DE LA SALLE UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF LAW

Lasallian Commission on Bar Operations

POLITICAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

Justice Perlas-Bernabe Digests
  The “Pork Barrel” is an appropriation of
government spending meant for localized
projects and secured solely or primarily to bring
money to a representative’s district.
o In the Philippines, this is referred to as
a lump-sump discretionary fund of
Members of the Legislature.
 Due to controversies in the Philippines,
Petitioners filed a petition for Prohibition and
sought that the “Pork Barrel System” be declared
unconstitutional, and that the Senate President
and Speaker of the House be enjoined from
taking further steps to enact legislation
appropriating funds for the Pork Barrel System.
 Inter alia, one of the petitioners submitted that
the Pork Barrel System enables politicians who
are members of political dynasties to accumulate
funds and perpetuate themselves in power.
Whether or not the Congressional Pork Barrel is
unconstitutional
No. Section 26, Article II of the Constitution,
prohibiting “political dynasties as may be defined by law.”
is not self-executing due to the qualifying phrase “as may
be defined by law.” In this respect, said provision does not,
by and of itself, provide a judicially enforceable
constitutional right but merely specifies a guideline for
legislative or executive action.
ecology has been violated by the petitioner through the Bt
talong field trials
 A Memorandum of Undertaking was entered by
Petitioners, among others for the conduct of
field trials for Bt eggplant or bioengineered
eggplants.
 From 2007 to 2009, UPLB conducted a contained
experiment on the Bt eggplant under the
supervision of the National Committee on
Biosafety of the Philippines (NCBP) and upon
completing the experiment, the NCBP issued a
Certificate
 Bureau of Plant Industries issued two (2)-year
Biosafety Permits for field testing of Bt eggplants
pursuant to Dept. of Agriculture Admin. Order
No. 8, s.2002 (DAO 08-2002), which provides for
the rules and regulation of the plants/products
from the use of modern biotechnology
 Respondents opposed the Bt eggplant field trials
arguing that their constitutional right to health
and balanced ecology has been violated.
 The SC in its 2015 decision denied the petitions
and affirmed the CA:
o Precautionary principle applies since
the risk of harm of the Bt eggplant field
trials remain uncertain and the
possibility of serious and irreversible
harm
o It agreed with the CA that the Bt
eggplant field trials were not moot and
academic despite the completion and
termination of said trials
o Public participation pursuant to the
National Biosafety Framework was not
complied with
o Field testing should have been
subjected to Environmental Impact
Assessment
Whether or not the right to health and balanced
 No. The right to health or a healthful and
balanced ecology was not violated. The case has been
dismissed for being moot and academic.
The Bt eggplant field trials never went beyond the field-
testing phase, none of the tasks related to propagation
stage were pursued nor the requirements complied with.
According to the cited jurisprudence, there is no hard-
and-fast rule in determining whether a case involves
paramount public interest. However, based on the analysis
of case laws, there should be some perceivable benefit to
the public which demands the Court to proceed with the
resolution of moot questions
Hence, there are no guaranteed after-effects to the
concluded Bt eggplant field trials that demand an
adjudication from which the public may perceivably
benefit. Any future threat to the right to health and
balanced ecology of the petitioner or the public in general
is more imagined than real
Therefore, it is clear that there is no benefit that would be
derived by the public in applying the paramount public
interest exception in relation the mootness rule
 Private respondent Rosalie Jaype-Garcia filed,
for herself and in behalf of her minor children, a
verified petition before the RTC for the issuance
of a TPO against her husband, Jesus C. Garcia
pursuant to R.A. 9262, the Anti-VAWC Act.
 Rosalie claimed to be a victim of physical abuse;
emotional, psychological, and economic violence
as a result of marital infidelity on the part of
Jesus, with threats of deprivation of custody of
her children and of financial support.
 Finding reasonable ground to believe that an
imminent danger of violence against the private
respondent and her children exists or is about to
recur, the RTC issued a TPO effective for thirty
(30) days
 Claiming that petitioner continued to deprive
them of financial support; failed to faithfully
comply with the TPO; and committed new acts
of harassment against her and their children,
Rosalie filed another application for the issuance
of a TPO ex parte.
 The RTC issued another TPO, effective for thirty
(30) days
 Jesus filed challenges (1) the constitutionality of
R.A. 9262 for being violative of the due process
and the equal protection clauses, and (2) the
validity of the modified TPO issued in the civil
case for being “an unwanted product of an
invalid law.”
Whether or not RA 9262 violates the policy of the
State to protect the family as a basic social institution
No. A perusal of the deliberations of Congress on
Senate Bill No. 2723 (which became R.A. 9262) reveals that
while the sponsor, Senator Luisa Pimentel-Ejercito, had
originally proposed what she called a “synthesized
measure” – an amalgamation of two measures, namely, the
“Anti-Domestic Violence Act” and the “Anti-Abuse of
Women in Intimate Relationships Act” – providing
protection to “all family members, leaving no one in
isolation” but at the same time giving special attention to
women as the “usual victims” of violence and abuse.
Nonetheless, it was eventually agreed that men be denied
protection under the same measure.
It is settled that courts are not concerned with the
wisdom, justice, policy, or expediency of a statute. Hence,
the Court dared not venture into the real motivations and
wisdom of the members of Congress in limiting the
protection against violence and abuse under R.A. 9262 to
women and children only. No proper challenge on said
grounds may be entertained in this proceeding.
Congress has made its choice and it is not the Court’s
prerogative to supplant this judgment. The choice may be
perceived as erroneous but even then, the remedy against
it is to seek its amendment or repeal by the legislative. By
the principle of separation of powers, it is the legislative
that determines the necessity, adequacy, wisdom and
expediency of any law. The Court only step in when there
is a violation of the Constitution. However, none was
sufficiently shown in case.

 The “Pork Barrel” is an appropriation of
government spending meant for localized
projects and secured solely or primarily to bring
money to a representative’s district.
 Due to controversies in the Philippines,
Petitioners filed a petition for Prohibition and
sought that the “Pork Barrel System” be declared
unconstitutional, and that the Senate President
and Speaker of the House be enjoined from
taking further steps to enact legislation
appropriating funds for the Pork Barrel System.
 In particular, the petitioners argued that the
Congressional Pork Barrel "allows individual
legislators to interfere" with the budget after the
GAA is passed. In particular, they submitted that
legislators should not wield any power over
project implementation.
1. Whether or not Congressional Pork Barrel and
the Malampaya Fund violated the principle of
separation of powers;
2. Whether or not the Congressional Pork Barrel
violates the principle of checks and balances.
1. On separation of powers: Yes. Congressional
Pork Barrel violates the principle of separation of
powers, because the following executive
functions are left to the legislature: (1) project
identification; (2) post-enactment authority in
the areas of fund release and realignment.
Role of the Executive. The enforcement of the
national budget, as primarily contained in the
GAA, is indisputably a function both
constitutionally assigned and properly entrusted
to the Executive branch of government.
Unless the Constitution provides otherwise, the
Executive department should exclusively
exercise all roles and prerogatives which go into
the implementation of the national budget as
provided under the GAA as well as any other
appropriation law. Congress enters the picture
when it deliberates or acts upon the budget
proposals of the President. Upon approval and
passage of the GAA, Congress’ law-making role
necessarily comes to an end and from there, the
Executive’s role of implementing the national
budget begins. Any post-enactment
congressional measure should be limited to
scrutiny and investigation.
Relationship of Delegation of Legislative Power to
Separation of Powers. As an adjunct to the
separation of powers principle, legislative power
shall be exclusively exercised by the body to
which the Constitution has conferred the same.
The only recognized exceptions to the general
rule of non-delegability are: Delegated legislative
power to local governments which, by
immemorial practice, are allowed to legislate on
purely local matters; and Constitutionally-
granted exceptions such as the authority of the
President to, by law, exercise powers necessary
and proper to carry out a declared national
policy in times of war or national emergency, or
fix within specified limits, and subject to such
limitations and restrictions as Congress may
impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas,
tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties
within the framework of the national
development program of the government.
The Presidential Pork Barrel violated the
principle of separation of powers, because the
Legislature, in crafting PD 910, gave the
President unbridled discretion to determine
what the funds will be used for.
2. On Checks and Balances: Yes.
Item-Veto. The item veto power of the President,
which is a constitutional check and balance, is
violated by the lump-sum nature of the PDAF (it
is one item in the GAA; this will render the
President’s power to item-veto useless). For the
President to be able to exercise his power of item
veto, the appropriation bill must contain
“specific appropriations of money,” and not only
“general provisions” which provide for
parameters of appropriation.
Accountability vis-à-vis Congressional Oversight.
Certain features of the Congressional Pork
Barrel have an effect on congressional oversight.
The conduct of oversight would be tainted as
legislators, who are vested with post-enactment
authority would, in effect, be checking on
activities in which they themselves participate.

 Prior to the election of the Speaker of the House
of Representatives, Acting Floor Leader Rep.
Farinas and Rep. Atienza had a parliamentary
inquiry. Rep. Farinas articulated that:
o All those who vote for the winning
Speaker shall belong to the Majority
and those who vote for other
candidates shall belong to the Minority
o Those who abstain from voting shall be
considered part of Minority
o The Minority Leader shall be elected by
the members of Minority.
 The Election for Speakership were held where
Alvarez won. Rep. Baguilat has 8 votes while Rep.
Suarez has 7 votes.
 Petitioners hoped that the “long-standing
tradition” of the House – where the candidate
who garnered the 2nd highest number of votes
automatically be declared as the Minority
Leader. In this case, Rep. Baguilat was never
recognized.
 Rep. Suarez was officially recognized as the
House Minority Leader.
 Hence, the petitioners filed the instant petition
for mandamus insisting that Rep. Baguilat should
be recognized as the Minority Leader.
Whether or not the respondents may be
compelled to recognize Rep. Baguilat as the Minority
Leader of the House of Representatives?
No, the respondent cannot be compelled
because Section 16(3), Article VI of the Constitution vests
in the House of Representative the sole authority to
determine the rules of its proceeding. After Rep. Farinas’
articulation on the election of Minority Leader, the
election of the Speaker of the House proceeded without
any objection from any member of the Congress, including
the petitioners. Thus, the House of Representatives had
effectively adopted Rep. Farinas' proposal.
Section 16 (1), Article VI of the Constitution provides that
the Speaker of the House of Representative shall be
elected by a majority vote of its entire membership. Each
house shall choose such other officers as may deem
necessary. Hence, the method and manner as to how these
officers are choses is within its sole control.
 Layug filed a Petition to Disqualify Buhay Party-
List and Brother Mike Velarde from the 2010
elections
 Grounds: Mere extension of El Shaddai, a
religious sect thus disqualified from being a
party-list; Velarde a billionaire and spiritual
leader thus a member of neither marginalized
nor underrepresented sector
 Defense: Political party composed of groups for
the elderly, the women, the youth, the
handicapped, and the professionals; Velarde
belongs to marginalized and elderly group, and
even if he did not, nominees do not need to come
from marginalized and underrepresented sector
 COMELEC: denied for lack of substantial
evidence; proclaimed Buhay Party-List as a
winner entitled to 2 seats in the House of
Representatives
Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction given the
proclamation of Buhay Part-List and the assumption of
office of its representatives
Yes. Layug assails the qualifications of Buhay
Party-List and its nominee, a matter which falls under the
jurisdiction of the regular courts and not of the HRET. The
HRET’s jurisdiction is over all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of its members. Under
Article VI, Sec. 17 (5) of the 1987 Constitution, members are
two kinds: those elected from legislative districts, and
those elected through the party-list system.

 PHILCOMSAT is a wholly-owned subsidiary of
the POTC, a government-sequestered
organization
 POHC is a private corporation whose main
operation is collecting the money market
interest income of PHILCOMSAT
o By virtue of PHC’s interests in both
PHILCOMSAT and POTC, the
government likewise has substantial
interest in PHC.
 POTC and PHC sustained financial losses and its
operating expenses ballooned tremendously.
 In view of these losses, Senator Defensor-
Santiago introduced Proposed Senate Resolution
(PSR) No. 455 directing for the conduct of an
inquiry, in aid of legislation, on the anomalous
losses insured by POTC, PHILCOMSAT, PHC, and
the mismanagement committed by their
respective board of directors.
 As a result of these hearings, the Senate
Committees submitted Committee Report No.
312, in sum, recommended:
o The privatization and transfer of
jurisdiction over the shares of the
government in PITC and PHILCOMSAT
to the Privatization Management
Office under the Department of
Finance
o The replacement of government
nominees as directors of POTC and
PHILCOMSAT
 So petitioners, PHC, et al. filed this petition
seeking to nullify Committee Report 312 for
having been approved by the Senate with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in
excess of jurisdiction
o Claiming that it should be nullified
because the Senate just hastily
approved the same and did not
propose a piece of legislation despite
conducting legislative inquiries
Whether or not Senate committed grave abuse of
discretion in approving Committee Resolution No. 312
No. Article VI, Section 21 of the Constitution
gives the Senate or the House of Representatives the
power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. As such,
the Senate Committee’s inquiry in PSSR No. 455 was valid.
The conferral of the legislative power of inquiry upon any
committee of the Congress must carry with it all powers
necessary and proper for its effective discharge. In line
with the exercise of this power of inquiry, the Senate did
not act in grave abuse of discretion when it approved
Committee Resolution No. 312 considering its
constitutional mandate to conduct legislative inquiries.
Also, the Senate cannot be faulted for approving the
Resolution on the very same day that the assailed
resolution was submitted. The wide latitude given to
Congress with respect to legislative inquiries has long
been settled.
 The “Pork Barrel” is an appropriation of
government spending meant for localized
projects and secured solely or primarily to bring
money to a representative’s district.
o In the Philippines, this is referred to as
a lump-sump discretionary fund of
Members of the Legislature.
 Due to controversies in the Philippines,
Petitioners filed a petition for Prohibition and
sought that the “Pork Barrel System” be declared
unconstitutional, and that the Senate President
and Speaker of the House be enjoined from
taking further steps to enact legislation
appropriating funds for the Pork Barrel System.
 Some of these controversies include:
o The “ghost projects” scandal involving
the JLN Corporation (Janet Lim
Napoles); and
o The Presidential Pork Barrel of Pres.
Arroyo used for the Malampaya gas
project off Palawan, which was
 intended originally for agrarian reform
beneficiaries.
Whether or not the Congress overstepped its
oversight functions through the Congressional Pork Barrel
Yes. Congressional oversight must be limited to:
1. Scrutiny based primarily on Congress’ power of
appropriation and the budget hearings
conducted in connection with it, its power to ask
heads of departments to hear and appear before
and be heard by either of its Houses on any
matter pertaining to the departments and its
power of confirmation; and
2. (2) Investigation and monitoring of the
implementation of laws pursuant to the power of
Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation.
Post-enactment measures which govern the
areas of project identification, fund release and
fund realignment are not related to the function
of congressional oversight.
 Chato lost the 2010 elections for representative
of the 2nd Legislative District of Camarines Norte
to Panotes by 3, 885 votes and filed an electoral
protest
 The initial revision of ballots showed a
substantial discrepancy between the votes of the
parties per physical count and per election
returns in 2 municipalities; Chato would later
move for the revision of ballots in all of the
clustered precincts
 Panotes moved for the suspension of the
proceedings to determine the integrity of the
ballots and ballot boxes due to alleged
irregularities in their condition
 The HRET directed the copying of the picture
image files of ballot relative to the protest
 Chato moved for the cancellation of the
decryption and copying, contending that there
was neither any legal basis nor guidelines
governing such, especially as the Provincial
Elections Supervisor admitted during canvassing
proceedings that the CF cards for the concerned
municipalities were defective and had been
replaced
 HRET: denied Chato’s Motion; later ordered the
continuation of the revision of ballots of the
remaining 75% of the clustered precincts
Whether or not the HRET acted with grave abuse
of discretion in ordering the revision of ballots of all
clustered precincts
No. There is no clear showing of arbitrary and
improvident use by the HRET of its power that constitutes
denial of due process or law or demonstration of a very
clear unmitigated error constituting grave abuse of
discretion.
The Constitution mandates that the HRET shall be the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of its members. Sole means full, complete,
unimpaired jurisdiction in the adjudication of election
contests involving its members. In fact, the 2011 HRET
Rules, Rule 7 states that the HRET shall have exclusive
control, direction, and supervision of all matters
pertaining to its own functions and operation.
In any case, the assailed revision proceedings had already
taken place, thus rendering the issue moot and academic.
 Petitioner Wigberto R. Tañada and private
respondents Angelina Tan and Alvin John Tañada
were contenders for Congress in the 4th District
of Quezon Province.
 Wigberto filed two separate petitions before the
COMELEC:
o First was to cancel Alvin John’s
Certificate of Candidacy (“COC”);
o Second was to declare Alvin John as a
nuisance candidate.
  The COMELEC held that Alvin John was not a
nuisance candidate.
 Subsequently, the COMELEC en banc cancelled
Alvin John’s COC due to false material
representations concerning his residency.
 Wigberto filed a 2nd Motion for Partial
Reconsideration. He claimed that Alvin John’s
candidacy was not bona fide, because Alvin John
was merely forced by his father to file the COC.
 Wigberto filed several more motions before the
COMELEC en banc, but the COMELEC didn’t add
upon them.
 Despite the COMELEC en banc’s ruling that Alvin
John’s COC is cancelled, Alvin John’s name was
still included in the ballot.
 Angelina Tan won.
 Wigberto filed a Petition to Annul the
Proclamation of Angelina Tan before the
COMELEC. He claimed that were it not for the
inclusion of Alvin John’s name, he would have
won the elections.
Whether or not the COMELEC should take
cognizance of the case.
No. The proclamation of a congressional
candidate following the election divests the COMELEC of
jurisdiction over disputes relating to the election, returns
and qualifications of the proclaimed representative in
favor of the HRET. The term “elections, returns and
qualifications” refers to all matters affecting the validity of
the contestee’s title.
 In 2001, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
issued E.O. 12 creating the Presidential Anti-
Graft Commission (PAGC) and vesting it with the
power to investigate or hear administrative cases
or complaints for possible graft and corruption,
among others, against presidential appointees
and to submit its report and recommendations to
the President.
 2010, President Aquino III issued E.O. 13
abolishing the PAGC and transferring its
functions to the Office of the Deputy Executive
Secretary for Legal Affairs more particularly to
its newly-established Investigative and
Adjudicatory Division (IAD)
 In 2011, Purisima filed before the IAD-ODESLA a
complaint for grave misconduct against
petitioner Prospero A. Pichay, Jr., Chairman of
the Board of Trustees of the Local Water Utilities
Administration as well as the incumbent
members of the LWUA Board of Trustees for
which purchasing 445,377 shares of stock of
Express Savings Bank, Inc.
 It is the contention of the petitioner that, aside
from the alleged encroachment of the powers of
the legislative by the executive in the “creation”
of IAD-ODESLA, it is likewise unconstitutional
for violation of the due process and equal
protection clause because IAD-ODESLA's
investigation only to presidential appointees
occupying upper-level positions in the
government
Whether or not EO 13 is unconstitutional for
usurping the power of the legislative in making a public
office
No. The President has Continuing Authority to
Reorganize the Executive Department under E.O. 292.
Section 31 of E.O. 292, otherwise known as the
Administrative Code of 1987.
Under Section 31 (1) of EO 292, the President can
reorganize the Office of the President Proper by
abolishing, consolidating or merging units, or by
transferring functions from one unit to another. In
contrast, under Section 31 (2) and (3) of EO 292, the
President's power to reorganize offices outside the Office
of the President Proper but still within the Office of the
President is limited to merely transferring functions or
agencies from the Office of the President to Departments
or Agencies, and vice versa.
The distinction between the allowable organizational
actions under Section 31 (1) on the one hand and Section 31
(2) and (3) on the other is crucial not only as it affects
employees' tenurial security but also insofar as it touches
upon the validity of the reorganization, that is, whether the
executive actions undertaken fall within the limitations
prescribed under E.O. 292.
When the PAGC was created under E.O. 12, it was
composed of a Chairman and two (2) Commissioners who
held the ranks of Presidential Assistant II and I,
respectively, and was placed directly “under the Office of
the President.”
On the other hand, the ODESLA, to which the functions of
the PAGC have now been transferred, is an office within
the Office of the President Proper. Since both of these
offices belong to the Office of the President Proper, the
reorganization by way of abolishing the PAGC and
transferring its functions to the ODESLA is allowable
under Section 31 (1) of E.O. 292.
 In 2001, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
issued E.O. 12 creating the Presidential Anti-
Graft Commission (PAGC) and vesting it with the
power to investigate or hear administrative cases
or complaints for possible graft and corruption,
among others, against presidential appointees
and to submit its report and recommendations to
the President.
 2010, President Aquino III issued E.O. 13
abolishing the PAGC and transferring its
functions to the Office of the Deputy Executive
Secretary for Legal Affairs more particularly to
its newly-established Investigative and
Adjudicatory Division (IAD)
 In 2011, Purisima filed before the IAD-ODESLA a
complaint for grave misconduct against
petitioner Prospero A. Pichay, Jr., Chairman of
the Board of Trustees of the Local Water Utilities
Administration as well as the incumbent
members of the LWUA Board of Trustees for
which purchasing 445,377 shares of stock of
Express Savings Bank, Inc.
 It is the contention of the petitioner that, aside
from the alleged encroachment of the powers of
the legislative by the executive in the “creation”
of IAD-ODESLA, it is likewise
UNCONSTITUTIONAL for USURPING the power
of the legislative department in appropriating
public funds
Whether or not EO 13 is unconstitutional for
usurping the power of the legislative in appropriating
public funds
No. Section 78 of R.A. 9970 or the General
Appropriations Act of 2010 provides the President’s
authority to “direct changes in the organizational units or
key positions in any department or agency.” The aforecited
provision, often and consistently included in the general
appropriations laws, recognizes the extent of the
President’s power to reorganize the executive offices and
agencies under him, which is, “even to the extent of
modifying and realigning appropriations for that purpose.”
And to further enable the President to run the affairs of the
executive department, he is likewise given constitutional
authority to augment any item in the General
Appropriations Law using the savings in other items of the
appropriation for his office.
Thus, while there may be no specific amount earmarked
for the IADODESLA from the total amount appropriated by
Congress in the annual budget for the Office of the
President, the necessary funds for the IADODESLA may be
properly sourced from the President's own office budget
without committing any illegal appropriation. After all,
there is no usurpation of the legislature's power to
appropriate funds when the President simply allocates the
existing funds previously appropriated by Congress for his
office.
 Respondents voluntarily offered a parcel of land
for sale pursuant to the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law of 1988.
 The DAR acquired 19.1071 Ha. of land, which
petitioner LBP valued at PhP440,255.93.
Respondents rejected this amount.
  The DAR Adjudication Board (“DARAB”)
conducted summary proceedings to determine
just compensation.
o They resolved to adopt LBP’s valuation.
o The amount was deposited to
Respondent’s credit as provisional
compensation for the land.
 Respondents filed a petition for judicial
determination of just compensation before the
RTC of Iloilo City (acting as Special Agrarian
Court).
o For the meantime, the RTC directed
LBP to recompute the value of the land.
o LBP filed a Manifestation, stating that
the recomputed value of the land (from
PhP440,355.92 to PhP503,148.97).
o Respondents still rejected the offer.
 In its judgment, the RTC fixed the compensation
at PhP669,962.53
o Plus 12% interest p.a.
o Plus additional 5% cash payment by
way of incentive for voluntarily
offering the lot for sale.
 CA affirmed the RTC judgment, with
modifications.
Whether or not the CA was correct in adopting the
ruling of the Special Agrarian Court in its entirety
No.
 While the determination of just compensation is
essentially a judicial function vested in the RTC
acting as a SAC, the judge cannot abuse his
discretion by not taking into full consideration
the facts specifically identified by the law and the
implementing rules.
 In this case, the valuation by DAR must be
considered. Pursuant to the DAR’s rule-making
power, the following criteria are translated into
a simple formula for valuation:
1. The acquisition cost of the land;
2. The current value of the properties;
3. Its nature, actual use, and income;
4. The sworn valuation by the owner;
5. The tax declarations;
6. The assessment made by government
assessors;
7. The social and economic benefits
contributed by the famrkers and the
farmworkers, and by the government
to the property; and
8. The non-payment of taxes or loans
secured from any government
financing institution on the said land, if
any.
 Prior to the election of the Speaker of the House
of Representatives, Acting Floor Leader Rep.
Farinas and Rep. Atienza had a parliamentary
inquiry. Rep. Farinas articulated the manner of
voting a Minority Leader that the latter shall be
elected by the members of minority. There was
no opposition.
 The Election for Speakership were held where
Alvarez won. Rep. Baguilat has 8 votes while Rep.
Suarez has 7 votes.
 Petitioners hoped that the “long-standing
tradition” of the House – where the candidate
who garnered the 2nd highest number of votes
automatically be declared as the Minority
Leader. In this case, Rep. Baguilat was never
recognized.
 Rep. Suarez was officially recognized as the
House Minority Leader.
 Hence, the petitioners filed the instant petition
for mandamus insisting that Rep. Baguilat should
be recognized as the Minority Leader.
Whether court can interfere the House’s internal
matters, thus compelling it to recognize Rep. Baguilat as
its Minority Leader?
No, the court cannot interfere in the internal matter of the
Congress unless there is grave abuse of discretion. Section
16(3), Article VI of the Constitution vests in the House of
Representative the sole authority to determine the rules of
its proceeding. The court has no authority to interfere and
unilaterally intrude into its exclusive realm. Otherwise, it
would lead to a breach of the separation of powers
doctrine. However, it is subject to an exception that there
is grave abuse of discretion on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of government including Congress. This is
the expanded concept of judicial power under Section 1,
Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.

 The “Pork Barrel” is an appropriation of
government spending meant for localized
projects and secured solely or primarily to bring
money to a representative’s district.
o In the Philippines, this is referred to as
a lump-sump discretionary fund of
Members of the Legislature.
 Due to controversies in the Philippines,
Petitioners filed a petition for Prohibition and
sought that the “Pork Barrel System” be declared
unconstitutional, and that the Senate President
and Speaker of the House be enjoined from
taking further steps to enact legislation
appropriating funds for the Pork Barrel System.
 Some of these controversies include:
o The “ghost projects” scandal involving
the JLN Corporation (Janet Lim
Napoles); and
o The Presidential Pork Barrel of Pres.
Arroyo used for the Malampaya gas
project off Palawan, which was
intended originally for agrarian reform
beneficiaries.
Whether or not the Court may exercise its judicial
power over the controversy.
Yes. Judicial power operates only when there is
an actual case or controversy. Section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution states that “judicial power includes the duty
of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable.”
Related to the question of an actual case or controversy is
the requirement of “ripeness,” i.e. “when the act being
challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual
challenging it.” The case is justiciable because the 2014
budget remains legally effective and subsisting.
In this case, the Petitioners also have standing as
taxpayers, because the “Pork Barrel System” is
implemented because of the taxes they pay. Moreover, as
citizens, they have fulfilled the requirement of standing,
because the matters raised are matters “of transcendental
importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of
paramount public interest.”
 PSBANK and its President seek to withdraw their
Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, which
had been filed to enjoin the Senate Impeachment
Court from requiring them to testify on the
alleged foreign currency deposit accounts of
then-Chief Justice Renato Corona (subpoena
duces tecum ad testificandum)
 During the pendency of the petition, the
impeachment proceedings were terminated
Whether or not the Senate Impeachment Court
acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the
aforementioned subpoena given the confidentiality of
bank deposits under RA 6426
The issue is already moot and academic.
Supervening events, such as Corona’s execution of a
waiver against the confidentiality of all his bank deposits
and his conviction, rendered the issue moot and academic,
thus, the Court can no longer exercise its power of judicial
review, as there is no justiciable controversy, and legal
relief is neither needed nor called for.
 The SRA issued a Sugar Order and issuances providing
that a lien of P2 per LKG-Bag shall be imposed on all
raw sugar quedan-permits, as well as on any other
form of sugar, in order to fund the Philippine Sugar
Research Institute (PHILSURIN).
 Penafrancia Sugar Mill questioned the validity of the
Sugar Orders, alleging that:
(a) they were issued beyond the powers and
authority granted to the SRA;
(b) the amount levied by virtue of the Sugar Orders
constitutes public funds and thus, cannot be
legally channeled to a private corporation such
as PHILSURIN.
 SRA and PHILSURIN filed their respective motions to
dismiss on the ground of forum-shopping.
 During the pendency of the instant petition, SRA has
issued Sugar Order No. 5, which revoked the assailed
Sugar Orders. All mill companies were directed to
cease from collecting the lien of P2.00.
Whether or not the case should be dismissed for
having become moot and academic.
Yes. A case or issue is considered moot and
academic when it ceases to present a justiciable
controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that an
adjudication of the case or a declaration on the issue would
be of no practical value or use. In such instance, there is
no actual substantial relief, which a petitioner would be
entitled to, and which would be negated by the dismissal
of the petition. Courts generally decline jurisdiction over
such case or dismiss it on the ground of mootness. This is
because the judgment will not serve any useful purpose or
have any practical legal effect because, in the nature of
things, it cannot be enforced.
 A Memorandum of Undertaking was entered by
Petitioners, among others, for the conduct of
field trials for Bt eggplant or bioengineered
eggplants.
 From 2007 to 2009, UPLB conducted a contained
experiment on the Bt eggplant under the
supervision of the National Committee on
Biosafety of the Philippines (NCBP) and upon
completing the experiment, the NCBP issued a
Certificate
 Bureau of Plant Industries issued two (2)-year
Biosafety Permits for field testing of Bt eggplants
pursuant to Dept. of Agriculture Admin. Order
No. 8, s.2002 (DAO 08-2002), which provides for
the rules and regulation of the plants/products
from the use of modern biotechnology
 Respondents opposed the Bt eggplant field trials
arguing that their constitutional right to health
and balanced ecology has been violated.
o They filed before the SC a petition for
Writ of Continuing Mandamus and
Writ of Kalikasan with prayer for
Temporary Environmental Protection
Order (TEPO)
 The Court referred the case to the CA which the
latter ruled in favor of the respondents and
directed the petitioners to permanently cease
and desist from conducting the Bt eggplant field
trials
 The petitioners elevated the case to the SC via
petition for review on certiorari
 The SC in its 2015 decision denied the petitions
and affirmed the CA:
o Precautionary principle applies since
the risk of harm of the Bt eggplant field
trials remain uncertain and the
 possibility of serious and irreversible
harm
o It agreed with the CA that the Bt
eggplant field trials were not moot and
academic despite the completion and
termination of said trials and
expiration of the Biosafety permits
o Public participation pursuant to the
National Biosafety Framework was not
complied with
o Field testing should have been
subjected to Environmental Impact
Assessment
 This is a Motion for Reconsideration to the 2015
SC decision.
Whether or not the case should have been
dismissed for mootness
Yes. The case was dismissed because none of the
exceptions to the mootness principle are present
The SC ruled that the Petition for the Writ of Continuing
Mandamus and Writ of Kalikasan with prayer for TEPO are
dismissed on the ground of mootness
Paramount public interest exception:
 There is no hard-and-fast rule in determining
whether the case involves paramount public
interest. However, a survey of cases provides a
guidepost that there should be some perceivable
benefit to the public which demands the Court
to proceed with the resolution of otherwise
moot questions
 Paramount public interest exception cannot be
applied in this case since the Bt eggplants never
went beyond the field-testing phase and none of
tasks related to propagation were pursued.
Hence any future threats to the right of the
respondents or the public in general to a
healthful and balanced ecology is more imagined
than real
Capable of repetition yet evading review exception:
 The case does not fall under the capable of
repetition yet evading review exception
 DAO 08-2002 was superseded by Joint
Department Circular No. 1, s.2016 (JDC 01-2016),
which is substantially different from the
superseded rule, clearly prevents the case from
being one capable of repetition
 With reference to Belgica v. Ochoa, the element
of “frequent” and “routinary” are absent or
wanting
:
 In 2011, the PNP entered into a Memorandum of
Agreement with WER FAST without going
through any public bidding. In the said memo,
the PNP undertook to allow WER FAST to
provide courier services to deliver firearm
licenses to gun owners.
 Said MoA was instructed to be reviewed by the
PNP’s Legal Service.
 Upon his appointment as PNP Chief in 2012,
Purisima approved a memorandum accrediting
WER FAST. However, for doing so, complaints
were filed against Purisima el at, praying that the
former be administratively charged for gross
negligence/gross neglect of duty, with a prayer
for preventive suspension.
 Without waiting for Purisima’s counter-affidavit,
the OMB issued an Order, which preventively
suspended Purisima and other PNP officers for 6
months without pay.
 Purisima’s petition for certiorari assailing the
order was denied by the CA holding that the
petitions were moot in view of the lapse of the 6-
month period of preventive suspension.
Whether lifting of the preventive suspension
order renders the petition moot.
No. The subsequent lifting of the preventive
suspension order against the accused does not render the
petition moot and academic. It does not preclude the
courts from passing upon the validity of a preventive
suspension order, it being a manifestation of its
constitutionally mandated power and authority to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.
In this case, despite the lapse of the period of his
preventive suspension, there remains some practical value
or use in resolving its propriety or impropriety. The
suspension’s validity would essentially determine
Purisima’s entitlement to back salaries during the period.
Ultimately, it should be borne in mind that the issuance of
a preventive suspension order does not amount to a
prejudgment of the merits of the case. Neither is it a
demonstration of a public official’s guilt as such
pronouncement can be done only after trial on the merits.
 This Administrative Matter sought to clarify
what is meant by the “Notice of Pendency/Non-
Pendency of Administrative Case/s from the
Civil Service Commission” in R.A. No. 10154
(Section 7, Rule III).
o The provision requires retiring
government employees to secure a
clearance from the CSC.
Whether or not retiring court personnel need to
comply with this requirement and secure a clearance from
the CSC.
No. Court employees need not secure a
clearance from the CSC prior to retirement. This is
because it is the Court who has administrative supervision
over court personnel. As such, it is the Court who has
custody of records pertaining to the administrative cases
of the court personnel.
 This case concerns a Notice of Disallowance filed
by the Commission on Audit (CoA-ND), and their
finding that Petitioners Delos Santos, Bacaltos,
Antoni, and Bien (“Petitioners”) should be held
liable for PhP3,386,697.10.
 This stemmed from a MOA entered by the
Vicente Sotto Memorial Medical Center
(“Hospital”) with then-Congressman Cuenco of
Cebu.
 The project was allegedly for the benefit of
indigent patients who may avail of the benefits of
the TNT program.
o One of the conditions is that the
Hospital shall purchase medicines
intended for indigent patients from
outside sources in case the medicine is
not available in the pharmacy.
 Several years after enforcement of the MOA,
allegations of forgery and falsification of
prescriptions and referrals for the availment of
medicines under the TNT surfaced.A fact-finding
committee was established to investigate.
 Within the same month, Booc, a State Auditor
assigned to audit the Hospital, found in her Audit
Observation Memoranda, that there really were
instances of fictitious patients and falsified
prescriptions.
o Meanwhile, the fact-finding
committee of the Hospital found that
there were “unseen and unnoticeable
irregularities.”
  Eventually, the CoA issued the Notice of
Disallowance, and found the Petitioners
solidarily liable.
Whether or not the findings of the CoA should be
disturbed
No. The COA is tasked to be vigilant and
conscientious in safeguarding the proper use of the
government’s, and ultimately the people’s, property. The
exercise of its general audit power is among the
constitutional mechanisms that gives life to the check and
balance system inherent in our form of government.
Furthermore, Corollary to the CoA’s functions is that the
Court should sustain the findings of a constitutionally-
created constitutional authority, due to the doctrine of
separation of powers and their presumed expertise. The
only exception is if there is a grave abuse of discretion, or
when bad faith and malice attended the findings of the
CoA.is endowed with enough latitude to determine,
prevent, and disallow irregular, unnecessary, excessive,
extravagant or unconscionable expenditures
government funds.
 Beumer (Dutch) and Amores (Filipino) were
married for several years before their marriage
was declared a nullity on the ground of
psychological incapacity
 Beumer thus filed a Petition for Dissolution of
Conjugal Partnership praying for the distribution
of several real properties (parcels of land) in
Dumaguete allegedly acquired during their
marriage
 The properties were registered in the name of
Amores
 Amores denied Beumer’s ownership/conjugal
share of the same, claiming that they were her
exclusive property, having purchased the same
with her own money
 Both the RTC and the CA denied Beumer’s claim
Whether or not Beumer has a right to reimburse
his half/share of the value of the real properties
No. The foreign spouse cannot seek
reimbursement on the ground of equity where it is clear
that he willingly and knowingly bought the property
despite the prohibition against ownership of foreign land
in the Constitution. A contract that violates the
Constitution and the law is null and void, vests no rights,
creates no obligations, and produces no legal effect at all.
of
 The subject property is a parcel of land located
in Quezon City. It was previously covered by TCT
under the name Donton until its registration in
the names of respondents Duane Stier and Emily
Maggay.
 While Donton was in the United States, he
discovered that the respondents took possession
and control of the subject property. Upon his
return to the Philippines, he learned that the
respondent, through alleged fraudulent means,
were able to transfer the ownership in their
names.
 Hence, Donton filed the instant complaint for
annulment of title and reconveyance of property.
Whether or not the sale is null and void
considering that Stier is a foreign individual
Yes. Even if the petitioner failed to prove that
Donton’s signature on the deed of absolute sale was a
forgery, the sale of the subject property to Stier is in
violation of the constitution. Hence, the sale is null and
void.
Stier admitted that he is an American Citizen in his Answer
with Counterclaim. It is considered as an admission against
interest. Section 7, Article XII of the constitution  CA: reversed; pacto de retro sale is actually an
disqualifies aliens from acquiring lands of the public equitable mortgage thus not a prohibited
domain as well as private lands. Thus, the sale of the transaction; Quirino has preferential right of
subject property is void. Furthermore, Stier is barred from redemption over land
recovering any amount he paid for the subject property
because the action is proscribed by the Constitution. Whether or not Quirino is the rightful owner and
possessor of the land
However, the sale with the other vendee, Maggay, is valid
for failure to prove the allegation that she has no capacity
No, he is not. Prisco violated agrarian laws by
to purchase the property. Thus, she is entitled to the
surrendering possession and cultivation of the land to
undivided one-half share.
Bayagno for 11 years without any justifiable reason. Such
act constituted abandonment, a ground for cancellation by
the DARAB of an award to the agrarian reform beneficiary,
and by extension, his heirs no longer had any right to
redeem the property.

 Prisco Quirino, Sr.was the owner of a 2880ha

agricultural land in Batangan, Valencia, Bukidnon
covered by a Certificate of Land Transfer
 Quirino executed a Deed of Conditional Sale
covering the said lot to Ernesto Bayagno,
reserving his right to redeem or repurchase the
land for 12 years, or until the P 40k consideration
is returned, whichever comes first
 Bayagno possessed and cultivated the land for
more than 10 years and refused Quirino’s offer to
redeem the property
 Instead, Bayagno allowed a former owner (Gua-
An) of the land to redeem the same
 After Quirino’s death, his wife and son filed a
complaint for specific performance, redemption,
reinstatement, and damages against Bayagno
and Gua-An
 Defense: Quirino’s right over the land was merely
inchoate for failure to establish payment of just
compensation to landowner, deed null and void
for being violative of the law and public policy,
and failure to consign redemption money bars
redemption
 DARAB: Quirino violated agrarian laws,
abandoned land because of failure to cultivate
the land; canceled CLT
 Lim applied for the issuance of a Certificate of
Land Ownership Award (CLOA) over a 73, 105
sqm parcel of land in Masbate before the DAR
Secretary
 The CLOA was granted upon recommendation of
the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer and OCT
was issued
 Sutton later filed a petition for the cancellation
of the CLOA and OCT for being invalid, as the
subject land is a private land devoted to cattle
raising, which she had inherited from her
deceased father; deprived of due process, as no
notice had been received by her regarding
aforementioned proceedings
 Lim: actual occupants and qualified
beneficiaries; lot they sold to Sutton was not the
same lot as the subject land; prescription as
petition filed after title became indefeasible
 The Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator
ordered the cancellation of the CLOA as it found
that the Lims were negligent in identifying lots of
the public domain and their actual occupants
  DARAB: reversed; no irregularities in issuance of
CLOA; CARP coverage under exclusive
jurisdiction of DAR Secretary; affirmed by CA
Whether or not an agrarian dispute exists between
the parties to vest jurisdiction with the DARAB
No. The jurisdiction of the DARAB is confined to
agrarian disputes between landowners and tenants in
whose favor CLOAs have been issued by the DAR
Secretary. The mere prayer for cancellation of a CLOA is
not the agrarian dispute contemplated by law. An agrarian
dispute must be a controversy relating to a tenurial
arrangement over lands devoted to agriculture. In this
case, no such arrangement has been alleged, thus
rendering the DARAB decision null and void.
No. His title springs from a null and void force. A
void contract is equivalent to nothing; it produces no civil
effect, and it does not create, modify, or extinguish a
juridical relation. Despite the erroneous identification of
the ownership of the property, Borromeo had no right to
file a petition for landholding exception. He is not an actual
tenant-tiller; thus, given the prohibition on transfer of
ownership over or alienation of tenanted rice and/or corn
lands to non-tenant-tillers since October 21, 1972, the sale
to him was null and void.

 BATCO owned several parcels of land, with an

aggregate area of 206Ha.
 The lands were voluntarily offered for sale at
 Borromeo filed a Petition seeking the exemption
PhP12.36M.
of his 1.1057 ha parcel of agricultural land in
 BATCO was informed that three lots were being
Isabela from the coverage of the government’s
placed under the compulsory acquisition
Operation Land Transfer program, and the
scheme of the DAR.
cancellation of Mina’s emancipation patent over
 BATCO reiterated its offer to sell, but this time,
the property
it included the improvements on the land, and at
 Borromeo: property purchased from previous
a price of PhP32M.
owner, as evidenced by notarized Deed of Sale;
 The DAR Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer
title not transferred to his name, surprised to
(PARO) offered PhP7M for the portion. BATCO
discover emancipation patent in Mina’s name as
rejected the offer.
it had been issued without prior notice to him;
 The DAR directed Land Bank of the Philippines
landholding (3.3635 ha) within retention limits
(LBP) to deposit the compensation in cash and
 MARO/PARO/DAR Regional Director/DAR
agrarian reform bonds. BATCO protested.
Secretary: ruled in favor of Borromeo; property
 The DAR proceeded with the registration of the
erroneously identified as belonging to Cipriano
lands, and issued Certificate of Land Ownership
Borromeo, actually belonged to Garcia, herein
Awards (CLOAs) to the beneficiaries, even with
petitioner Borromeo’s predecessor-in-interest;
BATCO’s protest.
landholdings way below retention limits
 BATCO filed a petition to exempt the subject
 CA: reversed; inconsistent allegation on dates of
portion of the lot because the lot was exempted
notarization, sale null and void for being a
from CARP coverage.
prohibited transaction as it involves the transfer
o The exemption can be availed of if the
or alienation of covered agricultural lands to a
land is devoted to cattle and livestock
non-tenant beneficiary
production since its acquisition.
 The DAR held that the land was not exempt from
Whether or not Borromeo is the true and lawful
CARP coverage, because the land was not
owner of the property
exclusively used for cattle production.
  The CA reversed the DAR’s decision.
Whether or not the DAR’s finding that the land was
subject to CARP coverage was properly reversed/ignored
No. The determination of the land’s classification
as either an agricultural or industrial land – and, in turn,
whether or not the land falls under agrarian reform
exemption – must be preliminarily threshed out before the
DAR, particularly, before the DAR Secretary. Therefore, the
Court cannot simply brush aside the DAR’s
pronouncements regarding the status of the subject
property as not exempt from CARP coverage.
Factual findings of administrative agencies are
generally accorded respect and even finality by this Court,
if such findings are supported by substantial evidence, a
situation that obtains in this case. The factual findings of
the Secretary of Agrarian Reform who, by reason of his
official position, has acquired expertise in specific matters
within his jurisdiction, deserve full respect and, without
justifiable reason, ought not to be altered, modified or
reversed.
 The case concerns the Operation Land Transfer
(“OLT”) Program pursuant to PD 27, which issues
Emancipation Patents (a kind of title) to tenant-
beneficiaries.
 Petitioners are the transferees of the original
owners who are absentee landowners. The
original owners left their property to the
cultivation of the tenants.
 Respondents are the tenants of the subject
property.
 The Department of Agrarian Reform found that
the Petitioners have no retention rights because
they left cultivation of the portion of the land
entirely to the tenants.
 The Petitioners filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, arguing that their right to
choose the retention area is guaranteed by the.
o The motion was denied, because
according to PD 27, landowners who
failed to exercise the right of retention
would lead to the distribution of the
Emancipation Patents to the tenants.
 This was affirmed by the CA
Whether or not the petitioners had the right to
choose the retention area.
No. Transferees have no right of retention. The
right of retention, as protected and enshrined in the
Constitution, balances the effects of compulsory land
acquisition by granting the landowner the right to choose
the area to be retained subject to legislative standards.
That the land falls under the coverage of the OLT Program
of the government is a prerequisite for the right of
retention.
 Quintos is the majority stockholder of Golden
Country Farms Incorporated (GCFI).
 GCFI contracted substantial loans with PNB and
DBP secured by several real estate mortgages
over GCFI properties, including a mango orchard
and the subject riceland.
 Certain people started to plant palay on the
riceland.
 PNB and DBP transferred their financial claims
against GCFI to Asset Privatization Trust (APT).
 APT entered into a verbal agreement with
Kanlurang Mindoro Farmers' Cooperative, Inc.
(KAMIFCI) allowing KAMIFCI to tend the mango
orchard, the payment for which was to be
remitted to Quintos.
 Quintos was informed by APT of the notice from
DAR placing the subject riceland under
compulsory acquisition pursuant CARP.
 Quintos filed a petition for exemption with DAR.
 PARAD, DARAB and CA: A tenancy relationship
exists between GCFI and KAMIFCI members who
were installed as tenants by APT, the "legal
possessor" of the mango orchard at that time.
Whether or not the tenancy agreement is valid.

No. Tenancy is a legal relationship established by
the existence of particular facts as required by law. For a
tenancy relationship to exist between the parties, the
following essential elements must be shown:
(a) the parties are the landowner and the tenant;
(b) the subject matter is agricultural land;
(c) there is consent between the parties;
(d) the purpose is agricultural production;
(e) there is personal cultivation by the tenant; and
(f) there is sharing of the harvests between the
parties.
The right to hire a tenant is a personal right of a
landowner. Hence, the consent of landowner should be
secured prior to the installation of tenants. Records do
NOT show that APT was authorized by the property's
landowner, GCFI, to install tenants thereon. APT only
assumed the rights of the original mortgagees. APT had no
authority to enter into any tenancy agreement with the
KAMIFCI members.
 Spouses Vales executed an unregistered Deed of
Sale conveying parcels of tenanted and
registered agricultural land to their children
(Petitioners). Title to the lands remained in the
names of Spouses Vales.
 Tenants belied having knowledge of the sale, and
still recognize Spouses Vales as the landowners.
 PD No. 27 was passed decreeing the
emancipation of tenants.
 Petitioners executed a sworn declaration that
they are the co-owners of the subject lands. This
notwithstanding, the lands were placed under
the coverage of the Operation Land Transfer
(OLT) Program as properties belonging to
Spouses Vales.
 Emancipation Patents were issued to certain
tenants of the subject lands.
 Petitioners claimed that such issuances were
made without their knowledge and despite their
protest.
 Petitioners filed for an exemption of the lands
from the coverage of OLT by claiming ownership
on the basis of the sale.
Whether the sale of the tenanted land to the
Petitioners is valid and binding on the tenants.
No, it is not binding. The sale, in order to be valid
and equally deemed as binding against the tenants
concerned, should comply with the May 7, 1982 DAR
Memorandum, that tenants should:
1) have actual knowledge of unregistered transfers
of ownership of lands covered by Torrens
Certificate of Titles prior to October 21, 1972,
2) have recognized the persons of the new owners,
and
3) have been paying rentals/amortization to such
new owners in order to validate the transfer and
bind the tenants to the same.
In this case, the sale was not registered or even annotated
on the certificates of title covering the subject lands.
Consequently, the subject lands would fall under the
complete coverage of the OLT, without any right of
retention on Petitioners’ part, being mere successors-in-
interest of Spouse Vales by virtue of intestate succession.
In this respect, the petition for exemption must be denied.
 Nieves is the owner of a piece of agricultural rice land.
 Duldulao and Parajillo are tenants and cultivators of
the subject land who are obligated to each pay
leasehold rentals of 45 cavans of palay for each
cropping season.
 Claiming that Duldulao and Parajillo failed to pay their
leasehold rentals, Nieves filed a petition before the
PARAD, seeking the ejectment of Duldulao and
Parajillo.
 A mediation was conducted before the Office of the
Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer and Legal Division
where Duldulao and Parajillo admitted being in
default in the payment of leasehold rentals, and
promised to pay the same.
 Subsequently, however, Duldulao claimed that he
merely inherited a portion of the back leasehold
rentals from his deceased father, but proposed to pay
the arrearages in 4 installments.
 Parajillo denied incurring any back leasehold rentals,
but at the same time proposed to pay whatever there
may be in 6 installments.
 Both Duldulao and Parajillo manifested their lack of
intention to renege on their obligations to pay the
leasehold rentals due, explaining that the supervening
calamities, such as the flashfloods and typhoons that
affected the area prevented them from complying.
Whether or not respondents Duldulao and Parajillo
must be ejected from the subject land.
Yes. Agricultural lessees, being entitled to
security of tenure, may be ejected from their landholding
only on the grounds provided by law. These grounds — the
existence of which is to be proven by the agricultural
lessor in a particular case — are enumerated in Section 36
of RA 3844 (Agricultural Land Reform Code).
In this case, it was established that the agricultural lessees
willfully and deliberately failed to pay the lease rentals
when they fell due, which is one of the grounds for
dispossession of their landholding as provided in said
provision of law.
 A big portion of the land owned Lajom was placed
under the government’s Operation Land Transfer
Program pursuant to PD 27 (Tenant’s Emancipation
Decree).
 DAR, through Land Bank, offered to pay Lajom just
compensation.
 Lajom rejected the DAR valuation and alleged that
computation of just compensation must be based on
RA 6657 (Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law) and
not P.D. 27 and/or EO 228.
 Land Bank alleged that P.D. 27 and E.O. 228 were
never abrogated by the passage of RA 6657.
 The RTC rejected the DAR valuation and fixed the just
compensation under P.D. 27 and E.O. 228, with legal
interest at the rate of 6% p.a. from 1991, when the
subject portion was actually expropriated, until fully
paid.
Whether or not RA 6657 retroactively applies to
land acquired under PD 27 and EO 228.
Yes. Case law instructs that when the agrarian
reform process under PD 27 remains incomplete and is
overtaken by RA 6657, such as when the just compensation
due the landowner has yet to be settled, as in this case,
such just compensation should be determined and the
process concluded under RA 6657, with PD 27 and EO
228 applying only suppletory..
Hence, where RA 6657 is sufficient, PD 27 and EO 228 are
superseded.
 Respondent Aquino is a bona fide tenant of the
subject land originally owned by the late Luis
Cardona, and later transferred to Cardona’s
heirs.
 The Cardona heirs sold the subject land to
Petitioner Perez.
 Respondent filed a complaint for redemption
against the petitioner before PARAD averring
that the sale violated his right of pre-emption as
the legitimate agricultural lessee
Whether or not the respondent is entitled to
redeem the land?
No, the respondent was not able to exercise his
right to redemption pursuant to Section 12 of RA 3844.
An agricultural lessor has the right to sell his land, with or
without the knowledge of the agricultural lessee, subject
to the latter’s right of redemption over the said land.
According to Section 12 of RA 3844, the right of redemption
is validly exercised if the following are compiled:
a. The redemptioner must be an agricultural lessee
or share tenant
 b. The land must have been sold by the owner to a
third party without prior written notice of the
sale given to the lessee or lessees and the DAR;
c. Only the area cultivated by the agricultural
lessee may be redeemed; and
d. The right of redemption must be exercised
within 180 days from written notice of the sale by
the vendee
Case law further holds that an offer to redeem can be
properly effected through:
a. A formal tender with consignation, or
b. A complaint filed in court coupled with
consignation of the redemption price.
The respondent is a bona fide tenant of the subject land,
thus has the right of redemption. However, respondent
failed to consign the redemption price when he filed the
complaint.
Notwithstanding, the petitioner, as the new owner, is
bound to respect and maintain respondent as a tenant of
the subject land. The respondent’s tenancy right attached
to the land regardless of who its owner. The existence of
an agricultural leasehold relationship is not terminated by
the changes in ownership in a sale.
right in rearing the youth without substantive
due process
Whether or not the curfew ordinance is
unconstitutional for depriving parents of their right in
rearing the youth without substantive due process
No. As parens patriae, the State has the inherent
right and duty to aid parents in the moral development of
their children, and, thus, assumes a supporting role for
parents to fulfill their parental obligations.
Under the Constitution, the State can properly conclude
that parents and others, teachers for example, who have
the primary responsibility for children's well-being are
entitled to the support of the laws designed to aid
discharge of that responsibility."
The Curfew Ordinances are but examples of legal
restrictions designed to aid parents in their role of
promoting their children's well-being. These ordinances
further compelling State interests particularly, the
promotion of juvenile safety and the prevention of juvenile
crime which necessarily entail limitations on the primary
right of parents to rear their children. Minors, because of
their peculiar vulnerability and lack of experience, are not
only more exposed to potential physical harm by criminal
elements that operate during the night; their moral well-
being is likewise imperiled as minor children are prone to
making detrimental decisions during this time.

The only aspect of parenting that the Curfew Ordinances

affects is the parents' prerogative to allow minors to
remain in public places without parental accompaniment
during the curfew hours. In this respect, the ordinances
neither dictate an over-all plan of discipline for the parents
to apply to their minors nor force parents to abdicate their
authority to influence or control their minors' activities.

As such, the Curfew Ordinances only amount to a minimal

— albeit reasonable — infringement upon a parent's right to
bring up his or her child.

 Following the campaign of President Rodrigo Roa

Duterte to implement a nationwide curfew for
minors, several local governments in Metro
Manila started to strictly implement their curfew
ordinances on minors through police operations
which were publicly known as part of “Oplan
Rody."
 Among those local governments that
implemented curfew ordinances was Quezon
City
 SPARK (Petitioners) filed this present petition,
arguing that the Curfew Ordinances are
unconstitutional because (amongst others) it
deprives parents of their natural and primary

 Private respondent Rosalie Jaype-Garcia filed,
for herself and in behalf of her minor children, a
verified petition before the RTC of Bacolod City
for the issuance of a TPO against her husband,
Jesus C. Garcia pursuant to R.A. 9262, the Anti-
VAWC Act.
 Rosalie claimed to be a victim of physical abuse;
emotional, psychological, and economic violence
as a result of marital infidelity on the part of
Jesus, with threats of deprivation of custody of
her children and of financial support.
 Finding reasonable ground to believe that an
imminent danger of violence against the private
respondent and her children exists or is about to
recur, the RTC issued a TPO effective for thirty
(30) days
 Claiming that petitioner continued to deprive
them of financial support; failed to faithfully
comply with the TPO; and committed new acts
of harassment against her and their children,
Rosalie filed another application for the issuance
of a TPO ex parte.
 Jesus filed challenges (1) the constitutionality of
R.A. 9262 for being violative of the due process
and the equal protection clauses, and (2) the
validity of the modified TPO issued in the civil
case for being “an unwanted product of an
invalid law.”
Whether or not the issuance of a TPO under RA
9262 violates the due process clause of the Constitution
No. RA 9262 does not violate the due process
clause of the Constitution.
A protection order is an order issued to prevent further
acts of violence against women and their children, their
family or household members, and to grant other
necessary reliefs. Its purpose is to safeguard the offended
parties from further harm, minimize any disruption in their
daily life and facilitate the opportunity and ability to regain
control of their life.
The grant of a TPO ex parte is not violative of the right to
due process. Just like a writ of preliminary attachment,
which is issued without notice and hearing because the
time in which the hearing will take could be enough to
enable the defendant to abscond or dispose of his
property. In the same way, the victim of VAWC may already
have suffered harrowing experiences in the hands of her
tormentor, and possibly even death, if notice and hearing
were required before such acts could be prevented. It is a
constitutional commonplace that the ordinary
requirements of procedural due process must yield to the
necessities of protecting vital public interests, among
which is protection of women and children from violence
and threats to their personal safety and security.
Also, respondent of a petition for protection order will be
apprised of the charges imputed to him and afforded an
opportunity to present his side. Thus, the fear of petitioner
of being “stripped of family, property, guns, money,
children, job, future employment and reputation, all in a
matter of seconds, without an inkling of what happened” is
a mere product of an overactive imagination. The essence
of due process is to be found in the reasonable opportunity
to be heard and submit any evidence one may have in
support of one's defense. "To be heard" does not only mean
verbal arguments in court; one may be heard also through
pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either through
oral arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial
of procedural due process.
 Two informations were filed before the RTC
accusing Geronimo of the crimes of illegal sale
and illegal possession of dangerous drugs.
 The prosecution alleged that they received a tip
from a confidential informant that Geronimo
was peddling illegal drugs in Caloocan City.
o Acting on the said tip, A1 Arguero
immediately organized a buy-bust
operation, which was coordinated with
PDEA.
  The buy-bust team reached the target area.
When Geronimo arrived, took out from his right
pocket a transparent plastic sachet containing
suspected shabu, and handed it over to the
poseur-buyer, IO1 Lorilla who signaled the rest
of the team that the transaction was completed.
 IO1 Lorilla recovered the buy-bust money, while
IO2 Advincula recovered the marijuana leaves
wrapped in a newspaper and gave them to the
former. The team proceeded to the headquarters
in QC, and the confiscated items were
supposedly marked, photographed, and
inventoried by IO1 Lorilla in the presence of
Geronimo and Barangay Kagawad Jose Y. Ruiz.
 After conducting the inventory, the specimens
were delivered to the PNP Crime Laboratory for
testing. Consequently, the specimens were
received and examined by Forensic, who later on
revealed that the substance found in the plastic
sachet tested positive for the presence of
marijuana, all dangerous drugs.
 Geronimo interposed the defenses of denial and
frame-up, maintaining that at the time of the
incident, he was drinking at the house of his
friend Julian Faura, Jr. (Faura) when three (3)
unidentified armed men suddenly arrived and
forced him to board a white Toyota Revo.
Whether or not the Geronimo’s right to liberty was
violated when the chain of custody rule was not properly
observed
Yes. An examination of the records reveals that
although the requisite inventory and photography of the
seized items were conducted in the presence of Geronimo
and an elected public official, the same was not done in the
presence of the representatives from the DOJ and the
media.
Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 provides the chain of
custody rule, outlining the procedure that police officers
must follow in handling the seized drugs, in order to
preserve their integrity and evidentiary value.
Under the said section, the apprehending team shall,
among others, immediately after seizure and confiscation
conduct a physical inventory and photograph the seized
items in the presence of the accused or the person from
whom the items were seized, or his representative or
counsel, a representative from the media and the DOJ and
any elected public official who shall be required to sign the
copies of the inventory and be given a copy of the same;
and the seized drugs must be turned over to the PNP
Crime Laboratory within 24 hours from confiscation for
examination.
In this case, there were inconsistencies in the statements
of the members of the apprehending team as to why the
requisite inventory and photography were not done
immediately after seizure and confiscation of the
dangerous drugs and at the place of Geronimo's arrest.
While the law allows that the same may be done at the
nearest police station or office of the apprehending team,
the police officers must nevertheless provide justifiable
grounds therefor in order for the saving clause to apply.
Here, the apprehending officers failed to discharge that
burden.
Accordingly, the plurality of the breaches of procedure
committed by the police officers, unacknowledged and
unexplained by the State, militate against a finding of guilt
beyond reasonable doubt against the accused, as the
integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti had
been compromised.
The Constitution covers with the mantle of its protection
the innocent and the guilty alike against any manner of
high-handedness from the authorities, however
praiseworthy their intentions. Those who are supposed to
enforce the law are not justified in disregarding the right
of the individual in the name of order. Order is too high a
price for the loss of liberty.
 Leticia Salamat filed an Application to Purchase
Friar Lands. At the final stage of her application,
she found out that the lot she wished to purchase
is already covered by a TCT in the name of
Transunion.
 Salamat filed a case against Transunion with the
LMB, alleging that the TCT was obtained through
fraud as there was no deed of conveyance issued
by the LMB for such lot in the name of any
person.
 Salamat also claims that she and her family had
been in continuous possession and occupation of
the lot since time immemorial and had even
introduced improvements thereon. Thus, an
investigation was instituted.
 Transunion filed with the LMB an MTD, alleging
that Salamat had no legal personality to attack
 the validity of Transunion’s title. The MTD was
denied, and the investigation was to proceed.
 The investigation report then recommended
that the TCT be cancelled and the lot be reversed
to the government. Neither Salamat nor
Transunion were furnished copies of the report
and memorandum adopting such
recommendations.
 Consequently, a Reversion Complaint was filed
by the petitioner (Republic) against Transunion
with the RTC. Transunion, in response, filed an
MTD, averring that they were deprived of the
opportunity to seek a reconsideration or an
appeal of the same.
Whether Transunion was denied (administrative)
due process.
No, there was no violation of Transunion's right
to administrative due process since, as the Republic
pointed out, not only did it file an answer, but it also
presented its evidence and formally offered the same.
It is well-established that the touchstone of due process is
the opportunity to be heard. This was unquestionably
afforded in this case, despite having been denied the
remedies of reconsideration and appeal which, however,
remain unavailable, either by statute or regulation, against
the investigation report and recommendation assailed
herein. At any rate, lack of administrative due process, on
the assumption of its truth, is not a ground for a motion to
dismiss; hence, the RTC's ruling was altogether proper.
 In 2001, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
issued E.O. 12 creating the Presidential Anti-
Graft Commission (PAGC) and vesting it with the
power to investigate or hear administrative cases
or complaints for possible graft and corruption,
among others, against presidential appointees
and to submit its report and recommendations to
the President.
 2010, President Aquino III issued E.O. 13
abolishing the PAGC and transferring its
functions to the Office of the Deputy Executive
Secretary for Legal Affairs more particularly to
its newly-established Investigative and
Adjudicatory Division (IAD)
 In 2011, Purisima filed before the IAD-ODESLA a
complaint for grave misconduct against
petitioner Prospero A. Pichay, Jr., Chairman of
the Board of Trustees of the Local Water Utilities
Administration as well as the incumbent
members of the LWUA Board of Trustees for
which purchasing 445,377 shares of stock of
Express Savings Bank, Inc.
 It is the contention of the petitioner that, aside
from the alleged encroachment of the powers of
the legislative by the executive in the “creation”
of IAD-ODESLA, it is likewise
UNCONSTITUTIONAL for VIOLATION DUE
PROCESS and EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
because IAD-ODESLA's investigation only to
presidential appointees occupying upper-level
positions in the government
Whether or not EO 13 is unconstitutional for
violating the equal protection clause
No. The equal protection clause is not absolute but
subject to reasonable classification so that aggrupations
bearing substantial distinctions may be treated differently
from each other.
The equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation
which applies only to those persons falling within a
specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such
class, and reasonable grounds exist for making a
distinction between those who fall within such class and
those who do not.
EO 13 does not violate equal protection clause because the
president has a direct right to discipline and remove its
appointees. Presidential appointees come under the direct
disciplining authority of the President. This proceeds from
the well settled principle that, in the absence of a contrary
law, the power to remove or to discipline is lodged in the
same authority on which the power to appoint is
vested. Having the power to remove and/or discipline
presidential appointees, the President has the corollary
authority to investigate such public officials and look into
their conduct in office.
There are substantial distinctions that set apart
presidential appointees occupying upper-level positions in
government from non-presidential appointees and those
that occupy the lower positions in government.
Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective
officials and appointive officials. The former occupy their
office by virtue of the mandate of the electorate. They are
elected to an office for a definite term and may be removed
therefrom only upon stringent conditions. On the other
hand, appointive officials hold their office by virtue of their
designation thereto by an appointing authority. Some
appointive officials hold their office in a permanent
capacity and are entitled to security of tenure while others
serve at the pleasure of the appointing authority.
 Private respondent Rosalie Jaype-Garcia filed,
for herself and in behalf of her minor children, a
verified petition before the RTC of Bacolod City
for the issuance of a TPO against her husband,
Jesus C. Garcia pursuant to R.A. 9262, the Anti-
VAWC Act.
 Rosalie claimed to be a victim of physical abuse;
emotional, psychological, and economic violence
as a result of marital infidelity on the part of
Jesus, with threats of deprivation of custody of
her children and of financial support.
 Finding reasonable ground to believe that an
imminent danger of violence against the private
respondent and her children exists or is about to
recur, the RTC issued a TPO effective for thirty
(30) days
 Claiming that petitioner continued to deprive
them of financial support; failed to faithfully
comply with the TPO; and committed new acts
of harassment against her and their children,
Rosalie filed another application for the issuance
of a TPO ex parte.
 The RTC issued another TPO, effective for thirty
(30) days
 Jesus filed challenges (1) the constitutionality of
R.A. 9262 for being violative of the due process
and the equal protection clauses because it only
provides protection to women who are victims of
violence or abuse, without providing the same
protection to men, and (2) the validity of the
modified TPO issued in the civil case for being
“an unwanted product of an invalid law.”
Whether or not RA 9262 is unconstitutional for
violating the Equal Protection Clause.
No.
The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a
guaranty of equality in the application of the laws upon all
citizens of the state. It is not, therefore, a requirement, in
order to avoid the constitutional prohibition against
inequality, that every man, woman and child should be
affected alike by a statute.
The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution
allows classification. All that is required of a valid
classification is (1) that it be reasonable, which means that
the classification should be based on substantial
distinctions which make for real differences; (2) that it
must be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) that it must
not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) that it
must apply equally to each member of the class.
First, the classification is reasonable. The unequal power
relationship between women and men; the fact that
women are more likely than men to be victims of violence;
and the widespread gender bias and prejudice against
women all make for real differences justifying the
classification under the law. As such, R.A. 9262 is based on
a valid classification, and so, did not violate the equal
protection clause by favoring women over men as victims
of violence and abuse to whom the State extends its
protection.
Second, the distinction between men and women is
germane to the purpose of R.A. 9262, which is to address
violence committed against women and children, as
spelled out in its Declaration of Policy.
Third, the application of R.A. 9262 is not limited to the
existing conditions when it was promulgated, but to future
conditions as well, for as long as the safety and security of
women and their children are threatened by violence and
abuse.
Lastly, R.A. 9262 applies equally to each member of the class
because it applies equally to all women and children who
suffer violence and abuse.

 Following the campaign of President Rodrigo Roa
Duterte to implement a nationwide curfew for
minors, several local governments in Metro
Manila started to strictly implement their curfew
ordinances on minors through police operations
which were publicly known as part of “Oplan
Rody."
 Among those local governments that
implemented curfew ordinances was Quezon
City
 SPARK (Petitioners) filed this present petition,
arguing that the Curfew Ordinances are
unconstitutional because (amongst others) it
deprives minors of the right to liberty and the
right to travel without substantive due process
Whether or not the classification in the ordinance
is constitutional passes the Strict Scrutiny Test
Yes.
The strict scrutiny test applies when a classification either
(i) interferes with the exercise of fundamental rights,
including the basic liberties guaranteed under the
Constitution, or (ii) burdens suspect classes. Considering
that the right to travel is a fundamental right in our legal
system guaranteed by our Constitution, the strict scrutiny
test is the applicable test. At this juncture, it should be
emphasized that minors enjoy the same constitutional
rights as adults; the fact that the State has broader
authority over minors than over adults does not trigger the
application of a lower level of scrutiny.
The strict scrutiny test as applied to minors entails a
consideration of the peculiar circumstances of minors
vis-a-vis the State's duty as parens patriae to protect and
preserve their well-being with the compelling State
interests justifying the assailed government act.
Under the strict scrutiny test, a legislative classification
that interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right or
operates to the disadvantage of a suspect class is
presumed unconstitutional. Thus, the government has the
burden of proving that the classification (i) is necessary to
achieve a compelling State interest, and (ii) is the least
restrictive means to protect such interest or the means
chosen is narrowly tailored to accomplish the interest.
As to (1) Compelling State Interest, children's welfare and
the State's mandate to protect and care for them as parens
patriae constitute compelling interests to justify
regulations by the State. In this case, respondents have
sufficiently established, through the “whereas clauses” of
the ordinance, that the ultimate objective of the Curfew
Ordinances is to keep unsupervised minors during the late
hours of night time off of public areas to reduce their
exposure to potential harm, and criminal pressure and
influences.
As to (2) Least Restrictive Means/Narrowly Drawn, this
requirement stems from the fundamental premise that
citizens should not be hampered from pursuing legitimate
activities in the exercise of their constitutional rights.
While rights may be restricted, the restrictions must be
minimal or only to the extent necessary to achieve the
purpose or to address the State's compelling interest.
Although treated differently from adults, the foregoing
standard applies to regulations on minors as they are still
accorded the freedom to participate in any legitimate
activity. Thus, in the present case, each of the ordinances
must be narrowly tailored as to ensure minimal constraint
not only on the minors' right to travel but also on their
other constitutional rights. Here, this was complied with
by the Quezon City Ordinance, as seen under Section 4 on
EXCEPTIONS, such that it only prohibits unsupervised
activities that hardly contribute to the well-being of
minors who publicly loaf and loiter within the locality at a
time where danger is perceivably more prominent.
 While Bulauitan's absence in the search, per se, did not
violate Section 8, Rule 126 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal
Procedure, the search team committed other errors which
led to such violation, such as (a) Bulauitan’s daughter,
Maria, was not able to witness SPO2 Baccay's search of
Bulauitan's room (where the shabu was allegedly found) as
PO3 Tagal kept her in the living room and even instructed
her to leave the house to contact her parents; and (b)
Kagawad Soliva and Kagawad. Polonia neither witnessed
the search as they remained outside Bulauitan's residence.

Accordingly, the search conducted therein by the search

team fell way below the standard mandated by Section 8,
Rule 126, and thus, is deemed unreasonable within the
purview of the exclusionary rule of the 1987 Constitution.
As a consequence, the three plastic sachets containing an
 The PNP of Solana constituted a team to
aggregate amount of 0.22 gram of shabu recovered
implement a search warrant issued by Executive
therefrom are inadmissible in evidence for being the
Judge Pauig to search Bulauitan’s residence
proverbial fruit of the poisonous tree. Since the
 The Barangay Chairman of Bulauitan’s barangay
confiscated shabu is the very corpus delicti of the crime
assigned Kagawad Soliva and Kagawad Polonia as
charged, Bulauitan must necessarily be acquitted and
search witnesses to the search to be conducted.
exonerated from all criminal liability.
 When they reached the residence of Bulauitan,
Bulauitan was not present. Only his 2 children
and housekeeper were there.
o One of the children was asked to call
Bulauitan for the search.
 The team did not wait for Bulauitan to arrive
before they conducted their search
o They were able to find 3 heat-sealed
plastic sachets containing shabu.
 Bulauitan was arrested and, later, found guilty
for illegal possession of dangerous drugs.

Whether or not Bulauitan’s search and,

consequent, arrest was valid

No. A search warrant, issued in accordance with

the provisions of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,
does not give the authorities limitless discretion in
implementing the same as the same. The Rules on Criminal
Procedure provide parameters in the proper conduct of a
search. Under Section 8, Rule 126 of the said rules, a search
under the strength of a warrant is required to be witnessed
by the lawful occupant of the premises sought to be
searched. It must be stressed that it is only upon their
absence that it is only upon their absence that their
presence may be replaced by two (2) persons of sufficient
age and discretion residing in the same locality. Departure
from the said mandatory rule — by preventing the lawful
occupant or a member of his family from actually
witnessing the search and choosing two (2) other
witnesses observe the search — violates the spirit and
letter of the law, and thus, taints the search with the vice
of unreasonableness, rendering the seized articles
inadmissible.
 The patrolling police heard a man shouting
“Putang ina mo! Limang daan na ba ito?”
o For violating a city ordinance which
punishes breaches of peace, they
apprehended the man who was later
identified as Ramon Martinez.
 The police recovered a plastic sachet from
Ramon which contained Shabu. One of the police
marked the sachet with the initials “RMG” before
sending it to the laboratory for testing. Ramon
was then charged for possession.
 Ramon, in his defense, averred that he was in the
area to borrow a welding machine from a friend
when a man in civilian clothing approached him
and asked if he was Ramon.
 The man, after revealing that he was a cop,
immediately handcuffed Ramon. They boarded a
tricycle where the cop asked if he was carrying
 drugs. Despite Ramon’s denial, he was still
brought to the precinct to be detained.
 The police then made a proposition, asking for
P20,000 in exchange for his release.
Whether the shabu seized pursuant to the arrest
made herein is admissible.
No. Generally, a warrant is required before an
arrest or search may be made and any evidence obtained
without a warrant is inadmissible. But this rule, commonly
known as the “exclusionary rule”, is not without
exceptions. One of which is a search incidental to a lawful
arrest. Moreover, a valid warrantless arrest which justifies
a subsequent search requires that the apprehending
officer must have been spurred by probable cause to arrest
a person caught in flagrante delicto.
In this case, Ramon was arrested for allegedly violating and
ordinance which punishes Breaches of Peace. To justify a
warrantless arrest based on the same, it must be
established that the apprehension was effected after a
reasonable assessment by the police officer that a public
disturbance is being committed. But the facts and
circumstances could not have engendered a well-founded
belief that any breach of the peace had been committed by
Ramon at the time that his warrantless arrest was effected.
Thus, no probable cause existed to justify Ramon’s
warrantless arrest.
Consequently, as it cannot be said that Ramon was validly
arrested the warrantless search that resulted from it was
also illegal. Thus, the subject shabu purportedly seized
from Ramon is inadmissible in evidence for being the
proverbial fruit of the poisonous tree as mandated by the
above discussed constitutional provision. In this regard,
considering that the confiscated shabu is the very corpus
deliciti of the crime charged, Ramon's acquittal should
therefore come as a matter of course.
charges of illegal possession of shabu
 A robbery occurred in a parlor which lead to a
shootout between the robbers and the police.
The robbers escaped via their vehicles which
were registered under Manago’s name.
 The police conducted an investigation in the
barangay where the robbery suspects were said
to have been seen.
 After gathering the necessary information, the
police conducted a “hot pursuit” operation one
(1) day after the robbery by setting up a
checkpoint.
o Manago drove by the checkpoint using
one of the getaway vehicles of the
robbers
 The police ordered Manago to disembark and
conducted a search through the vehicle. The
searched produced no contraband.
 They went to frisk Manago, resulting to the
discovery of a sachet of shabu. The police officers
seized the plastic pack, arrested Manago,
informed him of his constitutional rights, and
brought him and the plastic pack to their
headquarters.
 Manago denied having possessed the sachet. He
claims that a truck stopped in front of his vehicle
while he was going home. 3 police officers got
down with long firearms and asked for his
driver’s license, one officer confirming Manago’s
identity. They took him to their police station
and interrogated him about the robbers.
 Manago claimed that he requested for a phone
call with his lawyer, as well as a copy of the
warrant for his arrest, but both requests went
unheeded. After he was dispossessed of his
laptop, wallet, and two (2) mobile phones, he was
then photographed and placed in a detention
cell. He was then charged of illegal possession of
shabu.
Whether Manago should be convicted of the
 No. Evidence obtained from unreasonable
searches and seizures shall be inadmissible in evidence for
any purpose in any proceeding.
There are three (3) instances when warrantless arrests
may be lawfully effected, one of which is: (b) an arrest of a
suspect where, based on personal knowledge of the
arresting officer, there is probable cause that said suspect
was the perpetrator of a crime which had just been
committed
In such a warrantless arrest, it is essential that the element
of personal knowledge must be coupled with the element
of immediacy; otherwise, the arrest may be nullified, and
resultantly, the items yielded through the search
incidental thereto will be rendered inadmissible in
consonance with the exclusionary rule.
Moreover, this element of personal knowledge of facts and
circumstances must be coupled with immediacy within
which these facts or circumstances should be gathered.
This guarantees that the police would have to time to base
their probable cause finding on facts or circumstances
gathered after an exhaustive investigation. Thus, the
police’s determination of probable cause would
necessarily be limited to raw or uncontaminated facts or
circumstances gathered as they were within a very limited
period of time. The facts show that the element of
immediacy was not met. This is because investigation and
verification proceedings connected to the robbery
incident were already conducted before arresting Manago
without a warrant. The information the police officers had
gathered therefrom would have been enough for them to
secure the necessary warrants against the robbery
suspects.
Routine inspections (checkpoints) do not give police
officers blanket discretion to conduct warrantless
searches in the absence of probable cause. When a vehicle
is stopped and subjected to an extensive search, such a
warrantless search has been held to be valid only as long
as the officers conducting the search have reasonable or
probable cause to believe before the search that they will
find the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a crime
in the vehicle to be searched.
Thus, Manago's warrantless arrest and the search
incidental thereto, including that of his moving vehicle
were all unreasonable and unlawful.
 Agent Radan of the NARCOTICS group and PO3
Calag were aboard a motorcycle, patrolling the
area at a speed of 30kph.
 They spotted, at a distance of about 10 meters,
two people (Comerciante) and Dasilla who were
standing and showing “improper and unpleasant
movements”, with one of them handling plastic
sachets to the other. Thinking that the sachets
may contain shabu, they stopped, approached,
and arrested the two.
 Dasilla’s case was dismissed in the lower court
upon his filing of a demurer to evidence.
 Comerciante was found guilty for possession of
dangerous drugs.
Whether or not the warrantless search (stop-and-
frisk) on Comerciante was valid
No. The warrantless search and arrest was
invalid. The prosecution was unable to establish that a
valid “stop and frisk” search was made on Comerciante.
While probable cause is not required to conduct a “stop
and frisk,” mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a
“stop and frisk.” A genuine reason must exist, in light of the
police officer's experience and surrounding conditions, to
warrant the belief that the person detained has weapons
concealed about him.
Verily, Comerciante's acts of standing around with a
companion and handing over something to the latter do
not constitute criminal acts. These circumstances are not
enough to create a reasonable inference of criminal
activity which would constitute a "genuine reason" for PO3
Calag to conduct a "stop and frisk" search on the former.
In this light, the "stop and frisk" search made on
Comerciante should be deemed unlawful.
Since, there was no valid "stop and frisk" search made on
Comerciante, the shabu purportedly seized from him is
rendered inadmissible in evidence for being the proverbial
fruit of the poisonous tree. Since the confiscated shabu is
the very corpus delicti of the crime charged, Comerciante
must necessarily be acquitted and exonerated from all
criminal liability.

 At around 11:30AM, PO3 de Leon was driving his
motorcycle on the way home along 5th Avenue.
 Along the way, he saw Nazareno Villareal from a
distance of 8 – 10 meters.
o Villareal was holding and scruitinizing
in his a had a plastic sachet of shabu.
 So PO3 de Leon alighted from his motorcycle and
approached Villareal, whom he recognized as
someone he had previously arrested for illegal
drug possession.
 When Villareal saw PO3 de Leon, Villareal tried
to escape. However, in the end, Villareal was still
apprehended.
 RTC and CA convicted Villareal for possession of
dangerous drugs under Section 11, Article II of RA
9165.
Whether or not Villareal warrantless arrest was
valid.
No. There was no in fragrante delicto arrest in
this case. It is not enough that PO3 de Leon had reasonable
ground to believe that appellant had just committed a
crime; a crime must in fact have been committed first,
which does not obtain in this case.
There was likewise no hot pursuit arrest. The Court finds
it inconceivable how PO3 de Leon, even with his
presumably perfect vision, would be able to identify with
reasonable accuracy, from about 8 – 10 meters and while
simultaneously driving a motorcycle, a negligible and
minuscule amount of powdery substance (0.03 gram)
inside the plastic sachet allegedly held by Villareal.
Villareal’s act of walking along the street and holding
something in his hands, even if they appeared to be
dubious, coupled with his previous criminal charge for the
same offense, are not by themselves sufficient to incite
suspicion of criminal activity or to create probable cause
enough to justify a warrantless arrest under Section 5, Rule
113.
A previous arrest or existing criminal record, even for the
same offense, will not suffice to satisfy the exacting
requirements provided under Section 5, Rule 113. "Personal
knowledge" of the arresting officer that a crime has in fact
just been committed is required. To interpret "personal
knowledge" as referring to a person's reputation or past
criminal citations would create a dangerous precedent and
unnecessarily stretch the authority and power of police
officers to effect warrantless arrests based solely on
knowledge of a person's previous criminal infractions,
rendering nugatory the rigorous requisites laid out under
Section 5. While it is true that the legality of an arrest
depends upon the reasonable discretion of the officer or
functionary to whom the law at the moment leaves the
decision to characterize the nature of the act or deed of
the person for the urgent purpose of suspending his
liberty, it cannot be arbitrarily or capriciously exercised
without unduly compromising a citizen's constitutionally-
guaranteed right to liberty.
Consequently, there being no lawful warrantless arrest,
the shabu purportedly seized from appellant is rendered
inadmissible in evidence for being the proverbial fruit of
the poisonous tree. As the confiscated shabu is the very
corpus delicti of the crime charged, Villareal must be
acquitted and exonerated from all criminal liability.
 Following the campaign of President Rodrigo Roa
Duterte to implement a nationwide curfew for
minors, several local governments in Metro
Manila started to strictly implement their curfew
ordinances on minors through police operations
which were publicly known as part of “Oplan
Rody."
 Among those local governments that
implemented curfew ordinances was Quezon
City
 SPARK (Petitioners) filed this present petition,
arguing that the Curfew Ordinances are
unconstitutional because (amongst others) it
 deprives minors of the right to liberty and the
right to travel without substantive due process
ISSUE: Whether or not the ordinance is unconstitutional
for violating the right to travel
RULING: No. The ordinance restricted the right to travel
but grave and overriding considerations of public interest
justify restrictions.
As the Constitution itself reads, the State may impose
limitations on the exercise of this right, provided that
they: (1) serve the interest of national security, public
safety, or public health; and (2) are provided by law.
As to the first requirement (serve the interest of
national/public safety or public health), the stated
purposes of the Curfew Ordinances, specifically the
promotion of juvenile safety and prevention of juvenile
crime, inarguably serve the interest of public safety. The
restriction on the minor's movement and activities within
the confines of their residences and their immediate
vicinity during the curfew period is perceived to reduce
the probability of the minor becoming victims of or getting
involved in crimes and criminal activities.
As to the second requirement (limitation be provided by
law), our legal system is replete with laws emphasizing the
State's duty to afford special protection to children such
as laws VAWC, Special Protection of Children Against
Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act, and etc.
As parens patriae, the State regulates and, to a certain
extent, restricts the minors' exercise of their rights, such
as in their affairs concerning the right to vote, etc. With
respect to the right to travel, minors are required by law
to obtain a clearance from the DSWD before they can
travel to a foreign country by themselves or with a person
other than their parents. These limitations demonstrate
that the State has broader authority over the minors'
activities than over similar actions of adults, and overall,
reflect the State's general interest in the well-being of
minors. Thus, the State may impose limitations on the
minors' exercise of rights even though these limitations do
not generally apply to adults.
For these reasons, the State is justified in setting
restrictions on the minors' exercise of their travel rights,
provided, they are singled out on reasonable grounds.
 The Government by virtue of the CAR Law (RA
6657) acquired 159.0881 hectares from the
respondent Montinola (MECO)
 Land Bank assessed the subject land for
P823,204.08 but MECO rejected the same
 MECO filed a complaint for the determination of
just compensation before the RTC
 A four-member Board of Commissioners was
constituted by the RTC. Two (2) commissioners
recommended P4,615,194. One adopted the
valuation of Land Bank and the other adopted the
recommendation of Asian Appraisal, MECO’s
appraiser
 The DAR-RARAD adopted the valuation of Land
Bank at P823,204.08 and the RTC rendered a
decision fixing the just compensation at P7, 927,
660.60
Whether determination of just compensation is
correct
No. The SC remanded the case to the court a quo.
For purposes of determining just compensation, the fair
market value of an expropriated property is determined by
its character and price at the time of the taking.
The lower courts considered its actual use at the time of
appraisal and reclassified the property as cornland and
cocoland. It ignored the fact that at the time of the ocular
inspection, a substantial portion of the land was idle and
abandoned, but the farmers were already starting to
cultivate their designated area of occupancy.
Under DAR A.O. No. 11-1994, landowners shall not be
compensated for improvements made by third parties.
Hence, it was erroneous to reclassify the property as
cornland and cocoland considering that the improvements
were introduced by the farmers. At most, it can only be
considered as economic benefits. The case was remanded
to the lower court for reception of evidence and final
determination of just compensation.
 It is well-settled that the amount of just compensation is to
be ascertained as of the time of the taking. However, the
above-stated documents do not reflect the value of the
subject property at the time of its taking in 1986 but rather,
its valuation in 1996. Consequently, the case must be
remanded to the RTC in order to properly determine the
amount of just compensation during such time the subject
property was actually taken.

 In 1996, Quezon City, through Mayor Mathay, Jr.,

filed a complaint for expropriation with the RTC
to acquire a 1,000 sqm. parcel of land, owned and
registered under the name of Sy, intended to be
used as a site for a multi-purpose barangay hall,
day-care center, playground and community
activity center for the benefit of the residents of
Barangay Balingasa, Balintawak, Quezon City.
o The requisite ordinance to undertake
the aforesaid expropriation was
enacted in 1994.
 The City deposited the amount of P241,090.00
with the Office of the Clerk of Court,
representing 15% of the fair market value of the
subject property based on its tax declaration.
 Sy did not question the City's right to
expropriate the subject property. Thus, only the
amount of just compensation remained at issue.
 RTC appointed 3 commissioners as required by
law to determine the proper amount of just
compensation to be paid by the City for the
subject property and it was recommended by 2
commissioners the payment of P5,500.00 per
sqm., to be computed from the date of the filing
of the expropriation complaint
 On the other hand, the third Commissioner
recommended the higher amount of P13,500.00
per sq. m. as just compensation
 RTC AND CA adopted the 5,500.00/sqm
compensation ruling that just compensation
must be fair to both parties.
Whether or not courts properly determined the
just compensation for the petitioner
NO. Case is remanded to RTC.
The said valuation was actually arrived at after
considering: (a) the September 4, 1996 recommendation of
the City Appraisal Committee; (b) several sworn
statements made by Sy himself; and (c) Sy's own tax
declaration for 1996.
Romana’s property is proper and just
 Respondents are the owners of a 27K hectares of
agricultural land Nueva Ecija which DAR
compulsorily acquired a 21.2192-ha. portion
under the government's "Tenants Emancipation
Decree".
 the LBP fixed the value of the subject land at
P361,181.87 using the formula under EO 228,
which declares full land ownership to qualified
farmer beneficiaries covered by PD No. 27;
determines the value of remaining unvalued rice
and corn lands subject to PD No. 27; and provides
for the manner of payment by the farmer
beneficiary and mode of compensation to the
landowner
 Respondents were dissatisfied with the LBP
valuation so they filed a Petition for Approval and
Appraisal of Just Compensation before the RTC
arguing that the valuation was grossly
inadequate and it is way below the FMV.
 LBP insisted on the correctness of the valuation,
having been computed in accordance with the
formula under EO228 which governs the
determination of just compensation due a
landowner whose property was seized under PD
27.
o For its part, the DAR maintained that
the proper procedure relevant to the
determination of the valuation was
followed.
 RTC appointed commissioners for the valuation
and ruled in favor of the respondents. CA
Affirmed.
Whether or not the valuation by the LBP of Sta.
 No. The rule on valuation on CARP (RA 6657)
must be followed. Settled is the rule that when the agrarian
reform process is still incomplete, as in this case where the
just compensation for the subject land acquired under PD
27 has yet to be paid, just compensation should be
determined and the process concluded under RA
6657(CARP), with PD 27 and EO 228 only having mere
suppletory effects. Also, amendment to CARP under RA
9700 should not be followed because this case was filed in
2008 before RA 9700 was passed in 2009.
In addition, the factors enumerated under Section 17
of RA 6657, the acquisition cost of the land, the current
value of like properties, the nature and actual use of the
property, and the income therefrom, the owner's sworn
valuation, the tax declarations, the assessment made by
government assessors, the social and economic benefits
contributed by the farmers and the farmworkers, and by
the government to the property, and the non-payment of
taxes or loans secured from any government financing
institution on the said land, if any, must be equally
considered.
Just compensation must be valued at the time of taking, or
the time when the landowner was deprived of the use and
benefit of his property, such as when title is transferred in
the name of the Republic of the Philippines. Hence, the
evidence to be presented by the parties before the trial
court for the valuation of the subject land must be based
on the values prevalent on such time of taking for like
agricultural lands.
The Regional Trial Court may impose interest on the just
compensation award as may be warranted by the
circumstances of the case. In previous cases, the Court
has allowed the grant of legal interest in expropriation
cases where there is delay in the payment since the just
compensation due to the landowners was deemed to be
an effective forbearance on the part of the State. Legal
interest shall be pegged at the rate of 12% interest per
annum (p.a.), from the time of taking until June 30, 2013
only. Thereafter, or beginning July 1, 2013, until fully paid,
the just compensation due the landowners shall earn
interest at the new legal rate of 6% interest p.a. in line
with the amendment introduced by BSP-MB Circular No.
799, series of 2013.
should make the final determination of just compensation.
 Respondents are among the eight children of the
late spouses Sabiniano and Margarita Gacias,
whose 12.6 hectares of Riceland and 16.8
hectares. of other agricultural lands located in
Barangays Carriedo and Buenavista,
respectively, in Irosin, Sorsogon, were placed
under the government’s Operation Land
Transfer (OLT) Program, pursuant to PD 27.
 In 1972, Sps. Gacias executed individual deeds of
sale in favor of their children (Gacias Heirs), and
a 1980 deed of sale to respondent Meden,
conveying portions of the aforesaid lands.
 The Gacias Heirs filed a petition for retention of
the portions conveyed to them
o Regional Director of DAR: favorably
granted this petition, except for
Meden’s portion.
 On appeal, however, the DAR Secretary declared
that the said lands are within the coverage of the
OLT Program under PD 27 and upheld the
emancipation patents (EPs) and Certificates of
land transfer (CLTs) issued in the interim in favor
of the farmers-beneficiaries
o The DAR Secretary ruled that the
conveyances made by Sps. Gacias to
their children were ineffectual.
o Then the DAR initially valued the 8-ha.
portion of the aforesaid riceland at
PhP77, 000.0022 (DAR valuation).
 Gacias Heirs then filed a complaint for the
Determination of Just Compensation before the
RTC.
o In its answer, the DAR maintained that
the subject portion had already been
valued under PD 27 and EO 228, and,
thus, prayed for the dismissal of the
complaint.
o RTC: rejected the valuation of the DAR.
It fixed the valuation to PhP 735,562.05.
Whether or not the RTC as Special Agrarian Court
 Yes, it is the RTC sitting as a Special Agrarian
Court (SAC), that should make the final determination of
just compensation and which has the final say on what the
amount of just compensation will be pursuant to the well-
settled rule that the determination of just compensation is
a judicial function; hence, courts cannot be unduly
restricted in their determination thereof. To do so would
deprive the courts of their judicial prerogatives and reduce
them to the bureaucratic function of inputting data and
arriving at the valuation. While the courts should be
mindful of the different formulae created by the DAR in
arriving at just compensation, they are not strictly bound
to adhere thereto if the situations before them do not
warrant it.
 Jesus Alsua owned an unregistered agricultural
land in Albay. Respondent Heirs voluntarily
The RTC as a SAC, therefore, must still be able to
offered to sell the entire parcel of land to the
reasonably exercise its judicial discretion in the evaluation
government under RA 6657 or Comprehensive
of the factors for just compensation, which cannot be
Agrarian Reform Law, but only a portion
arbitrarily restricted by a formula dictated by the DAR, an
consisting of cocoland and unirrigated Riceland
administrative agency. Surely, DAR AO No. 5 did not intend
were acquired.
to straight-jacket the hands of the court in the
 Petitioner Land Bank valued the subject lands at
computation of the land valuation. While it provides a
around 1 million while the Provincial Agrarian
formula, it could not have been its intention to shackle the
Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) fixed the value at
courts into applying the formula in every instance. The
around 5 million.
court shall apply the formula after an evaluation of the
 LBP filed a petition for the determination of just
three factors, or it may proceed to make its own
compensation.
computation based on the extended list in Section 17 of
 Court of Appeals did not follow the value set by
Republic Act No. 6657, which includes other factors.
LBP and PARAD but fixed the just compensation
at around 2 million based on the formula under
Notwithstanding that the RTC is the one charged to
DAR AO No. 5 that just compensation is pegged
determine the amount of just compensation, a review of
at the price or value of the property at the time
the records impels the Court to order the remand of the
it was taken from the owner and not its value at
case to the RTC considering the failure of both the RTC and
the time of rendition of judgment or the filing of
the CA to consider the factors enumerated under Section
the complaint if the government takes
17 of RA 6657, as amended, in determining the just
possession of the land before the institution of
compensation for the subject portion.
expropriation proceedings

Whether just compensation should be pegged at

the price or value of the property at the time it was taken?

Yes, just compensation is pegged at the time of actual

taking.

When the agrarian reform process is still incomplete, just

compensation should be determined and the process be
concluded under RA 665.

For purposes of determining just compensation, the fair

market value of an expropriated property is determined by
1. its character and its price at the time of taking,
or
2. the “time when the landowner was deprived of
the use and benefit of his property,”
In this case, the second mode was used since the title is o G.R. No. 172352 – LBP assails the
transferred in the name of the beneficiaries. The case is awards of interest by CA. No interest
remanded to the RTC Legaspi to properly determine the can legally accrue to since (1) the heirs
just compensation based on the guidelines set by the were already paid provisional
court. The following are the guidelines in determining the compensation, (2) there is no delay,
just compensation: and (3) RA 6657 does not require it.
1. The just compensation must be valued at the o G.R. No. 172387-88 – Habang Heirs
time of taking or when the land owner was contend that CA erred in setting aside
deprived of the use and benefit of his property. the just compensation fixed by the RTC
2. The evidence must conform to Section 17 of RA
6657, as amended, prior to its amendment by RA
9700. This is if the claim is before RA 9700. 1. Whether CA’s award of just compensation is
3. RTC may impose legal interest on just proper? YES
compensation as may be warranted by the 2. Whether LBP is liable for interest at a rate of 12%
circumstances of the case e.g. when there is per annum? YES
delay in the payment.
4. RTC is not strictly bound to adhere to the
formula created by DAR because the
ISSUE 1: On the award of Just Compensation
determination of just compensation is a judicial
Yes, CA’s award of just compensation is proper since it
function.
based its valuation on the factors under RA 6657 unlike the
RTC’s Income Productivity Approach. RTC’s valuation is
improper because it contradicts the established
jurisprudence on expropriation. The constitutional
limitation of the just compensation is that it should be the
market value at the time of actual taking.

Section 17 of RA 6657 enumerates the factors which must

be taken into consideration to accurately determine the
amount of just compensation. Pursuant to its rule-making
powers in the same law, DAR translated these factors into
a basic formula. courts are not constrained to adopt the
said formula in every case since the determination of the
amount of just compensation essentially partakes the
nature of a judicial function. Courts may either adopt the
DAR formula or proceed with its own application for as
long as the factors listed in Section 17 of RA 6657 have been
duly complied.

ISSUE 2: On the Interest

Yes, LBP is liable for the payment of interest. The award of
12% interest is imposed in the nature of damages for the
 Alfredo Hababag, Sr. was the owner of several
delay in the payment of the full just compensation award.
parcels of agricultural land in Sorsogon. The
Even if LBP had already made corresponding deposits of
landholdings were voluntarily offered for sale to
the offered valuations and bonds, it is still liable for the
the government under RA 6657 or CARL.
interest. If the amount paid is lower that the just
 RTC applied the Income Productivity Approach
compensation awarded, the payment of interest is in order
in determining the just compensation.
insofar as the unpaid balance is concerned. It is computed
 CA set aside the RTC’s valuation for failure to give
from the time of taking. The legal interest is 12% pursuant
due consideration to the factors enumerated in
to Central Bank Circular No. 905, series of 1982
Section 17 of RA 6657 and the formula under DAR
AO 6-92 as amended by DA AO 11-94.
Furthermore, it imposed a 12% just
compensation award since the obligation to pay
just compensation is that of a forbearance of
money.
 Two cases were consolidated:
 No, submission of the complete documents is not a
precondition. Nowhere from the administrative guidelines
can it be inferred that the submission of the complete
documents is a pre-condition for the release of the initial
valuation to the land owner. Withholding the release
despite the deprivation of the possession of use of the
landowner’s property would in effect penalizing the
landowner for exercising his right. To hold otherwise
would protract the payment of the amount which RA 6657
guarantees that it be immediately due even pending the
determination of just compensation. In the expropriation
of a private property under CARP, the landowner’s only
consolation is that he receives just compensation. Thus,
the land owner is entitled of prompt payment.

ISSUE 2: On the Reckoning Point of the 12% Interest

No, the compensation for Land 3 should be computed from
the time of taking and not from January 1, 2010 until the
full payment on October 12, 2011. The case is remand to
determine the reckoning period.

Just compensation embraces not only the correct

determination of the amount to be paid to the landowner,
but also payment within reasonable time from its taking.
 Santos owned 3 parcels of agricultural land
Prompt payment not only requires immediate deposit and
devoted to corn situated in Camarines Sur
release to the landowner of the provision compensation as
namely land 1, 2 and 3. The subject lands were
determined by DAR but also payment in full.
placed under the Operation Land Transfer
Program pursuant to PD No. 27 and distributed
Interest is imposed if there is delay in the payment of just
to the farmer – beneficiaries.
compensation to the landowner since the obligation is
 Dissatisfied with the PARAD valuation, LBP deemed to be an effective forbearance on the part of the
instituted 2 separate complaints. The first case is State. 3. The interest shall be pegged at 12% per annum
for land 1, and the second case is for Lands 2 and reckoned from the time of taking or when the landowner
3. was deprived of the use and benefit of his property.
 Both petitions were consolidated and are filed
before the court alleging that:
o GR No. 213863 – LBP allege that CA
committed a reversible error in
allowing the release of the initial
valuation of Lands 1 and 2 without
submitting the documents listed under
DAR AO No. 2, Series of 2005
o G.R. No. 214021 – Santos questioned
the CA in reckoning the award of the
12% interest from January 1, 2010 until
the full payment of the just
compensation.

1. Whether the submission of the complete

documents is a precondition for the release of
the initial valuation? NO
2. Whether the 12% interest should be reckoned
from January 1, 2010? NO

ISSUE 1: On the Initial Valuation

 3. Interest may be awarded as may be warranted by
the circumstances of the case and based on
prevailing jursisprudence. In previous cases, the
court has allowed legal interest in cases of delay
in the payment of just compensation.

 Deceased Apolonio was the registered owner of

a parcel of land in Negros Oriental. A portion of
the said land was placed under Operational Land
Transfer pursuant to PD 27.
 LBP filed a petition for the determination of just
compensation.
 Subsequently, RA 9700 was passed and the
implementing guidelines under DAR AO 1 was
issued.
 CA applied the formula under DAR AO, series of
2010 in the determination of just compensation
and noted that RTC used DAR AO 5, series of 1998
was used in arriving at the valuation.

Whether or not the CA correctly fixed the just

compensation for the subject land?

No, CA did not correctly fix the just compensation. When  LBP filed a motion for reconsideration alleging
the acquisition process under PD 27 is still incomplete, that it is not liable for the payment of interest in
such as in this case where the just compensation due to absence of: (a) delay since it promptly deposited
the landowner has yet to be settled, just compensation the initial valuation for the subject lands; and (b)
should be determined and the process concluded under substantial difference between the amount of
RA 6657, as amended. DAR AO 1, series of 2010 was issued initial valuation and the final just compensation.
in line with RA 9700 which is effective only subsequent to  LBP also filed a motion for clarification of the
July 1, 2009. It cannot be applied in this case because the date of taking.
claims folder was received by LBP prior to July 1, 2009.
Thus, the value should be in accordance with RA 6657
pursuant to the cut-off date. 1. Whether LBP is liable for the payment of
interest?
The case is remanded to the RTC and is directed with the 2. When is the date of taking for purposes of
following guidelines: determining LBP’s liability to pay the interest?
1. Just compensation must be valued at the time of
taking or the time when the owner was deprived
of the use and benefit of his property.
ISSUE 1: On the payment of interest
2. Just compensation must be arrived at pursuant
Yes, LBP is liable for the payment. The substantiality of the
to the guidelines set forth in Section 17 of RA
payments made by the LBP is not the determining factor
6657, as amended, prior to its amendment by RA
in the imposition of interest. As long as the full just
9700. While RTC should take into account the
compensation is not paid, interest is due and should be
different formula created by the DAR, it is not
paid to compensate for the unpaid balance of this principal
strictly bound if the situations before it do not
sum after the taking has been completed
warrant their application.
 Whether CA correctly fixed the just
The just compensation for the subject lands was finally compensation for the subject land?
fixed at P2,398,487.24, while the payments made by the
LBP only amounted to P1,237,850.00. Hence, there
remained an unpaid balance of the "principal sum of the
No, the CA erred in fixing the just compensation. RTC
just compensation," warranting the imposition of interest.
should have computed just compensation using pertinent
DAR regulations applying Section 17 of RA 6657 prior to its
"Prompt payment" of just compensation encompasses the
amendment by RA 9700 instead of adopting the new DAR
payment in full of the just compensation to the landholders
issuance.
as finally determined by the courts. Hence, the
requirement of the law is not satisfied by the mere deposit
The claims folders were received by the LBP prior to July 1,
by the LBP with any accessible bank of the provisional
2009, hence, just compensation is determined in
compensation determined by it or by the DAR, and its
accordance with Section 17 of RA 6657 prior to its further
subsequent release to the landowner after compliance
amendment by RA 9700.
with the legal requirements set forth bv RA 6657.
RTC, as a Special Agrarian Court (SAC), is not strictly bound
ISSUE 2: On the Date of Taking
by the formula created by DAR. Courts of law possess the
Interest shall be pegged at the rate of 12% p.a. on the
power to make a final determination of just compensation.
unpaid balance, reckoned from the time of taking, or the
The valuation of the property and the determination of just
time when the landowner was deprived of the use and
compensation is essentially a judicial function.
benefit of his property such as when title is transferred to
the Republic of the Philippines, or emancipation patents
The case is remanded to the RTC for the determination of
are issued by the government, until June 30, 2013, and
just compensation following these guidelines:
thereafter, at 6% p.a. until full payment. In the case, the
1. Just compensation must be valued at the time of
date of taking cannot be determined because LBP did not
taking or the time when the owner was deprived
attach the certified true copies of the Republic’s title/s in
of the use and benefit of his property.
the consolidated cases. Hence, the case is remanded to the
2. Just compensation must be arrived at pursuant
RTC to compute the interest due.
to the guidelines set forth in Section 17 of RA
6657, as amended, prior to its amendment by RA
9700. While RTC should take into account the
different formula created by the DAR, it is not
strictly bound if the situations before it does not
warrant their application.
3. Interest may be awarded as may be warranted by
the circumstances of the case and based on
prevailing jurisprudence. In previous cases, the
court has allowed legal interest in cases of delay
in the payment of just compensation.

 Petitioner Heirs of Pablo Feliciano, Jr. are co-

owners of an agricultural land in Camarines Sur.
A portion was classified as unirrigated Riceland
(subject land) and placed under the coverage of
PD 27.
 LBP filed for a petition for the determination of
just compensation. RTC directed LBO to revalue
the subject land in accordance to DAR AO 1,
Series of 2010. CA affirmed the valuation.

.
 Respondent is a registered owner of the
agricultural subject land. It voluntary offered to
sell to the government and placed under the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program
(CARP) pursuant to RA 6657, as amended.
 LBP valued the subject land based on DAR AO 17,
Series of 1989 as amended.
 Respondent filed before the RTC, sitting as a
Special Agrarian Court (SAC), a petition seeking
the determination of just compensation for the
subject land or to be allowed to withdraw its VOS
if the valuation is unacceptable.
 CA upheld RTC’s valuation in accordance to the
guidelines under Section 17 RA 6657. It rejected
the LBP’s contention that DAR AO 17, Series of
1989, as amended, should control the
computation of just compensation, holding that
the said AOs are mere guidelines to be used by
the LBP, and are not binding on the courts.
Whether CA correctly fixed the just
compensation for the subject land?
No, the CA erred in fixing the just compensation because
it completely disregarded the DAR formula. CA merely
upheld the just compensation without showing that other
factors under Section 17 of RA 6657 were taken into
account or otherwise found to be inapplicable. Out of
regard for the DAR's expertise as the concerned
implementing agency, courts should henceforth consider
the factors stated in Section 17 of RA 6657, as amended, as
translated into the applicable DAR formulas in their
determination of just compensation for the properties
covered by the said law.
The case is remanded to the RTC following these
guidelines:
1. Just compensation must be valued at the time of
taking or the time when the owner was deprived
of the use and benefit of his property.
2. Just compensation must be arrived at pursuant
to the guidelines set forth in Section 17 of RA
6657, as amended, prior to its amendment by RA
9700. While RTC should take into account the
different formula created by the DAR, it is not
strictly bound if the situations before it does not
warrant their application.
3. Interest may be awarded as may be warranted by
the circumstances of the case and based on
prevailing jurisprudence. In previous cases, the
court has allowed legal interest in cases of delay
in the payment of just compensation.
 Atienza (budget officer) and Castro (utility worker) are
CA employees.
 Atienza introduced Atibula (custodian of CA Original
Decisions) to Dario who asked for Atibula’s help in
locating a CA decision in the “Fernando Case”.
o They found said case in Vol 260. Dario perused
said document and also scanned Vol. 265.
 Dario requested Atibula to insert a decision in one of
the Volumes, but Atibula refused. Atienza offered
Atibula P50,000 in exchange, but he also refused.
 Atibula subsequently discovered that Vol. 266 was
missing which he reported to his superiors.
 Nelson, also a CA employee, handed Atibula the
missing Vol. 266. Nelson claimed that it was Castro
who asked him to do so.
 There were new documents inserted in Vol. 266: CA
decisions and resolutions supposedly for the
Fernando Case. Signatures of the CA Justices therein
have been forged.
 NBI filed a complaint with the Office of the
Ombudsman implicating Atienza, Castro and Dario of
the Crimes of Falsification of Public Document and
Robbery.
Whether or not the guilt of the accused persons
were proven beyond reasonable doubt.
No. The Constitution mandates that an accused
shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proven
beyond reasonable doubt. The burden lies on the
prosecution to overcome such presumption of innocence,
failing which, the presumption of innocence prevails and
the accused should be acquitted.
This, despite the fact that his innocence may be doubted,
for a criminal conviction rests on the strength of the
evidence of the prosecution and not on the weakness or
even absence of defense. If the inculpatory facts and
circumstances are capable of two or more explanations,
one of which is consistent with the innocence of the
accused and the other consistent with his guilt, then the
evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and is
not sufficient to support a conviction, as in this case.
There being no circumstantial evidence sufficient to
support a conviction, the Court hereby acquits petitioners,
without prejudice, however, to any subsequent finding on
their administrative liability in connection with the
incidents in this case.
 PHILCOMSAT is a wholly-owned subsidiary of
the POTC, a government-sequestered
organization
 POHC is a private corporation whose main
operation is collecting the money market
interest income of PHILCOMSAT
o By virtue of PHC’s interests in both
PHILCOMSAT and POTC, the
government likewise has substantial
interest in PHC.
 Amongst the petitioners were Enrique Locsin
and Manual Andal, who are both:
o directors and corporate officers of
PHC
o nominees of the government to the
board of directors of POTC and
PHILCOMSAT
 POTC and PHC sustained financial losses and its
operating expenses ballooned tremendously.
 In view of these losses, Senator Defensor-
Santiago introduced Proposed Senate Resolution
(PSR) No. 455 directing for the conduct of an
inquiry, in aid of legislation, on the anomalous
losses insured by POTC, PHILCOMSAT, PHC, and
the mismanagement committed by their
respective board of directors.
 As a result of these inquiries, the Senate
Committees submitted Committee Report No.
312, which recommended, inter alia: the
replacement of government nominees as
directors of POTC and PHILCOMSAT
 In the petition for certiorari and prohibition filed
by the petitioners before the SC, Locsin and
Andal raised an allegation that their
constitutionally guaranteed right to counsel was
violated during the hearings held by the Senate
Committee in furtherance of PSR No. 455
Whether or not Locsin and Andal’s right to counsel
was violated
No. Locsin and Andal’s right to counsel was not
violated during the hearings held in furtherance of PSR No.
455.
The right to be assisted by counsel can only be invoked by
a person under custodial investigation suspected for the
commission of a crime, and therefore attaches only during
such custodial investigation. Since petitioners Locsin and
Andal were invited to the public hearings as resource
persons, they cannot therefore validly invoke their right to
counsel.
o Respondent Engr. Alayan, as the temporary
Municipal Assessor, applied for a permanent
employment status before the Civil Service
Commission (CSC)-Camarines Sur
o CSC-Camarines Sur initially denied her
application but it was approved on appeal by
CSC-Regional Office
o Alayan sought recognition of her appointment
and the grant of emoluments from petitioner
Mayor Gontang, where the latter denied Alayan’s
request
 o Alayan filed a petition for Mandamus before the
RTC, which the court dismissed. However, the
CA ruled in Alayan’s favor
o However, prior the the CA decision, the CSC set
aside the order of CSC-Regional Office, finding
that there was no permanent appointment as the
concurrence of the local Sanggunian (Municipal
Council) was not obtained
o Alayan moved for the issuance of an alias writ of
execution by the RTC in her Mandamus petition
for the alleged unsatisfied judgement of
P837,022.50.
o Gontang opposed it claiming full
satisfaction for paying Alayan the net
sum of P391,040.60
o The RTC ordered the issuance of alias writ of
execution.  The Judicial Audit Team reported to the Office of
o The CA dismissed the petition for certiorari of the Court Administrator (OCA) that Judge
Atty. Fandino and Atty. Saulon, counsels of Buenavista, Branch 72, had several cases
Gontang. It ruled that there was lack of authority unresolved leading to the clogging of court
on the part of the private attorneys to represent dockets
the Municipality of Gainza, Camarines Sur  Most of the cases were resolved beyond the
reglementary period; some cases were not even
acted upon; others did not progress for
Whether or not Attorneys Fandino and Saulon can unreasonable periods of time
represent the Municipality of Gainza, Camarines Sur  Judge Buenavista attributed the delays to the
death of his wife, slowly failing eyesight, and his
Yes. Attys. Fandino and Saulon had the authority
designation as a pairing judge of Branch 22
to represent Gontang at the litigation and even up to the
 The OCA recommended that Judge Buenavista
appeal.
be fined for his failure to effectively manage his
In the discharge of governmental function, the municipal court dockets
corporations are responsible for the acts of its officers only
if they acted by authority of the law and in conformity with Whether Judge Buenavista be fined as
the requirements thereof. However, in this case, the recommended by the OCA for failure to perform his duties
damages sought could have resulted in personal liability;
hence, Gontang cannot be deemed to have been Yes. Judges have the sworn duty to administer
improperly represented by the private counsels, Fandino, justice without undue delay, for justice delayed is justice
and Saulon. denied. They have always been exhorted to observe strict
adherence to the rule on speedy disposition of cases, as
delay in case disposition is a major culprit in the erosion of
public faith and confidence in the judicial system.

Under the 1987 Constitution, trial judges are mandated to

decide and resolve cases within 90 days from submission.
Corollary to this constitutional mandate, Section 5, Canon
6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine
Judiciary requires judges to perform all judicial duties
efficiently, fairly, and with reasonable promptness.

A judge cannot choose his deadline for deciding cases

pending before him. Without an extension granted by the
Court, the failure to decide even a single case within the
required period constitutes gross inefficiency that merits
administrative sanction. If a judge is unable to comply with
the period for deciding cases or matters, he can, for good
reasons, ask for an extension.
An inexcusable failure to decide a case within the
prescribed 90-day period constitutes gross inefficiency,
warranting the imposition of administrative sanctions
such as suspension from office without pay or fine on the
defaulting judge. The fines imposed vary in each case,
depending chiefly on the number of cases not decided
within the reglementary period and other factors, such as
the presence of aggravating or mitigating circumstances,
the damage suffered by the parties as a result of the delay,
the health and age of the judge, and other analogous
circumstances.
In this case, records are bereft of showing that Judge
Buenavista sought for an extension of time to decide and
resolve most of the cases pending before him, save only for
one instance. Having therefore failed to decide cases and
resolve incidents within the required period constituted
gross inefficiency, warranting the imposition of a fine of
P10,000.00 which the Court finds reasonable under the
circumstances.
 In 2001, Petitioners Coscolluela, the former
governor of the Province of Negros Occidental,
alongside with Nacionales, the Special Projects
Division Head, Amugod, Nacionales’ subordinate,
and Malvas, the Provincial Health Officer were
allegedly part of the anomalous purchase of
medical and agricultural equipment amounting
to P20M for the Province
 Graft Investigation Officer Canares found
probable cause against the petitioners for
violation of Sec. 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act and recommended the
filing of the information
 Information was submitted to the Ombudsman
for recommendation and was approved.
 However, the final approval of Acting
Ombudman Casimiro came only on May 21,
2009, and the information was filed with the
Sandiganbayan (SB) on June 19, 2009
 Petitioners allege that they learned only of the
March 27, 2003 Resolution and information only
after eight (8) years when they received a copy
shortly after its filing with the SB on June 19,
2009
 Petitioners filed a motion to quash on the ground
that their right to speedy disposition of cases
was violated.
Whether petitioners’ Constitutional Right to
Speedy disposition of cases was violated
Yes. The SC dismissed the criminal case for
violation of said right. However, this is without prejudice
to any civil action which the Province may file against the
petitioners
The said constitutional right extends to all parties in all
cases, be it criminal, civil, administrative and even judicial
or quasi-judicial. Factors to be considered in the
determination whether the right to speedy disposition of
cases has been denied: (1) the length of delay, (2) the
reasons for the delay, (3) the assertions or failure to assert
such right by the accused, (4) the prejudice caused by the
delay.
Length of the delay:
 The preliminary investigation took a protracted
or prolonged amount of time to complete
 Preliminary proceedings were not terminated
upon Canares’ preparation of the resolution and
information in March 27, 2003, but rather it was
on May 21, 2009 or almost eight years that the
said proceedings were terminated
Reason for the delay:
 No justifiable reason basis as to why the
Ombudsman could not have earlier resolved the
preliminary investigation
Assertion or failure to assert the right:
 Petitioners were unaware that the investigation
was still on-going
 They had reason to assume that the charges had
already been dismissed
 They were only informed of the March 27, 2003
Resolution and Information only after six years
or when they received a copy on June 19, 2009
Prejudice caused by the delay:
 Petitioners defense will be impaired because of
the inability to adequately prepare their defense
case skews the fairness of the entire system
 They will be unable to recall accurately the
events of the distant past since the
resolution/information was submitted for
approval on 2003 and it was in 2009 where they
 received the copy of the resolution and
information
 They will be disadvantaged by restraint on their
liberty and by living under a cloud of anxiety,
suspicion and often hostility
 Their financial resources may be drained;
association is curtailed; and will be subjected to
public criticism
 Santos entered into a Contract of Lease with
Chua.
o The contract granted Chua the “first
option or priority to buy” the property
in case of sale
 Chua assigned his rights from the contract to Lee
 Lee, then, assigned his rights thereon to
Paranaque Kings Enterprises (PKE)
 PKE then filed a complaint against Santos for
selling the property to Raymundo without giving
PKE the opportunity to exercise its priority to
buy the same
o This case, particularly the dismissal of
the same, was raised to the Supreme
Court.
o SC: decided against the dismissal of the
case and ordered for it to be remand
back to the RTC for further
proceedings
 During the proceedings in the RTC, the RTC
issued an order denying one of the motions filed
by PKE.
o PKE filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition before the CA to question
the order of the RTC.
o PKE also filed a Motion to Cancel Pre-
Trial before the RTC, claiming that,
since it was filing a petition for
certiorari and prohibition before the
CA, then the pre-trial should first be
suspended pending CA’s decision on its
petition.
 RTC: denied the Motion to Cancel Pre-Trial and
the Pre-Trial continued, but PKE refused to take
part in it. RTC declared PKE non-suited and
dismissed the complaint of PKE.
Whether or not the dismissal for the Motion to
Cancel Pre-Trial and the complaint by the RTC was proper
Yes. RTC was able to explain to the satisfaction
of the Court that the postponement of the pre-trial was
not warranted. Accordingly, prior to the Motion to Cancel
Pre-Trial, the pre-trial had already been rescheduled 4
times. The complaint of PKE was filed on March 1991, but,
seven years later (1998), no pre-trial has been conducted.
Hence, the cancellation of the pre-trial on the ground of
the impending filing of a petition for certiorari and
prohibition, as there was no proof at the time of the
hearing that said petition was in fact filed the time of the
hearing, was obviously a dilatory tactic designed for PKE
to control the proceedings of the court. Also, the mere
elevation of an interlocutory matter through a petition for
certiorari does not by itself merit a suspension of the
proceedings before the RTC, unless a temporary
restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction has
been issued.
The expeditious disposition of cases is as much the duty of
PKE, being the plaintiff, as well as the courts. Indeed,
respondents, as the defendants, cannot be wearingly
denied of their right to the speedy disposition of the case
filed against them. After more than two (2) decades,
respondents certainly do not deserve the agony of going
through the same issues all over again with petitioner,
which could have been settled had the latter simply
proceeded to pre-trial and had given the trial court the
opportunity to evaluate the evidence, apply the law, and
decree the proper judgment.
 Majestic Finance was the judgment creditor of
Thomas Cort in a Rescission Case.
o To satisfy the judgment, the property
of Cort was sold to Paulina Cruz who
then sold it to Cornelio Mendoza.
 Jose Tito then petitioned to declare the
Rescission Case null and void, contending that
 the court did not acquire jurisdiction over the
person of his predecessor-in-interest, Cort, who
died almost 5 years prior such case was filed.
 Tito’s standing is based on his purported
ownership of the property which he claims to
have inherited through a will.
 Before the institution of the annulment case,
Tito had already transferred his interest over the
property to Sps. Nazal who were joined as
intervenors in the annulment case. It turns out
that Mendoza filed against Sps. Nazal a cases for
forcible entry and recovery of possession.
 The annulment case never moved for 11 years
forward because of a fire which destroyed
several court records.
 The new owners of the property, Sps. Lim, filed
for an unlawful detainer case against Sps. Nazal,
prompting the latter to set the annulment case
for hearing.
 Majestic then motioned that the case be
declared closed and terminated, contending that
Tito had lost interest in the case, and Sps. Nazal
have no personality to prosecute the same.
Whether Sps. Nazal should be allowed to prosecute
the annulment case
No. Sps. Nazal, being intervenors, already lost
their right to participate because of Tito’s failure to
diligently and expeditiously prosecute the same for an
unjustified and unreasonable length of time. Case law
states that intervention is never an independent action,
but is merely ancillary and supplemental to the existing
litigation.
Its purpose is not to obstruct or unnecessarily delay the
placid operation of the machinery of trial, but merely to
afford one not an original party, who is claiming a certain
right or interest in the pending case, the opportunity to
appear and be joined so he could assert or protect such
right or interests. In other words, the right of an intervenor
should only be in aid of the right of the original party.
Assuming that Sps. Nazal were the original plaintiffs, they
would have carried the burden to diligently and
expeditiously prosecute the action within a reasonable
length of time. Nonetheless, they still failed in this regard.
Notably, while under both the present and the old Rules of
Court, the clerk of court has the duty to set the case for
pre-trial, the same does not relieve the plaintiffs of their
own duty to prosecute the case diligently. Truth be told,
the expeditious disposition of cases is as much the duty of
the plaintiff as the court.
 Petitioners’ names were included in what is
alleged to be a JCICC “AGILA” 3rd Quarter 2007
Order of Battle Validation Result of the
Philippine Army's 10th Infantry Division (10th ID)
(a.k.a. OB List)
o List is supposedly connected to the
CPP and the NPA.
 Petitioners perceive that, because of the OB List,
they became easy targets of unexplained
disappearances or extralegal killings – a real
threat to their life, liberty and security.
 Atty. Lilibeth Ladaga alleged that, because of the
list, suspicious looking men were visiting her
office in Davao when she is absent.
 Atty. Librado-Trinidad demanded the removal of
her name on the List. She averred that she has
not committed any act against national security
that would justify the inclusion of her name in
the said OB List.
 Atty. Carlos Zarate alleged that the inclusion of
his name in the said OB List was due to his
advocacies as a public interest or human rights
lawyer.
 The Petitioners filed a petition for a writ of
amparo, asserting that the OB List is really a
military hit-list as allegedly shown by the fact
that there have already been three victims of
extrajudicial killing whose violent deaths can be
linked directly to the OB List.
 RTC denied the Petitioners the privilege of the
writ and protection order.
Whether or not the RTC erred in not granting the
writ of amparo
No. The RTC was correct.
The writ of Amparo was promulgated by the Court
pursuant to its rulemaking powers in response to the
alarming rise in the number of cases of enforced
disappearances and extrajudicial killings. It plays the
preventive role of breaking the expectation of impunity in
the commission of extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances, as well as the curative role of facilitating
the subsequent punishment of the perpetrators.
Under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, the parties shall
establish their claims by substantial evidence, and if the
allegations in the petition are proven by substantial
evidence, the court shall grant the privilege of the writ and
such reliefs as may be proper and appropriate.
The alleged threat to herein petitioners' rights to life,
liberty and security must be actual, and not merely one of
supposition or with the likelihood of happening. And, when
the evidence adduced establishes the threat to be existent,
as opposed to a potential one, then, it goes without saying
that the threshold requirement of substantial evidence in
Amparo proceedings has also been met.
Thus, in the words of Justice Brion, in the context of the
Amparo rule, only actual threats, as may be established
from all the facts and circumstances of the case, can
qualify as a violation that may be addressed under the Rule
on the Writ of Amparo.
The Petitioners therefore were not able to prove by
substantial evidence that there was an actual threat to
their rights to life, liberty and security. The mere inclusion
of their names in the OB List is not sufficient enough
evidence for the issuance of the Writ of Amparo.
 Petitioner Dr. Joy Margate Lee and respondent
P/Supt. Neri Ilagan were former common law
partners
 Lee confronted Ilagan at his office regarding an
alleged sex video with another woman, which
she discovered from Ilagan’s digital camera
 Ilagan denied the video and demanded for the
return of his camera
 During the confrontation, Ilagan allegedly
slammed Lee’s head against the wall
 Lee filed for a criminal complaint under VAWC
and an administrative complaint of grave
misconduct against Ilagan
 Ilagan filed for the issuance of a writ of habeas
data alleging that Lee will allegedly distribute or
upload the subject video to the upper echelons
of NAPOLCOM and to Quiapo or the internet. He
alleges that his right to life, liberty, security, and
privacy as well as of the other woman in the
video will be violated
 Lee admitted that she kept the memory card of
the digital camera and reproduced the subject
video but averred that she did so to use the same
as evidence in the cases she filed against Ilagan
 RTC eventually granted the privilege of the writ
of habeas data in Ilagan’s favor
Whether or not the RTC correctly extended the
privilege of the writ of habeas data in favor of Ilagan
No.
Under the Habeas Data Rule, the petition must sufficiently
allege “the manner the right to privacy is violated or
threatened and how it affects the right to life, liberty, or
security of the aggrieved party.” Hence, the petition must
adequately show that there exist a nexus or connection
between the right to privacy and the right to life, liberty,
or security.
Ilagan was not able to sufficiently allege that his right to
privacy in life, liberty, or security was or would be violated
through the supposed reproduction and threatened
dissemination of the subject sex video. He failed to explain
the connection between his right to privacy and any
violation of his right to life, liberty, or security.
Ilagan only submitted his self-serving testimony which
hardly meets the substantial evidence requirements.
In addition, nothing would indicate that Lee actually
proceeded to upload or disseminate said video to the
NAPOLCOM or the public. The only reason why she
reproduced the subject video was to legitimately utilize it
as evidence in the criminal and administrative cases that
she filed against Ilagan.

 Petitioners arrived at NAIA 3 aboard a Cebu
Pacific Airline flight from a vacation with their
family and friends. They waited for the arrival
of their baggage but were eventually informed
that it was offloaded and transferred to a
different flight.
 Aggrieved, petitioners lodged a complaint
before the Cebu Pacific complaint desk. As
they were complaining, they noticed a man
(Ramon) taking photos of Claudine with his
cellular phone.
 Raymart approached the man and asked what
he was doing. Suddenly, the man (Ramon)
allegedly punched and kicked Raymart,
forcing the latter to fight back.
 When Claudine saw the commotion, she
approached Mon and the latter likewise
allegedly kicked and pushed her back against
the counter.
 At that instance, Raymart rushed to defend his
wife, while one Edoardo Benjamin Atilano
joined in the brawl. Immediately thereafter,
several airport security personnel came to
stop the altercation and brought them to the
Airport Police Department for investigation.
 Days after the incident, respondents (Raffy,
Ben, and Erwin Tulfo, brothers of Ramon)
aired on their TV program comments and
expletives against petitioners, and threatened
that they will retaliate.
 Terrified by the gravity of the threats hurled,
petitioners filed a petition for the issuance of
a writ of amparo against respondents
ISSUE: Whether or not writ of amparo should be granted
RULING: NO.
Amparo Rule was intended to address the intractable
problem of "extralegal killings" and "enforced
disappearances," its coverage, in its present form, is
confined to these two instances or to threats thereof.
While the the writ is a remedy to protect the right to life,
liberty, and security of the person desiring to avail of it,
the protection of such rights specifically pertain to
extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or
threats thereof, which are more concrete cases that
involve protection to the rights to life, liberty and
security.
In this case, it is undisputed that
petitioners' amparo petition before the RTC does not
allege any case of extrajudicial killing and/or enforced
disappearance, or any threats thereof, in the senses
above-described. Their petition is merely anchored on a
broad invocation of respondents' purported violation of
their right to life and security, carried out by private
individuals without any showing of direct or indirect
government participation
 The siblings of James Balao, and Longid
(petitioners), filed with the RTC of La Trinidad,
Benguet a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of
Amparo in James’ favor as he was abducted by
unidentified armed men.
 Named respondents in the petition were then
President GMA, Exec Sec Eduardo Ermita,
Defense Sec Gilberto Teodoro, Jr., ILG Secretary
Ronaldo Puno, National Security Adviser (NSA)
Norberto Gonzales, AFP Chief of Staff Gen.
Alexander. Yano, PNP Police Director General
Jesus Verzosa, among others.
 James M. Balao is a Psychology and Economics
graduate of the UP-Baguio.
o In 1984, he was among those who
founded the Cordillera Peoples
Alliance (CPA), a coalition of NGOs
working for the cause of indigenous
peoples in the Cordillera Region.
 According to witnesses' testimony, James was
abducted by unidentified men, saying they were
policemen and were arresting him for a drugs
case and then made to ride a white van.
  The petitioners prayed for the issuance of a writ
of Amparo and likewise prayed for (1) an
inspection order for the inspection of at least 11
military and police facilities; (2) a production
order for all documents that contain evidence
relevant to the petition, particularly the Order of
Battle List and any record or dossier
respondents have on James; and (3) a witness
protection order.
 RTC issued the writ of Amparo but denied the
issuance of protection order, production order,
and witness protection order.
under Section 17 of the Amparo rule. For this purpose, the
RTC may conduct hearings, as it may deem necessary, to
validate the results of the investigation.
Lastly, the Court upheld the RTC ruling denying the
interim reliefs prayed for by Balao, et aL, holding that the
issuance of inspection and production orders could not be
based on insufficient claims, lest it would have sanctioned
a "fishing expedition."

Whether or not the totality of evidence satisfies

the degree of proof required by the Amparo Rule to
establish an enforced disappearance.

No. The Rule on the Writ of Amparo was

promulgated amidst rising incidence of “extralegal killings”
and “enforced disappearances.” It was formulated in the
exercise of this Court’s expanded rule-making power for
the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights
enshrined in the 1987 Constitution, albeit limited to these
two situations.

“Extralegal killings” refer to killings committed without

due process of law, i.e., without legal safeguards or judicial
proceedings. On the other hand, “enforced
disappearances” are attended by the following
characteristics: an arrest, detention, or abduction of a
person by a government official or organized groups or
private individuals acting with the direct or indirect
acquiescence of the government; the refusal of the State
to disclose the fate or whereabouts of the person
concerned or a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of
liberty which places such person outside the protection of
law.

Government involvement in the abduction of James could

not be simply inferred based on past incidents in which the
victims also worked or were affiliated with left-leaning
groups.

The doctrine of command responsibility could not be

applied in amparo proceedings, considering that
pinpointing criminal culpability is not the issue thereat,
but rather, the same was conceived to determine
responsibility or at least accountability for enforced
disappearances (and extralegal killings), and to impose the
appropriate remedies to address them. Additionally, the
participation of members of the AFP or PNP in the
abduction of James was not sufficiently proven.

In order to safeguard the constitutional right to liberty and

security of James who remained missing to date, the case
must be remanded to the RTC so as to monitor and ensure
that the investigative efforts by the public officers would
be discharged with extraordinary diligence, as required

 Judge Ladago filed a letter-complaint against his
clerk of court Leonido
 Leonido allegedly intercepted and kept for
himself their share in the Judiciary Development
Fund and Allowance for Judges Fund.
 Judge Ladago repeatedly tried to contact
Leonido but to no avail. They were only able to
recover the said checks through his wife.
 It was averred in the complaint that this was not
the first time that Leonido fraudulently
intercepted checks of other MTC employees.
Whether or not Leonido should be held
administratively liable for Dishonesty and Grave
Misconduct.
Yes. Dishonesty is the disposition to lie, cheat,
deceive, defraud, or betray; unworthiness; lack of integrity;
lack of honesty, probity, or integrity in principle; and lack
of fairness and straightforwardness.
Misconduct, on the other hand, is a transgression of some
established and definite rule of action, more particularly,
unlawful behavior or gross negligence by the public officer.
Leonido is found guilty of Dishonesty and Gross
Misconduct for fraudulently intercepting the subject
checks through the use of a falsified authorization letter
and keeping such checks in his possession without the
complainants’ knowledge and authority.
The subsequent return of the subject checks to their lawful
owners is of no moment as it did not change the unlawful
nature of Leonido’s acts which is tantamount to stealing.
:
 Pursuant to the Resolution by SB of Kawit Cavite
authorizing the mayor to sell municipal
properties (lands), the Municipal Appraisal Board
(MAB) issued a resolution decreasing the
assessed fair market values of the lands from
P700 to P500/sqm.
 One parcel of land was auctioned off with the
minimum bid price pegged at P500/sqm.
 However, having found by the Commission on
Audit that the proper fair market value for the
said land was P876/sqm, complaints of graft and
corruption was filed against the members of the
MAB, including respondents. The complaint
alleged that MAB’s reappraisal was done sans any
basis or computation.
o Respondents maintain that the
reappraisal and reevaluation was based
on MAB’s aim of maintaining a uniform
assessment of lots with similar
attributes within the area.
 The Office of the Ombudsman found that the
respondents’ acts had caused undue injury to the
government, and are therefore liable for Grave
Misconduct for their disregard of established
rules in arriving at the questioned valuation.
 Contrary to the findings of the OMB, the CA held
that there is no substantial evidence to support
the finding that corruption, willful intent to
violate the law, or disregard of established
procedures may be ascribed to the respondents.
Whether or not the respondents were rightfully
absolved from administrative liability for Grave
Misconduct?
Yes. Misconduct is a transgression of some
established and definite rule of action, more particularly,
unlawful behavior or gross negligence by the public officer.
To warrant dismissal from service, the misconduct must
be grave, serious, important, weighty, momentous, and not
trifling. The misconduct must imply wrongful intention
and not a mere error of judgment and must also have a
direct relation to and be connected with the performance Any act deviating from the procedure laid down by the
of the public officer’s official duties amounting either to Rules of Court is misconduct that warrants disciplinary
maladministration or willful, intentional neglect, or failure action, which may be deemed as Simple Neglect of Duty or
to discharge the duties of the office. In order to even Grave Abuse of Authority.
differentiate gross misconduct from simple misconduct,
the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law,
or flagrant disregard of established rule, must be manifest
in the former.

Records were bereft of any showing that respondents

wrongfully intended to transgress some established and
definite rule of action which is attended by corruption,
clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of the
rules.

 11 stenographers of the RTC, including

 Aquino filed a civil case for damages against
Sabijon.
 Aquino was able to secure a Writ of Execution
against Sabijon.
 Acting on the writ, Aquino forcibly took Sabijon’s
truck which the latter uses for his livelihood.
 Sabijon now alleges that Aquino committed
irregularities in executing the writ. Claiming that
there was no Notice of Sheriff’s Sale was
furnished to Sabajon. Assuming that a sale took
place and since the value of the truck was higher
than the judgment debt, the excess of the
proceeds were never returned to them and that
Aquino did not sell the truck but appropriated it
to himself.
Whether or not respondent should be held
administratively liable for Grave Abuse of Authority
respondent, decided to attend a national
convention for stenographers.
 To cover their expenses, they solicited funds
from the City Government.
 It was decided that only 5 stenographers would
attend the seminar and that respondent is not
one of them.
 Respondent still received the money supposedly
for the seminar.
 The OCA recommended that respondent be
found guilty of simple misconduct
 The OCA did not adjudge respondent guilty of
the light offense of willful refusal to pay just
debts for the reason that her alleged debt to
complainant was not a claim adjudicated by a
court of law.
Whether or not respondent is guilty of simple
misconduct
No. The term "just debts" may refer not only to
claims adjudicated by a court of law but also to claims the
existence and justness of which are admitted by the
debtor, as respondent in this case. As such, respondent’s
infraction is willful refusal to pay just debts, not simple
misconduct.

Yes. Sheriffs, like respondent being ranking

officers of the court and agents of the law, must discharge
their duties with great care and diligence. In serving and
implementing writs, as well as processes and orders of the
court, they cannot afford to err without affecting adversely
the proper dispensation of justice.
 placed said office in a financial disadvantage as it was made
to pay a liability which did not belong to it.

 Board of Directors of San Pablo City Water

District (SPCWD) passed separate resolutions
dismissing its division chiefs Eje and Tolentino
on the basis of the administrative complaint filed
by its General Manager, Borja.
 Eje and Tolentino appealed. When it reached the
CA, CA ruled in their favor and made Borja liable
for the payment of their backwages.
 A complaint-affidavit was filed by Atty. Renato L.
 While Eje and Tolentino were reinstated and
Bondal and Nicolas "Ching" Enciso VI before the
paid backwages, the payment came from
Ombudsman against Binay, Jr. and other public
SPCWD’s funds as approved by Borja.
officers and employees of the City Government
 A civil action was filed on behalf of the water
of Makati, accusing them of Plunder in
concessionaires to compel the members of the
connection with the 5 phases of the
Board of Directors of SPCWD and Borja to
procurement and construction of the Makati
reimburse SPCWD for the amount paid to Eje
City Hall Parking Building.
and Tolentino.
 Special Panel of Investigators made for the case
 Borja was also criminally charged for violation of
filed a complaint against Binay, Jr., et al, charging
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act for
them with 6 administrative cases for Grave
causing undue injury to SPCWD when he paid Eje
Misconduct, Serious Dishonesty, and Conduct
and Tolentino's backwages and other benefits
Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service,
from the water district's funds.
and 6 criminal cases for violation of Section 3 (e)
of RA 3019, Malversation of Public Funds, and
Whether or not Borja should be held
Falsification of Public Documents .
administratively liable for conduct prejudicial to the best
 Binay invoked the condonation doctrine when he
interest of the service.
asked the CA to stop the preventive suspension
order against him over the alleged overpricing of
Yes. The CA ruling became final where Borja was the Makati City Hall Parking Building.
the one ordered to pay backwages of Eje and Tolentino.
Borja therefore contravened the final and executory WON the condonation doctrine is valid.
decision of the CA.

Yes, but only until this case.

While there is no concrete description of what specific
acts constitute the offense of conduct prejudicial to the
best interest of the service, it has been jurisprudentially
held to pertain to acts that tarnish the image and integrity
of the public office even if it not be related or connected
to the public officer's function.
While the condonation doctrine has been applied to cases
before, the doctrine of condonation is actually bereft of
legal bases. Thus, the condonation doctrine is abandoned
from this point onwards.

In the present case, Borja acted in a manner prejudicial to The concept of public office as a public trust and the
the best interest of the service by causing SPCWD to pay corollary requirement of accountability to the people at all
the backwages due to Eje and Tolentino. Borja clearly times, as mandated under the 1987 Constitution, is plainly
inconsistent with the idea that an elective local official’s
administrative liability for a misconduct committed during
a prior term can be wiped off by the fact that he was
elected to a second term of office, or even another elective
post.
Election is not a mode of condoning an administrative
offense, and there is simply no constitutional or statutory
basis in our jurisdiction to support the notion that an
official elected for a different term is fully absolved of any
administrative liability arising from an offense done during
a prior term.
 GSIS executed a Memorandum of Agreement
with the OGCC whereby the OGCC agreed to
handle the extrajudicial foreclosure of
delinquent real estate loan accounts of GSIS in
the GSIS Foreclosure Project.
 Commission on Audit found irregularities
amounting to P130,000.00 charged from the
special assessment fees from the GSIS
Foreclosure Project.
 The COA found that disbursements were made
directly to the agency officials Devanadera and
Faller instead of to bona fide suppliers and
without proper documentation.
Whether or not Faller is administratively liable for
grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service.
No. To constitute an administrative offense,
misconduct should relate to or be connected with the
performance of the official functions and duties of a public
officer. The misconduct is considered as grave if it involves
additional elements such as corruption or willful intent to
violate the law or to disregard established rules, which
must be proven by substantial evidence; otherwise, the
misconduct is only simple.
In this case, while Faller committed violations of
established and definite rules of action, there is no
substantial evidence to prove that the violations were done
by Faller with corruption or a willful intent to violate the
law so as to render him administratively liable for Grave
Misconduct.
 Court stenographer Rivera convinced Corpuz,
Judge Ferraris, and Martinez to invest in her
money-lending business with the promise that
they will earn a monthly interest that will be
deposited to her account at the end of each
month.
 Rivera never fulfilled her promise which
prompted Corpuz to verify Rivera's aforesaid
business.
 After discovering that no such money-lending
business existed, Corpuz immediately demanded
the return of her money.
 Rivera gave her 2 checks but the checks were
dishonored for being drawn against insufficient
funds.
 After her demands for payment went unheeded,
Corpuz filed 2 criminal cases for estafa and
violation of BP 2 against Rivera, as well as this
administrative complaint.
 Other persons who invested with Rivera found
themselves in the same situation as Corpuz.
 Rivera alleges that she engaged in the money
lending business in good faith but had financial
reverses.
 She also alleges that Judge Ferraris threatened to
kill her if she did not pay up.
1. Whether or not Rivera is administratively liable
2. Whether or not Judge Ferraris is administratively
liable for being complicit with Rivera’s money
lending business.
1. Yes. Rivera ought to have known that as a public
servant, she is expected at all times to exhibit the
highest sense of honesty and integrity. As an
employee of the Judiciary, she should be well
aware that the nature of her work demands her
highest degree of efficiency and responsibility,
and that she would only be able to meet this
demand by devoting her undivided time to
government service to ensure that undue delays
in the administration of justice and in the
disposition of court cases be avoided.
In admittedly engaging in her unauthorized
business, Rivera fell short of the standard
required of Judiciary employees, let alone public
servants in general. Her money-lending
activities which were done even during office
hours and within the court premises put the
integrity of her office under suspicion, as it gave
the impression that she took advantage of her
position and abused the confidence reposed in
her in doing her business.
However, absent any showing that her
inappropriate acts were tainted with corruption,
clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant
disregard of established rule, Rivera should only
be held administratively liable for Simple
Misconduct.
2. While the dismissal of the case against him was
proper as there is not enough evidence to show
that he exploited his position to receive
monetary benefit from Rivera's money-lending
activities. However, he must nevertheless be
admonished for his lack of concern in taking
steps to prevent Rivera from conducting her
trade and, in fact, condoned it by investing
money into the same.
 Tsuji arrived at NAIA carrying a luggage with a
small tin can containing various pieces of jewelry
with a total appraised value of ₱1,184,010.00.
 For Tsuji's failure to declare the subject jewelry
as required by customs laws, the same was
confiscated and withheld in the In-Bond Room
Section of the Bureau of Customs in NAIA.
 The subject jewelry was then deposited to the
Cashier's vault for appraisal and inventory. A
Baggage Inventory Report was issued certifying
that the subject jewelry was duly inventoried and
appraised.
 When Tsuji was authorized to claim the subject
jewelry, the jewelry same can no longer be found
at the In-Bond Room Section.
 Logbook entries showed that the subject jewelry
was taken out of the In-Bond Room Section and
given to Customs Cashier Vigilia which was
signed by Castillo, who was then a security guard
therein, and Tiñana as witnesses.
Whether or not Castillo should be held
administratively liable for Grave Misconduct
Yes. There is grave misconduct when the
employee arrogates unto himself responsibilities that are
clearly beyond his given duties.
Here, Castillo acted in flagrant disregard of established
rules when he transferred the subject jewelries from the
In-Bond Room to the Cashier Section without any
authority.

 Judge Arabani charged Rahim and Abduraji with
dishonesty, arising out of Abduraji’s alleged
punching of Rahim’s daily time record
(DTR)/bundy card on 3 occasions despite being
repeatedly warned by Judge Arabani.
 They were also charged with insubordination for
failure to comply with Judge Arabani’s
memorandum requiring them to explain the
subject incidents in writing
1. Whether the punching of the DTR of Rahim by
Abduraji, and Rahim’s silence and inaction
despite his awareness thereof are acts of
dishonesty.
2. Whether they are guilty of insubordination for
their noncompliance with Judge Arabani’s
memorandum to explain the subject incidents in
writing.
ISSUE 1: On Dishonesty
Dishonesty is defined as the disposition to lie, cheat,
deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness, lack of integrity.
The punching of a court employee’s DTR is a personal act
of the holder which cannot be delegated to anyone else.
Thus, the falsification of DTRs, as in this case, is an act of
dishonesty and is reflective of Rahim and Abdujari’s level of
discipline and morale in the service, rendering them
administratively liable. For this, they are suspended for 6
months without pay.
ISSUE 2: On Insubordination
Insubordination is defined as a refusal to obey some order,
which a superior officer is entitled to give and have
obeyed. Insubordination imports a willful or intentional
disregard of the lawful and reasonable instructions of the
Judge. In this case, there was no intent on their part to
deliberately defy Judge Arabani’s authority. However, their
noncompliance with the memorandum constitutes a
violation of reasonable office rules and regulations, a light
offense punishable with reprimand for the first offense.
 Judge Arabani charged Rodrigo with conduct
unbecoming a court employee, alleging inter alia
that Rodrigo:
o was constantly not at his assigned
table;
o roams in and out of the office openly;
o does not attend to his work;
o did not properly fill up his leave
application with the specific dates of
his intended leave of absence.
 Rodrigo incurred consecutive unauthorized
monthly absences of more than 2.5 days, and 12
half-day absences without previous notice.
Whether Rodrigo had rendered unauthorized
absences, rendering him administratively liable
Yes. Since Rodrigo’s leave application was not
properly filed, all his absences immediately succeeding his
leave application are unauthorized. Other than that,
Rodrigo also incurred numerous unauthorized monthly
absences. The unauthorized leave of absence becomes
punishable if the absence is frequent or habitual. Thus,
Rodrigo is administratively liable for the offense of
frequent unauthorized absences.
He is also guilty of loafing for his half-day absences. Court
officials and employees are at all times behooved to strictly
observe official time because the image of a court is
necessarily mirrored in the conduct of the men and
women who work thereat. Loafing results in inefficiency
and nonperformance of duty, and adversely affects the
prompt delivery of justice.
He is thus suspended for 6 months and 1 day and shall not
be entitled to receive his salary corresponding to the
period of his unauthorized leave of absence

 Sheldalyn charged Judge Arabani of sexual
harassment, alleging that he made a drawing of a
penis and a vagina on a piece of paper and tried
to show it to her, but the same was crumpled by
Mirad who threw it in a wastebasket.
Whether or not Judge Abarani’s act constituted
sexual harassment.
Yes The act was enough to create an
intimidating, hostile, or offensive environment for
Sheldalyn such that all subsequent interaction with Judge
Arabani became unwelcome on her part. An act that
constitutes a physical behavior of a sexual nature; a
gesture with lewd insinuation constitutes sexual
harassment.
Judge Arabani deliberately utilized this form of expression
to maliciously convey to Sheldalyn his sexual desires over
her; hence, his conduct cannot be classified as a mere
display of sexually offensive pictures, materials or graffiti.
He is thus suspended for 6 months without pay.
 This administrative case involves Quimno, who
has not submitted his Daily Time Record (DTR)
since February 2016 and failed to report for work
since July 20, 2016 without applying for leave.
Thus, he has been on absence without official
leave (AWOL).
Whether Quimno should be separated from service
for his AWOL.
Yes. Under the Omnibus Rules on Leave, an
employee who is continuously absent without approved
leave for at least 30 working days shall be considered on
AWOL and shall be separated from the service or dropped
from the rolls without prior notice.
Indeed, prolonged unauthorized absence causes
inefficiency in the public service. A court employee’s
continued absence without leave contravenes the duty of
a public servant to serve with the utmost degree of
responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency. Evidently,
his conduct constitutes gross disregard and neglect of his
duties. Undeniably, he failed to adhere to the high
standards of public accountability imposed on all those in
the government service.
 Complaints for dishonesty and misconduct were
filed against Daplas for her failure to disclose the
true and detailed statement of her assets,
liabilities, and net worth, business interests, and
financial connections, and those of her spouse in
her SALN’s.
 She insisted that she acquired her properties
through lawful means, and maintained that she
was not totally dependent on her salary to
finance the said acquisitions.
Whether Daplas should be liable for dishonesty and
misconduct for the exclusions in her SALNs
No, only for simple negligence.
The failure to declare some properties in Daplas’s SALNs is
not enough basis to hold her liable for dishonesty and
grave misconduct. Dishonesty is committed when an
individual intentionally makes a false statement of any
material fact while misconduct is intentional wrongdoing
or deliberate violation of a rule of law or standard of
behavior. In this case, there is no substantial evidence of
intent to commit a wrong, or to deceive the authorities,
and conceal the other properties in Daplas’s and her
husband’s names.
Consequently, Daplas is not guilty of the charge of
dishonesty and grave misconduct; but at most, of mere
negligence for having failed to accomplish her SALN
properly and accurately. She is meted a fine in the amount
equivalent to one (1) month and one (1) day of her last
salary.
 Complainants are the plaintiffs in an ejectment
case who obtained a favorable judgment from
the MCTC. They thus moved for the execution
thereof, which motion was granted.
 Defendant Aceveda refused to vacate the
premises. Complainants then filed a motion for
the issuance of a Writ of Demolition, which the
MCTC granted.
 However, Sheriff Montemayor informed them
that he could not enforce the said writ upon the
portion of the property occupied by Aceveda
because the latter was able to produce
“believable” documents from the DAR tending to
show his ownership over the portion of the land.
 The scheduled demolition never pushed through
despite that complainants gave the amount of
P15,000.00 to Sheriff Montemayor as purported
expenses.
 Complainants reported the matter to Atty.
Centron, the Clerk of Court, who, however, failed
to take appropriate action on Sheriff
Montemayor’s refusal to carry out the
demolition.
Whether Sheriff Montemayor’s refusal to carry out
the demolition is unwarranted.
Yes.
The sheriff’s duty in the execution of a writ is purely
ministerial so, once the writ is placed in his or her hands,
a sheriff is obligated to execute the order of the court
strictly to the letter and with reasonable promptness.sIn
this case, Sheriff Montemayor substituted his own
judgment and acted on his own belief that a specific
portion of the subject property should be excluded from
the execution. He is thus liable for dereliction of duty.
As regards the amount of P15,000.00 that Sheriff
Montemayor had admittedly received from complainants
as additional expenses for the cancelled demolition, his
receipt thereof is tantamount to an unlawful exaction for
which he must be held liable for grave misconduct and
dishonesty because the sum was without the approval of
the court and therefore cannot be considered as lawful
sheriff’s fees.
Similarly, Atty. Centron should be held administratively
liable for her failure to take a more decisive action against
Sheriff Montemayor’s unwarranted refusal. Her apparently
lackadaisical attitude in this matter evinces a similar failure
on her part to perform her duty of effectively supervising
him. She should have firmly reminded him of his mandated
ministerial task of implementing writs promptly and
expeditiously. She is thus liable for simple neglect of duty.
 Judge Baguio of RTC 34 filed a letter complaint
charging Lacuna, Stenographer of the same
court, with gross incompetence.
 Judge Baguio alleges that he had to reschedule
an initial trial for a criminal case because Lacuna
failed to transcribe and submit the stenographic
notes of the pre-trial proceedings.
 Judge Bauio pointed out that this incident is one
of many incidents that caused the court
cancellations and embarrassment.
 Lacuna, in her Comment alleges that her failing
to transcribe the notes were due to simple
oversight on her part considering that there are
 only 3 court stenographers, and that the
workload is heavy.
 Further, that she had an almost perfect
attendance showed not only her enthusiasm to
cope but also her willingness to improve.
 Lastly, she showed that even though she
incurred in delay, she was still in able to
complete the same in time for the calendar of
cases.
Whether or not Lacuna is guilty of gross
incompetence.
No. Lacuna is held administratively liable for
simple neglect considering that Lacuna significantly
improved, and in fact, extended efforts to fulfill her duties
within the prescribed time thus showing that she was not
acting in bad faith. However, she was still remiss in her
duties and is thus liable for simple neglect. She is thus
suspended.
Under Sec17 Rule 136 of the RoC, stenographers are
enjoined to immediately deliver to the clerk of court all the
notes taken during the session of the court, which are to
be attached to the records of the case. This, Lacuna failed
to do. The heavy workload proffered by Lacuna is not an
adequate excuse for her to be remiss in her duties. To
allow otherwise would permit every government employee
charged with negligence and dereliction of duty to resort
to the same convenient excuse to evade punishment.
All public officers are accountable to the people at all time
and must perform their duties and responsibilities with
utmost efficiency and competence. A public office is a
public trust, and a court stenographer, without doubt,
violates this duty by failing to fulfill her duties.
 This is a consolidation of 4 administrative cases
filed against Judge Bollozos, all initiated by
Rizalado. All 4 administrative cases stem from a
petition for Quieting of Title, Espano et al v
Guzman et al, which became final and
executory, and a Motion for Execution was filed
before Judge Bollozos, to which Judge Bollozos
issued a Joint Order ordering Guzman case to
make an accounting of the monies under
litigation.
 Rizalado, the purported counsel of record of
Guzman, alleges that:
o Judge Bollozos did not act on the
motion for execution within a
considerable amount of time
o Bollozos showed bias in favor of the
other party in not granting the Motion
for Execution
 In its Memorandum, the OCA recommended that
Rizalado be filed with contempt as the act of
filing multiple complaints against respondent
was anomalous and irregular considering that
Judge Bollozos was merely exercising his judicial
discretion.
Whether or not Rizalado should be charged with
contempt
Yes. The charges of bias and partiality against
Judge Bollozos was not substantiated by evidence. It is
well-settled that in administrative proceedings, the
burden of proof that respondents committed that acts
complained of rests on the complainant. Bare allegations
of bias and partiality are not enough in the absence of clear
and convincing evidence to overcome the presumption
that the judge will undertake his noble role to dispense
justice according to law and evidence without fear or
favor.
Further, the filing of an administrative complaint is not the
proper remedy for the correction of actions perceived to
have gone beyond the norms of propriety, where a
sufficient judicial remedy exists.
 Complainants Ponce are the owners of the
Sariling Atin Drug Store. They filed a complaint-
affidavit with the Ombudsman against the
 respondents for violations of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act and the Code of Conduct
and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees.
 Respondent Dionisio and Molina were the School
Principal of an elementary school and President
of its Teachers Association respectively. They
leased a portion of the school grounds for Ponce
to open a drug store therein.
 The parties signed a MOA where the Ponce will
pay the lease as well as make a donation to the
school in exchange for Ponce to exclusively set
up the only drug store within school grounds.
 Upon commencement of construction, Ponce
was informed that the area beside them would be
leased to another drug store. This prompted
Ponce to meet with DepEd officials who stated
that the MOA was illegal as it did not have proper
DepEd approval, that the school could not enter
into any commercial pursuits, and that the
Teacher’s Association that ratified the MOA was
not a legal entity.
 The Ombudsman found Respondents to be guilty
of Grave Misconduct
Whether or not Respondents are guilty of Grave
Misconduct.
Yes. Misconduct is a transgression of some
established and definite rule of action, more particularly,
unlawful behavior or gross negligence by the public officer.
In order to differentiate gross misconduct from simple
misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to
violate the law, or flagrant disregard of established rule
must be made manifest in the former.
In this case, the acts of the respondent fall under grave
misconduct as they violated the Local Government Code
when they leased the premises when they had no authority
to do so and when they failed to submit the official receipts
of the lease violating the Constitutionally prescribed
principle of accountability of public officers since public
school teachers are first and foremost civil servants.
Though Respondents try to justify their disregard for the
rules by arguing that their actions inured to the benefit of
the school and its students, the fact remains that
respondents knew of these laws and violated such laws
when they entered into the transaction. These exhibit
respondents’ clear intent to violate the law and/or flagrant
disregard of established rules, thus justifying their liability
for Grave Misconduct.
:
 The national government implemented a
devolution program pursuant to the LGC, which
affected the Department of Health (DOH) along
with other government agencies.
 Dr. Fortunata Castillo held the position of
Provincial Health Officer II (PHO II) of DOH
Regional Office in Zamboanga City
 Respondent Dr. Agnes Ouida P. Yu, on the other
hand, held the position of PHO I. She was
assigned, however, at the Integrated Provincial
Health Office in Isabela, Basilan.
 Upon the implementation of the devolution
program, Basilan Governor Gerry Salapuddin
refused to accept Dr. Castillo as the incumbent
of the PHO II position that was to be devolved to
the LGU of Basilan, prompting the DOH to retain
Dr. Castillo at the Regional Office.
Whether Dr. Casitllo considered to have
abandoned her position for consistently failing to assert
her rights.
No.
Abandonment of an office is the voluntary relinquishment
of an office by the holder with the intention of terminating
his possession and control thereof. In order to constitute
abandonment of office, it must be total and under such
circumstance as clearly to indicate an absolute
relinquishment. There must be a complete abandonment
of duties of such continuance that the law will infer a
relinquishment. Abandonment of duties is a voluntary act;
it springs from and is accompanied by deliberation and
freedom of choice. There are, therefore, two essential
elements of abandonment: first, an intention to abandon
and, second, an overt or ‘external’ act by which the
intention is carried into effect.
By no stretch of the imagination can Dr. Castillo’s seeming
lackadaisical attitude towards protecting her rights be
construed as an abandonment of her position resulting in
her having intentionally and voluntarily vacated the
same. Governor Salapuddin’s tenacious refusal to accept
Dr. Castillo negates any and all voluntariness on the part of
the latter to let go of her position.

However, with Dr. Castillo’s re-absorption by the DOH,

which appears to bear the former’s approval, her devolved
position with the LGU of Basilan was left vacant.

 Administrative case was filed against sheriff

Collado involving violation of Anti Money
Launderinfg Act and failure to disclose his
Statement of Assets, Liabilities, and Net Worth
(SALN)
 He failed to include certain time deposits and its
interests with MWC Corporation in his SALN
 He also failed to submit his SALN for previous
years

 De Guzman made some misdeclaration in her
Personal History Statement.
 Said document is required to be attested to by
the employee and any misdeclaration or
omission would be sufficient cause for
separation.
 It was later found out that De Guzman failed to
include in the Statement that she had a nephew
who also worked in PAGCOR
 Upon discovery of De Guzman’s alleged deceit,
Atty. Sordan of PAGCOR’s Corporate
Investigation Unit sent De Guzman a Notice of
Charges (Formal Charge) charging her of
"Deception or Fraud in Securing Employee’s
Appointment or Promotion"
Whether or not Collado is administratively guilty
for failing to disclose his SALN
Yes. RA 6713 requires all public officials and
employees to accomplish and submit declarations under
oath of their SALN and business interests including those
of their spouses and of unmarried children under 18 years
of age living in their households. It also mandates full
disclosure of all other assets such as investments, cash on
hand or in banks, stocks, bonds, and the like.
In this case, Collado only declared the original amount of
her time deposit and failed to disclose the interests
accrued through the years

Whether or not De Guzman should be dismissed

for her misdeclaration

No. PAGCOR is the proper disciplinary authority

of PAGCOR employees, and as such, formal charges against
its employees in administrative disciplinary proceedings
should emanate from it, through its Board of Directors, as
in this case.

However, in this instance, the Formal Charge, as well as the

Assailed Memorandum, did not come from PAGCOR
through its Board of Directors, but merely from Atty.
Sordan and HRDD-OIC Bailey, respectively. As such, the
Formal Charge and the Assailed Memorandum are null and
void.
 Complaints for dishonesty and misconduct were
filed against Daplas for her failure to disclose the
true and detailed statement of her assets,
liabilities, and net worth, business interests, and
 financial connections, and those of her spouse in
her SALN’s.
 She insisted that she acquired her properties
through lawful means, and maintained that she
was not totally dependent on her salary to
finance the said acquisitions.
Whether Daplas should be liable for dishonesty and
misconduct for the exclusions in her SALNs
No, only for simple negligence.
The requirement of filing a SALN promotes transparency
in the civil service, and operates as a deterrent against
government officials bent on enriching themselves
through unlawful means. Thus, every government
employee must completely disclose therein his or her
assets, liabilities, net worth, and financial and business
interests, including those of his/her spouse and
unmarried children under 18 years of age living in their
households, in order to suppress any questionable
accumulation of wealth because the latter usually results
from nondisclosure of such matters.
Nevertheless, the failure to declare some properties in
Daplas’s SALNs is not enough basis to hold her liable since
there is no substantial evidence of intent to commit a
wrong, or to deceive the authorities, and conceal the other
properties in Daplas’s and her husband’s names.
Given that the laws on SALN aim to curtail the acquisition
of unexplained wealth, if the source of the undisclosed
wealth was properly accounted for, the same is deemed an
“explained wealth” which the law does not penalize.
Consequently, Daplas is not guilty of the charge of
dishonesty and grave misconduct; but at most, of mere
negligence for having failed to accomplish her SALN
properly and accurately. She is meted a fine in the amount
equivalent to one (1) month and one (1) day of her last
salary.
The Ombudsman is explicitly authorized to issue a
preventive suspension order when two conditions are met:
:
 In 2011, the PNP entered into a Memorandum of
Agreement with WER FAST without going
through any public bidding. In the said memo,
the PNP undertook to allow WER FAST to
provide courier services to deliver firearm
licenses to gun owners.
 Said MoA was instructed to be reviewed by the
PNP’s Legal Service.
 Upon his appointment as PNP Chief in 2012,
Purisima approved a memorandum accrediting
WER FAST. However, for doing so, complaints
were filed against Purisima el at, praying that the
former be administratively charged for gross
negligence/gross neglect of duty, with a prayer
for preventive suspension.
 Without waiting for Purisima’s counter-affidavit,
the OMB issued an Order, which preventively
suspended Purisima and other PNP officers for 6
months without pay.
 Purisima’s petition for certiorari assailing the
order was denied by the CA holding that:
o Petitions were moot in view of the
lapse of the 6-month period of
preventive suspension
o OMB is authorized by Sec. 24 of the
Ombudsman Act to preventively
suspend without pay any public officer
or employee during the pendency of an
investigation, as part of the OMB’s
investigatory and disciplinary
authority.
Was Purisima’s preventive suspension valid?
YES.
(a) the evidence of guilt is strong based on the
Ombudsman’s judgment; and
(b) any of the three (3) circumstances are present —
(1) the charge against such officer or employee
involves dishonesty, oppression or grave
misconduct or neglect in the performance
of duty;
(2) the charges would warrant removal from
service; or
(3) the respondent’s continued stay in office
may prejudice the case filed against him.
As regards the first condition, case law states that the
strength of the evidence is left to the determination of the Whether or not the condonation doctrine is valid.
OMB by taking into account the evidence before her.
Yes, but only until this case.
This being the case, the OMB is given ample discretion to
determine the strength of the preliminary evidence
While the condonation doctrine has been applied to cases
presented before her and thereafter, decide whether or
before, the doctrine of condonation is actually bereft of
not to issue such order against a particular respondent.
legal bases. Thus, the condonation doctrine is abandoned
from this point onwards.
In the present case, the OMB found that the evidence of
guilt against Purisima was strong enough to place him
The concept of public office as a public trust and the
under preventive suspension. Said finding cannot be said
corollary requirement of accountability to the people at all
to be tainted with grave abuse of discretion as it was based
times, as mandated under the 1987 Constitution, is plainly
on supporting documentary evidence, none of which were
inconsistent with the idea that an elective local official’s
questioned to be inadmissible.
administrative liability for a misconduct committed during
a prior term can be wiped off by the fact that he was
elected to a second term of office, or even another elective
post.

Election is not a mode of condoning an administrative

offense, and there is simply no constitutional or statutory
basis in our jurisdiction to support the notion that an
official elected for a different term is fully absolved of any
administrative liability arising from an offense done during
a prior term.

 A complaint-affidavit was filed by Atty. Renato L.

Bondal and Nicolas "Ching" Enciso VI before the
Ombudsman against Binay, Jr. and other public
officers and employees of the City Government
of Makati, accusing them of Plunder in  Ecobel applied for a loan with GSIS Investment
connection with the 5 phases of the Management Group (GIG).
procurement and construction of the Makati
 Vice-President of GIG Valencerina made it appear
City Hall Parking Building.
that Ecobel’s application was fully secured, and that
 Special Panel of Investigators made for the case its approval was urgent.
filed a complaint against Binay, Jr., et al, charging
 GSIS filed criminal and administrative charges against
them with 6 administrative cases for Grave
the concerned GSIS officials, including Valencerina.
Misconduct, Serious Dishonesty, and Conduct
 Ombdusman found Valencerina, among others, guilty
Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service,
of gross neglect of duty, and inefficiency and
and 6 criminal cases for violation of Section 3 (e)
incompetence in the performance of official duties,
of RA 3019, Malversation of Public Funds, and
and ordered his dismissal.
Falsification of Public Documents .
 Valencerina filed with the CA a petition for
 Binay invoked the condonation doctrine when he
review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court and a
asked the CA to stop the preventive suspension
motion for Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction.
order against him over the alleged overpricing of
 The CA, finding the necessity to preserve the status
the Makati City Hall Parking Building.
quo between the parties, granted the same.
 o The CA pointed out that "under Rule 43 of the
Rules of Court, an appeal shall not stay the
judgment to be reviewed unless the CA shall
direct otherwise", and that it has resolved to stay
the assailed judgment and orders during the
pendency of the case.
1) Whether or not the CA can issue a writ of preliminary
injunction to stay the decisions of the Office of the
Ombudsman.
2) Whether or not the decisions of the Office of the
Ombudsman, imposing the penalty of removal, are
final and executory.
1) No. CA cannot stay the execution of decisions
rendered by the Office of the Ombudsman when
the rules the latter so promulgates categorically
and specifically warrant their enforcement, else
the OMB's rule-making authority be unduly
encroached and the constitutional and statutory
provisions providing the same be disregarded.
2) Yes. Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure
of the Office of the Ombudsman: “An appeal shall
not stop the decision from being executory. xxx
In case the penalty is suspension or removal and
the respondent wins such appeal, he shall be
considered as having been under preventive
suspension and shall be paid the salary and such
other emoluments that he did not receive by
reason of the suspension or removal.”
The OMB is constitutionally authorized to
promulgate its own rules of procedure. RA 6770
("The Ombudsman Act of 1989") empower the
OMB to "promulgate its rules of procedure for
the effective exercise or performance of its
powers, functions, and duties" and to
accordingly amend or modify its rules as the
interest of justice may require.
The Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman supersedes the discretion given to
the CA in Rule 43 of the Rules of Court when a
decision of the Ombudsman in an administrative
case is appealed to the CA. Specialis derogat
generali. When two rules apply to a particular
case, that which was specially designed for the
said case must prevail over the other.
 Roman, being the Provincial Governor at that time,
entered into a contract for the construction of a
mini-theater.
 Roman issued a Certificate stating that the project
was 100% completed.
 There are various documents attesting to the
project’s supposed completion, as well as the
disbursement of funds in payment therefor.
 Garcia, Roman’s successor, authorized the
inspection of the project and discovered that the
construction remained unfinished.
 Garcia filed cases of Malversation of Public Funds
through Falsification of Public Documents and
violation of “Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act”
against Roman et.al.
 The Ombudsman cleared Roman et.al. from liability
on the ground of insufficiency of evidence and lack
of probable cause, reasoning that “mere signature on
a voucher or certification is not enough” to establish
any conspiracy among them which would warrant
their conviction.
 Garcia maintains that the findings in the CoA Memo
(which stated that the project had no source of
funds, thus rendering the contract therefor void and
the payments made therefor illegal) are sufficient to
establish probable cause and to hold Roman for trial.
Whether or not the Ombudsman was correct in
dismissing all the criminal charges against respondents.
No. The Ombudsman gravely abused its
discretion.
The Constitution and RA 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989)
have endowed the Office of the Ombudsman with wide
latitude, in the exercise of its investigatory and
prosecutorial powers, to pass upon criminal complaints
involving public officials and employees. Hence, as a
general rule, the Court does not interfere with the
Ombudsman’s findings and respects the initiative and
independence inherent in its office, which “beholden to no
one, acts as the champion of the people and the preserver
of the integrity of the public service.”
The principle does not, however, apply when the
Ombudsman’s ruling is tainted with grave abuse of
discretion, subjecting the same to certiorari correction. It
may also be committed when the Ombudsman patently
violates the Constitution, the law or existing
jurisprudence.

The Ombudsman disregarded the CoA Memo. The non-

existence of valid appropriations rendered the contracts
void and the payments illegal. The validity of the
appropriations and the subsequent transactions were not
considered in audit due to lack of legal basis.
 Interpretative rules are intended to interpret, clarify or
explain existing statutory regulations under which the
administrative body operates. Their purpose or objective
is merely to construe the statute being administered and
purport to do no more than interpret the statute. Simply,
they try to say what the statute means and refer to no
single person or party in particular but concern all those
belonging to the same class which may be covered by the
said rules.

Contingent rules are those issued by an administrative

authority based on the existence of certain facts or things
upon which the enforcement of the law depends.

Here, AO 67 is an administrative regulation or a legislative

rule that introduced BA/BE testing requirement.

On the other hand, Circular Nos. 1 and 8 are not

administrative regulations. The only purpose of these
 AO67 required drug manufacturers to obtain
circulars is for the FDA to administer and supervise the
product registration with FDA
implementation of the provision of AO67 including those
 Manufacturers of rifampicin drug owns a
of BA/BE testing.
product registration
 Circular No. 1 and No. 8, s.1997 were issued and
resumed FDA’s implementation of
bioavailability/bioequivalence (BA/BE) testing
requirement with the establishment of BA/BE
testing facilities
 Their product registration expired
 They sought renewal but failed the BA/BE
testing
 They contend that these circulars constituted an
illegal exercise of legislative and administrative
powers.

Whether or not FDA may validly issue and

implement these circulars

Yes. FDA has delegated authority to exercise

quasi-legislative power to issue these circulars.

Administrative agencies may exercise quasi-legislative or

rule-making powers only if there exists a law which
delegates these powers to them. In this case, FDA has
delegated authority to exercise quasi-legislative power to
issue these circulars.
An administrative regulation may be classified as a
legislative rule, an interpretative rule, or a contingent rule:
Legislative rules are in the nature of subordinate
legislation and designed to implement a primary legislation
by providing the details thereof. They usually implement
existing law, imposing general, extra-statutory obligations
pursuant to authority properly delegated by Congress and
effect a change in existing law or policy which affects
individual rights and obligations.
 Redmont, interested in mining and exploring
certain areas in Palawan, filed an application for
an Exploration Permit (EP)
 Redmont later on found out that the areas it
wanted to undertake was already covered by
existing Mineral Production Sharing Agreements
(MPSA) and EPs between the petitioners and the
government
 The MPSAs and EPs of petitioners were
subsequently converted into FTAAs
 Redmont filed a petition before the OP for the
cancellation of the FTAAs of the petitioners
assailing that the petitioners are not entitled to
 enter into an FTAA for being a 100% foreign- appellate jurisdiction over the case, and its Decision is,
owned corporation perforce, null and void.
 The OP granted Redmont’s petitioner saying that
it has the authority to cancel the FTAA because
of the exclusive power of the President to enter
into agreements such as the FTAA
 On appeal by the petitioners, the CA affirmed the
decision of the OP ruling that the OP, in the
exercise of its quasi-judicial function, may validly
cancel the agreement with the petitioners

Whether or not the OP has quasi-judicial power to

cancel the agreement

No. Quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory

power is the power of the administrative agency
to adjudicate the rights of persons before it. In this case,
the OP's cancellation and/or revocation of the FTAA is
obviously not an adjudication but an exercise of an
administrative function pursuant to the President's
authority.

The FTAA is properly classified as a government or public

contract, which is, according to jurisprudence, "generally
subject to the same laws and regulations which govern the
validity and sufficiency of contracts between private
individuals." With that, it becomes apparent that the OP's
cancellation and/or revocation of the FTAA is an exercise
of a contractual right that is purely administrative in
nature, and thus, cannot be treated as an adjudication.
In this case, the OP cancelled/revoked the petitioners’
FTAA based on its finding that petitioners misrepresented
– that they were Filipino corporations qualified to engage
in mining activities. A material misrepresentation, if so
found by ordinary courts of law, would then constitute a
breach of a contractual condition that would entitle the
aggrieved party to cancel/revoke the agreement.
The scenario at hand does not involve a complaint for
cancellation/revocation commenced before the ordinary
courts of law. Hence, Redmont's recourse to the OP – that,
on the assumption that it even had the legal standing to
oppose an already executed FTAA which it was not a party
to – was, by and of itself, done outside the correct course
procedure.
The Supreme Court holds that the OP has no quasi-judicial
power to adjudicate the propriety of its
cancellation/revocation.
Ultimately, the FTAA is a contract to which the OP itself
represents a party, i.e., the Republic. It merely exercised a
contractual right by cancelling/revoking said agreement,
a purely administrative action which should not be
considered quasi-judicial in nature. Thus, absent the OP's
proper exercise of a quasi-judicial function, the CA had no
 In 2001, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
issued E.O. 12 creating the Presidential Anti-
Graft Commission (PAGC) and vesting it with the
power to investigate or hear administrative cases
or complaints for possible graft and corruption,
among others, against presidential appointees
and to submit its report and recommendations to
the President.
 2010, President Aquino III issued E.O. 13
abolishing the PAGC and transferring its
functions to the Office of the Deputy Executive
Secretary for Legal Affairs more particularly to
its newly-established Investigative and
Adjudicatory Division (IAD)
 In 2011, Purisima filed before the IAD-ODESLA a
complaint for grave misconduct against
petitioner Prospero A. Pichay, Jr., Chairman of
the Board of Trustees of the Local Water Utilities
Administration as well as the incumbent
members of the LWUA Board of Trustees for
which purchasing 445,377 shares of stock of
Express Savings Bank, Inc.
 It is the contention of the petitioner that, aside
from the alleged encroachment of the powers of
the legislative by the executive in the “creation”
of IAD-ODESLA, it is likewise
UNCONSTITUTIONAL for VIOLATION DUE
PROCESS and EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
because IAD-ODESLA's investigation only to
 presidential appointees occupying upper-level
positions in the government No. POA proceeded to resolve the present
mining dispute without affording either party any fair and
Whether or not EO 13 is unconstitutional for
reasonable opportunity to be heard. Hence, Mingson’s due
violating due process.
process rights were violated, thereby rendering the POA’s
Decision null and void.
NO.
A decision rendered without due process is void ab initio
His right to due process was not violated when the IAD-
and may be attacked at anytime directly or collaterally by
ODESLA took cognizance of the administrative complaint
means of a separate action, or by resisting such decision in
against him since he was given sufficient opportunity to
any action or proceeding where it is invoked.
oppose the formal complaint filed by Secretary Purisima.

In administrative proceedings, the filing of charges and

giving reasonable opportunity for the person so charged to
answer the accusations against him constitute the
minimum requirements of due process, which simply
means having the opportunity to explain one's side.

sHence, as long as petitioner was given the opportunity to

explain his side and present evidence, the requirements of
due process are satisfactorily complied with because what
the law abhors is an absolute lack of opportunity to be
heard.

 RTC Judge Grageda was charged of gross

inefficiency as it was found in the audit findings,
in view of his compulsory resignation, that he has
a lot of pending unresolved cases.
 He denied charges and alleged that there were
delays in the resolution of the cases because in
his 14 years of service, the lack of personnel,
facilities and other case-related incidents.

Whether or not Judge Grageda should be

 A dispute arose between Mingson and Apocemco
as to whom the subject mining lands be awarded
to.
 DENR awarded the lands to Apocemco. It
included in its resolution that the case is subject
to the review of the Panel of Arbitrators.
 Mingson appealed to the Panel of Arbitrators
who affirmed the decision of the DENR but its
findings were made without requiring the parties
to file any pleading
 Mingson now argues that he was not afforded
due process by the Panel of Arbitrators.
administratively liable
No. Judge Grageda’s retirement effectively
barred the Court from pursuing the administrative
proceedings that was instituted after his tenure in service.
Judge Grageda retired on November 25, 2009 and the audit
was made a day later. However, the OCA just submitted its
report 4 months later after Judge Grageda retired from
judiciary. Clearly, the case was filed after his incumbency
and does not bind him anymore.

Whether or not Mingson was afforded due process

 to believe that one is guilty of the act or omission
complained of, even if the evidence might not be
overwhelming.

The fundamental rule in administrative proceedings is that

the complainant has the burden of proving, by substantial
evidence, the allegations in his complaint. Section 27 of the
Ombudsman Act is unequivocal: Findings of fact by the
Office of the Ombudsman when supported by substantial
evidence are conclusive. Conversely, therefore, when the
findings of fact by the Ombudsman are not adequately
supported by substantial evidence, they shall not be
binding upon the courts.

In the case at bar, there is no substantial evidence to hold

: respondents administratively liable for Grave Misconduct.
 Pursuant to the Resolution by SB of Kawit Cavite
authorizing the mayor to sell municipal
properties (lands), the Municipal Appraisal Board
(MAB) issued a resolution decreasing the
assessed fair market values of the lands from
P700 to P500/sqm.
 One parcel of land was auctioned off with the
minimum bid price pegged at P500/sqm.
 However, having found by the Commission on
Audit that the proper fair market value for the
said land was P876/sqm, complaints of graft and
corruption was filed against the members of the
MAB, including respondents. The complaint
alleged that MAB’s reappraisal was done sans any
basis or computation.
o Respondents maintain that the
reappraisal and reevaluation was based
on MAB’s aim of maintaining a uniform
assessment of lots with similar
 Petitioners who were officers of DPWH received
attributes within the area.
an anonymous complaint against a contractor
 The Office of the Ombudsman found that the
that won in a bidding but was not included in the
respondents’ acts had caused undue injury to the
Registered Construction Firms (RCF).
government, and are therefore liable for Grave
 Investigation ensued and later found out that the
Misconduct for their disregard of established
contractor was not listed in the RCF.
rules in arriving at the questioned valuation.
 Then Secretary of DPWH, Ebdane, issued a
 Contrary to the findings of the OMB, the CA held
formal charge against the respondents, who
that there is no substantial evidence to support
were then DPWH Officials also, for grave
the finding that corruption, willful intent to
misconduct.
violate the law, or disregard of established
procedures may be ascribed to the respondents.  The charge directed the respondents to file their
answer with supporting documents and were
given the option to elect or waive the conduct of
Whether or not the respondents were rightfully
a formal investigation
absolved from administrative liability for Grave
 In their answer, the respondents argued that the
Misconduct?
formal charge has no basis and that they
expressly waive their rights to a formal hearing,
Yes. The OMB had insufficient evidence to and that the case against them be decided based
support their claim. In, administrative cases, substantial on the records submitted
evidence is required to support any findings. Substantial  Later on, respondents demanded for a formal
evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind investigation
may accept as adequate to support a conclusion. The
requirement is satisfied where there is reasonable ground
  Without waiting for DPWH’s decision,
respondents filed a case for certiorari and
prohibition before the RTC
Whether or not there was a violation of the
administrative due process of the respondents
No. The essence of procedural due process is
embodied in the basic requirement of notice and a real
opportunity to be heard. In administrative proceedings, as
in the case at bar, procedural due process simply means
the opportunity to explain one's side or the opportunity to
seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained
of.
In this case, while there were missteps in the proceedings
conducted before the DPWH, they were nonetheless
accorded a fair opportunity to be heard when the Formal
Charge directed them to file their answer with supporting
documents and were given the option to elect or waive the
conduct of a formal investigation
It should be noted that respondents filed their first answer,
they expressly waived their rights to a formal hearing, as
they sought instead, that the case against them be decided
based on the records submitted. With that, whatever
procedural lapses the DPWH had committed, the same had
already been cured by their answer.
 MERALCO filed with the now-defunct Energy
Regulatory Board (ERB) an application for
approval of the revision of its current rate
schedules and an appraisal of its properties.
 During the pendency of the case, ERB was
abolished and replaced by ERC under R.A. No.
9136 or the Electric Power Industry Reform Act
of 2001 (EPIRA).
 Under EPIRA, the conventional pricing of
electricity sale was changed from Return on Rate
Base (RORB) method to the Performance Based
Regulation (PBR) method.
 MERALCO refiled its application in accordance
with EPIRA.
 All the petitioners intervened to oppose the
application of MERALCO.
 Petitioners did not attend any of the hearings
conducted by ERC which led to approval of
MERALCO’s application.
 NASECOR now protests claiming that the
approval was premature since there were still 4
days before the expiration of the period given to
it to file its opposition.
Whether or not NASECOR and other petitioners
were deprived of due process.
No. Where opportunity to be heard either
through oral arguments or through pleadings is granted,
there is no denial of due process.
In the present case, prior to the issuance of the assailed
decision, petitioners were given several opportunities to
attend the hearings and to present all their pleadings and
evidence. However, petitioners voluntary failed to appear
in most of those hearings. Further, any defect in the
observance of due process requirements is cured by the
filing a Motion for Reconsideration.
 Ocho de Setiembre Inc (ODSI) and Nestle
Philippines Inc (NPI) entered into a
distributorship agreement with respondents.
 The respondents were hired by ODSI and NPI to
sell various products of NPI in the assigned area.
 The respondents demanded that they be
considered regular employees of NPI but they
were directed to sign contracts of employment
with ODSI instead which respondents refused
that resulted to their dismissal
 Respondents filed an action for illegal dismissal
against ODSI and NPI
  ODSI filed an answer but NPI did not file any
position paper nor appeared in the scheduled
conferences
 When the case reached the NLRC, NPI argued
that it was deprived of the right to participate in
the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter and
NLRC.
Whether or not NPI was deprived of its
administrative procedural rights
No. The essence of due process is to be heard,
and, as applied to administrative proceedings, this means
a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain one's side, or
an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or
ruling complained of.
In the present case, NPI was furnished via courier of a copy
of the amended complaint filed by the respondents against
it. It is also apparent that NPI was also furnished with the
respondents' Position Paper, Reply, and Rejoinder. Verily,
NPI was indeed accorded due process, but NPI chose not
to file any position paper or appear in the scheduled
conferences.
 PO Dennis Reci was convicted by Manila
Regional Trial Court Branch 9 Presiding Judge
Amelia Tria Infante, the case records have not
been transmitted to the Court of Appeals 3 years
after the defense attorney filed a Notice of
Appeal.
 The SC 2nd Division issued a reprimand and a
warning against Infante.
 The brother of the convicted felon, the
complainant in this case, felt that the penalties
imposed were insufficient, he then filed a
complaint accusing Marquez and Bahia of gross
negligence and dereliction of duty “for failing to
monitor the gross incompetence” of the judge
Whether or not Court Administrator Midas
Marquez and Deputy Court Administrator should be
administratively held liable
No. Dereliction of duty may be classified as gross
or simple neglect of duty or negligence. Gross neglect of
duty or gross negligence "refers to negligence
characterized by the want of even slight care, or by acting
or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to
act, not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally, with a
conscious indifference to the consequences, insofar as
other persons may be affected.
The quantum of evidence required to find an individual
guilty of gross negligence and dereliction of duty is
substantial evidence. In this case, the complainant has not
shown any prima facie evidence to support his claim that
CA Marquez and DCA Bahia should be held equally liable
for the delay in the transmittal of the case records of
Criminal Case No. 05-236956 to the CA in due time.
Absent any proof to the contrary, CA Marquez and DCA
Bahia are presumed to have regularly performed their
duties. The complaint against them ought to be dismissed.
 Lantion of serious ethical violations, the cases must be
dismissed.

 Complainants alleged that they are the mother

 Adante and Ofendoreyes filed letters before the
and live-in partner, respectively, of one Arturo,
Ombudsman, alleging that it was intimated to
who was arrested purportedly for the use of
her that Atty. Cajayon, whom she met only once,
illegal drugs. They were then told that
was in cahoots with Justice Lantion in engaging
respondent Balbona, Utility Worker I, Office of
in the shameful business of “selling” decisions
the Clerk of Court, RTC, could facilitate Arturo’s
involving cases from the CA-CDO to the highest
release in exchange for P30,000.
bidder.
 After they delivered the said amount, Balbona
 The OCA observed that the letter-complaints
failed to perform his undertaking. Out of the
were insufficient in form and substance in that
P30,000, respondent only returned P2,500 to
they were not verified and that theylacked
complainants; hence, the instant complaint.
affidavits of persons who may have personal
knowledge of the facts to prove or substantiate
the letter-complaints’ allegations against Atty. Whether or not Balbona may be administratively
Cajayon and Justice Lantion, as well as liable.
supporting documents.
Yes.
Whether Atty. Cajayon and Justice Lantion should
be held administratively liable. In order to sustain a finding of administrative culpability,
only substantial evidence is required, or that amount of
relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept
No. Complainants did not have personal
as adequate to support a conclusion.
knowledge of the acts imputed against respondents as
they merely relied on hearsay to support their claims. To
A judicious review of the records of this case reveals
satisfy the substantial evidence requirement for
substantial evidence showing that Balbona indeed solicited
administrative cases, hearsay evidence should necessarily
and received the amount of P30,000 from complainants,
be supplemented and corroborated by other evidence that
on the pretext that he will facilitate the release of the
are not hearsay, which, however, was not presented here.
latter’s relative who is a detention prisoner.

In administrative proceedings, including administrative

The acts of soliciting and receiving money from litigants
cases disciplining for grave offense court employees or
for personal gain constitute Grave Misconduct, for which
magistrates, complainants bear the burden of proving the
the court employee guilty thereof should be held
allegations in their complaints by substantial evidence.
administratively liable, as in this case. Therefore, his civil
service eligibility is cancelled
Considering that the complainants did not present
evidence to lend any ostensible merit to their letter-
complaints that accuse herein Atty. Cajayon and Justice
 found a prima facie case against her which necessitated
the issuance of a Formal Charge.

In fact, even after the issuance of the Formal Charge, the

LTO continued to respect her right to procedural due
process as it allowed her to file an Answer to refute the
charges against her.

 Respondent Gutierrez, Chief of the LTO

Registration Section, received a Memorandum
instructing her to temporarily relocate her
Section’s equipment.
 Gutierrez sent a Reply - Memorandum raising
concerns over the safety and integrity of the
records kept at her office during the ordered
transfer.
 Cosmos was late in filing their Annual Report.
 Subsequently, the LTO issued a memorandum to
 This led SEC-CFD to order the suspension of
show cause as to why no disciplinary action
Cosmos’ Registration.
should be taken against her for non-compliance
 When Cosmos finally submitted their report,
with the relocation directive.
they sent a letter to SEC-CFD asking the latter to
 Gutierrez sent a letter-reply stating the
lift the suspension on their registration.
concerns in her earlier memorandum.
 SEC-CFD referred this matter to the SEC-En
 When the LTO issued a Formal Charge against
Banc. After their deliberation, SEC En Banc
her for gross insubordination, Gutierrez, in her
issued a Resolution denying Cosmos’ request to
defense, alleged that she was denied of
lift the suspension order.
procedural due process as the Formal Charge
 Cosmos appealed the matter to the SEC En Banc
was done without the requisite preliminary
 SEC-CFD argues that the Revocation Order was
investigation.
issued by the SEC En Banc as it was promulgated
in their Resolution. As such, the Revocation
Whether or not Gutierrez was deprived of her
Order is then no longer appealable to the SEC En
procedural due process when the Formal Charge was Banc
issued against her.

Whether or not the Revocation Order was issued

No. The essence of procedural due process is by the SEC-CFD
embodied in the basic requirement of notice and a real
opportunity to be heard. In administrative case,
Yes. Cosmos never knew of the existence of
procedural due process simply means the opportunity to
Resolution as it was not furnished a copy thereof; nor did
explain one’s side or the opportunity to seek a
the Revocation Order make any specific reference to the
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. To
same.
be heard does not only mean verbal arguments in court;
one may also be heard thru pleadings.
Cosmos was only appraised of the existence of the
Resolution when it was finally cited by the SEC En Banc in
Gutierrez was given an opportunity to be heard when a
its Decision. When Cosmos received the Revocation Order,
Show Cause Memorandum was issued against her and she
it had every reason to believe that it was issued by the SEC-
then gave her letter-reply. It was only then that the LTO
CFD as an Operating Department of the SEC, and thus,
appealable to the SEC En Banc.
 Department managers of Local Water Utilities
(LWUA) filed for the reimbursement of their
extraordinary and miscellaneous expenses
 COA disallowed their claim as COA Circular No.
20006-1 provides that receipts or other
documents evidencing disbursements should
support reimbursement.
 Managers filed a petition in court questioning
the decision of COA
 It also alleged that the circular was not published
in the Official Gazette or newspaper of general
circulation and thus unenforceable
Whether or not the Court can immediately
entertain petitions questioning a constitutional body
No. It is the general policy of the Court to sustain
the decisions of administrative authorities, especially one
which is constitutionally-created, such as the CoA. Thus, it
is only when the COA has acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction, that this Court entertains
a petition questioning its rulings.
As provided in the 1987 Constitution, COA shall have
exclusive authority to promulgate accounting and auditing
rules and regulations.
 Petitioner filed with the National Water
Resources Board (NWRB) a Water Permit
Application (WPA) but was opposed by
respondent through a protest.
 The respondent then filed an Omnibus Motion
for the issuance of a Cease and Desist Order
(CDO) against the petitioner alleging that the
petitioner had finished the drilling operations
without the approval of the NWRB
 The NWRB made an ocular inspection where it
found out that a deep well was already installed
by the petitioner
 The NWRB issued a CDO and made a second
ocular inspection where it was revealed that
petitioner operated the deep well.
 NWRB then issued a resolution denying
petitioner’s WPA for its violation of the Water
Code and for open defiance of NWRB’s order
 Petitioner filed a
reconsideration/reinvestigation arguing that
respondent was represented by a private law
firm and not by OCGG as required by law
Whether or not the fact that the respondent’s
protest was represented by a private law firm affects the
power of the NWRB to resolve petitioner’s WPA
No. As a general rule, GOCCs are not allowed to
engage the legal services of private counsels. With that, the
protest filed by respondent against petitioner's WPA
should have been dismissed outright for lack of authority
of law firm to represent respondent considering that, at
the outset, respondent had already identified itself as a
government corporation.
However, this does not preclude the NWRB, as the chief
coordinating and regulating agency for all water resources
management development activities, to act upon
petitioner's WPA.
In an application for a water permit before the NWRB, the
presence of a protest converts the proceeding to a water Whether or not the DAR’s finding that the land was
controversy. subject to CARP coverage was properly reversed/ignored

The filing of an improper protest only deprives the NWRB

No.
of the authority to consider the substantial issues raised in
the protest but does not strip it of the power to act on the
The determination of the land’s classification as either an
application. Thus, even if the protest filed by respondent is
agricultural or industrial land – and, in turn, whether or
disregarded, the NWRB correctly denied petitioner's WPA
not the land falls under agrarian reform exemption – must
for its flagrant disregard of the Water Code and its IRR.
be preliminarily threshed out before the DAR, particularly,
before the DAR Secretary.
 Therefore, the Court cannot simply brush aside
the DAR’s pronouncements regarding the status
of the subject property as not exempt from CARP
coverage
 Issues of exclusion or exemption partake the
nature of Agrarian Law Implementation (ALI)
cases which are well within the competence and
jurisdiction of the DAR Secretary.
o Factual findings of administrative
agencies are generally accorded
respect and even finality by this Court,
if such findings are supported by
substantial evidence, a situation that
obtains in this case. The factual
findings of the Secretary of Agrarian
Reform who, by reason of his official
position, has acquired expertise in
specific matters within his jurisdiction,
deserve full respect and, without
justifiable reason, ought not to be
altered, modified or reversed.
 BATCO owned several parcels of land, with an
aggregate area of 206Ha.
 BATCO was informed that three lots were being
placed under the compulsory acquisition
scheme of the DAR.
 The DAR Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer
(PARO) offered PhP7M for the portion. BATCO
rejected the offer.
 The DAR directed Land Bank of the Philippines
(LBP) to deposit the compensation in cash and
agrarian reform bonds. BATCO protested this.
 The DAR proceeded with the registration of the
lands, and issued Certificate of Land Ownership
Awards (CLOAs) to the beneficiaries, even with
BATCO’s protest.
 BATCO filed a petition to exempt the subject
portion of the lot because the lot was exempted
from CARP coverage.
o The exemption can be availed of if the
land is devoted to cattle and livestock
production since its acquisition.
 The DAR held that the land was not exempt from
CARP coverage, because the land was not
exclusively used for cattle production.
 The CA reversed the DAR’s decision.
 No. Jurisprudence has characterized
registration as a form of regulation and not as a
qualification for the right of suffrage.

Under Sec. 1, Art V of the CONST, one must meet the

following qualifications in order to exercise the right of
suffrage:
1. he must be a Filipino citizen;
2. he must not be disqualified by law; and
3. he must have resided in the Philippines for at
least one (1) year and in the place wherein he
proposes to vote for at least six (6) months
immediately preceding the election.

The second item more prominently reflects the franchised

nature of the right of suffrage. The State may therefore
regulate said right by imposing statutory disqualifications,
with the restriction, however, that the same do not amount
: to, as per the second sentence of the provision, a "literacy,
 President Benigno Aquino signed into law property or other substantive requirement."
RA10367 which mandates the COMELEC to
implement a mandatory biometrics registration As a form of regulation, compliance with the registration
system for new voters in order to establish a procedure is dutifully enjoined. Thus, although one is
clean, complete, permanent, and updated list of deemed to be a "qualified elector," he must nonetheless
voters through the adoption of biometric still comply with the registration procedure in order to
technology. vote. This was echoed in AKBAYAN-Youth v. COMELEC,
 The law likewise directs that “registered voters wherein the Court pronounced that the process of
whose biometrics have not been captured shall registration is a procedural limitation on the right to vote.
submit themselves for validation.” “Voters who
fail to submit for validation on or before the last To reiterate, this requirement is not a "qualification" to the
day of filing of application for registration for exercise of the right of suffrage, but a mere aspect of the
purposes of the May 2016 elections shall be registration procedure, of which the State has the right to
deactivated x x x.” reasonably regulate. It was institutionalized conformant to
 COMELEC issued a resolution, which provides the limitations of the 1987 Constitution and is a mere
that: “the registration records of voters without complement to the existing Voter's Registration Act of
biometrics data who failed to submit for 1996.
validation on or before the last day of filing of
applications for registration for the purpose of
the May 9, 2016 National and Local Elections
shall be deactivated. Such deactivated voters are
not allowed to vote.
o Kabataan filed for a TRO and
preliminary mandatory injunction,
before the SC, assailing the
constitutionality of of the imposed
requirements under RA10367, as well as
its IRRs on the ground that, among
others, the biometrics validation
imposes an additional, substantial
qualification of literacy or property
where there is penalty of deactivation

Whether or not the statutory requirement of

biometrics validation is an unconstitutional requirement
of literacy and property.
 is illegal and of no effect. This is true when the election
returns missing or not counted can still drastically affect
the outcome of the election.

Prematurely proclaiming a winning candidate – as a result

of an incomplete canvass of election returns – without
justifiable grounds is considered as Grave Misconduct,
Gross Neglect of Duty, and/or Conduct Prejudicial to the
Best Interest of Service, and thus, Mamalinta should be
held administratively liable therefor.

:
 While being the Chairman for the Municipal
Board of Canvassers for South Upi,
Maguindanao, Bai Haidy D. Mamalinta allegedly
committing the following:
o the double proclamation of Sinsuat
(from 19/35 election returns) and
Gunsi (from 30/35) as mayor of South
Upi;
o the transfer of the place for canvassing
of votes without prior authority from
the COMELEC; and
o the premature proclamation of Sinsuat
as the winning candidate on the basis
of an incomplete canvass of election
returns.
 For such actions, she was charged and was found
guilty by the COMELEC, and affirmed by the
CSC, of Grave Misconduct, Gross Neglect of :
Duty, Gross Inefficiency and Incompetence, and  Romeo Jalosjos was convicted of rape and acts of
Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the lasciviousness and was sentenced to suffer the
Service and was dismissed from public service. principal penalties of reclusion perpetua and
 In her defense, Mamalinta denied the charges, temporal, which both carried the accessory
essentially claiming that the contested acts were penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification.
attended by duress in view of the imminent  Upon the grant of a commutation on his prison
danger to their lives due to the violence and term, Jalosjos was discharged from prison on
intimidation employed by Gunsi’s supporters. March 18, 2009.
This was given credence by the CA, which  Jalosjos applied to register as a voter in
ordered Mamalinta’s reinstatement Zamboanga City. However, because of his
previous conviction, this application was denied,
prompting him to file a petition for Inclusion in
Whether or not the CA erred in reversing the CSC
the Permanent List of Voters.
ruling by absolving Mamalinta from administrative
 Pending the resolution of the petition for
charges?
inclusion, Jalosjos filed a CoC on October 5, 2012
seeking to run as mayor of Zamboanga City.
Yes. While Mamalinta may be absolved from
 The petition for inclusion was denied on the
administrative liability for her acts of double proclamation account of his perpetual absolute
and unauthorized transfer of the place for canvassing as disqualification, which in effect deprived him of
such acts were done under duress, she is nevertheless the right to vote in any election.
administratively liable for her premature proclamation of
 Jalosjos’ CoC was eventually denied due course
Sinsuat as the winning candidate on the basis of an
through a motu proprio resolution by the
incomplete canvass of votes.
COMELEC En Banc, again on account of his
perpetual absolute disqualification.
A compete canvass of votes is necessary in order to reflect
the true desire of the electorate, and that a proclamation
of winning candidates on the basis of incomplete canvass
  Jalosjos claimed that Art. 30 of the RPC on the
effect of the perpetual absolute disqualification
was partially amended by Sec. 40(a) of the LGC
Whether or not Sec. 40(a) of the LGC excluded the
application of perpetual absolute disqualification under
Art. 30 of the RPC?
No. While Section 40(a) of the LGC allows a
prior convict to run for local elective office after the lapse
of two (2) years from the time he serves his sentence, the
said provision should not be deemed to cover cases
wherein the law imposes a penalty, either as principal or
accessory, which has the effect of disqualifying the convict
to run for elective office.
The principle in statutory construction that where two
statutes are of equal theoretical application to a particular
case, the one specifically designed therefor should prevail.
Between Art. 30 of the RPC and Sec. 40(a) of the LGC, the
latter is more specific in nature.
Section 40(a) of the LGC would not apply to cases wherein
a penal provision ― such as Article 41 in this case ―
directly and specifically prohibits the convict from running
for elective office. Hence, despite the lapse of two (2) years
from Jalosjos’s service of his commuted prison term, he
remains bound to suffer the accessory penalty of perpetual
absolute disqualification which consequently, disqualifies
him to run as mayor.
It is well to note that the use of the word “perpetual” in the
aforementioned accessory penalty connotes a lifetime
restriction and in this respect, does not depend on the
length of the prison term which is imposed as its principal
penalty.
 Joseph Dimapilis was elected as Punong
Barangay. He, again, ran for re-election, where
he filed his CoC declaring under oath that he is
“eligible for the office to be elected to.”
 He won in the said election and was proclaimed
as the duly elected.
 On the same day, COMELEC Law Department
filed a petition for Disqualification against
Dimapilis pursuant to Section 40 of the LGC,
claiming that the latter was barred from running
in an election since he was suffering from the
accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification
to hold public office as a consequence of his
dismissal from service as then Kagawad of his
barangay, after being found guilty, among others,
of the administrative offense of Grave
Misconduct.
 COMELEC 2nd Division granted the petition and
cancelled Dimapilis’s CoC, ruling that Dimapilis
committed material misrepresentation (a cause
to deny due course) in solemnly avowing that he
was eligible to run for the office he seeks to be
elected to, when he was actually suffering from
perpetual disqualification to hold public office by
virtue of a final judgment dismissing him from
service.
Is Dimapilis disqualified to hold public office?
Yes. Dimapilis’ perpetual disqualification to hold
public office is a material fact involving eligibility. A CoC is
a formal requirement for eligibility to public office. Section
74 of the OEC provides that the CoC of the person filing it
shall state, among others, that he is eligible for the office
he seeks to run, and that the facts stated therein are true
to the best of his knowledge.
To be "eligible" relates to the capacity of holding, as well as
that of being elected to an office. Conversely, "ineligibility"
has been defined as a "disqualification or legal incapacity
to be elected to an office or appointed to a particular
position." In this relation, a person intending to run for
public office must not only possess the required
qualifications for the position for which he or she intends
to run, but must also possess none of the grounds for
disqualification under the law.
In this case, Dimapilis had been found guilty of Grave
Misconduct by a final judgment, and punished with
dismissal from service with all its accessory penalties,
including perpetual disqualification from holding public
office. Verily, perpetual disqualification to hold public
office is a material fact involving eligibility which rendered
petitioner's CoC void from the start since he was not
eligible to run for any public office at the time he filed the
same.
 In this case, it is undisputed that Gomez was disqualified
to run in the May 10, 2010 elections due to his failure to
comply with the one-year residency requirement.
 On Nov 2009, Richard Gomez filed his Certificate
of Candidacy seeking congressional office as
Representative for the Fourth District of Leyte.
 Juntilla filed a verified petition alleging the
Gomez was actually a resident of San Juan City,
Manila, and thus misrepresented in his CoC that
he has met the 1 year residency requirement and
that he is a resident of Ormoc CIty.
 COMELEC granted Juntilla’s petition declaring
Gomez to be “disqualified as a candidate” for lack
ofthe residency requirement.
 Lucy Marie Torres then filed her CoC together
with a Certificate of Nomination and Acceptance
for the Liberal party endorsing her as the party’s
substitute candidate in place of her husband,
Richard, for the same congressional post.
Whether or not there was a valid substitution.
No.
A disqualified candidate cannot be validly substituted. One
who is disqualified under Sec 68 is still technically
considered to have been a candidate for all intents and
purposes but is proscribed from continuing due to the
supervening infraction. On the other hand, a person whose
CoC had been denied due course to and/or cancelled
under Section 77 is deemed not to have been a candidate
at all. The reason being that a cancelled CoC is considered
void ab initio and thus, cannot give rise to a valid candidacy
and necessarily, to valid votes. The existence of a valid CoC
is a condition sine qua non for a disqualified candidate to
be validly substituted.
Section 77 expressly enumerated the instances where
substitution is permissible, that is when an official
candidate of a registered or accredited political party
“dies, withdraws, or is disqualified for any cause.”
Noticeably, material misrepresentation cases are not
included in the said section and therefore, cannot be a
valid basis to proceed with candidate substitution.
:
 Joseph Dimapilis was elected as Punong
Barangay of Brgy. Pulung Maragul in the October
2010 Barangay Elections. In the 2013 Barangay
Election, he ran for re-election for the same
position.
 He won in the said election and was proclaimed
as the duly elected. On the same day, COMELEC
Law Department filed a petition for
Disqualification against Dimapilis pursuant to
Section 40 of the LGC, claiming that the latter
was barred from running in an election since he
was suffering from the accessory penalty of
perpetual disqualification to hold public office as
a consequence of his dismissal from service as
then Kagawad of Brgy. Pulung Maragul, after
being found guilty, along with others, of
administrative offense of Grave Misconduct.
 In opposition to the same, Dimapilis averred that
the petition should be dismissed, considering,
among others, that while the petition prayed for
his disqualification, it partakes the nature to
deny due course to or cancel CoC which should
be a distinct and separate actions, and that,
having been re-elected and applying the
Aguinaldo doctrine, he his acts were condoned.
 COMELEC 2nd Division granted the petition and
cancelled Dimapilis’s CoC.
o It treated the petition as one for
cancellation of CoC pursuant to
Section 78 of the OEC, notwithstanding
that it was captioned as a “Petition for
Disqualification” under Section 40(b) of
the LGC, holding that the nature of the
petition is not determined by the
caption given to it by the parties, but is
based on the allegations it presented.
 o It ruled that Dimapilis committed
material misrepresentation (a cause to
deny due course) in solemnly avowing
that he was eligible to run for the office
he seeks to be elected to, when he was
actually suffering from perpetual
disqualification to hold public office by
virtue of a final judgment dismissing
him from service.
Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its
discretion in cancelling Dimapilis’ CoC?
No. The COMELEC has the duty to motu
proprio bar from running for public office those suffering
from perpetual disqualification to hold public office. Under
Constitution, the COMELEC has the duty to "[e]nforce and
administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct
of an election x x x." The Court had previously ruled that
the COMELEC has the legal duty to cancel the CoC of
anyone suffering from the accessory penalty of perpetual
disqualification to hold public office, albeit, arising from a
criminal conviction.
Dimapilis’ perpetual disqualification to hold public office is
a material fact involving eligibility. A CoC is a formal
requirement for eligibility to public office. Section 74 of the
OEC provides that the CoC of the person filing it shall
state, among others, that he is eligible for the office he
seeks to run, and that the facts stated therein are true to
the best of his knowledge.
In this case, Dimapilis had been found guilty of Grave
Misconduct by a final judgment, and punished with
dismissal from service with all its accessory penalties,
including perpetual disqualification from holding public
office. Verily, perpetual disqualification to hold public
office is a material fact involving eligibility which rendered
petitioner's CoC void from the start since he was not
eligible to run for any public office at the time he filed the
same.
 Layug filed a Petition to Disqualify Buhay Party-
List and Brother Mike Velarde from the 2010
elections
 Grounds: Mere extension of El Shaddai, a
religious sect thus disqualified from being a
party-list; Velarde a billionaire and spiritual
leader thus a member of neither marginalized
nor underrepresented sector
 Defense: Political party composed of groups fo
the elderly, the women, the youth, the
handicapped, and the professionals; Velarde
belongs to marginalized and elderly group, and
even if he didn’t, nominees don’t need to come
from marginalized and underrepresented sector
 COMELEC: denied for lack of substantial
evidence; proclaimed Buhay Party-List as a
winner entitled to 2 seats in the House of
Representatives
Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction given the
proclamation of Buhay Part-List and the assumption of
office of its representatives
Yes. Layug assails the qualifications of Buhay
Party-List and its nominee, a matter which falls under the
jurisdiction of the regular courts and not of the HRET. The
HRET’s jurisdiction is over all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of its members. Under
Article VI, Sec. 17 (5) of the 1987 Constitution, members are
two kinds: those elected from legislative districts, and
those elected through the party-list system.
 assailed revision proceedings had already taken place, thus
rendering the issue moot and academic.

 Chato lost the 2010 elections for representative

of the 2nd Legislative District of Camarines Norte
to Panotes by 3, 885 votes and filed an electoral
protest
 The initial revision of ballots showed a
substantial discrepancy between the votes of the
parties per physical count and per election
returns in 2 municipalities; Chato would later
move for the revision of ballots in all of the
clustered precincts
 Panotes moved for the suspension of the
proceedings to determine the integrity of the
ballots and ballot boxes due to alleged
irregularities in their condition
 The HRET directed the copying of the picture
image files of ballot relative to the protest
 Chato moved for the cancellation of the
decryption and copying, contending that there
was neither any legal basis nor guidelines
governing such, especially as the Provincial
Elections Supervisor admitted during canvassing
proceedings that the CF cards for the concerned
municipalities were defective and had been
replaced
 HRET: denied Chato’s Motion; later ordered the
continuation of the revision of ballots of the
remaining 75% of the clustered precincts

Whether or not the HRET acted with GADALEJ in

ordering the revision of ballots of all clustered precincts

No. The Constitution mandates that the HRET

shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of its members. Sole =
full, complete, unimpaired jurisdiction in the adjudication
of election contests involving its members. In fact, the 2011
HRET Rules, Rule 7 states that the HRET shall have
exclusive control, direction, and supervision of all matters
pertaining to its own functions and operation. There is no
clear showing of arbitrary and improvident use by the
HRET of its power that constitutes denial of due process
or law or demonstration of a very clear unmitigated error
constituting grave abuse of discretion. In any case, the

: no power over a program for which funding has been
 In issue is the constitutionality of certain
provisions in the General Appropriations Act of
2011, which provides budget allocation for the
Conditional Cash Transfer Program (CCTP), a
project under the DSWD, on the ground that it
amounts to a “recentralization” of government
functions that have already been devolved from
the national government to local government
units (LGUs)
 DSWD embarked on a poverty reduction
strategy – CCTP – with the poorest of the poor
as target beneficiaries. In 2008, Congress funded
the CCTP. The initial budget allocation increased
in the following years, with the biggest allotment
amounting to P21B.
 Pimentel et al challenged the disbursement of
public funds and the implementation of the
CCTP which are alleged to have encroached into
the local autonomy of the LGUs.
o DSWD should not be the primary
implementing agency, but rather
LGUs, which have the responsibility
and functions of delivering social
welfare, agriculture and health care
services.
Whether or not the budget allocation in the GAA
FY2011 violated the constitution and the LGC by providing
for the recentralization of the national government in the
delivery of basic services already devolved to the LGUs.
Yes. The Constitution declares it a policy of the
State to ensure the autonomy of local governments. In
order to fully secure to the LGUs the genuine and
meaningful autonomy that would develop them into self-
reliant communities and effective partners in the
attainment of national goals, Sec. 17 of the LGC vested
upon the LGUs the duties and functions pertaining to the
delivery of basic services and facilities. With local
autonomy, the Constitution did nothing more than “to
break up the monopoly of the national government over
the affairs of the local government” and, without intending
to sever “the relation of partnership and interdependence
between the central administration and local government
units.”
While the provision charges the LGUs to take on the
functions and responsibilities that have already been
devolved upon them from the national agencies on the
aspect of providing for basic services and facilities in their
respective jurisdictions, paragraph (c) of the same
provision provides a categorical exception of cases
involving nationally-funded projects, facilities, programs
and services. The essence of this express reservation of
power by the national government it that, unless a LGU is
particularly designated as the implementing agency, it has
provided by the national government under the GAA, even
if the program involves the delivery of basic services within
the jurisdiction of the LGU.
Under the Philippine concept of local autonomy, the
national government has not completely relinquished all
its powers over local governments, including autonomous
regions. Only administrative powers over local affairs are
delegated to political subdivisions. The purpose of the
delegation is to make governance more directly responsive
and effective at the local levels. In turn, economic, political
and social development at the smaller political units are
expected to propel social and economic growth and
development. But to enable the country to develop as a
whole, the programs and policies effected locally must be
integrated and coordinated towards a common national
goal. Thus, policy-setting for the entire country still lies in
the President and Congress. To yield unreserved power of
governance to the local government unit as to preclude
any and all involvement by the national government in
programs implemented in the local level would be to shift
the tide of monopolistic power to the other extreme,
which would amount to a decentralization of power.
The national government is, thus, not precluded from
taking a direct hand in the formulation and
implementation of national development programs
especially where it is implemented locally in coordination
with the LGUs concerned.
  The “Pork Barrel” is an appropriation of
government spending meant for localized
projects and secured solely or primarily to bring
money to a representative’s district.
o In the Philippines, this is referred to as
a lump-sum discretionary fund of
Members of the Legislature.
 Due to controversies in the Philippines,
Petitioners filed a petition for Prohibition and
sought that the “Pork Barrel System” be declared
unconstitutional, and that the Senate President
and Speaker of the House be enjoined from
taking further steps to enact legislation
appropriating funds for the Pork Barrel System.
 Particularly, petitioners contend that the
Congressional Pork Barrel goes against the
principle on local autonomy since it allows
district representatives, who are national
officers, to substitute their judgments in utilizing
public funds for local development.
Whether or not the Congressional Pork Barrel
violates local autonomy
Yes. Insofar as individual legislators are
authorized to intervene in purely local matters and
thereby subvert genuine local autonomy, Congressional
Pork Barrel is deemed unconstitutional.
 That the gauge of the Congressional Pork Barrel
is based solely on the fact of office, without
taking into account the specific interests and
peculiarities of the district the legislator
represents, means that the Pork Barrel is not
based solely on local autonomy.
 With the Pork Barrel, a Congressman can simply
bypass the local development council and
initiate projects on his own, and even take sole
credit for its execution.
:
 The national government implemented a
devolution program pursuant to the LGC, which
affected the Department of Health (DOH) along
with other government agencies.
 Dr. Castillo held the position of Provincial Health
Officer II (PHO II) of DOH Regional Office in
Zamboanga City
 Upon the implementation of the devolution
program, Basilan Governor Gerry Salapuddin
refused to accept Dr. Castillo as the incumbent
of the PHO II position that was to be devolved to
the LGU of Basilan, prompting the DOH to retain
Dr. Castillo at the Regional Office.
 Two years after the implementation of the
devolution program, Dr. Yu was appointed to the
PHO II position.
 A law was then passed whereby the hospital
positions previously devolved to the local
government unit of Basilan were re-nationalized
and reverted to the DOH. The position of PHO II
was then re-classified to Chief of Hospital II. (CH
II)
 While Dr. Yu was among the personnel reverted
to the DOH with the re-nationalization. She was
made to retain her original item of PHO II instead
of being given the re-classified position of CH II.
 Subsequently, another doctor was appointed to
the position of CH II.
Whether or not Dr. Yu, as PHO II, held a devolved
position and is therefore entitled to the re-classified
position of CH II.
: Yes.
As defined, “devolution” is the act by which the national
government confers power and authority upon the various
local government units to perform specific functions and
responsibilities.
In this case, based on the devolution process, it was
mandatory for Governor Salapuddin to absorb the position
of PHO II, as well as its incumbent, Dr. Castillo.
However, with Dr. Castillo’s re-absorption by the DOH,
which appears to bear the former’s approval, her devolved
position with the LGU of Basilan was left vacant. Thus, Dr.
Yu was validly appointed to the position of PHO II and,
consequently, acquired a vested right to its re-classified
designation CH II.
As such, Dr. Yu should have been automatically re-
appointed. Considering, however, that Dr. Yu had already
retired, her re-appointment is no longer feasible but she
should at least recover her salaries for the services she had
rendered from when the PHO II position was re-classified
to CH II up to her retirement.
necessary permits or clearances from the local
government unit concerned as required by the
ECC. Cagayan argues that despite the issuance of
the ISAG Permit, Lara has yet to comply with its
terms and conditions – as he has yet to secure
the necessary permits and clearances from the
local government unit concerned – and hence,
remains to be proscribed from conducting any
quarrying operations.
 On the other hand, Lara maintains that the MGB
and DENR-EMB had already authorized him to
extract sand and gravel from the Permit Area, as
evidenced by the ISAG Permit and ECC, thereby
dispensing with the need to secure any permit
from the local government.
 RTC granted the petition and made permanent
the writ and enjoined petitioners from stopping
or disturbing Lara’s quarrying operations. Hence,
the recourse to the SC.

Whether or not Lara must first secure the

necessary permits and clearances from the LGU
concerned in order to conduct quarrying operations.

Yes. In order for an entity to legally undertake a

quarrying business, he must first comply with all the
requirements imposed not only by the national
government, but also by the local government unit where
his business is situated. Particularly, Section 138(2) of RA
7160 requires that such entity must first secure a
governor’s permit prior to the start of his quarrying
operations.

: Records, however, reveal that Lara admittedly failed to

 Joseph Lasam Lara obtained an Industrial Sand secure the same; hence, he has no right to conduct his
and Gravel Permit (ISAG Permit) from the Mines quarrying operations within the Permit Area.
and Geosciences Bureau (MGB) of the
Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR), authorizing him to conduct
quarrying operations and extract and dispose of
sand, gravel, and other unconsolidated materials
in Peñablanca, Cagayan (Permit Area). He also
obtained an Environmental Compliance
Certificate (ECC) from the DENR Environmental
Management Bureau (EMB).
 Equipped with the said permits, Lara
commenced his quarrying operations. However,
trucks loaded with sand and gravel extracted
from the Permit Area were stopped and
impounded by several local officials. Lara filed an
action for injunction with prayer for the issuance
of a writ of preliminary injunction against the
said officials, seeking to enjoin the stoppage of
his quarrying operations. The writ of PI was
issued enabling Lara to restart his business.
 Lara then received a Stoppage Order from
Cagayan Governor for failure to secure all
 A careful perusal of Sec. 444(b)(1)(vi) of the LGC shows that
while the authorization of the municipal mayor need not
be in the form of an ordinance, the obligation which he is
authorized to enter into must be made pursuant to a law
or ordinance. In the present case, while Mayor Eriguel’s
authorization to contract the Subject Loans was not
contained―as it need not be contained―in the form of an
ordinance, the said loans and even the Redevelopment
Plan itself were not approved pursuant to any law or
ordinance but through mere resolutions.

Generally, an ultra vires act is one committed outside the

object for which a corporation is created as defined by the
law of its organization and therefore beyond the powers
conferred upon it by law.

There is a distinction between an act utterly beyond the

: jurisdiction of a municipal corporation and the irregular
 The Municipality of Agoo, La Union entered into exercise of a basic power under the legislative grant in
two loans transaction with LBP in order to matters not in themselves jurisdictional. The former
finance a Redevelopment Plan of the Agoo Public are ultra vires in the primary sense and void;
Plaza. In both instance, the Sangguniang Bayan the latter, ultra viresonly in a secondary sense which does
of the Municipality, through a resolution, not preclude ratification or the application of the doctrine
authorized the Mayor to contract the loans of estoppel in the interest of equity and essential justice.
 A portion of the Plaza was put up as collateral for
the loans. An act which is outside of the municipality’s jurisdiction is
 Cacayuran and other residents opposed the considered as a void ultra vires act, while an act attended
redevelopment of the Plaza as well as the means only by an irregularity but remains within the
of the funding. municipality’s power is considered as an ultra vires act
 Cacayuran’s request for the documents relating subject to ratification and/or validation. The conversion of
to the plaza’s redevelopment was not granted, the said plaza is beyond the Municipality’s jurisdiction
which prompted Cacayuran to file a taxpayer’s considering the property’s nature as one for public use and
suit against LBP and officers of the municipality thereby, forming part of the public dominion.
He questioned the validity of the loan
agreements and prays that the redevelopment is
enjoined.
 The lower courts ruled in favor of Cacayuran
holding that the subject loans are null and void.
Further, the resolutions approving the
procurement were passed irregularly, lacking
the proper authority and are thus ultra vires.
 LBP avers that the Subject Resolutions provided
ample authority for the Mayor to contract the
same. It posits that Sec. 444(1)(1)(vi) LGC merely
requires that the municipal mayor be authorized
by the SB concerned and that such authorization
need not be embodied in an ordinance.

Whether or the subject loans are ultra vires being

transacted without the proper authority and their
collateralization constituted improper disbursement of
public funds.

Yes, the Mayor was not properly authorized to

enter into the loan agreements.
  Land Bank of the Philippines and the
International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (IBRD) entered into a Loan
Agreement for the implementation of IBRD’s
Support for Strategic Local Development and
Investment. It is conditioned upon the
participation of at least 2 local government units
by way of a Subsidiary Loan Agreement with
Land Bank (SLA).
 Land Bank entered into a SLA with City
Government of Iligan to finance the
development and expansion of the city’s water
supply system
 Atlanta Industries, a bidder, allege that BAC’s use
of bidding documents were not in accordance
with RA 9184 and its Implementing Rules and
Regulations

Whether SLA is an executive agreement similar to

the IBRD, thus is exempt from the application of RA9184?

Yes. SLA is an executive agreement, thus exempt

from RA9184.

The Loan Agreement is in the nature of an executive

agreement. Thus, the Government of the Philippines is
obligated to observe its terms and conditions under the
rule of pacta sunt servanda, the international law maxim
that requires the parties to keep their agreements in good
faith.

Since the Loan Agreement were incorporated and made

part of SLA, SLA cannot be treated as an independent and
unrelated contract but as a conjunct of the Loan
Agreement. SLA is an accessory contract of the Loan
Agreement