filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration20 praying for the modification of the NLRC
Decision in that complainants be declared to have waived their right to their claims under the Joint Compromise Agreement for
likewise violating the agreement.

Both motions were denied in the NLRC Resolution 21 dated October 14, 2008.

Proceedings before the Court of Appeals

In their Petition for Certiorari22 filed before the CA, complainants insisted on their right to rescind the Joint Compromise Agreement
under Article 204123 of the Civil Code and on their right to re-file their complaints under Section 16, Rule V of the NLRC Rules of
Procedure.24

Napar and Lacsamana filed a Comment 25 on the Petition. Jonas and Young, however, failed to file a comment. As the CA did not
acquire jurisdiction over Jonas and Young and on the basis of complainants' manifestation that Jonas and Young had already
ceased operation, Jonas and Young were dropped as party respondents by the CA in its Resolution 26 of December 16, 2009.

On August 27, 2010, the CA rendered a Decision27 affirming the NLRC. The CA considered the January 16, 2003 Order of LA
Reyno, which approved the Joint Compromise Agreement, as a judgment on the merits, and held that the second set of complaints
was barred by res judicata. According to the C A, the complainants, in re-filing their complaints due to respondents' unwarranted
refusal to provide them work, were essentially seeking to enforce the compromise agreement and were not insisting on their original
demands that do not even include a claim for illegal dismissal. Thus, the CA ruled that complainants should have moved for the
execution of the Joint Compromise Agreement instead of filing a separate and independent action for illegal dismissal. The CA
dismissed the Petition, viz.:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit. Accordingly, the June 26,
2008 Decision and October 14, 2008 Resolution of public respondent National Labor Relations Commission are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.28cralawlawlibrary

Complainants filed a Motion for Reconsideration 29 but it was likewise denied by the CA in its Resolution 30 dated February 10, 2011.
Twelve of the complainants, herein petitioners, instituted the present Petition for Review on Certiorari.

Issues

Petitioners presented the following issues:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT PETITIONERS' COMPLAINT IS ALREADY
BARRED BY RES JUDICATA.

II

WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT, IN FILING THE SECOND COMPLAINT, THE
PETITIONERS ARE ENFORCING THE JOINT COMPROMISE AGREEMENT AND NOT RESCINDING IT. THUS, THE
PETITIONERS SHOULD HAVE MOVED FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF EXECUTION BEFORE THE LABOR ARBITER
INSTEAD OF FILING A SECOND COMPLAINT.

III

WHETHER THE PETITIONERS ARE ENTITLED TO SEPARATION PAY IN LIEU OF REINSTATEMENT AND FULL
BACKWAGES.31cralawlawlibrary

Petitioners argue that the CA, in ordering the execution of the Joint Compromise Agreement, has deprived them of their right of
rescission under Article 2041 of the Civil Code. They posit that due to the blatant violation by the respondents of the provisions of
the Joint Compromise Agreement, they only exercised the option accorded to them by law of rescinding the agreement and of
insisting upon their original demands by filing anew their Complaints. The inclusion of illegal dismissal in their causes of action is, for
petitioners, a necessary consequence of their subsequent dismissal and the blatant omission of respondents' commitment to
reinstate them. Petitioners thus pray for the payment of separation pay in lieu of reinstatement and full backwages as a
consequence of their illegal dismissal.

Napar and Lacsamana on the other hand, aver that petitioners' sole remedy was to move for the execution of the Joint Compromise
Agreement. They aver that petitioners cannot be allowed to rescind the agreement after having violated the same and having
already enjoyed its benefits. After all, the Joint Compromise Agreement is final, binding and constitutes as res judicata between
them.

Our Ruling

The Petition has merit. Petitioners' right to rescind the Joint Compromise Agreement and right to re-file their complaints must
prevail.

Petitioners validly exercised the

option of rescinding the Joint
CompromiseAgreement under
Article 2041 of the Civil Code

Article 2028 of the Civil Code defines a compromise agreement as a contract whereby the parties make reciprocal concessions in
order to avoid litigation or put an end to one already commenced. If judicially approved, it becomes more than a binding contract; it
is a determination of a controversy and has the force and effect of a judgment.32 Article 227 of the Labor Code provides that any
compromise settlement voluntarily agreed upon by the parties with the assistance of the Bureau of Labor Relations or the regional
office of the Department of Labor and Employment shall be final and binding upon the parties. Compromise agreements between
employers and workers have often been upheld as valid and accepted as a desirable means of settling disputes. 33

Thus, a compromise agreement, once approved, has the effect of res judicata between the parties and should not be disturbed
except for vices of consent, forgery, fraud, misrepresentation, and coercion. 34 A judgment upon compromise is therefore not
appealable, immediately executory, and can be enforced by a writ of execution. 35 However, this broad precept enunciated under
Article 203736 of the Civil Code has been qualified by Article 2041 of the same Code which recognizes the right of an aggrieved
party to either (1) enforce the compromise by a writ of execution, or (2) regard it as rescinded and insist upon his original demand,
upon the other party's failure or refusal to abide by the compromise. In a plethora of cases, 37 the Court has recognized the option of
rescinding a compromise agreement due to non-compliance with its terms. We explained in Chavez v. Court of
Appeals:38chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

A compromise has upon the parties the effect and authority of res judicata; but there shall be no execution except in compliance
with a judicial compromise.cralawlawlibrary
Thus, we have held that a compromise agreement which is not contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals or good customs
is a valid contract which is the law between the parties themselves. It has upon them the effect and authority of res judicata even if
not judicially approved, and cannot be lightly set aside or disturbed except for vices of consent and forgery.
However, in Heirs of Zari, et al v. Santos, we clarified that the broad precept enunciated in Art, 2037 is qualified by Art. 2041 of the
same Code, which provides:
If one of the parties fails or refuses to abide by the compromise, the other party may either enforce the compromise or regard it as
rescinded and insist upon his original demand.
We explained, viz.:
[B]efore the onset of the new Civil Code, there was no right to rescind compromise agreements. Where a party violated the terms of
a compromise agreement, the only recourse open to the other party was to enforce the terms thereof.

When the new Civil Code came into being, its Article 2041 xxx created for the first time the right of rescission. That provision gives
to the aggrieved party the right to "either enforce the compromise or regard it as rescinded and insist upon his original
demand." Article 2041 should obviously be deemed to qualify the broad precept enunciated in Article 2037 that "[a] compromise has
upon the parties the effect and authority of res judicata.
In exercising the second option under Art. 2041, the aggrieved party may, if he chooses, bring the suit contemplated or involved in
his original demand, as if there had never been any compromise agreement, without bringing an action for rescission. This is
because he may regard the compromise as already rescinded by the breach thereof of the other party.cralawlawlibrary

To reiterate, Article 2041 confers upon the party concerned the authority, not only to regard the compromise agreement as
rescinded but also, to insist upon his original demand. We find that petitioners validly exercised this option as there was breach and
non-compliance of the Joint Compromise Agreement by respondents.

It is undisputed that Napar failed to reassign and provide work to petitioners. Napar, however, puts the blame on petitioners for their
alleged deliberate refusal to comply with the requirements for reassignment to other clients. Napar claims that the imposition of
these so-called "reassessment procedures" will efficiently guide them on where to assign petitioners; it likewise posits that it is a
valid exercise of its management prerogative to assign workers to their principal employer.

At the outset, it must be emphasized that there was no indication that petitioners deliberately refused to comply with the procedures
prior to their purported reassignment. Petitioners alleged that they reported to Napar several times waiting for tlieir assignment and
that Napar was giving them a run-around even as they tried to comply with the requirements. These matters were not disputed by
respondents. Thus, we cannot agree with respondents were the ones who violated the compromise agreement. Moreover, we are
not persuaded by Napar's assertion that petitioners' reassignment cannot be effected without compliance with the requirements set
by it. Petitioners are regular employees of Napar; thus, their reassignment should not involve any reduction in rank, status or
salary.39 As aptly noted by LA Espiritu, petitioners are not newly-hired employees. Considering further that they are ordinary factory
workers, they do not need special training or any skills assessment procedures for proper placement. While we consider Napar's
decision to require petitioners to submit documents and employment clearances, to attend seminars and interviews and take
examinations, which according to Napar is imperative in order for it to effectively carry out its business objective, as falling within the
ambit of management prerogative, this undertaking should not, however, deny petitioners their constitutional right of tenure.
Besides, there is no evidence nor any allegation proffered that Napar has no available clients where petitioners can be assigned to
work in the same position they previously occupied. Plainly, Napar's scheme of requiring petitioners to comply with reassessment
procedures only seeks to prevent petitioners' immediate reassignment.

"We have held that management is free to regulate, according to its own discretion and judgment, all aspects of employment,
including hiring, work assignments, working methods, time, place and manner of work, processes to be followed, supervision of
workers, working regulations, transfer of employees, work supervision, lay off of workers and discipline, dismissal and recall of
workers. The exercise of management prerogative, however, is not absolute as it must be exercised in good faith and with due
regard to the rights of labor."40 Such "cannot be used as a subterfuge by the employer to rid himself of an undesirable worker." 41

Respondents' non-compliance with the strict terms of the Joint Compromise Agreement of reassigning petitioners and ensuring that
they will be given work within the required time constitutes repudiation of the agreement. As such, the agreement is considered
rescinded in accordance with Article 2041 of the Civil Code. Petitioners properly chose to rescind the compromise agreement and
exercised the option of filing anew their complaints, pursuant to Art. 2041. It was error on the part of the CA to deny petitioners the
right of rescission.

Still, respondents insist that petitioners cannot seek rescission for they have already enjoyed the benefits of the Joint Compromise
Agreement. According to respondents, petitioners' acceptance of the amount of P7,000.00 each bars them from repudiating and
rescinding the agreement.

The contention lacks merit for the following reasons. First, petitioners never accepted the meager amount of P7,000.00 as full
satisfaction of their claims as they also expected to be reassigned and reinstated in their jobs. In other words, their acceptance of
the amount of P7,000.00 each should not be interpreted as full satisfaction of all their claims, which included reinstatement in their
jobs. The amount of P7,000.00 is measly compared to the amount of monetary award granted by LA Espiritu and therefore makes
the agreement unconscionable and against public policy,42 At this point, it is worth noting that even quitclaims are ineffective in
barring recovery for the full measure of the worker's rights and that acceptance of benefits therefrom does not amount to
estoppel.43 Lastly, it must be emphasized that the Joint Compromise Agreement expressly provided that each of the complainants
shall receive P7,000.00 as payment for their monetary claims and "which amount shall be considered in any future litigation."44 By
virtue of this stipulation, the parties in entering into the agreement did not rule out the possibility of any future claims in the event of
non-compliance. As correctly ruled by LA Espiritu, this proviso showed that petitioners were not barred from raising their money
claims in the future.

Section 16 of Rule V of the NLRC Rules

of Procedure allows petitioners to re-file their
complaints which were previously dismissed
without prejudice

The Court also takes into account the circumstance that petitioners' previous complaints were dismissed without prejudice. "A
dismissal without prejudice does not operate as a judgment on the merits."45 As contrasted from a dismissal with prejudice which
disallows and bars the filing of. a complaint, a dismissal without prejudice "does not bar another action involving the same parties,
on the same subject matter and theory."46 The NLRC Rules of Procedure, specifically Section 16 of Rule V thereof, provides the
remedy of filing for a revival or re-opening of a case which was dismissed without prejudice within 10 days from receipt of notice of
the order of dismissal and of re-filing the case after the lapse of the 10-day period. Petitioners are thus not barred from re-filing their
Complaints.

In choosing to rescind the Joint Compromise Agreement and re-file their complaints, petitioners can rightfully include their claim of
illegal dismissal. The CA took off from the wrong premise that petitioners, in re-filing their case, cannot be said to have opted to
rescind the compromise agreement since they were not insisting on their original claim. It must be noted that when petitioners
initially filed their first set of complaints for wage differentials, 13th month pay, overtime pay, holiday pay, premium pay for holiday
and rest day, service incentive leave pay, and unpaid ECOLA (that does not include the claim of illegal dismissal), subsequent
events transpired which brought about their unceremonious suspension and dismissal from work. This then led to the parties
entering into the Joint Compromise Agreement whereby respondents undertook to reinstate petitioners and pay them the sum of
P7,000.00 in partial satisfaction of their claims. The compromise agreement evinces and shows that petitioners' reinstatement was
part of their original demands. Besides, respondents acknowledged that the first and second sets of Complaints filed by petitioners
are similar in nature. Respondents even admitted that the issues raised in the first set of Complaints were similar to the issues
raised by petitioners when they filed anew their Complaints. Nevertheless, the filing of a separate action for illegal dismissal shall
only go against the rule on multiplicity of suits. It is settled that a plaintiff may join several distinct demands, controversies or rights of
action in one declaration, complaint or petition. 47 This is to avert duplicity and multiplicity of suits that would farther delay the
disposition of the case.

In view of the foregoing, we find that both the NLRC and CA gravely erred in dismissing petitioners' Complaints on the ground of res
judicata. LA Espiritu correctly assumed jurisdiction and properly took cognizance of petitioners' consolidated complaints for illegal
dismissal and other monetary claims.

Petitioners are entitled to separation pay

and full backwages as well as to the other
monetary awards granted by the
Labor Arbiter

We, likewise, subscribe to LA Espiritu's ruling that petitioners, as regular employees, are deemed to have been constructively and
illegally dismissed by respondents. Being on floating status and off-detailed for more than six months, not having been reinstated
and reassigned by respondents, petitioners are considered to have been constructively dismissed. 48 Settled is the rule that an
employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement, or separation pay if reinstatement is no longer
viable, and to his full backwages.49

LA Espiritu awarded petitioners separation pay in lieu of reinstatement. The Court agrees that the award of separation pay is
warranted due to the already strained relations between the parties.50 However, aside from separation pay, petitioners, for having
been illegally dismissed, should also be awarded full backwages, inclusive of allowances and their other benefits or their monetary
equivalent computed from November 9, 2002 (the date of their last work assignment or from the time compensation was withheld
from them) up to the date of finality of this Decision.

While petitioners failed to raise the matter of entitlement to backwages before the CA, this does not prevent the Court from
considering their entitlement to the same. The Court has discretionary authority to take up new issues on appeal if it finds that their
consideration is necessary in arriving at a just decision.

Anent the other monetary claims in petitioners' complaints, the awards granted to them by LA Espiritu stand undisturbed for
petitioners' failure to question the same on appeal before the CA and even before this Court. Hence, we sustain the award of wage
differentials, 13th month pay differentials, service incentive leave pay, unpaid ECOLA, and holiday pay less the P7;000.00 already
received by them.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The August 27, 2010 Decision and February 10, 2011 Resolution of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 106724 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The July 29, 2004 Decision of the Labor Arbiter Pablo C. Espiritu, Jr.
in NLRC NCR Case Nos. 00-05-05557-2003, 00-05-06187-2003, 00-05-06605-2003 and 00-07-07792-2003 is REINSTATED. In
addition, respondents Napar Contracting & Allied Services and Norman Lacsamana are held jointly and severally liable to pay
petitioners Reynaldo Inutan, Helen Carte, Noel Ayson, Ivy Cabarle, Noel Jamili, Maritess Hular, Rolito Azucena, Raymundo Tunog,
Roger Bernal, Agustin Estre, Marilou Sagun, and Enrique Ledesma, Jr. full backwages, inclusive of allowances and their other
benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from November 9, 2002 up to the date of finality of this Decision.
SO ORDERED.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

G.R. No. 185746

LUCITA TIOROSIO-ESPINOSA, Petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE PRESIDING JUDGE VIRGINIA HOFILEÑA-EUROPA, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
Court of Davao City, Branch 11, 11th Judicial Region, Davao City, NICOLAS L. SUMAPIG, in his capacity as Sheriff IV of the
Office of the Provincial Sheriff, Office of the Clerk of Court, 11th Judicial Region, Davao City and NECEFERO
JOVERO, Respondents.

DECISION

JARDELEZA, J.:

We consider the propriety of the Court of Appeals' outright dismissal of a petition for certiorari on procedural grounds and whether
the awards of moral damages, exemplary damages, and attorney's fees may be included in an execution pending appeal.

Private respondent Necefero Jovero (Jovero) filed an action for damages against spouses Pompiniano Espinosa 1 and petitioner
Lucita Tiorosio-Espinosa2 (Spouses Espinosa) before the Regional Trial Court of Davao City (RTC). In the complaint, Jovero alleged
that Spouses Espinosa maliciously filed several cases for theft, estafa and perjury against him for the sole purpose of vexing,
harassing, and humiliating him. Accordingly, Jovero prayed that Spouses Espinosa be ordered to pay compensatory damages,
moral damages, exemplary damages, attorney’s fees, and costs of suit.3

After trial, the RTC rendered a decision 4 dated November 21, 2005 in favor of Jovero. The dispositive portion reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff Necefero Jovero, ordering
defendants to pay Jovero:

1. The sum of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) as compensatory damages;

2. The sum of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) as moral damages;

3. The sum of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) as exemplary damages;

4. The sum of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) for and as attorney’s fees; and

5. The costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.5

Consequently, Jovero moved for execution pending appeal, citing his advanced age and failing health. 6 Meanwhile, Spouses
Espinosa moved for reconsideration of the RTC decision. 7 On April 12, 2007, the RTC granted Jovero’s motion for execution
pending appeal and denied Spouses Espinosa’s motion for reconsideration. 8 The RTC subsequently issued a writ of execution
pending appeal on April 19, 2007 which covered the entire amount stated in the decision. 9

Aggrieved by the denial of their motion for reconsideration, Spouses Espinosa filed their notice of appeal of the main RTC
decision.10

They also filed a separate motion to stay execution pending appeal and to approve/fix the supersedeas bond. They contended that
execution pending appeal involving awards of moral and exemplary damages is improper because it is contrary to the decisions of
the Supreme Court.11 The RTC denied the motion to stay execution pending appeal in an order dated September 14, 2007. 12

On November 19, 2007,13 Spouses Espinosa filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA) assailing the September
14, 2007 order.14 In a resolution dated December 14, 2007, the CA dismissed outright the petition for certiorari for failure to state the
date when the assailed order was received.15 Spouses Espinosa filed their motion for reconsideration alleging that their previous
counsel received the assailed order on October 4, 2007, attaching as proof a certified photocopy of postal registry return
card.16 Thus, they filed the petition for certiorari on time. They explained that the return card was not yet available with the RTC at
the time they filed the petition for certiorari, and that they disclosed this fact to the CA in the petition with an undertaking to submit it
as soon as it was available. On November 18, 2008, however, the CA denied the motion for reconsideration. This time, it cited
Spouses Espinosa’s failure to file a motion for reconsideration of the RTC’s September 14, 2007 order to sustain its earlier dismissal
of the petition for certiorari.17

Lucita Tiorosio-Espinosa (Lucita) filed this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 to appeal the CA’s dismissal of the
case.18 She argues that the motion to stay execution was in fact a motion for reconsideration of the RTC’s grant of Jovero’s motion
for execution pending appeal. She also reiterates that the petition for certiorari with the CA was timely filed, and that the reason for
the omission of the date of receipt of the assailed RTC order in the petition was the unavailability of the registry return card at that
time. On the substantive aspect, Lucita asserts that the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion when it ordered the execution
pending appeal of the awards of moral and exemplary damages. Lucita also questions the sheriff’s issuance of the notice of public
sale because the properties to be levied were excessive, and were part of the pool of properties that included their family
home.19 She likewise prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order, which we granted on February 9, 2009. 20 At the time
she posted the surety bond, Lucita concurrently filed an amended petition21 for the purpose of converting the petition for review to a
petition for certiorari and impleading thereto as public respondents the presiding RTC judge and sheriff. 22 We admitted the amended
petition on April 20, 2009. 23

In his comment, Jovero claims that the issues raised by Lucita are not germane to the CA resolutions subject of the present petition.
He posits that the issues being raised in the petition for review properly pertain to the alleged errors of the RTC, not the CA. In any
case, Jovero maintains that the RTC correctly granted the motion for execution pending appeal because of his advanced age and
frail health.24

II

The CA erred in dismissing outright the petition for certiorari on tenuous procedural grounds.

Under Section 3 of Rule 4625 of the Rules of Court, the CA has the prerogative to dismiss the case outright for failure to comply with
the formal requirements of an action filed under Rule 65. The formal requirements include, among others, a statement by the
petitioner indicating the material dates when the order or resolution subject of the petition was received. The CA identified Spouses
Espinosa’s failure to comply with this requirement as the primary ground for dismissing the petition outright.

An examination of the petition for certiorari filed with the CA shows that the CA is technically correct with respect to its finding that
Spouses Espinosa failed to indicate the exact date of receipt of the assailed RTC order. However, the CA should have considered
Spouses Espinosa’s explanation regarding this omission, which was apparent on the face of the petition. In paragraph 8(g),
Spouses Espinosa stated:

On 18 September 2007, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 11, Davao City, has released for mailing to petitioners’ former counsel,
Atty. Eufracio Dayaday, the Order dated 14 September 2007, denying their "Motion To Stay Execution Pending Appeal and to
Approve/Fix Supersedeas Bond"… The records surrendered by Atty. Eufracio Dayaday to petitioners after he withdrew his
appearance as counsel for the latter does not bear the Order dated 14 September 2007. Upon verification made by petitioners, the
records of the said case with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 11, Davao City, do not have the Postal Registry Return Card for the
mailing of the Order dated 14 September 2007. Nevertheless, petitioners herein undertake to submit a certified photocopy of the
postal registry return card, as soon as the same be made available in the records of the case.26

Spouses Espinosa likewise executed a "Joint-Affidavit of Material Dates," 27 which was attached to the petition for certiorari filed with
the CA, attesting to the fact that the September 14, 2007 order was not among the documents turned over to them by their former
counsel, and that the registry return card had not been returned to the RTC.28

It is therefore apparent that Spouses Espinosa attempted to comply with the material date requirement. Unfortunately, they
themselves could not ascertain when the subject order was received by their former counsel and thereby make an accurate
statement as to such fact. Moreover, the best evidence to prove receipt of the RTC order, i.e., the registry return card, was not yet
available when they elevated the case to the CA. But, as a sign of good faith, Spouses Espinosa undertook to submit the return card
as soon as it was available—which they subsequently did on January 30, 2008. 29 Given the foregoing circumstances, it may be
deduced that the basic reason why no precise date of receipt was given by Spouses Espinosa is because they did not want to
misrepresent the date in their petition. In fine, we find Spouses Espinosa’s failure to indicate the date of receipt excusable; the CA’s
outright dismissal of their petition is not commensurate with the degree of their non- compliance with the prescribed procedure. In
any case, the return card showed that the order was received on October 4, 2007, which means that when Spouses Espinosa filed
the petition for certiorari on November 19, 2007, they did so well within the sixty (60) day reglementary period.1âwphi1

Although it is true that procedural rules should be treated with utmost respect and due regard, since they are designed to facilitate
the adjudication of cases to remedy the worsening problem of delay in the resolution of rival claims and in the administration of
justice, this is not an inflexible tenet. After all, rules of procedure are mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their
strict and rigid application especially on technical matters, which tends to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must be
avoided.30

In denying Spouses Espinosa’s motion for reconsideration of the dismissal of their petition for certiorari, the CA held that their failure
to first file a motion for reconsideration of the RTC order, which denied their motion to stay execution, was fatal to their petition.
While the CA’s legal proposition is correct, the rule was misapplied in the present case.

A petition for certiorari before a higher court will generally not prosper unless the inferior court has been given, through a motion for
reconsideration, a chance to correct the errors imputed to it. This is because a motion for reconsideration is the plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law alluded to in Section 1, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. 31 A motion for
reconsideration is required in order to grant the lower court an opportunity to correct any actual or perceived error attributed to it by
the re-examination of the legal and factual circumstances of the case.32 Contrary to the CA’s findings, however, Spouses Espinosa
already complied with this requirement. Their motion to stay execution is, in fact, a motion for reconsideration of the RTC order
dated April 12, 2007 which granted Jovero’s motion for execution pending appeal.

Although not captioned as a "motion for reconsideration," Spouses Espinosa’s motion to stay execution directly challenged the
RTC’s order of execution pending appeal insofar as it allowed the inclusion of the awards for moral and exemplary
damages.33 Thus, when the RTC denied Spouses Espinosa’s motion to stay execution on September 14, 2007, it was already the
second time the trial court had passed upon the issue of execution pending appeal. Both the April 12, 2007 and September 14, 2007
orders dealt with the same issue, i.e., the propriety of execution pending appeal. In the first instance, the RTC allowed the execution
pending appeal; in the latter, it denied Spouses Espinosa's motion to stay execution and, thus, sustained its earlier ruling. On both
occasions, the parties had been accorded ample opportunity to squarely argue their positions and the RTC more than enough
opportunity to study the matter and to deliberate upon the issues raised by the parties. Under these circumstances, the filing of a
motion for reconsideration of the order denying the stay of execution pending appeal by Spouses Espinosa could not be considered
a plain and adequate remedy but a mere superfluity. 34

III

Having disposed of the procedural issues, we now proceed to the main substantive issue of whether the awards of moral and
exemplary damages, as well as attorney’s fees, may be the subject of execution pending appeal. 35

The resolution of this issue is straightforward. Jurisprudence is replete with pronouncements that execution pending appeal of
awards of moral and exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees is not allowed. In Radio Communications of the Philippines, Inc.
(RCPI) v. Lantin,36 we explained why these cannot be the subject of execution pending appeal:

…The execution of any award for moral and exemplary damages is dependent on the outcome of the main case. Unlike actual
damages for which the petitioners may clearly be held liable if they breach a specific contract and the amounts of which
are fixed and certain, liabilities with respect to moral and exemplary damages as well as the exact amounts remain
uncertain and indefinite pending resolution by the Intermediate Appellate Court and eventually the Supreme Court. The
existence of the factual bases of these types of damages and their causal relation to the petitioners' act will have to be
determined in the light of the assignments of errors on appeal. It is possible that the petitioners, after all, while liable for actual
damages may not be liable for moral and exemplary damages. Or as in some cases elevated to the Supreme Court, the awards
may be reduced.37 (Emphasis supplied.)

In Engineering Construction Inc. v. National Power Corporation,38 we expanded the RCPI doctrine to likewise exclude consequential
damages and attorney's fees from execution pending appeal.39 The doctrine has since been reiterated in Heirs of Santiago C.
Divinagracia v. Ruiz,40 International School, Inc. (Manila) v. Court of Appeals, 41 Echauz v. Court of Appeals,42 and Valencia v. Court
of Appeals.43 Clearly, the RTC committed legal error when it ordered the premature execution of the awards of moral damages,
exemplary damages, and attorney's fees. Nonetheless, we recognize that the RTC had the power to order the execution pending
appeal of actual or compensatory damages in accordance with the cited authorities.

IV

The rest of petitioner's arguments are devoted to assailing the sheriff's levy of her properties: However, a petition for certiorari is not
the proper remedy to question the sheriff's actions. The special civil action of certiorari is directed only against a tribunal, board or
officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions.44 lt is not available as a remedy for the correction of acts performed by a sheriff
during the execution process, which acts are neither judicial nor quasi-judicial but arc purely ministerial functions. 45 The more
appropriate remedy would have been a petition for prohibition filed under Section 2 of Rule 65. Moreover, the matters being raised
by the petitioner are factual in nature and, hence, not proper for this Court to resolve at the first instance
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The resolutions dated December 14, 2007 and November 18, 2008 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 02061-MIN are SET ASIDE. The orders dated April 12, 2007 and September 14, 2007 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 11, Davao City are MODIFIED to exclude moral damages, exemplary damages, and attorney's fees in
the execution pending appeal. The temporary restraining order issued on February 9, 2009 is LIFTED

[G.R. No. 150462 : June 15, 2011]

TOP MANAGEMENT PROGRAMS CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS. LUIS FAJARDO AND THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF
LAS PIÑAS CITY, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 seeking the reversal of the Decision [1] dated May 30, 2001 and
Resolution[2] dated October 23, 2001 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 60712 which affirmed the Order [3] of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las Piñas City, Branch 275 in Civil Case No. 94-564 dismissing petitioner's complaint for quieting of
title and damages against private respondent.

The factual antecedents:

On December 31, 1964, Emilio Gregorio (Gregorio) filed an application for registration of title over Lots 1 to 4 of Plan Psu-204785
situated at Mag-asawang Mangga, Las Piñas, Rizal, before the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal, Branch II (LRC Case
No. N-5053, LRC Rec. No. N-27523). On January 4, 1966, said court issued an order declaring as abandoned the reserved
oppositions of Jose T. Velasquez and Pablo Velasquez.  Thereafter, the case proceeded to trial.

Meanwhile, on July 29, 1965, Jose T. Velasquez (Velasquez) filed an application for registration of title over six lots denominated as
Lots 7 and 9 of Psu-80886, Ap-5538, and Lots 1, 7, 9 and 11 of Psu-56007 Amd., Ap-11135, situated at Almanza, Las Piñas,
Rizal, in LRC Case No. N-5416, LRC Rec. No. N-28735, before the same court.

On January 31, 1966, the CFI rendered a decision[4] in LRC Case No. N-5053 declaring Gregorio to be the absolute owner of Lots 1,
2, 3 and 4 described in Plan Psu-204785. On March 9, 1966, an order was issued by said court for the issuance of the decree of
registration, stating that the January 31, 1966 had become final.

On March 30, 1966, the same court promulgated a decision in LRC Case No. N-5416 adjudicating Lots 1, 7, 9 and 11 of Psu-56007-
Amd, plan Ap-11135, and Lots 7 and 9 of Psu-80886 (Ap-5538) to Jose T. Velasquez.  On May 3, 1966, said court ordered the
issuance of a decree of registration in view of the finality of the March 30, 1966 decision.

In the meantime, on July 25, 1966, the LRA called the attention of the Director of Lands regarding the overlapping of Lots 1, 7 and
11 of Psu-56007-Amd awarded to Velasquez, with Lots 1 to 4 of Psu-204785 adjudicated to Gregorio, and requested that portions of
these lots that are not in  conflict be segregated.  On September 16, 1966, the LRA informed the CFI that Lots 1 and 7 of Psu-
56007-Amd (Ap-11135) had been amended by the Bureau of Lands to exclude therefrom portions covered by Lot 2, Psu-64894,
Psu-96904, and Lots 1 to 4, Psu-204785 of Gregorio.[5]  On the basis of the LRA report, Velasquez petitioned the CFI to set aside
the award earlier made in favor of Gregorio in LRC Case No. N-5035 on the ground of lack of jurisdiction and to give due course to
his application over the said lots in LRC Case No. N-5416. On November 23, 1966, the CFI issued an Order in LRC Case Nos. N-
5053 and N-5416 declaring that the application of Velasquez be given due course insofar as Lots 1 and 7 of Ap-11135 which are
identical to Lots 1 to 4, Plan Psu-204785, and the January 31, 1966 decision in LRC Case No. N-5053 in favor of Gregorio
respecting the same lots as null and void.[6]  On December 6, 1966, Decree Nos. N-111862 to N-111865 and the corresponding
certificates OCT Nos. 5677, 5678, 5679 and 5680 were issued in favor of Velasquez.

On January 7, 1967, Gregorio appealed the November 23, 1966 decision of the CFI to the CA (CA-G.R. No. 40739-40-R). On July
30, 1971, the CA rendered its Decision[7] reversing the CFI, as follows:

WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is hereby reversed and, in lieu thereof, another is hereby rendered declaring null and void
the Decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, dated March 30, 1966, in Land Registration Case No. N-5416, LRC Rec. No. N-
28735, insofar as it adjudicates in favor of appellee Jose T. Velasquez Lots Nos. 1 and 7 of  Plan Ap-11315; and directing that the
Order of March 9, 1966 for the issuance of the decree in Land Registration Case No. N-5053, LRC Rec. No. N-27523, over Lots 1,
2, 3 and 4 of Plan Psu-204785, in the name of appellant Emilio Gregorio, be given due course.

No costs.

IT IS SO ORDERED.[8]

Per entry of judgment issued by the CA, the above decision became final and executory on February 1, 1972. [9]  It appears,
however, that a petition for review had been filed by Velasquez with this Court, docketed as G.R. Nos. L-34239-40 ("Jose T.
Velasquez v. Emilio Gregorio"), which was given due course per Resolution dated March 7, 1972 of the Second Division.
Eventually, this Court denied the petition under Resolution [10] dated February 8, 1984 stating that:
We have carefully scrutinized the arguments of the parties stated in their respective briefs as well as the reasons adduced by the
Court of Appeals to support its decision sought to be reviewed and We have Resolved to RECONSIDER the resolution of March 7,
1972, and enter instead another resolution DENYING the petition for lack of merit with COSTS against the petitioners. [11]

The above resolution became final and executory on March 2, 1984 as per entry of judgment [12] issued by this Court. Prior to this
however, on October 31, 1972, Decree No. N-141990 over Lots 1, 3 and 4 of Plan Psu-204785 were issued by the LRA and the
corresponding OCT No. 9587 in the name of Gregorio, was subsequently issued on November 21, 1972. [13]

Lots 1, 3 and 4, Plan Psu-204785 covered by OCT No. 9587 also became the subject of Civil Case No. 16977 of the CFI of Rizal. 
Gregorio sought the annulment of the deed of sale over the said lots in favor of Luciana Parami.  The CFI dismissed the complaint
of Gregorio in a decision rendered on May 8, 1974. Gregorio appealed to the CA (CA-G.R. No. 56015-R, entitled "Emilio Gregorio v.
Spouses Luciana and Corpus Parami and the Register of Deeds of Rizal") which reversed the CFI.  In its decision dated February 7,
1978, the CA declared the aforesaid deed of sale null and void, and ordered the cancellation of certificate of title (No. 38433) in the
name of the Paramis and issuance of an OCT in favor of Gregorio covering Lots 1, 3 and 4, Plan Pasu-204785.  On November 20,
1979, the court in the same case issued an order declaring the children (Ana, Paz, Carmen, Remedios and Rolando, all surnamed
Gregorio) of the deceased Emilio Gregorio "as his compulsory heirs to substitute the said plaintiff." [14]  Pursuant to the said decision,
OCT No. 9587 in the name of Emilio Gregorio was cancelled and a new certificate of title, TCT No. S-91911 in favor of his heirs was
issued.[15]

In a Report dated September 12, 1984, the LRA informed the CFI in LRC Case No. N-5416 that compliance with the July 30, 1971
CA decision in CA-G.R. No. 40739-40-R adjudicating Lots 1, 3 and 4 of Plan Psu-204785 in favor of Gregorio will result in
duplication of titles over the said properties. The report further stated:

21. That based on the records of this Commission, Lots 1, 3 and 4 of plan Psu-204785 were already covered by TCT No. S-
91911 in the name of the Heirs of Emilio Gregorio with several annotations of encumbrances x x x;

22. That among those encumbrances are the deeds of sale executed by them in favor of Herminia Galman covering an undivided
portion of aforesaid Lot 1, and of Everlita Talusan of the whole Lots 3 and 4 denominated as Entry No. 21079/S-97421, and that the
latter vendee E. Talusan had already acquire[d] TCT No. S-97421 over said two lots in her name also with several annotation of
encumbrances x x x;

23. That as per our verification from the Registry of Deeds of Makati, corresponding titles were issued in the name of J.T. Velasquez
denominated as OCT Nos. 5678, 5677, 5679 and 5680 x x x;

24. And that these certificates of title were all cancelled and assigned in favor of J.V. Development Corporation as per Entry Nos.
99377/T-195606, 195605, 195605 and 19505 all inscribed on July 27, 1967.

WHEREFORE, these facts are respectfully brought to the attention of this Honorable Court with the recommendation:

That Decree Nos. N-111862 to N-111865 issued on December 6, 1966 over Lots 1 to 4, Psu-204785, in favor of Jose T. Velasquez,
as well as existing subsequent titles emanating from the same shall be declared null and void and ordered cancelled. [16]

On April 9, 1984, the heirs of Emilio Gregorio filed an ex-parte motion for execution before the RTC of Pasig, Metro Manila, Branch
152 in LRC Case Nos. N-5053 and N-5416.  On March 21, 1986, the RTC of Pasig issued the following Order [17]:

Considering that the Resolution issued on February 8, 1984 by the Supreme Court in G.R. No. L-34239-40, entitled "Jose T.
Velasquez vs. Emilio Gregorio", denying the petition for review on certiorari of the judgment of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No.
40739-40-R, had on March 2, 1984 become final and executory in favor of Emilio Gregorio, and considering further the
recommendation contained in the Report dated September 12, 1984 of the Acting Commissioner of Land Registration thru Silverio
G. Perez, Chief, Division of Original Registration, relative to LRC Case No. N-5053, LRC Record No. N-27523, wherein Emilio
Gregorio is the applicant and in LRC Case No. N-5416, LRC Record No. N-28735, wherein Jose T. Velasquez is the applicant,
which report is hereby approved, the Court declares as null and void Decree Nos. N-111862 to N-111865, inclusive, issued on
December 6, 1966, covering Lots 1, 2, 3 and 4, Psu-204785 in favor of Jose T. Velasquez in LRC Case No. No. 5416 as well as all
existing subsequent titles emanating therefrom, and any and all encumbrances constituted against said Lots 1, 2, 3 and 4, Psu-
204785 and other acts of disposition affecting the same.

WHEREFORE, the Register of Deeds of Pasay City is hereby directed to cancel Original Certificates of Title Nos. 5677, 5678, 5679
and 5680 issued in the name of Jose T. Velasquez and all titles and transactions emanating therefrom and which are annotated at
the back of the said Certificates of Title, and to issue, in lieu thereof, new Certificates of Title in the name of the Heirs of Emilio
Gregorio, after paying the prescribed fees therefor, pursuant to the Order for issuance of a decree dated March 9, 1966 in the LRC
Case No. N-5053, Record No. N-27523.

SO ORDERED.[18]

On April 29, 1986, TCT Nos. 107727, 107728 and 107729 (covering Lot 1)[19]  was issued by the Register of Deeds of Pasay City in
the name of the Heirs of Emilio Gregorio.  Subsequently, by virtue of a Partition Agreement with Herminia Galman, the property was
subdivided into two lots between the heirs of Gregorio (Lot 1-A consisting of 20,000 sq. ms.) and Galman (Lot 1-B consisting of
27,536 sq. ms.). Consequently, TCT No. 107729 was cancelled and in lieu thereof TCT No. 4635 in the name of the heirs of
Gregorio and TCT No. 4636 in the name of Herminia Galman, were issued by the Register of Deeds of Las Piñas. [20]

Undeniably, the duplication of titles over Lot 1, Psu-204785 with the issuance of TCT No. S-91911 (transfer from OCT No. 9587)
and TCT No. 107729 and its derivative title, TCT No. 4635, both in the name of the same owners, gave rise to the present
controversy.

The Claim of Luis Fajardo

(TCT No. 27380, now
TCT No. T-34923)

As earlier mentioned, Gregorio appealed the November 23, 1966 CFI decision in LRC Case Nos. N-5053 and N-5416 awarding Lots
1 to 4 of Psu-204785 in favor of Velasquez, docketed as CA-G.R. No. 40739-40-R.  Sometime after this, he entered into an
agreement with Tomas Trinidad (Trinidad) and Luis Fajardo (Fajardo) entitled "Kasunduan na may Pambihirang
Kapangyarihan." By virtue of this agreement, Fajardo would finance the cost of the litigation and in return he would be entitled to
one-half of the subject property after deducting twenty per cent (20%) of the total land area as attorney's fees for Trinidad if the
appeal is successful.

After the CA rendered a favorable ruling on Gregorio's appeal, Fajardo and Trinidad filed Civil Case No. 35305 before the RTC of
Pasig, Branch 164 to enforce their agreement with Gregorio.  On May 8, 1986, said court rendered judgment in their favor, as
follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered ordering herein defendants:

(1) to convey to Atty. Tomas Trinidad as honorarium for his services an area of 14,684 sq.m. which is twenty percent
(20%) of 72,424 sq.m. the total area of Lots 1, 2, 3 and 4;
(2) to convey to Luis Fajardo an area of 29,369 sq.m. representing fifty percent (50%) of the remainder of the property
after deducting the honorarium of Atty. Trinidad.
(3) to pay the cost of suit and litigation expenses.

SO ORDERED.[21]

The heirs of Gregorio appealed the above decision but their appeal was declared abandoned and dismissed by the CA.  By virtue of
an Entry of Judgment issued by the CA dated December 8, 1988, Trinidad and Fajardo filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of
execution.  However, the writ issued remained unsatisfied as per the Return filed by the Sheriff on April 10, 1989. On August 14,
1989, the court appointed Deputy Sheriff Marcial Estrellado to execute the deed of conveyance in favor of the plaintiffs.

Deputy Sheriff Estrellado executed the Officer's Deed of Conveyance[22] dated August 15, 1989 in favor of Trinidad and Fajardo.
While the plaintiffs moved for the approval of the subdivision plan needed for the transfer and issuance of separate titles as per
decision, the Register of Deeds of Las Piñas wrote a letter-reply[23] to the Deputy Sheriff indicating that the deed of conveyance
and Order of the Court dated August 14, 1989 entered as Entry No. 6503 and 6504 in their docket book could not be pursued
because the subject property was already sold to other parties.

In compliance with the order of the CFI, then Register of Deeds of Las Piñas Alejandro R. Villanueva submitted an official
report[24] stating that TCT No. S-91911, still existing in their records, should have been cancelled when TCT Nos. 107727, 107728
and 107729 were issued in compliance with the Order dated March 21, 1986 of the RTC of Pasig, and that such caused an
anomalous situation of having two separate and distinct certificates of title covering the same parcels of land although in the name
of the same registered owners. Villanueva opined that the issuance of TCT Nos. 107727, 107728 and 107729 covering Lots 1, 3
and 4 of Psu-204785, "placed TCT No. S-91911, as deemed cancelled, inasmuch as the latter certificate of title covers one and the
same parcels of land" and hence TCT No. S-91911 should not anymore be subject of any transactions.

The CFI initially withdrew its Order dated August 14, 1989 but eventually reinstated the same and ordered the Register of Deeds to
annotate the Deed of Conveyance at the back of TCT No. S-91911 within 24 hours upon receipt of the order.  Said directive was
reiterated by the CFI on June 7, 1991.  On June 26, 1991, the court authorized the subdivision of Lot 1, Psu-204785 and directed
the Register of Deeds to issue separate titles in favor of plaintiffs Trinidad and Fajardo. Consequently, TCT No. T-27380 [25] covering
29,369 sq. ms. portion of Lot 1, Psu-204785 in the name of Luis Fajardo was issued on December 12, 1991.  On April 26, 1993,
said TCT No. T-27380 was cancelled per Order[26] of the court dated March 13, 1992 and in lieu thereof, TCT No. T-34923 [27] was
issued, still in the name of Luis Fajardo and without any of the encumbrances carried over from TCT No. S-91911.

The Claim of Top Management

Programs Corporation
(TCT No. T-8129)

On September 24, 1991, herein petitioner Top Management Programs Corporation sought the annulment of the CFI orders in Civil
Case No. 35305 reinstating the August 14, 1989 order and directing the issuance of new certificates of title in the name of Trinidad
and Fajardo, on the ground of extrinsic fraud.  Petitioner claimed that by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale [28] dated November 29,
1988 which was notarized on January 9, 1989, the heirs of Gregorio sold to it a parcel of land with an area of 20,000 sq. ms.,
located at Las Piñas and identified as Lot 1-A Psd-293076, being a portion of Lot 1, Psu-204785 covered by TCT No. T-4635, and
that on February 20, 1989, TCT No. T-8129 [29] covering the said property was issued in its name.
On November 28, 1991, the CA rendered its decision dismissing the petition for annulment (CA-G.R. SP No. 26100).   It held that
there existed no extrinsic fraud which would justify the annulment of the questioned orders.  Petitioner sought the reversal of the CA
ruling before this Court via a petition for certiorari.  By Decision[30] dated May 28, 1993, this Court dismissed the petition and affirmed
the CA judgment.  On the issue raised by petitioner as to whether the CA erred in holding that petitioner's claim of title to Lot 1-A
should be served as third-party claim on the Deputy Sheriff who executed the Deed of Conveyance and caused its registration, or to
vindicate the claim to the property through a separate independent action, the Court refrained from discussing the same since its
resolution is inconsequential and would not alter in any way the outcome of the petition. [31]

Civil Case No. 94-564

Thus, on February 10, 1994, petitioner filed before the RTC of Makati Civil Case No. 94-564 for Quieting of Title With Damages. 
Petitioner alleged that the issuance of TCT No. T-27380 in the name of Fajardo -- who obtained the same from the court in a case
without the knowledge of petitioner who was not a party therein -- despite the existence of TCT No. T-8129 in its name constitutes a
cloud upon the title of petitioner.  Petitioner claimed that it acquired the same property in good faith and for value from the original
owners thereof.

In his Answer, private respondent Fajardo asserted that it is the title of petitioner which originated from a void title.  OCT No. 5678
from which TCT No. 4635 was derived, was in effect declared null and void under this Court's Resolution dated February 8, 1984 in
G.R. No. L-34239-40 which dismissed petitioner's appeal from the July 30, 1971 CA Decision in CA-G.R. No. 40739-40-R.  The CA
had nullified the CFI decision dated March 30, 1966 in LRC Case No. N-5416 insofar as it adjudicates the subject lots to Velasquez.

After petitioner's formal offer of evidence, private respondent filed a demurrer to evidence, which the trial court granted in its
Order[32] dated June 8, 1998, as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the case is hereby DISMISSED.  No pronouncement as to costs.  The Register of Deeds of
Las Piñas City is hereby ordered to cancel TCT No. T-8129 in the name of plaintiff Top Management Programs Corporation.

SO ORDERED.[33]

Petitioner appealed to the CA and on May 30, 2001 said court rendered the assailed Decision [34] affirming the trial court's dismissal
of petitioner's complaint.  The CA held that petitioner cannot invoke the rule that the title which bears the earlier date should prevail
in view of the infirmity in TCT No. 107729 which on its face shows that its origin was a title already voided by the appellate court.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was likewise denied by the CA.

Hence, this petition alleging that the CA erred in (a) declaring TCT No. T-8129 as defective based on a mere clerical error despite
acknowledgment of its issuance resulting from a final determination by this Court of the validity of Emilio Gregorio's claim over the
subject property, and (b) affirming the validity of private respondent's TCT No. T-27380 despite the clear nullity of its mother title
(OCT No. 9587) which was issued pending the appeal filed by Velasquez from the decision of the appellate court in CA-G.R. No.
40739-40-R to this Court.

Petitioner reiterates that an error was made on the entries in TCT No. 107729. Instead of providing that said title, as well as TCT
Nos. 107727 and 107728 issued in the name of the Heirs of Emilio Gregorio, emanated from the application for registration of Emilio
Gregorio in LRC Case No. N-5053, LRC Rec. No. N-27523 pursuant to the Order of the RTC in LRC Case Nos. N-5416 and N-
5053, the Register of Deeds of Pasay City annotated on the face of said titles that these were derived from Jose T. Velasquez's
OCT No. 5678 under Decree No. N-111862. Petitioner laments that deplorable situation of the legitimate successor of the winning
litigant holding a title wrongly annotated to have been derived from the voided title of the loser in the case.  The winning party was
then given a title registered as derived from the title he fought so hard to set aside.  Moreover, there is no logic in the appellate
court's conclusion that petitioner's title traces its origin to a mother title already voided, when in fact it is undisputed that TCT No.
107729 was issued pursuant to the March 21, 1986 order of the RTC of Pasig in LRC Case Nos. N-5416 and N-5053 implementing
the final and executory February 8, 1984 decision of this Court in G.R. Nos. L-34239-40 denying Velasquez's appeal.

Petitioner further claims that it is a buyer in good faith who had no knowledge of any defect in the title of his predecessor-in-interest. 
It paid the purchase price and acquired its title long before it discovered the right to compensation of private respondent through the
Officer's Deed of Conveyance.

Finally, petitioner argues that the issuance of OCT No. 9587 during the pendency of Velasquez's appeal to this Court renders said
title null and void ab initio, citing the ruling in Director of Lands v. Reyes[35].  Since OCT No. 9587 is a nullity, it follows that its
derivative title, private respondent's TCT No. T-27380, is likewise a nullity.

Private respondent counters that petitioner's assertion of the existence of clerical errors in the annotations of the entries in TCT No.
8129 is, at the very least, an admission that said title is indeed defective.  Obviously, petitioner may not file a petition to quiet its title
and at the same time seek, in the same proceeding, the corrections of the entries therein.

As to the issue of premature issuance of OCT No. 9587, private respondent points out that the decision in LRC Case No. N-5053
dated January 31, 1966 as a consequence of which Decree of Registration No. 141990 was issued, has already attained finality
even before Velasquez sought the annulment of the award in favor of Emilio Gregorio utilizing the Report of the Commissioner of
Land Registration dated September 16, 1966, to the effect, among others, that a portion of the land awarded in his favor overlapped
with that adjudicated to Gregorio. Hence, the prohibition mentioned in the case of Director of Lands v. Reyes (supra) has no
application to the case at bar, and therefore could not serve as basis to nullify OCT No. 9587, the mother title of TCT No. T-27380 in
the name of private respondent.

We deny the petition.

Quieting of title is a common law remedy for the removal of any cloud, doubt, or uncertainty affecting title to real property.  In an
action for quieting of title, the plaintiffs must show not only that there is a cloud or contrary interest over the subject real property, but
that they have a valid title to it.[36]   The court is tasked to determine the respective rights of the complainant and the other claimants,
not only to place things in their proper places, and to make the claimant, who has no rights to said immovable, respect and not
disturb the one so entitled, but also for the benefit of both, so that whoever has the right will see every cloud of doubt over the
property dissipated, and he can thereafter fearlessly introduce the improvements he may desire, as well as use, and even abuse the
property as he deems fit.[37]

Petitioner anchors its claim over the disputed lot on TCT No. T-8129  issued on  February 20, 1989 which is a transfer from TCT No.
107729 in the name of the Heirs of Emilio Gregorio, from whom it bought the property in January 1989.   On the other hand, private
respondent acquired the same land by virtue of the Officer's Deed of Conveyance dated August 15, 1989 executed in their favor
pursuant to the final judgment in Civil Case No. 35305 of the RTC of Pasig, Branch 164 and was issued TCT No. T-27380 in his
name on December12, 1991.

In Degollacion v. Register of Deeds of Cavite[38] we held that if two certificates of title purport to include the same land, whether
wholly or partly, the better approach is to trace the original certificates from which the certificates of title were derived.  Citing our
earlier ruling in Mathay v. Court of Appeals[39] we declared:

x x x where two transfer certificates of title have been issued on different dates, to two different persons, for the same parcel of land
even if both are presumed to be title holders in good faith, it does not necessarily follow that he who holds the earlier title should
prevail. On the assumption that there was regularity in the registration leading to the eventual issuance of subject transfer
certificates of title, the better approach is to trace the original certificates from which the certificates of title in dispute were
derived.   Should there be only one common original certificate of title, x x x, the transfer certificate issued on an earlier date along
the line must prevail, absent any anomaly or irregularity tainting the process of registration. [40]

From the recitals in the transfer certificates of title  respectively held by petitioner and private respondent, as well as the records of 
the LRA, there appears not just one but two different original certificates.  TCT No. T-8129  on its face shows that the land covered
was originally registered as OCT No. 5678 under Decree No. N-111862 (Velasquez), while TCT No. T-27380 indicates the original
registration as OCT No. 9587 under Decree No. N-141990 (Gregorio).   Both the LRC and CA found TCT No. 107729 and its
derivative titles TCT Nos. 4635 and T-8129 as void and inexistent since OCT No. 5678 in the name of Velasquez had been nullified
under the order for execution of the final judgment in LRC Case Nos. N-5053 and N-5416 in which Gregorio prevailed. 
Consequently, the lower courts upheld the title of private respondent which alone can be traced to the original certificate in the name
of Emilio Gregorio (OCT No. 9578).

Petitioner, however, asserts that the entries in his TCT contain errors and insists that TCT Nos. 107729, 4635 and T-8129 actually
emanated from the application for registration of Emilio Gregorio in LRC Case No. N-5053, LRC Record No. N-27523 pursuant to
the Order of the Regional Trial Court in LRC Case Nos. N-5053 and N-5416, as in fact TCT No. 107729 were issued along with TCT
Nos. 107727 and 107728 covering two other lots also in the name of the Heirs of Emilio Gregorio by way of implementing the final
judgment of said court in the case between Gregorio and Velasquez, as affirmed by the CA and this Court.

We disagree.

TCT No. 107729 in the name of the heirs of Emilio Gregorio issued on April 29, 1986, on its face showed badges of irregularity in its
issuance.   First, the technical description stated that it covers a portion of Lot 1, plan Psu-204785, LRC Case No. N-5416 instead of
N-5053.  Second, the decree number and date of issuance, as well as OCT number clearly indicate that the original decree
pertained to Velasquez and not Gregorio. Third, the name of the registered owner in the original certificate is not Velasquez or
Gregorio but "Delta Motor Corp." And fourth, the certificate from which TCT No. 107729 was supposedly a transfer should have
been the OCT (of Gregorio) and not those unfamiliar TCT numbers indicated therein. The annotations regarding the supposed
original registration of TCT No. 107729 read as follows:

IT IS FURTHER CERTIFIED that said land was originally registered on the   12th   day of  December   in the year nineteen hundred
and   sixty-six in the Registration Book of the Office of the Register of Deeds of  Rizal Volume A-69   page 78   as Original
Certificate of Title No.   5678   pursuant to Decree No. N-111862  issued in L.R.C. _____________ Record No.   N-28735  Case
No. N-5416  in the name of Delta Motor Corp. .

This certificate is a transfer from Transfer Certificate of Title No.  27737/A/T-145-A  S-8722/T-41 which is cancelled by virtue
hereof in so far as the above-described land is concerned. [41] (Emphasis supplied.)

The foregoing errors are not mere typographical as petitioner claims,  but serious discrepancies in the registration process.  In fact,
it is not far-fetched that the erroneous entries could have been intended to create the impression that TCT No. 107729 was a
separate and distinct title from the previously issued TCT No. S-91911 even if they pertain to one and the same lot adjudicated to
Emilio Gregorio.  Such conclusion is reinforced by the unexplained inaction or failure of the heirs of Gregorio to rectify the alleged
errors in their title before selling the property to petitioner.  The heirs of Gregorio knew that their TCT No. S-91911 bore
encumbrances in favor of third parties, notably the notice of pending litigation (Lis Pendens) involving the property covered by said
title before the CFI of Pasig, Metro Manila in Civil Case No. 35305, which Trinidad caused to be annotated thereon. The issuance of
a new certificate with exactly identical entries as that of TCT No. S-91911 (as to its original registration) would mean that the
aforesaid annotations had to be carried over to such new certificate. Strangely, it is TCT No. 107729 which RD Alejandro
R.Villanueva upheld in his February 5, 1989 Report notwithstanding its later issuance and the glaring errors in the entries of its
original registration.  It must be stressed that OCT No. 5677, 5678, 5679 and 5680 and its derivative titles were ordered cancelled
precisely because they were issued pursuant to Decree Nos. N-111862 to N-111865 issued in LRC Case No. N-5416 in the name of
Velasquez, who lost in the final judgment rendered in CA-G.R. No. 40739-40-R, and whose claim to the lots covered thereby were
declared null and void.  Logically, therefore, any new certificate of title to be issued to the heirs of Gregorio by virtue of the aforesaid
final judgment adjudicating the land to Emilio Gregorio, could not possibly be a  transfer or replacement of the aforesaid void OCTs
in the name of Velasquez.

But even granting that the subject entries in TCT No. 107729 were mere clerical errors and assuming arguendo that said certificate
was issued to implement the final judgment in CA-G.R. No. 40739-40-R, such execution is tainted with infirmity.  The March 21,
1986 order issued by the RTC of Pasig did not only cancel OCT No. 5678 (and other titles in the name of Velasquez covering the
same lots adjudicated to Gregorio), it also ordered the issuance of new certificates of title in the name of the heirs of Emilio Gregorio
despite having been informed by the LRA and the Register of Deeds that there was already issued OCT No. 9587 over the same lot
in the name of Emilio Gregorio, which was replaced with TCT No. S-91911 in the name of the heirs of Emilio Gregorio following the
decision rendered by the appellate court (CA-G.R. No. 56015-R) in another case filed by Gregorio against spouses Parami (Civil
Case No. 16977).

At this point, it serves well to emphasize that upon finality of judgment in land registration cases, the winning party does not file a
motion for execution as in ordinary civil actions.  Instead, he files a petition with the land registration court for the issuance of an
order directing the Land Registration Authority to issue a decree of registration, a copy of which is then sent to the Register of
Deeds for inscription in the registration book, and issuance of the original certificate of title. [42]  The LRC upon the finality of the
judgment adjudicating the land to an applicant shall, following the prescribed procedure, merely issues an order for the issuance of a
decree of registration and the corresponding certificate of title in the name of such applicant. [43]

In this case, the RTC of Pasig, cognizant of a previous decree of registration instead ordered the Register of Deeds to
issue new certificates in favor of the heirs of Gregorio, erroneously declaring that such certificates are in lieu of OCT Nos. 5677,
5678, 5679 and 5680.  Said court exceeded its authority when it ordered the issuance of transfer certificates in the name of the heirs
of Gregorio despite the existence of TCT No. S-91911 already issued to them covering the sae parcel of land. This caused the
duplication of titles held by the heirs of Gregorio over Lot 1.   Thus, while there was only one decree and original certificate issued to
the common predecessor-in-interest of petitioner and private respondent, Emilio Gregorio, the latter's heirs were able to
secure two transfer certificates covering the same land.  Indeed it could not order the issuance of another OCT as it would result to
duplication of titles or "double titling." [44] A land registration court has no jurisdiction to order the registration of land already decreed
in the name of another in an earlier land registration case. [45]  Issuance of another decree covering the same land is therefore null
and void.[46]

In the light of the LRA Report dated September 12, 1984 stating that compliance with the July 30, 1971 final judgment rendered by
the CA which reversed the LRC decision and adjudicated Lots 1, 3 and 4 in favor of Emilio Gregorio, would result in duplication of
titles, it was grave error for the RTC of Pasig to grant the motion for execution filed by the heirs of Emilio Gregorio who sought, -- in
the guise of implementing the July 30, 1971 CA decision -- the issuance of new titles in their name notwithstanding the existence of
OCT No. 9587 and TCT No. S-91911.  Given such vital information, there exists a compelling need for the land registration court to
ascertain the facts and "address the likelihood of duplication of titles x x x, an eventuality that will undermine the Torrens system of
land registration."[47]

Petitioner nonetheless assails OCT No. 9587 as null and void, having been issued when the adverse decision of the appellate court
in CA-G.R. No. 40739-40-R was elevated by it to this Court.  Following the doctrine in Director of Lands v. Reyes (supra), it is
asserted that OCT No. 9587 should not have been issued because the decision in CA-G.R. No. 40739-40-R was not yet final at the
time,  pending resolution by this Court of the appeal by Velasquez (G.R. No. L-34239-40).

In Director of Lands v. Reyes (supra), this Court laid down the rule that execution pending appeal is not applicable in a land
registration proceeding and the certificate of title thereby issued is null and void. In that case, the assignee of the original applicant
applied for a motion for issuance of a decree of registration before the lower court pending the approval of the Record on Appeal. 
The motion was opposed by the Government which appealed the lower court's decision adjudicating the land to the said assignee.  
We thus ruled:

Under the circumstances of this case, the failure of the appellants to serve a copy of their Notice of Appeal to the counsel for the
adjudicatee Roman C. Tamayo is not fatal to the appeal because, admittedly, he was served with a copy of the original, as well as
the Amended Record on Appeal in both of which the Notice of Appeal is embodied.  Hence, such failure cannot impair the right of
appeal.

What is more, the appeal taken by the Government was from the entire decision, which is not severable.  Thus, the appeal affects
the whole decision.

In any event, We rule that execution pending appeal is not applicable in a land registration proceeding. It is fraught with dangerous
consequences.  Innocent purchasers may be misled into purchasing real properties upon reliance on a judgment which may be
reversed on appeal.
A Torrens title issued on the basis of a judgment that is not final is a nullity, as it is violative of the explicit provisions of the Land
Registration Act which requires that a decree shall be issued only after the decision adjudicating the title becomes final and
executory, and it is on the basis of said decree that the Register of Deeds concerned issues the corresponding certificate of title.

Consequently, the lower court acted without jurisdiction or exceeded its jurisdiction in ordering the issuance of a decree of
registration despite the appeal timely taken from the entire decision a quo.[48]

OCT No. 9587 on its face showed that its basis was Decree No. N-141990 issued on October 31, 1972 pursuant to the January 31,
1966 decision of the CFI in Land Reg. Case No. N-5053 and CA decision dated July 30, 1971.  Per records of this Court, however,
Velasquez had filed a petition for review of the CA decision.  Be that as it may, the premature issuance of the decree in favor of
Emilio Gregorio and the corresponding original certificate of title in his name did not affect his acquisition of title over the subject
land considering that Velasquez's petition was eventually dismissed. Neither can petitioner, by reason alone of defective issuance of
OCT No. 9587, claim a right over the subject land superior to that acquired by the private respondent.

A reading of the annotations of encumbrances at the back of TCT No. T-27380 which were carried over from TCT No. S-91911 in
the name of the Heirs of Gregorio, would show that during the pendency of Civil Case No. 35305 filed before the CFI of Rizal by
private respondent and Trinidad, the latter caused the annotation of a Notice of Lis Pendens involving the same properties of the
defendants therein, the heirs of Emilio Gregorio.  The notice of lis pendens was registered as Entry No. 21398[49] on TCT No. S-
91911.

Lis pendens, which literally means pending suit, refers to the jurisdiction, power or control which a court acquires over property
involved in a suit, pending the continuance of the action, and until final judgment.   Founded upon public policy and necessity, lis
pendens is intended to keep the properties in litigation within the power of the court until the litigation is terminated, and to prevent
the defeat of the judgment or decree by subsequent alienation.  Its notice is an announcement to the whole world that a particular
property is in litigation and serves as a warning that one who acquires an interest over said property does so at his own risk or that
he gambles on the result of the litigation over said property. [50]

The filing of a notice of lis pendens has a two-fold effect: (1) to keep the subject matter of the litigation within the power of the court
until the entry of the final judgment to prevent the defeat of the final judgment by successive alienations; and (2) to bind a
purchaser, bona fide or not, of the land subject of the litigation to the judgment or decree that the court will promulgate
subsequently.[51]  Once a notice of lis pendens has been duly registered, any subsequent transaction affecting the land involved
would have to be subject to the outcome of the litigation.[52]

Petitioner being a mere transferee at the time the decision of the RTC of Pasig in Civil Case No. 35305 had become final and
executory on December 6, 1988, it  is bound by the said judgment which ordered the heirs of Emilio Gregorio to convey Lots 1, 2, 3
& 4, Psu-204875 in favor of private respondent and Trinidad. As such buyer of one of the lots to be conveyed to private respondent
pursuant to the court's decree with notice that said properties are in litigation, petitioner merely stepped into the shoes of its vendors
who lost in the case.  Such vested right acquired by the private respondent under the final judgment in his favor may not be
defeated by the subsequent issuance of another certificate of title to the heirs of Gregorio respecting the same parcel of land.  For it
is well-settled that being an involuntary transaction, entry of the notice of lis pendens in the primary entry book of the Register of
Deeds is sufficient to constitute registration and such entry is notice to all persons of such claim.[53]

"It is to be noted that the notation of the lis pendens on the back of the owner's duplicate is not mentioned for the purpose of
constituting a constructive notice because usually such owner's duplicate certificate is presented for the purpose of the annotation
later, and sometimes not at all until [it is] ordered by the court." [54]  Strictly speaking, the lis pendens annotation is not to be referred
to "as a part of the doctrine of notice; the purchaser pendente lite is affected, not by notice, but because the law does not allow
litigating parties to give to others, pending the litigation, rights to the property in dispute so as to prejudice the opposite party.  The
doctrine rests upon public policy, not notice."[55]  Thus we have held that one who buys land where there is a pending notice of lis
pendens cannot invoke the right of a purchaser in good faith; neither can he have acquired better rights than those of his
predecessor in interest.[56]

In view of the foregoing, we hold that the CA did not err in affirming the trial court's order dismissing petitioner's complaint for
quieting of title and ordering the cancellation of its TCT No. T-8129.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.  The Decision dated May 30, 2001 and Resolution dated October 23, 2001 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 60712 are AFFIRMED.

With costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 157644               November 17, 2010

SPOUSES ERNESTO and VICENTA TOPACIO, as represented by their attorney-in-fact MARILOU TOPACIO-
NARCISO, Petitioners,
vs.
BANCO FILIPINO SAVINGS and MORTGAGE BANK, Respondent.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari,1 filed by petitioner spouses Ernesto and Vicenta Topacio (petitioners), assailing
the August 26, 2002 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 32389, as well as its March 17, 2003
Resolution3 denying the petitioners’ motion for reconsideration. The CA Decision and Resolution affirmed in toto the October 1, 1993
Order of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela City, Branch 75, which issued an alias writ of possession in favor of the respondent
Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank (respondent).

THE BACKGROUND FACTS

The backgrounds facts, as culled from the records, are summarized below.

The petitioners obtained a loan amounting to ₱400,000.00 from the respondent. To secure the loan, the petitioners executed on
May 8, 1980, a real estate mortgage over Lot 1224-B-1 LRC Psd-15436, covered by TCT No. T-191117 (now 13554) of the Registry
of Deeds of Bulacan, in favor of the respondent. The petitioners failed to pay the loan, prompting the respondent to file a Petition for
Extrajudicial Foreclosure of Mortgage, pursuant to Act No. 3135. To satisfy the obligation, the Provincial Sheriff of Bulacan, on
November 8, 1982, sold the mortgaged property at public auction, where the respondent emerged as the highest bidder.
Accordingly, a Certification of Sale was issued in favor of the respondent and registered with the Registry of Deeds. 4

On May 26, 1983, the respondent filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Possession 5 over the mortgaged property before the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 172, Valenzuela City (RTC). In an Order 6 dated December 12, 1983, the RTC granted the petition,
conditioned on the posting of a ₱100,000.00 bond. Upon posting of the required bond, the RTC issued, on February 16, 1984, a writ
of possession, commanding the sheriff to place the respondent in possession of the property.

The writ of possession was not implemented 7 because, on February 27, 1984, the petitioners, filed with the RTC, a petition to set
aside the auction sale and the writ of possession (with application for a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary
injunction).8 In an Order dated February 28, 1984, the RTC issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the respondent and the
Deputy Sheriff from implementing the writ of possession it previously issued. 9 After hearing, the RTC, issued on March 13, 1984, a
writ of preliminary injunction ordering the respondent and the Provincial Sheriff to desist from implementing the writ of possession
and to refrain from interfering with and disrupting the possession of the petitioners over the subject parcel of land. 10

Sometime in April 1984, the respondent filed with the RTC its Motion to Admit Answer with Opposition to the Petition to Set Aside
Auction Sale and Writ of Possession with Motion to Dissolve or Lift Preliminary Injunction (Answer) which was granted on April 26,
1984.11 On May 21, 1984, the petitioners filed their Reply thereto, praying that the writ of preliminary injunction previously issued be
maintained.12

More than two years after the filing of the Answer and the Reply, and after a series of postponements at the instance of both parties,
then Presiding Judge Teresita D. Capulong issued an Order dated December 16, 1986, dismissing the respondent’s petition for the
issuance of a writ of possession on the ground of "failure to prosecute."13 The Order reads in full:

When this case was called for hearing, counsel for the oppositors [now petitioners], Atty. Constancio R. Gallamos, was present.
Atty. Francisco Rivera [counsel for the respondent] was absent despite notice. Upon petition of the counsel for the oppositors, this
case is hereby ordered dismissed for failure to prosecute.

SO ORDERED.
No copy of the above Order was served on the respondent 14 whose operations the Monetary Board (Central Bank of the Philippines)
shut down on January 25, 1985, for reasons not relevant to the present case.15

Nearly six (6) years later (after the Court ordered the reorganization and resumption of the respondent’s operations in G.R. No.
70054)16 or on August 19, 1992, the respondent filed a Motion to Clarify the Order of December 16, 1986. In the same motion, the
respondent likewise moved for the issuance of an alias writ of possession. 17

In an Order18 dated September 18, 1992, the RTC made a clarification that the Order of Dismissal of December 16, 1986 refers to
the dismissal of the "main case for issuance of a writ of possession." In that same Order, the RTC denied the respondent’s motion
for the issuance of an alias writ of possession.

On May 18, 1993, the respondent moved for the reconsideration 19 of the September 18, 1992 Order. In an Order20 dated June 2,
1993, the RTC, this time presided by Judge Emilio L. Leachon, Jr., reconsidered and set aside the Order of December 16, 1986 and
granted the respondent’s prayer for the issuance of an alias writ of possession. The petitioners moved for a reconsideration of the
June 2, 1993 Order and prayed that the implementation of the alias writ of possession be held in abeyance.

The RTC Ruling

On October 1, 1993, the RTC, now presided by Judge Jaime F. Bautista, issued the assailed Order 21 which denied the petitioners’
motion for reconsideration and reiterated its order for the issuance of an alias writ of possession in favor of the respondent. The
assailed RTC Order is summarized below.

First, the RTC ruled that the Order of Dismissal was granted on a "technicality" and that "[t]he ground of failure to prosecute is
manifestly unfounded."22 The RTC held that "the power of the trial court to dismiss an action on the ground of non prosequitur is not
unbounded. The real test x x x is whether under the facts and circumstances, the plaintiff is chargeable with want of due diligence in
[failing] to proceed with reasonable promptitude."23 In the present case, the RTC noted that the records show that the case dragged
on for years because of several postponements at the request of both parties, particularly petitioner Ernesto Topacio who went
abroad for a long time during the pendency of the case.24

Second, the RTC held that the December 16, 1986 Dismissal Order cannot be considered a dismissal on the merits as it was
founded not on a substantial ground but on a technical one; it does not amount to a "declaration of the law [on] the respective rights
and duties of the parties, based upon the ultimate x x x facts disclosed by the pleadings and evidence, and upon which the right of
recovery depends, irrespective of formal, technical or dilatory objectives or contentions." 25

Third, the RTC ruled that the revival by a motion for reconsideration (filed on May 18, 1993) of the February 16, 1984 Order,
granting the writ of possession, was seasonably filed by the respondent, pursuant to the period allowed under Section 6, Rule 39 of
the Rules of Court. Citing National Power Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 26 the RTC held that "[i]n computing the time [limit] for
suing out an execution, x x x the general rule is that there should not be included the time when execution is stayed, either by
agreement of the parties for a definite time, by injunction, by the taking of an appeal or writ of error so as to operate as a
supersedeas, by the death of a party, or otherwise." The RTC noted that the running of the five-year period under Section 6 of the
Rules of Court had been interrupted by the erroneous issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction; the February 16, 1984 Order never
attained finality and was overtaken by the issuance of the Order dated June 2, 1993, granting the issuance of an alias writ of
execution.27

Finally, the RTC held that the respondent, as the winning bidder, "has an absolute right to a writ of possession," 28 considering that:
(1) a writ of possession had been issued on February 16, 1984 and the corresponding bond had already been posted, although the
writ was not enforced because of the erroneous injunction issued by Judge Capulong; and (2) there was no redemption by the
petitioners.29

On October 20, 1993, the petitioners filed their Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Court with
prayer for the issuance of a preliminary injunction (petition), docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 32389. 30 Before the CA, the petitioners
argued that the RTC acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion when it: (1) reinstated the respondent’s case more
than seven (7) years after the December 16, 1986 Dismissal Order became final and executory, and (2) issued an alias writ of
execution upon a mere motion for reconsideration and not by an independent action pursuant to Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court.

The CA Ruling

On August 26, 2002, the CA denied the petitioners’ petition and affirmed in toto the June 2, 1993 and October 1, 1993 Orders of the
RTC. The CA found that the December 16, 1986 Order of the RTC does not amount to a dismissal on the merits as it was based on
purely technical grounds. It noted that the records show that the respondent was not furnished a copy of the Dismissal Order;
hence, the case cannot be deemed to be final with respect to the respondent. The CA also agreed with the RTC’s conclusion that
the delay in the resolution of the case cannot be solely attributed to the respondent and did not warrant its outright dismissal. 31
The CA held that an independent action for the revival of the writ of possession need not be filed in order to enforce the writ of
possession issued on December 12, 1983 since Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court applies only to civil actions and not to
special proceedings,32 citing Heirs of Cristobal Marcos v. de Banuvar. 33

The Petition

In the present petition,34 the petitioners contend that the CA erred in affirming the October 1, 1993 Order of the RTC considering
that:

1) the December 16, 1986 Dismissal Order constitutes an adjudication on the merits which has already attained finality,
and

2) a writ of possession may not be enforced upon mere motion of the applicant after the lapse of more than five (5) years
from the time of its issuance.

On the first assignment of error, the petitioners submit that the December 16, 1986 Dismissal Order for failure to prosecute
constitutes adjudication upon the merits, considering that the RTC did not declare otherwise, pursuant to Section 3, Rule 17 of the
Rules of Court. The petitioners further contend that the Dismissal Order has become final and executory since the respondent
belatedly filed the Motion to Clarify the Order of December 16, 1986 on August 19, 1992 or almost six years later. On these
premises, the petitioners argue that res judicata has set in and consequently, the RTC had no jurisdiction to grant the motion for
reconsideration and to issue an alias writ of possession in favor of the respondent. 35

On the second assignment of error, the petitioners contend that pursuant to Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, the writ of
possession issued on February 16, 1984 may no longer be enforced by a mere motion but by a separate action, considering that
more than five years had elapsed from its issuance. The petitioners also argue that Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court applies
to the present case since a petition for the issuance of a writ of possession is neither a special proceeding nor a land registration
case.36

In their Memorandum, the petitioners additionally submit that they do not dispute that the CA made a finding that the December 16,
1986 Dismissal Order was not properly served. They, however, point out that the CA made no such finding with respect to the
September 18, 1992 Order of the RTC. The petitioners contend that the Motion for Reconsideration, filed on May 18, 1993 or eight
months later from the September 18, 1992 Order by the respondent, was filed out of time. Thus, they conclude that any subsequent
ruling of the RTC, including the June 2, 1993 and October 1, 1993 Orders, is barred by res judicata. 37

OUR RULING

We deny the petition for lack of merit.

A. Preliminary Considerations

Our review of the records, particularly the CA decision, indicates that the CA did not determine the presence or absence of grave
abuse of discretion in the RTC decision before it. Given that the petition before the CA was a petition for certiorari and prohibition
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, it appears that the CA instead incorrectly reviewed the case on the basis of whether the RTC
decision on the merits was correct.

To put the case in its proper perspective, the task before us is to examine the CA decision from the prism of whether it correctly
determined the presence or absence of grave abuse of discretion in the RTC decision before it. Stated otherwise, did the CA
correctly determine whether the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in ruling on the
case?

As discussed below, our review of the records and the CA decision shows that the RTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in
issuing an alias writ of possession in favor of the respondent.

B. Applicability of Res Judicata

Under the rule of res judicata, a final judgment or decree on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights
of the parties or their privies, in all later suits and on all points and matters determined in the previous suit. The term literally means
a "matter adjudged, judicially acted upon, or settled by judgment."38 The principle bars a subsequent suit involving the same parties,
subject matter, and cause of action. The rationale for the rule is that "public policy requires that controversies must be settled with
finality at a given point in time." 39
The doctrine of res judicata embraces two (2) concepts: the first is "bar by prior judgment" under paragraph (b) of Rule 39, Section
47 of the Rules of Court, and the second is "conclusiveness of judgment" under paragraph (c) thereof. Res judicata applies in the
concept of "bar by prior judgment" if the following requisites concur: (1) the former judgment or order must be final; (2) the judgment
or order must be on the merits; (3) the decision must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and
the parties; and (4) there must be, between the first and the second action, identity of parties, of subject matter and of causes of
action.40

The petitioners claim that res judicata under the first concept applies in the present case because all of the elements thereof are
present. In response, the respondent argues that res judicata did not set in as the first element is lacking.

We agree with the respondent.

The December 16, 1986 Dismissal Order never attained finality as it was not properly served

The following provisions under Rule 13 of the Rules of Court define the proper modes of service of judgments: 41

SEC. 2. Filing and service, defined. – x x x

Service is the act of providing a party with a copy of the pleading or paper concerned. x x x

SEC. 5. Modes of service. – Service of pleadings, motions, notices, orders, judgments and other papers shall be made either
personally or by mail.

SEC. 6. Personal service. – Service of the papers may be made by delivering personally a copy to the party or his counsel, or by
leaving it in his office with his clerk or with a person having charge thereof. If no person is found in his office, or his office is not
known, or he has no office, then by leaving the copy, between the hours of eight in the morning and six in the evening, at the party’s
or counsel’s residence, if known, with a person of sufficient age and discretion then residing therein.

SEC. 7. Service by mail. – Service by registered mail shall be made by depositing the copy in the office, in a sealed envelope,
plainly addressed to the party or his counsel at his office, if known, otherwise at his residence, if known, with postage fully pre-paid,
and with instructions to the postmaster to return the mail to the sender after ten (10) days if undelivered. If no registry service is
available in the locality of either the sender or the addressee, service may be done by ordinary mail.

SEC. 8. Substituted service. – If service of pleadings, motions, notices, resolutions, orders and other papers cannot be made under
the two preceding sections, the office and place of residence of the party or his counsel being unknown, service may be made by
delivering the copy to the clerk of court, with proof of failure of both personal service and service by mail. The service is complete at
the time of such delivery.

SEC. 9. Service of judgments, final orders or resolutions. –Judgments, final orders or resolutions shall be served either personally or
by registered mail. When a party summoned by publication has failed to appear in the action, judgments, final orders or resolutions
against him shall be served upon him also by publication at the expense of the prevailing party.

As a rule, judgments are sufficiently served when they are delivered personally, or through registered mail to the counsel of record,
or by leaving them in his office with his clerk or with a person having charge thereof. After service, a judgment or order which is not
appealed nor made subject of a motion for reconsideration within the prescribed 15-day period attains finality. 42

In Philemploy Services and Resources, Inc. v. Rodriguez,43 the Court ruled that the Resolution of the National Labor Relations
Commission, denying the respondent’s motion for reconsideration, cannot be deemed to have become final and executory as there
is no conclusive proof of service of the said resolution. In the words of the Court, "there was no proof of actual receipt of the notice
of the registered mail by the respondent’s counsel." 44 Based on these findings, the Court concluded that the CA properly acquired
jurisdiction over the respondent’s petition for certiorari filed before it; in the absence of a reckoning date of the period provided by
law for the filing of the petition, the Court could not assume that it was improperly or belatedly filed.

Similarly, in Tomawis v. Tabao-Cudang,45 the Court held that the decision of the Regional Trial Court did not become final and
executory where, from the records, the respondent had not received a copy of the resolution denying her motion for
reconsideration.46 The Court also noted that there was no sufficient proof that the respondent actually received a copy of the said
Order or that she indeed received a first notice. Thus, the Court concluded that there could be no valid basis for the issuance of the
writ of execution as the decision never attained finality.

In the present case, we note that the December 16, 1986 Dismissal Order cannot be deemed to have become final and executory in
view of the absence of a valid service, whether personally or via registered mail, on the respondent’s counsel. We note in this regard
that the petitioners do not dispute the CA finding that the "records failed to show that the private respondent was furnished with a
copy of the said order of dismissal[.]"47 Accordingly, the Dismissal Order never attained finality.

The petitioners now claim that the Motion for Reconsideration, filed by the respondent on May 18, 1993 from the September 18,
1992 Order of the RTC, was filed out of time. The petitioners make this claim to justify their contention that the subsequent rulings of
the RTC, including the June 2, 1993 and October 1, 1993 Orders, are barred by res judicata.

We reject this belated claim as the petitioners raised this only for the first time on appeal, particularly, in their Memorandum. In fact,
the petitioners never raised this issue in the proceedings before the court a quo or in the present petition for review.

As a rule, a party who deliberately adopts a certain theory upon which the case is tried and decided by the lower court will not be
permitted to change the theory on appeal. 48 Points of law, theories, issues and arguments not brought to the attention of the lower
court need not be, and ordinarily will not be, considered by a reviewing court, as these cannot be raised for the first time at such late
stage. It would be unfair to the adverse party who would have no opportunity to present further evidence material to the new theory,
which it could have done had it been aware of it at the time of the hearing before the trial court. 49 Thus, to permit the petitioners in
this case to change their theory on appeal would thus be unfair to the respondent and offend the basic rules of fair play, justice and
due process.50

C. Applicability of the Rule on Execution

by Motion or by Independent Action

The petitioners finally submit that the writ of possession, issued by the RTC on February 16, 1984, may no longer be enforced by a
mere motion, but by a separate action, considering that more than five years had elapsed from its issuance, pursuant to Section 6,
Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, which states:

Sec. 6. Execution by motion or by independent action. – A final and executory judgment or order may be executed on motion within
five (5) years from the date of its entry. After the lapse of such time, and before it is barred by the statute of limitations, a judgment
may be enforced by action. The revived judgment may also be enforced by motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry and
thereafter by action before it is barred by the statute of limitations.

Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court only applies to civil actions

In rejecting a similar argument, the Court held in Paderes v. Court of Appeals 51 that Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court finds
application only to civil actions and not to special proceedings. Citing Sta. Ana v. Menla, 52 which extensively discussed the rationale
behind the rule, the Court held:

In a later case [Sta. Ana v. Menla, 111 Phil. 947 (1961)], the Court also ruled that the provision in the Rules of Court to the effect
that judgment may be enforced within five years by motion, and after five years but within ten years by an action (Section
6, Rule 39) refers to civil actions and is not applicable to special proceedings, such as land registration cases. x x x x

We fail to understand the arguments of the appellant in support of the above assignment, except in so far as it supports his theory
that after a decision in a land registration case has become final, it may not be enforced after the lapse of a period of 10 years,
except by another proceeding to enforce the judgment or decision. Authority for this theory is the provision in the Rules of Court to
the effect that judgment may be enforced within 5 years by motion, and after five years but within 10 years, by an action (Sec. 6,
Rule 39). This provision of the Rules refers to civil actions and is not applicable to special proceedings, such as a land
registration case. This is so because a party in a civil action must immediately enforce a judgment that is secured as
against the adverse party, and his failure to act to enforce the same within a reasonable time as provided in the Rules
makes the decision unenforceable against the losing party. In special proceedings the purpose is to establish a status,
condition or fact; in land registration proceedings, the ownership by a person of a parcel of land is sought to be
established. After the ownership has been proved and confirmed by judicial declaration, no further proceeding to enforce
said ownership is necessary, except when the adverse or losing party had been in possession of the land and the winning
party desires to oust him therefrom.

Subsequently, the Court, in Republic v. Nillas,53 affirmed the dictum in Sta. Ana and clarified that "Rule 39 x x x applies only to
ordinary civil actions, not to other or extraordinary proceedings not expressly governed by the Rules of Civil Procedure but by some
other specific law or legal modality," viz:

Rule 39, as invoked by the Republic, applies only to ordinary civil actions, not to other or extraordinary proceedings not expressly
governed by the Rules of Civil Procedure but by some other specific law or legal modality such as land registration cases. Unlike in
ordinary civil actions governed by the Rules of Civil Procedure, the intent of land registration proceedings is to establish ownership
by a person of a parcel of land, consistent with the purpose of such extraordinary proceedings to declare by judicial fiat a status,
condition or fact. Hence, upon the finality of a decision adjudicating such ownership, no further step is required to effectuate the
decision and a ministerial duty exists alike on the part of the land registration court to order the issuance of, and the LRA to issue,
the decree of registration.1avvphi1
In the present case, Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court is not applicable to an ex parte petition for the issuance of the writ of
possession as it is not in the nature of a civil action54 governed by the Rules of Civil Procedure but a judicial proceeding governed
separately by Section 7 of Act No. 3135 which regulates the methods of effecting an extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage. The
provision states:

Section 7. Possession during redemption period. In any sale made under the provisions of this Act, the purchaser may petition the
[Regional Trial Court] where the property or any part thereof is situated, to give him possession thereof during the redemption
period, furnishing bond in an amount equivalent to the use of the property for a period of twelve months, to indemnify the debtor in
case it be shown that the sale was made without violating the mortgage or without complying with the requirements of this Act. Such
petition shall be made under oath and filed in form of an ex parte motion in the registration or cadastral proceedings if the property is
registered, or in special proceedings in the case of property registered under the Mortgage Law or under section one hundred and
ninety-four of the Administrative Code, or of any other real property encumbered with a mortgage duly registered in the office of any
register of deeds in accordance with any existing law, and in each case the clerk of the court shall, upon the filing of such petition,
collect the fees specified in paragraph eleven of section one hundred and fourteen of Act Numbered Four hundred and ninety-six, as
amended by Act Numbered Twenty-eight hundred and sixty-six, and the court shall, upon approval of the bond, order that a writ of
possession issue, addressed to the sheriff of the province in which the property is situated, who shall execute said order
immediately.

The above-cited provision lays down the procedure that commences from the filing of a motion for the issuance of a writ of
possession, to the issuance of the writ of possession by the Court, and finally to the execution of the order by the sheriff of the
province in which the property is located. Based on the text of the law, we have also consistently ruled that the duty of the trial court
to grant a writ of possession is ministerial; the writ issues as a matter of course upon the filing of the proper motion and the approval
of the corresponding bond.55 In fact, the issuance and the immediate implementation of the writ are declared ministerial and
mandatory under the law.

Thus, in Philippine National Bank v. Adil,56 we emphatically ruled that "once the writ of possession has been issued, the trial court
has no alternative but to enforce the writ without delay." The issuance of a writ of possession to a purchaser in an extrajudicial
foreclosure is summary and ministerial in nature as such proceeding is merely an incident in the transfer of title. The trial court does
not exercise discretion in the issuance thereof;57 it must grant the issuance of the writ upon compliance with the requirements set
forth by law, and the provincial sheriff is likewise mandated to implement the writ immediately.

Clearly, the exacting procedure provided in Act No. 3135, from the moment of the issuance of the writ of possession, leaves no
room for the application of Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which we consistently ruled, as early as 1961 in Sta. Ana, to be
applicable only to civil actions. From another perspective, the judgment or the order does not have to be executed by motion or
enforced by action within the purview of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. 58

D. Conclusion

In sum, based on these considerations, we find that the RTC committed no grave abuse of discretion in issuing an alias writ of
possession in favor of the respondent.

WHEREFORE, the present petition is DENIED. The August 26, 2002 Decision and the March 17, 2003 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 32389 are AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioners.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 231116

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner

vs.
CLARO YAP, Respondent

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

Nature of the Case

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the March 16, 2017 Decision1 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 05491. The CA affirmed the October 20, 2011 Decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 6, granting respondent's petition for registration of a parcel of land located in Carcar, Cebu.

The Facts

On July 28, 2010, respondent Claro Yap (Yap) filed a petition3 for cancellation and re-issuance of Decree No. 99500 covering Lot
No. 922 of the Carcar Cadastre, and for the issuance of the corresponding Original Certificate of Title (OCT) pursuant to the re-
issued decree. His petition alleged the following:

1. Lot No. 922 with an area of thirty four (34) square meters is covered by Decree No. 99500 issued on November 29,
1920 in the name of Andres Abellana, as Administrator of the Estate of Juan Rodriguez;

2. Ownership over Lot No. 922 was vested upon Yap by virtue of inheritance and donation and that he and his
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the said lot since June 12,
1945, or earlier, and/or by acquisitive prescription being possessors in good faith in the concept of an owner for more than
thirty (30) years;

3. While a valid decree was issued for Lot No. 922, based on the certification from the Register of Deeds of the Province
of Cebu, there is no showing or proof that an OCT was ever issued covering the said lot;

4. Lot No. 922 was registered for taxation purposes in the name of Heirs of Porfirio Yap; and

5. There is no mortgage or encumbrance of any kind affecting Lot No. 922, or any other person having any interest
therein, legal or equitable, in possession, reversion or expectancy, other than Yap. 4

Finding the petition sufficient in form and substance, the RTC issued an Order 5 dated August 3, 2010 setting the case for hearing on
August 3, 2011 and ordering the requisite publication thereof. Since no oppositors appeared before the court during the said
scheduled hearing, the R TC issued another Order6 setting the case for hearing on petitioner's presentation of evidence.

During the ex parte hearing held on August 8, 2011, Yap presented the following documents, among others, as proof of his claim:

1. Certified true copy of Decree No. 99500 issued by the authorized officer of the Land Registration Authority (LRA); 7

2. Index of decree showing that Decree No. 99500 was issued for Lot No. 922;8

3. Certification from the Register of Deeds of Cebu that no certificate of title covering Lot No. 922, Cad. 30 has been issued; 9

4. Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of the Late Porfirio C. Yap with Deed of Donation; 10

5. Certification from the Office of the City Assessor of Carcar indicating that the heirs of Porfirio Yap had been issued Tax
Declarations for Lot No. 922 since 1948;
6. Tax Declarations covering Lot No. 922 from 1948 up to 2002; 11

7. Blueprint of the approved consolidation and subdivision plan; and

8. Certification from Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO), Cebu City stating that there is no existing
public land application for Lot No. 922.12

In its September 20, 2011 Order,13 the RTC admitted petitioner's evidence and deemed the case submitted for decision.

RTC Ruling

The RTC found that Yap had sufficiently established his claims and was able to prove his ownership and possession over Lot No.
922. As such, it granted the petition and ordered the Register of Deeds of the Province of Cebu to cancel Decree No. 99500, re-
issue a new copy thereof, and on the basis of such new copy, issue an Original Certificate of Title in the name of Andres Abellana,
as administrator of the Estate of Juan Rodriguez. The dispositive portion of the October 20, 2011 Decision states:

WHEREFORE, the court grants the petition in favor of the petitioner Claro Yap. The Land Registration Authority thru the Register of
Deeds of the Province of Cebu is hereby directed to cancel Decree No. 99500 issued on November 29, 1920 and to re-issue a new
copy thereof in the name of Andres Abellana, as Administrator of the Estate of Juan Rodriguez, and on the bases of the new copy of
Decree No. 99500, to issue an Original Certificate of Title covering Lot No. [922] in the name of Andres Abellana, as administrator of
the Estate of Juan Rodriguez.

Further, the Register of Deeds is directed to furnish the petitioner, Claro Yap, with the re-issued copy of Decree No. 99500 and the
copy of its title upon payment of any appropriate fees.

SO ORDERED.14

Since the order of the RTC was for the re-issuance of the decree under the name of its original adjudicate, Yap filed a Partial Motion
for Reconsideration15 stating that the new decree and OCT should be issued under his name instead of Andres Abellana.

On the other hand, petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed its Comment 16 mainly arguing that Yap's
petition and motion should be denied since the Republic was not furnished with copies thereof.

In its Joint Order17 dated August 26, 2014, the RTC denied Yap's motion ruling that the law provides that the decree, which would be
the basis for the issuance of the OCT, should be issued under the name of the original adjudicate. Likewise, the RTC also denied
the OSG's motion finding that the records of the case show that it was furnished with copies of the Petition as well as the Partial
Motion for Reconsideration.18

The OSG then interposed an appeal before the CA arguing that Yap's petition should have been denied due to insufficiency of
evidence and failure to implead indispensable parties such as the heirs of Juan Rodriguez and/or Andres Abellana.

CA Ruling

In its March 16, 2017 Decision, the CA upheld the RTC's ruling finding that the pieces of evidence submitted by Yap were sufficient
to support the petition. It ruled that since it has been established that no certification of title or patent had been issued over Lot No.
922, the RTC did not err in ordering the re-issuance of Decree No. 99500 in the name of Andres Abellana, as Administrator of the
Estate of Juan Rodriguez.19

As regards the OSG's argument on non-joinder of indispensable parties, the CA highlighted that it is not a ground for dismissal of an
action. Nevertheless, it ruled that the heirs of either Andres Abellana or Juan Rodriguez were not deprived of the opportunity to be
heard as the proceeding before the R TC was -an in rem proceeding. Thus, when the petition was published, all persons including
the said heirs were deemed notified. 20

Lastly, while the CA delved into the issues ventilated by the OSG on appeal, it also noted that it was too late to raise the same due
to the latter's failure to file a motion for reconsideration of the RTC's decision or submit a comment on the merits of Yap's Partial
Motion for Reconsideration.21 The dispositive portion of the CA decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated October 20, 2011 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 06, Cebu
City, in LRC REC. NO. Lot No. 922, Cad. 30, Carcar City, Cebu, is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.22
Thus, the OSG filed the instant petition raising essentially the same arguments but this time also advancing the theory that Yap's
action had already prescribed.

The Issue

The principal issue before this Court is whether or not the R TC correctly ordered the cancellation of Decree No. 99500, the re-
issuance thereof, and the issuance of the corresponding Original Certificate of Title covering Lot No. 922.

The Court's Ruling

We deny the petition.

At the threshold, settled is the rule that prescription cannot be raised for the first time on appeal; 23 the general rule being that the
appellate court is not authorized to consider and resolve any question not properly raised in the courts below. 24

In any event, prescription does not lie in the instant case.

There is nothing in the law that

limits the period within which the
court may order or issue a decree

The OSG now postulates that the petition should be denied due to Yap and his predecessors' failure to file the proper motion to
execute Decree No. 99500 as prescribed under Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. 25 It also subscribes that the petition is now
barred by the statute of limitations26 since nine (9) decades had already passed after the issuance of the said decree in November
1920 without any action brought upon by Yap or his predecessors-in-interest.27

Further, the OSG asseverates that there is no proof that Decree No. 99500 has attained finality and the decision granting the
issuance thereof was not appealed or modified.

The foregoing arguments are specious.

Decree No. 99500 covering Lot No. 922 had been issued on November 29, 1920 by the Court of First Instance, Province of Cebu
pursuant to the court's decision in Cadastral Case No. 1, GLRO Cadastral Record No. 58. 28 The issuance of the said decree creates
a strong presumption that the decision in Cadastral Case No. 1 had become final and executory. Thus, it is incumbent upon the
OSG to prove otherwise. However, no evidence was presented to support its claims that the decision in Cadastral Case No. 1 and
the issuance of Decree No. 99500 had not attained finality.

The fact that the ownership over Lot No. 922 had been confirmed by judicial declaration several decades ago does not, however,
give room for the application of the statute of limitations or laches, nor bars an application for the re-issuance of the corresponding
decree.

In the landmark case of Sta. Ana v. Menla,29 the Court elucidated the raison d'etre why the statue of limitations and Section 6, Rule
39 of the Rules of Court do not apply in land registration proceedings, viz:

We fail to understand the arguments of the appellant in support of the above assignment, except in so far as it supports his theory
that after a decision in a land registration case has become final, it may not be enforced after the lapse of a period of 10 years,
except by another proceeding to enforce the judgment, which may be enforced within 5 years by motion, and after five years but
within 10 years, by an action (Sec. 6, Rule 39.) This provision of the Rules refers to civil actions and is not applicable to special
proceedings, such as a land registration case. This is so because a party in a civil action must immediately enforce a judgment that
is secured as against the adverse party, and his failure to act to enforce the same within a reasonable time as provided in the Rules
makes the decision unenforceable against the losing party. In special proceedings the purpose is to establish a status, condition or
fact; in land registration proceedings, the ownership by a person of a parcel of land is sought to be established. After the ownership
has been proved and confirmed by judicial declaration, no further proceeding to enforce said ownership is necessary, except when
the adverse or losing party had been in possession of the land and the winning party desires to oust him therefrom.

Furthermore, there is no provision in the Land Registration Act similar to Sec. 6, Rule 39, regarding the execution of a judgment in a
civil action, except the proceedings to place the winner in possession by virtue of a writ of possession. The decision in a land
registration case, unless the adverse or losing party is in possession, becomes final without any further action, upon the expiration
of the period for perfecting an appeal.

The third assignment of error is as follows:

THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE ISSUANCE OF A DECREE OF REGISTRATION IN THE NAMES OF
THE OPPOSITORS-APPELLEES BASED ON A DECISION WIDCH HAS ALLEGEDLY NOT YET BECOME FINAL, AND IN ANY
CASE ON A DECISION THAT HAS BEEN BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.

We also find no merit in the above contention. There is nothing in the law that limits the period within which the court may order or
issue a decree. The reason is what is stated in the consideration of the second assignment error, that the judgment is merely
declaratory in character and does not need to be asserted or enforced against the adverse party. Furthermore, the issuance of a
decree is a ministerial duty both of the judge and of the Land Registration Commission; failure of the court or of the clerk to issue the
decree for the reason that no motion therefore has been filed cannot prejudice the owner, or the person in whom the land is ordered
to be registered. (Emphasis supplied)

The foregoing pronouncements were echoed in Heirs of Cristobal Marcos v. de Banuvar30 and reiterated by the Court in the more
recent Ting v. Heirs of Diego Lirio31 wherein We ruled that a final judgment confirming land title and ordering its registration
constitutes res judicata against the whole world and the adjudicate need not file a motion to execute the same, thus:

In a registration proceeding instituted for the registration of a private land, with or without opposition, the judgment of the court
confirming the title of the applicant or oppositor, as the case may be, and ordering its registration in his name constitutes, when
final, res judicata against the whole world. It becomes final when no appeal within the reglementary period is taken from a judgment
of confirmation and registration.

The land registration proceedings being in rem, the land registration court's approval in LRC No. N-983 of spouses Diego Lirio and
Flora Atienza's application for registration of the lot settled its ownership, and is binding on the whole world including petitioner.

xx xx

The December 10, 1976 decision became "extinct" in light of the failure of respondents and/or of their predecessors-in-interest to
execute the same within the prescriptive period, the same does not lie.

For the past decades, the Sta. Ana doctrine on the inapplicability of the rules on prescription and lacl1es to land registration cases
has been repeatedly affirmed. Clearly, the peculiar procedure provided in the Property Registration Law 32 from the time decisions in
land registration cases become final is complete in itself and does not need to be filled in. From another perspective, the judgment
does not have to be executed by motion or enforced by action within the purview of Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. 33

The propriety of cancellation and reissuance

of Decree No. 99500, to
serve as basis for the issuance of an
OCT covering Lot No. 922, had been
sufficiently proven in the instant case

The OSG maintains that even assuming that Yap's petition is not barred by the statute of limitations, the re-issuance of Decree No.
99500 is still improper due to the total lack of evidence presented before the court. 34

We disagree.

At the outset, the Court need not belabor itself by enumerating and discussing in detail, yet again, the pieces of evidence proffered
in the instant case. This matter had already been passed upon and settled by the courts a quo and it is not our function to analyze
or weigh evidence all over again. Yet, even if We take a second look at the facts of the case, the Court is still inclined to deny the
petition.

Records show that Yap sufficiently established that Decree No. 99500 was issued on November 29, 1920 in the name of Andres
Abellana, as Administrator of the Estate of Juan Rodriguez. Further, it was also proven during the proceedings before the court that
no OCT was ever issued covering the said lot. In this regard, Section 39 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 35 or the "Property
Registration Decree" provides that the original certificate of title shall be a true copy of the decree of registration. There is, therefore,
a need to cancel the old decree and a new one issued in order for the decree and the OCT to be exact replicas of each other.

In Republic v. Heirs of Sanchez,36 the Court enunciated the necessity of the petition for cancellation of the old decree and its re-
issuance, if no OCT had been issued pursuant to the old decree:

1. Under the premises, the correct proceeding is a petition for cancellation of the old decree, re-issuance of decree and for issuance
of OCT pursuant to that re-issued decree.
In the landmark decision of Teofilo Cacho vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R No. 123361, March 3, 1997, our Supreme Court had
affirmed the efficacy of filing a petition for cancellation of the old decree; the reissuance of such decree and the issuance of OCT
corresponding to that reissued decree.

"Thus, petitioner filed an omnibus motion for leave of court to file and to admit amended petition, but this was denied. Petitioner
elevated the matter to his Court (docketed as Teofilo Cacho vs. Hon. Manindiara P. Mangotara, G.R. No. 85495) but we resolved to
remand the case to the lower court, ordering the latter to accept the amended petition and to hear it as one for reissuance of decree
under the following guidelines:

Considering the doctrines in Sta. Ana vs. Menla, 1 SCRA 1297 (1961) and Heirs of Cristobal Marcos vs. de Banuvar, 25 SCRA 315
[1968], and the lower court findings that the decrees had in fact been issued, the omnibus motion should have been heard as a
motion to reissue the decrees in order to have a basis for the issuance of the titles and the respondents being heard in their
opposition.

Considering the foregoing, we resolve to order the lower court to accept the amended petition subject to the private respondent's
being given the opportunity to answer and to present their defenses. The evidence already on record shall be allowed to stand but
opportunity to controvert existing evidence shall be given the parties."

Following the principle laid down in the above-quoted case, a question may be asked: Why should a decree be canceled and re-
issued when the same is valid and intact? Within the context of this discussion, there is no dispute that a decree has been validly
issued. And in fact, in some instances, a copy of such decree is intact. What is not known is whether or not an OCT is issued
pursuant to that decree. If such decree is valid, why is there a need to have it cancelled and re-issued?

Again, we invite you back to the highlighted provision of Section 39 of PD 1529 which states that: "The original certificate of title
shall be a true copy of the decree of registration." This provision is significant because it contemplates an OCT which is an exact
replica of the decree. If the old decree will not be canceled and no new decree issued, the corresponding OCT issued today will
bear the signature of the present Administrator while the decree upon which it was based shall bear the signature of the past
Administrator. This is not consistent with the clear intention of the law which states that the OCT shall be true copy of the decree of
registration. Ostensibly, therefore, the cancellation of the old decree and the issuance of a new one is necessary.

xx xx

4. The heirs of the original adjudicate may file the petition in representation of the decedent and the re-issued decree shall still be
under the name of the original adjudicate.

It is a well settled rule that succession operates upon the death of the decedent. The heirs shall then succeed into the shoes of the
decedent. The heirs shall have the legal interest in the property, thus, they cannot be prohibited from filing the necessary petition.

As the term connotes, a mere re-issuance of the decree means that the new decree shall be issued which shall, in all respects, be
the same as that of the original decree. Nothing in the said decree shall be amended nor modified; hence, it must be under the
name of the original adjudicate. (Emphasis and underscoring in the original)

Based from the foregoing, the R TC correctly ordered the cancellation of Decree No. 99500, the re-issuance thereof, and the
issuance of the corresponding OCT covering Lot No. 922 in the name of its original adjudicate, Andres Abellana, as Administrator of
the Estate of Juan Rodriguez.

Verily, this Court sees no reason to overturn the factual findings and the ruling of the CA. Petitioner failed to show that the CA's
decision was arbitrarily made or that evidence on record was disregarded.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated March 16, 2017 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 05491 is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 187512               June 13, 2012

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
YOLANDA CADACIO GRANADA, Respondent.

DECISION

SERENO, J.:

This is a Rule 45 Petition seeking the reversal of the Resolutions dated 23 January 20091 and 3 April 20092 issued by the Court of
Appeals (CA), which affirmed the grant by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of the Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death of the
absent spouse of respondent.

In May 1991, respondent Yolanda Cadacio Granada (Yolanda) met Cyrus Granada (Cyrus) at Sumida Electric Philippines, an
electronics company in Paranaque where both were then working. The two eventually got married at the Manila City Hall on 3 March
1993. Their marriage resulted in the birth of their son, Cyborg Dean Cadacio Granada.

Sometime in May 1994, when Sumida Electric Philippines closed down, Cyrus went to Taiwan to seek employment. Yolanda
claimed that from that time, she had not received any communication from her husband, notwithstanding efforts to locate him. Her
brother testified that he had asked the relatives of Cyrus regarding the latter’s whereabouts, to no avail.

After nine (9) years of waiting, Yolanda filed a Petition to have Cyrus declared presumptively dead. The Petition was raffled to
Presiding Judge Avelino Demetria of RTC Branch 85, Lipa City, and was docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 2002-0530.

On 7 February 2005, the RTC rendered a Decision declaring Cyrus as presumptively dead.

On 10 March 2005, petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of this Decision. Petitioner argued that Yolanda had failed to exert earnest efforts to locate Cyrus and thus failed to
prove her well-founded belief that he was already dead. However, in an Order dated 29 June 2007, the RTC denied the motion.

Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal to elevate the case to the CA, presumably under Rule 41, Section 2(a) of the Rules of Court.
Yolanda filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the CA had no jurisdiction over the appeal. She argued that her Petition for
Declaration of Presumptive Death, based on Article 41 of the Family Code, was a summary judicial proceeding, in which the
judgment is immediately final and executory and, thus, not appealable.

In its 23 January 2009 Resolution, the appellate court granted Yolanda’s Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
Citing Republic v. Bermudez-Lorino,3 the CA ruled that a petition for declaration of presumptive death under Rule 41 of the Family
Code is a summary proceeding. Thus, judgment thereon is immediately final and executory upon notice to the parties.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but its motion was likewise denied by the CA in a Resolution dated 3 April 2009. 4

Hence, the present Rule 45 Petition.

Issues

1. Whether the CA seriously erred in dismissing the Petition on the ground that the Decision of the RTC in a summary
proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death is immediately final and executory upon notice to the parties and,
hence, is not subject to ordinary appeal

2. Whether the CA seriously erred in affirming the RTC’s grant of the Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death under
Article 41 of the Family Code based on the evidence that respondent presented

Our Ruling
1. On whether the CA seriously erred in dismissing the Petition on the ground that the Decision of the RTC in a summary
proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death is immediately final and executory upon notice to the parties and, hence, is not
subject to ordinary appeal

In the assailed Resolution dated 23 January 2009, the CA dismissed the Petition assailing the RTC’s grant of the Petition for
Declaration of Presumptive Death of the absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code. Citing Republic v. Bermudez-
Lorino,5 the appellate court noted that a petition for declaration of presumptive death for the purpose of remarriage is a summary
judicial proceeding under the Family Code. Hence, the RTC Decision therein is immediately final and executory upon notice to the
parties, by express provision of Article 247 of the same Code. The decision is therefore not subject to ordinary appeal, and the
attempt to question it through a Notice of Appeal is unavailing.

We affirm the CA ruling.

Article 41 of the Family Code provides:

Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the
celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present has a
well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the
circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.

For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph the spouse present must institute
a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the
effect of reappearance of the absent spouse. (Underscoring supplied.)

Clearly, a petition for declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse for the purpose of contracting a subsequent marriage
under Article 41 of the Family Code is a summary proceeding "as provided for" under the Family Code.

Further, Title XI of the Family Code is entitled "Summary Judicial Proceedings in the Family Law." Subsumed thereunder are
Articles 238 and 247, which provide:

Art. 238. Until modified by the Supreme Court, the procedural rules in this Title shall apply in all cases provided for in this Code
requiring summary court proceedings. Such cases shall be decided in an expeditious manner without regard to technical rules.

x x x           x x x          x x x

Art. 247. The judgment of the court shall be immediately final and executory.

Further, Article 253 of the Family Code reads:

ART. 253. The foregoing rules in Chapters 2 and 3 hereof shall likewise govern summary proceedings filed under Articles 41, 51,
69, 73, 96, 124 and 217, insofar as they are applicable.

Taken together, Articles 41, 238, 247 and 253 of the Family Code provide that since a petition for declaration of presumptive death
is a summary proceeding, the judgment of the court therein shall be immediately final and executory.

In Republic v. Bermudez-Lorino,6 the Republic likewise appealed the CA’s affirmation of the RTC’s grant of respondent’s Petition for
Declaration of Presumptive Death of her absent spouse. The Court therein held that it was an error for the Republic to file a Notice
of Appeal when the latter elevated the matter to the CA, to wit:

In Summary Judicial Proceedings under the Family Code, there is no reglementary period within which to perfect an appeal,
precisely because judgments rendered thereunder, by express provision of Section 247, Family Code, supra, are "immediately final
and executory."

x x x           x x x          x x x

But, if only to set the records straight and for the future guidance of the bench and the bar, let it be stated that the RTC’s decision
dated November 7, 2001, was immediately final and executory upon notice to the parties. It was erroneous for the OSG to file a
notice of appeal, and for the RTC to give due course thereto. The Court of Appeals acquired no jurisdiction over the case, and
should have dismissed the appeal outright on that ground.
Justice (later Chief Justice) Artemio Panganiban, who concurred in the result reached by the Court in Republic v. Bermudez-Lorino,
additionally opined that what the OSG should have filed was a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, not a petition for review under
Rule 45.

In the present case, the Republic argues that Bermudez-Lorino has been superseded by the subsequent Decision of the Court in
Republic v. Jomoc,7 issued a few months later.

In Jomoc, the RTC granted respondent’s Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death of her absent husband for the purpose of
remarriage. Petitioner Republic appealed the RTC Decision by filing a Notice of Appeal. The trial court disapproved the Notice of
Appeal on the ground that, under the Rules of Court,8 a record on appeal is required to be filed when appealing special proceedings
cases. The CA affirmed the RTC ruling. In reversing the CA, this Court clarified that while an action for declaration of death or
absence under Rule 72, Section 1(m), expressly falls under the category of special proceedings, a petition for declaration of
presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code is a summary proceeding, as provided for by Article 238 of the same Code.
Since its purpose was to enable her to contract a subsequent valid marriage, petitioner’s action was a summary proceeding based
on Article 41 of the Family Code, rather than a special proceeding under Rule 72 of the Rules of Court. Considering that this action
was not a special proceeding, petitioner was not required to file a record on appeal when it appealed the RTC Decision to the CA.

We do not agree with the Republic’s argument that Republic v. Jomoc superseded our ruling in Republic v. Bermudez-Lorino. As
observed by the CA, the Supreme Court in Jomoc did not expound on the characteristics of a summary proceeding under the Family
Code. In contrast, the Court in Bermudez-Lorino expressly stated that its ruling on the impropriety of an ordinary appeal as a vehicle
for questioning the trial court’s Decision in a summary proceeding for declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family
Code was intended "to set the records straight and for the future guidance of the bench and the bar."

At any rate, four years after Jomoc, this Court settled the rule regarding appeal of judgments rendered in summary proceedings
under the Family Code when it ruled in Republic v. Tango:9

This case presents an opportunity for us to settle the rule on appeal of judgments rendered in summary proceedings under the
Family Code and accordingly, refine our previous decisions thereon.

Article 238 of the Family Code, under Title XI: SUMMARY JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS IN THE FAMILY LAW, establishes the rules
that govern summary court proceedings in the Family Code:

ART. 238. Until modified by the Supreme Court, the procedural rules in this Title shall apply in all cases provided for in this Code
requiring summary court proceedings. Such cases shall be decided in an expeditious manner without regard to technical rules.

In turn, Article 253 of the Family Code specifies the cases covered by the rules in chapters two and three of the same title. It states:

ART. 253. The foregoing rules in Chapters 2 and 3 hereof shall likewise govern summary proceedings filed under Articles 41, 51,
69, 73, 96, 124 and 217, insofar as they are applicable. (Emphasis supplied.)

In plain text, Article 247 in Chapter 2 of the same title reads:

ART 247. The judgment of the court shall be immediately final and executory.

By express provision of law, the judgment of the court in a summary proceeding shall be immediately final and executory. As a
matter of course, it follows that no appeal can be had of the trial court's judgment in a summary proceeding for the declaration of
presumptive death of an absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code. It goes without saying, however, that an aggrieved
party may file a petition for certiorari to question abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Such petition should be filed in
the Court of Appeals in accordance with the Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts. To be sure, even if the Court's original jurisdiction to
issue a writ of certiorari is concurrent with the RTCs and the Court of Appeals in certain cases, such concurrence does not sanction
an unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. From the decision of the Court of Appeals, the losing party may then file a petition
for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court with the Supreme Court. This is because the errors which the court may
commit in the exercise of jurisdiction are merely errors of judgment which are the proper subject of an appeal.

In sum, under Article 41 of the Family Code, the losing party in a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death may
file a petition for certiorari with the CA on the ground that, in rendering judgment thereon, the trial court committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. From the decision of the CA, the aggrieved party may elevate the matter to this Court via
a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

Evidently then, the CA did not commit any error in dismissing the Republic’s Notice of Appeal on the ground that the RTC judgment
on the Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death of respondent’s spouse was immediately final and executory and, hence, not
subject to ordinary appeal.
2. On whether the CA seriously erred in affirming the RTC’s grant of the Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death under Article
41 of the Family Code based on the evidence that respondent had presented

Petitioner also assails the RTC’s grant of the Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death of the absent spouse of respondent on
the ground that she had not adduced the evidence required to establish a well-founded belief that her absent spouse was already
dead, as expressly required by Article 41 of the Family Code. Petitioner cites Republic v. Nolasco, 10 United States v. Biasbas 11 and
Republic v. Court of Appeals and Alegro 12 as authorities on the subject.

In Nolasco, petitioner Republic sought the reversal of the CA’s affirmation of the RTC’s grant of respondent’s Petition for Declaration
of Presumptive Death of his absent spouse, a British subject who left their home in the Philippines soon after giving birth to their son
while respondent was on board a vessel working as a seafarer. Petitioner Republic sought the reversal of the ruling on the ground
that respondent was not able to establish his "well-founded belief that the absentee is already dead," as required by Article 41 of the
Family Code. In ruling thereon, this Court recognized that this provision imposes more stringent requirements than does Article 83 of
the Civil Code.13 The Civil Code provision merely requires either that there be no news that the absentee is still alive; or that the
absentee is generally considered to be dead and is believed to be so by the spouse present, or is presumed dead under Articles
390 and 391 of the Civil Code. In comparison, the Family Code provision prescribes a "well-founded belief" that the absentee is
already dead before a petition for declaration of presumptive death can be granted. As noted by the Court in that case, the four
requisites for the declaration of presumptive death under the Family Code are as follows:

1. That the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive years, or two consecutive years if the disappearance
occurred where there is danger of death under the circumstances laid down in Article 391, Civil Code;

2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry;

3. That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead; and

4. That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee.

In evaluating whether the present spouse has been able to prove the existence of a "well-founded belief" that the absent spouse is
already dead, the Court in Nolasco cited United States v. Biasbas, 14 which it found to be instructive as to the diligence required in
searching for a missing spouse.

In Biasbas, the Court held that defendant Biasbas failed to exercise due diligence in ascertaining the whereabouts of his first wife,
considering his admission that that he only had a suspicion that she was dead, and that the only basis of that suspicion was the fact
of her absence.

Similarly, in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Alegro, petitioner Republic sought the reversal of the CA ruling affirming the RTC’s
grant of the Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death of the absent spouse on the ground that the respondent therein had not
been able to prove a "well-founded belief" that his spouse was already dead. The Court reversed the CA, granted the Petition, and
provided the following criteria for determining the existence of a "well-founded belief" under Article 41 of the Family Code:

For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the spouse present must institute a
summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the
effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.

The spouse present is, thus, burdened to prove that his spouse has been absent and that he has a well-founded belief that the
absent spouse is already dead before the present spouse may contract a subsequent marriage. The law does not define what is
meant by a well-grounded belief. Cuello Callon writes that "es menester que su creencia sea firme se funde en motivos racionales."

Belief is a state of the mind or condition prompting the doing of an overt act.1âwphi1 It may be proved by direct evidence or
circumstantial evidence which may tend, even in a slight degree, to elucidate the inquiry or assist to a determination probably
founded in truth. Any fact or circumstance relating to the character, habits, conditions, attachments, prosperity and objects of life
which usually control the conduct of men, and are the motives of their actions, was, so far as it tends to explain or characterize their
disappearance or throw light on their intentions, competence [sic] evidence on the ultimate question of his death.

The belief of the present spouse must be the result of proper and honest to goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain the
whereabouts of the absent spouse and whether the absent spouse is still alive or is already dead. Whether or not the spouse
present acted on a well-founded belief of death of the absent spouse depends upon the inquiries to be drawn from a great many
circumstances occurring before and after the disappearance of the absent spouse and the nature and extent of the inquiries made
by present spouse. (Footnotes omitted, underscoring supplied.)

Applying the foregoing standards to the present case, petitioner points out that respondent Yolanda did not initiate a diligent search
to locate her absent husband. While her brother Diosdado Cadacio testified to having inquired about the whereabouts of Cyrus from
the latter’s relatives, these relatives were not presented to corroborate Diosdado’s testimony. In short, respondent was allegedly not
diligent in her search for her husband. Petitioner argues that if she were, she would have sought information from the Taiwanese
Consular Office or assistance from other government agencies in Taiwan or the Philippines. She could have also utilized mass
media for this end, but she did not. Worse, she failed to explain these omissions.

The Republic’s arguments are well-taken. Nevertheless, we are constrained to deny the Petition.

The RTC ruling on the issue of whether respondent was able to prove her "well-founded belief" that her absent spouse was already
dead prior to her filing of the Petition to declare him presumptively dead is already final and can no longer be modified or reversed.
Indeed, "[n]othing is more settled in law than that when a judgment becomes final and executory, it becomes immutable and
unalterable. The same may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be
an erroneous conclusion of fact or law."15

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated 23 January 2009 and 3 April 2009 in
CA-G.R. CV No. 90165 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 195443               September 17, 2014

JUANARIO G. CAMPIT, Petitioner,
vs.
ISIDRA B. GRIP A, PEDRO BARDIAGA, and SEVERINO BARDIAGA, represented by his son ROLANDO
BARDIAGA, Respondents.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

We review in this petition for review on certiorari1 the decision2 dated May 13, 2010 and resolution3 dated January 27, 2011 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 92356. The CA dismissed the appeal filed by petitioner Juanario Campit to the
decision4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 3 8, Lingayen, Pangasinan, which ordered him to surrender a Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) that was found to have been fraudulently issued in his name. Factual Antecedents

Subject of this case is a 2. 7360-hectare agricultural land situated in Umangan, Mangatarem, Pangasinan, presently occupied by
respondents Isidra B. Gripa, Pedro Bardiaga, and Severino Bardiaga, represented by his son Rolando Bardiaga, but covered by
TCT No. 122237 issued in the petitioner’s name.5 The petitioner claimed to have purchased the property from his father Jose
Campit in 1977.6

On the other hand, respondents Isidra Gripa, Pedro Bardiaga and Severino Bardiaga (as represented by his son, Rolando Bardiaga)
claimed to be the rightful owners of the subject property, as earlier adjudged by the court in Civil CaseNo. 11858 decided on June
12, 1961, and in Civil Case No. 15357 decided on August 8, 1978. 7

The Court, in these cases, cancelled the titles of the petitioner and his father Jose because they were obtained through the
misrepresentation of the petitioner’s grandfather, Isidro Campit.8 The respondents further contended that they have long desired to
divide the subject property among themselves, but the petitioner adamantly refused to surrender his title to the property to them, or
to the Register of Deeds, despite their formal demand. 9

Due to the petitioner’s continued refusal to surrender the subject TCT, the respondents filed anewan action for annulment and
cancellation of title with the RTC on August 15, 2003, docketed as Civil Case No. 18421. 10

The petitioner opposed the respondents’ action and argued that the August 8, 1978 decision in Civil Case No. 15357, which
declared his title null and void, could no longer be enforcedbecause its execution was already barred by the Statute of Limitations,
as the said decision was never executed within 10 years from July 19, 1979 - the date of finality of the judgment. 11

Noting that the action filed by the respondents was not one for revival of judgment, the RTC proceeded to hear the case and, in a
decision dated August 13, 2008, ruled in the respondents’ favor, in this wise:

WHEREFORE, considering that the Transfer of Certificate of Title No. 122237 issued in the name of defendant Juanario Campit had
earlier been declared null and void in the decision of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan (sic) Civil Case No. 15357, judgment
is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs, as follows:

a) Ordering the defendant Juanario Campit to surrender the said Transfer of Certificate of Title No. 122237 within a period
of fifteen (15) days from finality of this decision to the Register of (sic) Pangasinan for its cancellation;

b) Ordering the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan to cancel TCT No. 122237 inthe event that Juanario Campit fails to
surrender the same within the period given to him, and to revive the title issued in the name of Mariano Campit.

Costs against the defendant.

SO ORDERED.

On appeal, the CA, in a decision dated May 13, 2010, affirmed the RTC and held that:

Not being the true owner ofthe subject property, the subsequent issuance of a certificate of title to the defendant-appellant does not
vest him ownership over the subject land. Registration of real property under the Torrens Systemdoes not create or vest title
because it is not a mode of acquiring ownership.
The petitioner moved to reconsider, but the CA denied his motion in a resolution dated January 27, 2011, hence, the filing of the
present petition for review on certiorari with this Court.

The Petition

In his petition before this Court, the petitioner argues that his title to the subject property must prevail not only because the August 8,
1978 decision in Civil Case No. 15357, which declared his title null and void, was never executed, but also because, under the
Torrens system of registration, a certificate of title is an indefeasible and incontrovertible proof of ownership of the person, inwhose
favor it was issued, over the land described therein. He now contends that he had acquired the property in good faith and for
valuable consideration and, thus, entitled to own and possess the subject property.

Our Ruling

We find no merit in the petitioner’s arguments.

The issue on the validity of the petitioner’s title to the subject property has long been settled in Civil Case No. 15357, where the
court, in its decision dated August 8, 1978, which became final and executory on July 19, 1979, had found and declared the
petitioner’s title null and void by reason of fraud and misrepresentation.

A matter adjudged with finality by a competent court having jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter already constitutes
res judicatain another action involving the same cause of action, parties and subject matter. The doctrine of res judicata provides
that a final judgment on the merits rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction, is conclusive as to the rights of the parties and their
privies and constitutes as an absolute bar to subsequent actions involving the same claim, demand, or cause of action. 12 Thus, the
validity of petitioner’s title, having been settled with finality in Civil Case No. 15357, could no longer be reviewed in the present case.
The August 8, 1978 decision in Civil Case No. 15357, however, was not executed or enforced withinthe time allowed under the law.
Under Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, a final and executory judgment may be executed by the prevailing party as a matter
of right by mere motion within five (5) years from the entry of judgment, failing which the judgment is reduced to a mere right of
action which must be enforced by the institution of a complaint in a regular court within ten (10) years from finality of the judgment. 13

It appears that no motion or action to revive judgment was ever filed by the respondents - the prevailing party in Civil Case No.
15357, to execute and enforce the August 8,1978 decision. The title to the subject property, therefore, remained registered under
the petitioner’s name. As the petitioner argued, his title had already become incontrovertible since the Torrens system of land
registration provides for the indefeasibility of the decree of registration and the certificate of title issued upon the expiration of one (1)
year from the date of entry of the registration decree. 14

We cannot, however, allow the petitioner to maintain his title and benefit from the fruit of his and his predecessors’ fraudulent acts at
the expense of the respondents who are the rightful owners of the subject property. The Torrens system of registration cannot be
used to protect a usurper from the true owner, nor can it be used as a shield for the commission of fraud,or to permit one to enrich
oneself at the expense of others.15

Notwithstanding the indefeasibility of the Torrens title, the registered owner can still be compelled under the law to reconvey the
property registered to the rightful owner16 under the principle that the property registered is deemed to be held in trust for the real
owner by the person in whose name it is registered.17 The party seeking to recover title to property wrongfully registered in another
person’s name must file an action for reconveyance within the allowed period of time.

An action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten (10) years from the issuance of the Torrens
title over the property.18 There is, however, an exception to this rule where the filing of such action does not prescribe, i.e. when the
plaintiff is in possession of the subject property, the action, being in effect that of quieting of title to the property, does not
prescribe.19

In the present case, the respondents, who are the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 18421 (the action for annulment and cancellation of title
filed in 2013), have always been in possession of the subject property. Worth noting are the CA’s findings on this respect:

xxx Of course, the defendant-appellant (petitioner herein) has a certificate of title in his favor.1âwphi1 But it cannot be denied that
he has never been in possession of the subject property. Neither did he exercise acts of ownership over the said land since the time
he allegedly purchased it from his father in 1977. Similarly, the defendant-appellant was not able to show that his predecessor-
ininterest, Jose Campit, claimed ownership or was ever in possession of the said land. The defendant-appellant has admitted that
he has paid realty tax covering the subject landonly once when he applied for the issuance of title in his favor.

xxxx
On the other hand, the continuous possession of the subject premises by the plaintiffs-appellees has not been denied or disputed by
the defendants-appellants (sic).The possession in the concept of an owner by the plaintiffs-appellees has also been confirmed by
witness Charlie Martin.20 (Emphasis ours)

Considering that the action for annulment and cancellation of title filed by the respondents is substantially in the nature of an action
for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust, combined with the fact that the respondents have always been in
possession of the subject property, we shall treat Civil Case No. 18421 as an action to quiet title, the filing of which does not
prescribe. Thus, we find the respondents’ filing of Civil Case No. 18421 to be proper and not barred by the time limitations set forth
under the Rules of Court in enforcing or executing a final and executory judgment.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the present petition for review on certiorari and consequently AFFIRM the decision
dated May 13, 2010 and resolution dated January 27, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 92356.

Costs against petitioner Juanario G. Campit.

SO ORDERED.
 G.R. Nos. 191370-71, August 10, 2015

RODOLFO BASILONIA, LEODEGARIO CATALAN AND JOHN BASILONIA, Petitioners, v. HON. DELANO F. VLLLARUZ,

ACTING IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, ROXAS CITY, BRANCH 16, AND
DIXON ROBLETE, Respondents.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

The lone issue for resolution in this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure (Rules) with
prayer for the issuance of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order is the applicability of Section 6, Rule 39 of the
Rules in criminal cases. Specifically, does a trial court have jurisdiction to grant a motion for execution which was filed almost twenty
(20) years after the date of entry of judgment? In his Orders dated December 3, 2009 1 and January 4, 2010,2 respondent Judge
Delano F. Vi11aruz of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Roxas City, Branch 16, held in the affirmative.3 We sustain in part.

The Facts

On June 19, 1987, a Decision4 was promulgated against petitioners in Criminal Case Nos. 1773, 1774 and 1775, the dispositive
portion of which states:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

WHEREFORE, and in view of the foregoing considerations, this court finds the [accused] Rodolfo Basilonia, Leodegario Catalan,
and John "Jojo" Basilonia, GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT, as principals in Criminal Case No. 1773 for the murder of
Atty. Isagani Roblete on September 15, 1983 in Roxas City, Philippines, defined under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code of the
Philippines, without any aggravating or mitigating circumstance, and sentences the said [accused] to suffer an indeterminate
sentence of 12 years, 1 month and 1 day of reclusion temporal as minimum, to 20 years, and 1 day of reclusion temporal as
maximum, and the accessory penalties thereto; to pay and [indemnify], jointly and severally, the heirs of the deceased Atty. Isagani
Roblete the sum of 1!32,100.00 representing funeral expenses, tomb, burial, and expenses for wake; the sum of 1!30,000.00 as
indemnity for the death of Atty. Isagani Roblete; the amount of lost income cannot be determined as the net income of the deceased
cannot be ascertained; and to pay the costs of suit. [Accused] Vicente Catalan and Jory Catalan are ACQUITTED for lack of
evidence.

In Criminal Case No. 1775 for Frustrated Murder, this court finds the accused John "Jojo" Basilonia GUlLTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT of the crime of Frustrated Homicide, as principal, committed against the person of Rene Gonzales on
September 15, 1983, defined under Article 249, in relation to Articles 6 and 50 of the Revised Penal Code and sentences the said
accused to suffer an indeterminate sentence of 2 years, 4 months and 1 day of prision [correccional] as minimum, to 6 years, and 1
day of prision mayor as maximum; and to pay the costs. [Accused] Rodolfo Basilonia, Leodegario Catalan, Vicente Catalan and Jory
Catalan are ACQUITTED for lack of evidence.

In Criminal Case No. 1774 for Illegal Possession of Firearm, all [accused] are ACQUITTED for insufficiency of evidence.

SO ORDERED.5

Petitioners filed a Notice of Appeal on July 30, 1987, which the trial court granted on August 3, 1987. 6redarclaw

On January 23, 1989, the Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed the appeal for failure of petitioners to file their brief despite extensions of
time given.7redarclaw

The Resolution was entered in the Book of Entries of Judgment on September 18, 1989. 8 Thereafter, the entire case records were
remanded to the trial court on October 4, 1989.9redarclaw

Almost two decades passed from the entry of judgment, on May 11, 2009, private respondent Dixon C. Roblete, claiming to be the
son of the deceased victim, Atty. Roblete, filed a Motion for Execution of Judgment. 10redarclaw

He alleged, among others, that despite his request to the City Prosecutor to file a motion for execution, the judgment has not been
enforced because said prosecutor has not acted upon his request.

Pursuant to the trial court's directive, the Assistant City Prosecutor filed on May 22, 2009 an Omnibus Motion for Execution of
Judgment and Issuance of Warrant of Arrest.11redarclaw

On July 24, 2009, petitioners filed before the CA a Petition for Relief of Judgment praying to set aside the June 19, 1987 trial court
Decision and the January 23, 1989 CA Resolution. 12 Further, on September 1, 2009, they filed before the trial court a Manifestation
and Supplemental Opposition to private respondent Roblete's motion.13redarclaw

The trial court granted the motion for execution on December 3, 2009 and ordered the bondsmen to surrender petitioners within ten
(10) days from notice of the Order. The motion for reconsideration14 filed by petitioners was denied on January 4, 2010.
Due to petitioners' failure to appear in court after the expiration of the period granted to their bondsmen, the bail for their provisional
liberty was ordered forfeited on January 25, 2010. 15 On even date, the sheriff issued the writ of execution.16redarclaw

The Court's Ruling

The determination of whether respondent trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
in granting a motion for execution which was filed almost twenty (20) years after a judgment in a criminal case became final and
executory necessarily calls for the resolution of the twin issues of whether the penalty of imprisonment already prescribed and the
civil liability arising from the crime already extinguished. In both issues, petitioners vehemently assert that respondent trial court has
no more jurisdiction to order the execution of judgment on the basis of Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules.

We consider the issues separately.

Prescription of Penalty

With respect to the penalty of imprisonment, Act No. 3815, or the Revised Penal Code (RPC)17 governs. Articles 92 and 93 of which
provide:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

ARTICLE 92. When and How Penalties Prescribe. - The penalties imposed by final sentence prescribe as
follows:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
1. Death and reclusion perpetua, in twenty years;
2. Other afflictive penalties, in fifteen years;
3. Correctional penalties, in ten years; with the exception of the penalty of arresto mayor, which prescribes in five years;
4. Light penalties, in one year.

ARTICLE 93. Computation of the Prescription of Penalties.- The period of prescription of penalties shall commence to run from the
date when the culprit should evade the service of his sentence, and it shall be interrupted if the defendant should give himself up, be
captured, should go to some foreign country with which this Government has no extradition treaty, or should commit another crime
before the expiration of the period of prescription.

As early as 1952, in Infante v. Provincial Warden of Negros Occidental,18 the Court already opined that evasion of service of
sentence is an essential element of prescription of penalties. Later, Tanega v. Masakayan, et al.19 expounded on the rule that the
culprit should escape during the term of imprisonment in order for prescription of penalty imposed by final sentence to commence to
run, thus:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

x x x The period of prescription of penalties- so the succeeding Article 93 provides - "shall commence to run from the date when the
culprit should evade the service of his sentence."

What then is the concept of evasion of service of sentence? Article 157 of the Revised Penal Code furnishes the ready answer.
Says Article 157:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
ART. 157. Evasion of service of sentence. - The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods shall be
imposed upon any convict who shall evade service of his sentence by escaping during the term of his imprisonment by reason of
final judgment. However, if such evasion or escape shall have taken place by means of unlawful entry, by breaking doors, windows,
gates, walls, roofs, or floors, or by using picklocks, false keys, disguise, deceit, violence or intimidation, or through connivance with
other convicts or employees of the penal institution, the penalty shall be prision correccional in its maximum period.

Elements of evasion of service of sentence are: (1) the offender is a convict by final judgment; (2) he "is serving his sentence which
consists in deprivation of liberty"; and (3) he evades service of sentence by escaping during the term of his sentence. This must be
so. For, by the express terms of the statute, a convict evades "service of his sentence" by "escaping during the term of his
imprisonment by reason of final judgment." That escape should take place while serving sentence, is emphasized by the provisions
of the second sentence of Article 157 which provides for a higher penalty if such "evasion or escape shall have taken place by
means of unlawful entry, by breaking doors, windows, gates, walls, roofs, or floors, or by using picklocks, false keys, disguise,
deceit, violence or intimidation, or through connivance with other convicts or employees of the penal institution, * * *" Indeed,
evasion of sentence is but another expression of the term "jail breaking."
A dig into legal history confirms the views just expressed. The Penal Code of Spain of 1870 in its Article 134 - from whence Articles
92 and 93 of the present Revised Penal Code originated- reads:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
"Las penas impuestas por sentencia firme prescriben: Las de muerte y cadena perpetua, a los veinte años.

***

Las leves, al año.

El tiempo de esta prescripcion comenzara a correr desde el dia en que se notifique personalmente al reo la sentencia firme, o
desde el quebrantamiento de la condena, si hubiera esta comenzado a cumplirse. * * *" Note that in the present Article 93 the words
"desde el dia en que se notifique personalmente al reo la sentencia firme", written in the old code, were deleted. The omission is
significant. What remains reproduced in Article 93 of the Revised Penal Code is solely "quebrantamiento de Ia condena". And,
"quebrantamiento" or "evasion" means escape. Reason dictates that one can escape only after he has started service of sentence.

Even under the old law, Viada emphasizes, where the penalty consists of imprisonment, prescription shall only begin to run when he
escapes from confinement. Says Viada:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
"El tiempo de la prescripcion empieza a contarse desde el dia en que ha tenido Iugar la notificacion personal de la sentencia firme
al reo: el Codigo de 1850 no expresaba que la notificacion hubiese de ser personal, pues en su art. 126 se consigna que el termino
de Ia prescripcion se cuenta desde que se notifique la sentencia, causa de la ejecutoria en que se imponga le pena
respectiva. Luego ausente el reo, ya no podra prescribir hoy Ia pena, pues que Ia notificacion personal no puede ser sup/ida por Ia
notificacion hecha en estrados. Dada la imprescindible necesidad del requisito de la notificacion personal, es obvio que en las
penas que consisten en privacion de libertad solo podra existir Ia prescripcion quebrantando el reo Ia condena, pues que si no se
hallare ya preso preventivamente, debera siempre procederse a su encerrarniento en el acto de serle notificada personalmente la
sentencia."
We, therefore, rule that for prescription of penalty of imprisonment imposed by final sentence to commence to run, the culprit should
escape during the term of such imprisonment. 20

Following Tanega, Del Castillo v. Hon. Torrecampo21 held that one who has not been committed to prison cannot be said to have
escaped therefrom. We agree with the position of the Solicitor General that "escape" in legal parlance and for purposes of Articles
93 and 157 of the RPC means unlawful departure of prisoner from the limits of his custody.

Of more recent vintage is Our pronouncements in Pangan v. Hon. Gatbalite,22 which cited Tanega and Del Castillo, that the
prescription of penalties found in Article 93 of the RPC applies only to those who are convicted by final judgment and are serving
sentence which consists in deprivation of liberty, and that the period for prescription of penalties begins only when the convict
evades service of sentence by escaping during the term of his sentence.

Applying existing jurisprudence in this case, the Court, therefore, rules against petitioners. For the longest time, they were never
brought to prison or placed in confinement despite being sentenced to imprisonment by final judgment. Prescription of penalty of
imprisonment does not run in their favor. Needless to state, respondent trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion in
assuming jurisdiction over the motion for execution and in eventually granting the same.

Extinction of Civil Liability

The treatment of petitioners' civil liability arising from the offense committed is different.

Elementary is the rule that every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. 23 We said in one case:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

It bears repeating that "an offense as a general rule causes two (2) classes of injuries - the first is the social injury produced by the
criminal act which is sought to be repaired thru the imposition of the corresponding penalty and the second is the personal injury
caused to the victim of the crime which injury is sought to be compensated thru indemnity, which is civil in nature." (Ramos v.
Gonong, 72 SCRA 559). As early as 1913, this Court in US. v. Heery (25 Phil. 600) made it clear that the civil liability of the accused
is not part of the penalty for the crime committed. It is personal to the victim. x x x.

Under Article 112 of the RPC, civil liability established in Articles 100, 25 101,26 102,27 and 10328 of the Code shall be extinguished in
the same manner as other obligations, in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Law. Since the Civil Code is the governing law,
the provisions of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, particularly Section 6, Rule 39 thereof, is applicable. It
states:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

Section 6. Execution by motion or by independent action. - A final and executory judgment or order may be executed on motion
within five (5) years from the date of its entry. After the lapse of such time, and before it is barred by the statute of limitations, a
judgment may be enforced by action. The revived judgment may also be enforced by motion within five (5) years from the date of its
entry and thereafter by action before it is barred by the statute of limitations. (6a)
Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules must be read in conjunction with

Articles 1144 (3) and 1152 of the Civil Code, which provide:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

Art. 1144. The following actions must be brought within ten years from the time the right of action accrues:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

xxxx

(3) Upon a judgment

Art. 1152. The period for prescription of actions to demand the fulfillment of obligations declared by a judgment commences from the
time the judgment became final.

Based on the foregoing, there are two (2) modes of enforcing a final and executory judgment or order: through motion or by
independent action.

These two modes of execution are available depending on the timing when the judgment creditor invoked its right to enforce the
court's judgment. Execution by motion is only available if the enforcement of the judgment was sought within five (5) years
from the date of its entry. On the other hand, execution by independent action is mandatory if the five-year prescriptive period for
execution by motion had already elapsed. However, for execution by independent action to prosper - the Rules impose another
limitation - the action must be filed before it is barred by the statute of limitations which, under the Civil Code, is ten (10) years from
the finality of the judgment. 29

An action for revival of judgment is not intended to reopen any issue affecting the merits of the case or the propriety or correctness
of the first judgment.30 The purpose is not to re-examine and re-try issues already decided but to revive the judgment; its cause of
action is the judgment itself and not the merits of the original action. 31 However, being a mere right of action, the judgment sought to
be revived is subject to defenses and counterclaims like matters of jurisdiction and those arising after the finality of the first judgment
or which may have arisen subsequent to the date it became effective such as prescription, payment, or counterclaims arising out of
transactions not connected with the former controversy.32redarclaw

Once a judgment becomes final, the prevailing party is entitled as a matter of right to a writ of execution the issuance of which is the
trial court's ministerial duty, compellable by mandamus. 33 Yet, a writ issued after the expiration of the period is null and void. 34 The
limitation that a judgment be enforced by execution within the stated period, otherwise it loses efficacy, goes to the very jurisdiction
of the court. Failure to object to a writ issued after such period does not validate it, for the reason that jurisdiction of courts is solely
conferred by law and not by express or implied will of the parties.35redarclaw

Nonetheless, jurisprudence is replete with a number of exceptions wherein the Court, on meritorious grounds, allowed execution of
judgment despite non-observance of the time bar. In Lancita, et al. v. Magbanua, et al.36 it was held:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

In computing the time limited for suing out an execution, although there is authority to the contrary, the general rule is that there
should not be included the time when execution is stayed, either by agreement of the parties for a definite time, by injunction, by the
taking of an appeal or writ of error so as to operate as a supersedeas, by the death of a party, or otherwise. Any interruption or delay
occasioned by the debtor will extend the time within which the writ may be issued without scire facias. x x x.37

Thus, the demands of justice and fairness were contemplated in the following instances: dilatory tactics and legal maneuverings of
the judgment obligor which redounded to its benefit;38 agreement of the parties to defer or suspend the enforcement of the
judgment;39 strict application of the rules would result in injustice to the prevailing party to whom no fault could be attributed but
relaxation thereof would cause no prejudice to the judgment obligor who did not question the judgment sought to be executed; 40 and
the satisfaction of the judgment was already beyond the control of the prevailing party as he did what he was supposed to
do.41 Essentially, We allowed execution even after the prescribed period elapsed when the delay is caused or occasioned by actions
of the judgment debtor and/or is incurred for his benefit or advantage. 42redarclaw

In the instant case, it is obvious that the heirs of Atty. Roblete did not file a motion for execution within the five-year period or an
action to revive the judgment within the ten-year period. Worse, other than the bare allegation that the judgment has not been
enforced because the public prosecutor has not acted on the request to file a motion for execution, no persuasive and compelling
reason was presented to warrant the exercise of Our equity jurisdiction. Unfortunately for private respondent Roblete, the instant
case does not fall within the exceptions afore-stated. It cannot be claimed that the delay in execution was entirely beyond their
control or that petitioners have any hand in causing the same.43 As regards the civil aspect of a criminal case is concerned, it is apt
to point that —

ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Litigants represented by counsel should not expect that all they need to do is sit back and relax, and await the outcome of their
case. They should give the necessary assistance to their counsel, for at stake is their interest in the case. While lawyers are
expected to exercise a reasonable degree of diligence and competence in handling cases for their clients, the realities of law
practice as well as certain fortuitous events sometimes make it almost physically impossible for lawyers to be immediately updated
on a particular client's case.44

Aside from the civil indemnity arising from the crime, costs and incidental expenses of the suit are part of the judgment and it is
incumbent upon the prevailing party in whose favor they are awarded to submit forthwith the itemized bill to the clerk of
court.45 Manifestly, the heirs of Atty. Roblete failed to do so. Their indifference, if not negligence, is indicative of lack of interest in
executing the decision rendered in their favor. To remind, the purpose of the law in prescribing time limitations for executing
judgments or orders is to prevent obligors from sleeping on their rights.46 Indeed, inaction may be construed as a waiver.47redarclaw

To close, the Court cannot help but impress that this case could have been averted had the lower court been a competent dispenser
of justice. It is opportune to remind judges that once a judgment of conviction becomes final and executory, the trial court has the
ministerial duty to immediately execute the penalty of imprisonment and/or pecuniary penalty (fine). A motion to execute judgment of
conviction is not necessary. With respect to the penalty of imprisonment, the trial court should cancel the bail bond and issue a
warrant of arrest, if the accused is not yet under detention. If the convicted accused is already under detention by virtue of the
warrant of arrest issued, the trial court should immediately issue the corresponding mittimus or commitment order for the immediate
transfer of the accused to the National Penitentiary to serve his sentence, if the penalty imposed requires the service of sentence in
the National Penitentiary. The commitment order should state that an appeal had been filed, but the same had been
withdrawn/dismissed/decided with finality.
If aside from the penalty of imprisonment the penalty of fine is likewise imposed, the trial court should issue at once an order
requiring the payment of fine within a reasonable period of time and, in case of nonpayment and subsidiary imprisonment is
imposed, he should likewise serve the subsidiary imprisonment. If, however, the penalty is only fine and the judgment has become
final and executory, an order should be issued by the trial court at once for the payment of the fine. And in case of non-payment, the
bail bond previously issued for his provisional liberty should be cancelled and a warrant of arrest should be issued to serve the
subsidiary imprisonment, if there is any.

In cases where the accused is a detention prisoner, i.e., those convicted of capital offenses or convicted of non-capital offenses
where bail is denied, or refused to post bail, a mittimus or commitment order should be immediately issued after the promulgation of
judgment by the trial court as long as the penalty imposed requires the service of sentence in the National Penitentiary. The filing of
a motion for reconsideration, motion for new trial, or notice of appeal should not stop the lower court from performing its ministerial
duty in issuing the commitment order, unless a special order has been issued by the Court in specific cases - to the effect that the
convicted accused shall remain under detention in the provincial jail or city jail while the motion is being heard or resolved.

In so far as the civil liability arising from the offense is concerned, a motion for execution should be filed in accordance with Section
6, Rule 39 of the Rules and existing jurisprudence.

WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the instant petition for certiorari is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Orders dated December
3, 2009 and January 25, 2010 of Presiding Judge Delano F. Villaruz, Regional Trial Court, Roxas City, Branch 16, are AFFIRMED
IN PART only insofar as to the execution of the penalty of imprisonment is concerned. Let the records of this case
be REMANDED to the trial court for the immediate issuance of mittimus, pursuant to OCA Circular No. 40-2013, in relation to OCA
Circular No. 4-92-A.

The Office of the Court Administrator is hereby DIRECTED to conduct an investigation on the possible culpability of those
responsible for the unreasonable delay in the execution of the judgment of conviction.

SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary
G.R. No. 176598               July 9, 2014

PETRONIO CLIDORO, DIONISIO CLIDORO, LOLITA CLIDORO, CALIXTO CARD ANO, JR., LOURDES CLIDORO-LARIN,
MATEO CLIDORO and MARLIZA CLIDORO-DE UNA, Petitioners,
vs.
AUGUSTO JALMANZAR, GREGORIO CLIDORO, JR., SENECA CLIDORO-CIOCSON, MONSERAT CLIDORO-QUIDAY,
CELESTIAL CLIDORO-BINASA, APOLLO CLIDORO, ROSALIE CLIDORO-CATOLICO, SOPHIE CLIDORO, and JOSE
CLIDORO, JR., Respondents.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

This deals with the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court praying that the Decision 1 of the Court of
Appeals (CA), dated October 17, 2006, and its Resolution 2 dated February 6, 2007, denying herein petitioner's motion for
reconsideration of the Decision, be reversed and set aside.

The antecedent facts, as set forth in the CA Decision, are undisputed, to wit:

The instant appeal stemmed from a complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. T-2275 for revival of judgment filed by Rizalina Clidoro,
et al. against Onofre Clidoro, et al., praying that the Decisiondated November 13, 1995 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV
No. 19831, which affirmed with modification the RTC Decision dated March 10, 1988 in Civil Case No. T-98 for partition, berevived
and that the corresponding writ of execution be issued. The dispositive portion ofthe CA Decision reads:

The estate of the late Mateo Clidoro, excepting that described in paragraph (i) of the Complaint, is hereby ordered partitioned in the
following manner:

1. One-fifth portion to the Plaintiffs-Appellees, by right of representation to the hereditary share of Gregorio Clidoro, Sr.;

2. One-fifth portion to Defendant-Appellant Antonio Clidoro or his legal heirs;

3. One-fifth portion to Appellant Josaphat Clidoro;

4. One-fifth portion to Appellant Aida Clidoro; 5. One-tenth portion to Gregoria Clidoro, as her legitime in the hereditary share of
Onofre Clidoro; and

6. One-tenth portion to Catalino Morate, as successor-ininterest to the legitime of Consorcia Clidoro.

SO ORDERED.

On September 3, 2003, defendants-appellees except Gregoria Clidoro-Palanca, moved to dismiss the said complaint on the
following grounds: "1.) The petition, not being brought up against the real partiesin-interest, is dismissible for lack of cause of action;
2.) The substitution of the parties defendant is improper and is not in accordance with the rules; 3.) Even if the decision is ordered
revived, the same cannot be executed since the legal requirements of Rule 69, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure has
not been complied with; and 4.) The Judgment of the Honorable Court ordering partition is merely interlocutory as it leaves
something more to be done to complete the disposition of the case."

After the filing of plaintiffs-appellants' Comment/Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss, defendants-appellees' Reply, plaintiffs-
appellants' Rejoinder and defendants-interestedparties' Sur-Rejoinder, the RTC issued the assailed Order dated December 8, 2003
dismissing the instant complaint for lack of cause of action, the pertinent portion of which reads:

"xxx

The complaint shows that most of the parties-plaintiffs, partiesdefendants and interested parties are already deceased and have no
more natural or material existence. This is contrary to the provision of the Rules (Sec. 1, Rule 3, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure).
They could no longer be considered as the real parties-in-interest. Besides, pursuant to Sec. 3, Rule 3 (1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure), where the action is allowed to be prosecuted or defended by a representative or someone acting in fiduciary capacity,
the beneficiary shall be included in the title of the case. In the instant case the beneficiaries are already deceased persons. Also, the
Complaint states thatthey were the original parties in Civil Case No. T-98 for Partition, but this is not so (paragraph 2). Some of the
parties are actually not parties to the original case, but representing the original parties who are indicated as deceased.
From the foregoing, the Court finds the instant complaint to be flawed in form and substance. The suit is not brought by the real
parties-ininterest, thus a motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint states no cause of action is proper (Section 1(g), Rule
16).

WHEREFORE, the instant complaint is ordered DISMISSED for lack of cause of action.

SO ORDERED."

Plaintiffs-appellants moved for reconsideration of the foregoing Order with prayer to admit the attached Amended Complaint
impleading the additional heirs of the interested party Josaphat Clidoro and the original plaintiffs Rizalina Clidoro-Jalmanzar, Cleneo
Clidoro and Aristoteles Clidoro. The same was,however, denied in the second assailed order. x x x3

Respondents then appealed to the CA, and on October 17, 2006, the CA promulgated its Decision reversing and setting aside the
Orders of the RTC, and remanding the case to the RTC for further proceedings. Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration of the
Decision was denied per Resolution dated February 6, 2007.

Hence, the present petition where the following issues are raised:

A. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS FAILED TO CONSIDER THAT THERE WAS NO PROPER SUBSTITUTION OF
PARTIES IN THE INSTANT ACTION FOR REVIVAL OF JUDGMENT.

B. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONSIDERING THE RESPONDENTS AS WELL AS THE PETITIONERS
AS THE REAL PARTIES-IN-INTEREST.

C. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT AMENDMENT TO PLEADINGS WAS PROPERLY MADE
AND IS APPLICABLE TO THE INSTANT ACTION.

D. THE HONORABLE COURT OFAPPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THERE WAS MERE MISJOINDER OF PARTIES IN THE
INSTANT ACTION.4

The petition deserves scant consideration.

Reduced to its essence, the pivotal issue here is whether the complaint for revival of judgment may be dismissed for lack of cause
of action as it was not brought by or against the real parties-in-interest.

First of all, the Court emphasizes that lack of cause of action is not enumerated under Rule 16 of the Rules of Court as one of the
grounds for the dismissal of a complaint. As explained in Vitangcol v. New Vista Properties, Inc., 5 to wit:

Lack of cause of action is, however, not a ground for a dismissal of the complaint through a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 of the
Rules of Court, for the determination of a lack of cause of action can only be made during and/or after trial. What is dismissible via
that mode is failure of the complaint to state a cause of action. Sec. 1(g) of Rule 16 of the Rules of Court provides that a motion may
be made on the ground "that the pleading asserting the claim states no cause of action."

The rule is that in a motion to dismiss, a defendant hypothetically admits the truth ofthe material allegations of the ultimate facts
contained in the plaintiff's complaint. When a motion to dismiss is grounded on the failure tostate a cause of action, a ruling thereon
should, as rule, be based only on the facts alleged in the complaint.x x x

xxxx

In a motion to dismiss for failureto state a cause of action, the focus is on the sufficiency, not the veracity, of the material allegations.
The test of sufficiency of facts alleged in the complaint constituting a cause of action lies on whether or not the court, admitting the
facts alleged, could render a valid verdict in accordance with the prayer of the complaint.x x x6

Again, in Manaloto v. Veloso III,7 the Court reiterated as follows:

When the ground for dismissal is that the complaint states no cause of action, such fact can be determined only from the facts
alleged in the complaint and fromno other, and the court cannot consider other matters aliunde. The test, therefore, is whether,
assuming the allegations of fact in the complaint to be true, a valid judgment could be rendered in accordance withthe prayer stated
therein.8
In this case, it was alleged in the complaint for revival of judgment that the parties therein were also the parties inthe action for
partition. Applying the foregoing test of hypothetically admitting this allegation in the complaint, and not looking into the veracity of
the same, it would then appear that the complaint sufficiently stated a cause of action as the plaintiffs in the complaint for revival of
judgment (hereinafter respondents), as the prevailing parties in the action for partition, had a right to seek enforcement of the
decision in the partition case.

It should be borne in mind that the action for revival of judgment is a totally separate and distinct case from the original Civil Case
No. T-98 for Partition. As explained in Saligumba v. Palanog, 9 to wit:

An action for revival of judgment is no more than a procedural means of securing the execution of a previous judgment which has
become dormant after the passage of five years without it being executed upon motion of the prevailing party. It isnot intended to re-
open any issue affecting the merits of the judgment debtor's case nor the propriety or correctness of the first judgment. An action for
revival of judgment is a new and independent action, different and distinct fromeither the recovery of property case or the
reconstitution case [in this case, the original action for partition], wherein the cause of action is the decision itself and not the merits
of the action upon which the judgment sought to be enforced is rendered. x x x10

With the foregoing in mind, it is understandable that there would be instances where the parties in the original case and in the
subsequent action for revival of judgment would not be exactly the same. The mere fact that the names appearing as parties in the
the complaint for revival of judgment are different from the names of the parties in the original case would not necessarily mean that
theyare not the real parties-in-interest. What is important is that, as provided in Section 1, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, they are "the
party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit." Definitely, as
the prevailing parties in the previous case for partition, the plaintiffs in the case for revival of judgment would be benefited by the
enforcement of the decision in the partition case.

Moreover, it would appear that petitioners are mistaken in alleging that respondents are not the real parties-in-interest. The
complaint for revival of judgment impleaded the following parties:

[[reference - http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprudence/2014/july2014/176598.pdf]]

PLAINTIFFS DEFENDANTS

1. Rizalina Clidoro (deceased) 1. Onofre Clidoro (deceased) rep.

rep. herein by Augusto Jalmanzar by Gregoria Clidoro-Palanca

(daughter)

2. Gregorio Clidoro, Jr. 2. Antonio Clidoro (deceased)

herein rep. by Petronio Clidoro,

3. Urbana Costales (deceased) 3. Carmen Clidoro-Cardano, rep.

by Calixto Cardano, Jr. (husband)

4. Cleneo Clidoro (deceased) 4. Dionisio Clidoro

5. Seneca Clidoro Ciocson 5. Lourdes Clidoro-Lari

6. Monserrat Clidoro 6. Lolita Clidoro

7. Celestial Clidoro 7. Mateo Clidoro

8. Aristoteles Clidoro (deceased) INTERESTED PARTIES

9. Apollo Clidoro 1. AidaClidoro (deceased)

10. Rosalie Clidoro 2. Josaphat Clidoro (deceased),

herein rep. by Marliza Clidoro-De

Una

11. Sophie Clidoro  

12. Jose Clidoro, Jr.  

On the other hand, the parties to the original case for partition are named as follows:

[[reference - http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprudence/2014/july2014/176598.pdf]]

PLAINTIFFS DEFENDANTS

1. Rizalina Clidoro 1. Onofre Clidoro

2. Gregorio Clidoro, Jr. 2. Antonio Clidoro

3. Sofia Cerdena INTERESTED PARTIES

4. Urbana Costales 1. Aida Clidoro

5. Cleneo Seneca 2. Josaphat Clidoro

6. Monserrat Clidoro  

7. Celestial Clidoro  

8. Aristoteles Clidoro  

9. Apollo Clidoro  

10. Rosalie Clidoro  

A comparison of the foregoing would show that almost all of the plaintiffs in the original case for partition, in whose favor the court
adjudged certain shares in the estate of deceased Mateo Clidoro, are also the plaintiffs in the action for revival of judgment.
Meanwhile, the defendants impleaded in the action for revival are allegedly the representatives of the defendants in the original
case, and this appears to hold water, as Gregoria ClidoroPalanca, named as the representative of defendant Onofre Clidoro in the
complaint for revival of judgment, was also mentioned and awarded a portion of the estate in the judgment in the original partition
case. In fact, the trial court itself stated in its Order11 of dismissal dated December 8, 2003, that "[s]ome of the parties are actually
not parties to the original case, but representing the original parties who are indicated as deceased."

In Basbas v. Sayson,12 the Court pointed out that even just one of the co-owners, by himself alone, can bring an action for the
recovery of the coowned property, even through an action for revival of judgment, because the enforcement of the judgment would
result in such recovery of property. Thus, as in Basbas, it is not necessary in this case that all of the parties, in whose favor the case
for partition was adjudged, be made plaintiffs to the action for revival of judgment. Any which one of said prevailing parties, who had
an interest in the enforcement of the decision, may file the complaint for revival of judgment, even just by himself.

Verily, the trial court erred in dismissing the complaint for revival of judgment on the ground of lack of, or failure to state a cause of
action. The allegations in the complaint, regarding the parties' interest in having the decision in the partition case executed or
implemented, sufficiently state a cause of action. The question of whether respondents were the real partiesin-interest who had the
right to seek execution of the final and executory judgment in the partition case should have been threshed out in a full-blown trial.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated October 17, 2006, and its Resolution dated
February 6, 2007 in CA-G.R. No. 82209, are hereby AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 192048

DOUGLAS F. ANAMA, Petitioner,
vs.
CITIBANK, N.A. (formerly First National City Bank), Respondent.

DECISION

JARDELEZA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court seeking to reverse and set aside the
Decision2 dated November 19, 2009 (assailed Decision) and the Resolution3 dated April 20, 2010 (assailed Resolution) of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 1077 48, denying petitioner's action for revival of judgment.

In consideration for a loan obtained from respondent First National City Bank of New York (now Citibank, N.A.) (Citibank), on
November 10, 1972, petitioner Douglas F. Anama (Anama) executed a promissory note in the amount of ₱418,000.00 in favor of
Citibank.4 To secure payment of the obligation, Anama also executed in favor of Citibank a chattel mortgage over various industrial
machineries and equipment located on his property at No. 1302, E. de los Santos Avenue, Quezon City. 5 For Anama's failure to pay
the monthly installments due on the promissory note starting January 1974, Citibank filed a complaint for sum of money and
replevin6 dated November 13, 1974 (docketed as Civil Case No. 95991) with the Court of First Instance of Manila (now Regional
Trial Court), Branch 11. Anama filed his answer with counterclaim 7 and his amended answer with counterclaim,8 alleging, among
others, that his failure to pay the monthly installments was due to the fault of Citibank as it refused to receive the checks he issued,
and that the chattel mortgage was defective and void.9

On December 2, 1974, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), upon proof of default of Anama in the payment of his loan, issued an Order
of Replevin over the machineries and equipment covered by the chattel mortgage. 10

On January 29, 1977, Citibank, alleging that the properties subject of the Order of Replevin which were taken by the Sheriff under
his custody were not delivered to it, filed a motion for [issuance of] alias writ of seizure. 11 Citibank prayed that an alias writ of seizure
be issued directing the Sheriff to seize the properties and to dispose them in accordance with Section 6, Rule 60 of the Revised
Rules of Court. The RTC granted the motion through its Resolution12 dated February 28, 1977. The Ex-Officio Sheriff of Quezon City
issued three receipts for the seized properties on March 1 7, 18, and 19, 1977.13 Anama filed a motion for reconsideration but this
was denied by the RTC in a Resolution14 dated March 18, 1977.

Anama then filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with writ of preliminary injunction with the CA on March 21, 1977 (docketed
as CAG. R. SP No. 06499) on the ground that the above resolutions of the trial court were issued in excess of jurisdiction and with
grave abuse of discretion because of the lack of evidence proving Citibank's right to possession over the properties subject of the
chattel mortgage.15

On July 30, 1982, the CA rendered a Decision16 (July 30, 1982 Decision) granting Anama's petition for certiorari and prohibition and
nullifying the RTC's orders of seizure, to wit:

WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. The questioned resolutions issued by the respondent judge in Civil Case No. 95991, dated
February 28, 1977, and March 18, 1977, together with the writs and processes emanating or deriving therefrom, are hereby
declared null and void ab initio.

The respondent ex-of[f]icio sheriff of Quezon City and the respondent First National City Bank are hereby ordered to return all the
machineries and equipments with their accessories seized, dismantled and hauled, to their original and respective places and
positions in the shop flooring of the petitioner's premises where these articles were, before they were dismantled, seized and hauled
at their own expense. The said respondents are further ordered to cause the repair of the concrete foundations destroyed by them
including the repair of the electrical wiring and facilities affected during the seizure, dismantling and hauling.

The writ of preliminary injunction heretofore in effect is hereby made permanent. Costs against the private respondents.

SO ORDERED.17

On August 25, 1982, Citibank filed its petition for review on certiorari with this Court (docketed as G.R. No. 61508) assailing the July
30, 1982 Decision of the CA.18 On March 17, 1999, we promulgated a Decision19 dismissing Citibank's petition for lack of merit
and affirming the July 30, 1982 Decision of the CA. An Entry of Judgment20 was subsequently issued on April 12, 1999.

Meanwhile, on November 19, 1981, during the pendency of CA-G.R. SP No. 06499 in the CA, the fourth floor of the Manila City Hall,
where Branch 11 of the R TC of Manila and its records, including the records of Civil Case No. 95991 were located, was destroyed
by fire.21
On February 10, 1982, Anama filed a petition for reconstruction of record22 in the RTC, which the latter granted in an Order 23 dated
May 3, 1982. On December 2, 1982, considering that G.R. No. 61508 was already pending before this Court, the R TC issued an
Order24 directing that all pending incidents in Civil Case No. 95991 be suspended until G.R. No. 61508 has been resolved.

On March 12, 2009, Anama filed a petition for revival of judgment with the CA (docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 107748). 25 Anama
sought to revive the CA's July 30, 1982 Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 06499 and argued that Citibank's failure to file an action for the
reconstitution of the records in the RTC in Civil Case No. 95991 constituted abandonment of its cause of action and complaint
against Anama.26 In addition to the revival of the CA's July 30, 1982 Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 06499, Anama sought to remand
the case to the RTC for further proceedings in Civil Case No. 95991, particularly his counterclaims against Citibank. 27

In its comment, Citibank argued that the petition should be dismissed as an action for revival of judgment is within the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the RTC. It also argued that laches has set in against Anama for having slept on his rights for almost 10 years.
Lastly, Citibank claimed that it did not abandon its money claim against Anama when it did not initiate the reconstitution proceedings
in the RTC.28

On November 19, 2009, the CA denied the petition for lack of jurisdiction. Pertinent portions of the assailed Decision reads:

[W]e find that respondent bank correctly question (sic) this Court's jurisdiction to entertain the instant petition to revive the July 30,
1982 decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 06499. While concededly filed within 10 years from the April 12, 1999 entry of the decision
rendered in G.R. No. 61508, the petition should have been filed with the appropriate Regional Trial Court which has exclusive
original jurisdiction over all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation and/or all cases not
within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or body exercising judicial or quasijudicial functions. x x x 29

Anama filed his motion for reconsideration which the CA denied through its assailed Resolution30 dated April 20, 2010.

On June 10, 2010, Anama filed this petition 31 and argued that his petition for revival of judgment should be filed in the court that
issued the judgment sought to be revived, the CA in this case.32

In its comment,33 Citibank agrees with the CA that jurisdiction over actions for revival of judgments is with the R TC. 34 Citibank also
argues that Anama's petition to revive judgment is already barred by laches and that it did not waive or abandon its claim against
Anama in Civil Case No. 95991.35

On December 30, 2010, Anama filed his reply.36

On August 25, 2016, Anama filed a manifestation37 reiterating the arguments on his petition. On February 17, 2017, Citibank filed its
comment38 stressing that the CA did not err in dismissing the petition to revive judgment on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. On
March 16, 2017, Anama filed his reply.39

We deny the petition.

An action to revive a judgment is an action whose exclusive purpose is to enforce a judgment which could no longer be enforced by
mere motion.40 Section 6, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 6. Execution by motion or by independent action. - A final and executory judgment or order may be executed on motion within
five (5) years from the date of its entry. After the lapse of such time, and before it is barred by the statute of limitations, a judgment
may be enforced by action. The revived judgment may also be enforced by motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry and
thereafter by action before it is barred by the statute of limitations.

Section 6 is clear. Once a judgment becomes final and executory, the prevailing party can have it executed as a matter of right by
mere motion within five years from the date of entry of judgment. If the prevailing party fails to have the decision enforced by a
motion after the lapse of five years, the said judgment is reduced to a right of action which must be enforced by the institution of a
complaint in a regular court within 10 years from the time the judgment becomes final. 41

Further, a revival suit is a new action, having for its cause of action the judgment sought to be revived. 42 It is different and distinct
from the original judgment sought to be revived or enforced. 43 It is a new and independent action, wherein the cause of action is the
decision itself and not the merits of the action upon which the judgment sought to be enforced is rendered. Revival of judgment is
premised on the assumption that the decision to be revived, either by motion or by independent action, is already final and
executory.44

As an action for revival of judgment is a new action with a new cause of action, the rules on instituting and commencing actions
apply, including the rules on jurisdiction. Its jurisdictional requirements are not dependent on the previous action and the petition
does not necessarily have to be filed in the same court which rendered judgment. 45
Jurisdiction is defined as the power and authority of the courts to hear, try and decide cases. What determines the jurisdiction of the
court is the nature of the action pleaded as appearing from the allegations in the complaint. The averments and the character of the
relief sought are the ones to be consulted. 46

The principle is that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and determined by the allegations in the
complaint which comprise a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiffs cause of action. The nature of an
action, as well as which court or body has jurisdiction over it, is determined based on the allegations contained in the complaint of
the plaintiff, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted. 47 Jurisdiction
being a matter of substantive law, the established rule is that the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action
determines the jurisdiction of the court.48

Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 (BP 129), otherwise known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 and its amendments, is the law
which confers jurisdiction to the courts. Section 19 of BP 129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7691, 49 provides:

Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. - Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:

(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation;

In determining the jurisdiction of an action whose subject is incapable of pecuniary estimation, the nature of the principal action or
remedy sought must first be ascertained. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of
pecuniary estimation and the jurisdiction of the court depends on the amount of the claim. But, where the primary issue is something
other than the right to recover a sum of money, where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal
relief sought, such are actions whose subjects are incapable of pecuniary estimation, hence cognizable by the RTCs. 50

As an action to revive judgment raises issues of whether the petitioner has a right to have the final and executory judgment revived
and to have that judgment enforced and does not involve recovery of a sum of money, we rule that jurisdiction over a petition to
revive judgment is properly with the R TCs. Thus, the CA is correct in holding that it does not have jurisdiction to hear and decide
Anama's action for revival of judgment.

A reading of the CA's jurisdiction also highlights the conclusion that an action for revival of judgment is outside the scope of
jurisdiction of the CA. Section 9 of BP 129 provides:

Sec. 9. Jurisdiction. -The Court of Appeals shall exercise:

1. Original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, and quo warranto, and auxiliary writs or
processes, whether or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction;

2. Exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for annulment of judgments of Regional Trial Courts; and

3. Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, resolutions, orders or awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial
agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commission, including the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Social Security
Commission, the Employees Compensation Commission and the Civil Service Commission, except those falling within the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the Labor Code of the Philippines under Presidential Decree
No. 442, as amended, the provisions of this Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and subparagraph 4 of the fourth
paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.

The CA also has concurrent original jurisdiction over petitions for issuance of writ of amparo,51 writ of habeas data,52 and writ
of kalikasan. 53

Not being one of the enumerated cases above, it is clear that the CA is without jurisdiction to hear and decide an action for revival of
judgment.

Anama's reliance on Aldeguer v. Gemelo54 to justify his filing with the CA is misplaced.1avvphi1 The issue in Aldeguer is not
jurisdiction but venue. The issue was which between the RTC of Iloilo and RTC of Negros Occidental was the proper court to hear
the action.

However, venue and jurisdiction are entirely distinct matters. Jurisdiction may not be conferred by consent or waiver upon a court
which otherwise would have no jurisdiction over the subject matter of an action; but the venue of an action as fixed by statute may
be changed by the consent of the parties and an objection that the plaintiff brought his suit in the wrong county may be waived by
the failure of the defendant to make a timely objection. In either case, the court may render a valid judgment. Rules as to jurisdiction
can never be left to the consent or agreement of the parties, whether or not a prohibition exists against their alteration. 55 Venue is
procedural, not jurisdictional, and hence may be waived.56
As we have already ruled on jurisdiction, there is no more reason to discuss whether laches has set in against Anama.

Considering, however, that the proceedings in Civil Case No. 95991 have been suspended and remains pending since 1982, we
deem it necessary to lift the order of suspension and instruct the trial court to hear and try the case with deliberate dispatch.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated November 19, 2009 and Resolution dated April 20, 2010 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 107748 are AFFIRMED.

We direct the trial court to proceed with the hearing and disposition in Civil Case No. 95991 with all deliberate dispatch.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 191594               October 16, 2013

DAVID A. RAYMUNDO, Petitioner,
vs.
GALEN REALTY AND MINING CORPORATION, Respondent.
 DECISION

REYES, J.:

Assailed in the present Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 1 of the Rules of Court is the Decision2 dated October 30,
2009 and Resolution3 dated March 10, 2010 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 105401, which dismissed petitioner
David A. Raymundo s (Raymundo) special civil action for certiorari for lack of merit.

Facts of the Case

Civil Case No. 18808 is an action for Reconveyance with Damages filed by respondent Galen Realty and Mining Corporation (yalen)
against Raymundo and Tensorex Corporation (Tensorex). Subject of the case was a transaction between Galen and Raymundo
over a house and lot located in Urdaneta Village, Makati City originally covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. S-105-651
in the name of Galen. By virtue of a Deed of Sale dated September 9, 1987 executed between Galen and Raymundo, title to the
property was transferred to the latter, who later on sold the property to Tensorex, which caused the issuance of TCT No. 149755 in
its name.

In a Decision dated April 12, 2000, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 62, in Civil Case No. 18808, ruled that the
transaction between Raymundo and Galen was actually an equitable mortgage. 4 On appeal, the CA upheld the RTC decision but
modified the loan obligation of Galen and reduced the same to ₱3,865,000.00. The dispositive portion of the CA Decision 5 dated
May 7, 2004 provides:

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Assailed Decision is hereby MODIFIED as follows:

V) the Deed of Absolute Sale between plaintiff-appellant and defendant-appellant David Raymundo is declared null and
void, being a Deed of Equitable Mortgage;

VI) the Deed of Sale between defendant-appellant David Raymundo and defendant-appellant Tensorex is declared null
and void;

VII) defendant-appellant David Raymundo to reconvey the subject property to plaintiff-appellant’s [sic] upon plaintiff-
appellant[’s] payment to defendant-appellant David Raymundo of ₱3,865,000.00 plus legal interest thereon from the date
of filing of the complaint, until it is fully paid, or if reconveyance is no longer feasible, for defendants-appellants Raymundo
and Tensorex to solidarily pay plaintiff-appellant the fair market value of the subject property by expert appraisal;

VIII) defendants-appellants Raymundo and Tensorex to solidarily pay plaintiff-appellant, as follows:

a) ₱100,000.00 in exemplary damages;

b) ₱100,000.00 in attorney’s fees;

c) Costs of suit. Defendants-appellant’s COUNTERCLAIM is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.6 (Emphasis ours)

Said CA decision eventually became final and executory on January 11, 2005, and entry of judgment was made. 7

Galen moved for the execution of the CA decision, submitting that the writ of execution should order Raymundo and Tensorex to
solidarily pay the following: (1) the current fair market value of the property less Galen’s mortgage debt of ₱3,865,000.00 with legal
interest; and (2) the award of damages and costs of suit. Raymundo and Tensorex opposed the motion, arguing that the CA
decision provides for two alternatives – one, for Raymundo to reconvey the property to Galen after payment of ₱3,865,000.00 with
legal interest or, two, if reconveyance is no longer feasible, for Raymundo and Tensorex to solidarily pay Galen the fair market value
of the property.8

In its Order9 dated February 3, 2006, the RTC granted Galen’s motion and ordered the issuance of a writ of execution. The property
(land and improvements) was appraised by Asian Appraisal, Inc. at ₱49,470,000.00. 10 Subsequently, the appointed special sheriff
issued a Notice of Reconveyance/Notice of Demand to Pay11 on March 8, 2007. The sheriff also issued on April 4, 2007 a Notice of
Levy on Execution12 to the Register of Deeds of Makati City over the rights and interest of Tensorex over the property, including all
buildings and improvements covered by TCT No. 149755.
On July 16, 2007, the special sheriff issued a Notice of Sheriff’s Sale of Real Estate Property, 13 stating that "the total outstanding
balance of mortgage indebtedness as of January 25, 1988 and interest for 225 months with 2.25% interest is ₱37,108,750.00 plus
costs x x x,"14 and sale at public auction was set on August 8, 2007. Raymundo filed a Manifestation and Urgent Motion 15 objecting
to the auction sale and expressing his willingness to reconvey the property upon payment in full by Galen of its indebtedness. Galen
filed a Counter Manifestation and Opposition16 claiming that reconveyance is no longer feasible as the property is heavily
encumbered and title to the property is still in the name of Tensorex which had already gone out of operations and whose
responsible officers are no longer accessible.

Raymundo also submitted on August 6, 2007 a duplicate copy of the Cancellation of the Real Estate Mortgages 17 over the property.
As regards the other entries on the title, Raymundo stated that these do not affect his rights, interests and participation over the
property as the Notice of Lis Pendens of Civil Case No. 18808 inscribed on September 27, 1990 was superior to these entries. 18 On
the same date, the RTC issued an Order19 noting Raymundo’s motions, ordering him to show proof how his willingness to reconvey
the property can be realized, and holding the auction sale in abeyance. The order also provided that "compliance herein is enjoined
x x x, which proof shall consist primarily of a submission of the Transfer Certificate of Title covering the subject property duly
registered in Raymundo’s name."20

Raymundo filed a Compliance/Comment 21 to the RTC’s order, contending that his obligation to reconvey is not yet due pending
payment of Galen’s own obligation.

On December 12, 2007, the RTC issued an Order22 lifting the suspension of the auction sale and directing Galen to coordinate with
the deputy sheriff for the enforcement of the decision. The RTC ruled that Raymundo failed to show proof that the title was already
registered in his name and thus, it resolves to deny his compliance/comment.

Raymundo filed a Motion for Reconsideration23 of the RTC’s order but it was denied per Order24 dated August 15, 2008. As a result,
the property was sold at a public auction on November 26, 2008 for ₱37,108,750.00, with Galen as the highest bidder, and a
certificate of sale25 was issued by the sheriff.

Raymundo then filed a special civil action for certiorari with the CA. In the assailed Decision 26

dated October 30, 2009, the petition was dismissed for lack of merit. His motion for reconsideration having been denied in the
assailed CA Resolution27 dated March 10, 2010, Raymundo is now seeking recourse with the Court on petition for review under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

Raymundo contends that the CA committed an error in upholding the validity of RTC’s writ of execution. He argues that the writ
changed the tenor of the final and executory CA decision as his obligation under said decision is to reconvey the property upon
Galen’s payment of its obligation. Raymundo also argues that the sale on public auction of the property was void inasmuch as the
RTC’s conclusion, as affirmed by the CA, that reconveyance is no longer feasible has no basis. 28

Galen, on the other hand, claims that Raymundo was given the option to choose between reconveyance and payment of the fair
market value of the property but did not manifest his choice. It was only when the property was set for sale at public auction that
Raymundo manifested his choice of reconveyance, which was opposed by Galen because by that time, the property was still in the
name of Tensorex and was already heavily encumbered. 29 Galen maintains that the writ of execution and the auction sale was valid
inasmuch as payment of the fair market value of the property is the only feasible way to satisfy the judgment.

Ruling of the Court

The manner of execution of a final judgment is not a matter of "choice". It does not revolve upon the pleasure or discretion of a party
as to how a judgment should be satisfied, unless the judgment expressly provides for such discretion. Foremost rule in execution of
judgments is that "a writ of execution must conform strictly to every essential particular of the judgment promulgated, and may not
vary the terms of the judgment it seeks to enforce, nor may it go beyond the terms of the judgment sought to be executed." 30 As a
corollary rule, the Court has clarified that "a judgment is not confined to what appears on the face of the decision, but extends as
well to those necessarily included therein or necessary thereto."31

In this case, the writ of execution issued by the RTC originated from Civil Case No. 18808, which is an action for Reconveyance with
Damages filed by Galen against Raymundo and Tensorex, where Galen sought recovery of the property subject of the Deed of
Absolute Sale between Galen and Raymundo. The RTC ruled in favor of Galen, finding that the transaction between them is an
equitable mortgage, which was affirmed by the CA. Both the RTC and the CA, in the dispositive portions of their respective
decisions, ordered Raymundo to "reconvey the subject property o Galen upon Galen’s payment to x x x Raymundo x x x plus legal
interest thereon from the date of the filing of the complaint, until it is fully paid, or if reconveyance is no longer feasible, for x x x
Raymundo and Tensorex to solidarily pay Galen the fair market value of the subject property by expert appraisal." 32 In implementing
said judgment, the RTC should have considered the nature of the agreement between Galen and Raymundo. The rule is that in
case of ambiguity or uncertainty in the dispositive portion of a decision, the body of the decision may be scanned for guidance in
construing the judgment.33
Nevertheless, the import of the dispositive portion of the CA Decision dated May 7, 2004 is clear. The principal obligation of
Raymundo under the judgment is to reconvey the property to Galen; on the other hand, Galen’s principal obligation is to pay its
mortgage obligation to Raymundo. Performance of Raymundo’s obligation to reconvey is upon Galen’s payment of its mortgage
obligation in the amount of ₱3,865,000.00 plus legal interest thereon from the date of the filing of the complaint, until fully paid. This
is in accord with the nature of the agreement as an equitable mortgage where the real intention of the parties is to charge the real
property as security for a debt.34 It was wrong for the RTC to require Raymundo to show proof of his "willingness" to reconvey the
property because as stressed earlier, their agreement was an equitable mortgage and as such, Galen retained ownership of the
property.35 In Montevirgen, et al. v. CA, et al.,36 the Court was emphatic in stating that "the circumstance that the original transaction
was subsequently declared to be an equitable mortgage must mean that the title to the subject land which had been transferred to
private respondents actually remained or is transferred back to [the] petitioners herein as owners-mortgagors, conformably to the
well-established doctrine that the mortgagee does not become the owner of the mortgaged property because the ownership remains
with the mortgagor."37 Thus, it does not devolve upon Raymundo to determine whether he is willing to reconvey the property or not
because it was not his to begin with. If Raymundo refuses to reconvey the property, then the court may direct that the act be done
by some other person appointed by it as authorized by Section 10 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, to wit:

Sec. 10. Execution of judgments for specific act. (a) conveyance, delivery of deeds, or other specific acts; vesting title.—If a
judgment directs a party to execute a conveyance of land or personal property, or to deliver deeds or other documents, or to perform
any other specific act in connection therewith, and the party fails to comply within the time specified, the court may direct the act to
be done at the cost of the disobedient party by some other person appointed by the court and the act when so done shall have like
effect as if done by the party. If real or personal property is situated within the Philippines, the court in lieu of directing a conveyance
thereof may by an order divest the title of any party and vest it in others, which shall have the force and effect of a conveyance
executed in due form of law. (Emphasis and underscoring ours)

The "some other person appointed by the court" can be the Branch Clerk of Court,38 the Sheriff,39 or even the Register of
Deeds,40 and their acts when done under such authority shall have the effect of having been done by Raymundo himself. A party
cannot frustrate execution of a judgment for a specific act on the pretext of inability to do so as the Rules provide ample means by
which it can be satisfied.

Conversely, Galen’s obligation to pay the mortgage obligation is not subject to Raymundo’s reconveyance of the property. If Galen
refuses to pay, it is only then that the court may direct the foreclosure of the mortgage on the property and order its sale at public
auction to satisfy Galen’s judgment debt against Raymundo, pursuant to Rule 68 of the Rules of Court on Foreclosure. 41 If
Raymundo, meanwhile, unjustly refuses to accept Galen’s payment, the latter’s remedy is to consign the payment with the court in
accordance with the Civil Code provisions on consignment.

It is only when reconveyance is no longer feasible that Raymundo and Tensorex should pay Galen the fair market value of the
property. In other words, it is when the property has passed on to an innocent purchaser for value and in good faith, has been
dissipated, or has been subjected to an analogous circumstance which renders the return of the property impossible that Raymundo
and/or Tensorex, is obliged to pay Galen the fair market value of the property.

In this case, it appears that the RTC accommodated Galen’s choice of payment of the fair market value of the property and it
became the main obligation of Raymundo as well as Tensorex instead of being the alternative. Worse, it even considered the
subject property as absolutely owned by Tensorex and levied upon the same to satisfy payment of the fair market value of the very
property that has only been pledged as security of Galen’s loan. While it indeed appears that Raymundo was able to transfer title of
the property to Tensorex, it should be noted that the latter is a party to Civil Case No. 18808 and is necessarily bound by the
judgment. The dissolution of Tensorex is not a valid reason to avoid reconveyance inasmuch as the court may order the transfer of
title to Galen by some other person appointed by the court in accordance with Section 10, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.1avvphi1

The existence of subsequent encumbrances on the property is also not a sufficient ground to insist on the payment of its fair market
value. To begin with, it was Galen which sought the return of the property by filing the civil case. Moreover, as correctly pointed out
by Raymundo, whatever transactions Tensorex entered into is subject to the notice of lis pendens which serves as a constructive
notice to purchasers or other persons subsequently dealing with the same property. 42 Further, having Raymundo and/or Tensorex
keep the property (and later on levy upon the same) and order the payment of its fair market value virtually amounts to a sale, which
goes against the RTC and CA’s conclusion that the transaction subject of Civil Case No. 18808 is not a sale but an equitable
mortgage. It also violates the very public policy that prohibits pactum commissorium.43 In the early case of Guanzon v. Hon.
Argel,44 which also involves an equitable mortgage, the Court ruled –

In no way can the judgment at bar be construed to mean that should the Dumaraogs fail to pay the money within the specified
period then the party would be conveyed by the Sheriff to Guanzon. Any interpretation in that sense would contradict the declaration
made in the same judgment that the contract between the parties was in fact a mortgage and not a pacto de retro sale.1âwphi1 x x x
The mortgagor’s default does not operate to vest in the mortgagee the ownership of the encumbered property, for any such effect is
against public policy, as enunciated by the Civil Code. The court can not be presumed to have adjudged what would be contrary to
law, unless it be plain and inescapable from its final judgment. No such purport appears or is legitimately inferable from the terms of
the judgment aforequoted. x x x.45 (Citation omitted and emphasis ours)

The RTC, therefore, committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering the payment of the fair market value of the subject property
despite the fact that reconveyance is still feasible under the circumstances of this case. Consequently, the CA committed a
reversible error in sustaining the assailed RTC orders and in dismissing Raymundo’s special civil action for certiorari for lack of
merit.

In Muñoz v. Ramirez,46 the Court stated:

In Lustan v. CA, where we established the reciprocal obligations of the parties under an equitable mortgage, we ordered the
reconveyance of the property to the rightful owner therein upon the payment of the loan within 90 days from the finality of this
decision.47 (Emphasis ours)

Before concluding, the Court notes that under the final and executory CA Decision dated May 7, 2004, Galen was adjudged to pay
Raymundo the sum of ₱3,865,000.00 with legal interest from the date of the filing of the complaint until fully paid. Raymundo,
meanwhile, was ordered to pay damages, attorney’s fees and costs of suit.

In Sunga-Chan v. Court of Appeals, 48 the Court, citing Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,49 reiterated the rule on the
rates and application of interests, viz:

Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. synthesized the rules on the imposition of interest, if proper, and the applicable rate, as follows: The
12% per annum rate under CB Circular No. 416 shall apply only to loans or forbearance of money, goods, or credits, as well as to
judgments involving such loan or forbearance of money, goods, or credit, while the 6% per annum under Art. 2209 of the Civil Code
applies "when the transaction involves the payment of indemnities in the concept of damage arising from the breach or a delay in
the performance of obligations in general," with the application of both rates reckoned "from the time the complaint was filed until the
adjudged amount is fully paid." In either instance, the reckoning period for the commencement of the running of the legal interest
shall be subject to the condition "that the courts are vested with discretion, depending on the equities of each case, on the award of
interest."

Otherwise formulated, the norm to be followed in the future on the rates and application thereof is:

"x x x x

II. ― With regard particularly to an award of interest in the concept of actual and compensatory damages, the rate of interest, as
well as the accrual thereof, is imposed, as follows:

1. When the obligation is breached, and it consists in the payment of a sum of money, i.e., a loan or forbearance of
money, the interest due should be that which may have been stipulated in writing. Furthermore, the interest due shall itself
earn legal interest from the time it is judicially demanded. In the absence of stipulation, the rate of interest shall be 12%
per annum to be computed from default, i.e., from judicial or extrajudicial demand under and subject to the provisions of
Article 1169 of the Civil Code.

xxxx

3. When the judgment of the court awarding a sum of money becomes final and executory, the rate of legal interest,
whether the case falls under paragraph 1 or paragraph 2, above, shall be 12% per annum from such finality until its
satisfaction, this interim period being deemed to be by then an equivalent to a forbearance of credit." 50 (Citations omitted
and emphases and underscoring ours)

Recently, the Monetary Board of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas issued Resolution No. 796 dated May 16, 2013, revising the
interest rate to be imposed for the loan or forbearance of any money, goods or credits, in the absence of an express contract, to six
percent (6%) per annum. This was implemented by BSP Circular No. 799 dated June 21, 2013 and effective July 1, 2013. Applying
the foregoing guidelines, the following rates are to be imposed on the parties’ respective obligations:

(a) Galen’s mortgage indebtedness shall earn interest at the rate of 12% per annum from the date of the filing of the
complaint on January 25, 198851 until June 30, 2013; thereafter, it shall earn six percent (6%) interest per annum until fully
paid. The Court is constrained to retain the application of the interest rate from the filing of the complaint until full payment
because the CA’s judgment on this score has already attained finality and cannot be disturbed at this stage; 52 and

(b) The damages, attorney’s fees and costs to be paid by Raymundo shall earn interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per
annum from the date of finality of the CA Decision on May 7, 2004 until fully paid.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated October 30, 2009 and Resolution dated March 10, 2010 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 105401 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the assailed Orders dated August 6, 2007,
December 12, 2007 and August 15, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City Branch 62 as well as the writ o execution dated
January 1 0 2007 and all other orders writs and processes issued pursuant thereto are NULLIFIED.
The RTC o Makati City Branch 62 is DIRECTED to implement the Decision dated May 7, 2004 of the Court o Appeals in accordance
with this Decision and subject to the interest rates discussed herein.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 215933

POWER SECTOR ASSETS AND LIABILITIES MANAGEMENT CORPORATION (PSALM), Petitioner

vs.
MAUNLAD HOMES, INC., Respondent

DECISION
PERALTA, J.:

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari are the Decision1 dated July 30, 2012 and the Resolution2 dated December 10, 2014
issued by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 118302.

The antecedent facts are as follows:

Respondent Maunlad Homes, Inc. filed with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Malolos City, Bulacan, an unlawful detainer
case with damages against National Power Corporation (NPC), raffled-off to Branch 1. After trial, the MTCC issued its
Decision3 dated October 26, 2009, ordering NPC to vacate the subject premises and surrender physical possession thereof to
respondent; to pay reasonable compensation equivalent to Php20.00 per square meter per month of respondent's 25,896-sq. m.
properties, reckoned from the date of demand on October 6, 2008, until complete vacation and surrender of the subject premises;
and to pay Php20,000.00 as and for attorney's fees and cost of suit.

The NPC appealed the decision to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos City, Bulacan, and was raffled-off to Branch 78. The
RTC rendered its Decision4 dated May 18, 2010 affirming in toto the MTCC decision.

Respondent filed a Motion for Execution which was opposed by the NPC. The NPC also filed a motion for reconsideration of the
RTC decision. In an Order dated August 5, 2010, the RTC denied the NPC's motion for reconsideration and granted respondent's
motion for execution. On August 25, 2010, a Writ of Execution pending appeal was issued. 5 And on September 6, 2010, the sheriff
served a Notice of Demand6 of payment to the NPC.

Respondent then filed an urgent motion for issuance of a Break Open Order since the sheriff who tried to implement the writ of
execution, by serving the notice of levy on the NPC Warehouse at Barangay Lagundi, Mexico, Pampanga, was prevented by the
security guards assigned therein. The NPC argued that the warehouse is being used both by it and the Power Sector Assets and
Liabilities Management Corporation (herein petitioner PSALM), an entity created and existing by virtue of Republic Act No. 9136, the
Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001 (EPIRA Law); that the said law provides that the ownership and all generation assets,
IPP contracts and other NPC disposable assets are transferred to PSALM; and that as of the moment, the ownership of the said
items stored in the said warehouse cannot be established with certainty as they are in the process of determining what properties
may be retained by the latter.

On October 26, 2010, the RTC issued a Break Open Order7 authorizing the sheriff and his deputies, police officers/escorts,
representatives from both parties to enter/break open into the NPC's warehouse facilities located at Barangay Lagundi, Mexico,
Pampanga.

On November 4, 2010, the sheriff issued a Notice of Levy8 on execution pending appeal of personal properties/sale of seven (7)
units transformer radiator fins, one (1) unit power transformer with Serial No. 77740395, and four (4) pieces angle bars.

The fallo of the notice states:

NOW WHEREFORE, by virtue of said writ of execution pending appeal and in accordance with Rule 39, Section 9 of the Rules of
Court, the undersigned sheriff IV will sell at public auction to the highest bidder for CASH and in Philippine Currency, on November
12, 2010 at 10:00 in the morning or soon thereafter, at No. 120 Gapan Olongapo Road, Barangay Lagundi, Mexico, Pampanga, the
above- described properties to satisfy the said Writ of Execution pending Appeal.9

On November 9, 2010, petitioner filed an Affidavit10 of third-party claim with the sheriff pursuant to Section 16, Rule 39 of the Rules
of Court, and alleging that it is the owner of the levied properties pursuant to the EPIRA Law. On November 10, 2010, petitioner filed
a Manifestation11 with Urgent Ex Parte Motion for Issuance of Status Quo Order with the RTC arguing that it is the owner of the
subject properties pulled out by the sheriff by operation of law; that it is not a party to the instant case and therefore cannot be
bound by the judgment therein; that the obligation to pay respondent had not been transferred to it. Petitioner also prayed for the
nullification of the levy of its properties and restoring their immediate possession to it.

On November 11, 2010, the RTC issued an Order12 holding in abeyance the public sale of the subject levied properties until further
orders.

On February 1, 2011, the RTC issued an Order,13 the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the motion for issuance of Status Quo Order is hereby DENIED. The third-party claim filed
by PSALM is likewise denied.

Further PSALM's prayer to nullify the levy of seven units transformers radiator fins, one unit power transformer with serial number E-
77740395 and four pieces of angle bars and restoring its immediate possession to the same is DENIED.
Accordingly, the Sheriff of this Court is DIRECTED to proceed with the implementation of the writ of execution issued in this case in
accordance with law and without further delay.

SO ORDERED.14

On February 21, 2011, the sheriff issued a notice15 of sale on execution of personal properties.

Petitioner filed with the CA a petition for certiorari assailing the October 26, 2010 Break Open Order, the November 4, 2010 notice
of levy on execution pending appeal, the Order dated February 1, 2011 denying the motion for issuance of Status Quo Order and
the third-party claim, and the February 21, 2011 notice of sale on execution of personal properties. It alleged that it has no adequate
remedy available from the writs and processes issued by the RTC, and that it acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in issuing the
assailed orders despite the fact that petitioner is the owner of the subject properties.

On July 30, 2012, the CA issued its assailed Decision dismissing the petition for certiorari for being an incorrect remedy.

The CA found, among others, that contrary to the allegation of petitioner that there exists no plain, speedy and adequate remedy
obtaining under the circumstances, Section 16, Rule 3 9 of the Rules of Court provides a more expeditious and encompassing
recourse in case a property belonging to a third person is placed under the coverage of the writ of execution and, thereafter, sold at
public auction.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied by the CA in a Resolution dated December 10, 2014.

Petitioner filed the instant petition for review on certiorari alleging the following:

THE CA, IN DISMISSING PSALM'S PETITION ON PROCEDURAL GROUNDS, OVERLOOKED PSALM'S PREVIOUSLY FILED
THIRD PARTY CLAIM.

II

PSALM OWNS THE PROPERTIES SUBJECT MATTER OF THE ORDERS OF JUDGE SAMPAGA ISSUED AND THE
PROCESSES SHERIFF ESGUERRA ISSUED.

III

THE JUDGMENT OBLIGATION IS NOT AMONG THE OBLIGATIONS PSALM ASSUMED.

IV

PSALM WAS NOT A PARTY TO THE CASE IN WHICH THE DECISION THEREIN IS THE SUBJECT OF THE EXECUTION
PROCEEDINGS.16

Petitioner claims that the CA erred in overlooking the fact that it filed a third party claim as provided under Section 16 of Rule 39 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Petitioner contends that the CA should have taken consideration of the substantive issues raised
in its petition reiterating its ownership of the levied properties. It claims that upon the effectivity of the EPIRA law on June 26, 2001,
the ownership of all existing generation assets, IPP contracts, real estate and all other disposable assets of NPC were transferred to
it; and that all existing liabilities and outstanding financial obligations of NPC as of June 26, 200 I arising from loans, issuance of
bonds, securities and other instrument of indebtedness were then and there likewise legally transferred and assumed by it.
However, since respondent's claim is not among those existing obligations that were transferred to it upon the effectivity of the
EPIRA law, it cannot be held liable for the claim even if it were made a party in the case. It contends that there is sufficient ground to
annul the levy and sale made by the sheriff since it is not a party in the case, and therefore, not bound by the judgment rendered.

The pivotal issue for resolution is whether the CA erred in dismissing petitioner's petition for certiorari assailing the denial of the
latter's third party claim for being a wrong remedy.

We find no merit in the petition.

The power of the court in executing judgments extends only to properties unquestionably belonging to the judgment debtor
alone.17 An execution can be issued only against a party and not against one who did not have his day in court. 18 The duty of the
sheriff is to levy the property of the judgment debtor not that of a third person. For, as the saying goes, one man's goods shall not be
sold for another man's debts.19 Thus, if the property levied by virtue of a writ of execution is claimed by a third person who is not the
judgment obligor, Section 16 of Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides for the remedy of such third party claimant, to
wit:

Sec. 16. Proceedings where property claimed by third person. - If the property levied on is claimed by any person other than the
judgment obligor or his agent, and such person makes an affidavit of his title thereto or right to the possession thereof, stating the
grounds of such right or title, and serves the same upon the officer making the levy and a copy thereof upon the judgment obligee,
the officer shall not be bound to keep the property, unless such judgment obligee, on demand of the officer, files a bond approved
by the court to indemnify the third-party claimant in a sum not less than the value of the property levied on. In case of disagreement
as to such value, the same shall be determined by the court issuing the writ of execution. No claim for damages for the taking or
keeping of the property may be enforced against the bond unless the action therefor is filed within one hundred twenty (120) days
from the date of the filing of the bond.

The officer shall not be liable for damages for the taking or keeping of the property, to any third-party claimant if such bond is filed.
Nothing herein contained shall prevent such claimant or any third person from vindicating his claim to the property in a separate
action, or prevent the judgment obligee from claiming damages in the same or a separate action against a third-party claimant who
filed a frivolous or plainly spurious claim.

When the writ of execution is issued in favor of the Republic of the Philippines, or any officer duly representing it, the filing of such
bond shall not be required, and in case the sheriff or levying officer is sued for damages as a result of the levy, he shall be
represented by the Solicitor General and if held liable therefor, the actual damages adjudged by the court shall be paid by the
National Treasurer out of such funds as may be appropriated for the purpose.

Under the above-quoted provision, the third-party claimant may execute an affidavit of his title or right to the possession of the
property levied, and serve the same to the officer making the levy and a copy thereof to the judgment creditor. This remedy is known
as terceria.20 The officer shall not be bound to keep the property, unless the judgment creditor files a bond approved by the court to
indemnify the third-party claimant in a sum not less than the value of the property levied on. An action for damages may be brought
against the officer within one hundred twenty (120) days from the date of the filing of the bond. The same section also provides that
a third-party claimant may file a proper action to vindicate his claim to the levied property. The proper action mentioned in Section
16 would have for its object the recovery of ownership or possession of the property seized by the sheriff, as well as damages
resulting from the allegedly wrongful seizure and detention thereof despite the third party claim and it may be brought against the
sheriff and such other parties as may be alleged to have colluded with him in the supposedly wrongful execution proceedings, such
as the judgment creditor himself. If instituted by a stranger to the suit in which execution has issued, such proper action should be a
totally separate and distinct action from the former suit.21

In this case, petitioner had filed an affidavit of third-party claim with the sheriff and a motion for issuance of status quo order with the
RTC to prevent the sale of the levied properties at public auction, nullification of the levy and restoration of the subject properties to
it, which were denied by the RTC and, consequently, the sheriff was directed to proceed with the implementation of the issued writ
of execution.

The RTC denied the third-party claim as follows:

As to the third-party claim by movant PSALM, this Court also resolves to deny the same for lack of merit.

Section 16 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides:

xxx

In this present case, aside from serving said affidavit of third-party claim to the Sheriff of this Court, claimant PSALM also filed this
instant motion for issuance of status quo order to prevent the sale of the levied properties at public auction, nullification of the levy
and restoration of the subject properties in the possession of PSALM. In effect, instead of the Sheriff requiring the plaintiff-obligee to
file an indemnity bond, the Court is constrained to resolve the merit of the third-party claim filed by PSALM.

However, it must be emphasized that the resolution of this Court is limited only to a determination of whether the Sheriff acted
correctly in the performance of his duties. It cannot pass upon the question of title to the property, with any character of finality. It
only treats of that matter in so far as may be necessary to decide if the sheriff acted correctly or not.

After giving an opportunity to vindicate their claim and after a judicious examination of the arguments posed by all of the parties, this
Court finds that PSALM has not been able to satisfactorily establish their claim of ownership over the subject properties.

First, claimant PSALM has not presented sufficient proof of ownership over the said levied properties.1âwphi1 It merely claimed that
the subject properties were transferred by operation of law in view of the passage of EPIRA in 2001. It did not submit any document
evidencing ownership. It even failed to present any document that the levied property is among those included in the inventoried
property of PSALM. The doctrine of "Ei incumbit probatio qui dicit, non qui negat" or "He who asserts, not he who denies, must
prove" is applicable in this present case.

Second, a careful perusal of EPIRA, particularly Sections 49, 50, 51 and 56, in relation to Section 1 of Rule 21 of its Implementing
Rules and Regulations, would show that ownership of NPC's assets, herein levied properties included, is not ipso jure or by
operation of law as there is the need to execute certain documents evidencing transfer of ownership and possession. This Court
agrees with the plaintiff-appellee that these documents are conditions precedent that are needed to be performed and executed in
order to have a valid transfer.

Section 1, Rule 21 of the IRR provides:

NPC and PSALM shall take such measures and execute such documents to effect the transfer of ownership and possession of all
assets, rights and privileges, liabilities required by the Act to be transferred by NPC to PSALM.

Third, even if the transfer is by operation of law, it would be an injustice and inequitable, to say the least, to interpret the aforesaid
provision as to effect the transfer only of the assets and properties of NPC but not its obligation and liabilities. The assets and
properties transferred should also account for the liabilities and obligations incurred by NPC. In fact, Section 49 of the said law
explicitly states that PSALM should not only assume and take ownership of all existing NPC generations assets, liabilities and IPP
contracts, real estate and other disposable assets.

In the instant case, plaintiff Maunlad Homes, Inc. is already on the stage of reaping the fruits of its labor after it had judiciously
battled the case with the court a quo and this Court. Injustice is manifest if they would not be awarded what is due them merely on
the ground of technicalities and evasive measures undertaken by its adversary. 22

In Spouses Sy v. Hon. Discaya,23 We held that for the remedy of terceria to prosper, the claim of ownership or right of possession to
the levied property by the third-party claimant must first be unmistakably established, thus:

x x x A third person whose property was seized by a sheriff to answer for the obligation of the judgment debtor may invoke the
supervisory power of the court which authorized such execution. Upon due application by the third person and after summary
hearing, the court may command that the property be released from the mistaken levy and restored to the rightful owner or
possessor. What said court can do in these instances, however, is limited to a determination of whether the sheriff has acted rightly
or wrongly in the performance of his duties in the execution of judgment, more specifically, if he has indeed taken hold of property
not belonging to the judgment debtor. The court does not and cannot pass upon the question of title to the property, with any
character of finality.1âwphi1 It can treat of the matter only insofar as may be necessary to decide if the sheriff has acted correctly or
not. It can require the sheriff to restore the property to the claimant's possession if warranted by the evidence. However, if the
claimant's proofs do not persuade the court of the validity of his title or right of possession thereto, the claim will be denied. 24

Independent of the above-stated recourse, a third-party claimant may also avail of the remedy known as "terceria, " provided in
Section 17, Rule 39, by serving on the officer making the levy an affidavit of his title and a copy thereof upon the judgment creditor.
The officer shall not be bound to keep the property, unless such judgment creditor or his agent, on demand of the officer,
indemnifies the officer against such claim by a bond in a sum not greater than the value of the property levied on. An action for
damages may be brought against the sheriff within one hundred twenty (120) days from the filing of the bond.

The aforesaid remedies are nevertheless without prejudice to "any proper action" that a third-party claimant may deem suitable to
vindicate "his claim to the property." Such a "proper action" is, obviously, entirely distinct from that explicitly prescribed in Section 17
of Rule 39, which is an action for damages brought by a third-party claimant against the officer within one hundred twenty (120)
days from the date of the filing of the bond for the taking or keeping of the property subject of the "terceria."

Since the RTC denied the third-party claim for failure of petitioner to satisfactorily establish its claim of ownership over the subject
properties, the latter filed with the CA a petition for certiorari assailing such denial and claimed that there is no plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The petition for certiorari was dismissed by the CA for being a wrong remedy.

We affirm the dismissal.

A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court may be filed when any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. An adequate
remedy has been defined as a remedy which is equally beneficial, speedy and sufficient, not merely a remedy which at some time in
the future will bring about a revival of the judgment of the lower court complained of in the certiorari proceeding, but a remedy which
will promptly relieve the petitioner from the injurious effects of that judgment and the acts of the inferior court or tribunal. 25
Notably, petitioner cannot appeal from the denial of its third-party claim since it is not one of the parties in the action where the writ
of execution was issued,26 as the unlawful detainer case was between respondent and the NPC. Also, the denial of the third-party
claim is not appealable as provided under the above-quoted Section 16, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court since the remedy of a third
party claimant is to file a separate and independent action to vindicate his claim of ownership or right of possession of the levied
properties against the judgment creditor or the purchaser of the property at the public auction sale. It is in this separate and
independent action that the issue of the third-party claimant's title to the levied properties can be resolved with finality.

In Queblar v. Garduno,27 we declared:

The appeal interposed by the third-party claimant-appellant is improper, because she was not one of the parties in the action who
were exclusively Venancio Queblar as plaintiff and Leonardo Garduno as defendant. Considering the provisions of said section 451
of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act No. 4108,28 the appealed order was not appealable. The appeal that should have
been interposed by her, if the term "appeal" may properly be employed, is a separate reinvidicatory action against the execution
creditor or the purchaser of her property after the sale at public auction, or a complaint for damages to be charged against the bond
filed by the judgment creditor in favor of the sheriff.29

Hence, petitioner's claim in their jurisdictional allegations in its petition for certiorari filed with the CA that it was constrained to file
the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 to protect its rights and interest over the subject properties because of the absence of a
plain, speedy and adequate remedy, is contradicted by the procedure laid down under Section 16 of Rule 39, i.e., the third-party
claimant may file an independent action to vindicate its claim of ownership to the levied property. Where a specific remedy has been
laid down by our rules for the protection or enforcement of rights, the same should be resorted to. In Solidum v. CA,30 We held:

We have held that neither an appeal nor a petition for certiorari is the proper remedy from the denial of a third-party claim. In the
case of Northern Motors, Inc. v. Coquia, the petitioner filed, among others, a third-party claim which was denied by the respondent
judge in the disputed resolution. Northern Motors, Inc. thereafter filed a petition for certiorari to nullify the resolution and order of the
respondent judge. In resolving whether the respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner's third-party
claim, the Court held:

Pursuant to [Section 17, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court], a third-party claimant has two remedies, such as, an action for
damages against the sheriff to be brought within 120 days from the filing of the bond, and a separate and independent action to
vindicate his claim to the property. In the case at bar, petitioner's and intervenor's remedy against the bond proved to be unavailing
because of the disputed order of the respondent Judge canceling the indemnity bond. Such an order as well as the order denying a
motion to reconsider the same in effect discarded or quashed the third-party claims. What then would the remedy be of the third-
party claimants?

In the recent case of Serra vs. Rodriguez, xxx this Court (First Division), thru Mr. Justice Makasiar, ruled:

From the denial of a third-party claim to defeat the attachment caused to be levied by a creditor, neither an appeal nor a petition
for certiorari is the proper remedy. The remedy of petitioner would be to file a separate and independent action to determine the
ownership of the attached property or to file a complaint for damages chargeable against the bond filed by the judgment creditor in
favor of the provincial sheriff.

In Lara vs. Bayona, L-7920, May 10, 1955, this Court, thru Mr. Justice Concepcion, later Chief Justice, in denying the petition
for certiorari to set aside the order of the lower court quashing the third-party claim of a chattel mortgagee, held:

Pursuant to this provision, nothing contained therein shall prevent petitioner "from vindicating his claim to the property by any proper
action." Neither does the order complained of deprive petitioner herein of the opportunity to enforce his alleged rights by appropriate
proceedings. In short, he has another "plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law," and, hence is not entitled
either to a writ of certiorari or to a writ of prohibition.

The Court further held that since the third-party claimant is not one of the parties to the action, he could not, strictly speaking, appeal
from the order denying its claim, but should file a separate reinvidicatory action against the execution creditor or a complaint for
damages against the bond filed by the judgment creditor in favor of the sheriff. The rights of a third-party claimant should be decided
in a separate action to be instituted by the third person. In fine, the appeal that should be interposed, if the term appeal may be
properly employed, is a separate reinvidicatory action against the execution creditor or complaint for damages to be charged against
the bond filed by the judgment creditor in favor of the sheriff.31

And in such separate action, the court may issue a writ of preliminary injunction against the sheriff enjoining him from proceeding
with the execution sale,32 which is a speedy and adequate remedy to immediately relieve petitioner from the adverse effects of the
lower court's judgment. Thus, the CA did not err in saying that Section 16 of Rule 39 provides a more expeditious and
encompassing recourse from the denial of its third-party claim.

Considering our foregoing discussions, We need not address the other issues raised by petitioner regarding its right to ownership
and possession of the levied properties.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated July 30, 2012 and the Resolution dated December 10, 2014 issued by
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 118302 are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 182571               September 2, 2013

LIGAYA ESGUERRA, LOWELL ESGUERRA AND LIESELL ESGUERRA, PETITIONERS,

vs.
HOLCIM PHILIPPINES, INC., RESPONDENT.

DECISION
REYES, J.:

The present petition is an offshoot of our final and executory decision promulgated on December 27, 2002 in G.R. No. 120004,
entitled "Iluminada de Guzman v. Court of Appeals and Jorge Esguerra."1 Ligaya Esguerra (Ligaya), Lowell Esguerra (Lowell), and
Liesell Esguerra (Liesell) (petitioners) are heirs of Jorge Esguerra (Esguerra) while herein respondent, HOLCIM Philippines, Inc.
(HOLCIM) is the successor-in-interest of Iluminada de Guzman (de Guzman).

In the instant petition, the petitioners assail the Decision2 dated August 31, 2007 and Resolution3 dated April 14, 2008 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 94838 which reversed and set aside the: (a) Order 4 dated December 1, 2005 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 16 granting the petitioners’ motion for the issuance of the alias writ of execution of the
Decision dated December 27, 2002 in G.R. No. 120004, which ordered HOLCIM to pay the amount equivalent to the total volume of
limestones extracted from the subject property in the sum of ₱91,872,576.72; (b) Order5 dated December 20, 2005, which reiterated
the issuance of the alias writ of execution; and (c) Order 6 dated June 7, 2006, which denied the motion for reconsideration of the
above-mentioned orders and the manifestation and motion for ocular inspection filed by HOLCIM. The CA’s Resolution dated April
14, 2008 denied herein petitioners’ motion for reconsideration of the CA’s Decision dated August 31, 2007.

Antecedent Facts

As a backgrounder and as stated in our Decision dated December 27, 2002 in G.R. No. 120004, therein respondent Esguerra filed
on December 12, 1989 with the RTC, Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 16 an action to annul the Free Patent in the name of de Guzman.
Esguerra claimed that he was the owner of Lot 3308-B, located at Matiktik, Norzagaray, Bulacan, covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title No. T-1685-P (M) of the Registry of Deeds of Bulacan, with an approximate area of 47,000 square meters. Esguerra learned
that the said parcel of land was being offered for sale by de Guzman to Hi-Cement Corporation (now named HOLCIM Philippines,
Inc.). The former possessor of the land, Felisa Maningas, was issued Free Patent No. 575674 which was subsequently issued in the
name of de Guzman over said parcel of land located at Gidgid, Norzagaray, Bulacan with an area of 20.5631 hectares and
described in Psu-216349, covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-3876. Esguerra also demanded that the portion of his
property, which has been encroached upon and included in de Guzman’s Free Patent, be excluded. He later amended his complaint
to implead Hi-Cement as a co-defendant since the latter was hauling marble from the subject land. He also prayed that Hi-Cement
be ordered to desist from hauling marble, to account for the marble already hauled and to pay him.7

The RTC dismissed Esguerra’s complaint but on appeal, the CA reversed in the Decision dated February 28, 1995 in CA-G.R. CV
No. 40140. The dispositive portion reads as follows:

"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision appealed from is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and another judgment is hereby
rendered:

"1. Declaring [de Guzman’s] OCT No. P-3876 (Exh. B) null and void insofar as the disputed area of 38,641 square meters,
which is part of Lot 3308-B, covered by TCT No. 1685-p (Exh. C) in the name of [Esguerra];

"2. Ordering [de Guzman] to cause the segregation, at his expense, of the disputed area of 38,641 square meters from
OCT No. P-3876;

"3. Ordering [de Guzman] to surrender her owner’s copy of OCT No. P-3876 to the Register of Deeds of Bulacan who is in
turn ordered to exclude from said OCT No. P-3876 the disputed area of 38,641 square meters included in [Esguerra’s]
TCT No. T-1685;

"4. Ordering [de Guzman] to immediately vacate and surrender to [Esguerra] possession of the disputed area of 38,641
square meters;

"5. Ordering defendant-appellee Hi-Cement Corporation to immediately cease and desist from quarrying or extracting
marble from the disputed area;

"6. Ordering defendant-appellee Hi-Cement Corporation to make an accounting of the compensation or royalty it has paid
to defendant-appellee Iluminada de Guzman for marbles quarried from the disputed area of 38,451 square meters from
the time of the filing of the amended complaint on March 23, 1990.

"7. Ordering and sentencing defendant-appellee Iluminada de Guzman to pay and turn over to [Esguerra] all such
amounts that she has received from her co-defendant Hi-Cement Corporation as compensation or royalty for marbles
extracted or quarried from the disputed area of 38,451 square meters beginning March 23, 1990; and

"8. Ordering defendant-appellee Iluminada de Guzman to pay the costs.

"SO ORDERED."8

In our Decision dated December 27, 2002 in G.R. No. 120004, the Court affirmed in toto the aforesaid CA’s decision. After attaining
finality, the case was remanded to the RTC for execution. 9

Thereafter, the heirs of Esguerra, herein petitioners, filed an Omnibus Motion10 dated September 28, 2004 with the RTC,
manifesting that the Court’s decision in G.R. No. 120004 has yet to be executed, 11 and thus prayed:

xxxx

1. That Sheriff Perlito Dimagiba be directed to submit his Return on the execution of the judgment;

2. That defendant Iluminada de Guzman and Hi-Cement (now Union Cement Corporation Matictic, Sapang Kawayn [sic],
Norzagaray, Bulacan) be diverted [sic] to appear before this Honorable Court x x x;

3. That the plaintiffs be granted other legal and equitable reliefs.12

On December 1, 2004, the RTC issued an Order13, to wit:

Acting on the Omnibus Motion filed by the Heirs of Jorge Esguerra, through counsel, Atty. Orlando Lambino, and pursuant to Secs.
36 and 37, Rule 39 of [the] 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court hereby GRANTS the same

AS PRAYED FOR, x x x Sheriff Perlito Dimagiba is hereby directed to submit his return of a Writ of Execution dated October 28,
2003 within five (5) days from receipt of this Order.

Accordingly, defendant Iluminada de Guzman of Tanza, Malabon, Metro Manila and the Hi-Cement (now Union Cement
Corporation, Matictic, Sapang Kawayan, Norzagaray, Bulacan) are hereby ordered to appear before this Court on December 6,
2004 at 8:30 o’clock in the morning to be examined on the dispositive portion of the judgment of the Court of Appeals, affirmed by
the Supreme Court.14

However, contrary to the Order dated December 1, 2004, de Guzman and HOLCIM were not examined. Rather, the petitioners
presented Engineer Louie Balicanta who testified that upon an examination of the topographical maps covering the land of the
deceased Esguerra, the estimated volume of limestone hauled or quarried therefrom covering the years 1990 to 2003 was
3,535,020.471 cubic meters. On May 16, 2005, the petitioners filed their Formal Offer of Exhibits. 15

Later, the petitioners filed a Supplement to the Motion for Execution16 dated August 16, 2005 and a Motion for Alias Writ of
Execution17 dated November 9, 2005. They claimed that the royalties due them amounted to ₱10.00 per metric ton. Thus, for the
9,187,257.67 metric tons18 of limestone which HOLCIM allegedly acquired, the petitioners should receive a total royalty of
₱91,872,576.72.19

On December 1, 2005, the RTC made a finding that the total volume of limestone which HOLCIM allegedly quarried from the subject
land amounted to ₱91,872,576.72. It also ordered the issuance of an Alias Writ of Execution for the royalties which were purportedly
due to the petitioners.20 The said order states:

Acting on the motion for alias writ of execution filed by the [petitioners], through counsel, to be meritorious, the same is hereby
granted, it appearing that the decision subject matter of the writ of execution has not been satisfied by [de Guzman] and Hi-Cement
Corporation, and considering, further, that the Total Volume Extracted Materials (LIMESTONE) at Lot #3308-B PSD-102661 (Annex
A) was properly proven during the hearing for the examination of judgment debtors showing the claim of Php91,872,576.72 to be
substantiated based on the Monthly Mineral Commodity Price Monitor for January 2005 (Annex B), together with the O.R. for
Certification fee (Annex C).

AS PRAYED FOR, let an alias writ of execution be issued for the implementation of the Decision of the Supreme Court in relation to
the total volume extracted by Hi-Cement (now HOLCIM) which is now the successor of defendant Iluminada de Guzman. 21

On December 8, 2005, the petitioners filed an Urgent Motion for Clarification 22 praying that the alias writ of execution be clarified for
the purpose of directing [de Guzman] and/or Hi-Cement Corporation and/or HOLCIM to pay the petitioners the amount of
₱91,872,576.72.

As prayed for, the RTC issued an Order23 on December 20, 2005, stating thus:
In view of the Urgent Motion for Clarification filed by the [petitioners], through counsel, and there being no comment/opposition filed
by [de Guzman], let an alias writ of execution be issued directing [de Guzman] and/or Hi-Cement Corporation and/or HOLCIM to pay
the [petitioners] the amount of Php 91,872,576.72 representing their liability for the minerals extracted from the subject property
pursuant to the Order of the Court, dated December 01, 2005. 24

Subsequently, an alias writ of execution and notices of garnishment on several banks, garnishing all amounts that may have been
deposited or owned by HOLCIM, were issued on December 20, 2005 and December 21, 2005 respectively. 25

On January 5, 2006, HOLCIM filed a motion for reconsideration.26 It alleged that it did not owe any amount of royalty to the
petitioners for the extracted limestone from the subject land. HOLCIM averred that it had actually entered into an Agreement 27 dated
March 23, 1993 (Agreement) with the petitioners governing their respective rights and obligations in relation to the limestone
allegedly extracted from the land in question. HOLCIM further asserted that it had paid advance royalty to the petitioners from year
1993, in an aggregate sum of ₱694,184.22, an amount more than the ₱218,693.10 which the petitioners were entitled under the
Agreement.28

On January 13, 2006, the petitioners filed its Opposition to [the] Motion for Reconsideration 29 dated January 7, 2006, claiming that
the Motion for Reconsideration is barred by the omnibus motion rule because HOLCIM failed to question the petitioners’ motion for
execution of this Court’s decision in G.R. No. 120004. The petitioners also averred that HOLCIM is barred by estoppel to question
the execution of the decision based on the Agreement, because said Agreement is in contravention with the trial court’s previous
orders which required HOLCIM to deposit to the clerk of court the royalties due the deceased Esguerra. The petitioners also argued
that the Agreement is a way to evade the trial court’s orders and has been procured by taking advantage of the petitioners’ financial
distress after Esguerra died.30

On February 21, 2006, HOLCIM filed a Manifestation and Motion (for Ocular Inspection). 31 It asked the court to conduct an ocular
inspection, advancing the argument that HOLCIM did not extract limestone from any portion of the 47,000-sq m property which
Esguerra owned; and that the pictures, which the petitioners presented to prove that HOLCIM has been extracting limestone from
the subject land until year 2005, were actually photographs of areas outside the contested land.

On June 7, 2006, the RTC denied HOLCIM’s motion for reconsideration and motion for ocular inspection. It held that the petitioners
proved their entitlement to the royalties totaling to ₱91,872,576.72. The RTC also blamed HOLCIM for not presenting its own
witnesses and evidence. It further stated that to grant the motions for reconsideration and ocular inspection is to reopen the case
despite the fact that the trial court has no more power to do so since the execution of this Court’s decision in G.R. No. 120004 is
now a matter of right on the petitioners’ part.32

On June 13, 2006, HOLCIM filed a Petition for Certiorari (with Urgent Applications for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of
Preliminary Injunction)33 with the CA. On June 30, 2006, the petitioners filed their Comment on [the] "Petition for Certiorari" and
Opposition,34 to which HOLCIM filed a Reply35 on July 25, 2006. On August 31, 2007, the CA promulgated the now assailed decision
finding merit in HOLCIM’s petition.36 The dispositive portion states:

WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED and the assailed Orders REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. No costs.

SO ORDERED.37

The motion for reconsideration thereof was denied in the CA’s Resolution38 dated April 14, 2008.

Issues

Thus, the petitioners filed the present petition for review under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, raising the following
assignment of errors:

A. THE [CA] GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT [HOLCIM] IS ESTOPPED TO QUESTION THE
JURISDICTION OF THE TRIAL COURT TO CONDUCT A HEARING ON THE EXACT PAYMENT WHICH [HOLCIM]
WAS SUPPOSED TO PAY TO THE PETITIONERS;

B. THE [CA] GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT DISMISSING [HOLCIM’S] PETITION FOR CERTIORARI ON [THE] GROUND
OF LACK OF BOARD RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING THE FILING OF THE PETITION;

C. THE [CA] GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR [CERTIORARI], IT BEING NOT THE
PROPER REMEDY, BUT AN APPEAL;
 D. THE [CA] GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN THE
EXECUTION OF THE DECISION BY CALLING FOR EVIDENCE TO PROVE THE EXACT AMOUNT WHICH [HOLCIM]
HAS TO PAY TO THE PETITIONERS;

E. THE [CA] GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE ORDERS OF THE TRIAL COURT OF DECEMBER 1, 2005,
DECEMBER 20, 2005, AND JUNE 7, 2006 MODIFIED THE DECISION OF THE CA G.R. CV NO. 40140 OF FEBRUARY
28, 1995[.]39

Our Ruling

The present petition has substantially complied with the requirements.

HOLCIM alleged that the present petition is fatally defective since all of the most important pleadings before the RTC and the CA
have not been attached to the present petition. However, a review of the records of the case shows that the petitioners attached to
their petition the following: (a) the CA’s Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 94838 dated August 31, 2007; 40 (b) the CA’s Resolution in CA-
G.R. SP No. 94838 dated April 14, 2008; 41 (c) the RTC’s Order in Civil Case No. 725-M-89 dated December 1, 2005; 42 (d) the RTC’s
Order in Civil Case No. 725-M-89 dated December 20, 2005; 43 (e) the RTC’s Order in Civil Case No. 725-M-89 dated June 7,
2006;44 (f) HOLCIM’s Manifestation and Motion (for Ocular Inspection) in Civil Case No. 725-M-89 dated February 21, 2006 and its
attachments;45 (g) the Memorandum of Agreement between Republic Cement Corporation and Spouses Juan and Maria Bernabe
dated December 1, 1991;46 (h) the Price Monitor of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) on the price per
metric ton of non-metallic mines;47 and (i) the Special Power of Attorney executed by Ligaya and Liesell appointing Lowell as their
attorney-in-fact.48

From the foregoing, the Court finds the same substantially compliant with the requirements of Section 4, Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure. All of the pertinent documents necessary for the Court to appreciate the circumstances surrounding the case and
to resolve the issues at hand were attached. Furthermore, the parties’ subsequent comment and reply have sufficiently provided the
Court the needed information regarding the proceedings and acts of the trial court during the execution of the final and executory
decision of this Court in G.R. No. 120004 which are the matters being questioned. In Shimizu Philippines Contractors, Inc. v.
Magsalin,49 the Court proceeded to give due course to the petition when it found the same and its attachments sufficient for the
Court to access and resolve the controversy. 50

On the other hand, the petitioners claim that HOLCIM’s petition for certiorari in the CA failed to comply with the rules on Verification
and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping because the latter did not secure and/or attach a certified true copy of a board resolution
authorizing any of its officers to file said petition.51 Thus, the CA should have dismissed outright HOLCIM’s petition before it.

The general rule is that a corporation can only exercise its powers and transact its business through its board of directors and
through its officers and agents when authorized by a board resolution or its bylaws. The power of a corporation to sue and be sued
is exercised by the board of directors. The physical acts of the corporation, like the signing of documents, can be performed only by
natural persons duly authorized for the purpose by corporate bylaws or by a specific act of the board. Absent the said board
resolution, a petition may not be given due course. 52

In Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Court of Appeals, 53 the Court held that the application of the rules must be the general rule, and
the suspension or even mere relaxation of its application, is the exception. This Court may go beyond the strict application of the
rules only on exceptional cases when there is truly substantial compliance with the rule.54

In the case at bar, HOLCIM attached to its Petition for Certiorari before the CA a Secretary’s Certificate authorizing Mr. Paul M.
O’Callaghan (O’Callaghan), its Chief Operating Officer, to nominate, designate and appoint the corporation’s authorized
representative in court hearings and conferences and the signing of court pleadings. 55 It also attached the Special Power of Attorney
dated June 9, 2006, signed by O’Callaghan, appointing Sycip Salazar Hernandez & Gatmaitan and/or any of its lawyers to represent
HOLCIM;56 and consequently, the Verification and Certification of Non Forum Shopping signed by the authorized
representative.57 To be sure, HOLCIM, in its Reply filed in the CA, attached another Secretary’s Certificate, designating and
confirming O’Callaghan’s power to authorize Sycip Salazar Hernandez & Gatmaitan and/or any of its lawyers to file for and on
behalf of HOLCIM, the pertinent civil and/or criminal actions in Civil Case No. 725-M-89 pending before the RTC, including any
petition to be filed with the CA and/or the Supreme Court in connection with the Orders dated December 1, 2005, December 20,
2005 and June 7, 2006.58

The foregoing convinces the Court that the CA did not err in admitting HOLCIM’s petition before it. HOLCIM attached all the
necessary documents for the filing of a petition for certiorari before the CA. Indeed, there was no complete failure to attach a
Certificate of Non-Forum Shopping. In fact, there was such a certificate. While the board resolution may not have been attached,
HOLCIM complied just the same when it attached the Secretary’s Certificate dated July 17, 2006, thus proving that O’Callaghan had
the authority from the board of directors to appoint the counsel to represent them in Civil Case No. 725-M-89. The Court recognizes
the compliance made by HOLCIM in good faith since after the petitioners pointed out the said defect, HOLCIM submitted the
Secretary’s Certificate dated July 17, 2006, confirming the earlier Secretary’s Certificate dated June 9, 2006. For the Court, the
ruling in General Milling Corporation v. NLRC59 is applicable where the Court rendered a decision in favor of the petitioner despite its
failure to attach the Certification of Non- Forum Shopping. The Court held that there was substantial compliance when it eventually
submitted the required documents. Substantial justice dictates that technical and procedural rules must give way because a
deviation from the rigid enforcement of the rules will better serve the ends of justice. The Court ratiocinated:

The rules of procedure are intended to promote, rather than frustrate, the ends of justice, and while the swift unclogging of court
dockets is a laudable objective, it, nevertheless, must not be met at the expense of substantial justice. Technical and procedural
rules are intended to help secure, not suppress, the cause of justice and a deviation from the rigid enforcement of the rules may be
allowed to attain that prime objective for, after all, the dispensation of justice is the core reason for the existence of courts. 60 (Citation
omitted)

HOLCIM’s filing in the CA of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is proper.

The petitioners also argue that the CA gravely erred when it did not dismiss HOLCIM’s petition for certiorari on the ground of
improper remedy. The petitioners contend that HOLCIM should have filed an appeal because when the RTC allowed the petitioners
to adduce evidence to determine the exact amount to be paid by HOLCIM during the execution stage, it was implementing the
dispositive portion of the decision of the CA in CA-G.R. CV No. 40140 as affirmed by the Court. As ruled by the trial court, a case in
which an execution has been issued is regarded as still pending so that all proceedings on the execution are proceedings in the suit.
Accordingly, the court that rendered the judgment maintains a general supervisory control over its process of execution, and this
power carries with it the right to determine questions of fact and law, which may be involved in the execution. 61 Thus, for the
petitioners, the RTC neither acted in excess of its jurisdiction nor with grave abuse of discretion, which would call for HOLCIM to file
a petition for certiorari.62

The Court disagrees with the petitioners’ mental acrobatics. Their arguments are contrary to Section 1(f), Rule 41 of the Rules of
Court, which provides:

Sec. 1. Subject of appeal.—An appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that completely disposes of the case, or of a
particular matter therein when declared by these Rules to be appealable.

No appeal may be taken from:

xxxx

(f) an order of execution;

xxxx

In all the above instances where the judgment or final order is not appealable, the aggrieved party may file an appropriate special
civil action under Rule 65.

The foregoing provision is explicit that no appeal may be taken from an order of execution and a party who challenges such order
may file a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. 63 An order of execution, when issued with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, may be the subject of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. 64 Thus,
HOLCIM did not err in filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

HOLCIM is not estopped to question the jurisdiction of the trial court to conduct a hearing and to accept evidence on the exact
amount of royalty HOLCIM should pay the petitioners.

The petitioners argue that HOLCIM is estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the RTC in conducting a hearing on the exact
amount of royalty that HOLCIM must pay the petitioners. They allege that: (a) HOLCIM expressed willingness to pay the royalty to
whoever would be adjudged the rightful owner of the subject land; (b) HOLCIM and de Guzman did not appear in the hearing nor
oppose the Omnibus Motion dated September 28, 2004; (c) HOLCIM did not file any opposition or comment on the petitioners’
Formal Offer of Evidence, Supplement to the Motion for Execution and Motion for Alias Writ of Execution; and (d) HOLCIM is now
the new owner of de Guzman’s property. As such, it has acquired the rights, interests and liabilities of de Guzman. The petitioners
insist that HOLCIM must not only account for the royalty it paid de Guzman, but it must also turn over said payments to the
petitioners.65

HOLCIM counter-argues that when it expressed willingness to pay the royalties to whoever would be declared the rightful owner of
the subject land, it simply manifested its good faith in fulfilling its obligations. It adds that the petitioners and HOLCIM entered into an
Agreement regarding the amount of royalty it should pay to the landowner; and subsequently, the petitioners voluntarily accepted
and retained the amount of ₱694,184.22 paid by HOLCIM. In fact, HOLCIM stresses that the said amount was more than what was
stipulated in the Agreement. HOLCIM also asserts that jurisdiction is conferred by law, and not by laches, estoppel or by agreement
among the parties and such lack of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceedings. 66 Furthermore, HOLCIM avers that it
is even the DENR panel of arbitrators which has jurisdiction over the case pursuant to Section 77 of the Philippine Mining Act of
1995.67 Lastly, HOLCIM claims that it eventually acquired de Guzman’s property, maintaining that the said property did not overlap
with Esguerra’s property. Thus, HOLCIM’s ownership and quarrying operations on lands outside the disputed area would have no
bearing whatsoever on the petitioners’ claim for royalties on extractions done within the disputed area. HOLCIM also asseverates
that the obligation to turn over any royalty paid to de Guzman is not a real obligation which attaches to the disputed area or to the
land itself or which follows the property to whoever might subsequently become its owner; rather, HOLCIM argues that the obligation
is purely a personal obligation of de Guzman and thus, not transferable to HOLCIM.

What is clear is that the present case emanates from the petitioners’ desire to implement the CA decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 40140
which was affirmed by the Court in the Decision of December 27, 2002 in G.R. No. 120004. At the execution stage, the only thing
left for the trial court to do is to implement the final and executory judgment; and the dispositive portion of the decision controls the
execution of judgment. The final judgment of this Court cannot be altered or modified, except for clerical errors, misprisions or
omissions.68

In the instant case, the CA’s decision which this Court affirmed in G.R. No. 120004 rendered, among others, the following judgment:

(a) Insofar as then defendant-appellee de Guzman is concerned, the CA declared OCT No. P-3876 in her possession null
and void in relation to the disputed area of 38,641 sq m; the same CA’s decision subsequently ordered de Guzman –

[i] to segregate at her expense the disputed area of 38,641 sq m from OCT No. P-3876;

[ii] to surrender her owner’s copy of OCT No. P-3876 to the Register of Deeds of Bulacan;

[iii] to immediately vacate and surrender to then plaintiff-appellant Esguerra possession of the disputed area;

[iv] to pay and turn over to plaintiff-appellant Esguerra all the amount she received from her co-defendant Hi-
Cement Corporation (now HOLCIM) as compensation or royalty for marbles extracted or quarried from the
disputed area of 38,451 sq m beginning March 23, 1990; and

[v] to pay the costs.

(b) Insofar as HOLCIM is concerned, the CA’s decision ordered HOLCIM –

[i] to immediately cease and desist from quarrying or extracting marble from the disputed area; and

[ii] to make an accounting of the royalty it paid to de Guzman.

Indeed, the final judgment does not direct HOLCIM nor its predecessor Hi-Cement to pay a certain amount to Esguerra and his
heirs. What was required from HOLCIM to do was merely to account for the payments it made to de Guzman. Apparently, this was
not enforced. It may be deduced from the records that when the petitioners filed the Omnibus Motion dated September 28, 2004,
they asked for the examination of de Guzman and Hi-Cement (HOLCIM) under Sections 36 and 37 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.
This motion was subsequently granted by the trial court.

Sections 3669 and 3770 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court are resorted to only when the judgment remains unsatisfied, and there is a
need for the judgment obligor to appear and be examined concerning his property and income for their application to the unsatisfied
amount in the judgment. In the instant case, the decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 40140 as affirmed by the Court calls on HOLCIM to
simply make an accounting of the royalty paid to de Guzman. Unfortunately, the trial court, instead of facilitating the accounting of
payments made by HOLCIM to de Guzman, proceeded to adduce evidence on the amount of limestone extracted from the disputed
area and imposed the monetary liability on HOLCIM.

It is rather unfortunate that HOLCIM did not register a whimper upon petitioners’ presentation of evidence.1âwphi1 Notwithstanding,
it cannot be denied that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the questioned orders without giving HOLCIM
the chance to be heard. Indeed, when the decision has been rendered unenforceable on account of the undetermined amount to be
awarded, it was incumbent upon the trial court to receive evidence from both parties to determine the exact amount due to the
petitioners.71 Since HOLCIM was not given an opportunity to rebut the petitioners’ evidence, considering that the former’s
Manifestation and Motion for Ocular Inspection was denied, justice will be better served if the trial court determines first the
existence of documents relative to HOLCIM’s payments made to de Guzman, and if the same is not done, to receive further
evidence, this time, from both parties. It must be emphasized, however, that the evidence to be adduced here is in relation to the
amount of royalty paid to de Guzman by HOLCIM for marbles extracted from the disputed area of 38,451 sq m beginning March 23,
1990 up to the time HOLCIM ceased to operate in the subject area. In the event that the petitioners’ claim is beyond the subject
area and period, and HOLCIM denies such indebtedness, the governing rule should be Section 43, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, to
wit:
SEC. 43. Proceedings when indebtedness denied or another person claims the property.— If it appears that a person or
corporation, alleged to have property of the judgment obligor or to be indebted to him, claims an interest in the property adverse to
him or denies the debt, the court may authorize, by an order made to that effect, the judgment obligee to institute an action against
such person or corporation for the recovery of such interest or debt, forbid a transfer or other disposition of such interest or debt
within one hundred twenty (120) days from notice of the order, and may punish disobedience of such order as for contempt. Such
order may be modified or vacated at any time by the court which issued it, or by the court in which the action is brought, upon such
terms as may be just. (Emphasis ours)

Pursuant to this Rule, in the examination of a person, corporation, or other juridical entity who has the property of such judgment
obligor or is indebted to him (Rule 39, Section 37), and such person, corporation, or juridical entity denies an indebtedness, the
court may only authorize the judgment obligee to institute an action against such person or corporation for the recovery of such
interest or debt. Nothing in the Rules gives the court the authority to order such person or corporation to pay the judgment obligee
and the court exceeds its jurisdiction if it orders the person who denies the indebtedness to pay the same. In Atilano II v.
Asaali,72 the Court held that an "[e]xecution of a judgment can only be issued against one who is a party to the action, and not
against one who, not being a party thereto, did not have his day in court. Due process dictates that a court decision can only bind a
party to the litigation and not against innocent third parties." 73

Finally, the Court does not agree with petitioners’ argument that the person of de Guzman is "now merged in the person of HOLCIM
or that HOLCIM has assumed her personal liability or the judgment rendered against her." 74 Nothing in the records shows that
HOLCIM admitted of assuming all the liabilities of de Guzman prior to the sale of the subject property. HOLCIM, however, expresses
its willingness to pay royalty only to the rightful owner of the disputed area. Thus, in the event that the amount paid by HOLCIM to
de Guzman has been proven, de Guzman is ordered to turn over the payment to the petitioners. 75 If the petitioners insist that
HOLCIM owed them more than what it paid to de Guzman, the petitioners cannot invoke the CA’s decision which was affirmed by
the Court in G.R. No. 120004 to ask for additional royalty. As earlier discussed, this must be addressed in a separate action for the
purpose. All told, the Court finds no reversible error with the decision of the CA in nullifying the orders of the RTC for having been
issued in excess of its jurisdiction.

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated August 31, 2007 and the Resolution dated April 14, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 94838 are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 186322, July 08, 2015

ENRICO S. EULOGIO AND NATIVIDAD V. EULOGIO, Petitioners, v. PATERNO C. BELL, SR., ROGELIA CALINGASAN-BELL,

PATERNO WILLIAM BELL, JR., FLORENCE FELICIA VICTORIA BELL, PATERNO FERDINAND BELL III, AND PATERNO
BENERAÑO BELL IV, Respondents.

DECISION

SERENO, C.J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision1 in CA-G.R. SP No. 87531 which granted the
Petition for Certiorari filed by respondents and enjoined the execution sale of their family home for the satisfaction of the money
judgment awarded to petitioners in Civil Case No. 4581, and the Resolution 2 which denied petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration.

Antecedent Facts

Respondents Paterno William Bell, Jr., Florence Felicia Victoria Bell, Paterno Ferdinand Bell III, and Paterno Benerano IV (the Bell
siblings) are the unmarried children of respondent Spouses Paterno C. Bell and Rogelia Calingasan-Bell (Spouses Bell). In 1995,
the Bell siblings lodged a Complaint for annulment of documents, reconveyance, quieting of title and damages against petitioners
Enrico S. Eulogio and Natividad Eulogio (the Eulogios). It was docketed as Civil Case No. 4581 at the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Batangas City, Branch 84. The Complaint sought the annulment of the contract of sale executed by Spouses Bell over their 329-
square-meter residential house and lot, as well as the cancellation of the title obtained by petitioners by virtue of the Deed.

The RTC granted respondents' prayers, but declared Spouses Bell liable to petitioners in the amount of PI million plus 12% interest
per annum. The dispositive portion of the Decision dated 15 July 1998 reads as follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, prescinding from all the foregoing, the Court hereby declares:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

1. That the sale of the subject house and lot under Deed of Sale marked as Exhibit "F" is only an equitable mortgage in favor of the
defendants Enrico Eulogio and Natividad Eulogio. However, the mortgage cannot bind the property in question for being violative of
Chapter 2, Title 4 of the Family Code, its encumbrance not having been consented to in writing by a majority of the beneficiaries
who are the plaintiffs herein;

2. The said equitable mortgage is deemed to be an unsecured mortgage [sic] for which the Spouses Paterno C. Bell, Sr. and
Rogelia Calingasan Bell as mortgagors are liable to the defendants-spouses Enrico Eulogio and Natividad Eulogio in the amount of
P1,000,000 plus interest of 12% per annum. However, under the Fourth Party Complaint Sps. Paterno C. Bell, Sr. and Rogelia
Calingasan Bell have the right of reimbursement from fourth party defendants Nicolas Moraña and Julieta Moraña for whom their
loan of P1,000,000 was secured by Sps. Paterno C. Bell, Sr. and Rogelia Calingasan Bell. Accordingly, the fourth party defendants
Nicolas Moraña and Julieta Moraña are hereby ordered to reimburse Paterno C. Bell, Sr. and Rogelia Calingasan Bell the loan of
P1,000,000 plus interest of 12% per annum to be paid by the latter to defendants Enrico and Natividad Eulogio;

3. The house and lot in question is free from any and all encumbrances by virtue of said equitable mortgage or the purported sale;
and

4. The Deed of Sale (Exhibit "F") is null and void for being contrary to law and public policy.

Accordingly, (1) the Register of Deeds of Batangas City is hereby ordered to cancel Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-131472 in the
name of defendants Enrico S. Eulogio and Natividad Eulogio and to reconstitute (sic) Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-680-(5997)
as "family home" of the plaintiffs Florence Felicia Victoria C. Bell, Paterno William C. Bell Jr., Paterno Ferdinand C. Bell III, Paterno
Benerano C. Bell IV and fourth party plaintiffs Paterno C. Bell Sr. and Rogelia Calingasan Bell; or in the alternative to issue a new
Transfer Certificate of Title under the same tenor;

2. The City Assessor of Batangas City is hereby directed to issue a tax declaration covering the said subject property as family
home for the said plaintiffs and fourth party plaintiffs Paterno C. Bell and Rogelia Calingasan Bell; and

3. Defendants Enrico Eulogio and Natividad Eulogio are ordered to pay the plaintiffs attorney's fees and litigation expenses of
P35,000.00, as the plaintiffs have been compelled to litigate to protect their property rights, and costs. 3
Both petitioners and respondents appealed to the CA, but the trial court's Decision was affirmed en toto. Spouses Bell later brought
the case to this Court to question their liability to petitioners in the amount of P1 million plus interest. The Court, however, dismissed
their Petition for failure to show any reversible error committed by the CA. 4 Thereafter, entry of judgment was made.5chanrobleslaw

On 9 June 2004 the RTC issued a Writ of Execution, as a result of which respondents' property covered by the newly reconstituted
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 54208 [formerly RT-680 (5997)] was levied on execution. Upon motion by respondents, the
trial court, on 31 August 2004, ordered the lifting of the writ of execution on the ground that the property was a family
home.6chanrobleslaw

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the lifting of the writ of execution. Invoking Article 160 of the Family Code, they
posited that the current market value of the property exceeded the statutory limit of P300,000 considering that it was located in a
commercial area, and that Spouses Bell had even sold it to them for P1 million. 7chanrobleslaw

The RTC, on 13 October 2004, set the case for hearing to determine the present value of the family home of respondents. It also
appointed a Board of Appraisers to conduct a study on the prevailing market value of their house and lot.8chanrobleslaw

Respondents sought reconsideration of the above directives and asked the RTC to cite petitioners for contempt because of forum-
shopping.9 They argued that petitioners' bid to determine the present value of the subject property was just a ploy to re-litigate an
issue that had long been settled with finality.

The RTC, however, denied the Motion for Reconsideration10 of respondents and directed the commissioners to canvass prospective
buyers of their house and lot.11chanrobleslaw
On 23 November 2004, respondents filed a Petition for Certiorari and Injunction before the CA,12 where it was docketed as CA-G.R.
SP No. 87531.

Subsequently, the RTC issued on 25 November 2004 an Order 13 dispensing with the valuation report of the commissioners and
directing the issuance of a writ of execution. Consequently, respondents filed before the CA a Supplemental Petition with an urgent
prayer for a temporary restraining order.14chanrobleslaw

The CA eventually enjoined15 the execution sale set on 22 December 200416 by the RTC.

On 31 July 2008, the CA rendered its Decision granting respondents' Petition for Certiorari, but it rejected their theory that res
judicata had already set in.

The appellate court ruled that the RTC Decision, which had become final and executory, only declared respondents' house and lot
as a family home. Since the issue of whether it may be sold in execution was incidental to the execution of the aforesaid Decision,
there was as yet no res judicata.

Still, the CA found that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering the execution sale of the subject family home
after finding that its present value exceeded the statutory limit. The basis for the valuation of a family home under Article 160,
according to the appellate court, is its actual value at the time of its constitution and not the market/present value; therefore, the trial
court's order was contrary to law.17chanrobleslaw

On 09 February 2009,18 the CA denied petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration. Hence, this Petition.

Issues

The issues to be resolved are: (1) whether petitioners are guilty of forum-shopping; (2) whether a hearing to determine the value of
respondents' family home for purposes of execution under Article 160 of the Family Code is barred under the principle of res
judicata; and (3) whether respondents' family home may be sold on execution under Article 160 of the Family Code.

The Court's Ruling

The Court denies the Petition for lack of merit.

Petitioners are not guilty of forum-shopping.

Forum shopping can be committed in three ways: (1) by filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action and with the same
prayer, the previous case not having been resolved yet (where the ground for dismissal is litis pendentia); (2) by filing multiple cases
based on the same cause of action and with the same prayer, the previous case having been finally resolved (where the ground for
dismissal is res judicata); and (3) by filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action but with different prayers, or by splitting
of causes of action (where the ground for dismissal is also either litis pendentia or res judicata).19chanrobleslaw

The essence of forum shopping is the filing of multiple suits involving the same parties for the same cause of action, either
simultaneously or successively, for the purpose of obtaining a favorable judgment through means other than by appeal or
certiorari.20 Forum shopping does not apply to cases that arise from an initiatory or original action that has been elevated by way of
appeal or certiorari to higher or appellate courts or authorities. This is so because the issues in the appellate courts necessarily
differ from those in the lower court, and the appealed cases are but a continuation of the original case and treated as only one
case.21chanrobleslaw

Respondents contend that the Decision in Civil Case No. 4581, which declared that property in dispute was a family home, had long
attained finality. Accordingly, respondents maintain that petitioners' bid to re-litigate the present value of the property in the course of
the execution proceedings is barred by res judicata, and that petitioners should be cited for contempt of court because of forum-
shopping.22chanrobleslaw

Recall that although the trial court had nullified the Deed of Sale over respondents' family home in Civil Case No. 4581 for lack of a
written consent from its beneficiaries as required under Article 158 of the Family Code, 23 the court still recognized the validity of the
transaction as an unsecured loan. Hence, it declared Spouses Bell liable to petitioners in the amount of PI million plus 12% interest
per annum.

Petitioners' bid to satisfy the above judgment cannot be considered an act of forum shopping. Simply, the execution of a decision is
just the fruit and end of a suit and is very aptly called the life of the law. 24 It is not separate from the main case. Similarly, the filing of
the instant Petition as a continuation of the execution proceedings does not constitute forum shopping. Seeking a reversal of an
adverse judgment or order by appeal or certiorari does not constitute forum shopping. Such remedies are sanctioned and provided
for by the rules.25chanrobleslaw

Indeed, as will be presently discussed, the causes of action in the main proceedings in Civil Case No. 4581 and the consequent
execution proceedings are identical. Suffice it to say, however, that the danger of a multiplicity of suits upon one and the same
cause of action, which the judicial policy against forum shopping seeks to prevent, does not exist in this case.

Re-litigating the issue of the value of respondents' family home is barred by res judicata.
Res judicata (meaning, a "matter adjudged") is a fundamental principle of law that precludes parties from re-litigating issues actually
litigated and determined by a prior and final judgment. 26 Under the 1997 Rules of Court, there are two aspects of res judicata,
namely: bar by prior judgment 27 and conclusiveness of judgment.28chanrobleslaw

There is "bar by prior judgment" when, as between the first case in which the judgment has been rendered and the second case that
is sought to be barred, there is an identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action. In this instance, the judgment in the first
case constitutes an absolute bar to the second action. The judgment or decree on the merits of the court of competent jurisdiction
concludes the litigation between the parties, as well as their privies, and constitutes a bar to a new action or suit involving the same
cause of action before the same or any other tribunal.29chanrobleslaw

On the other hand, there is "conclusiveness of judgment" where there is an identity of parties in the first and second cases, but no
identity of causes of action. Under this rule, the first judgment is conclusive only as to those matters actually and directly
controverted and determined and not as to matters merely involved therein. Stated differently, any right, fact, or matter in issue
directly adjudicated or necessarily involved in the determination of an action before a competent court in which judgment is
rendered on the merits is conclusively settled by the judgment therein and cannot again be litigated between the parties and their
privies whether or not the claim, demand, purpose, or subject matter of the two actions is the same. 30chanrobleslaw

In this case, the trial court's final decision in Civil Case No. 4581 bars petitioners' move to have the property in dispute levied on
execution.

There is no question that the main proceedings in Civil Case No. 4581 and the subsequent execution proceedings involved the
same parties31 and subject matter.32 For these reasons, respondents argue that the execution sale of the property in dispute under
Article 160 of the Family Code is barred by res judicata, since the trial court has already determined that the value of the property
fell within the statutory limit.

The CA held that the trial court's Decision, which is indisputably final, only settled the issue of whether the property in dispute was a
family home. The CA ruled thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
We rule that there is no res judicata.

At the outset, let it be emphasized that the decision of the trial court dated July 15, 1998, which has become final and executory,
only declares the subject property as a family home. As a matter of fact, private respondents never questioned that such property is
a family home, and consequently, the issue as to whether or not the property is family home is settled and res judicata lies only with
respect to this issue.

But the issue as to whether or not a family home could be the subject of an execution sale was not resolved by the trial court. This
issue[was] raised only when the writ of execution was issued and hence, [was not] resolved with finality. Thus, the issue before this
Court is whether or not the [f]amily [h]ome of petitioners under the facts and circumstances of the case could be the subject of a writ
of execution and sold at public auction.33
The Court disagrees with the CA.

"Cause of action" is the act or omission by which a party violates the right of another. 34 It may be argued that the cause of action in
the main proceedings was the sale of the property in dispute, while in the execution proceedings it was the indebtedness of
Spouses Bell to petitioners.

The settled rule, however, is that identity of causes of action does not mean absolute identity. Otherwise, a party could easily
escape the operation of res judicata by changing the form of the action or the relief sought. 35 The test to determine whether the
causes of action are identical is to ascertain whether the same evidence will sustain both actions, or whether there is an identity of
the facts essential to the maintenance of the two actions. If the same facts or evidence would sustain both, the two actions are
considered the same, and a judgment in the first case would be a bar to the subsequent action. Hence, a party cannot, by varying
the form of action or adopting a different method of presenting the case, escape the operation of the principle that one and the same
cause of action shall not be twice litigated between the same parties or their privies. 36chanrobleslaw

Among several tests resorted to in ascertaining whether two suits relate to a single or common cause of action are: (1) whether the
same evidence would support and sustain both the first and the second causes of action; and (2) whether the defenses in one case
may be used to substantiate the complaint in the other. Also fundamental is the test for determining whether the cause of action in
the second case existed at the time of the filing of the first complaint. 37chanrobleslaw

Applying the above guidelines, the Court finds that the entirety of Civil Case No. 4581 - including the bid of petitioners to execute the
money judgment awarded to them by the trial court - is founded on a common cause of action. Records show that the sole evidence
submitted by petitioners during the execution proceedings was the Deed of Sale, which the trial court had nullified in the main
proceedings. Concomitantly, the very same defense raised by petitioners in the main proceedings, i.e., that they had bought the
property from Spouses Bell for P1 million - was utilized to substantiate the claim that the current value of respondents' family home
was actually PI million. In fact, the trial court's order for respondents' family home to be levied on execution was solely based on the
price stated in the nullified Deed of Sale.

Res judicata applies, considering that the parties are litigating over the same property. Moreover, the same contentions and
evidence advanced by the petitioners to substantiate their claim over respondents' family home have already been used to support
their arguments in the main proceedings.
Any lingering doubt on the application of res judicata to this case should be put to rest by the trial court's discussion of the nature
and alienability of the property in dispute, to wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The second issue is about the allegation of the plaintiffs that the family home which has been constituted on the house and lot in
question is exempt from alienation and that its value does not exceed P300,000. Paterno Bell, Sr. testified that the two-storey house
was built in 1947 and was made of wood and hollow blocks. He inherited it in 1976 from his parents and has been living there with
his family. In 1976, when an extra-judicial settlement was made of the estate of his parents, the fair market value of the house was
P70,000.

City Assessor Rodezinda Pargas testified and presented Tax Declaration and others, (Exhibit "J", Tax Declaration No. 005-047)
beginning 1985 showing that the subject lot with an area of 329 sq. m. had a fair market value of P76,000.00 and the residential
house located thereon of P50,000.00, for a total value of P126,000.00. She testified that during the prior years the assessed values
were lower. This shows that the limit of the value of P300,000.00 under Article 157, Title 5 of the Family Code has not been
exceeded. The testimonies of the plaintiffs who are children of Sps. Paterno Bell, Sr. and Rogelia Calingasan Bell show that they
had lived in that house together with their said parents. The Court therefore concludes that the said house is a family home under
Chapter 2, Title 5 of the Family Code. Its alienation by the said Spouses without the written consent of the majority of the
children/plaintiffs is null and void for being contrary to law and public policy as enunciated in Art. 158 of the Family
Code.38 [Underscoring supplied]
The foregoing points plainly show that the issue of whether the property in dispute exceeded the statutory limit of P300,000 has
already been determined with finality by the trial court. Its finding necessarily meant that the property is exempt from execution.
Assuming for the sake of argument that causes of action in the main proceedings and in the execution proceedings are different, the
parties are still barred from litigating the issue of whether respondents' family home may be sold on execution sale under the
principle of conclusiveness of judgment.

Respondents' family home cannot be sold on execution under Article 160 of the Family Code.

Unquestionably, the family home is exempt from execution as expressly provided for in Article 153 of the Family
Code.39chanrobleslaw

It has been said that the family home is a real right that is gratuitous, inalienable and free from attachment. 40 The great controlling
purpose and policy of the Constitution is the protection or the preservation of the homestead - the dwelling place. A houseless,
homeless population is a burden upon the energy, industry, and morals of the community to which it belongs. No greater calamity,
not tainted with crime, can befall a family than to be expelled from the roof under which it has been gathered and sheltered. 41 The
family home cannot be seized by creditors except in special cases.42chanrobleslaw

The nature and character of the property that debtors may claim to be exempt, however, are determined by the exemption statute.
The exemption is limited to the particular kind of property or the specific articles prescribed by the statute; the exemption cannot
exceed the statutory limit.43chanrobleslaw

Articles 155 and 160 of the Family Code specify the exceptions mentioned in Article 153, to wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
ARTICLE 155. The family home shall be exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment except:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

(1) For nonpayment of taxes;

(2) For debts incurred prior to the constitution of the family home;

(3) For debts secured by mortgages on the premises before or after such constitution; and

(4) For debts due to laborers, mechanics, architects, builders, materialmen and others who have rendered service or furnished
material for the construction of the building.

ARTICLE 160. When a creditor whose claims is not among those mentioned in Article 155 obtains a judgment in his favor, and he
has reasonable grounds to believe that the family home is actually worth more than the maximum amount fixed in Article 157, he
may apply to the court which rendered the judgment for an order directing the sale of the property under execution. The court shall
so order if it finds that the actual value of the family home exceeds the maximum amount allowed by law as of the time of its
constitution. If the increased actual value exceeds the maximum allowed in Article 157 and results from subsequent voluntary
improvements introduced by the person or persons constituting the family home, by the owner or owners of the property, or by any
of the beneficiaries, the same rule and procedure shall apply.

At the execution sale, no bid below the value allowed for a family home shall be considered. The proceeds shall be applied first to
the amount mentioned in Article 157, and then to the liabilities under the judgment and the costs. The excess, if any, shall be
delivered to the judgment debtor.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Related to the foregoing is Article 157 of the Family Code, which provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
ARTICLE 157. The actual value of the family home shall not exceed, at the time of its constitution, the amount of three hundred
thousand pesos in urban areas, and two hundred thousand pesos in rural areas, or such amounts as may hereafter be fixed by law.

In any event, if the value of the currency changes after the adoption of this Code, the value most favorable for the constitution of a
family home shall be the basis of evaluation.
For purposes of this Article, urban areas are deemed to include chartered cities and municipalities whose annual income at least
equals that legally required for chartered cities. All others are deemed to be rural areas. [Underscoring supplied]
The minutes of the deliberation by the drafters of Family Code on Article 160 are enlightening, to wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Justice Puno inquired if the above Article [160] is still necessary. In reply, Judge Diy opined that the above Article is intended to
cover a situation where the family home is already worth P500,000 or P1M. Justice Reyes stated that it is possible that a family
home, originally valued at P300,000. later appreciated to almost P1M because of improvements made, like roads and
plazas. Justice Caguioa, however, made a distinction between voluntary and involuntary improvements in the sense that if the value
of the family home exceeded the maximum amount because of voluntary improvements by the one establishing the family home,
the Article will apply; but if it is through an involuntary improvement, like the conversion into a residential area or the establishment
of roads and other facilities, the one establishing the family home should not be punished by making his home liable to creditors. He
suggested that the matter be clarified in the provision.

xxxx

Prof. Bautista objected to the phrase "is worth" since if they will specify that the family home is worth more than the maximum
amount at the time it was constituted, they will avoid the suit because the creditor will be given proper warning. Justice Puno opined
that this is a question of fact. Justice Caguioa added that, under the second sentence, there will be a preliminary determination as to
whether the family home exceeds the maximum amount allowed by law.
xxxx

Justice Caguia accordingly modified the last sentence as follows:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

If the excess in actual value over that allowed in Article 157 is due to subsequent voluntary improvements by the person or persons
constituting the family home or by the owner or owners of the property, the same rules and procedure shall
apply.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Prof. Bautista objected to the above provision, because it will in effect penalize the owner for improving the family home. On the
other hand, Justice Puno opined that the provision covers only the excess in actual value over that allowed by law. Judge Diy added
that the owner may improve the family home up to P300,000. Justice Caguioa stated that without the above provision, one can
borrow money, put it all on improvement of the family home even beyond the maximum value of a family home and, thereby, exempt
it from levy on the part of the creditor. He added that anyway, if one voluntarily improves his family home out of his money, nobody
can complain because there are no creditors.

Justice Puno posed the question: What is "due to the subsequent improvement?" Is it the "excess" or is it the "increase", or is it the
"increase", which constitutes the "excess"? In reply. Justice Reyes opined that it is the "increase" which constituted the
"excess". Justice Puno, Justice Reyes and Justice Caguioa modified the last sentence as follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
If the increase in actual value exceeds that maximum allowed in Article 157 and results from subsequent voluntary improvements
introduced by the person or persons constituting the family home or by the owner or owners of the property, the same rule and
procedure shall apply.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Prof. Bautista commented that the phrase "increase in actual value" does not include the original value. Justice Puno suggested that
they just say "increased actual value", which the Committee approved.44 [Underscoring supplied]
To summarize, the exemption of the family home from execution, forced sale or attachment is limited to P300,000 in urban areas
and P200,000 in rural areas, unless those maximum values are adjusted by law. If it is shown, though, that those amounts do not
match the present value of the peso because of currency fluctuations, the amount of exemption shall be based on the value that is
most favorable to the constitution of a family home. Any amount in excess of those limits can be applied to the payment of any of the
obligations specified in Articles 155 and 160.

Any subsequent improvement or enlargement of the family home by the persons constituting it, its owners, or any of its beneficiaries
will still be exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment provided the following conditions obtain: (a) the actual value of the
property at the time of its constitution has been determined to fall below the statutory limit; and (b) the improvement or enlargement
does not result in an increase in its value exceeding the statutory limit.45 Otherwise, the family home can be the subject of a forced
sale, and any amount above the statutory limit is applicable to the obligations under Articles 155 and 160.

Certainly, the humane considerations for which the law surrounds the family home with immunities from levy do not include the
intent to enable debtors to thwart the just claims of their creditors.46chanrobleslaw

Petitioners maintain that this case falls under the exceptions to the exemption of the family home from execution or forced sale.
They claim that the actual value of respondents' family home exceeds the P300,000 limit in urban areas. This fact is supposedly
shown by the Deed of Sale whereby private respondents agreed to sell the property for PI million way back in 1995. Therefore, the
RTC only properly ordered the execution sale of the property under Article 160 to satisfy the money judgment awarded to them in
Civil Case No. 4581.47chanrobleslaw

As earlier discussed, it has been judicially determined with finality that the property in dispute is a family home, and that its value at
the time of its constitution was within the statutory limit. Moreover, respondents have timely claimed the exemption of the property
from execution.48 On the other hand, there is no question that the money judgment awarded to petitioners falls under the ambit of
Article 160.

Notwithstanding petitioners' right to enforce the trial court's money judgment, however, they cannot obtain its satisfaction at the
expense of respondents' rights over their family home. It is axiomatic that those asserting the protection of an exception from an
exemption must bring themselves clearly within the terms of the exception and satisfy any statutory requirement for its
enforcement.49chanrobleslaw

To warrant the execution sale of respondents' family home under Article 160, petitioners needed to establish these facts: (1) there
was an increase in its actual value; (2) the increase resulted from voluntary improvements on the property introduced by the persons
constituting the family home, its owners or any of its beneficiaries; and (3) the increased actual value exceeded the maximum
allowed under Article 157.

During the execution proceedings, none of those facts was alleged - much less proven - by petitioners. The sole evidence presented
was the Deed of Sale, but the trial court had already determined with finality that the contract was null, and that the actual
transaction was an equitable mortgage. Evidently, when petitioners and Spouses Bell executed the Deed of Sale in 1990, the price
stated therein was not the actual value of the property in dispute.

The Court thus agrees with the CA's conclusion that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering the sale on
execution of the property in dispute under Article 160. The trial court had already determined with finality that the property was a
family home, and there was no proof that its value had increased beyond the statutory limit due to voluntary improvements by
respondents. Yet, it ordered the execution sale of the property. There is grave abuse of discretion when one acts in a capricious,
whimsical, arbitrary or despotic manner in the exercise of one's judgment, as in this case in which the assailed order is bereft of any
factual or legal justification. 50chanrobleslaw

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. Accordingly, the Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 87531, enjoining the trial court from proceeding with the sale of the family home of respondents,
is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 200751, August 17, 2015

MONICO LIGTAS, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:
"Bakit niya babawiin ang aking saka?" tanong ni Tata Selo. "Dinaya ko na ba siya sa partihan? Tinuso ko na ba siya? Siya ang
may-ari ng lupa at kasama lang niya ako. Hindi ba't kaya maraming nagagalit sa akin ay dahil sa ayaw kong magpamigay ng kahit
isang pinangko kung anihan?"

Hindi pa rin umaalis sa harap ng istaked si Tata Selo. Nakahawak pa rin siya sa rehas. Nakatingin siya sa labas ngunit wala siyang
sino mang tinitingnan.

"Binabawi po niya ang aking saka," sumbong ni Tata Selo. "Saan papo ako pupunta kung wala na akong saka?"

Habang nakakapit sa rehas at nakatingin sa labas, sinasabi niyang lahat ay kinuha na sa kanila, lahat, ay! ang lahat ay kinuha na
sa kanila.

- "TataSelo" (1963) by Rogelio R. Sikat

The uncontested declaration of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board that Monico Ligtas was a tenant negates a
finding of theft beyond reasonable doubt. Tenants having rights to the harvest cannot be deemed to have taken their own produce.

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Court of Appeals Decision2 dated
March 16, 2010 and the Resolution3 dated February 2, 2012.4 The Court of Appeals affirmed the Decision5 of the Regional Trial
Court finding Monico Ligtas (Ligtas) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of theft. 6

Ligtas was charged with the crime of theft under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code. 7 The Information
provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
That on or about the 29th day of June 2000 at Sitio Lamak, Barangay San Juan, Municipality of Sogod, Province of Southern Leyte,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent of gain, entered into the abaca
plantation belonging to one Anecita Pacate, and once inside the plantation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
harvested 1,000 kilos of abaca fibers, valued at Php29,000.00 at Php29.00 per kilo, without the consent of said owner, Anecita
Pacate, to her damage and prejudice in the aforestated amount of Twenty Nine Thousand Pesos (Php29,000.00), Philippine
currency.

CONTRARY TO LAW.8ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Ligtas pleaded not guilty.9

The prosecution presented five (5) witnesses during trial: Efren Cabero (Cabero), Modesto Cipres (Cipres), Anecita Pacate, SPO2
Enrique Villaruel, and Ernesto Pacate.10

According to the prosecution witnesses, Anecita Pacate was the owner of an abaca plantation situated at Sitio Lamak, Barangay
San Juan, Sogod, Southern Leyte. On June 29, 2000, Cabero, the plantation's administrator, and several men, including Cipres,
went to the plantation to harvest abaca upon Anecita Pacate's instructions. At about 10:00 a.m., Cabero and his men were surprised
to find Ligtas harvesting abaca at the plantation. Ligtas was accompanied by three (3) unidentified men. Allegedly, Ligtas threatened
that there would be loss of life if they persisted in harvesting the abaca. Cabero reported the incident to Anecita Pacate and the
police.11

On July 2, 2000, Cabero and Cipres went back to the plantation and conducted a survey on the condition of the plantation. They
found that 1,000 kilos of abaca, valued at P28.00 per kilo, were harvested by Ligtas. 12

On July 3, 2000, Ligtas and Anecita Pacate confronted each other before the Sogod Police Station. 13 Ligtas admitted to harvesting
the abaca but claimed that he was the plantation owner.14

The defense presented three (3) witnesses during trial: Ligtas; Pablo Palo, his neighbor; and Delia Ligtas, his wife. 15 According to
Ligtas, he had been a tenant of Anecita Pacate and her late husband, Andres Pacate since 1993. 16 Andres Pacate installed him as
tenant of the 1.5 to two hectares of land involved in the criminal case.17

Ligtas allegedly "made his first harvest in 1997."18 He then gave Anecita Pacate her share to the harvest. 19 However, he could not
remember the exact amount anymore.20 Previously, Ligtas and Pablo Palo were workers in another land, around 15 hectares,
owned by Anecita Pacate and Andres Pacate.21

Ligtas alleged that on June 28, 2000, Anecita Pacate sent workers to harvest abaca from the land he cultivated. Ligtas prevented
the men from harvesting the abaca since he was the rightful tenant of the land. 22

Furthermore, Ligtas denied harvesting abaca at the plantation on June 29, 2000. He claimed that he was with Cabero and Cipres
attending a barangay fiesta at Sitio Hubasan, San Juan, Sogod, Southern Leyte, when the alleged harvesting happened. 23

Meanwhile, Ligtas filed a Complaint before the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) of Sogod, Southern
Leyte for Maintenance of Peaceful Possession on November 21, 2000. 24 On January 22, 2002, the DARAB rendered the
Decision25 ruling that Ligtas was a bona fide tenant of the land. 26

While records are bereft as to when the DARAB Decision was formally offered as evidence before the trial court, records are clear
that the DARAB Decision was considered by both the trial court27 and Court of Appeals28 and without any objection on the part of the
People of the Philippines.29
In the Decision dated August 16, 2006, the Regional Trial Court held that "the prosecution was able to prove the elements of
theft[.]"30 Ligtas' "defense of tenancy was not supported by concrete and substantial evidence nor was his claim of harvest sharing
between him and [Anecita Pacate] duly corroborated by any witness."31 His "defense of alibi cannot prevail over the positive
identification ... by prosecution witnesses." 32

The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

WHEREFORE, finding the accused Monico Ligtas guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Theft, this court hereby renders
judgment, sentencing him:

1. To suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years, nine (9) months and ten (10) days as minimum to eight (8)
years and eight (8) months as maximum;cralawlawlibrary

2. To indemnify the offende[d] party:

a. The amount of P29,000.00 for the value of the abaca stole[n];cralawlawlibrary

b. The amount of P5000.00 as moral damages;cralawlawlibrary

c. The amount of P10,000.00 as litigation expenses/attorney's fees;cralawlawlibrary

3. To pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.33ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
I

The Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the trial court.34 According to it, "the burden to prove the existence of the tenancy
relationship"35 belonged to Ligtas. He was not able to establish all the essential elements of a tenancy agreement. 36

The Court of Appeals declared that Ligtas' reliance on the DARAB Decision "declaring him as a bonafide tenant of the . . . land is
irrelevant in the case at bar":37
Jurisprudence is replete with cases declaring that "findings of or certifications issued by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform, or his
authorized representative, in a given locality concerning the presence or absence of a tenancy relationship between the contending
parties, are merely preliminary or provisional and are not binding upon the courts.["] 38ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
As to the ownership of the land, the Court of Appeals held that Ligtas had taken conflicting positions. While he claimed to be a
legitimate tenant, Ligtas also assailed Anecita Pacate's title over the land. Under Rule 131, Section 2 of the Rules of Court, a tenant
cannot deny the title of his or her landlord at the time of the commencement of the tenancy relation. 39

The Court of Appeals remained unconvinced as to Ligtas' allegations on ownership. "He claims that the parcel of land owned by
[Anecita Pacate] is different from the subject abaca land. However, such assertion was based merely on the testimony of the
municipal assessor, not an expert competent to identify parcels of land."40

More importantly, the Court of Appeals ruled that Ligtas committed theft by harvesting abaca from Anecita Pacate's
plantation.41 Ligtas had constructive possession of the subject of the theft without the owner's consent. 42 "The subject of the crime
need not be carried away or actually taken out from the land in order to consummate the crime of theft." 43

Furthermore, Ligtas' argument that the abaca did not constitute as personal property under the meaning of Article 308 of the
Revised Penal Code was erroneous. 44 Following the definition of personal property, the abaca hemp was "capable of appropriation
[and] [could] be sold and carried away from one place to another."45 The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's finding that about
1,000 kilos of abaca were already harvested.46 Hence, all the elements of theft under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code were
sufficiently established by the prosecution.

The Court of Appeals ruled that Ligtas' defense of alibi could not excuse him from criminal liability.47 His alibi was doubtfully
established. "[W]here an accused's alibi is established only by himself, his relatives and friends, his denial of culpability should be
accorded the strictest scrutiny."48

Ligtas' attack on the credibility of the witnesses did not prosper. 49 He failed to show that the case was initiated only through Anecita
Pacate's quest for revenge or to ensure that Ligtas would be evicted from the land. 50

The Court of Appeals dismissed Ligtas' appeal and affirmed the trial court's Decision finding Ligtas guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of theft under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code. 51 The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the instant Appeal is DISMISSED. Accordingly, the assailed Decision dated . . . August 16, 2006 of the Regional
Trial Court of Sogod, Southern Leyte, Branch 39, in Criminal Case No. R-225, finding accused-appellant Monico Ligtas guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of Theft under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code, is hereby AFFIRMED in all respects.
SO ORDERED.52ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Ligtas filed a Motion for Reconsideration,53 which the Court of Appeals denied on February 2, 2012. 54

II

On April 4, 2012, Ligtas filed this Petition assailing the Court of Appeals Decision and Resolution. 55 This court required People of the
Philippines to file its Comment on the Petition within 10 days from notice. 56

The issues for consideration of this court are:

First, whether questions of fact may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court;cralawlawlibrary

Second, whether the DARAB Decision, finding petitioner Monico Ligtas as tenant of the land owned by private complainant Anecita
Pacate and located at Sitio Lamak, Barangay San Juan, Sogod, Southern Leyte is conclusive or can be taken judicial notice of in a
criminal case for theft; and

Third, whether the Court of Appeals committed reversible error when it upheld the conviction of petitioner Monico Ligtas for theft
under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code.

The Petition is meritorious.

III

Petitioner argues that the findings of fact of both the trial court and Court of Appeals must be revisited for being "conclusions without
citation of specific evidence on record and premised on the supposed absence of evidence on the claim of petitioner [as] tenant." 57

Only questions of law are allowed in a petition for review under Rule 4558 of the Rules of Court.59 Factual findings of the Regional
Trial Court are conclusive and binding on this court when affirmed by the Court of Appeals. 60 This court has differentiated between a
question of law and question of fact:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
A question of law exists when the doubt or controversy concerns the correct application of law or jurisprudence to a certain set of
facts; or when the issue does not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented, the truth or falsehood of
facts being admitted. A question of fact exists when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of facts or when the
query invites calibration of the whole evidence considering mainly the credibility of the witnesses, the existence and relevancy of
specific surrounding circumstances as well as their relation to each other and to the whole, and the probability of the
situation.61 (Emphasis supplied)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Petitioner admits that the Petition raises substantially factual issues that are beyond the scope of the Rule he seeks redress
from.62 However, there are exceptions to the rule that only questions of law should be the subject of a petition for review under Rule
45:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures, (2) when the inference made is manifestly
mistaken, absurd or impossible, (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion, (4) when the judgment is based on misapprehension of
facts, (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting, (6) when in making its findings, the CA went beyond the issues of the case, or its
findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee, (7) when the CA's findings are contrary to those by
the trial court, (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based, (9) when the acts
set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent, (10) when the findings
of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record, or (11) when the CA
manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different
conclusion.63 (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
This court has held before that a re-examination of the facts of the case is justified "when certain material facts and circumstances
had been overlooked by the trial court which, if taken into account, would alter the result of the case in that they would introduce an
element of reasonable doubt which would entitle the accused to acquittal."64

The issue of tenancy, in that whether a person is an agricultural tenant or not, is generally a question of fact. 65 To be precise,
however, the existence of a tenancy relationship is a legal conclusion based on facts presented corresponding to the statutory
elements of tenancy.66

The Court of Appeals committed reversible error in its assailed Decision when it held that all the essential elements of the crime of
theft were duly proven by the prosecution despite petitioner having been pronounced a bona fide tenant of the land from which he
allegedly stole.67 A review of the records of the case is, thus, proper to arrive at a just and equitable resolution.

IV

Petitioner claims that private complainant's filing of criminal charges was motivated by ill will and revenge. 68 The charges were
designed to remove petitioner from the land he has legitimately occupied as tenant. 69 Telling is the fact that petitioner filed his
Complaint before the DARAB on November 21, 2000, while the Information for Theft was filed on December 8, 2000. 70
Petitioner argues that he has sufficiently established his status as private complainant's tenant. 71 The DARAB Decision is entitled to
respect, even finality, as the Department of Agrarian Reform is the administrative agency vested with primary jurisdiction and has
acquired expertise on matters relating to tenancy relationship.72

The findings of the DARAB were also supported by substantial evidence.73 To require petitioner to prove tenancy relationship
through evidence other than the DARAB Decision and the testimonies of the witnesses is absurd and goes beyond the required
quantum of evidence, which is substantial evidence. 74

Also, according to petitioner, the DARAB Decision has attained finality since private complainant did not file an appeal. The
DARAB's finding as to the parties' tenancy relationship constitutes as res judicata.75

On the other hand, respondent argues that the Court of Appeals correctly disregarded the DARAB Decision. 76 The trial court could
not have taken judicial notice of the DARAB Decision:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
While the DARAB . . . ruled that petitioner is a bonafide tenant of Pacate, courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the
contents of the records of other cases even when such cases have been tried or are pending in the same court, and notwithstanding
the fact that both cases may have been heard or are actually pending before the same judge. 77 (Citation
omitted)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Moreover, according to respondent, petitioner invokes conflicting defenses: that there is a legitimate tenancy relationship between
him and private complainant and that he did not take the abaca hemp.78 Nevertheless, respondent maintains that petitioner failed to
prove all the essential elements of a tenancy relationship between him and private complainant. 79 Private complainant did not
consent to the alleged tenancy relationship.80 Petitioner also failed to provide evidence as to any sharing of harvest between the
parties.81

We hold that a DARAB decision on the existence of a tenancy relationship is conclusive and binding on courts if supported by
substantial evidence.

Generally, decisions in administrative cases are not binding on criminal proceedings. This court has ruled in a number of cases
that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
It is indeed a fundamental principle of administrative law that administrative cases are independent from criminal actions for the
same act or omission. Thus, an absolution from a criminal charge is not a bar to an administrative prosecution, or vice versa. One
thing is administrative liability; quite another thing is the criminal liability for the same act.

....

Thus, considering the difference in the quantum of evidence, as well as the procedure followed and the sanctions imposed in
criminal and administrative proceedings, the findings and conclusions in one should not necessarily be binding on the other.
Notably, the evidence presented in the administrative case may not necessarily be the same evidence to be presented in the
criminal cases.82 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
However, this case does not involve an administrative charge stemming from the same set of facts involved in a criminal
proceeding. This is not a case where one act results in both criminal and administrative liability. DARAB Case No. VIII-319-SL-2000
involves a determination of whether there exists a tenancy relationship between petitioner and private complainant, while Criminal
Case No. R-225 involves determination of whether petitioner committed theft. However, the tenancy relationship is a factor in
determining whether all the elements of theft were proven by the prosecution.

In its Decision dated January 22, 2002, the DARAB found:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

All the necessary requisites in order to establish tenancy relationship as required in the above-quoted Supreme Court ruling, has
been established by the evidence submitted by plaintiff; And these evidences were not controverted by any evidence submitted by
the respondent.

In fine, this board found plaintiff a bonafide tenant of the land in question and as such is entitled to a security of tenure, in which
case he shall not be dispossessed of his holdings by the landowner except for any of the causes provided by law and only after the
same has been proved before, and the dispossession is authorized by the Court and in the judgment that is final and
executory[.]83 (Citations omitted)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The dispositive portion of the DARAB Decision provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, premises being considered, judgment is hereby rendered, finding Monico Ligtas a bonafide tenant of the land
subject in this case and well described in paragraph three (3) in the complaint, and ordering as follows, to wit:

1. The respondent and all other persons acting for and in her behalf to maintain plaintiff in the peaceful possession
of the land in dispute;cralawlawlibrary

2. The MARO of Sogod, Southern Leyte, and concurrently the cluster Manager of Sogod Bay DAR Cluster to call
the parties and assist them in the execution of a leasehold contract covering the land in dispute, and for the
parties to respect and obey such call of the said MARO in compliance with the legal mandate.

3. Ordering the respondent to pay plaintiff the amount of Five Thousand (P5,000.00) Pesos representing the
expenses incurred by plaintiff in vindicating his right and other actual expenses incurred in this litigation.
Other relief sought are hereby ordered dismissed for lack of evidence.

No cost.

SO DECIDED.84ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Private complainant did not appeal the DARAB's findings.

Findings of fact of administrative agencies in the exercise of their quasi-judicial powers are entitled to respect if supported by
substantial evidence.85 This court is not tasked to weigh again "the evidence submitted before the administrative body and to
substitute its own judgment [as to] the sufficiency of evidence."86

The DARAB is the quasi-judicial tribunal that has the primary jurisdiction to determine whether there is a tenancy relationship
between adverse parties.87 This court has held that "judicial determinations [of the a DARAB] have the same binding effect as
judgments and orders of a regular judicial body." 88 Disputes under the jurisdiction of the DARAB include controversies relating
to:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise, over lands devoted to agriculture, including disputes
concerning farmworkers associations or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or seeking to arrange
terms or conditions of such tenurial arrangements.89ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In Salazar v. De Leon,90 this court upheld the Department of Agrarian Reform's primary jurisdiction over agrarian disputes, which
includes the relationship between landowners and tenants. 91 The DARAB Decision is conclusive and binding on courts when
supported by substantial evidence.92 This court ruled that administrative res judicata exists in that case:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Significantly, respondent did not appeal the Decision dated 17 November 1995 of the DARAB in DARAB Case # II-380-ISA'94;
consequently, the same has attained finality and constitutes res judicata on the issue of petitioner's status as a tenant of
respondent.

Res judicata is a concept applied in the review of lower court decisions in accordance with the hierarchy of courts. But jurisprudence
has also recognized the rule of administrative res judicata: "The rule which forbids the reopening of a matter once judicially
determined by competent authority applies as well to the judicial and quasi-judicial facts of public, executive or administrative
officers and boards acting within their jurisdiction as to the judgments of courts having general judicial powers. It has been declared
that whenever final adjudication of persons invested with power to decide on the property and rights of the citizen is examinable by
the Supreme Court, upon a writ of error or a certiorari , such final adjudication may be pleaded as res judicata." To be sure, early
jurisprudence was already mindful that the doctrine of res judicata cannot be said to apply exclusively to decisions rendered by
what are usually understood as courts without unreasonably circumscribing the scope thereof; and that the more equitable attitude
is to allow extension of the defense to decisions of bodies upon whom judicial powers have been conferred.93 (Emphasis supplied,
citations omitted)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In Encinas v. Agustin, Jr.,94 this court clarified that res judicata applies only to decisions rendered by agencies in judicial or quasi-
judicial proceedings and not to purely administrative proceedings:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The CA was correct in ruling that the doctrine of res judicata applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings, and not to the
exercise of administrative powers. Administrative powers here refer to those purely administrative in nature, as opposed to
administrative proceedings that take on a quasi-judicial character.

In administrative law, a quasi-judicial proceeding involves (a) taking and evaluating evidence; (b) determining facts based upon the
evidence presented; and (c) rendering an order or decision supported by the facts proved. The exercise of quasi-judicial functions
involves a determination, with respect to the matter in controversy, of what the law is; what the legal rights and obligations of the
contending parties are; and based thereon and the facts obtaining, the adjudication of the respective rights and obligations of the
parties.95 (Citations omitted)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
We find it necessary to clarify the two concepts of res judicata: bar by prior judgment and conclusiveness of judgment. In Social
Security Commission v. Rizal Poultry and Livestock Association, Inc., et al.,96 this court discussed and differentiated the two
concepts of res judicata:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Res judicata embraces two concepts: (1) bar by prior judgment as enunciated in Rule 39, Section 47(b) of the Rules of Civil
Procedure; and (2) conclusiveness of judgment in Rule 39, Section 47(c).

There is "bar by prior judgment" when, as between the first case where the judgment was rendered and the second case that is
sought to be barred, there is identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action. In this instance, the judgment in the first case
constitutes an absolute bar to the second action.

But where there is identity of parties in the first and second cases, but no identity of causes of action, the first judgment is conclusive
only as to those matters actually and directly controverted and determined and not as to matters merely involved therein. This is the
concept of res judicata known as "conclusiveness of judgment." Stated differently, any right, fact or matter in issue directly
adjudicated or necessarily involved in the determination of an action before a competent court in which judgment is rendered on the
merits is conclusively settled by the judgment therein and cannot again be litigated between the parties and their privies, whether or
not the claim, demand, purpose, or subject matter of the two actions is the same.

Thus, if a particular point or question is in issue in the second action, and the judgment will depend on the determination of that
particular point or question, a former judgment between the same parties or their privies will be final and conclusive in the second if
that same point or question was in issue and adjudicated in the first suit. Identity of cause of action is not required but merely
identity of issue.

The elements of res judicata are: (1) the judgment sought to bar the new action must be final; (2) the decision must have been
rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) the disposition of the case must be a judgment on
the merits; and (4) there must be as between the first and second action, identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of
action. Should identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action be shown in the two cases, then res judicata in its aspect as
a "bar by prior judgment" would apply. If as between the two cases, only identity of parties can be shown, but not identical causes of
action, then res judicata as "conclusiveness of judgment" applies.97 (Emphasis supplied, citations
omitted)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In Martillano v. Court of Appeals,98 the DARAB Decision finding for the existence of a tenancy relationship between the parties was
declared by this court as conclusive on the parties. 99 As in this case, the DARAB Decision100 in Martillano attained finality when the
landowner did not appeal the Decision.101 This court ruled that the doctrine of res judicata applies:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Under the afore-cited sections of RA 6657, the Department of Agrarian Reform is empowered, through its adjudicating arm the
regional and provincial adjudication boards, to resolve agrarian disputes and controversies on all matters pertaining to the
implementation of the agrarian law. Section 51 thereof provides that the decision of the DARAB attains finality after the lapse of
fifteen (15) days and no appeal was interposed therefrom by any of the parties.

In the instant case, the determination of the DARAB in DARAB Case No. 062-Bul '89, there being no appeal interposed therefrom,
attained finality. Accordingly, the matter regarding the status of Martillano as a tenant farmer and the validity of the CLT and
Emancipation Patents issued in his favor are settled and no longer open to doubt and controversy.

....

We recall that DARAB Case 062-Bul '89 was for the cancellation of petitioner's CLT and Emancipation patents. The same effect is
sought with the institution of DARAB Case No. 512-Bul '94, which is an action to withdraw and/or cancel administratively the CLT
and Emancipation Patents issued to petitioner. Considering that DARAB Case 062-Bul '89 has attained finality prior to the filing of
DARAB Case No. 512-Bul '94, no strenuous legal interpretation is necessary to understand that the issues raised in the prior case,
i.e., DARAB Case No. 062-Bul '89, which have been resolved with finality, may not be litigated anew.

The instant case is complicated by the failure of the complainant to include Martillano as party-defendant in the case before the
adjudication board and the DARAB, although he was finally impleaded on appeal before the Court of Appeals.

The belated inclusion of Martillano as respondent in the petition will not affect the applicability of the doctrine of bar by prior
judgment. What is decisive is that the issues which have already been litigated in a final and executory judgment precludes, by the
principle of bar by prior judgment, an aspect of the doctrine of res judicata, and even under the doctrine of "law of the case," the re-
litigation of the same issue in another action. It is well established that when a right or fact has been judicially tried and determined
by a court of competent jurisdiction, so long as it remains unreversed, it should be conclusive upon the parties and those in privity
with them. The dictum therein laid down became the law of the case and what was once irrevocably established as the controlling
legal rule or decision, continues to be binding between the same parties as long as the facts on which the decision was predicated,
continue to be the facts of the case before the court. Hence, the binding effect and enforceability of that dictum can no longer be
resurrected anew since said issue had already been resolved and finally laid to rest, if not by the principle of res judicata, at least by
conclusiveness of judgment.102 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In Co v. People, et al.,103 this court held that "the doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment also applies in criminal cases." 104 Petitioner
in that case was charged with the violation of Republic Act No. 1161, as amended, for the alleged non-remittance of Social Security
System contributions.105 This court upheld the findings of the National Labor Relations Commission in a separate case, which
declared the absence of an employer-employee relationship and had attained finality. 106 This court held
that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The reasons for establishing the principle of "collusiveness of judgment" are founded on sound public policy. ... It is allowable to
reason back from a judgment to the basis on which it stands, upon the obvious principle that where a conclusion is indisputable, and
could have been drawn only from certain premises, the premises are equally indisputable with the conclusion. When a fact has been
once determined in the course of a judicial proceeding, and a final judgment has been rendered in accordance therewith, it cannot
be again litigated between the same parties without virtually impeaching the correctness of the former decision, which, from motives
of public policy, the law does not permit to be done.

Res judicata has two concepts. The first is bar by prior judgment under Rule 39, Section 47 (b), and the second is conclusiveness of
judgment under Rule 39, Section 47 (c). Both concepts are founded on the principle of estoppel, and are based on the salutary
public policy against unnecessary multiplicity of suits. Like the splitting of causes of action, res judicata is in pursuance of such
policy. Matters settled by a Court's final judgment should not be litigated upon or invoked again. Relitigation of issues already settled
merely burdens the Courts and the taxpayers, creates uneasiness and confusion, and wastes valuable time and energy that could
be devoted to worthier cases.107 (Citations omitted)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In VHJ Construction and Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals,108 this court ruled that tenancy relationship must be duly
proven:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
[A] tenancy relationship cannot be presumed. There must be evidence to prove this allegation. The principal factor in determining
whether a tenancy relationship exists is intent. Tenancy is not a purely factual relationship dependent on what the alleged tenant
does upon the land. It is also a legal relationship. 109 (Citation omitted)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The DARAB, in DARAB Case No. VIII-319-SL-2000, held that all the essential elements of a tenancy relationship were proven by
petitioner.110 It found that there was substantial evidence to support petitioner's claim as tenant of the land. 111 In rendering the
Decision, the DARAB examined pleadings and affidavits of both petitioner and private complainant. 112 It was convinced by
petitioner's evidence, which consisted of sworn statements of petitioner's witnesses that petitioner was installed as tenant by Andres
Pacate sometime in 1993.113 Petitioner and Andres Pacate had an agreement to share the produce after harvest.114 However,
Andres Pacate had died before the first harvest.115 Petitioner then gave the landowner's share to private complainant, and had done
so every harvest until he was disturbed in his cultivation of the land on June 29, 2000. 116

We emphasize that after filing her Answer before the DARAB, private complainant failed to heed the Notices sent to her and refused
to attend the scheduled hearings.117 The DARAB even quoted in its Decision the reason offered by private complainant's counsel in
his Motion to Withdraw as counsel:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
That as early as the preliminary hearings of the case, the respondent has already shown her intention not to participate the
proceedings of the case for reasons known only to her;cralawlawlibrary

That despite the advi[c]e of the undersigned, respondent stood pat with her decision not to participate in the proceedings of the
case;cralawlawlibrary

That in view of this predicament, the undersigned can do nothing except to withdraw as he is now withdrawing as counsel for the
respondent of the above-entitled casef.]118ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
It is true that trial courts are not mandated to take judicial notice of decisions of other courts or even records of other cases that have
been tried or are pending in the same court or before the same judge. 119 In declaring that the DARAB's findings on the tenancy
relationship between petitioner and private complainant are immaterial to the criminal case for theft, the Court of Appeals 120 relied
on Rollo, et al. v. Leal Realty Centrum Co., Inc., et al.121

In Rollo, petitioners, who were farmers of a 21-hectare agricultural land in Tarlac that was principally devoted to sugar and rice and
who claim the rights of their predecessors-in-interest, filed separate Complaints before the Provincial Adjudication Board of Region
III in Tarlac, Tarlac. They claimed that when the registered owner of the land, Josefina Roxas Omaña, sold the land to respondents,
respondents were aware of the tenancy relationship between petitioners and Josefina Roxas Omaña. 122

Respondents offered a compensation package to petitioners in exchange for the renunciation of their tenancy rights under the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. However, they failed to comply with their obligations under the terms of the compensation
package.123 Petitioners then filed a series of Complaints before the DARAB. The cases were consolidated and resolved by the
Provincial Adjudicator.124

The Provincial Adjudicator ruled, among other things, that "there was no tenancy relationship [that] existed between the
parties."125 He found that petitioners and their predecessors-in-interest were mere hired laborers, not tenants. Tenancy cannot be
presumed from respondents' offer of a compensation package. 126

On appeal, the DARAB reversed the Decision of the Provincial Adjudicator. It found that there was an implied tenancy between the
parties. Petitioners were deemed tenants of the land for more than 30 years. They were entitled to security of tenure. 127

The Court of Appeals reversed the DARAB Decision and reinstated the Provincial Adjudicator's Decision. It held that there was no
substantial evidence to prove that all the requisites of tenancy relationship existed. However, despite the lack of tenancy
relationship, the compensation package agreement must be upheld. 128

This court affirmed the Court of Appeals Decision.129 It held that petitioners failed to overcome the burden of proving the existence of
a tenancy relationship:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
At the outset, the parties do not appear to be the landowner and the tenants. While it appears that there was personal cultivation by
petitioners and their predecessors-in-interest of the subject landholding, what was established was that petitioners' claim of tenancy
was founded on the self-serving testimony of petitioner Rodolfo Rollo that his predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of
the landholding for more than 30 years and had engaged in a "50-50" sharing scheme with JOSEFINA and JOSEFINA's
grandmother, the previous owner thereof. Self-serving statements in pleadings are inadequate; proof must be adduced. Such claims
do not suffice absent concrete evidence to support them. The burden rests on the shoulders of petitioners to prove their affirmative
allegation of tenancy, which burden they failed to discharge with substantial evidence. Such a juridical tie must be aptly shown.
Simply put, he who alleges the affirmative of the issue has the burden of proof, and from the plaintiff in a civil case, the burden of
proof never parts. The same rule applies to administrative cases. In fact, if the complainant, upon whom rests the burden of proving
his cause of action, fails to show in a satisfactory manner the facts upon which he bases his claim, the respondent is under no
obligation to prove his exception or defense....

Neither was it shown to the satisfaction of this Court that there existed a sharing of harvests in the context of a tenancy relationship
between petitioners and/or their predecessors-in-interest and JOSEFINA. Jurisprudence is illuminating to the effect that to prove
such sharing of harvests, a receipt or any other evidence must be presented. None was shown. No receipts were presented as
testaments to the claimed sharing of harvests. The only evidence submitted to establish the purported sharing of harvests was the
testimony of petitioner Rodolfo Rollo. The sharing arrangement cannot be deemed to have existed on the basis alone of petitioner
Rodolfo Rollo's claim. It is self-serving and is without evidentiary value. Self-serving statements are deemed inadequate; competent
proof must be adduced. If at all, the fact alone of sharing is not sufficient to establish a tenancy relationship.

We also sustain the conclusion reached by the Provincial Adjudicator and the Court of Appeals that the testimony of Araceli Pascua,
an employee of the DAR in Victoria, Tarlac, that the subject landholding was tenanted cannot overcome substantial evidence to the
contrary. To prove the alleged tenancy no reliance may be made upon the said public officer's testimony. What cannot be ignored is
the precedent ruling of this Court that the findings of or certifications issued by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform, or his authorized
representative, in a given locality concerning the presence or absence of a tenancy relationship between the contending parties, are
merely preliminary or provisional and are not binding upon the courts. This ruling holds with greater effect in the instant case in light
of the fact that petitioners, as herein shown, were not able to prove the presence of all the indispensable elements of
tenancy.130 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Thus, in Rollo, this court did not categorically hold that the DARAB's findings were merely provisional and, thus, not binding on
courts. What was deemed as a preliminary determination of tenancy was the testimony of the Department of Agrarian Reform
employee stating that the land involved was tenanted. Further, the tribunals had conflicting findings on whether petitioners were
bona fide tenants.

In this case, records are bereft as to whether private complainant appealed the DARAB Decision. Thus, it is presumed that the
Decision has long lapsed into finality.131 It is also established that private complainant participated in the initial stages of the DARAB
proceedings.132 Therefore, the issue of the existence of a tenancy relationship is final as between the parties. We cannot collaterally
review the DARAB's findings at this stage. The existence of the final Decision that tenancy exists creates serious doubts as to the
guilt of the accused.

VI

According to petitioner, the elements of theft under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code were not established since he was a bona
fide tenant of the land.133 The DARAB's recognition of petitioner as a legitimate tenant necessarily "implie[d] that he ha[d] the
authority to harvest the abaca hemp from [private complainant's land]."134 This shows that petitioner had no criminal intent.

As to the existence of another element of theft—that the taking was done without the consent of the owner—petitioner argues that
this, too, was negated by his status as private complainant's tenant:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The purported lack of consent on the part of the private complainant as alleged by the prosecution, is misplaced. In fact, it was even
improper for Anecita Pacate to stop or prevent petitioner from harvesting the produce of the landholding because as tenant,
petitioner is entitled to security of tenure. This right entitled him to continue working on his landholding until the leasehold relation is
terminated or until his eviction is authorized by the DARAB in a judgment that is final and executory. 135 (Citation
omitted)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Petitioner argues that the constitutional presumption of innocence must be upheld:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Well-settled is the rule that where "inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one of which is
consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, then the evidence does not fulfill the test of
moral certainty and is not sufficient to support a conviction." In acquitting an appellant, we are not saying that he is lily-white, or pure
as driven snow. Rather, we are declaring his innocence because the prosecution's evidence failed to show his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. For that is what the basic law requires. Where the evidence is insufficient to overcome the presumption of
innocence in favour of the accused, then his "acquittal must follow in faithful obeisance to the fundamental law."136 (Citations
omitted)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The Court of Appeals erred when it affirmed the findings of the trial court finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of theft.

Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

ARTICLE. 308. Who are Liable for Theft. — Theft is committed by any person who, with intent to gain but without violence against or
intimidation of persons nor force upon things, shall take personal property of another without the latter's consent.

Theft is likewise committed by:

1. Any person who, having found lost property, shall fail to deliver the same to the local authorities or to its
owner;cralawlawlibrary

2. Any person who, after having maliciously damaged the property of another, shall remove or make use of the
fruits or object of the damage caused by him; and

3. Any person who shall enter an enclosed estate or a field where trespass is forbidden or which belongs to
another and without the consent of its owner, shall hunt or fish upon the same or shall gather fruits, cereals, or
other forest or farm products.

The essential elements of theft are: (1) taking of personal property; (2) the property taken belongs to another; (3) the taking was
done without the owner's consent; (4) there was intent to gain; and (5) the taking was done without violence against or intimidation
of the person or force upon things.137

Tenants have been defined as:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

persons who — in themselves and with the aid available from within their immediate farm households — cultivate the land belonging
to or possessed by another, with the latter's consent, for purposes of production, sharing the produce with the landholder under the
share tenancy system, or paying to the landholder a price certain or ascertainable in produce or money or both under the leasehold
tenancy system.138 (Citation omitted)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Under this definition, a tenant is entitled to the products of the land he or she cultivates. The landowner's share in the produce
depends on the agreement between the parties. Hence, the harvesting done by the tenant is with the landowner's consent.
The existence of the DARAB Decision adjudicating the issue of tenancy between petitioner and private complainant negates the
existence of the element that the taking was done without the owner's consent. The DARAB Decision implies that petitioner had
legitimate authority to harvest the abaca. The prosecution, therefore, failed to establish all the elements of theft.

In Pit-og v. People,139 this court acquitted petitioner of theft of sugarcane and banana crops on the basis of reasonable doubt. 140 The
prosecution failed to prove lack of criminal intent on petitioner's part. 141 It failed to clearly identify "the person who, as a result of a
criminal act, without his knowledge and consent, was wrongfully deprived of a thing belonging to him."142 There were doubts as to
whether the plants taken by petitioner were indeed planted on private complainant's lot when petitioner had planted her own plants
adjacent to it.143 Thus, it was not proven beyond reasonable doubt that the property belonged to private complainant. This court
found that petitioner "took the sugarcane and bananas believing them to be her own. That being the case, she could not have had a
criminal intent."144

In this case, petitioner harvested the abaca, believing that he was entitled to the produce as a legitimate tenant cultivating the land
owned by private complainant. Personal property may have been taken, but it is with the consent of the owner.

No less than the Constitution provides that the accused shall be presumed innocent of the crime until proven guilty. 145 "[I]t is better to
acquit ten guilty individuals than to convict one innocent person."146 Thus, courts must consider "[e]very circumstance against guilt
and in favor of innocence[.]"147 Equally settled is that "[w]here the evidence admits of two interpretations, one of which is consistent
with guilt, and the other with innocence, the accused must be given the benefit of doubt and should be acquitted." 148

In view of petitioner's acquittal based on reasonable doubt, we find it unnecessary to discuss further the other errors raised by
petitioner.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated March 16, 2010 and the Resolution dated February
2, 2012 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Monico Ligtas is ACQUITTED of the crime of theft under Article 308 of the
Revised Penal Code. If detained, he is ordered immediately RELEASED, unless he is confined for any other lawful cause. Any
amount paid by way of a bailbond is ordered RETURNED.

SO ORDERED.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

G.R. No. 217930

SPOUSES JORGE NAVARRA and CARMELITA NAVARRA, Petitioners,

vs.
YOLANDA LIONGSON, Respondent.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the August 28, 2014 Amended Decision 1 and
the April 16, 2015 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 105568, which reversed its December 8, 2011
Decision3 and recalled and set aside the entry of judgment issued on January 6, 2012.

The Antecedents:

On September 23, 1993, Jose Liongson (Jose), the deceased husband of respondent Yolanda Liongson (Yolanda), filed a
complaint for damages based on malicious prosecution against spouses Jorge and Carmelita Navarra (Spouses Navarra) and
spouses Ruben and Cresencia Bernardo (Spouses Bernardo) [collectively referred as defendant spouses], before the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 255, Las Piñas City (RTC).

After the presentation and formal offer of their respective evidence, the parties were required to file their respective memoranda.

On January 4, 2001, Atty. Salvador B. Aguas (Atty. Aguas), counsel of Jose, filed the Motion for Time to Submit Motion for
Substitution of Plaintiff with Motion For Suspension/Commencement of Counting of Period in Filing Pleadings 4 informing the RTC of
the death of Jose and praying for time to submit a motion for substitution pending receipt of the death certificate.

On May 2, 2001, a Decision5 was rendered in favor of Jose ordering defendant spouses to pay P500,000.00 for moral damages;
P200,000.00 for exemplary damages; P20,000.00 for reimbursement of expenses; P35,000.00 for substantial number of
appearance, P50,000.00 for attorney’s fees; and the costs of suit.

On July 13, 2001, defendant spouses filed their Motion for Declaration of Nullity of the Decision and/or Notice of Appeal 6 based on
the absence of a valid substitution of Jose.

Consequently, Atty. Aguas filed the Motion for Substitution,7 dated July 30, 2001, praying that Jose be substituted by his surviving
wife, Yolanda.

In its Order,8 dated May 13, 2002, the RTC denied the motion for declaration of nullity of the May 2, 2001 decision. Defendant
spouses then elevated the matter before the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 74988. In a Resolution[[,9]] dated July 30, 2004, the
CA dismissed the petition for want of appellant’s brief. On August 30, 2004, an entry of judgment 10 was issued.

Thereafter, Atty. Aguas filed a motion for execution, 11 but it was opposed by defendant spouses on the ground that no valid
substitution had been made, and that the continued appearance of Atty. Aguas was ultra vires.12

In the Order,13 dated October 28, 2005, the motion for execution was deemed withdrawn upon motion of Atty. Aguas.

On November 20, 2005, Atty. Aguas filed a pleading denominated as Motions to Resolve Motion for Substitution of Parties, dated
July 31, 2001 or Considered it Deemed Admitted, and Thereafter Issue Writ of Execution of the Judgment, dated May 2, 2001, in
the name of Yolanda Liongson as Substituting Party for Plaintiff Jose Liongson.14 In the said motion, it was prayed that Yolanda be
allowed to substitute her deceased husband and that a writ of execution be issued in her favor. Attached to the motion was a copy
of the death certificate15 of Jose indicating that the latter died on November 28, 2000.

In the Order,16 dated March 17, 2006, the RTC denied the motion to resolve the motion for substitution of parties and the motion for
issuance of a writ of execution for lack of merit.

In the meantime, Yolanda filed a petition for issuance of letters of administration of the estate of Jose, her deceased husband,
before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 274, Parañaque City. In the December 29, 2006 Order, the Letter of Administration was
issued appointing Yolanda as administratix of the estate of Jose.

Thus, acting as the administratix of the estate of Jose, Yolanda filed a motion for execution of the May 2, 2001 decision.[[ 17]] It
was, however, denied in an Order,18 dated September 14, 2007, on the ground that no proper substitution had been made yet.

Unperturbed, Yolanda, thru her new counsel, Atty. Bonifacio G. Caboboy (Atty. Caboboy), filed her Motion to Substitute the Plaintiff
Jose Liongson19 which was finally granted by the RTC in the Order,20 dated January 25, 2008.

Defendant spouses then filed a motion for reconsideration of the January 25, 2008 Order. 21 On May 22, 2008, the RTC denied the
said motion.22

Defendant spouses then filed a petition for certiorari before the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 104667, assailing the January 25,
2008 and May 22, 2008 orders of the RTC. They insisted that the issue of substitution had been laid to rest by the RTC on
three (3) occasions and Yolanda did not question the propriety of its denial. Hence, she was forever barred from effecting the
substitution.

Meanwhile, Yolanda filed her Motion for Execution of Judgment23 which was granted by the RTC in its Order,24 dated July 25, 2008.
On August 1, 2008, a writ of execution25 was issued and the Notice to Pay,26 dated August 5, 2008, was served upon defendant
spouses. The latter then filed a motion to recall or hold in abeyance the implementation of the writ of execution and the sheriff’s
notice to pay.

Without waiting for the RTC to rule on the said motion, defendant spouses filed another petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court before the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 105568, this time questioning the July 25, 2008 Order and the August 1,
2008 Writ of Execution issued by the RTC. Defendant spouses insisted that the RTC gravely abused its discretion when it allowed
the substitution and then issued the writ of execution.

In its January 16, 2009 Order,27 the RTC denied the motion to recall or hold in abeyance the implementation of the August 1, 2008
writ of execution and the August 5, 2008 sheriff’s notice to pay for lack of merit. Thereafter, the notice of garnishment and the notice
of levy were issued. Spouses Navarra’s property, covered by TCT No. 103473, was levied and subsequently sold in a public auction
pursuant to the writ of execution.28

Meanwhile, on October 28, 2009, the CA rendered a Decision, 29 in CA-G.R. SP No. 104667, dismissing the petition
for certiorari and declaring the substitution of plaintiff in order. The CA held that the rule on substitution was not a matter of
jurisdiction but a requirement of due process; and that considering that both parties had already completed the presentation of their
evidence in chief before Jose died, neither of them was denied due process of law. Thus, the CA stated that the belated substitution
of Jose as plaintiff to the case did not affect the validity of the final and executory judgment.

On December 8, 2011, a decision30 was rendered in CA-G.R. SP No. 105568, in favor of defendant spouses. The
CA reversed and set aside the questioned RTC order granting the motion for execution and the issuance of the writ of execution.
The CA held that the complaint for damages, arising from malicious prosecution filed by Jose against defendant spouses was
a purely personal action that did not survive upon his death; and because the action was deemed abated upon his death, the RTC
was found to have gravely abused its discretion when it allowed the substitution of Jose and issued the writ of execution. The CA
further stated that upon the death of Jose, the RTC lost jurisdiction over the case and the decision rendered therein was a void
judgment; hence, all acts performed pursuant thereto and all claims emanating therefrom had no legal effect.

On January 6, 2012, the December 8, 2011 decision of the CA in CAG. R. SP No. 105568 became final and executory and the entry
of judgment31 was issued.

On December 16, 2013, almost two years later, Yolanda filed her Urgent Omnibus Motion 32 praying for the recall/lifting of the entry
of judgment and for the admission of the attached motion for reconsideration. Yolanda contended that she was totally unaware of
this petition for certiorari filed before the CA and docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 105568; that although notices were sent to her
counsel, Atty. Caboboy, the latter did not inform or furnish her with copies of the notices and the petition; that Atty. Caboboy did not
file any comment on the petition or a motion for reconsideration; and that Atty. Caboboy’s gross negligence and mistake should not
bind her because the said negligence and mistake would amount to deprivation of her property without due process of law.

On August 28, 2014, the CA promulgated an amended decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 105568. While the CA took note that no
comment was filed by defendant spouses despite notice, it granted the omnibus motion and the motion for reconsideration filed by
Yolanda. The appellate court recalled and set aside the entry of judgment and reversed its December 8, 2011 decision in the
interest of substantial justice. The CA discovered that the appellate court rendered two conflicting decisions in CA-G.R. SP No.
104667 and CA-G.R. SP No. 105568. In CA-G.R. SP No. 104667, earlier filed by defendant spouses, the appellate court arrived at a
decision allowing the substitution of Jose. The same issue of substitution was debunked in the December 8, 2011 CA decision in
CA-G.R. SP No. 105568.

In its amended decision, the CA did not apply the general rule that the negligence of counsel would bind the client so as not to
deprive Yolanda of her right to due process of law. On the merits, the CA ruled that the action filed by Jose before the RTC was not
extinguished upon his death as it was one for recovery of damages for injury to his person caused by defendant spouses’ tortuous
conduct of maliciously filing an unfounded suit.

Spouses Navarra (petitioners) filed their separate motions for reconsideration, but both were denied by the CA in a
Resolution,33 dated April 16, 2015.

Hence, this petition anchored on the following –

GROUNDS FOR THE PETITION

THE COURT OF APPEALS DECIDED THE INSTANT CASE IN A WAY NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND WITH THE
APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT.

A. THE COURT OF APPEALS BREACHED THE WELLSETTLED RULE THAT A FINAL AND EXECUTORY
JUDGMENT MAY NO LONGER BE MODIFIED IN ANY RESPECT, EVEN IF THE MODIFICATION IS MEANT TO
CORRECT WHAT IS PERCEIVED TO BE AN ERRONEOUS CONCLUSION OF LAW OR FACT.

B. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT AMENDED A FINAL AND EXECUTORY DECISION UPON PRIVATE
RESPONDENT’S MERE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION.

C. THE COURT OF APPEALS LEGALLY ERRED IN EXCEPTING THE INSTANT CASE FROM THE RULE THAT THE
MISTAKE OR NEGLIGENCE OF COUNSEL BINDS THE CLIENT.

D. AT ALL EVENTS, THE COURT OF APPEALS LEGALLY ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PETITION IN CA-G.R. SP
NO.105568.[[34]]

Petitioners argue that it is beyond the power of the CA to amend its original decision in this case, dated December 8, 2011, for it
violates the principle of finality of judgment and its immutability. They point out that the said CA decision had acquired finality,
hence, it could no longer be modified in any respect even if the modification was meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or
law, or it would be made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court of the land.

Petitioners also aver that there was no conflict in the decisions rendered by the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 104667 and in the present
case as the two cases involved different issues. The former case ruled on the validity of the January 25, 2008 Order of the RTC
which granted the substitution of Jose by Yolanda, while the present case questioned the July 25, 2008 Order of the RTC
which granted the motion for execution of judgment filed by Yolanda.

Finally, petitioners assert that the CA erred when it granted the motion for reconsideration filed by Yolanda after almost two years
from the time the decision was rendered. They point out that Yolanda did not even indicate in

her motion for reconsideration the exact date of her receipt of the copy of the December 8, 2011 decision and that it could not be
presumed that she learned of it only two (2) years after its issuance. They contend that the respondent was negligent because she
waited for two long years before she filed a motion for reconsideration. They added that she should have made efforts to ascertain
the status of the case considering that she was appointed administratix of the estate of Jose.

Respondent Yolanda counters that the CA was correct when it reversed and set aside its December 8, 2011 decision and dismissed
the petition for certiorari as the issues therein had already been laid to rest in the October 28, 2009 CA decision in CA- G.R. SP No.
104667. She argues that because the petitions in both CA- G.R. SP No. 104667 and CA- G.R. SP No. 105568, involved the same
issues and parties under similar factual and legal settings, the decision rendered in the first case became final and could no longer
be changed, revised or reversed.

All the arguments by both parties boil down to the lone issue of whether or not the CA erred and violated the principle of immunity of
judgment when it amended its December 8, 2011 decision.

The Court’s Ruling

The petition is not meritorious.

Well-settled is the rule that a judgment that has acquired finality "becomes immutable and unalterable, and may no longer be
modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law, and whether it be made
by the court that rendered it or by the Highest Court of the land." 35 The rationale of this doctrine is to avoid delay in the
administration of justice and in order to put an end to judicial controversies. In the case of Manotok Realty, Inc. v. CLT Realty
Development Corp.,36 the Court explained the principle of immunity of judgment in this wise:

The doctrine of finality of judgment is grounded on fundamental considerations of public policy and sound practice,

and that, at the risk of occasional errors, the judgments or orders of courts must become final at some definite time fixed by law;
otherwise, there would be no end to litigations, thus setting to naught the main role of courts of justice which is to assist in the
enforcement of the rule of law and the maintenance of peace and order by settling justiciable controversies with finality. 37

Nonetheless, this doctrine may be relaxed in order to serve substantial justice in case compelling circumstances that clearly warrant
the exercise of the Court’s equity jurisdiction are extant.38 Thus, like any other rule, it has exceptions, such as: (1) the correction of
clerical errors; (2) the so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party; (3) void judgments; and (4) whenever
circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision rendering its execution unjust and inequitable. 39 After all, the rules of
procedure intend to promote the ends of justice, thus, their strict and rigid application must always be eschewed when it would
subvert its primary objective.40

The issue posed before the Court is not of first impression. It involves three conflicting final and executory judgments rendered by
the RTC and the CA. The first is the May 2, 2001 RTC decision which granted the complaint

for damages. The second is the October 28, 2009 CA decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 104667 which granted the motion for substitution
and the motion for execution. The third, which is obviously in conflict with the first and second judgment, is the December 8, 2011
CA decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 105568 which not only reversed and set aside the motion for execution but also declared the May
2, 2001 RTC decision a void judgment.

Where a certain case comprises two or more conflicting judgments which are final and executory, the Court, in the case of Collantes
v. Court of Appeals41 (Collantes), offered three (3) options in resolving the same. First, the court may opt to require the parties to
assert their claims anew; second, to determine which judgment came first; and third, to determine which of the judgments had been
rendered by a court of last resort.

In the case of Heirs of Maura So v. Obliosco,42 the Court stated that it was more equitable to apply the second and third options
mentioned in Collantes. It, thus, sustained the earlier decisions over the current ones, as they already had vested rights over the
winning party, and accorded more respect to the decisions of this Court than those made by the lower courts.

The Court, in Government Service Insurance System v. Group Management Corporation,43 also resorted to the second and third
options and affirmed the finality of the earlier decisions rendered by the Court. The Court held that:

In Collantes, this Court applied the first option and resolved the conflicting issues anew. However, resorting to the first solution in the
case at bar would entail disregarding not only the final and executory decisions of the Lapu-Lapu RTC and the Manila RTC, but also
the final and executory decisions of the Court of Appeals and this Court. Moreover, it would negate two decades worth of litigating.
Thus, we find it more equitable and practicable to apply

the second and third options consequently maintaining the finality of one of the conflicting judgments. The primary criterion under
the second option is the time when the decision was rendered and became final and executory, such that earlier decisions should
prevail over the current ones since final and executory decisions vest rights in the winning party. In the third solution, the main
criterion is the determination of which court or tribunal rendered the decision. Decisions of this Court should be accorded more
respect than those made by the lower courts.44

Guided by these jurisprudence, the Court agrees with the CA that it would be more equitable to make use of the second option
mentioned in Collantes and sustain the finality of the earlier decisions rendered by the RTC and the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 104667.
To recall, the RTC decision in the complaint for damages was promulgated as early as May 2, 2001 and became final and executory
on August 30, 2004.45 The only reason why the said decision was not immediately executed was the petitioners’ insistence on the
improper substitution of plaintiff. This issue, however, was laid to rest on October 8, 2009 by the CA when it rendered its decision in
CA-G.R. SP

No. 104667. The CA declared that the decision and the proceedings in the said case were not rendered nugatory notwithstanding
the belated compliance with the rules on substitution as none of the parties was denied

due process. The appellate court further stated that the rule on the substitution by heirs was not a matter of jurisdiction, but a
requirement of due process. It follows therefore, that when due process is not violated as when the right of the representative or heir
is recognized and protected, noncompliance or belated formal compliance with the rules cannot affect the validity of a promulgated
decision. 46 Moreover, the Court notes that petitioners did not question the propriety of the May 2, 2001 decision in their petition in
CA-G.R. SP No. 104667 but even admitted the finality and executory nature of the said decision and their only concern was how the
said decision would be executed without a valid substitution of the plaintiff.

Clearly, the October 28, 2009 decision of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 104667 constituted res judicata with respect to the latter case
in CA-G.R. SP No. 105568.1âwphi1 "Res judicata is defined as ‘a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon or decided; a thing
or matter settled by judgment.’ 47" Based on this principle, a final judgment or order on the merits, rendered by a competent court on
any matter within its jurisdiction, "is conclusive in a subsequent case between the same parties and their successor-in-interest by
title subsequent to the commencement of the action or special proceeding, litigating for the same thing and under the same title and
in the same capacity."48 Simply put, "a final judgment on the merits rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction, is conclusive as to
the rights of the parties and their privies and constitutes an absolute bar to subsequent actions involving the same claim, demand, or
cause of action."49

For res judicata to serve as an absolute bar to a subsequent action, the following requisites must concur: (a) the former judgment is
final; (b) it was rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (c) it is a judgment on the merits; and,
(d) there is, between the first and second actions, identity of parties, of subject matter and of cause of action. 50
In the present case, there is no quibble that all the elements adverted to above obtain in this case. There is no dispute that the
December 2, 2001 RTC decision had become final and executory and the entry of judgment was issued on August 30, 2004. There
is no question either that the RTC had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties, and that the decision was a judgment on
the merits.

The controversy arose when petitioners questioned the propriety of the substitution of Jose before the CA in CA-G.R. SP No.
104667 and subsequently the July 25, 2008 RTC order and its August 1, 2008 writ of execution in CA-G.R. SP No. 105568, which
was raffled to a different division of the CA. Although petitioners would like to impress to this Court that the issues raised in two
cases before the CA were anchored on different causes of action, the Court rules otherwise. Under the doctrine of conclusiveness of
judgment, facts and issues actually and directly resolved in a former suit can never again be raised in any future case between the
same parties even involving a different cause of action. 51 The CA decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 104667 concerning the validity of
plaintiffs substitution became conclusive on the parties. Thus, petitioners cannot again seek refuge by filing their second petition
(CA-G.R. SP No. 105568) in the guise of questioning the order of execution but actually invoking the alleged nullity of the
substitution of plaintiff. Petitioners cannot evade or avoid the application of res judicata by· simply varying· the form of his action or
adopting a different method of presenting their case.52

Indeed, it is time to put an end to this litigation as the enforcement of the final judgment has long been delayed. In the
interest of justice, petitioners are ordered to respect and comply with the final and executor judgment of the Court. As stated in the
case of Selga v. Sony Entierro Brar :53

It must be remembered that it is to the interest of the public thatthere should be an end to litigation by the parties over a subject fully
and fairly adjudicated. The doctrine of res judicata is a rule that pervades every well-regulated system of jurisprudence and is
founded upon two grounds ·embodied in various maxims of the common law, namely: (1) public policy and necessity, which dictates
that it would be in the interest of the State that there should be an end to litigation republicae ut sit litium; and (2) the hardship on the
individual that he should be vexed twice for the same cause nemo debet bis vexari pro una et eadem causa. A contrary doctrine
would subject public peace and quiet to the will and neglect of individuals and prefer the gratification of the litigious disposition on
the part of suitors to the preservation of public tranquility and happiness. 54

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The August 28, 2014 Amended Decision and the April 16, 2015 Resolution of the· Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 105568 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 186571               August 11, 2010

GERBERT R. CORPUZ, Petitioner,
vs.
DAISYLYN TIROL STO. TOMAS and The SOLICITOR GENERAL, Respondents.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

Before the Court is a direct appeal from the decision1 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Laoag City, Branch 11, elevated via a
petition for review on certiorari2 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court (present petition).

Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian citizenship through naturalization on November
29, 2000.3 On January 18, 2005, Gerbert married respondent Daisylyn T. Sto. Tomas, a Filipina, in Pasig City. 4 Due to work and
other professional commitments, Gerbert left for Canada soon after the wedding. He returned to the Philippines sometime in April
2005 to surprise Daisylyn, but was shocked to discover that his wife was having an affair with another man. Hurt and disappointed,
Gerbert returned to Canada and filed a petition for divorce. The Superior Court of Justice, Windsor, Ontario, Canada granted
Gerbert’s petition for divorce on December 8, 2005. The divorce decree took effect a month later, on January 8, 2006. 5

Two years after the divorce, Gerbert has moved on and has found another Filipina to love. Desirous of marrying his new Filipina
fiancée in the Philippines, Gerbert went to the Pasig City Civil Registry Office and registered the Canadian divorce decree on his
and Daisylyn’s marriage certificate. Despite the registration of the divorce decree, an official of the National Statistics Office (NSO)
informed Gerbert that the marriage between him and Daisylyn still subsists under Philippine law; to be enforceable, the foreign
divorce decree must first be judicially recognized by a competent Philippine court, pursuant to NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982. 6

Accordingly, Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or declaration of marriage as dissolved (petition)
with the RTC. Although summoned, Daisylyn did not file any responsive pleading but submitted instead a notarized
letter/manifestation to the trial court. She offered no opposition to Gerbert’s petition and, in fact, alleged her desire to file a similar
case herself but was prevented by financial and personal circumstances. She, thus, requested that she be considered as a party-in-
interest with a similar prayer to Gerbert’s.

In its October 30, 2008 decision,7 the RTC denied Gerbert’s petition. The RTC concluded that Gerbert was not the proper party to
institute the action for judicial recognition of the foreign divorce decree as he is a naturalized Canadian citizen. It ruled that only the
Filipino spouse can avail of the remedy, under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, 8 in order for him or her to be
able to remarry under Philippine law.9 Article 26 of the Family Code reads:

Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were
solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6),
36, 37 and 38.

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad
by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine
law.

This conclusion, the RTC stated, is consistent with the legislative intent behind the enactment of the second paragraph of Article 26
of the Family Code, as determined by the Court in Republic v. Orbecido III; 10 the provision was enacted to "avoid the absurd
situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the
Filipino spouse."11

THE PETITION

From the RTC’s ruling,12 Gerbert filed the present petition. 13

Gerbert asserts that his petition before the RTC is essentially for declaratory relief, similar to that filed in Orbecido; he, thus, similarly
asks for a determination of his rights under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code. Taking into account the rationale
behind the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, he contends that the provision applies as well to the benefit of the
alien spouse. He claims that the RTC ruling unduly stretched the doctrine in Orbecido by limiting the standing to file the petition only
to the Filipino spouse – an interpretation he claims to be contrary to the essence of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code. He considers himself as a proper party, vested with sufficient legal interest, to institute the case, as there is a possibility that
he might be prosecuted for bigamy if he marries his Filipina fiancée in the Philippines since two marriage certificates, involving him,
would be on file with the Civil Registry Office. The Office of the Solicitor General and Daisylyn, in their respective Comments, 14 both
support Gerbert’s position.

Essentially, the petition raises the issue of whether the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code extends to aliens the right
to petition a court of this jurisdiction for the recognition of a foreign divorce decree.

THE COURT’S RULING

The alien spouse can claim no right under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code as the substantive right it
establishes is in favor of the Filipino spouse

The resolution of the issue requires a review of the legislative history and intent behind the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code.

The Family Code recognizes only two types of defective marriages – void15 and voidable16 marriages. In both cases, the basis for
the judicial declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of the marriage exists before or at the time of the marriage. Divorce, on the
other hand, contemplates the dissolution of the lawful union for cause arising after the marriage. 17 Our family laws do not recognize
absolute divorce between Filipino citizens. 18

Recognizing the reality that divorce is a possibility in marriages between a Filipino and an alien, President Corazon C. Aquino, in the
exercise of her legislative powers under the Freedom Constitution, 19 enacted Executive Order No. (EO) 227, amending Article 26 of
the Family Code to its present wording, as follows:

Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were
solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6),
36, 37 and 38.

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad
by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine
law.

Through the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, EO 227 effectively incorporated into the law this Court’s holding in
Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.20 and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera.21 In both cases, the Court refused to acknowledge the alien spouse’s assertion
of marital rights after a foreign court’s divorce decree between the alien and the Filipino. The Court, thus, recognized that the foreign
divorce had already severed the marital bond between the spouses. The Court reasoned in Van Dorn v. Romillo that:

To maintain x x x that, under our laws, [the Filipino spouse] has to be considered still married to [the alien spouse] and still subject to
a wife's obligations x x x cannot be just. [The Filipino spouse] should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and
fidelity, and render support to [the alien spouse]. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal
property. She should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served. 22

As the RTC correctly stated, the provision was included in the law "to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains
married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse." 23 The legislative intent is for
the benefit of the Filipino spouse, by clarifying his or her marital status, settling the doubts created by the divorce decree.
Essentially, the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provided the Filipino spouse a substantive right to have his or her
marriage to the alien spouse considered as dissolved, capacitating him or her to remarry.24 Without the second paragraph of Article
26 of the Family Code, the judicial recognition of the foreign decree of divorce, whether in a proceeding instituted precisely for that
purpose or as a related issue in another proceeding, would be of no significance to the Filipino spouse since our laws do not
recognize divorce as a mode of severing the marital bond;25 Article 17 of the Civil Code provides that the policy against absolute
divorces cannot be subverted by judgments promulgated in a foreign country. The inclusion of the second paragraph in Article 26 of
the Family Code provides the direct exception to this rule and serves as basis for recognizing the dissolution of the marriage
between the Filipino spouse and his or her alien spouse.

Additionally, an action based on the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is not limited to the recognition of the foreign
divorce decree. If the court finds that the decree capacitated the alien spouse to remarry, the courts can declare that the Filipino
spouse is likewise capacitated to contract another marriage. No court in this jurisdiction, however, can make a similar declaration for
the alien spouse (other than that already established by the decree), whose status and legal capacity are generally governed by his
national law.26

Given the rationale and intent behind the enactment, and the purpose of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the
RTC was correct in limiting the applicability of the provision for the benefit of the Filipino spouse. In other words, only the Filipino
spouse can invoke the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code; the alien spouse can claim no right under this provision.

The foreign divorce decree is presumptive evidence of a right that clothes the party with legal interest to petition for its recognition in
this jurisdiction

We qualify our above conclusion – i.e., that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code bestows no rights in favor of
aliens – with the complementary statement that this conclusion is not sufficient basis to dismiss Gerbert’s petition before the RTC. In
other words, the unavailability of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code to aliens does not necessarily strip Gerbert
of legal interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of his foreign divorce decree. The foreign divorce decree itself, after its
authenticity and conformity with the alien’s national law have been duly proven according to our rules of evidence, serves as a
presumptive evidence of right in favor of Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which provides for the effect
of foreign judgments. This Section states:

SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders.—The effect of a judgment or final order of a tribunal of a foreign country, having
jurisdiction to render the judgment or final order is as follows:

(a) In case of a judgment or final order upon a specific thing, the judgment or final order is conclusive upon the title of the
thing; and
 (b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the judgment or final order is presumptive evidence of a right as
between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title.

In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion,
fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.

To our mind, direct involvement or being the subject of the foreign judgment is sufficient to clothe a party with the requisite interest
to institute an action before our courts for the recognition of the foreign judgment. In a divorce situation, we have declared, no less,
that the divorce obtained by an alien abroad may be recognized in the Philippines, provided the divorce is valid according to his or
her national law.27

The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the acknowledgment that our courts do not take judicial notice
of foreign judgments and laws. Justice Herrera explained that, as a rule, "no sovereign is bound to give effect within its dominion to
a judgment rendered by a tribunal of another country." 28 This means that the foreign judgment and its authenticity must be proven as
facts under our rules on evidence, together with the alien’s applicable national law to show the effect of the judgment on the alien
himself or herself.29 The recognition may be made in an action instituted specifically for the purpose or in another action where a
party invokes the foreign decree as an integral aspect of his claim or defense.

In Gerbert’s case, since both the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the alien, recognizing his or her capacity to obtain a
divorce, purport to be official acts of a sovereign authority, Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court comes into play. This Section
requires proof, either by (1) official publications or (2) copies attested by the officer having legal custody of the documents. If the
copies of official records are not kept in the Philippines, these must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper
diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b)
authenticated by the seal of his office.

The records show that Gerbert attached to his petition a copy of the divorce decree, as well as the required certificates proving its
authenticity,30 but failed to include a copy of the Canadian law on divorce.31 Under this situation, we can, at this point, simply dismiss
the petition for insufficiency of supporting evidence, unless we deem it more appropriate to remand the case to the RTC to
determine whether the divorce decree is consistent with the Canadian divorce law.

We deem it more appropriate to take this latter course of action, given the Article 26 interests that will be served and the Filipina
wife’s (Daisylyn’s) obvious conformity with the petition. A remand, at the same time, will allow other interested parties to oppose the
foreign judgment and overcome a petitioner’s presumptive evidence of a right by proving want of jurisdiction, want of notice to a
party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. Needless to state, every precaution must be taken to ensure conformity with
our laws before a recognition is made, as the foreign judgment, once recognized, shall have the effect of res judicata 32 between the
parties, as provided in Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.33

In fact, more than the principle of comity that is served by the practice of reciprocal recognition of foreign judgments between
nations, the res judicata effect of the foreign judgments of divorce serves as the deeper basis for extending judicial recognition and
for considering the alien spouse bound by its terms. This same effect, as discussed above, will not obtain for the Filipino spouse
were it not for the substantive rule that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provides.

Considerations beyond the recognition of the foreign divorce decree

As a matter of "housekeeping" concern, we note that the Pasig City Civil Registry Office has already recorded the divorce decree on
Gerbert and Daisylyn’s marriage certificate based on the mere presentation of the decree. 34 We consider the recording to be legally
improper; hence, the need to draw attention of the bench and the bar to what had been done.

Article 407 of the Civil Code states that "[a]cts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall be recorded
in the civil register." The law requires the entry in the civil registry of judicial decrees that produce legal consequences touching
upon a person’s legal capacity and status, i.e., those affecting "all his personal qualities and relations, more or less permanent in
nature, not ordinarily terminable at his own will, such as his being legitimate or illegitimate, or his being married or not." 35

A judgment of divorce is a judicial decree, although a foreign one, affecting a person’s legal capacity and status that must be
recorded. In fact, Act No. 3753 or the Law on Registry of Civil Status specifically requires the registration of divorce decrees in the
civil registry:

Sec. 1. Civil Register. – A civil register is established for recording the civil status of persons, in which shall be entered:

(a) births;

(b) deaths;
 (c) marriages;

(d) annulments of marriages;

(e) divorces;

(f) legitimations;

(g) adoptions;

(h) acknowledgment of natural children;

(i) naturalization; and

(j) changes of name.

xxxx

Sec. 4. Civil Register Books. — The local registrars shall keep and preserve in their offices the following books, in which they shall,
respectively make the proper entries concerning the civil status of persons:

(1) Birth and death register;

(2) Marriage register, in which shall be entered not only the marriages solemnized but also divorces and dissolved
marriages.

(3) Legitimation, acknowledgment, adoption, change of name and naturalization register.

But while the law requires the entry of the divorce decree in the civil registry, the law and the submission of the decree by
themselves do not ipso facto authorize the decree’s registration. The law should be read in relation with the requirement of a judicial
recognition of the foreign judgment before it can be given res judicata effect. In the context of the present case, no judicial order as
yet exists recognizing the foreign divorce decree. Thus, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office acted totally out of turn and without
authority of law when it annotated the Canadian divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyn’s marriage certificate, on the strength alone
of the foreign decree presented by Gerbert.

Evidently, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office was aware of the requirement of a court recognition, as it cited NSO Circular No. 4,
series of 1982,36 and Department of Justice Opinion No. 181, series of 1982 37 – both of which required a final order from a
competent Philippine court before a foreign judgment, dissolving a marriage, can be registered in the civil registry, but it,
nonetheless, allowed the registration of the decree. For being contrary to law, the registration of the foreign divorce decree without
the requisite judicial recognition is patently void and cannot produce any legal effect.1avvphi1

Another point we wish to draw attention to is that the recognition that the RTC may extend to the Canadian divorce decree does not,
by itself, authorize the cancellation of the entry in the civil registry. A petition for recognition of a foreign judgment is not the proper
proceeding, contemplated under the Rules of Court, for the cancellation of entries in the civil registry.

Article 412 of the Civil Code declares that "no entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected, without judicial order." The
Rules of Court supplements Article 412 of the Civil Code by specifically providing for a special remedial proceeding by which entries
in the civil registry may be judicially cancelled or corrected. Rule 108 of the Rules of Court sets in detail the jurisdictional and
procedural requirements that must be complied with before a judgment, authorizing the cancellation or correction, may be annotated
in the civil registry. It also requires, among others, that the verified petition must be filed with the RTC of the province where the
corresponding civil registry is located; 38 that the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest must be made parties
to the proceedings;39 and that the time and place for hearing must be published in a newspaper of general circulation. 40 As these
basic jurisdictional requirements have not been met in the present case, we cannot consider the petition Gerbert filed with the RTC
as one filed under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.

We hasten to point out, however, that this ruling should not be construed as requiring two separate proceedings for the registration
of a foreign divorce decree in the civil registry – one for recognition of the foreign decree and another specifically for cancellation of
the entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. The recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108
proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the
status or right of a party or a particular fact. Moreover, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court can serve as the appropriate adversarial
proceeding41 by which the applicability of the foreign judgment can be measured and tested in terms of jurisdictional infirmities, want
of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition for review on certiorari, and REVERSE the October 30, 2008 decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Laoag City, Branch 11, as well as its February 17, 2009 order. We order the REMAND of the case to the trial court for
further proceedings in accordance with our ruling above. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Civil Registrar General. No
costs.

SO ORDERED.