1. People V.

Perfecto

Facts: The Secretary of the Philippine Senate, Fernando M. Guerrero discovered that certain
documents which constituted the records of testimony given by witnesses in the investigation of
oil companies had disappeared from his office. On September 7, 1920, the newspaper La Nacion
published an article edited by the defendant, Gregorio Perfecto which contains statement against
the Senate. As a result, an information was filed in the Municipal Court of the City of Manila
alleging the defendant to have violated Article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code.

Issue: Whether or not Article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code is still in effect and applicable to the
case at bar.

Held: The court emphasized that “it is a general principle of the public law that on acquisition of
territory, the previous political relations of the ceded region are totally abrogated.” Article 256 of
the Spanish Penal Code was enacted by the Government of Spain to protect Spanish officials
who were the representatives of the King. With the change of sovereignty, a new government,
and a new theory of government, is set up in the Philippines. Therefore, Article 256 is no longer
in effect and the defendant is acquitted.

2. Macariola V. Asuncion

Facts: A complaint was filed by Sinforosa R. Bales, Luz R. Bakunawa, Anacorita Reyes,
Ruperto Reyes, Adela Reyes, and Priscilla Reyes, plaintiffs, against Bernardita R. Macariola,
defendant, concerning the properties left by the deceased Francisco Reyes, the common father of
the plaintiff and defendant. On June 8, 1963, a decision was rendered by respondent, Judge Elias
B. Asuncion in Civil Case 3010 and it was rendered final because of lack of an appeal. On
October 16, 1963 a project of partition was submitted to Judge Asuncion. One of the properties
mentioned in the project was Lot 1184 which according to the decision was the exclusive
property of the deceased Francisco Reyes, was adjudicated to the plaintiffs Luz, Anacorita,
Ruperto, Adela and Priscilla and when the project of partition was approved by the trial court,
the lot was subdivided into five lots denominated as Lot 1184-A to Lot1184-E. On July 31, 1964,
Lot 1184-E was sold to Dr. Arcadio Galapon which then sold a portion of the lot to Judge
Asuncion and his wife, Victoria Asuncion. On August 31, 1966, spouses Asuncion and spouses
Galapon conveyed their respective shares and interest in Lot 1184-E to “The Traders
Manufacturing and Fishing Industries Inc.” where Judge Asuncion is the president while his wife
is the secretary of the said company. Macariola filed a complaint against Judge Asuncion
alleging the latter to have violated Article 1491, par. 5 of the New Civil Code, Article 14, par. 1
& 5 of the Code of Commerce, Sec. 3 par H of RA 3019 also known as the Anti-Graft & Corrupt
Practice Act., Sec. 12, Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules and Canon 25 of the Canons of
Judicial Ethics.
Issue: Whether or not Judge Asuncion violated the mentioned provisions.
Held: The Supreme Court held that on the contention of complainant that respondent Judge
violated Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules, We hold that the Civil Service Act of
1959 (R.A. No. 2260) and the Civil Service Rules promulgated thereunder, particularly Section
12 of Rule XVIII, do not apply to the members of the Judiciary. Under said Section 12: "No
officer or employee shall engage directly in any private business, vocation, or profession or be
connected with any commercial, credit, agricultural or industrial undertaking without a written
permission from the Head of Department" Moreover, the prohibition in paragraph 5, Article
1491 of the New Civil Code against the purchase by judges of a property in litigation before the
court within whose jurisdiction they perform their duties, cannot apply to respondent Judge
because the sale of the lot in question to him took place after the finality of his decision in Civil
Case No. 3010 as well as his two orders approving the project of partition; hence, the property
was no longer subject of litigation. In conclusion, while respondent Judge Asuncion, now
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals, did not violate any law in acquiring by purchase a
parcel of land which was in litigation in his court and in engaging in business by joining a private
corporation during his incumbency as judge of the Court of First Instance of Leyte, he should be
reminded to be more discreet in his private and business activities, because his conduct as a
member of the Judiciary must not only be characterized with propriety but must always be above
suspicion.

3. Javellana V Executive Secretary

Facts:

4. The Province of North Cotabato V. Govt. of the Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel on
Ancestral Domain

5. Magallona V. Ermita

Facts: In 1961, the Congress passed RA 3046, demarcating the maritime baselines of the
Philippines as an archipelagic State. This law followed the framing of the Convention on the
Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone in 1958 (UNCLOS I). In March 2009, RA 3046 was
amended by enacting RA 9522 prompted by the need to make RA 3046 compliant with the terms
of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), which the Philippines
ratified on 27 February 1984. Petitioners, professors of law, law students and a legislator
questions the constitutionality of RA 9522 because first, it reduces Philippine maritime territory,
and logically, the reach of the Philippine states sovereign power, in violation of Article 1 of the
1987 Constitution. Second, it opens the country’s waters landward of the baselines to maritime
passage by all vessels and aircrafts, undermining Philippine sovereignty and national security,
contravening the country’s nuclear-free policy, and damaging marine resources, in violation of
relevant constitutional provisions.
Issue: Whether or not RA 9522 is unconstitutional.

Held: The Supreme Court stated that the enactment of UNCLOS III compliant baselines law for
the Philippine archipelago and adjacent areas, as embodied in RA 9522, allows an
internationally-recognized delimitation of the breadth of the Philippines maritime zones and
continental shelf. RA 9522 is therefore a most vital step on the part of the Philippines in
safeguarding its maritime zones, consistent with the Constitution and our national interest.

6. Serrano vs. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc.

Facts: Petitioner Antonio Serrano was hired by Gallant Maritime Services and Marlow
Navigation under a POEA-approved contract of employment of 12 months as a Chief Officer.
On date of his departure, Serrano was forced to accept the downgraded employment for the
position of Second Officer and the company assured him that he would be a Chief Officer by the
end of April 1998. Respondents failed to fulfil their promise hence the petitioner refused to stay
as a Second Officer and was repatriated to the Philippines. At the time of the petitioner’s
repatriation, he had only served for two months leaving an unexpired portion of 9 months.
Petitioner filed a complaint with the Labor Arbiter against respondents for constructive dismissal
and for payment of his money claims at the amount of $26,442.73. The LA declared the
petitioner’s dismissal as illegal and awarded him $8,770 as a representation of his 3 months
compensation of the unexpired employment contract plus salary differential of $45. However
claims for moral and exemplary damages were dismissed. Both petitioner and respondents filed
an appeal before the NLRC which it corrected the LA’s computation of the lump-sum salary
awarded to the petitioner by reducing the salary rate since RA No. 8042 does not provide for the
award of overtime pay and vacation leave pay. Petitioner filed a motion for partial
reconsideration and questioned the constitutionality of the last clause in the 5th paragraph of
section 10 of the aforesaid law. The NLRC dismissed the motion therefore the petitioner file a
petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals reiterating the challenge against the
constitutionality of the clause. The CA affirmed the decision of the NLRC but dodged the
constitutional issue.

Issue: Whether or not the aforementioned clause violates Section 1, Article III of the
Constitution.

Held: 5th paragraph of Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042 is unconstitutional. All monetary
benefits should be equally enjoyed by workers of similar category, while all monetary
obligations should be borne by them in equal degree; none should be denied the protection of the
laws which is enjoyed by, or spared the burden imposed on, others in like circumstances. In the
present case, the Court dug deep into the records but found no compelling state interest that the
subject clause may possibly serve. Thus, the subject clause in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of
R.A. No. 8042 is violates the right of petitioner and other OFWs to equal protection.

7. Bases Conversion and Development Authority V. COA

Facts: On March 13, 1992, Congress approved RA 7227 creating the Bases and Conversion and
Development Authority. On December 20, 1996, the Board adopted a new compensation benefit
scheme which included Ten Thousand Pesos (PhP 10,000) year-end benefit granted to each
contractual, regular and permanent employee. State Auditor Corazon V. Espao of the COA
issued Audit Observation Memorandum No. 2003-004 stating that the grant of year-end benefit
to Board members was contrary to Department of Budget and Management (DBM) Circular
Letter No. 2002-2 dated 2 January 2002. BCDA President and Chief Executive Officer Rufo
Colayco requested a reconsideration but Director tablang denied the request. BCDA filed a
notice of appeal.

Issue: Whether or not the member of the Board of Director entitled to year-end benefit.

Held: The Court stated that the members and ex-officio members of the Board of Directors are
not entitled to YEB, they being not salaried officials of the government. The same goes with full
time consultants wherein no employer-employee relationships exist between them and the
BCDA. Thus, the whole amount paid to them totaling P342,000 is properly disallowed in audit.
The Board's power to adopt compensation and benefit scheme is not unlimited. Section 9 of RA
No. 7227 states that Board members are entitled to a per diem: Members of the Board shall
receive a per diem of not more than Five thousand pesos (P5,000) for every board meeting:
Provided, however, That the per diem collected per month does not exceed the equivalent of four
(4) meetings.

8. Government of the Philippine Islands V. Monte de Piedad

Facts: About $400,000 were paid to the Treasury of Philippine Islands by the inhabitants of the
Spanish Dominions for the relief of the victims of the earthquake that took place on June 3,
1863. The government managed to save $80, 000 out of the said fund and invested it to Monte de
Piedad y Caja de Ahorros which then invested the money to jewelleries. In June 1983, the
government through the Department of Finance ordered the return of the said amount from
Monte Piedad but the bank refused to return the money on the ground that the Governor-General
of the Philippine Islands and not the Department of Finance had the right to order the
reimbursement because the Philippine government is not the affected party.

Issue: Whether or not the Philippine government is competent to file a complaint for
reimbursement against the bank.

Held: The Court stated the doctrine of Parens Patriae. The government being the protector of the
rights of the people has the inherent supreme power to enforce such laws that will promote the
public interest. Therefore, ordering the bank to reimburse the said amount to the government.
Petition Granted.

9. Soriano V. Laguardia
Facts: In August 2004, separate but almost identical affidavit-complaints were filed by Jessie
Galapon and seven other respondents, all members of Iglesia ni Cristo (INC) against Eliseo
Soriano for certain utterances made by Mr. Soriano during his program ‘Ang Dating Daan’ at
around 10:00pm.The MTRCB then issued an order suspending him from the program ‘Ang
Dating Daan’ for three months. Petitioner then filed the petition for certiorari and prohibition
with prayer for injunctive relief.

Issue/s: 1. Whether or not Section 3 (C) of PD 1986 is unconstitutional.

2. Whether or not the decision of MTRCB violated Sec.4, Art. III of the Constitution.

Held: No. The Supreme Court held that administrative agencies have powers and functions
which may be administrative, investigatory, regulatory, quasi-legislative, or quasi-judicial, or a
mix of the five, as may be conferred by the Constitution or by statute.They have in fine only such
powers or authority as are granted or delegated, expressly or impliedly, by law. The freedom of
expression, as with the other freedoms encased in the Bill of Rights, is, however, not absolute. It
may be regulated to some extent to serve important public interests, some forms of speech not
being protected. As has been held, the limits of the freedom of expression are reached when the
expression touches upon matters of essentially private concern. The Court affirmed the three-
month suspension of the program “Ang Dating Daan”.

10. Lawyers League for a Better Philippines V Corazon Aquino

Facts: Petitioners questions the legitimacy of the government of President Corazon Aquino. It is
claimed that her government is illegal because it was not established pursuant to the 1973
Constitution. The court voted to dismiss the petition for Atty. Lozano as counsel for the
petitioners withdrew the petitions.

Issue: Whether or not the government of President Corazon Aquino is legitimate.

Held: The Supreme Court held that it is legitimate because The legitimacy of the Aquino
government is not a justiciable matter but belongs to the realm of politics where only the people
are the judge. In addition, it is not merely a de facto government but in fact a de jure government.

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.
16. Lambino vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 174153, October 25, 2006

Facts

Petitioners in G.R. No. 174153 such as Raul L. Lambino and Erico B. Aumentado including
other group and individuals started gathering signatures for an initiative petition to change the
1987 Constitution on Feb 15, 2006. The Lambino Group filed a petition on August 25, 2006 to
the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite which will ratify their initiative petition under Section 5 (b)
and (c) and Section 7 of Republic Act No. 6735 or the Initiative and Referendum Act.

Supported by 6,327,952 individuals, Lambino Group claimed that the number of petitioners
constitutes twelve percent (12%) of all registered voters, with each legislative district represented
by at least three percent (3%) of its registered voters. They also claimed that COMELEC election
registrars had verified the signatures of the 6.3 million individuals.

The Lambino Group's initiative petition modifies the 1987 Constitution by amending Sections 1-
7 of Article VI (Legislative Department) and Sections 1-4 of Article VII (Executive Department)
and by adding Article XVIII entitled "Transitory Provisions." These proposed amendments will
change the present form of government from Bicameral-Presidential to a Unicameral-
Parliamentary system.
The COMELEC issued its Resolution denying due course to the Lambino Group's petition for
lack of existing law that allows governing initiative petitions to amend the Constitution. The
COMELEC invoked this Court's ruling in Santiago v. Commission on Elections declaring RA
6735 insufficient to implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend the Constitution.

Issues
1. Whether the Lambino Group's initiative petition met the terms of Section 2, Article XVII of
the Constitution on amendments to the Constitution through a people's initiative

2. Whether this Court should re-examine its ruling in Santiago vs COMELEC declaring RA 6735
"incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions" to amend the Constitution
by implementing the initiative clause.

3. Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying due course to the
Lambino Group's petition.

Held

There is no merit to the petition.

The Lambino Group failed to comply with the basic requirements of the Constitution for
conducting a people's initiative. Thus, there is even no need to revisit Santiago, as the present
petition warrants dismissal based alone on the Lambino Group's clear failure to comply with the
basic requirements of the Constitution. For following the Court's ruling in Santiago, no grave
abuse of discretion is committed by the Commission on Elections.

This Court cannot betray its duty to protect and defend the Constitution. The Constitution as the
bible of this Court is tasked to embody the people's sovereign will. This Court exists to defend
and protect the Constitution and to allow this initiative, impelled by misleadingly gathered
signatures to alter basic principles in the Constitution is to allow a violation of the Constitution.
To allow such alteration and violation is to lose this Court's raison d'etre.

Wherefore, the petition is dismissed.

17. Oposa vs. Factoran, G.R. No. 101083, July 30, 1993
Facts

The plaintiffs in G.R. No. 101083 are all minors duly joined and represented by their parents.
The first complaint was filed as a taxpayer's class suit at the Regional Trial Court, National
Capital Judicial Region Branch 66 (Makati) against defendant, Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran,
Jr., Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). Plaintiffs
claimed that they are entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource
treasure which is the country's virgin tropical forests. They further affirmed that they represent
their generation as well as future generations and emphasized that continued deforestation have
caused disturbance and distortion of the ecological balance and resulted environmental tragedies.

Plaintiffs wished that judgment be rendered ordering the respondent, his agents, representatives
and other persons acting in his behalf to cancel all existing Timber License Agreement (TLA) in
the country and to cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving
new TLAs.

On the other hand, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint had
no cause of action against him and that it raises a political question. While RTC Judge sustained
the motion to dismiss further ruling that granting of the order prayed for would result in the
impairment of contracts which is prohibited by the Constitution.

Thus, the petitioners filed the instant special civil action for certiorari and asked the court to
rescind and set aside the dismissal order on the ground that the respondent RTC Judge gravely
abused his discretion in dismissing the action.

Issues

1. Whether or not the plaintiffs have a cause of action.

2. Whether or not the complaint raises a political issue.
3. Whether or not the original prayer of the plaintiffs result in the impairment of contracts.

Held

Respondents state that the petitioners failed to mention in their complaint a specific legal right
violated by the respondent Secretary for which any relief is provided by law. The Court did not
agree with this because the complaint focuses on one fundamental legal right -- the right to a
balanced and healthful ecology which is incorporated in Section 16 Article II of the Constitution.
The said right carries with it the duty to refrain from impairing the environment and implies,
among many other things, the judicious management and conservation of the country's forests.
Section 4 of E.O. 192 expressly mandates the DENR to be the primary government agency
responsible for the governing and supervising the exploration, utilization, development and
conservation of the country's natural resources. The policy declaration of E.O. 192 is also
substantially re-stated in Title XIV Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987. Both E.O. 192
and Administrative Code of 1987 have set the objectives which will serve as the bases for policy
formation, and have defined the powers and functions of the DENR. Thus, right of the petitioners
(and all those they represent) to a balanced and healthful ecology is as clear as DENR's duty to
protect and advance the said right.

A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the correlative duty or obligation to
respect or protect or respect the same gives rise to a cause of action. Petitioners maintain that the
granting of the TLA, which they claim was done with grave abuse of discretion, violated their
right to a balance and healthful ecology. Therefore, the full protection thereof requires that no
further TLAs should be renewed or granted.

After careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, the Court finds it to be adequate enough
to show, prima facie, the claimed violation of their rights.

With regards to which the complaint raises a political issue or not, the provision in the Second
paragraph, Section 1 of Article VIII of the Constitution vested the Supreme Court to allow the
lower Courts to rule upon even on the wisdom of the decision of the Executive and Legislature.
Hence, the Court has the right to declare that their acts are invalid for lack or excess of
jurisdiction because it is tainted with grave abuse of discretion.

The Court held that the Timber License Agreement is an instrument by which the state regulates
the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. It is
not a contract within the purview of the due process clause thus, the non-impairment clause
cannot be invoked. It can be validly removed whenever dictated by public interest or public
welfare as in this case. The granting of license does not create irrevocable rights, neither is it
property or property rights.

Moreover, the constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of obligations of contract is limit by the

exercise by the police power of the State, in the interest of public health, safety, moral and
general welfare. In short, the non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of the State.

The instant petition, being impressed with merit, is hereby granted and the RTC decision is set
aside.
18.

19. Mutuc vs. Comelec, 36 SCRA 228 (1970)

Facts

Amelito R. Mutuc, the petitioner was a candidate for delegate to the Constitutional Convention.
He filed a special civil action against the respondent COMELEC when the latter informed him
through a telegram that his certificate of candidacy was given due course but he was prohibited
from using jingles in his mobile units provided with sound systems and loud speakers. The
petitioner claimed that the order was a violation of his constitutional right to freedom of speech.
COMELEC justified its prohibition and argued that the Constitutional Convention act provided
that it is unlawful for the candidates “to purchase, produce, request or distribute sample ballots,
or electoral propaganda gadgets such as pens, lighters, fans (of whatever nature), flashlights,
athletic goods or materials, wallets, bandanas, shirts, hats, matches, cigarettes, and the like,
whether of domestic or foreign origin.” COMELEC contended that the jingle or the recorded or
taped voice of the singer used by petitioner was a tangible propaganda material and was, under
the above statute, subject to confiscation.

Issue

Whether or not the petitioner’s usage of the jingle is a part of the prohibition raised by the
COMELEC

Held

The Court held that “the general words following any enumeration being applicable only to
things of the same kind or class as those specifically referred to”. The COMELEC’s claim that a
candidate’s jingle form part of the prohibition, categorized under the phrase “and the like”, could
not merit the court’s approval by principle of Ejusdem Generis. It is quite evident that what was
contemplated in the Act was the distribution of gadgets of the kind referred to as a means of
inducement to obtain a favorable vote for the candidate responsible for its distribution.