Professional Documents
Culture Documents
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
CAMILO VILLA, petitioner
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
RODOLFO E. MONTAYRE, petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
JOSEFINA SUCALIT, petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
ARTURO JIMENEZ, petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
The case involved questionable payments made by the CAA Mactan to Rocen
Enterprises and Sprayway Corp., dealers in paper products and printed matter,
for the purchase of electrical items and the cost of their installation, in the total
amount of P299,175.00.
Dario, Centeno and Robles represented these firms in the transaction. Another
accused, Mactan Airport General Manager Arturo Jimenez, was dropped from
the amended information after a reinvestigation.
On October 20, 1978, the Circuit Criminal Court of Cebu City then presided by
Judge Romeo Escareal rendered a decision finding all the accused guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 3, paragraphs (a), (e), 6 (h),
and (i) 7 of R.A. 3019. All the accused appealed the judgment of conviction the
Court of Appeals.
The decision of the trial court included findings that Arturo Jimenez; Rodolfo
Montayre, assistant airport general manager for operations; Camilo Villa, chief,
logistics section; Josefina Sucalit, technical inspector, COA, assigned at CAA
Mactan; Hereto Leonor, acting chief accountant; and Manuel Bustamante,
regional auditor of Region 7, COA, conspired and were equally liable with the
convicted accused.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Upon arraignment, all the accused pleaded not guilty. The case against Manuel
Bustamante was, on motion of the prosecution, dismissed without prejudice for
lack of prima facie case. Jimenez, Montayre, Villa and Sucalit were later
suspended from public office during the pendency of the case.
Dario, Centeno and Robles negotiated with Jimenez for the purchase of
transformers and electrical supplies for the Mactan International Airport. The
three were on leave during that time. On June 1, 1975, Montayre issued
Requisition and Issue Voucher 6-513-75 for the following articles:
On June 25, 1975, the sealed bids were opened by the Bidding Committee. The
Committee prepared an Abstract of Bids signed by David, Villa, Sucalit,
Wigberto Fuentebella, Leonardo Mahinay, and Fermin Beltran, approving the
lowest bid, which was that of Rocen Enterprises. On the same day, a Purchase
Order addressed to Rocen Enterprises was prepared and signed by David and
approved by Jimenez, with Leonor certifying to the availability of funds.
From June 25-30, 1975, four reports of inspection were prepared and signed
by Sucalit, Villa and Montayre; four certificates of delivery were signed by
Montayre and Villa; and four general vouchers for P70,180, P75,900, P99,000
and P53,020 respectively were prepared and signed by Villa, Montayre, Leonor
and Jimenez.
It turned out that the requisitioned articles were delivered at Cebu City only on
July 6, 1975, and were shipped by UTESCO, a losing bidder, to Rocen
Enterprises, c/o Mrs. Remedios Centeno via the vessel Sweet Faith. The freight
and handling charges of P5,500.00 incurred in connection with the delivery
were reimbursed under a General Voucher signed by Jimenez, Montayre and
Leonor to Rocen Enterprises.
As the CDCs would expire on June 30, 1975, it was necessary to make it
appear in the vouchers, supporting documents, reports of inspection, and
certificates of delivery that the items requisitioned were delivered and inspected
on or before June 30, 1975. The CDCs had to be utilized before the end of the
fiscal year as otherwise they would revert to the general fund. In view of the
emergency nature of the purchase, there was no time to advertise and the
Bidding Committee had to adopt the more expeditious mode of procurement.
Anyway, the prices paid by the government were reasonable.
Jimenez testified that he approved the vouchers after verifying that all the
supporting documents were in order and duly certified by the proper officers.
He disclaimed responsibility in determining the reputability of the supplier. He
admitted he knew Dario, Centeno and Robles but denied that they were in his
office at Mactan Airport to follow up the transaction.
Villa, a member of the Bidding Committee, argued that he did not participate in
the canvass of the requisitioned items. As chief of the logistics section, it was
his duty to determine the items needed for the airport but not the availability of
funds for their acquisition. He processed the vouchers before June 30, 1975,
because the funds needed for the items requisitioned would not be available if
not disbursed before that date. He did this upon Montayre's direction.
In its decision dated July 28, 1988, the First Division of the Sandiganbayan
found all the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 3,
paragraphs(a), (c) 8 (h), and (i) of R.A. 3019, in relation to the Unnumbered
Memorandum of the President dated April 22, 1971, Section 12, Rule XVIII of
the Civil Service Rules and Section 1(x) of P.D. No. 6.
While the Sandiganbayan case was pending, the Court of Appeals, in a decision
promulgated on January 29, 1988, reversed the judgment of conviction
rendered by the Circuit Criminal Court, on the ground of insufficient evidence.
This decision was subsequently, and quite understandably, invoked by the
herein petitioners in their separate motions for reconsideration of the decision
of the Sandiganbayan.
In a resolution dated February 17, 1989, the Sandiganbayan denied all these
motions for reconsideration. Hence, four separate petitions for review were filed
with this Court, by Villa, in G.R. No. 87186; Montayre, in G.R. No. 87281;
Sucalit, in G.R. No. 87466; and Jimenez, in G.R. No. 87524. Leonor did not
appeal,
On May 4, 1989, G.R. No. 87466 was dismissed for non-compliance with
Circular No. 1-88. Sucalit filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied
with finality. On October 3, 1989, however, this Court resolved to hold in
abeyance enforcement of final judgment on the petition pending resolution of
the other petitions. On August 22, 1989, we resolved to consolidate these cases
upon motion of the Solicitor General, who was directed to file a Consolidated
Comment on all the cases.
The petitioners contend that since their cases in the Sandiganbayan were
merely an offshoot of Criminal Case No. CCC-XIV-1457 in the Circuit Criminal
Court of Cebu City, which was reversed by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No.
24142, the decision of the Court of Appeals has become the "law of the case"
which cannot now be overturned by any court and should be applied in the
case at bar. Accordingly, they should also be acquitted.
The doctrine has been defined as "that principle under which determinations of
questions of law will generally be held to govern a case throughout all its
subsequent stages where such determination has already been made on a prior
appeal to a court of last resort. It is merely a rule of procedure and does not go
to the power of the court, and will not be adhered to where its application will
result in an unjust decision. It relates entirely to questions of law, and is
confined in its operation to subsequent proceedings in the same case."
In light of these definitions, we find that the Sandiganbayan did not err in
holding as follows:
The petitioners also invoke res judicata, pointing out that in Criminal Case No.
CCC-XIV-1457 and the case at bar, there was identity of the transaction
involved, the witnesses and documentary evidence presented, and the offenses
charged.
The petitioners claim that the Sandiganbayan "relied very heavily, if not
mainly" on and has merely adopted the findings of facts of the Circuit Criminal
Court in arriving at its judgment of conviction. With the reversal of the decision
of the Circuit Criminal Court, the Sandiganbayan decision has also lost its
basis.
While the Sandiganbayan did consider the decision of the Circuit Criminal
Court in finding the petitioners guilty, this was not the sole reason for their
conviction. Apart from the conclusions of that court, the Sandiganbayan made
its own findings of fact based on the testimony of witnesses and documentary
evidence submitted to it during the trial. In fact, the major part of its decision
dwelt its own analysis of such evidence.
The petitioners also invoke the decision of the Court of Appeals rejecting the
charge of conspiracy and contend that its finding that David, Centeno, Dario
and Robles did not conspire among themselves or with the herein petitioners
precluded the Sandiganbayan from arriving at a contrary conclusion.
In the case at bar, the first three accused were convicted by the Circuit
Criminal Court and later acquitted by the Court of Appeals. The second batch
of accused, the petitioners herein, were convicted directly by the
Sandiganbayan.
The failure to show that the petitioners profited from the transaction would not
necessarily result in acquittal. In Luciano v Estrella, 14 Justice J.B.L. Reyes, in
interpreting paragraph (g), Section 3 of R.A. 3019, said:
The petitioners stress that the investigating fiscal who conducted the
preliminary investigation cleared them of liability (while Tanodbayan Fernandez
maintained there was conspiracy) and argue that the findings of the former
should prevail pursuant to Quizo v. Sandiganbayan. 15 That case, in fact,
argues against them. In Quizo, it was the Tanodbayan himself who moved for
the dismissal of the information with the Sandiganbayan which denied the
same and which denial we set aside. The investigating fiscal being the
subordinate of the Tanodbayan, the letter's decision should prevail.
Lastly, it is contended that there was denial of due process because the case
against them was heard by several sets of justices as follows
At the same time, the too frequent rotation of Justices hearing this
particular case borders on unfairness. The Sandiganbayan should
devise a better system whereby, as much as possible, the same
Justices who hear a case shall be the ones to decide it. The
procedure in the Court of Appeals cannot be used as a precedent.
Except in some isolated instances provided in Batas Pambansa
Blg. 129, the Court of Appeals reviews and decides cases on the
basis of the records and does not conduct trials. In reducing
temporary changes in its divisions to the barest minimum, the
Sandiganbayan also reduces the possibility of one Justice who
hears all the witnesses, influencing the findings of the Justices
who did not have the same opportunity.
In that case, we set aside the decision of the Sandiganbayan and ordered a new
trial not solely on the basis of the "too frequent rotation of justices" but also
because "in addition to the newly-discovered evidence, there (were) serious
allegations which call(ed) for a more thorough examination."
Dario, Centeno and Robles were CAA Manila employees and were on leave
during the period of the questioned transaction. They were seen by prosecution
witnesses at Mactan Airport in the company of Jimenez, who admitted he knew
the three. Robles and Centeno are incorporators of Rocen Trading, Inc., which
was the Rocen Enterprises at the time the transaction was consummated. This
was a sole proprietorship registered in the name of Remedios Centeno, wife of
Estanislao Centeno, and engaged only in the business of dealing in "paper
products and printed matter."
When the requisition of the items was made, Sucalit went to Manila pursuant
to a travel order issued by Jimenez to canvass prices of the articles. It is not
explained why she delivered an advertisement form to Rocen Enterprises,
which was a supplier only of paper products and printed matter but not of the
needed electrical items. Curiously, Rocen submitted the lowest quotation for
the items requisitioned. When the contract was awarded to it, Rocen merely
procured the items requisitioned from UTESCO, a losing bidder.
These acts and omissions of Jimenez and Sucalit violated paragraph (a) of
Section 3 of R.A. 3019 in relation to the Unnumbered Presidential
Memorandum. They were persuaded, induced or influenced, and persuaded,
induced or influenced each other, to award the purchase of electrical items to
an entity which was not even a supplier of electrical items in disregard of the
Presidential Memorandum directing that procurement of supplies by
government offices should be from reputable suppliers. Rocen was not a
"reputable supplier" as it was dealing only in paper products and printed
matter at the time of the transaction in question.
Paragraph (e) was likewise violated by Jimenez and Sucalit because, with
manifest partiality in the discharge of their official and administrative
functions, they gave unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference to Rocen
Enterprises.
We believe, however that Montayre and Villa are not criminally liable.
Villa was likewise convicted as involved in the conspiracy for having signed
invoices, reports of inspection, certificates of delivery and general vouchers
before delivery of the items requisitioned. He is absolved of this charge like
Montayre, for the same reasons. Villa, moreover, did not take part in the
canvassing of supplies. It is true that he was a member of the Bidding
Committed and he signed the Abstract of Bids and the approval of the lowest
bid to Rocen Enterprises. However, this act cannot be considered criminal as
he relied in fact on the canvass made and sealed bids procured by Sucalit in
Manila. Such reliance may have constituted negligence but certainly not the
gross inexcusable negligence punishable by law.
Regarding the offenses involved, the Court finds that only paragraphs (a) and
(e) of Section 3, R.A. 3019, in relation to this Unnumbered Presidential
Memorandum dated April 22, 1971, were violated.
Paragraph (i) was also not violated because the Bidding Committee did not
exercise discretion in the award of the contract for purchase of the equipment,
which had to be given to the lowest bidder.
SO ORDERED.
Footnotes