Section 11 Article XII

―Capital‖

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 NARRA NICKEL MINING AND DEVELOPMENT CORP.,
TESORO MINING AND DEVELOPMENT, INC., and
MCARTHUR MINING, INC., Petitioners, vs.
REDMONT CONSOLIDATED MINES CORP., Respondent.
G.R. No. 195580
April 21, 2014

Velasco, Jr., J.:

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule

45 filed by Narra Nickel and Mining Development Corp. (Narra),
Tesoro Mining and Development, Inc. (Tesoro), and McArthur
Mining Inc. (McArthur), which seeks to reverse the October 1, 2010
Decision1 and the February 15, 2011 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals (CA).

FACTS

Sometime in December 2006, respondent Redmont Consolidated

Mines Corp. (Redmont), a domestic corporation organized and
existing under Philippine laws, took interest in mining and exploring
certain areas of the province of Palawan. After inquiring with the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), it
learned that the areas where it wanted to undertake exploration and
mining activities where already covered by Mineral Production
Sharing Agreement (MPSA) applications of petitioners Narra, Tesoro
and McArthur.

On January 2, 2007, Redmont Consolidated Mines, Inc. (Redmont)

filed before the Panel of Arbitrators (POA) of the DENR separate
petitions for denial of McArthur Mining, Inc. (McArthur), Tesoro
and Mining and Development, Inc. (Tesoro), and Narra Nickel
Mining and Development Corporation (Narra) applications Mineral
Production Sharing Agreement (MPSA) on the ground that they are
not ―qualified persons‖ and thus disqualified from engaging in
mining activities through MPSAs reserved only for Filipino citizens.

Redmont alleged that at least 60% of the capital stock of McArthur,

Tesoro and Narra are owned and controlled by MBMI Resources, Inc.
(MBMI), a 100% Canadian corporation. Redmont reasoned that
since MBMI is a considerable stockholder of petitioners, it was the
driving force behind petitioners‘ filing of the MPSAs over the areas
covered by applications since it knows that it can only participate in
mining activities through corporations which are deemed Filipino
citizens. Redmont argued that given that petitioners‘ capital stocks

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were mostly owned by MBMI, they were likewise disqualified from
engaging in mining activities through MPSAs, which are reserved
only for Filipino citizens.

McArthur Tesoros Narra

Madridejos-(Fil.Corp) Sara Marie- Patricia Louise-
5,999 out of 10,000 (Fil.Corp) 5,997 out (Fil.Corp) 5,997 out
shares of 10,000 shares of 10,000 shares
MBMI-(Canadian) MBMI-(Canadian) MBMI-(Canadian)
3,998 out of 10,000 3,998 out of 10,000 3,998 out of 10,000
shares shares shares
MBMI also owns
MBMI also owns MBMI also owns
3,998 out of 10,000
3,331 out of 10,000 3,331 out of 10,000
shares of Patricia
shares of Madridejos shares of Tesoro
Louise

With respect to the applications of respondents McArthur, Tesoro

and Narra for Financial or Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA)
or conversion of their MPSA applications to FTAA, the matter for its
rejection or approval is left for determination by the Secretary of the
DENR and the President of the Republic of the Philippines.

After a careful review of the records, the CA found that there was
doubt as to the nationality of petitioners when it realized that
petitioners had a common major investor, MBMI, a corporation
composed of 100% Canadians.

On October 1, 2010, the CA rendered a Decision which partially

granted the petition, reversing and setting aside the September 10,
2008 and July 1, 2009 Orders of the MAB.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred when it did not

dismiss the case for mootness.
2. Whether or not POA has jurisdiction with regard to the
settlement of disputes over rights to mining areas.
3. Whether or not Petitioners are Filipino-owned corporations.
HELD:

1. NO.
A case is said to be moot and/or academic when it "ceases to
present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening
events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical

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 use or value." Thus, the courts "generally decline jurisdiction
over the case or dismiss it on the ground of mootness."

The "mootness" principle, however, does accept certain

exceptions and the mere raising of an issue of "mootness" will
not deter the courts from trying a case when there is a valid
reason to do so. In David v. Macapagal-Arroyo (David), the
Court provided four instances where courts can decide an
otherwise moot case, thus:

1.) There is a grave violation of the Constitution;

2.) The exceptional character of the situation and paramount
public interest is involved;
3.) When constitutional issue raised requires formulation of
controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the
public; and
4.) The case is capable of repetition yet evading review.34
All of the exceptions stated above are present in the instant
case. We of this Court note that a grave violation of the
Constitution, specifically Section 2 of Article XII, is being
committed by a foreign corporation right under our country‘s
nose through a myriad of corporate layering under different,
allegedly, Filipino corporations.

2. YES.
Under Sec. 77 of RA 7942: Panel of Arbitrators.— shall have
exclusive and original jurisdiction to hear and decide the
following: (c) Disputes involving rights to mining areas (d)
Disputes involving mineral agreements or permits
It is clear that POA has exclusive and original jurisdiction over
any and all disputes involving rights to mining areas.

3. NO.
There are two acknowledged tests in determining the
nationality of a corporation: the control test and the
grandfather rule.

Paragraph 7 of DOJ Opinion No. 020, Series of 2005, adopting

the 1967 SEC Rules which implemented the requirement of
the Constitution and other laws owned by Filipino citizens,
provides: "shares belonging to corporations or partnerships at
least 60% of the capital of which is owned by Filipino citizens
shall be considered as of Philippine nationality," which pertains
to the control test or the liberal rule. Under the liberal Control
Test, there is no need to further trace the ownership of the

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60% (or more) Filipino stockholdings of the Investing
Corporation since a corporation which is at least 60% Filipino-
owned is considered as Filipino. On the other hand, the second
part of the DOJ Opinion which provides, "if the percentage of
the Filipino ownership in the corporation or partnership is less
than 60%, only the number of shares corresponding to such
percentage shall be counted as Philippine nationality," pertains
to the stricter, more stringent grandfather rule. Under the
Strict Rule or Grandfather Rule Proper, the combined totals in
the Investing Corporation and the Investee Corporation must
be traced (i.e., ―grandfathered‖) to determine the total
percentage of Filipino ownership. The Grandfather Rule
applies only when the 60-40 Filipino-Foreign equity ownership
is in doubt.

Under a joint venture agreement the Company holds directly

and indirectly an effective equity interest in the Alpha Property
of 60.4%. Pursuant to a shareholders‘ agreement, the Company
exercises joint control over the companies in the Alpha Group.
(emphasis supplied)

Petitioners McArthur, Tesoro and Narra are not Filipino since

MBMI, a 100% Canadian corporation, owns 60% or more of
their equity interests. Such conclusion is derived from
grandfathering petitioners‘ corporate owners, namely: MMI,
SMMI and PLMDC. Going further and adding to the picture,
MBMI‘s Summary of Significant Accounting Policies
statement– –regarding the "joint venture" agreements that it
entered into with the "Olympic" and "Alpha" groups––involves
SMMI, Tesoro, PLMDC and Narra. Noticeably, the ownership
of the "layered" corporations boils down to MBMI, Olympic or
corporations under the "Alpha" group wherein MBMI has joint
venture agreements with, practically exercising majority
control over the corporations mentioned. In effect, whether
looking at the capital structure or the underlying relationships
between and among the corporations, petitioners are NOT
Filipino nationals and must be considered foreign since 60% or
more of their capital stocks or equity interests are owned by
MBMI. Corporate layering" is admittedly allowed by the FIA;
but if it is used to circumvent the Constitution and pertinent
laws, then it becomes illegal.

In ending, the "control test" is still the prevailing mode of

determining whether or not a corporation is a Filipino
corporation, within the ambit of Sec. 2, Art. II of the 1987

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Constitution, entitled to undertake the exploration,
development and utilization of the natural resources of the
Philippines. When in the mind of the Court there is doubt,
doubt based on the attendant facts and circumstances of the
case, in the 60-40 Filipino-equity ownership in the corporation,
then it may apply the "grandfather rule."

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ANA THERESIA ―RISA‖ HONTIVEROS-BARAQUEL v. TOLL
REGULATORY BOARD, GR No. 181293, 2015-02-23
Facts:
The Toll Regulatory Board (TRB) was created on 31 March 1977 by
Presidential Decree No. (P.D.) 1112 in order to supervise and
regulate, on behalf of the government, the collection of toll fees and
the operation of toll facilities by the private sector.

On the same date, P.D. 1113 was issued granting to the

Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines (now
Philippine National Construction Corporation or PNCC) the right,
privilege, and authority to construct, operate, and maintain toll
facilities in the North and South Luzon Toll Expressways for a period
of 30 years starting 1 May 1977. TRB and PNCC later entered into a
Toll Operation Agreement, which prescribed the operating
conditions of the right granted to PNCC under P.D. 1113.

P.D. 1113 was amended by P.D. 1894, which granted PNCC the
right, privilege, and authority to construct, maintain, and operate the
North Luzon, South Luzon and Metro Manila Expressways, together
with the toll facilities appurtenant thereto. The term of 30 years
provided under P. D. 1113 starting from 1 May 1977 remained the
same for the North and the South Luzon Expressways, while the
franchise granted for the Metro Manila Expressway (MME) provided
a term of 30 years commencing from the date of completion of the
project.

On September 22, 1993, PNCC entered into an agreement with PT

Citra Lamtoro Gung Persada (CITRA), a limited liability company
organized and established under the laws of the Republic of
Indonesia, whereby the latter committed to provide PNCC with a
pre-feasibility study on the proposed MME project. The agreement
was supplemented on 14 February 1994 with a related undertaking
on the part of CITRA. CITRA was to provide a preliminary feasibility
study on the Metro Manila Skyways (MMS) project, a system of
elevated roadway networks passing through the heart of the
Metropolitan Manila area. In order to accelerate the actual
implementation of both the MME and the MMS projects, PNCC and
CITRA entered into a second agreement. Through that agreement,
CITRA committed to finance and undertake the preparation,
updating, and revalidation of previous studies on the construction,
operation, and maintenance of the projects.

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As a result of the feasibility and related studies, PNCC and CITRA
submitted, through the TRB, a Joint Investment Proposal (JIP) to the
Republic of the Philippines. The JIP embodied the implementation
schedule for the financing, design and construction of the MMS in
three stages: the South Metro Manila Skyway, the North Metro
Manila Skyway, and the Central Metro Manila Skyway.

On August 30 1995, PNCC and CITRA entered into a Business and

Joint Venture Agreement and created the Citra Metro Manila
Tollways Corporation (CMMTC). CMMTC was a joint venture
corporation organized under Philippine laws to serve as a channel
through which CITRA shall participate in the construction and
development of the project.

On November 27, 1995, the Republic of the Philippines through the

TRB as Grantor, CMMTC as Investor, and PNCC as Operator
executed a Supplemental Toll Operation Agreement (STOA)
covering Stage 1, Phases 1 and 2; and Stage 2, Phase 1 of the South
Metro Manila Skyway. Under the STOA, the design and construction
of the project roads became the primary and exclusive privilege and
responsibility of CMMTC. CMMTC completed the design and
construction of Stage 1 of the South Metro Manila Skyway, which
was operated and maintained by PSC.

On July 18, 2007, the Republic of the Philippines, through the TRB,
CMMTC, and PNCC executed the assailed Amendment to the
Supplemental Toll Operation Agreement (ASTOA). The ASTOA
incorporated the amendments, revisions, and modifications
necessary to cover the design and construction of Stage 2 of the
South Metro Manila Skyway. Also under the ASTOA, Skyway O & M
Corporation (SOMCO) replaced PSC in performing the operations
and maintenance of Stage 1 of the South Metro Manila Skyway.
Secretary Leandro Mendoza approved the ASTOA through the
challenged Memorandum dated 20 July 2007.

On December 21, 2007, PNCC, PSC, and CMMTC entered into the
assailed Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) providing for the
successful and seamless assumption by SOMCO of the operations
and maintenance of Stage 1 of the South Metro Manila Skyway.
Under the MOA, PSC received the amount of ?320 million which
was used for the settlement of its liabilities arising from the
consequent retrenchment or separation of its affected employees.

The TRB issued the challenged Toll Operation Certificate (TOC) to

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SOMCO on 28 December 2007, authorizing the latter to operate and
maintain Stage 1 of the South Metro Manila Skyway effective 10:00
p.m. on 31 December 2007.

Meanwhile, on December 28, 2007, petitioner PNCC Traffic

Management and Security Department Workers Organization
(PTMSDWO) filed a Notice of Strike against PSC on the ground of
unfair labor practice, specifically union busting. The Secretary of
Labor and Employment assumed jurisdiction over the dispute in an
Order dated 31 December 2007 and set the initial hearing of the case
on 2 January 2008.

On January 3, 2008, petitioners PTMSDWO and PNCC Skyway

Corporation Employees Union (PSCEU) filed before the Regional
Trial Court of Parañaque City, Branch 258 (RTC), a complaint
against respondents TRB, PNCC, PSC, CMMTC, and SOMCO. The
complaint was for injunction and prohibition with a prayer for a writ
of preliminary injunction and/or a temporary restraining order, and
sought to prohibit the implementation of the ASTOA and the MOA,
as well as the assumption of the toll operations by SOMCO.
Petitioners PSCEU and PTMSDWO also sought the subsequent
nullification of the ASTOA and the MOA for being contrary to law
and for being grossly disadvantageous to the government. They later
filed an Amended Complaint dated 8 January 2008, additionally
praying that PSC be allowed to continue the toll operations.

The RTC issued an Order denying the prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction.
According to the RTC, petitioners were seeking to enjoin a national
government infrastructure project. Under Republic Act No. (R.A.)
8975, courts are prohibited from issuing a temporary restraining
order or preliminary injunction against the government or any
person or entity acting under the government's direction to restrain
the execution, implementation, or operation of any such contract or
project. Furthermore, the RTC ruled that it could no longer issue a
temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction, considering
that the act sought to be restrained had already been consummated.
On January 28, 2008, petitioners PSCEU and PTMSDWO filed a
Notice of Dismissal with Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for the Issuance of
Order Confirming the Dismissal, considering that no Answers had
yet been filed. On the basis thereof, the RTC dismissed the case
without prejudice on 29 January 2008.

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On February 4, 2008, petitioners filed the instant Petition before this
Court. Meanwhile, defendants PNCC and PSC filed their respective
Motions for Partial Reconsideration of the Order of the RTC
dismissing the case without prejudice. Both pointed out that
petitioners PSCEU and PTMSDWO had acted in bad faith by filing
the complaint before the RTC, despite the pendency of a labor case
over which the Secretary of Labor and Employment had assumed
jurisdiction.

The RTC denied the Motions for Partial Reconsideration in an Order

dated 13 June 2008.
Issues:
Substantive:
I. WON the TRB has the power to grant authority to operate a toll
facility;
II. WON the TOC issued to SOMCO was valid;
III. WON the assumption of toll operations by SOMCO is
disadvantageous to the government;
Ruling:
I. YES, the has the power to grant authority to operate a toll facility.
Sections 3 (a) and (e) of P.D. 1112 in relation to Section 4 of P.D.
1894 have invested the TRB with sufficient power to grant a
qualified person or entity with authority to construct, maintain, and
operate a toll facility and to issue the corresponding toll operating
permit or TOC.
Section 3. Powers and Duties of the Board. The Board shall have in
addition to its general powers of administration the following
powers and duties:
(a) Subject to the approval of the President of the Philippines, to
enter into contracts in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines with
persons, natural or juridical, for the construction, operation and
maintenance of toll facilities such as but not limited to national...
highways, roads, bridges, and public thoroughfares. Said contract
shall be open to citizens of the Philippines and/or to corporations or
associations qualified under the Constitution and authorized by law
to engage in toll operations;
(e) To grant authority to operate a toll facility and to issue therefore
the necessary "Toll Operation Certificate" subject to such conditions
as shall be imposed by the Board including inter alia the following:

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II. YES, it is Valid.
The TOC, as a grant of authority from the government, is subject to
the latter's control insofar as the grant affects or concerns the
public. Like all other franchises or licenses issued by the
government, the TOC is issued subject to terms, conditions, and
limitations under existing laws and agreements. This rule especially
holds true in this instance since the TRB has the power to issue "the
necessary 'Toll Operation Certificate' subject to such conditions as
shall be imposed by the Board including inter alia" those specified
under Section 3(e) of P.D. 1112. Thus, impliedly written into every
TOC are the conditions prescribed therein.
Finally, no public notices and hearings were necessary prior to the
issuance of the TOC to SOMCO. For the same reason that a public
bidding is not necessary, PNCC cannot be required to call for public
hearings concerning matters within its prerogative. At any rate, we
have studied P.D. 1112 and the Implementing Rules and Regulations
Authorizing the Establishment of Toll Facilities and found no
provision requiring the issuance of public notices and the conduct of
public hearings prior to the issuance of a TOC.
III. No, Petitioners have not shown that the transfer of toll
operations to SOMCO was grossly disadvantageous to the
government.
When one uses the term "grossly disadvantageous to the
government," the allegations in support thereof must reflect the
meaning accorded to the phrase. "Gross" means glaring,
reprehensible, culpable, flagrant, and shocking. It requires that the
mere allegation shows that the disadvantage on the part of the
government is unmistakable, obvious, and certain.

In this case, we find that the allegations of petitioners are nothing

more than speculations, apprehensions, and suppositions. They
speculate that with its "measly" capital investment, SOMCO would
not be able to cover the overhead expenses for personal services
alone. They fear that the revenue from toll operations would go to
"private pockets" in exchange for a small settlement amount to be
given to PSC. Given that SOMCO has no proven track record,
petitioners deduce that its assumption of the toll operations would
lead to poor delivery of toll services to the public.

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The aim in the establishment of toll facilities is to draw from private
resources the financing of government infrastructure projects.
Naturally, these private investors would want to receive reasonable
return on their investments. Thus, the collection of toll fees for the
use of public improvements has been authorized, subject to
supervision and regulation by the national government.

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AMENDMENT

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 League of Cities v. Comelec

G.R. No. 176951 November 18, 2008

Action:
These are consolidated petitions for prohibition with prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining
order filed by the League of Cities of the Philippines, City of Iloilo,
City of Calbayog, and Jerry P. Treñas assailing the constitutionality
of the subject Cityhood Laws and enjoining the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) and respondent municipalities from
conducting plebiscites pursuant to the Cityhood Laws.

Facts:
During the 11th Congress, Congress enacted into law 33 bills
converting 33 municipalities into cities. However, Congress did not
act on bills converting 24 other municipalities into cities.
During the 12th Congress, Congress enacted into law Republic Act
No. 9009 (RA 9009), which took effect on 30 June 2001. RA 9009
amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code by increasing
the annual income requirement for conversion of a municipality into
a city from P20 million to P100 million. The rationale for the
amendment was to restrain, in the words of Senator Aquilino
Pimentel, ―the mad rush‖ of municipalities to convert into cities
solely to secure a larger share in the Internal Revenue Allotment
despite the fact that they are incapable of fiscal independence.

After the effectivity of RA 9009, the House of Representatives of the

12th Congress adopted Joint Resolution No. 29, which sought to
exempt from the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 the
24 municipalities whose cityhood bills were not approved in the 11th
Congress. However, the 12th Congress ended without the Senate
approving Joint Resolution No. 29.

During the 13th Congress, the House of Representatives re-adopted

Joint Resolution No. 29 as Joint Resolution No. 1 and forwarded it
to the Senate for approval. However, the Senate again failed to
approve the Joint Resolution. Following the advice of Senator
Aquilino Pimentel, 16 municipalities filed, through their respective
sponsors, individual cityhood bills. The 16 cityhood bills contained a
common provision exempting all the 16 municipalities from the
P100 million income requirement in RA 9009.

On 22 December 2006, the House of Representatives approved the

cityhood bills. The Senate also approved the cityhood bills in
February 2007, except that of Naga, Cebu which was passed on 7

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June 2007. The cityhood bills lapsed into law (Cityhood Laws) on
various dates from March to July 2007 without the President‘s
signature.

The Cityhood Laws direct the COMELEC to hold plebiscites to

determine whether the voters in each respondent municipality
approve of the conversion of their municipality into a city.

Petitioners filed the present petitions to declare the Cityhood Laws

unconstitutional for violation of Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution, as well as for violation of the equal protection clause.
Petitioners also lament that the wholesale conversion of
municipalities into cities will reduce the share of existing cities in
the Internal Revenue Allotment because more cities will share the
same amount of internal revenue set aside for all cities under Section
285 of the Local Government Code.

Issue:
The petitions raise the following fundamental issues:
1. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution; and
2. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate the equal protection clause.

Held:
We grant the petitions.
The Cityhood Laws violate Sections 6 and 10, Article X of the
Constitution, and are thus unconstitutional.

First, applying the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 to

the present case is a prospective, not a retroactive application,
because RA 9009 took effect in 2001 while the cityhood bills became
law more than five years later.

Second, the Constitution requires that Congress shall prescribe all

the criteria for the creation of a city in the Local Government Code
and not in any other law, including the Cityhood Laws.

Third, the Cityhood Laws violate Section 6, Article X of the

Constitution because they prevent a fair and just distribution of the
national taxes to local government units.

Fourth, the criteria prescribed in Section 450 of the Local

Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, for converting a
municipality into a city are clear, plain and unambiguous, needing no
resort to any statutory construction.

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Fifth, the intent of members of the 11th Congress to exempt certain
municipalities from the coverage of RA 9009 remained an intent and
was never written into Section 450 of the Local Government Code.

Sixth, the deliberations of the 11th or 12th Congress on unapproved

bills or resolutions are not extrinsic aids in interpreting a law passed
in the 13th Congress.

Seventh, even if the exemption in the Cityhood Laws were written in

Section 450 of the Local Government Code, the exemption would
still be unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection clause

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GRANT OF
IMMUNITY

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G.R. No. 100295 April 26, 1994

PLACIDO L. MAPA, JR., and J. LORENZO

VERGARA, petitioners,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN, respondent.

FACTS:
Petitioners were charged with violation of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act. However, they were promised immunity from
further criminal prosecution provided that they will testify as
witnesses against the Marcoses for violating the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act (RICO) by transporting to
the United States and concealing the investment of money through
cronies and offshore organizations.
President Marcos was delisted as an accused as he died in the course
of the proceedings. Petitioners, despite their availability and
willingness to testify, the US prosecutors decided not to call them to
the witness stand. Mrs. Imelda Marcos was acquitted by the jury.
Petitioners were put back to the prosecution of their criminal case,
thus filed a joint Motion to Dismiss but was denied by respondent
Sandiganbayan contending that since petitioners were not able to
testify, their immunity from suit was without force and effect. Hence
this petition.

ISSUES:
1. WON respondent court has jurisdiction to review the immunity
granted by PCGG in favor of the petitioners.
2. WON respondent court committed grave abuse of discretion when
it denied petitioners' motion to dismiss based on a claim of
immunity granted by the PCGG under section 5 of E.O. 14, as
amended.

HELD:
1. YES. In Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan which is tasked to handle the ill-gotten wealth cases

18
must include the jurisdiction to determine whether or not the PCGG
exceeded its power to grant immunity pursuant to the provisions of
Executive Order No.14.
In the case at bar, the respondent court has already acquired
jurisdiction to try and decide Case No. 11960 where petitioners
stand accused of violating RA 3019. It has started receiving the
evidence of the prosecution against the petitioners. Petitioners, with
the conformity of PCGG, then claimed their immunity via a motion
to dismiss addressed to the respondent court. The motion to dismiss
is thus a mere incident well within the jurisdiction of the respondent
court to resolve.

2. YES. Section 5 of E.O. No. 14, as amended, confers on the PCGG

the power to grant immunity alone and on its own authority. . The
basic reason for vesting the power exclusively on the PCGG lies in
the principles of separation of power

The power of the respondent court can go no further than to pass

upon its procedural regularity.

Contrary to the ruling of the respondent court, the failure of

petitioners to testify in the RICO cases against the Marcoses in New
York cannot nullify their immunity. They have satisfied the
requirements both of the law and the parties' implementing
agreements. Under section 5 of E.O. No. 14, as amended, their duty
was to give information to the prosecution, and they did.
The records show that petitioners provided information to the PCGG
relating to the prosecution of the RICO cases against the Marcoses in
New York. They gave the information in the course of interviews
conducted by PCGG lawyers Kendall and Severina Rivera and US
prosecutor Charles
La Bella. They collaborated with the prosecution.
Under their Memorandum of Agreement, they promised to make
themselves available as witnesses in the said RICO cases, and they
did. Petitioners were ready to testify but they were not called to
testify by the US prosecutors of the RICO case. Their failure to
testify was not of their own making. It was brought about by the
decision of the US prosecutors who may have thought that their
evidence was enough to convict the Marcoses.

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IN VIEW WHEREOF, the resolutions of the respondent court dated
March 7, and June 3, 1991 are annulled and set aside and the
Amended Information against the petitioners in Criminal Case No.
11960 is ordered dismissed. No costs.

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TANCHANCO V SANDIGANBAYAN
Gr No. 141675-96 November 25, 2005
Tinga, J.:
Facts:
Tanchanco served as NFA Administrator from 1972 to 1986, during
the presidency of Ferdinand Marcos. His co-petitioner Romeo Lacson
(Lacson) was the Deputy Administrator of the NFA when he was the
Administrator. On 6 May 1988, Tanchanco and the PCGG entered
into a Cooperation Agreement, occasioned by the desire of
Tanchanco to cooperate with the Philippine government in
connection with the latter‘s efforts in the location and pursuit of
government properties purloined by Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos,
their agents and others who hold property on their behalf. In the
Cooperation Agreement, the parties stipulated as follows:
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual covenants
contained herein and intending to be legally bound hereby, the
parties agree as follows:
1. Tanchanco shall cooperate with any and all Philippine
Government investigations or prosecutions pursuant to Executive
Order No. 1;
2. Cooperation means that Tanchanco shall provide complete, candid
and absolutely truthful disclosures, in response to any and all
questions and inquiries that may be put to him/her in connection
with the Philippines investigations, civil actions, criminal
prosecutions, or any other proceedings whether in the Philippines,
the United States or elsewhere. Further, upon the request of the
Philippines, Tanchanco will offer such cooperation in investigations
and proceedings brought by other governments, including but not
limited to the United States and Switzerland;
Cooperation also means a disgorgement of assets, if any, acquired in
violation of Philippine laws, rules and regulations. Cooperation
further means a full disclosure of assets and liabilities, beneficially
owned by Tanchanco. Any assets not therein listed as Tanchancos
personal property, and thereafter discovered to be in Tanchancos
name or under his/her legal or beneficial control, directly or
indirectly, as of the date of this Agreement, shall become the
property of the PCGG.

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3. Should any of Tanchancos statements or testimonies be false,
misleading or materially incomplete, or should Tanchanco knowingly
fail to act with total honesty and candor in any such matters, the
Philippines shall no longer be bound by any of its representations
contained herein. Immunities and other considerations granted in
reliance thereof, shall be null and void.
In return for the above, the Philippines hereby represents and agrees
as follows:
1. At a time to be mutually agreed upon between Tanchanco and the
Philippines, the Philippines shall move to dismiss all actions that are
presently pending against Tanchanco before the Sandiganbayan and
any such other courts;
2. The Philippines shall lift any sequestration orders against
Tanchanco‘s properties, if any, and rescind hold orders it may have
issued against his/her actions;
3. The Philippines shall not bring any additional civil or criminal
charges against Tanchanco, arising from:
(A) Service in or for the Marcos government;
(B) Any other actions revealed by Tanchanco pursuant to his/her
cooperation as defined in this Agreement.
Tanchanco was called as one of the witnesses for the prosecution in
the case filed against Imelda Marcos in New York for violation of the
so-called RICO Act. His testimony disclosed the transfer of P10,
000,000.00 rebate obtained by the NFA from the Philippine National
Lines to the Security Bank, as well as the matter of the use of
discretionary and/or intelligence funds by the Marcos administration
involving the funds of the NFA during Tanchanco‘s administration.
A criminal case was filed in 1991 against Tanchanco with the
Sandiganbayan for malversation of public funds in the amount of
P10, 000,000.00 from the Philippine National Bank. Tanchanco filed
a Motion for Reinvestigation, wherein he argued that the case should
be dismissed as he had been granted immunity from the said suit by
the PCGG. Eventually, the Sandiganbayan First Division agreed with
Tanchanco and in a Resolution dated 27 October 2000, the case was
ordered dismissed. However, Criminal Case No. 16950 proved to be
only just one of several attempts of the government to prosecute
Tanchanco. In 1997, a total of 22 Informations were filed with the
Sandiganbayan against Tanchanco. He was charged with 21 counts of
22
Malversation of Public Funds under Article 217 of the Revised Penal
Code, and one count of Failure of Accountable Officer to Render
Accounts under Article 218 of the same Code. Lacson was charged as
a co-defendant in four of the informations for Malversation of Public
Funds. These cases were consolidated and raffled to the
Sandiganbayan Second Division. On 2 September 1997, Tanchanco
and Lacson pleaded not guilty to all of the charges.
On 26 November 1997, Tanchanco and Lacson filed a Motion to
Quash and/or dismiss all 22 cases, citing as basis the Cooperation
Agreement which was said to have granted immunity to Tanchanco
from criminal prosecution.
Still, the motion was denied by the Sandiganbayan. The
Sandiganbayan examined Section 5 of Executive Order (E.O.) No.
14, which empowered the PCGG to grant immunity from criminal
prosecution and ruled that the grant of immunity by the PCGG
pertained only to offenses which may arise from the act of a person
testifying or giving information in connection with the recovery of
supposed ill-gotten wealth. The Sandiganbayan likewise concluded
that even assuming the immunity granted by the Cooperation
Agreement covered the offenses charged against Tanchanco, the
same could not benefit Lacson, as he was not aparty to the immunity
agreement.
A Motion for Reconsideration was filed by Tanchanco and Lacson,
however, the same was denied. Hence, this Petition by the
Petitioners arguing that the grant of immunity under the
Cooperation Agreement encompassed the subject charges.
Issue:
Whether or not Jesus T. Tanchanco and Romeo R. Lacson can be
granted immunity under the Cooperation Agreement?
Ruling:
Tanchanco is entitled to immunity.
The court hold that Cooperation Agreement, validly undertaken
between the PCGG and Tanchanco as it was, precludes the
prosecution of Tanchanco under the subject changes. The
Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion in refusing to
dismiss the charges despite its lack of jurisdiction to continue
hearing the case against Tanchanco. The present petition, in so far as
it relates to Tanchanco, must be granted. It goes without saying
23
though that this ruling does not shield all grantees under section 5
of E.O No.14-A from all kinds of criminal prosecution. The extent of
immunity available to each particular grantee depends on their
respective immunity agreements with the PCGG and the
surrounding facts.
Lacson Not Entitled to Immunity.
It may seem unsettling to some that Lacson will have to endure
criminal prosecution while Tanchanco would be discharged, or that
Tanchanco will need not answer for whatever culpable acts of his
during his service in the Marcos government. Yet the Court is not
the guarantor of karmic warrants, but only of legal ones. The
Cooperation Agreement, entered into in the judgment of the State
that it would serve a higher end of justice, is a valid document,
enforceable as to Tanchanco before this Court and other courts of
the land.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED IN PART. The Court
hereby orders the DISMISSAL of the SUBJECT CRIMINAL CASES
INSOFAR AS PETITIONER JESUS TANCHANCO IS CONCERNED.

24
G.R. No. 169042 October 5, 2011
ERDITO QUARTO, Petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE OMBUDSMAN SIMEON MARCELO,
CHIEF SPECIAL PROSECUTOR DENNIS VILLA IGNACIO,
LUISITO M. TABLAN, RAUL B. BORILLO, and LUIS A.
GAYYA, Respondents.
FACTS:
The petitioner is the Chief of the Central Equipment and Spare
Parts Division (CESPD), Bureau of Equipment (BOE), Department
of Public Works and Highways (DPWH), Port Area, Manila. As
CESPD Chief, he is also the Head of the Special Inspectorate Team
(SIT) of the DPWH. The respondents are members of the SIT.
DPWH Secretary Simeon Datumanong created a committee to
investigate alleged anomalous transactions involving the repairs
and/or purchase of spare parts of DPWH service vehicles in 2001.
The committee designated the DPWH Internal Audit Service (IAS)
as its Technical Working Group to conduct the actual investigation.
The DPWH-IAS discovered that from March to December
2001, several emergency repairs and/or purchase of spare parts of
hundreds of DPWH service vehicles, which were approved and paid
by the government, did not actually take place, resulting in
government losses for this ten-month period alone. Thus, Atty. Irene
D. Ofilada of the DPWH-IAS filed before the Office of the
Ombudsman a Complaint-Affidavit and a Supplemental Complaint-
Affidavit charging several high-ranking DPWH officials and
employees – including the petitioner, the respondents, and other
private individuals who purportedly benefited from the anomalous
transactions – with Plunder, Money Laundering, Malversation, and
violations of RA No. 3019 and the Administrative Code. Atty.
Ofilada charged the respondent(s) (now petitioner) with dishonesty
and grave misconduct.
The petitioner denied the allegations against him, claiming that
he merely relied on his subordinates when he signed the job orders
and the inspection reports. In contrast, the respondents admitted the
existence of irregularities in the repairs and/or purchase of spare
parts of DPWH service vehicles, and offered to testify and to provide

25
evidence against the DPWH officials and employees involved in the
anomaly in exchange for their immunity from prosecution.
After conducting preliminary investigation, the Ombudsman
filed with the Sandiganbayan several information charging a number
of DPWH officials and employees with plunder, estafa through
falsification of official/commercial documents and violation of
Section 3(e), RA No. 3019. On the other hand, the Ombudsman
granted the respondents‘ request for immunity in exchange for their
testimonies and cooperation in the prosecution of the cases filed.
The petitioner initially filed a certiorari petition with the
Sandiganbayan, questioning the Ombudsman‘s grant of immunity in
the respondents‘ favor. The Sandiganbayan, however, dismissed the
petition for lack of jurisdiction and advised the petitioner to instead
question the Ombudsman‘s actions before this Court.23 Hence, this
present petition.
ISSUE: WON the Ombudsman has the authority to grant
immunity from prosecution to witnesses; and
WON the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of
discretion.
HELD:
In the exercise of his investigatory and prosecutorial powers,
the Ombudsman is generally no different from an ordinary
prosecutor in determining who must be charged. He also enjoys the
same latitude of discretion in determining what constitutes sufficient
evidence to support a finding of probable cause (that must be
established for the filing of an information in court) and the degree
of participation of those involved or the lack thereof. His findings
and conclusions on these matters are not ordinarily subject to review
by the courts except when he gravely abuses his discretion.
Under Sec 17 of RA No. 6770, Under such terms and
conditions as it may determine, taking into account the pertinent
provisions of the Rules of Court, the Ombudsman may grant
immunity from criminal prosecution to any person whose testimony
or whose possession and production of documents or other evidence
may be necessary to determine the truth in any hearing, inquiry or
proceeding being conducted by the Ombudsman or under its
authority, in the performance or in the furtherance of its
constitutional functions and statutory objectives. The immunity

26
granted under this and the immediately preceding paragraph shall
not exempt the witness from criminal prosecution for perjury or
false testimony nor shall he be exempt from demotion or removal
from office.
The Constitution and RA No. 6770 have endowed the Office of
the Ombudsman with a wide latitude of investigatory and
prosecutory powers, freed, to the extent possible within our
governmental system and structure, from legislative, executive, or
judicial intervention, and insulated from outside pressure and
improper influence. Consistent with this purpose and subject to the
command of paragraph 2, Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution, the Court reiterates its policy of non-interference with
the Ombudsman‘s exercise of his investigatory and prosecutory
powers (among them, the power to grant immunity to witnesses),
and respects the initiative and independence inherent in the
Ombudsman who, "beholden to no one, acts as the champion of the
people and the preserver of the integrity of the public service.
Following this policy, we deem it neither appropriate nor
advisable to interfere with the Ombudsman‘s grant of immunity to
the respondents, particularly in this case, where the petitioner has
not clearly and convincingly shown the grave abuse of discretion that
would call for our intervention.

27
 WHO CAN
EXERCISE
LEGISLATIVE POWER?

28
DAVID v ARROYO
FACTS
On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20th
Anniversary of the Edsa People Power I, President Arroyo issued
Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 declaring a state of national
emergency and call upon the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP)
and the Philippine National Police (PNP), to prevent and suppress
acts of terrorism and lawless violence in the country. The Office of
the President announced the cancellation of all programs and
activities related to the 20th anniversary celebration of Edsa People
Power I, and revoked the permits to hold rallies issued earlier by
local governments and dispersal of the rallyists along EDSA. The
police arrested (without warrant) petitioner Randolf S. David, a
professor at the University of the Philippines and newspaper
columnist. Also arrested was his companion, Ronald Llamas,
president of party-list Akbayan.
In the early morning of February 25, 2006, operatives of the
Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG) of the PNP, on
the basis of Presidential proclamation 1017 and G.O. No.5, raided
the Daily Tribune offices in Manila in attempt to arrest was made
against representatives of ANAKPAWIS, GABRIELA and BAYAN
MUNA whom suspected of inciting to sedition and rebellion. On
March 3, 2006, President Arroyo issued Presidential Proclamation
1021 declaring that the state of national emergency has ceased to
exist. Petitioners filed seven (7) certiorari with the Supreme Court
and three (3) of those petitions impleaded President Arroyo as
respondent questioning the legality of the proclamation, alleging that
it encroaches the emergency powers of Congress and it violates the
constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press, of speech and
assembly.
ISSUE
1. Whether or not Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 is
unconstitutional?
2. Whether or not the warrantless arrest of Randolf |S. David
and Ronald Llamas and the dispersal of KMU and NAFLU-
KMU members during rallies were valid?
3. Whether or not it is proper to implead President Gloria
Macapagal Arroyo as respondent in the petitions?

29
 4. Whether or not the petitioners have a legal standing in
questioning the constitutionality of the Proclamation?
5. Whether or not the concurrence of congress is necessary
whenever the alarming powers incident to Martial Law are
used?
RULING
1. The Court finds and so holds that Presidential Proclamation
1017 is constitutional insofar as it constitutes a call by the
President for the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence
whenever becomes necessary as prescribe under Section 18,
Article VII of the Constitution. However, there were
extraneous provisions giving the President express or implied
power
a. To issue decrees
b. To direct the AFP to enforce obedience to all laws even
those not related to lawless violence as well as decrees
promulgated by the President
c. To impose standards on media or any form of prior
restraint on press are ultra vires and unconstitutional.
The Court also rules that under Section 17, Article XII of
the Constitution, the President, in the absence of
legislative legislation, cannot take over privately-owned
public utility and private business affected with public
interest. Therefore, the Presidential Proclamation No.
1017 is only partly unconstitutional.
2. The warrantless arrest of Randolf S. David and Ronald Llamas;
the dispersal and warrantless arrest of the KMU and NAFLU-
KMU members during their rallies are illegal, in the absence of
proof that these petitioners were committing acts constituting
lawless violence, invasion or rebellion and violating BP 880;
the imposition of standards on media or any form of prior
restraint on the press, as well as the warrantless search of the
Tribune offices and whimsical seizure of its articles for
publication and other materials, are declared unconstitutional
because there was no clear and present danger of a substantive
evil that the state has a right to prevent.
3. It is not proper to implead President Arroyo as respondent.
Settled is the doctrine that the President, during his tenure of
office or actual incumbency, may not be sued in any civil or

30
 criminal case, and there is no need to provide for it in the
Constitution or law.
4. This Court adopted the ―direct injury‖ test in our jurisdiction.
In People v. Vera, it held that the person who impugns the
validity of a statute must have ―a personal and substantial
interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain
direct injury as a result.‖ Therefore, the court ruled that the
petitioners have a locus standi, for they suffered ―direct injury‖
resulting from ―illegal arrest‖ and ―unlawful search‖
committed by police operatives pursuant to PP 1017.
5. Under Article XII Section 17 of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution, in times of national emergency, when the public
interest so requires, the President may temporarily take over a
privately owned public utility or business affected with public
interest only if there is congressional authority or approval.
There must enactment of appropriate legislation prescribing
the terms and conditions under which the President may
exercise the powers that will serves as the best assurance that
due process of law would be observed.

31
LEGISLATIVE
VETO

32
 MACALINTAL VS COMELEC
G.R. NO. 157013, JULY 10, 2003

FACTS:
Petitioner Macalintal, a member of the Philippine Bar, seeking a
declaration that certain provisions of Republic Act No. 9189 (The
Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003) suffer from constitutional
infirmity. Claiming that he has actual and material legal interest in
the subject matter of this case in seeing to it that public funds are
properly and lawfully used and appropriated, petitioner filed the
instant petition as a taxpayer and as a lawyer.
Petitioner posits that Section 5(d) is unconstitutional because it
violates Section 1, Article V of the 1987 Constitution which requires
that the voter must be a resident in the Philippines for at least one
year and in the place where he proposes to vote for at least six
months immediately preceding an election.
The petitioner also claims that the provision of Section 18.5 of R.A.
No. 9189 empowering the comelec to order the proclamation of
winning candidates insofar as it affects the canvass of votes and
proclamation of winning candidates for president and vice-president,
is unconstitutional because it violates the following provisions of
paragraph 4, Section 4 of Article VII of the Constitution.
The petitioner posit that Sections 19 and 25 of R.A. No. 9189 are
invalid and unconstitutional on the ground that there is nothing in
Article VI of the Constitution on Legislative Department that would
as much as imply that Congress has concurrent power to enforce and
administer election laws with the comelec.

ISSUE;
A. Does Section 5(d) of Rep. Act No. 9189 violate Section 1, Article
V of the 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines?

B. Is Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 in relation to Section 4 of the

same Act in contravention of Section 4, Article VII of the
Constitution?

C. Are Sections 19 and 25 of R.A. No. 9189 in violation of Section 1,

Article IX-A of the Constitution?

33
HELD
A. No, It is clear from the discussions of the members of the
Constitutional Commission that they intended to enfranchise as
much as possible all Filipino citizens abroad who have not
abandoned their domicile of origin. The Commission even intended
to extend to young Filipinos who reach voting age abroad whose
parents domicile of origin is in the Philippines, thus, they must
return to the philippines otherwise their failure to return shall be
the cause for the removal of their names from the national registry of
absentee voters and his/her permanent disqualification to vote.
B. Yes, under Section 4, par. 4 Article VII of the Constitution which
provides that the returns of every election for President and Vice-
President shall be certified by the board of canvassers to Congress,
hence, Congress could not have allowed the comelec to usurp a
power that constitutionally belongs to it or, as aptly stated by
petitioner, to encroach on the power of Congress to canvass the
votes for president and vice-president and the power to proclaim the
winners for the said positions. The provisions of the Constitution as
the fundamental law of the land should be read as part
of The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003 and hence, the
canvassing of the votes and the proclamation of the winning
candidates for president and vice-president for the entire nation
must remain in the hands of Congress.
C. Yes, the Court held that the power of the comelec to formulate
rules and regulations is implicit in its power to implement
regulations under Section 2(1) of Article IX-C of the Constitution as
an independent constitutional body. It may not be subject to
interference by any government instrumentality and that the court
only review the comelec rules and only in cases of grave abuse of
discretion. Hence, Congress went beyond the scope of its
constitutional authority and trampled the constitutional mandate of
independence of the comelec.

34
 RULE ON
PRESENTMENT

35
ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST (formerly
1
AASJS) OFFICERS/MEMBERS SAMSON S. ALCANTARA, ED
VINCENT S. ALBANO, ROMEO R. ROBISO, RENE B.
GOROSPE and EDWIN R. SANDOVAL, petitioners,
vs.
HON. CESAR V. PURISIMA, in his capacity as Secretary of
Finance, HON. GUILLERMO L. PARAYNO, JR., in his capacity
as Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, and HON.
ALBERTO D. LINA, in his Capacity as Commissioner of Bureau
of Customs, respondents.
FACTS: Petitioners seeks to prevent respondents from
implementing and enforcing Republic Act (RA) 9335. R.A. 9335 was
enacted to optimize the revenue-generation capability and collection
of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs
(BOC). The law intends to encourage BIR and BOC officials and
employees to exceed their revenue targets by providing a system of
rewards and sanctions through the creation of a Rewards and
Incentives Fund (Fund) and a Revenue Performance Evaluation
Board (Board). It covers all officials and employees of the BIR and
the BOC with at least six months of service, regardless of
employment status.
Petitioners, invoking their right as taxpayers filed this petition
challenging the constitutionality of RA 9335, a tax reform
legislation. They contend that, by establishing a system of rewards
and incentives, the law ―transforms the officials and employees of
the BIR and the BOC into mercenaries and bounty hunters‖ as they
will do their best only in consideration of such rewards. Thus, the
system of rewards and incentives invites corruption and undermines
the constitutionally mandated duty of these officials and employees
to serve the people with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and
efficiency.
Petitioners also claim that limiting the scope of the system of
rewards and incentives only to officials and employees of the BIR and
the BOC violates the constitutional guarantee of equal protection.
There is no valid basis for classification or distinction as to why such
a system should not apply to officials and employees of all other
government agencies.
In addition, petitioners assert that the law unduly delegates the
power to fix revenue targets to the President as it lacks a sufficient

36
standard on that matter. While Section 7(b) and (c) of RA 9335
provides that BIR and BOC officials may be dismissed from the
service if their revenue collections fall short of the target by at least
7.5%, the law does not, however, fix the revenue targets to be
achieved. Instead, the fixing of revenue targets has been delegated to
the President without sufficient standards. It will therefore be easy
for the President to fix an unrealistic and unattainable target in order
to dismiss BIR or BOC personnel.
Finally, petitioners assail the creation of a congressional oversight
committee on the ground that it violates the doctrine of separation
of powers. While the legislative function is deemed accomplished
and completed upon the enactment and approval of the law, the
creation of the congressional oversight committee permits legislative
participation in the implementation and enforcement of the law.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the scope of the system of rewards and incentives
limitation to officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC violates
the constitutional guarantee of equal protection.
Whether or not there was an unduly delegation of power to fix
revenue targets to the President.
Whether or not the doctrine of separation of powers has been
violated in the creation of a congressional oversight committee.
RULINGS: The equal protection clause recognizes a valid
classification, that is, a classification that has a reasonable
foundation or rational basis and not arbitrary.22 With respect to RA
9335, its expressed public policy is the optimization of the revenue-
generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC.23 Since
the subject of the law is the revenue- generation capability and
collection of the BIR and the BOC, the incentives and/or sanctions
provided in the law should logically pertain to the said agencies.
Moreover, the law concerns only the BIR and the BOC because they
have the common distinct primary function of generating revenues
for the national government through the collection of taxes, customs
duties, fees and charges.
Both the BIR and the BOC principally perform the special function of
being the instrumentalities through which the State exercises one of
its great inherent functions – taxation. Indubitably, such substantial
distinction is germane and intimately related to the purpose of the

37
law. Hence, the classification and treatment accorded to the BIR and
the BOC under R.A. 9335 fully satisfy the demands of equal
protection.
R.A. 9335 adequately states the policy and standards to guide the
President in fixing revenue targets and the implementing agencies in
carrying out the provisions of the law under Sec 2 and 4 of the said
Act. Moreover, the Court has recognized the following as sufficient
standards: ―public interest,‖ ―justice and equity,‖ ―public
convenience and welfare‖ and ―simplicity, economy and welfare.‖33
In this case, the declared policy of optimization of the revenue-
generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC is
infused with public interest.
The court declined jurisdiction on this case. The Joint Congressional
Oversight Committee in RA 9335 was created for the purpose of
approving the implementing rules and regulations (IRR) formulated
by the DOF, DBM, NEDA, BIR, BOC and CSC. On May 22, 2006, it
approved the said IRR. From then on, it became functus officio and
ceased to exist. Hence, the issue of its alleged encroachment on the
executive function of implementing and enforcing the law may be
considered moot and academic.

38
 POST
ENACTMENT

39
 BELGICA, ET. AL VS. OCHOA
FACTS:

―Pork Barrel‖ refers to an appropriation of government

spending meant for localized projects and secured solely or primarily
to bring money to a representative's district. It may also refer to
legislative control of local appropriations.

I. History of Congressional Pork Barrel

In the Philippines, "Pork Barrel" is referred to as lump-

sum, discretionary funds of the Legislature and the Executive.
The earliest form of the Pork Barrel System can be traced in
Sec. 3 Act 3044, otherwise known as the ―Public Works Act
of 1922‖. Stipulated under this Act is the provision that
provides the fact that the release of funds and realignment of
transfer unexpected portions appropriated for certain public
works projects shall be subject to the approval of a joint
committee elected by the Senate and the House of
Representatives.

It was only during the Marcos Administration,

specifically during the Martial Law when the pork barrel
system was temporarily discontinued. It reappeared in 1982
through the ―Support for Local Development Projects (SLDP)‖
in the General Appropriations Act (GAA). After the EDSA
People Power Revolution and the restoration of democracy, the
pork barrel was revived through the ―Mindanao Development
Fund‖ and the ―Visayas Development Fund‖.

In 1990, the pork barrel was renamed as ―Countrywide

Development Fund‖. The CDF contained the same provisions
from 1994-1996 except that the Department of Budget and
Management was required to submit reports to the Senate
Committee on Finance and the House Committee on
Appropriations regarding the releases made from the funds.

In 2000, the Priority Development Assistance Fund

(―PDAF‖) appeared in the GAA. It was during the Arroyo
administration when the formal participation of non-
governmental organizations in the implementation of PDAF
projects was introduced.

40
 In 2011, the PDAF article in the GAA expressly released
a statement on lump-sum amounts allocated for individual
legislators and the Vice-President. Also, stipulated therein is
the provision on realignment of funds but with the
qualification that it may be allowed only once.

The 2013 PDAF Article allowed LGUs to be identified as

implementing agencies. Legislators were also allowed to
identify programs/projects outside of his legislative district.
Realignment of funds and release of funds were required to be
favorably endorsed by the House Committee on Appropriations
and the Senate Committee on Finance, as the case may be.

II. PRESIDENTIAL PORK BARREL

While the term "Pork Barrel" has been typically

associated with lump-sum, discretionary funds of Members of
Congress, the present cases and the recent controversies on the
matter have, however, shown that the term‗s usage has
expanded to include certain funds of the President such as the
Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund.

The ―Presidential Pork Barrel‖ examined by the

petitioners include the Malampaya Fund and the Presidential
Social Fund. The Malampaya Fund was created as a special
fund under Section 8, Presidential Decree (PD) 910 by
President Ferdinand Marcos to help consolidate government
efforts relating to the exploration, exploitation, and
development of energy resources vital to economic growth. The
Presidential Social Fund was created under Section 12, Title IV,
PD 1869 (1983) or the Charter of the Philippine Amusement
and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR), as amended by PD 1993
issued in 1985. The Presidential Social Fund is a special
funding facility administered by the Presidential Management
Staff through which the President provides direct assistance to
priority programs and projects not funded under the regular
budget. It is sourced from the share of the government in the
aggregate gross earnings of PAGCOR.

ISSUES:

I. Procedural Issues

41
 1. Is there an actual and justiciable controversy on the
consolidated petitions?
2. Are the issues raised a matter of policy not subject to
judicial review?
3. Do the petitioners have a legal standing to sue?
4. Does the previous decisions of the Court on Philippine
Constitution Association v. Enriquez (Philconsa) and the
2012 Decision of the Court on Lawyers Against Monopoly
and Poverty v. Secretary of Budget and
Management (LAMP) bar the re-litigation of the
constitutionality of the Pork Barrel system?

II. Substantive Issues

1. On Congressional Pork Barrel

Are the 2013 PDAF article and other laws on
Congressional Pork Barrel unconstitutional for violating
the following:
a. Separation of Powers
b. Non-delegability of Legislative Power
c. Checks and Balances
d. Accountability

2. On Presidential Pork Barrel

Do the following phrases constitute undue delegation of
legislative power?
a. Under Section 8 of PD 910 relating to the Malampaya
Funds:
―and for such other purposes as may be hereafter
directed by the President‖

b. Under Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD

1993, relating to the Presidential Social Fund:
―to finance the priority infrastructure development
projects and to finance the restoration of damaged or
destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be
directed and authorized by the Office of the President
of the Philippines‖

RULING:

I. Procedural Issues

42
 There can be no question heard and decided by the
Court involving the constitutionality or validity of a law or
governmental act unless there is compliance with
the legal requisites for judicial inquiry.

The requisites for a valid judicial inquiry are as follows:

a. There must be an actual case or controversy calling for the
exercise of judicial power;
b. The person challenging the act must have the standing to
question the validity of the subject act or issuance;
c. The question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
opportunity;
d. The issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the
case.

1. Is there an actual and justiciable controversy on the

consolidated petitions?

YES. There exists an actual and justiciable controversy in

these cases.

The requirement of contrariety of legal rights is satisfied

by the antagonistic positions of the parties on the constitutionality of
the ―Pork Barrel System.‖ Moreover, the questions in these
consolidated cases are ripe for adjudication since the challenged
funds and the provisions allowing for their utilization – such as
the 2013 GAA for the PDAF, PD 910 for the Malampaya Funds and
PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, for the Presidential Social Fund –
are currently existing and operational; hence, there exists an
immediate or threatened injury to petitioners as a result of
the unconstitutional use of these public funds.

As for the PDAF, the Court dispelled the notion that the
issues related thereto had been rendered moot and academic by the
reforms undertaken by respondents. A case becomes moot when
there is no more actual controversy between the parties or no useful
purpose can be served in passing upon the merits.

The respondents‘ proposed line-item budgeting

scheme would not terminate the controversy nor diminish the
useful purpose for its resolution since said reform is geared towards
the 2014 budget, and not the 2013 PDAF Article which, being
a distinct subject matter, remains legally effective and
existing. Neither will the President‘s declaration that he had
already ―abolished the PDAF‖ render the issues on PDAF moot
43
precisely because the Executive branch of government has no
constitutional authority to nullify or annul its legal existence.

On the assumption of mootness, nevertheless, jurisprudence

dictates that ―the ‗moot and academic‘ principle is not a magical
formula that can automatically dissuade the Court in resolving a
case.‖ The Court will decide cases, otherwise moot, if:

i.) There is a grave violation of the Constitution

ii.) The paramount public interest is involved.
iii.) When the constitutional issue raised requires
formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench,
the bar, and the public.
iv.) The case is capable of repetition yet evading review

2. Are the issues raised a matter of policy not subject to judicial

review?

YES. The intrinsic constitutionality of the ―Pork Barrel

System‖ is not an issue dependent upon the wisdom of the
political branches of government but rather a legal one which
the Constitution itself has commanded the Court to act
upon. Political Question Doctrine is simply inapplicable.

Scrutinizing the contours of the system along constitutional

lines is a task that the political branches of government are incapable
of rendering precisely because it is an exercise of judicial power.
More importantly, the present Constitution has not only vested the
Judiciary the right to exercise judicial power but essentially makes it
a duty to proceed therewith (Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution).

3. Do the petitioners have a legal standing to sue?

YES. Petitioners have sufficient locus standi to file the

instant cases.

Petitioners have come before the Court in their respective

capacities as citizen-taxpayers and accordingly, assert that they
―dutifully contribute to the coffers of the National Treasury.‖ As
taxpayers, they possess the requisite standing to question the
validity of the existing ―Pork Barrel System‖ under which the taxes
they pay have been and continue to be utilized. They are bound to
44
suffer from the unconstitutional usage of public funds, if the Court
so rules. Invariably, taxpayers have been allowed to sue where there
is a claim that public funds are illegally disbursed or that public
money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that public
funds are wasted through the enforcement of an invalid or
unconstitutional law, as in these cases.

4. Does the previous decisions of the Court bar the re-litigation of

the constitutionality of the Pork Barrel system?

NO. On the one hand, res judicata states that a judgment on

the merits in a previous case rendered by a court of competent
jurisdiction would bind a subsequent case if, between the first
and second actions, there exists an identity of parties, of subject
matter, and of causes of action. This required identity is not
present hereto since Philconsa and LAMP involved constitutional
challenges against the 1994 CDF Article and 2004 PDAF Article,
however, the cases at bar call for a broader constitutional scrutiny of
the entire ―Pork Barrel System‖. The ruling in LAMP is essentially a
dismissal based on a procedural technicality – and, thus, hardly a
judgment on the merits. Thus, res judicata cannot apply.

And since the Court now benefits from hindsight and current
findings (such as the CoA Report), it must partially abandon its
previous ruling in Philconsa insofar as it validated the post-
enactment identification authority of Members of Congress on the
guise that the same was merely recommendatory.

Lastly, since LAMP was dismissed on a procedural technicality

and, hence, has not set any controlling doctrine susceptible of
current application to the substantive issues in these cases, stare
decisis would not apply.

II. Substantive Issues

1. On Congressional Pork Barrel

Are the 2013 PDAF article and other laws on Congressional

Pork Barrel unconstitutional?

a. The separation of powers between the Executive and

Legislative Departments has been violated.

45
 Legislators have been accorded post-enactment
authority in the areas of fund release (Special Provision 5
under the 2013 PDAF Article) and realignment (Special
Provision 4, paragraphs 1 and 2 under the 2013 PDAF
Article).

Thus, legislators have been, in one form or another,

authorized to participate in ―the various operational
aspects of budgeting,‖ including ―the evaluation of work
and financial plans for individual activities‖ and the
―regulation and release of funds‖, in violation of the
separation of powers principle. That the said authority is
treated as merely recommendatory in nature does not alter
its unconstitutional tenor since the prohibition covers any
role in the implementation or enforcement of the law.

b. The non delegability clause has been violated.

The 2013 PDAF Article violates the principle of non-

delegability since legislators are effectively allowed to
individually exercise the power
of appropriation, which, as settled in Philconsa, is lodged
in Congress. The power to appropriate must be exercised
only through legislation, pursuant to Section 29(1), Article
VI of the 1987 Constitution which states: ―No money shall
be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of
an appropriation made by law.‖

The power of appropriation, as held by the Court

in Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice and Insular Auditor,
involves (a) setting apart by law a certain sum from the
public revenue for (b) a specified purpose. Under the
2013 PDAF Article, individual legislators are given a
personal lump-sum fund from which they are able
to dictate (a) how much from such fund would go to (b) a
specific project or beneficiary that they themselves also
determine. Since these two acts comprise the exercise of
the power of appropriation as described in Bengzon, and
given that the 2013 PDAF Article authorizes individual
legislators to perform the same, undoubtedly, said
legislators have been conferred the power to legislate
which the Constitution does not, however, allow.

c. Principle on Checks and Balances have been violated

46
 Evident in the 2013 PDAF Article, the amount of
P24.79 Billion only appears as a collective allocation
limit since the said amount would be further divided
among individual legislators who would then
receive personal lump-sum allocations and could, after the
GAA is passed, effectively appropriate PDAF funds based
on their own discretion. As these intermediate
appropriations are made by legislators only after the
GAA is passed and hence, outside of the law, it means
that the actual items of PDAF appropriation would not
have been written into the General Appropriations Bill
and thus effectuated without veto consideration.
This kind of lump-sum/post-enactment legislative
identification budgeting system fosters the creation of a
―budget within a budget‖ which subverts the prescribed
procedure of presentment and consequently impairs
the President’s power of item veto.

d. Conduct on oversight is tainted.

Allowing legislators to intervene in the various phases

of project implementation renders them susceptible to
taking undue advantage of their own office. However, the
Court cannot completely agree that the same post-
enactment authority and/or the individual legislator‘s
control of his PDAF per se would allow him to perpetrate
himself in office. This is a matter which must be analyzed
based on particular facts and on a case-to-case basis.

Also, while the Court accounts for the possibility that the
close operational proximity between legislators and the
Executive department, through the former‘s post-
enactment participation, may affect the process
of impeachment, this matter largely borders on the domain
of politics and does not strictly concern the Pork Barrel
System‘s intrinsic constitutionality. As such, it is an
improper subject of judicial assessment.

2. On Presidential Pork Barrel

Do the following phrases constitute undue delegation of

legislative power?

Under Section 8 of PD 910 relating to the Malampaya

Funds:

47
 ―and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed
by the President‖

YES. The phrase ―and for such other purposes as may be

hereafter directed by the President‖ under Section 8 of PD 910
constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power insofar as
it does not lay down a sufficient standard to adequately determine
the limits of the President‘s authority with respect to the purpose for
which the Malampaya Funds may be used. As it reads, the said
phrase gives the President wide latitude to use the Malampaya Funds
for any other purpose he may direct and, in effect, allows him
to unilaterally appropriate public funds beyond the purview of the
law.

That the subject phrase may be confined only to ―energy

resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the
government‖ under the principle of ejusdem generis, meaning that
the general word or phrase is to be construed to include – or be
restricted to – things akin to, resembling, or of the same kind or
class as those specifically mentioned, is belied by three (3) reasons:
first, the phrase ―energy resource development and exploitation
programs and projects of the government‖ states a singular and
general class and hence, cannot be treated as a statutory reference of
specific things from which the general phrase ―for such other
purposes‖ may be limited; second, the said phrase also exhausts the
class it represents, namely energy development programs of
the government; and, third, the Executive department has used
the Malampaya Funds for non-energy related purposes under the
subject phrase, thereby contradicting respondents‘ own position that
it is limited only to ―energy resource development and exploitation
programs and projects of the government.‖However, the rest of
Section 8, insofar as it allows for the use of the Malampaya Funds
―to finance energy resource development and exploitation programs
and projects of the government,‖ remains legally effective and
subsisting.

Under Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993,

relating to the Presidential Social Fund: ―to finance the priority
infrastructure development projects and to finance the
restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities,
as may be directed and authorized by the Office of the President
of the Philippines‖

48
 The second indicated purpose adequately curtails the authority
of the President to spend the Presidential Social Fund only for
restoration purposes which arise from calamities. The first indicated
purpose, however, gives him carte blanche authority to use the same
fund for any infrastructure project he may so determine as a
―priority―. Verily, the law does not supply a definition of ―priority
infrastructure development projects‖ and hence, leaves the President
without any guideline to construe the same. To note,
the delimitation of a project as one of ―infrastructure‖ is too broad of
a classification since the said term could pertain to any kind of
facility. Thus, the phrase ―to finance the priority infrastructure
development projects‖ must be stricken down as
unconstitutional since – similar to Section 8 of PD 910 – it lies
independently unfettered by any sufficient standard of the delegating
law. As they are severable, all other provisions of Section 12 of PD
1869, as amended by PD 1993, remains legally effective and
subsisting.

49
IRREPEALABLE
LAWS

50
DATU MICHAEL ABAS KIDA vs. SENATE OF THE
PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 196271 (and other cases consolidated therewith)

Promulgated, October 18, 2011
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

BRION, J.:

I. THE FACTS

Several laws pertaining to the Autonomous Region in Muslim

Mindanao (ARMM) were enacted by Congress. Republic Act (RA)
No. 6734 is the organic act that established the ARMM and
scheduled the first regular elections for the ARMM regional officials.
RA No. 9054 amended the ARMM Charter and refined the basic
ARMM structure. It also reset the regular elections for the ARMM
regional officials to the second Monday of September 2001.

RA No. 9140 further reset the first regular elections to November

26, 2001. It likewise set the plebiscite to ratify RA No. 9054, which
was successfully held on August 14, 2001. RA No. 9333 reset for
the third time the ARMM regional elections to the 2nd Monday of
August 2005 and on the same date every 3 years thereafter.

Pursuant to RA No. 9333, the next ARMM regional elections should

have been held on August 8, 2011. COMELEC had begun
preparations for these elections and had accepted certificates of
candidacies for the various regional offices to be elected. But
on June 30, 2011, RA No. 10153 was enacted, resetting the next
ARMM regular elections to May 2013 to coincide with the regular

51
national and local elections of the country.

RA No. 10153 originated in the House of Representatives as House

Bill No. 4146, which the House passed on March 22, 2011 with 191
(of the 285) Members voting in its favor. The Senate adopted its own
version, Senate Bill No. 2756, on June 6, 2011. 13 (of the 23)
Senators voted favorably for its passage. On June 7, 2011, the House
of Representative concurred with the Senate amendments and
on June 30, 2011, the President signed RA No. 10153 into law.

In these consolidated petitions filed directly with the Supreme

Court, the petitioners assailed the constitutionality of RA No.
10153.

II. THE ISSUES:

1. Does the 1987 Constitution mandate the synchronization of
elections?
2. Does the passage of RA No. 10153 violate Section 26(2), Article
VI of the 1987 Constitution?
3. Does the passage of RA No. 10153 require a supermajority vote
[at least 2/3 of all members of Congress] and a plebiscite?
a. Does the postponement of the ARMM regular elections constitute
an amendment to Section 7, Article XVIII of RA No. 9054?
b. Does the requirement of a supermajority vote for amendments or
revisions to RA No. 9054 violate Sections 1 and 16(2), Article VI of
the 1987 Constitution and the corollary doctrine [prohibiting]
irrepealable laws?
c. Does the requirement of a plebiscite apply only in the creation of
autonomous regions under Section 18(2), Article X of the 1987
Constitution?
4. Is the grant [to the President] of the power to appoint OICs
constitutional?

III. THE HOLDING

52
[The Supreme Court] DISMISSED the petitions and UPHELD the
constitutionality of RA No. 10153 in toto.]

1. YES, the 1987 Constitution mandates the synchronization of

elections.

While the Constitution does not expressly state that Congress

has to synchronize national and local elections, the clear intent
towards this objective can be gleaned from the Transitory Provisions
(Article XVIII) of the Constitution, which show the extent to which
the Constitutional Commission, by deliberately making adjustments
to the terms of the incumbent officials, sought to attain
synchronization of elections.

The objective behind setting a common termination date for all

elective officials, done among others through the shortening the
terms of the twelve winning senators with the least number of votes,
is to synchronize the holding of all future elections – whether
national or local – to once every three years. This intention finds full
support in the discussions during the Constitutional Commission
deliberations.

The Constitutional Commission exchanges, read with the

provisions of the Transitory Provisions of the Constitution, all
serve as patent indicators of the constitutional mandate to hold
synchronized national and local elections, starting the second
Monday of May, 1992 and for all the following elections.

xxx xxx xxx

Although called regional elections, the ARMM elections should

be included among the elections to be synchronized as it is a
―local‖ election based on the wording and structure of the
Constitution.

53
xxx xxx xxx

From the perspective of the Constitution, autonomous regions are

considered one of the forms of local governments, as evident from
Article X of the Constitution entitled ―Local
Government.‖ Autonomous regions are established and discussed
under Sections 15 to 21 of this Article – the article wholly devoted to
Local Government. That an autonomous region is considered a form
of local government is also reflected in Section 1, Article X of the
Constitution, which provides:

Section 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of

the Philippines are the provinces, cities, municipalities, and
barangays. There shall be autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao,
and the Cordilleras as hereinafter provided.

Thus, we find the contention – that the synchronization mandated

by the Constitution does not include the regional elections of the
ARMM – unmeritorious. xxx.

2. NO, the passage of RA No. 10153 DOES NOT violate

Section 26(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution because the
President certified on the urgency of [the enactment of] RA No.
10153.

The petitioners in G.R. No. 197280 also challenge the validity of RA

No. 10153 for its alleged failure to comply with Section 26(2),
Article VI of the Constitution, which provides that before bills
passed by either the House or the Senate can become laws, they
must pass through three readings on separate days. The exception to
this is when the President certifies to the necessity of the bill‘s
immediate enactment.

The Court, in Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, explained the effect

of the President‘s certification of necessity in the following manner:
54
The presidential certification dispensed with the requirement
not only of printing but also that of reading the bill on separate
days. The phrase "except when the President certifies to the
necessity of its immediate enactment, etc." in Art. VI, Section 26[2]
qualifies the two stated conditions before a bill can become a law: [i]
the bill has passed three readings on separate days and [ii] it has
been printed in its final form and distributed three days before it is
finally approved.

In the present case, the records show that the President wrote
to the Speaker of the House of Representatives to certify the
necessity of the immediate enactment of a law synchronizing
the ARMM elections with the national and local elections.
Following our Tolentino ruling, the President’s certification
exempted both the House and the Senate from having to comply
with the three separate readings requirement.

On the follow-up contention that no necessity existed for the

immediate enactment of these bills since there was no public
calamity or emergency that had to be met, again we hark back to our
ruling in Tolentino:

The sufficiency of the factual basis of the suspension of the writ

of habeas corpus or declaration of martial law Art. VII, Section 18, or
the existence of a national emergency justifying the delegation of
extraordinary powers to the President under Art. VI, Section 23(2) is
subject to judicial review because basic rights of individuals may be
of hazard. But the factual basis of presidential certification of
bills, which involves doing away with procedural requirements
designed to insure that bills are duly considered by members of
Congress, certainly should elicit a different standard of review.

The House of Representatives and the Senate – in the exercise of

their legislative discretion – gave full recognition to the President‘s
certification and promptly enacted RA No. 10153. Under the
circumstances, nothing short of grave abuse of discretion on the part

55
of the two houses of Congress can justify our intrusion under our
power of judicial review.

The petitioners, however, failed to provide us with any cause or

justification for [our intrusion under the power of judicial
review]. Hence, while the judicial department and this Court are
not bound by the acceptance of the President's certification by both
the House of Representatives and the Senate, prudent exercise of our
powers and respect due our co-equal branches of government in
matters committed to them by the Constitution, caution a stay of the
judicial hand.

In any case, despite the President‘s certification, the two-fold

purpose that underlies the requirement for three readings on
separate days of every bill must always be observed to enable our
legislators and other parties interested in pending bills to
intelligently respond to them. Specifically, the purpose with respect
to Members of Congress is: (1) to inform the legislators of the
matters they shall vote on and (2) to give them notice that a measure
is in progress through the enactment process.

We find, based on the records of the deliberations on the law, that

both advocates and the opponents of the proposed measure had
sufficient opportunities to present their views. In this light, no
reason exists to nullify RA No. 10153 on the cited ground.

3. NO, the passage of [RA No. 9333 and] RA No. 10153

DOES NOT require a supermajority vote and a plebiscite

A. RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 are NOT amendments to

RA No. 9054

[N]either RA No. 9333 nor RA No. 10153 amends RA No.

9054. As an examination of these laws will show, RA No. 9054
only provides for the schedule of the first ARMM elections and
does not fix the date of the regular elections. A need therefore

56
existed for the Congress to fix the date of
the subsequent ARMM regular elections, which it did by enacting
RA No. 9333 and thereafter, RA No. 10153. Obviously, these
subsequent laws – RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 – cannot be
considered amendments to RA No. 9054 as they did not change or
revise any provision in the latter law; they merely filled in a gap in
RA No. 9054 or supplemented the law by providing the date of the
subsequent regular elections.

xxx xxx xxx

From these legislative actions, we see the clear intention of Congress

to treat the laws which fix the date of the subsequent ARMM
elections as separate and distinct from the Organic Acts. Congress
only acted consistently with this intent when it passed RA No.
10153 without requiring compliance with the amendment
prerequisites embodied in Section 1 and Section 3, Article XVII of
RA No. 9054.

B. Supermajority voting requirement [under RA No. 9054]

VIOLATES Section 16(2), Article VI for giving RA No. 9054 the
character of an irrepealable law

Even assuming that RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 did in fact
amend RA No. 9054, the supermajority (2/3) voting requirement
required under Section 1, Article XVII of RA No. 9054 has to be
struck down for giving RA No. 9054 the character of an irrepealable
law by requiring more than what the Constitution demands.

Section 16(2), Article VI of the Constitution provides that a

―majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do business.‖
In other words, as long as majority of the members of the House of
Representatives or the Senate are present, these bodies have the
quorum needed to conduct business and hold session. Within a
quorum, a vote of majority is generally sufficient to enact laws or
approve acts.

57
In contrast, Section 1, Article XVII of RA No. 9054 requires a vote of
no less than two-thirds (2/3) of the Members of the House of
Representatives and of the Senate, voting separately, in order to
effectively amend RA No. 9054. Clearly, this 2/3 voting
requirement is higher than what the Constitution requires for
the passage of bills, and served to restrain the plenary powers of
Congress to amend, revise or repeal the laws it had passed. The
Court‘s pronouncement in City of Davao v. GSIS on this subject best
explains the basis and reason for the unconstitutionality:

Moreover, it would be noxious anathema to democratic principles for

a legislative body to have the ability to bind the actions of future
legislative body, considering that both assemblies are regarded with
equal footing, exercising as they do the same plenary
powers. Perpetual infallibility is not one of the attributes desired in a
legislative body, and a legislature which attempts to forestall future
amendments or repeals of its enactments labors under delusions of
omniscience.

Thus, while a supermajority is not a total ban against a repeal,

it is a limitation in excess of what the Constitution requires on
the passage of bills and is constitutionally obnoxious because it
significantly constricts the future legislators’ room for action
and flexibility.

C. Plebiscite requirement only applies to the creation of

autonomous regions; Section 3, Article XVII of RA No. 9054
unconstitutional for excessively enlarging the plebiscite
requirement in Section 18, Article X of the Constitution

[T]he plebiscite requirement under Section 3, Article XVII of RA No.

9054 is excessive to point of absurdity and, hence, a violation of the
Constitution.

Section 18, Article X of the Constitution states that the plebiscite is

58
required only for the creation of autonomous regions and for [the
determination of] which provinces, cities and geographic areas will
be included in the autonomous regions. While the settled rule is that
amendments to the Organic Act have to comply with the plebiscite
requirement in order to become effective, questions on the extent of
the matters requiring ratification may unavoidably arise because of
the seemingly general terms of the Constitution and the obvious
absurdity that would result if a plebiscite were to be required
for every statutory amendment.

Section 18, Article X of the Constitution plainly states that ―The

creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved
by the majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a
plebiscite called for the purpose.‖ With these wordings as standard,
we interpret the requirement to mean that only amendments to, or
revisions of, the Organic Act constitutionally-essential to the
creation of autonomous regions – i.e., those aspects specifically
mentioned in the Constitution which Congress must provide for
in the Organic Act – require ratification through a
plebiscite. These amendments to the Organic Act are those that
relate to: (a) the basic structure of the regional government; (b) the
region‘s judicial system, i.e., the special courts with personal,
family, and property law jurisdiction; and, (c) the grant and extent of
the legislative powers constitutionally conceded to the regional
government under Section 20, Article X of the Constitution.

The date of the ARMM elections does not fall under any of the
matters that the Constitution specifically mandated Congress to
provide for in the Organic Act. Therefore, even assuming that
the supermajority votes and the plebiscite requirements are
valid, any change in the date of elections cannot be construed as
a substantial amendment of the Organic Act that would require
compliance with these requirements.

4. YES, the grant [to the President] of the power to appoint

OICs is constitutional

During the oral arguments, the Court identified the three options
59
open to Congress in order to resolve the problem on who should sit
as ARMM officials in the interim: (1) allow the elective officials in
the ARMM to remain in office in a hold over capacity until those
elected in the synchronized elections assume office; (2) hold special
elections in the ARMM, with the terms of those elected to expire
when those elected in the [2013] synchronized elections assume
office; or (3) authorize the President to appoint OICs, [their terms to
last] also until those elected in the [2013] synchronized elections
assume office.

A. Holdover Option is Unconstitutional

We rule out the [hold over] option xxx violates Section 8,

Article X of the Constitution. This provision states:

Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except

barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three
years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive
terms. [emphases ours]

Since elective ARMM officials are local officials, they are

covered and bound by the three-year term limit prescribed by
the Constitution; they cannot extend their term through a
holdover. xxx.

xxx xxx xxx

In the case of the terms of local officials, their term has been fixed
clearly and unequivocally, allowing no room for any implementing
legislation with respect to the fixed term itself and no vagueness that
would allow an interpretation from this Court. Thus, the term of
three years for local officials should stay at three (3) years as
fixed by the Constitution and cannot be extended by holdover
by Congress.

60
If it will be claimed that the holdover period is effectively another
term mandated by Congress, the net result is for Congress to create
a new term and to appoint the occupant for the new term. This view
– like the extension of the elective term – is constitutionally infirm
because Congress cannot do indirectly what it cannot do
directly, i.e., to act in a way that would effectively extend the term of
the incumbents. Indeed, if acts that cannot be legally done directly
can be done indirectly, then all laws would be illusory. Congress
cannot also create a new term and effectively appoint the
occupant of the position for the new term. This is effectively an
act of appointment by Congress and an unconstitutional
intrusion into the constitutional appointment power of the
President. Hence, holdover – whichever way it is viewed – is a
constitutionally infirm option that Congress could not have
undertaken.

Jurisprudence, of course, is not without examples of cases where the

question of holdover was brought before, and given the imprimatur
of approval by, this Court. The present case though differs
significantly from past cases with contrary rulings, where the Court
ruled that the elective officials could hold on to their positions in a
hold over capacity.

All these past cases refer to elective barangay or Sanggunian

Kabataan officials whose terms of office are not explicitly provided
for in the Constitution; the present case, on the other hand, refers to
local elective officials – the ARMM Governor, the ARMM Vice-
Governor, and the members of the Regional Legislative Assembly –
whose terms fall within the three-year term limit set by Section 8,
Article X of the Constitution. Because of their constitutionally
limited term, Congress cannot legislate an extension beyond the
term for which they were originally elected.

Even assuming that holdover is constitutionally permissible, and

there had been statutory basis for it (namely Section 7, Article VII of
RA No. 9054) in the past, we have to remember that the rule of
holdover can only apply as an available option where no express
or implied legislative intent to the contrary exists; it cannot
apply where such contrary intent is evident.
61
Congress, in passing RA No. 10153, made it explicitly clear that
it had the intention of suppressing the holdover rule that
prevailed under RA No. 9054 by completely removing this
provision. The deletion is a policy decision that is wholly within the
discretion of Congress to make in the exercise of its plenary
legislative powers; this Court cannot pass
upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation,
except where an attendant unconstitutionality or grave abuse of
discretion results.

B. The COMELEC has no authority to order special elections

Another option proposed by the petitioner in G.R. No. 197282 is for

this Court to compel COMELEC to immediately conduct special
elections pursuant to Section 5 and 6 of Batas Pambansa Blg. (BP)
881.

The power to fix the date of elections is essentially legislative in

nature. [N]o elections may be held on any other date for the
positions of President, Vice President, Members of Congress and
local officials, except when so provided by another Act of Congress,
or upon orders of a body or officer to whom Congress may have
delegated either the power or the authority to ascertain or fill in the
details in the execution of that power.

Notably, Congress has acted on the ARMM elections by

postponing the scheduled August 2011 elections and setting
another date – May 13, 2011 – for regional elections
synchronized with the presidential, congressional and other
local elections. By so doing, Congress itself has made a policy
decision in the exercise of its legislative wisdom that it shall not
call special elections as an adjustment measure in synchronizing
the ARMM elections with the other elections.

After Congress has so acted, neither the Executive nor the

62
Judiciary can act to the contrary by ordering special elections
instead at the call of the COMELEC. This Court, particularly,
cannot make this call without thereby supplanting the legislative
decision and effectively legislating. To be sure, the Court is not
without the power to declare an act of Congress null and void for
being unconstitutional or for having been exercised in grave abuse of
discretion. But our power rests on very narrow ground and is merely
to annul a contravening act of Congress; it is not to supplant the
decision of Congress nor to mandate what Congress itself should
have done in the exercise of its legislative powers. Thus, contrary to
what the petition in G.R. No. 197282 urges, we cannot compel
COMELEC to call for special elections.

xxx xxx xxx

Even assuming that it is legally permissible for the Court to compel

the COMELEC to hold special elections, no legal basis likewise
exists to rule that the newly elected ARMM officials shall hold office
only until the ARMM officials elected in the synchronized elections
shall have assumed office.

In the first place, the Court is not empowered to adjust the terms of
elective officials. Based on the Constitution, the power to fix the
term of office of elective officials, which can be exercised only in the
case of barangay officials, is specifically given to Congress. Even
Congress itself may be denied such power, as shown when the
Constitution shortened the terms of twelve Senators obtaining the
least votes, and extended the terms of the President and the Vice-
President in order to synchronize elections; Congress was not
granted this same power. The settled rule is that terms fixed by the
Constitution cannot be changed by mere statute. More particularly,
not even Congress and certainly not this Court, has the authority to
fix the terms of elective local officials in the ARMM for less, or more,
than the constitutionally mandated three years as this tinkering
would directly contravene Section 8, Article X of the Constitution as
we ruled in Osmeña.

Thus, in the same way that the term of elective ARMM officials
63
cannot be extended through a holdover, the term cannot be
shortened by putting an expiration date earlier than the three
(3) years that the Constitution itself commands. This is what
will happen – a term of less than two years – if a call for special
elections shall prevail. In sum, while synchronization is achieved, the
result is at the cost of a violation of an express provision of the
Constitution.

D. The President’s Power to Appoint OICs

The above considerations leave only Congress‘ chosen interim

measure – RA No. 10153 and the appointment by the President of
OICs to govern the ARMM during the pre-synchronization period
pursuant to Sections 3, 4 and 5 of this law – as the only measure that
Congress can make. This choice itself, however, should be examined
for any attendant constitutional infirmity.

At the outset, the power to appoint is essentially executive in nature,

and the limitations on or qualifications to the exercise of this power
should be strictly construed; these limitations or qualifications must
be clearly stated in order to be recognized. The appointing power is
embodied in Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, which
states:

Section 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of
the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the
executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or
naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in
him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of
the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for
by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to
appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other
officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the
heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. [emphasis
ours]

64
This provision classifies into four groups the officers that the
President can appoint. These are:

First, the heads of the executive departments; ambassadors; other

public ministers and consuls; officers of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, from the rank of colonel or naval captain; and other
officers whose appointments are vested in the President in this
Constitution;

Second, all other officers of the government whose appointments are

not otherwise provided for by law;

Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to

appoint; and

Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may

by law vest in the President alone.

Since the President’s authority to appoint OICs emanates from

RA No. 10153, it falls under the third group of officials that the
President can appoint pursuant to Section 16, Article VII of the
Constitution. Thus, the assailed law facially rests on clear
constitutional basis.

If at all, the gravest challenge posed by the petitions to the authority

to appoint OICs under Section 3 of RA No. 10153 is the assertion
that the Constitution requires that the ARMM executive and
legislative officials to be ―elective and representative of the
constituent political units.‖ This requirement indeed is an express
limitation whose non-observance in the assailed law leaves the
appointment of OICs constitutionally defective.

After fully examining the issue, we hold that this

alleged constitutional problem is more apparent than real and
becomes very real only if RA No. 10153 were to be mistakenly read

65
as a law that changes the elective and representative character of
ARMM positions. RA No. 10153, however, does not in any way
amend what the organic law of the ARMM (RA No. 9054) sets
outs in terms of structure of governance. What RA No. 10153
in fact only does is to ―appoint officers-in-charge for the Office
of the Regional Governor, Regional Vice Governor and
Members of the Regional Legislative Assembly who shall
perform the functions pertaining to the said offices until the
officials duly elected in the May 2013 elections shall have
qualified and assumed office.‖ This power is far different from
appointing elective ARMM officials for the abbreviated term
ending on the assumption to office of the officials elected in the
May 2013 elections.

[T]he legal reality is that RA No. 10153 did not amend RA No.
9054. RA No. 10153, in fact, provides only for synchronization
of elections and for the interim measures that must in the
meanwhile prevail. And this is how RA No. 10153 should be
read – in the manner it was written and based on its
unambiguous facial terms. Aside from its order for
synchronization, it is purely and simply an interim measure
responding to the adjustments that the synchronization
requires.

xxx xxx xxx

Furthermore, the ―representative‖ character of the chosen

leaders need not necessarily be affected by the appointment of
OICs as this requirement is really a function of the appointment
process; only the ―elective‖ aspect shall be supplanted by the
appointment of OICs. In this regard, RA No. 10153 significantly
seeks to address concerns arising from the appointments by
providing, under Sections 3, 4 and 5 of the assailed law, concrete
terms in the Appointment of OIC, the Manner and Procedure of
Appointing OICs, and their Qualifications.

Based on these considerations, we hold that RA No. 10153 – viewed

in its proper context – is a law that is not violative of the
66
Constitution (specifically, its autonomy provisions), and one that is
reasonable as well under the circumstance.

67
USURPATION
BY THE
EXECUTIVE

68
G.R. No. 166471: March 22, 2011
TAWANG MULTI-PURPOSE COOPERATIVE Petitioner,v. LA
TRINIDAD WATER DISTRICT, Respondent.
CARPIO,J.:

FACTS:

Tawang Multi-Purpose Cooperative (TMPC) is a cooperative,

organized to provide domestic water services in Barangay Tawang, La
Trinidad, Benguet. La Trinidad Water District (LTWD) is a local
water utility created under Section 47 of Presidential Decree (PD)
No. 198, as amended. It is authorized to supply water for domestic,
industrial and commercial purposes within the municipality of La
Trinidad, Benguet.

TMPC filed with the National Water Resources Board (NWRB) an

application for a certificate of public convenience (CPC) to operate
and maintain a waterworks system in Barangay Tawang. LTWD
opposed TMPCs application, arguing that its franchise is exclusive as
provided under PD 198. A CPC is however granted. LTWD filed a
motion for reconsideration but the same was denied by NWRB.
LTWD then appealed to the RTC where it court set aside the NWRB
decision. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petition may be granted

HELD: Yes. RTC Decision Set Aside.

Political Law- No franchise, certificate, or any other form of

authorization for the operation of a public utility shall be granted
except to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or
associations organized under the laws of the Philippines, at least
sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens,nor shall
such franchise, certificate or authorizationbe exclusive in characteror
for a longer period than fifty years.

Plain words do not require explanation. The 1935, 1973 and 1987
Constitutions are clear franchises for the operation of a public utility
cannot be exclusive in character. The 1935, 1973 and 1987
Constitutions expressly and clearly state that,"nor shall such
franchise x x x be exclusive in character."There is no exception.

When the law is clear, there is nothing for the courts to do but to
apply it. The duty of the Court is to apply the law the way it is

69
worded. What cannot be legally done directly cannot be done
indirectly. This rule is basic and, to a reasonable mind, does not need
explanation. Indeed, if acts that cannot be legally done directly can
be done indirectly, then all laws would be illusory.

Indeed, the President, Congress and the Court cannot create directly
franchises that are exclusive in character. What the President,
Congress and the Court cannot legally do directly they cannot do
indirectly. Thus, the President, Congress and the Court cannot create
indirectly.

In PD No. 198, as amended, former President Ferdinand E. Marcos

(President Marcos) created indirectly franchises that are exclusive in
character by allowing the BOD of LTWD and the LWUA to create
directly franchises that are exclusive in character.

In case of conflict between the Constitution and a statute, the

Constitution always prevails because the Constitution is the basic
law to which all other laws must conform to. The duty of the Court
is to uphold the Constitution and to declare void all laws that do not
conform to it.

Petition Granted. Section 47 of PD 198 is UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

70
SECTION 30
ARTICLE VI

71
 TERESITA G. FABIAN VS. HON. ANIANO A. DESIERTO, ET
AL.
G.R. No. 129742, September 16, 1998
REGALADO, J.:
Facts:
Fabian (F), the president of PROMAT Construction Development
Corp. (PROMAT) was inveigled by Agustin (A), the District
Engineer of the First Metro Manila Engineering District (FMED)
into an amorous relationship. PROMAT, participated in the bidding
for government construction projects and A gifted PROMAT with
contracts. When F tried to terminate the relationship, A harassed,
intimidated and threatened F which led to the filing of an
administrative case. The Graft Investigator found a guilty of grave
misconduct and ordered his dismissal with forfeiture of benefits,
approved by the Director and Asst. Ombudsman. The Ombudsman
modified the ruling by suspending A without pay for a year. After the
ombudsman inhibited himself, the deputy exonerated A from the
charges.
Issue/s:
Whether the SC has jurisdiction over the case.
Ruling:
Negative. RA 6770 provides for an appeal under Rule 45 while AO
07 states that a decision absolving a respondent is final and
unappealable. Hence, F filed a petition under Rule 65. Respondents
countered that the Ombudsman is empowered to promulgate its
own rules of procedure. Although the SC will not dwell into the
constitutionality of a law, it may do so when its jurisdiction is in
question. RA 6770 is involved only whenever it is a certiorari under
Rule 45; not under Rule 65. Those under Rule 45 includes decisions
of appellate courts. Appeals from judgments of quasi-judicial bodies
are appealed to the CA under Rule 43. Offenses under RA 6770 may
either be tried by the CSC appealed to the CA or by the
Ombudsman appealed to the SC, but, for expediency, they should be
consolidated to the CA. Art VI, Sec 30 states, ―no law shall be passed
increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the SC as provided in this
constitution without its advice and consent‖. Thus, the jurisdiction
of a court is not a question of acquiescence but an issue of
conferment as a matter of law. If the rule takes away a vested right, it
is not procedural. If the rule creates a right such as the right to
appeal, it may be classified as a substantive matter; but if it operates
as a means of implementing an existing right then the rule is
procedural. In this case, the rule is procedural since the right has
72
been preserved, only the procedure is changed. Thus, Sec 27 of RA
6770 and Sec, Rule 3 of AO 07 are void.

73
 SECTION 27
RA 6770
RULE 45, SEC. 1,
SEC. 6 RULE 135

74
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES, IN HER CAPACITY AS THE
OMBUDSMAN, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS
(SIXTH DIVISION) AND JEJOMAR ERWIN S. BINAY, JR.,
RESPONDENTS.
G.R. Nos. 217126-27, November 10, 2015

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

FACTS:
A complaint/affidavit was filed by Atty. Renato L. Bondal and
Nicolas "Ching" Enciso VI before the Office of the Ombudsman
against Binay, Jr. and other public officers and employees of the City
Government of Makati (Binay, Jr., et al), accusing them of Plunder
and violation of Republic Act No. (RA) 3019, otherwise known as
"The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act," in connection with the
five (5) phases of the procurement and construction of the Makati
City Hall Parking Building (Makati Parking Building).
The Ombudsman constituted a Special Panel of Investigators to
conduct a fact-finding investigation, submit an investigation report,
and file the necessary complaint, if warranted (1st Special Panel).
The 1st Special Panel filed a complaint (OMB Complaint) against
Binay, Jr., et al, charging them with six (6) administrative cases for
Grave Misconduct, Serious Dishonesty, and Conduct Prejudicial to
the Best Interest of the Service, and six (6) criminal cases for
violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, Malversation of Public Funds,
and Falsification of Public Documents (OMB Cases).

Binay’s First Term:

Binay, Jr. issued the Notice of Award for Phase III, IV and V of the
Makati Parking Building project to Hilmarc's Construction
Corporation (Hilmarc's), and consequently, executed the
corresponding contract without the required publication and the lack
of architectural design, and approved the release of funds therefor.

Binay’s Second Term:

Binay, Jr. approved the release of funds for the remaining balance of
contract with Hilmarc's for Phase V of the Makati Parking Building
project; and approved the release of funds for the remaining balance
of the contract with MANA Architecture & Interior Design Co.
(MANA) for the design and architectural services covering the
Makati Parking Building. Before Binay, Jr., et al.'s filing of their
counter-affidavits, the Ombudsman, the subject preventive
suspension order, placing Binay, Jr., et al. under preventive

75
suspension for not more than six (6) months without pay, during
the pendency of the OMB Cases.
The Ombudsman ruled that the requisites for the preventive
suspension of a public officer are present, finding that:
(a) the evidence of Binay, Jr., et al.'s guilt was strong given that
(1) the losing bidders and members of the Bids and Awards
Committee of Makati City had attested to the irregularities
attending the Makati Parking Building project;
(2) the documents on record negated the publication of bids;
and
(3) the disbursement vouchers, checks, and official receipts
showed the release of funds; and
(b)
(1) Binay, Jr., et al. were administratively charged with Grave
Misconduct, Serious Dishonesty, and Conduct Prejudicial to
the Best Interest of the Service;
(2) said charges, if proven to be true, warrant removal from
public service under the Revised Rules on Administrative
Cases in the Civil Service (RRACCS), and
(3) Binay, Jr., et al.'s respective positions give them access to
public records and allow them to influence possible witnesses;
hence, their continued stay in office may prejudice the
investigation relative to the OMB Cases filed against them.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the CA has subject matter jurisdiction to issue a
TRO and/or WPI enjoining the implementation of a preventive
suspension order issued by the Ombudsman;
2. Whether or not the CA gravely abused its discretion in issuing the
TRO and eventually, the WPI in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 enjoining
the implementation of the preventive suspension order against
Binay, Jr. based on the condonation doctrine

HELD:
1. YES
OMB contends that the CA has no jurisdiction to issue any
provisional injunctive writ against her office to enjoin its preventive
suspension orders. As basis, she invokes the first paragraph of
Section 14, RA 6770 in conjunction with her office's independence
under the 1987 Constitution. She advances the idea that "[i]n order
to further ensure [her office's] independence, [RA 6770] likewise
insulated it from judicial intervention," particularly, "from injunctive
reliefs traditionally obtainable from the courts," claiming that said

76
writs may work "just as effectively as direct harassment or political
pressure would."

A. The concept of Ombudsman independence.

Section 5, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution guarantees the
independence of the Office of the Ombudsman:
Section 5. There is hereby created the independent Office of the
Ombudsman, composed of the Ombudsman to be known as
Tanodbayan, one overall Deputy and at least one Deputy each
for Luzon, Visayas[,] and Mindanao. A separate Deputy for the
military establishment may likewise be appointed.

Gonzales III v. Office of the President is the first case which grappled
with the meaning of the Ombudsman's independence vis-a-vis the
independence of the other constitutional bodies. The concept of
Ombudsman's independence covers three (3) things:
First: creation by the Constitution, which means that the office
cannot be abolished, nor its constitutionally specified functions and
privileges, be removed, altered, or modified by law, unless the
Constitution itself allows, or an amendment thereto is made
Second: fiscal autonomy, which means that the office "may not be
obstructed from [its] freedom to use or dispose of [its] funds for
purposes germane to [its] functions; hence, its budget cannot be
strategically decreased by officials of the political branches of
government so as to impair said functions; and
Third: insulation from executive supervision and control, which
means that those within the ranks of the office can only be
disciplined by an internal authority. Evidently, all three aspects of
independence intend to protect the Office of the Ombudsman from
political harassment and pressure, so as to free it from the "insidious
tentacles of politics."

That being the case, the concept of Ombudsman independence

cannot be invoked as basis to insulate the Ombudsman from judicial
power constitutionally vested unto the courts. Courts are apolitical
bodies, which are ordained to act as impartial tribunals and apply
even justice to all. Hence, the Ombudsman's notion that it can be
exempt from an incident of judicial power - that is, a provisional writ
of injunction against a preventive suspension order - clearly strays
from the concept's rationale of insulating the office from political
harassment or pressure.

2) It is well-settled that an act of a court or tribunal can only be

considered as with grave abuse of discretion when such act is done

77
in a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be
so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or
to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all
in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility. It
has also been held that "grave abuse of discretion arises when a
lower court or tribunal patently violates the Constitution, the
law or existing jurisprudence."

As earlier established, records disclose that the CA's resolutions

directing the issuance of the assailed injunctive writs were all hinged
on cases enunciating the condonation doctrine. To recount, the
March
16, 2015 Resolution directing the issuance of the subject TRO was
based on the case of Governor Garcia, Jr., while the April 6, 2015
Resolution directing the issuance of the subject WPI was based on
the cases of Aguinaldo, Salalima, Mayor Garcia, and again, Governor
Garcia, Jr. Thus, by merely following settled precedents on the
condonation doctrine, which at that time, unwittingly remained
"good law," it cannot be concluded that the CA committed a grave
abuse of discretion based on its legal attribution above.

Accordingly, the WPI against the Ombudsman's preventive

suspension order was correctly issued. With this, the ensuing course
of action should have been for the CA to resolve the main petition
for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 on the merits. However,
considering that the Ombudsman, on October 9, 2015, had already
found Binay, Jr. administratively liable and imposed upon him the
penalty of dismissal, which carries the accessory penalty of perpetual
disqualification from holding public office, for the present
administrative charges against him, the said CA petition appears to
have been mooted. As initially intimated, the preventive suspension
order is only an ancillary issuance that, at its core, serves the
purpose of assisting the Office of the Ombudsman in its
investigation. It therefore has no more purpose - and perforce,
dissolves - upon the termination of the office's process of
investigation in the instant administrative case of assisting the Office
of the Ombudsman in its investigation. It therefore has no more
purpose - and perforce, dissolves - upon the termination of the
office's process of investigation in the instant administrative case.

78
PROSPECTIVE APPLICATION OF THE
LAW VIS A VIS REINCORPORATION

79
 G.R. No. 197528 September 5, 2012
PERT/CPM MANPOWER EXPONENT CO., INC., Petitioner,
vs.
ARMANDO A. VINUY A, LOUIE M. ORDOVEZ, ARSENIO S.
LUMANTA,. JR., ROBELITO S. ANIPAN, VIRGILIO R.
ALCANTARA, MARINO M. ERA, SANDY O. ENJAMBRE and
NOEL T. LADEA, Respondents.

Short Title: Pert/CPM Manpower Exponent Co., Inc. vs Vinuya

Doctrine: Constructive Dismissal; Retroactivity of Laws

FACTS:
Respondents were contracted by Pert/CPM Manpower
(agency) for deployment to work as aluminum fabricator/installer in
the agency‘s principal, Modern Metal in Dubai, UAE. Their
employment contracts, which were approved by the POEA, provided
for a two-year employment, nine working hours a day, salary of
1,350 AED with overtime pay, food allowance, free and suitable
housing (four to a room), free transportation, free laundry, and free
medical and dental services. However, in Dubai, Modern Metal gave
them appointment letters with terms different from those they
signed in the Philippines -increasing their employment terms,
reducing salaries, allowances, and benefits. The working conditions
were also not as promised. Because of their difficult living and
working conditions, they complained to their agency about their
predicament, but to no avail. Due to the unbearable living and
working condition, respondents resigned from their job. Out of fear
that Modern Metal would not give them their salaries and release
papers, respondents, expect Era who mentioned the real reason,
cited personal/family problems for their resignation.

After returning to the Philippines, respondents filed a

complaint for illegal dismissal against the agency. The agency
countered that they were not illegally dismissed because they
resigned voluntarily. The LA dismissed the complaint finding that
the respondents voluntarily resigned from their jobs. Respondents
appealed to NLRC which reversed the LA decision. NLRC stressed
that it is illegal for an employer to require its employees to execute
new employment papers, especially those which provide benefits
that are inferior to the POEA-approved contracts. NLRC ordered the
agency, and Modern Metal to jointly pay respondents their unpaid
salary, placement fee, salary for the unexpired portion of the contract
and exemplary damages. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration
which was denied by NLRC, but modified its earlier decision and

80
adjusted the respondents‘ salary entitlement in light of the Serrano
ruling which declared unconstitutional the clause in Sec. 10, par. 5 of
RA 8042, limiting to three months for every year the payment of
salaries (for the unexpired portion of the employment) to illegally
dismissed OFWs. Petitioner questioned the applicability of Serrano
ruling. The agency posit that the Serrano ruling has already been
nullified by RA 10022 which restored Sec. 10, par. 5 of RA 8042. CA
upheld NLRC‘s decision.

ISSUES:
1.) WON the respondents were illegally dismissed
2.) WON the CA erred in affirming the NLRC‘s award to the
respondents of their salaries for the unexpired portion of their
employment contracts, pursuant to the Serrano ruling

RULING:
1.) Yes. The respondents were illegally dismissed. Contrary to the
argument of the agency that the respondents voluntarily
resigned, the respondents were constructively dismissed. A
constructive dismissal or discharge is "a quitting because
continued employment is rendered impossible, unreasonable
or unlikely, as, an offer involving a demotion in rank and a
diminution in pay.‖ In the case at bar, with their original
contracts substituted and their oppressive working and living
conditions unmitigated, they were compelled to give up their
jobs. The respondents‘ continued employment with Modern
Metal had become unreasonable. A reasonable mind would not
approve of a substituted contract that pays a diminished salary
or an extended employment (from 2 to 3 years) at such inferior
terms, or a "free and suitable" housing which is hours away
from the job site, cramped and crowded, without potable water
and exposed to air pollution.

2.) No. The CA is correct in affirming the NLRC‘s award to the

respondents of their salaries for the unexpired portion of their
employment contracts, pursuant to the Serrano ruling. The
agency‘s objection to the application of the Serrano ruling in
the present case is of no moment. Laws shall have no
retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided. By its very
nature, the amendment introduced by R.A. 10022 — restoring
a provision of R.A. 8042 declared unconstitutional — cannot
be given retroactive effect, not only because there is no express
declaration of retroactivity in the law, but because such

81
retroactive application will result in an impairment of a right
that had accrued to the respondents by virtue of the Serrano
ruling - entitlement to their salaries for the unexpired portion
of their employment contracts.

82
SAMEER OVERSEAS PLACEMENT AGENCY, INC. VS. JOY
CABILES
G.R. No. 170139, August 5, 2014
LEONEN, J.:

FACTS:

Joy was employed in a quality control job in Taiwan, with SOPA for a
1 year term. In Taiwan, she worked a cutter instead and terminated
without prior notice and then repatriated. She only earned NT$9,000
to which the principal deducted NT$3,000 for her plane ticket. Joy
filed for illegal dismissal which the LA dismissed. On appeal, the
NLRC reversed the LA ruling and awarded Joy only 3 months‘ worth
of salary. The CA affirmed the ruling but remanded the case to
address the validity of SOPA‘s allegations against Pacific Manpower
& Mgt.Services. Hence, this case.

ISSUE/S:

Whether Joy was illegally dismissed and was the award proper.

RULING:

Affirmative. 1 st , SOPA and the principal failed to show that Joy was
legally
dismissed and was afforded due process. Management prerogative is
recognized by law but it should not be abused. Thus, employees
retain their right to security of tenure. In respect to the employment
of OFWs, we follow the principle of lex loci contractus. Thus, our
laws apply which only allows termination for a just or authorized
cause coupled with due process. To prove inefficiency, it must be
shown that employer has set standards communicated to the
employee at a reasonable time prior to the performance assessment.
This, SOPA failed to prove. Joy was neither afforded due process
when she was repatriated at the same day of her termination nor
given twin-notice. 2 nd , under RA 8042, Joy is shall be entitled to
the full reimbursement of placement fee with interest of 12% per
annum, plus salaries for the unexpired portion of the contract (or for
3 months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less); to
the refund of her repatriation fees; and 10% attorney‘s fees. Joy
should be entitled to her salaries for the unexpired portion of the

83
contract since the last phrase was already declared unconstitutional
in Serrano v. Gallant. The applicable law during her termination was
RA 8042. While RA 10022 re-enacted said provision, it is still
violative of the due process and equal protection clauses. The
situation has not so changed to revisit the ruling. 3 rd , the interest
rate of the salaries shall be 6%, pursuant to CBC 799 since the law
does not provide for its rate. 4 th , SOPA and the principal are jointly
and severally liable under the Migrant Workers and Overseas
Filipinos Act of 1995. Hence, SOPA is still liable.

84
CONTINUITY
OF
STATE

85
 VIRGILIO O. GARCILLANO VS.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEES ON
PUBLIC INFORMATION, PUBLIC ORDER AND SAFETY,
NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY, INFORMATION AND
COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY, and SUFFRAGE AND
ELECTORAL REFORMS1
G.R. No. 170338, December 23, 2008
NACHURA, J.:
Facts:
When the Hello Garci tapes, allegedly containing the
conversations between Pres. Arroyo and COMELEC Com. Garcillano
to manipulate in the former‘s favor, the results of the 2004
presidential elections surfaced, the committees of each house of
congress conducted hearings. After long debates, the tapes were
played and the hearings were indefinitely suspended. The members
were ordered to prepare their reports based on the tapes. Garcillano
filed with the SC for prohibition with TRO and WPI to restrain the
House Committees (HC) from using the tape recordings for their
reports. After some time, the Senate delved back to the issue.
Ranada and Agcaoili filed a similar petition seeking to bar the Senate
from conducting their scheduled inquiry. Since the SC did not issue
a TRO, the tapes were played. Some of the senators entered as
respondent-intervenors. Maj. Sagge on the other hand entered as a
petitioner-in-intervention.
Issue:
Whether the HC of the Senate may proceed on the inquiry.
Ruling:
Negative.
Procedural Issues: Petitioners have locus standi. It was alleged
that Garcillano is the person alluded to in the tapes; Ranada and
Agcaoili are concerned citizens, taxpayers, and members of the IBP;
and Sagge alleges violation of his right to due process considering
that he is summoned to attend the Senate hearings.
Garcillano Petition: The Garcillano petition is moot and
academic. The tapes were already played and the committee reports
were completed and submitted to the House in plenary.
Ranada and Agcaoili Petition: Their petition is granted. Senate
cannot be allowed to continue the inquiry without duly published

86
rules of procedure pursuant to Art VI, Sec 21. Publication is
imperative, for it will be the height of injustice to punish or
otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law or rule of
which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.
Notably, respondent HCs admit that the Senate Rules on Legislative
Inquiries was published in newspapers of general circulation only in
1995 and in 2006. The Senate as an institution is continuing, as it is
not dissolved as an entity with each national election or change in
the composition of its members. However, it is not continuing in its
day-to-day business. Consequently, the Rules of Procedure must be
republished by the Senate after every expiration of Congress. Thus,
all pending matters, are considered terminated upon the expiration
of a congress, but may be taken by the succeeding congress as if
presented for the first time. Evidently, the Senate has determined
that its main rules are intended to be valid from the date of their
adoption until they are amended or repealed. Such language is
conspicuously absent from the subject rules. The non-amendment of
the rule is also immaterial. The constitution does not distinguish
among original, amended or revised rules. The invocation of RA
8792 is also misplaced. The law only considers the use of electronics
as a valid document for evidentiary purposes. It does not make the
internet a medium for publishing laws, rules and regulations. Lastly,
the rule‘s recent publication does not cure the infirmity. Insofar as
these cases are concerned, the legislative investigation still could not
be undertaken by the respondents.

87
 ROMULO L. NERI,
Petitioner, -versus-
SENATE COMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC
OFFICERS AND INVESTIGATIONS, SENATE COMMITTEE ON
TRADE AND COMMERCE, AND SENATE COMMITTEE ON
NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY,
Respondents.
G. R. No. 180643
March 25, 2008

Facts:
The Department of Transportation and Communication
(DOTC), somehow in April 2007, entered into a contract with Zhing
Xing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) for the supply of
equipment and services for the National Broadband Network (NBN)
which was to be financed by the People‘s Republic of China. Various
Resolutions were introduced in the Senate as regards this project.
Jose de Venecia III, a businessman, attested that several high
executive officials and power brokers were using their influence to
push the approval of the project. Petitioner disclosed that then
COMELEC Chairman Benjamin Abalos offered him P200 Million in
exchange for his approval of the project. He also said that he
informed President Arroyo about the bribery attempt and that the
president told him not to accept the bribe. However, when probed
further on what they discussed about the NBN Project, petitioner
refused to answer, invoking ―executive privilege‖. In particular, he
refused to answer the questions on (a) whether or not President
Arroyo followed up the NBN Project, (b) whether or not she directed
him to prioritize it, and (c) whether or not she directed him to
approve. Petitioner replied to respondent Committees that he
thought the only remaining questions were those he claimed to be
covered by executive privilege.

Issue:
Whether or not the questions that petitioner Neri refused to
answer are covered by executive privilege.

Ruling:
Yes. The court relied its decision on various jurisprudence by
the US Court such as in the case of Nixon, In Re Sealed Case and
Judicial Watch, which provided the elements of presidential
communications privilege, to wit:

88
1) The protected communication must relate to a ―quintessential
and non-delegable presidential power.‖

2) The communication must be authored or ―solicited and received‖

by a close advisor of the President or the President himself. The
judicial test is that an advisor must be in ―operational proximity‖
with the President.

3) The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified

privilege that may be overcome by a showing of adequate need, such
that the information sought ―likely contains important evidence‖ and
by the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate
investigating authority.
In the case at bar, Executive Secretary Ermita premised his
claim of executive privilege on the ground that the communications
elicited by the three (3) questions ―fall under conversation and
correspondence between the President and public officials‖ necessary
in ―her executive and policy decision-making process‖ and, that ―the
information sought to be disclosed might impair our diplomatic as
well as economic relations with the People‘s Republic of
China.‖ Simply put, the bases are presidential communications
privilege and executive privilege on matters relating to diplomacy or
foreign relations.
Using the above elements, the court is convinced that, indeed,
the communications elicited by the three (3) questions are covered
by the presidential communications privilege.
First, the communications relate to a ―quintessential and non-
delegable power‖ of the President, i.e. the power to enter into an
executive agreement with other countries. This authority of the
President to enter into executive agreements without the
concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been recognized in
Philippine jurisprudence.
Second, the communications are ―received‖ by a close advisor
of the President. Under the ―operational proximity‖ test, petitioner
can be considered a close advisor, being a member of President
Arroyo‘s cabinet.
And third, there is no adequate showing of a compelling need
that would justify the limitation of the privilege and of the
unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate
investigating authority.
Therefore, the communications elicited by the petitioner are
covered by executive privilege.

89
NATURAL BORN
FILIPINOS

90
LIMKAICHONG v. COMELEC GR 178831-32

1. On March 26, 2007, Limkaichong filed with the COMELEC her

COC for the position of representative of the first district of Negros
Oriental.
2. Two petitions for disqualification were instituted against her on
the ground that she lacked the citizenship requirement.
3. Limkaichong claimed that she is a natural-born Filipino since she
was born to a naturalized Filipino father and a natural-born Filipino
mother.
4. Limkaichong won the election pending the resolution of the
disqualification cases.
5. On May 17, 2007, the COMELEC disqualified Limkaichong as a
candidate.
6. On May 20, 2007 , Limkaichong filed a motion for
reconsideration.
7. On August 1, 2007, she filed a petition for certiorari with the
Court for grave abuse of discretion committed by the COMELEC.
8. On August 16, 2007, the COMELEC ruled that all pending
incidents relating the qualifications of Limkaichong should now be
determined by the HRET since she already assumed office.
9. Thereafter, various petitions were filed with the Court against
Limkaichong.

ISSUES:
1. Whether Limkaichong‘s proclamation was valid?
2. Whether HRET should assume jurisdiction over the
disqualification cases?

RULING:
On the 1st issue - It was valid. Limkaichong was able to file her
motion for reconsideration on May 20, 2007 which effectively
suspended the May 17, 2007 COMELEC Joint Resolution

On the 2nd issue - Yes. Once a winning candidate has been

proclaimed, taken his oath and assumed office as a member of the
House of Representatives, the COMELEC‘s jurisdiction over election
contests relating to returns and qualifications ends, and the HRET‘s
own jurisdiction begins.

91
 EN BANC
[ G.R. No. 205505, September 29, 2015 ]
ATTY. ISIDRO Q. LICO, RAFAEL A. PUENTESPINA, PROCULO T.
SARMEN, AMELITO L. REVUELTA, WILLIAM C. YBANEZ,
SILVERIO J. SANCHEZ, GLORIA G. FUTALAN, HILARIO DE
GUZMAN, EUGENE M. PABUALAN, RODOLFO E. PEREZ,
HIPOLITO R. QUILLAN, MARIO ARENAS, TIRSO C.
BUENAVENTURA, LYDIA B. TUBELLA, REYNALDO C. GOLO&
JONATHAN DEQUINA IN THEIR INDIVIDUAL CAPACITIES,
AND AS LEGITIMATE MEMBERS AND OFFICERS OF
ADHIKAING TINATAGUYOD NG KOOPERATIBA (ATING KOOP
PARTY LIST), PETITIONERS,
VS.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC AND THE SELF-
STYLED SHAM ATING KOOP PARTYLIST REPRESENTED BY
AMPARO T. RIMAS, RESPONDENTS.

SERENO, C.J.:

FACTS:
Ating Koop is a multi-sectoral party-list organization which was
registered on 16 November 2009 under Republic Act (R.A.) No.
7941, also known as the Party-List System Act (Party-List Law).
Under Ating Koop's Constitution and By-Laws, its highest
policymaking body is the National Convention. The Central
Committee, however, takes over when the National Convention is
not in session.
On 30 November 2009, Ating Koop filed its Manifestation of Intent
to Participate in the Party-List System of Representation for the 10
May 2010 Elections and on 6 March 2010, it filed with the
COMELEC the list of its nominees, with petitioner Lico as first
nominee and Roberto Mascarina as second nominee. On 8 December
2010, COMELEC proclaimed Ating Koop as one of the winning
party-list groups. Petitioner Lico subsequently took his oath of office
on 9 December 2010 before the Secretary-General of the House of
Representatives, and thereafter assumed office.

92
Several months prior to its proclamation as one of the winning party-
list organizations, or on 9 June 2010, Ating Koop issued Central
Committee Resolution 2010-01, which incorporated a term-sharing
agreement signed by its nominees. Under the agreement, petitioner
Lico was to serve as Party-list Representative for the first year of the
three-year term.
On 14 May 2011, Ating Koop held its Second National Convention,
during which it introduced amendments to its Constitution and By-
laws. Among the salient changes was the composition of the Central
Committee, which would still be composed of 15 representatives but
with five each coming from Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao (5-5-5
equal representation). The amendments likewise mandated the
holding of an election of Central Committee members within six
months after the Second National Convention. In effect, the
amendments cut short the three-year term of the incumbent
members (referred to hereafter as the Interim Central Committee) of
the Central Committee. The Interim Central Committee was
dominated by members of the Rimas Group.
On 5 December 2011, or almost one year after petitioner Lico had
assumed office, the Interim Central Committee expelled him from
Ating Koop for disloyalty. Apart from allegations of malversation and
graft and corruption, the Committee cited petitioner Lico's refusal to
honor the term-sharing agreement as factual basis for disloyalty and
as cause for his expulsion under Ating Koop's Amended Constitution
and By-laws.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the COMELEC has jurisdiction over the expulsion of
a Member of the House of Representatives from his party-list
organization
HELD:
None. The COMELEC has no jurisdiction over the expulsion of a
Member of the House of Representatives from his party-list
organization. Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution endows
the HRET with jurisdiction to resolve questions on the qualifications
of members of Congress. In the case of party-list representatives, the
HRET acquires jurisdiction over a disqualification case upon
proclamation of the winning party-list group, oath of the nominee,
and assumption of office as member of the House of
Representatives.
93
In the present case, the Petition for petitioner Lico's expulsion from
the House of Representatives is anchored on his expulsion from
Ating Koop, which necessarily affects his title as member of
Congress. A party-list nominee must have been, among others, a
bona fide member of the party or organization for at least ninety (90)
days preceding the day of the election. Needless to say, bona fide
membership in the party-list group is a continuing qualification. We
have ruled that qualifications for public office, whether elective or
not, are continuing requirements. They must be possessed not only
at the time of appointment or election, or of assumption of office,
but during the officer's entire tenure.

94
 USE OF
PASSPORT

95
Maquiling vs COMELEC

Facts:

Respondent Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen. However,

as a consequence of his subsequent naturalization as a citizen of
USA, he lost his Filipino citizenship. Arnado applied for
repatriation under R.A. No. 9225 before the Consulate
General of the Philippines in San Francisco, USA and took the
Oath of Allegianceto the RP on 10 July 2008. On the same day an
order of approval of his citizenship retention and re-acquisition was
issued in his favour. In 2009, Arnado again took his Oath of
Allegiance to RP and executed an affidavit of renunciation of his
foreign citizenship. On 30 November 2009, Arnado filed his
certificate of candidacy for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao Del
Norte. Respondent Linog Balua, another mayoralty candidate,
filed a petition to disqualify Arnado and presented a record
indicating that Arnado has been using his US Passport in
entering and departing the Philippines.

COMELEC issued an order requiring the respondent to personally

file his answer. After Arnado failed to answer the petition, Balua
moved to declare him in default. In 2010 election, Arnado
garnered the highest number of votes and was subsequently
proclaimed
as the winning candidate for Mayor. It was only after his
proclamation that Arnado filed his answer.

COMELEC first division ruled for his disqualification.

Petitioner Maquiling, another candidate for mayor of Kausawagan,
and who garnered the second highest number of votes, intervened
in the case and filed before the COMELEC En Banc a motion for
reconsideration claiming that the cancellation of Arnado‘s
candidacy and the nullification of his proclamation, him, as
the legitimate candidate who obtained the highest lawful votes
should be proclaimed as the winner. COMELEC En Banc held that it
shall continue with the trial and hearing. However, it reversed and
set aside the ruling of first division and granted Arnado‘s MR.

Maquiling filed the instant petition questioning the propriety

of declaring Arnado qualified to run for public office despite his
continued use of a US passport, and praying that he be proclaimed as
the winner in the 2010 mayoralty race.

96
Issue:

Whether or not the use of a foreign passport after renouncing

foreign citizenship amount to undoing a renunciation earlier made.

Held:

Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that the use of foreign passport after
renouncing one‘s foreign citizenship is a positive and voluntary act of
representation as to one‘s nationality and citizenship; it does
not divest Filipino citizenship regained by repatriation but it
recants the Oath of Renunciation required to qualify one to run for
an elective position.
Section 5(2) of The Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of
2003 provides:

Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under this Act

shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all
attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of
the Philippines and the following conditions:

xxxx

(2)Those seeking elective public in the Philippines shall meet

the qualification for holding such public office as required by the
Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the
certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of
any and all foreign before any public officer authorized to administer
an oath.

xxx

Rommel Arnado took all the necessary steps to qualify to run for a
public office. He took the Oath of Allegiance and renounced his
foreign citizenship. There is no question that after performing these
twin requirements required under Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 or
the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003, he became
eligible to run for public office.
By renouncing his foreign citizenship, he was deemed to
be solely a Filipino citizen, regardless of the effect of such
renunciation under the laws of the foreign country.

However, this legal presumption does not operate

permanently and is open to attack when, after renouncing the

97
foreign citizenship, the citizen performs positive acts showing his
continued possession of a foreign citizenship. Arnado himself
subjected the issue of his citizenship to attack when, after
renouncing his foreign citizenship, he continued to use his US
passport to travel in and out of the country before filing his
certificate of candidacy on 30 November 2009. The pivotal question
to determine is whether he was solely and exclusively a Filipino
citizen at the time he filed his certificate of candidacy, thereby
rendering him eligible to run for public office.

Between 03 April 2009, the date he renounced his foreign

citizenship, and 30 November 2009, the date he filed his COC, he
used his US passport four times, actions that run counter to the
affidavit of renunciation he had earlier executed. By using
his foreign passport, Arnado positively and voluntarily represented
himself as an American, in effect declaring before immigration
authorities of both countries that he is an American citizen, with all
attendant rights and privileges granted by the United States
of America. The renunciation of foreign citizenship is not a hollow
oath that can simply be professed at any time, only to be violated
the next day. It requires an absolute and perpetual
renunciation of the foreign citizenship and a full divestment of
all civil and political rights granted by the foreign country which
granted the citizenship. While the act of using a foreign passport
is not one of the acts enumerated in Commonwealth Act
No. 63 constituting renunciation and loss of Philippine
citizenship, it is nevertheless an act which repudiates the very
oath of renunciation required for a former Filipino citizen who is
also a citizen of another country to be qualified to run for a local
elective position.

When Arnado used his US passport on 14 April 2009, or just

eleven days after he renounced his American citizenship, he
recanted his Oath of Renunciation that he "absolutely and
perpetually renounce(s) all allegiance and fidelity to the
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" and that he "divest(s) himself of
full employment of all civil and political rights and privileges of the
United States of America."
We agree with the COMELEC En Banc that such act of using a
foreign passport does not divest Arnado of his Filipino citizenship,
which he acquired by repatriation. However, by representing himself
as an American citizen, Arnado voluntarily and effectively reverted to
his earlier status as

98
a dual citizen. Such reversion was not retroactive; it took
place the instant Arnado represented himself as an American
citizen by using his US passport. This act of using a foreign passport
after renouncing one‘s foreign citizenship is fatal to Arnado‘s
bid for public office, as it effectively imposed on him a
disqualification to run for an elective local position.

The citizenship requirement for elective public office is a

continuing one. It must be possessed not just at the time
of the renunciation of the foreign citizenship but
continuously. Any act which violates the oath of renunciation opens
the citizenship issue to attack.

Citizenship is not a matter of convenience. It is a badge

of identity that comes with attendant civil and political
rights accorded by the state to its citizens. It likewise
demands the concomitant duty to maintain allegiance to one‘s flag
and country. While those who acquire dual citizenship by choice are
afforded the right of suffrage, those who seek election or
appointment to public office are required to renounce their
foreign citizenship to be deserving of the public trust. Holding public
office demands full and undivided allegiance to the Republic and to
no other.

We therefore hold that Arnado, by using his US passport after

renouncing his American citizenship, has recanted the same Oath of
Renunciation he took. Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code
applies to his situation. He is disqualified not only from holding the
public office but even from becoming a candidate in the May 2010
elections.

With Arnado being barred from even becoming a candidate, his

certificate of candidacy is thus rendered void from the beginning. It
could not have produced any other legal effect except that Arnado
rendered it impossible to effect his disqualification prior to the
elections because he filed his answer to the petition when
the elections were conducted already and he was already
proclaimed the winner.
Arnado being a non-candidate, the votes cast in his favor should not
have been counted. This leaves Maquiling as the qualified
candidate who obtained the highest number of votes.
Therefore, the rule on succession under the Local Government Code
will not apply.

99
Arnado vs. COMELEC
GR No. 210164
Ponente: Del Castillo, J.

Facts:

Petitoner Arnado is a natural-born Filipino citizen who lost his

Philippine citizenship after he was naturalized as citizen of USA.
Arnado applied for repatriation under RA 9225 before the Consul
General of the Philippines in San Francisco, USA. He also took an
Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. Order of
approval of Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition was issued in
his favor. On November 3, 2009, Arnado filed his Certificate of
Candidacy for the mayoralty post of Kauswagan, Lanao Del Norte.
Linog Balua, another mayoralty candidate, filed a petition to
disqualify Arnado on the grounds that Arnado remained a US Citizen
because he continued using his US Passport for entry and exit from
the Philippines. While the case was pending, Arnado garnered the
highest number of votes and was proclaimed as the winning
candidate. Later on, COMELEC issued a Resolution holding that
Arnado‘s continued use of his US Passport effectively negated his
April 3, 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation. Thus he was disqualified to
run for public office to comply with the requirements of RA 9225.

Issue:
WON Arnado fully complied with the requirements of RA 9225
before filing his COC.

Ruling:
No. Congress enacted RA 9225 allowing natural-born citizens of the
Philippines who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of
their naturalization abroad to reacquire Philippine citizenship and to
enjoy full civil and political rights upon compliance with the
requirements of the law. They may now run for public office in the
Philippines provided that they: (1) meet the qualifications for
holding such public office as required by the Constitution and
existing laws; and, (2) make a personal and sworn renunciation of
any and all foreign citizenships before any public officer authorized
to administer an oath46 prior to or at the time of filing of their CoC.

In the case at bench, the Comelec Second Division, as affirmed by

the Comelec En Banc, ruled that Arnado failed to comply with the
100
second requisite of Section 5 (2) of RA 9225 because, as held
in Maquiling v. Commission on Elections,47 his April 3, 2009
Affidavit of Renunciation was deemed withdrawn when he used his
US passport after executing said affidavit. Consequently, at the time
he filed his CoC on October 1, 2012 for purposes of the May 13,
2013 elections, Arnado had yet to comply with said second
requirement. The Comelec also noted that while Arnado submitted
an affidavit dated May 9, 2013, affirming his April 3, 2009 Affidavit
of Renunciation, the same would not suffice for having been
belatedly executed.

For those who avail themselves of RA 9225 and intend to run for
public office, Section 5(2) thereof provides the additional
requirement of making a personal and sworn renunciation of any and
all foreign citizenships prior to or at the time of filing of their CoC.
Definitely, the provisions of Section 5(2) are not useless or
meaningless surplusage. When the law expressly requires an explicit
renunciation, an implicit one would be insufficient. Furthermore,
even assuming that Arnado's 2008 implied renunciation is sufficient,
the same has also been negated by his use of his US passport in
2009, following the ruling in Maquiling.

101
 MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. POE-
LLAMANZARES, Petitioners, v. COMELEC AND ESTRELLA C.
ELAMPARO Respondents.
G.R. No. 221697 March 8, 2016
PEREZ, J.:

FACTS:

In 1968, Grace Poe-Llamanzares (petitioner) found abandoned as a

newborn infant by Edgardo Militar, who later on transferred her
parental care and custody to his relatives. Petitioner was registered
as a foundling, with the Office of the Civil Registrar of Iloilo City.

At the age of five, petitioner was adopted by celebrity spouses

Ronald Poe and Jesusa Poe through a petition for adoption in MTC
of San Juan City, which the court granted.

In 1991, petitioner married Teodoro Llamanzares who was citizen of

both US and the Philippines. Two days after their wedding, both of
them flew back to US. In 2001, petitioner became a naturalized
citizen of America and was able to get her American passport as well.

Due to the death of his father, petitioner with her family decided to
permanently reside in the Philippines on May 24, 2005.

On 7 July 2006, petitioner took her Oath of Allegiance to the

Republic of the Philippines pursuant to R.A. No. 9225 and filed with
the Bureau of Immigration (BI) a sworn petition to reacquire
Philippine citizenship. BI granted her petition and declared that she
have re-acquired her Philippine Citizenship. Petitioner was
successful in relinquishing her American Citizenship when she
executed her Oath of Renunciation of Nationality of the United
States and assumed her office in MTRCB.

On May 16, 2013, petitioner became senator. In 2015, petitioner

filed her COC to run in the 2016 presidential election, where she
indicated that hat she is a natural-born citizen and that her residence
in the Philippines would be ten (10) years and eleven (11) months.
Petitioner's filing of her COC for Presidential Elections triggered the
filing of several COMELEC cases against her. One of which is
Elamparo, where she filed a petition denial of due course and cancel
Poe‘s COC on the grounds that latter committed material
misrepresentation when she stated that she is a natural-born citizen

102
and a resident for at least 10 years and in the Philippines before the
2016 Elections.
Elamparo assailed petitioner‘s claim of natural-born citizenship
on the ground that she is a foundling. To support her contention,
Elamparo said that international law does not grant natural-born
status and Filipino citizenship on foundlings. Furthermore,
respondent alleged that petitioner is not qualified for reacquisition of
Filipino citizenship under R.A. No. 9225 because it only applies to
former natural-born citizens. According to Elamparo, natural-born
citizenship must be continuous from birth. On the matter of
petitioner‘s residency, Elamparo pointed out that petitioner fell short
of the ten-year residency requirement of the Constitution and failed
to re-establish her domicile in the Philippines.

ISSUES:
1. Whether Grace Poe-Llamanzares is a natural-born citizen.
2. Whether petitioner‘s repatriation in July 2006 results to the
reacquisition of his status as a natural-born citizen.
3. Whether petitioner committed false material representation
when she stated in her COC that she has before and until 9
May 2016 been a resident of the Philippines for ten (10) years
and eleven (11) months.

RULING:
1. Yes, petitioner who is a foundling is granted natural-born
citizenship.
As a matter of law, foundlings are as a class, natural-born citizens.
While the 1935 Constitution's enumeration is silent as to
foundlings, there is no restrictive language which would definitely
exclude foundlings either. There was silence on 1935 Constitution,
since the framers assumed that there is no more need to expressly
declare foundlings as Filipinos because they are already impliedly so
recognized.
Under international laws, foundlings are likewise citizens. Current
legislation reveals the adherence of the Philippines to this generally
accepted principle of international law. In particular, R.A. No. 8552,

103
R.A. No. 8042 and this Court's Rules on Adoption, expressly refer to
"Filipino children." In all of them, foundlings are among the Filipino
children who could be adopted. Likewise, it has been pointed that
the DFA issues passports to foundlings. Passports are by law, issued
only to citizens. This shows that even the executive department,
acting through the DFA, considers foundlings as Philippine citizens.
2. Yes, repatriation in pursuant to RA No. 9225 results in the
recovery of the original nationality.

Court cited its ruling in Bengson v. HRET where it explained

repatriation. Repatriation results in the recovery of the original
nationality. This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his
citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized
Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-
born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be
restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.

3. No, petitioner's claim that she will have been a resident

for ten (10) years and eleven (11) months on the day
before the 2016 elections, is true.

Petitioner presented voluminous evidence showing that she and

her family abandoned their U.S. domicile and relocated to the
Philippines for good as of May 24, 2005.

104
 BENGSON vs. HRET
G.R. No. 142840
May 7, 2001

FACTS:

The citizenship of respondent Cruz is at issue in this case, in view of

the constitutional requirement that ―no person shall be a Member of
the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born
citizen.‖Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was
born in Tarlac in 1960 of Filipino parents. In 1985, however, Cruz
enlisted in the US Marine Corps and without the consent of the
Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the USA.
As a Consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship for under CA No.
63 An Act Providing for the Ways in Which Philippine Citizenship
May Be Lost or Reacquired (1936) section 1(4), a Filipino citizen
may lose his citizenship by, among other, rendering service to or
accepting commission in the armed forces of a foreign country.

Whatever doubt that remained regarding his loss of Philippine

citizenship was erased by his naturalization as a U.S. citizen in 1990,
in connection with his service in the U.S. Marine Corps.

In 1994, Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through

repatriation under RA 2630 An Act Providing for Reacquisition of
Philippine Citizenship by Persons Who Lost Such Citizenship by
Rendering Service To, or Accepting Commission In, the Armed
Forces of the United States (1960). He ran for and was elected as the
Representative of the 2nd District of Pangasinan in the 1998
elections. He won over petitioner Bengson who was then running for
reelection.

Subsequently, petitioner filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam

with respondent HRET claiming that Cruz was not qualified to
become a member of the House of Representative since he is not a
natural-born citizen as required under Article VI, section 6 of the
Constitution.
HRET rendered its decision dismissing the petition for quo warranto
and declaring Cruz the duly elected Representative in the said
election.

ISSUE:

WON Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an American

citizen, can still be considered a natural-born Filipino upon his
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.

105
HELD: petition dismissed

YES

Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however

reacquire the same in the manner provided by law. C.A. No. 63
enumerates the 3 modes by which Philippine citizenship may be
reacquired by a former citizen: (1). by naturalization, (2.) by
repatriation, and (3.) by direct act of Congress.

Repatriation may be had under various statutes by those who lost

their citizenship due to: (1.) desertion of the armed forces; (2.)
services in the armed forces of the allied forces in World War II; (3.)
service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any other time,
(4.) marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien; and (5.) political
economic necessity

Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality This

means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be
restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the
other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost
his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as
a natural-born Filipino.

R.A. No. 2630 provides: Sec 1. Any person who had lost his
Philippine citizenship by rendering service to, or accepting
commission in, the Armed Forces of the United States, or after
separation from the Armed Forces of the United States, acquired
United States citizenship, may reacquire

Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic

of the Philippines and registering the same with Local Civil Registry
in the place where he resides or last resided in the Philippines. The

said oath of allegiance shall contain a renunciation of any other

citizenship.

Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic

and having registered the same in the Civil Registry of Magantarem,
Pangasinan in accordance with the aforecited provision, Cruz is
deemed to have recovered his original status as a natural-born
citizen, a status which he acquired at birth as the son of a Filipino
father. It bears stressing that the act of repatriation allows him to
recover, or return to, his original status before he lost his Philippine
citizenship.

106
QUALIFICATIONS
OF
VOTERS

107
 Nicolas-Lewis v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 162759, August 4, 2006
Facts:
Nicolas-Lewis et al. were able to require their Philippine
citizenships by virtue of R.A. No. 9225. They applied for
registration and certification as ―overseas absentee voter‖ only
to be told by the Philippine Embassy that per COMELEC advice,
they have yet no right to vote in the 2004 elections owing to
their lack of the one-year residence requirement prescribed by
the Constitution. The COMELEC wrote Nicolas-Lewis that ―it is
the Commission‘s position that those who have availed of the
law cannot exercise the right to suffrage given under the
Overseas Absentee Voting Law for the reason that the law is not
enacted for them.‖
The letter added that ―as Filipinos who have merely reacquired
their citizenship on September 18, 2003 at the earliest, they are
considered regular voters who have to meet the requirements of
residency, among others under Section 1, Article 5 of the 1987
Constitution.
Nicolas-Lewis et al. filed a Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition with the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether or not dual citizens may exercise their right to suffrage
as absentee voters
Held:
Yes, they are entitled to vote as absentee voters.
There is no provision under R.A. No. 9225 requiring duals to
actually establish residence and physically stay in the
Philippines before they can exercise their right to suffrage.
Congress enacted RA 9189 pursuant to Sections 1 and 2
of Article V of the Constitution, identifying in its Section 4 of
the said Act who can vote under it, among others, are Filipino
immigrants and permanent residents in another country opens
an exception and qualifies the disqualification rule under the
Section 5(d) of the same Act.

By applying the doctrine of necessary implication, Constitutional

Commission provided for an exception to actual residency
requirement of Section 1, Article 5 of 1987 Constitution, with
respect to qualified Filipinos abroad. Filipino immigrants and
108
permanent residents in another country may be allowed to vote
even though they do not fulfill the residency requirement of said
Sec 1 Art V of the Constitution.

109
 NESTOR A. JACOT
vs.
ROGEN T. DAL and COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R. No. 179848 November 27, 2008

TOPIC:
Loss and Re-Acquisition of Citizenship

FACTS:

Petitioner Nestor A. Jacot assails the Resolution dated 28 September

2007 of the , affirming the Resolution dated 12 June 2007 of the
COMELEC Second Division, disqualifying him from running for the
position of Vice-Mayor of Catarman, Camiguin in the 14 May 2007
National and Local Elections, on the ground that he failed to make a
personal renouncement of his US citizenship.

Petitioner was a natural born citizen of the Philippines, who became

a naturalized citizen of the US on 13 December 1989. Petitioner
sought to reacquire his Philippine citizenship under Republic Act
No. 9225, otherwise known as the Citizenship Retention and Re-
Acquisition Act.

He filed a request for the administration of his Oath of Allegiance to

the Republic of the Philippines with the Philippine Consulate
General (PCG) of Los Angeles, California. The Los Angeles PCG
issued on 19 June 2006 an Order of Approval of petitioner‘s request,
and on the same day, petitioner took his Oath of Allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines before Vice Consul Edward C. Yulo. On
27 September 2006, the Bureau of Immigration issued and
Identification Certificate, recognizing petitioner as a citizen of the
Philippines.

Six months after, on 26 March 2007, petitioner filed his Certificate

of Candidacy for the Position of Vice-Mayor of the Municipality of
Catarman, Camiguin.

In the meantime, the 14 May 2007 National and Local Elections were
held. Petitioner garnered the highest number of votes for the
position of Vice Mayor.

On 12 June 2007, the COMELEC Second Division finally issued its

Resolution11 disqualifying the petitioner from running for the

110
position of Vice-Mayor of Catarman, Camiguin, for failure to make
the requisite renunciation of his US citizenship.

ISSUE/S:

Whether or not petitioner has validly complied the citizenship

requirement as required by law for persons seeking public office.

HELD:

Contrary to the assertions made by petitioner, his oath of allegiance

to the Republic of the Philippines made before the Los Angeles
PCG and his Certificate of Candidacy do
not substantially comply with the requirement of
a personal and sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship, because
these are distinct requirements to be complied with for different
purposes.

Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225 requires that natural-born

citizens of the Philippines, who are already naturalized citizens of a
foreign country, must take the following oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines to reacquire or retain their Philippine
citizenship.

By the oath dictated in the afore-quoted provision, the Filipino

swears allegiance to the Philippines, but there is nothing therein on
his renunciation of foreign citizenship.

The law categorically requires persons seeking elective public office,

who either retained their Philippine citizenship or those who
reacquired it, to make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and
all foreign citizenship before a public officer authorized to administer
an oath simultaneous with or before the filing of the certificate of
candidacy.

Hence, Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 compels natural-born

Filipinos, who have been naturalized as citizens of a foreign country,
but who reacquired or retained their Philippine citizenship

(1) to take the oath of allegiance under Section 3 of Republic Act No.
9225, and

111
(2) for those seeking elective public offices in the Philippines,

to additionally execute a personal and sworn renunciation of any and

all foreign citizenship before an authorized public officer prior or
simultaneous to the filing of their certificates of candidacy, to qualify
as candidates in Philippine elections.

112
RESIDENCE
VS.
DOMICILE

113
 In the matter of the petition of WILFRED UYTENGSU to be
admitted a citizen of the Philippine. WILFRED
UYTENGSU, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
G.R. No. L-6379 , September 29, 1954

Facts:

Uytengsu was born, of Chinese parents in Dumaguete, Negros

Oriental, where he also finished his primary and secondary
education. From 1947 to 1950, He studied in the United States and
graduated thereto with the degree of Bachelor of Science. He
returned to the Philippines in April 1950 for four months
vacation. On July 15, 1950, his present application for naturalization
was filed. Instantly, he returned to the United States and took a
postgraduate course, in chemical engineering. He finished this
course in July 1951 but did not return to the Philippines until
October 13, 1951.

Issue: Whether or not the application for naturalization

may be
granted, notwithstanding the fact that petitioner left the
Philippines immediately after the filing of his petition

Held:

No. The Court made a pronouncement that Uytengsu has not

complied with the requirements of section 7 of Commonwealth Act
No. 473 and with the explicit promise made by him in his
application that he would reside continuously in the Philippines
―from the date of the filing of his petition up to the time of his
admission to Philippine citizenship‖. Hence, he is not entitled, in the
present proceedings.

It should be noted that under Sections 2 and 3,

Commonwealth Act No. 473, to become a citizen of the Philippines
by naturalization, one must reside therein for not less than 10 years,
except in some special cases, in which 5 years of residence is
sufficient. Pursuant to the said provision, he must, also, file an
application stating therein, among other things, that he "has the
qualifications required" by law. Inasmuch as these qualifications
include the residence requirement already referred to, it follows that
the applicant must prove that he is a residence of the Philippines at

114
the time, not only of the filing of the application, but, also, of its
hearing. If the residence thus required is the actual or constructive
permanent home, otherwise known as legal residence or domicile,
then the applicant must be domiciled in the Philippines on both
dates. Consequently, when section 7 of Commonwealth Act No. 473
imposes upon the applicant the duty to state in his sworn application
"that he will reside continuously in the Philippines" in the
intervening period, it cannot refer merely to the need of an
uninterrupted domicile or legal residence, irrespective of actual
residence, for said legal residence or domicile is obligatory under the
law, even in the absence of the requirement contained in said clause,
and, it is well settled that, whenever possible, a legal provision must
not be so construed as to be a useless surplus age, and, accordingly,
meaningless, in the sense of adding nothing to the law or having no
effect whatsoever thereon. These consequences may be avoided only
by construing the clause in question as demanding actual residence
in the Philippines from the filing of the petition for naturalization to
its determination by the court.

Moreover, the Court stated that considering that petitioner had

stayed in the United States, practically without interruption, from
early in 1947 to late in 1951, or for almost five (5) years, over three
years and a half of which preceded the filing of the application, it
may be said that he resided in the United States at that time and for
over a year subsequently thereto. The word "residence" has been
construed, generally, to mean "domicile". Thus, it can be construed
as actual residence, coupled with the intention to stay permanently,
at least at the time of the acquisition of said domicile. And with that,
it would seem apparent from the foregoing that the length of
petitioner's habitation in the United States amply justifies the
conclusion that he was residing abroad when his application for
naturalization was filed. Due to this, Uytengsu‘s application for
naturalization will not prosper.

115
IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and CIRILO ROY
MONTEJO, respondents.
G.R. No. 119976 September 18, 1995
FACTS: Imelda, a little over 8 years old, in or about 1938,
established her domicile in Tacloban, Leyte where she studied and
graduated high school in the Holy Infant Academy from 1938 to
1949. She then pursued her college degree, education, in St. Paul‘s
College now Divine Word University also in
Tacloban. Subsequently, she taught in Leyte Chinese School still in
Tacloban. She went to manila during 1952 to work with her cousin,
the late speaker Daniel Romualdez in his office in the House of
Representatives. In 1954, she married late President Ferdinand
Marcos when he was still a Congressman of Ilocos Norte and was
registered there as a voter. When Pres. Marcos was elected as
Senator in 1959, they lived together in San Juan, Rizal where she
registered as a voter. In 1965, when Marcos won presidency, they
lived in Malacanang Palace and registered as a voter in San Miguel
Manila. She served as member of the Batasang Pambansa and
Governor of Metro Manila during 1978.
Imelda Romualdez-Marcos was running for the position of
Representative of the First District of Leyte for the 1995
Elections. Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the
First District of Leyte and also a candidate for the same position,
filed a ―Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification" with then
Commission on Elections alleging that petitioner did not meet the
constitutional requirement for residency. The petitioner, in an
honest misrepresentation, wrote seven months under residency,
which she sought to rectify by adding the words "since childhood" in
her Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy filed on March 29,
1995 and that "she has always maintained Tacloban City as her
domicile or residence. She arrived at the seven months residency
due to the fact that she became a resident of the Municipality of
Tolosa in said months.
ISSUE: Whether petitioner has satisfied the 1year residency
requirement to be eligible in running as representative of the First
District of Leyte.
HELD:

116
Residence is used synonymously with domicile for election
purposes. The court are in favor of a conclusion supporting
petitoner‘s claim of legal residence or domicile in the First District of
Leyte despite her own declaration of 7 months residency in the
district for the following reasons:
1. A minor follows domicile of her parents. Tacloban became
Imelda‘s domicile of origin by operation of law when her father
brought them to Leyte;
2. Domicile of origin is only lost when there is actual removal or
change of domicile, a bona fide intention of abandoning the former
residence and establishing a new one, and acts which correspond
with the purpose. In the absence and concurrence of all these,
domicile of origin should be deemed to continue.
3. A wife does not automatically gain the husband‘s domicile
because the term ―residence‖ in Civil Law does not mean the same
thing in Political Law. When Imelda married late President Marcos
in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a new
home and not domicilium necessarium.
4. Assuming that Imelda gained a new domicile after her marriage
and acquired right to choose a new one only after the death of Pres.
Marcos, her actions upon returning to the country clearly indicated
that she chose Tacloban, her domicile of origin, as her domicile of
choice. To add, petitioner even obtained her residence certificate in
1992 in Tacloban, Leyte while living in her brother‘s house, an act,
which supports the domiciliary intention clearly manifested. She
even kept close ties by establishing residences in Tacloban,
celebrating her birthdays and other important milestones.
WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses the
necessary residence qualifications to run for a seat in the House of
Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC's
questioned Resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May 11, and May 25,
1995 are hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent COMELEC is hereby
directed to order the Provincial Board of Canvassers to proclaim
petitioner as the duly elected Representative of the First District of
Leyte.

117
 NORLAINIE MITMUG LIMBONA vs
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and MALIK "BOBBY" T.
ALINGAN
G.R. No. 186006 , October 16, 2009

Facts:

Norlainie Mitmug Limbona and her husband, Mohammad

"Exchan" Limbona, filed their individual Certificate of Candidacy for
Mayor of Pantar, Lanao del Norte. Subsequently, Bobby filed
disqualification cases for the spouses and were premised on the
ground that Norlainie and her husband lacked the one-year residency
requirement and both were not registered voters of Pantar. Norlainie
executed an Affidavit of Withdrawal of her certificate of
candidacy, which was later approved by the COMELEC. She also
filed a Motion to Dismiss the disqualification case against her for
being moot and academic. On the day of the election, The
COMELEC settled to postpone the said election for the reason that
there was no final list of voters yet and a special election was then
scheduled. The COMELEC promulgated a resolution granting the
disqualification of Mohammad as a candidate for mayor for failure to
comply with the one-year residency requirement. Due to this,
Norlainie filed a new Certificate of Candidacy as a substitute
candidate for her husband which was approved by the COMELEC.
Bobby yet again sought for the disqualification of Norlainie.

Issue: Whether or not Norlainie satisfied the one-year

residency requirement

Held:

No. Norlainie failed to satisfy the residency requirement. In

Election Law, the term "residence" is synonymous with "domicile,"
which imports not only intention to reside in a fixed place but also
personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of
such intention. The manifest intent of the law in fixing a residence
qualification is to exclude a stranger or newcomer, unacquainted
with the conditions and needs of a community and not identified
with the latter, from an elective office to serve that community. For
purposes of election law, the question of residence is mainly one of
intention. There is no hard and fast rule by which to determine
where a person actually resides. Three rules are, however, well
established: first, that a man must have a residence or domicile
somewhere; second, that where once established it remains until a

118
new one is acquired; and third, a man can have but one domicile at a
time.

Petitioner‘s claim that she has been physically present and

actually residing in Pantar for almost 20 months prior to the
elections, is self-serving and unsubstantiated. Furthermore, the
Court find no other act that would indicate Norlaine‘s intention to
stay in Pantar for an indefinite period of time. The filing of her
Certificate of Candidacy in Pantar, standing alone, is not sufficient to
hold that she has chosen Pantar as her new residence. The Court
also noted the fact that in SPA No. 07-611, this Commission has
even found that she is not a registered voter in the said municipality
warranting her disqualification as a candidate.

The Court also duly noted the findings of the COMELEC that
Norlainie‘s domicile of origin is Maguing, Lanao del Norte, which is
also her place of birth and that her domicile by operation of law (by
virtue of marriage) is Rapasun, Marawi City. Norlainie‘s husband,
effected the change of his domicile in favor of Pantar, Lanao del
Norte only on November 11, 2006. Since it is presumed that the
husband and wife live together in one legal residence, then it follows
that petitioner effected the change of her domicile also on November
11, 2006. Thus, for failure to comply with the residency requirement,
petitioner is disqualified to run for the office of mayor of Pantar,
Lanao del Norte.

119
JALOVER vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 209286, September 23, 2014
BRION, J.:

FACTS:

On October 3, 2012, Osmeña filed his Certificate of Candidacy

(COC) for the position of mayor, Toledo City, Cebu. In his COC,
Osmeña indicated that he had been a resident of Toledo City for
fifteen (15) years prior to the May 2013 elections. Before running for
the mayoralty position, Osmeña also served as the representative of
the 3rd Congressional District of the Province of Cebu from 1995-
1998 which incidentally includes the City of Toledo.

Thereafter, the petitioners filed before the COMELEC a

"Petition to Deny Due Course and to Cancel Certificate of Candidacy
and to disqualify a Candidate for Possessing Some Grounds for
Disqualification‖, alleging that Osmeña made material
misrepresentations of fact in his COC and likewise failed to comply
with the residency requirement under Section 39 of the Local
Government Code. Specifically, the petitioners claimed that Osmeña
falsely declared under oath in his COC that he had already been a
resident of Toledo City fifteen (15) years prior to the scheduled May
13, 2013 local elections. The petitioners submitted the following in
support of their petition: a) a certification from the Toledo City
Assessor‘s Office, dated October 5, 2012, showing that Osmeña does
not own any real property in Toledo City; b) a tax declaration of
Osmeña‘s alleged residence at Ibo, Toledo City showing that it is
owned by Osmeña‘s son; c) photographs of Osmeña‘s alleged
dilapidated residence in Barangay Ibo, Toledo City, which the
petitioners claim is not in keeping with Osmeña‘s prominence,
wealth and stature in society; d) a certification from the Business
Permit and Licensing Office, that Osmeña never applied nor has he
been issued any business permit by Toledo City; and e) several
affidavits, including that of the barangay captain of Ibo, Toledo
City, attesting that Osmeña was never a resident of Toledo City and
that he has only been seen in the city in September 2012 to conduct
political meetings.

But this petitioner‘s allegations were denied by the

respondent. Herein respondent argued that even prior to his actual
transfer of residence to Ibo, Toledo City, in 2004; he had been able
to establish ties with Toledo City in view of his family‘s business
interests and his political linkages. In 1995, he bought a piece of land
in Ibo, Toledo City, where he built two (2) houses from 1998 to

120
2002 and became a permanent resident thereof in 2004. Osmeña
further averred that he became a registered voter of Toledo City in
2006 and that he leased at least two (2) properties in Toledo City for
his headquarters. In addition, he claimed that in December 2011, he
bought a five (5) hectare parcel of land in Das, Toledo City.

ISSUE:
(1) Whether the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
(2) Whether Osmeña committed any material
misrepresentation in his COC and likewise failed to comply with the
residency requirement under Section 39 of the Local Government
Code.

HELD:

(1.) NO. The petitioners failed to substantiate their claim of

partiality on the part of the COMELEC in admitting Osmeña‘s
Answer, Amended Memorandum. The petitioners herein insist that
the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in admitting
Osmeña‘s belatedly filed Answer, Amended Memorandum and
Supplemental Memorandum. The petitioners, however, failed to
substantiate this allegation in their petition. In fact, the petitioners
admitted that they do not exactly know when Osmeña was served
with summons by the clerk or commission. They only speculated
that Osmeña‘s Answer was filed one day delayed. The Court do not
find any error on the part of the COMELEC in allowing the filing of
Osmeña‘s amended memorandum, after obtaining leave from the
COMELEC. As Osmeña aptly pleaded in his motion for leave, the
amendments consisted of mere technical errors; the lower portions
and the most crucial parts of the Memorandum were omitted in its
final printing because the printer was inadvertently configured to use
an incorrect paper size.

Moreover, amendments are actually favored in order to allow

the complete presentation of the real controversies. With regard in
Contech Construction Technology and Dev‘t Corp. v. Court of
Appeals:

"It is a recognized rule of procedure that pleadings shall be

construed liberally so as to render substantial justice to the parties
and in order that actual merits of the controversy may speedily be
determined without regard to technicalities and in the most
expeditious and inexpensive manner. The judicial attitude has always
been favorable and liberal in allowing amendments to a pleading.
121
The rationale behind the rule is to avoid multiplicity of suits and in
order that the real controversies between the parties are presented,
their rights are determined and the case decided on the merits
without unnecessary delay. When the situation is such that if the
proposed amendment is not allowed, another action would be
instituted, thus making two actions, two trials, and two appeals
possible and probable, the said amendment should be admitted.
Hence, should the trial court find the allegations in the pleadings to
be inadequate, it should allow the party concerned to file proper
amendments to pleadings in accordance with the mandate of the
Rules of Court that amendments to pleadings are favored and should
be liberally allowed."

In these lights, the Court held that the petitioners have not
presented a convincing case sufficient to show that the COMELEC
committed an error of jurisdiction in upholding the residency of
Osmeña in Toledo City and the validity of his representation on this
point in his COC.

(2). NO. Herein respondent did not commit any material

misrepresentation in his COC. The law does not require a person to
be in his home twenty-four (24) hours a day, seven (7) days a week,
to fulfill the residency requirement. In Fernandez v. House Electoral
Tribunal, the Court ruled that the "fact that a few barangay health
workers attested that they had failed to see petitioner whenever they
allegedly made the rounds in Villa de Toledo is of no moment,
especially considering that there were witnesses (including
petitioner's neighbors in Villa de Toledo) that were in turn presented
by petitioner to prove that he was actually a resident of Villa de
Toledo, in the address he stated in his COC. It may be that whenever
these health workers do their rounds petitioner was out of the house
to attend to his own employment or business."

Under the circumstances, the evidence submitted by the

petitioners do not conclusively prove that Osmeña did not in fact
reside in Toledo City for at least the year before election day, most
especially since the sworn statements of some Toledo City residents
attesting that they never saw Osmeña in Toledo City were
controverted by similar sworn statements by other Toledo City
residents who claimed that Osmeña resided in Toledo City.
Osmeña‘s actual physical presence in Toledo City is established not
only by the presence of a place (Ibo, Toledo City, house and lot) he
can actually live in, but also the affidavits of various persons in
Toledo City. Osmeña‘s substantial and real interest in establishing
his domicile of choice in Toledo City is also sufficiently shown not

122
only by the acquisition of additional property in the area and the
transfer of his voter registration and headquarters, but also his
participation in the community‘s socio-civic and political activities.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is

DISMISSED for lack of merit. No costs.

123
 PUNDAODAYA, Petitioner,
vs.
COMELEC, Respondents.

FACTS: Makil Pundaodaya run for the position of municipal mayor

of Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental against Arsenio Noble in the 2007
elections. Noble filed his COC indicating he is a resident of
Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental for 15 years. Pundaodaya filed for
disqualification against Noble alleging that the latter lacks residency
requirements as prescribed by existing laws. Noble averred that he is
a registered voter and resident and has been engaging in electoral
activities of the said municipality. In a resolution of the Second
Division of COMELEC it ruled in favor of Pundaodaya and
disqualified Noble from running for mayor. During pendency of
Noble‘s motion for reconsideration, Noble garnered the highest
number of votes and was proclaimed winning candidate. Pundaodaya
then immediately filed an Urgent Motion to Annul Proclamation.
COMELEC en banc reversed the decision of the Second Division of
COMELEC and declared Noble qualified to run for mayor.

ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not the term ―domicile‖ and ―residence‖ must be
construed as to dwelling
2. Whether or not the Noble is qualified to run
3. Whether or not Pundaodaya is the winning candidate in the
mayoralty position

RULING:
1. NO. Records show that Noble's domicile of origin was
Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro City. In Japzon v. Commission on
Elections, it was held that the term "residence" is to be
understood not in its common acceptation as referring to
"dwelling" or "habitation," but rather to "domicile" or legal
residence, that is, "the place where a party actually or
constructively has his permanent home, where he, no matter
where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to
return and remain (animus manendi)." While In Domino v.
Commission on Elections, the Court explained that domicile
124
 denotes a fixed permanent residence to which, whenever
absent for business, pleasure, or some other reasons, one
intends to return. It is a question of intention and
circumstances. In the consideration of circumstances, three
rules must be borne in mind, namely: (1) that a man must
have a residence or domicile somewhere; (2) when once
established it remains until a new one is acquired; and (3) a
man can have but one residence or domicile at a time. The
above pieces of documentary evidence, however, fail to
convince us that Noble successfully effected a change of
domicile. As correctly ruled by the COMELEC Second Division,
private respondent's claim that he is a registered voter and has
actually voted in the past 3 elections in Kinoguitan, Misamis
Oriental do not sufficiently establish that he has actually
elected residency in the said municipality. Indeed, while we
have ruled in the past that voting gives rise to a strong
presumption of residence, it is not conclusive evidence thereof.
Thus, in Perez v. Commission on Elections, we held that a
person's registration as voter in one district is not proof that he
is not domiciled in another district. The registration of a voter
in a place other than his residence of origin is not sufficient to
consider him to have abandoned or lost his residence. In this
case, Noble's marriage to Bernadith Go does not establish his
actual physical presence in Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental.
Neither does it prove an intention to make it his permanent
place of residence.

2. NO. We find that Noble's alleged change of domicile was

effected solely for the purpose of qualifying as a candidate in
the 2007 elections. This we cannot allow. In Torayno, Sr. v.
Commission on Elections, we held that the one-year residency
requirement is aimed at excluding outsiders "from taking
advantage of favorable circumstances existing in that
community for electoral gain." Establishing residence in a
community merely to meet an election law requirement defeats
the purpose of representation: to elect through the assent of
voters those most cognizant and sensitive to the needs of the
community. Thus, we find Noble disqualified from running as
municipal mayor of Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental in the 2007
elections.

125
3. NO. Notwithstanding Noble's disqualification, we find no basis
for the proclamation of Judith Pundaodaya, as mayor. The rules
on succession under the Local Government Code, explicitly
provides: SECTION 44. Permanent Vacancies in the Offices of
the Governor, Vice-Governor, Mayor, and Vice-Mayor. - If a
permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the xxx mayor, the
xxx vice-mayor concerned shall become the xxx mayor. For
purposes of this Chapter, a permanent vacancy arises when an
elective local official fills a higher vacant office, refuses to
assume office, fails to qualify or is removed from office,
voluntarily resigns, or is otherwise permanently incapacitated
to discharge the functions of his office. Thus, considering the
permanent vacancy in the Office of the Mayor of Kinoguitan,
Misamis Oriental occasioned by Noble's disqualification, the
proclaimed Vice-Mayor shall then succeed as mayor.

126
 G.R. No. 209835, September 22, 2015
ROGELIO BATIN CABALLERO, Petitioner
versus
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND
JONATHAN ENRIQUEZ V. NANUD JR., Respondents

Facts:

Petitioner and private respondent Jonathan Enrique V. Nanud,

Jr. were both candidates for the mayoralty position of the
Municipality of Uyugan, Province of Batanes in the May 13, 2013
elections.Private respondent filed a Petition for cancellation of
petitioner's certificate of candidacy alleging that the latter made a
false representation when he declared in his COC that he was
eligible to run for Mayor despite being a Canadian citizen and a
non-resident thereof.
Petitioner argued that prior to the filing of his COC he took an
Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines before the
Philippine Consul General in Toronto, Canada on and became a dual
Filipino and Canadian citizen pursuant to Republic Act (RA) No.
9225.
Thereafter, he renounced his Canadian citizenship and
executed an Affidavit of Renunciation before a Notary Public in
Batanes on 2012. On2013 COMELEC issued a Resolution finding
that petitioner made a material misrepresentation in his COC when
he declared that he is a resident of Barangay Imnajbu within one year
prior to the election.
It found that while petitioner complied with the requirements
of RA No. 9225 since he had taken his Oath of Allegiance to the
Philippines and had validly renounced his Canadian citizenship, he
failed to comply with the other requirements provided under RA No.
9225 for those seeking elective office.
Elections were subsequently held and petitioner won over
private respondent was proclaimed Mayor. Thereafter, petitioner
filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the COMELEC in canceling
his COC.

127
 Sometime in May 2013, private respondent filed a Petition to
Annul Proclamation

Issues:

Whether petitioner had been a resident of Uyugan, Batanes at least

one (1) year before the elections held on May 13, 2013 as he
represented in his COC and what is the effect of petitioner's
retention of his Philippine citizenship under RA No. 9225 on his
residence or domicile?

Ruling:

Negative. RA No. 9225, which is known as the Citizenship

Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003, declares that natural-born
citizens of the Philippines, who have lost their Philippine citizenship
by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country, can
re-acquire or retain his Philippine citizenship under the conditions of
the law.
The law does not provide for residency requirement for the
reacquisition or retention of Philippine citizenship; nor does it
mention any effect of such reacquisition or retention of Philippine
citizenship on the current residence of the concerned natural-born
Filipino.
RA No. 9225 treats citizenship independently of residence.
Since a natural-born Filipino may hold, at the same time, both
Philippine and foreign citizenships, he may establish residence either
in the Philippines or in the foreign country of which he is also a
citizen. However, when a natural-born Filipino with dual citizenship
seeks for an elective public office, residency in the Philippines
becomes material.
All Government Code requires that the candidate must be a
resident of the place where he seeks to be elected at least one year
immediately preceding the day of election. Petitioner was a natural
born Filipino who was born and raised in Uyugan, Batanes. Thus, it

128
could be said that he had his domicile of origin in Uyugan, Batanes.
However, he later worked in Canada and became a Canadian citizen.
Naturalization in a foreign country may result in an
abandonment of domicile in the Philippines. This holds true in
petitioner's case as permanent resident status in Canada is required
for the acquisition of Canadian citizenship.Hence, petitioner had
effectively abandoned his domicile in the Philippines and transferred
his domicile of choice in Canada. His frequent visits to Uyugan,
Batanes during his vacation from work in Canada cannot be
considered as waiver of such abandonment. Petitioner's reacquisition
of his Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 had no
automatic impact or effect on his residence/domicile.
Hence, petitioner's retention of his Philippine citizenship
under RA No. 9225 did not automatically make him regain his
residence in Uyugan, Batanes. He must still prove that after
becoming a Philippine citizen on September 13, 2012, he had
reestablished Uyugan, Batanes as his new domicile of choice which is
reckoned from the time he made it as such. Petitioner failed to prove
that he was able to reestablish his residence in Uyugan within a
period of one year immediately preceding the May 13, 2013
elections. The period from September 13, 2012 to May 12, 2013 was
even less than the one year residency required by the law.
We concluded that material representation contemplated by
Section 78 refers to qualifications for elective office, such as the
requisite residency, age, citizenship or any other legal qualification
necessary to run for a local elective office as provided for in the Local
Government Code. Furthermore, aside from the requirement of
materiality, the misrepresentation must consist of a deliberate
attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise
render a candidate ineligible.

129
 TERM LIMIT
―INTERRUPTION OF PUBLIC
OFFICE‖

130
ABUNDO VS. COMELEC, G.R. No. 201716, Jan. 8, 2013
FACTS:
Abundo vied for the position of municipal mayor of Viga,
Catanduanes. In both the 2001 and 2007 runs, he emerged and was
proclaimed as the winning mayoralty candidate and accordingly
served the corresponding terms as mayor.
In the 2004 electoral derby, however, the Viga municipal board of
canvassers initially proclaimed as winner one Jose Torres (Torres),
who, in due time, performed the functions of the office of mayor.
Abundo protested Torres‘ election and proclamation. Abundo was
eventually declared the winner of the 2004 mayoralty electoral
contest, paving the way for his assumption of office starting May 9,
2006 until the end of the 2004-2007 term on June 30, 2007, or for a
period of a little over one year and one month.
Then came the May 10, 2010 elections where Abundo and Torres
again opposed each other. When Abundo filed his certificate of
candidacy for the mayoralty seat relative to this electoral contest,
Torres lost no time in seeking the former‘s disqualification to run,
the corresponding petition, predicated on the three-consecutive term
limit rule.
ISSUE:
Is the service of a term less than the full three years by Mayor
Abundo, in view of an election protest, considered as full service of
the term for purposes of the application of the three consecutive
term limit for elective local officials?
RULING:
No. Abundo cannot plausibly claim,even if he wanted to, that he
could hold office of the mayor as a matterof right during the period
of one year and ten months, or from June 30, 2004 until May 8,
2006. Neither can heassert title to the same nor serve the functions
ofthe said elective office. The reason is that during that period, title
to hold such office and the corresponding right to assume the
functions thereof still belonged to his opponent, as proclaimed
election winner. Accordingly, Abundo actually held the office and
exercised the functions as mayor only upon his declaration, following
the resolution of the protest, as duly elected candidate in the May
2004 elections or for only a little over one year and one month.
Consequently, since the legally contemplated full term for local
131
elected officials is three (3) years, it cannot be said that Abundo fully
served the term 2004-2007.

132
 EN BANC

RAYMUNDO M. ADORMEO, Petitioner, vs.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and RAMON Y. TALAGA, JR.,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 147927 : February 4, 2002

QUISUMBING, J.:
FACTS:
Private respondent Talaga, Jr. was elected mayor of Lucena in May
1992. He served the full term. Again, he was re-elected in 1995-1998
and fully served his term of office. However, in the May 1998
elections, his would be third term as Mayor, he lost to Bernard G.
Tagarao. In the recall election of May 12, 2000, he again won and
served the unexpired term of Tagarao until June 30, 2001.
For the May 2001 elections, Talaga filed his certificate of candidacy,
once again, for the office of mayor. He and Petitioner Raymund
Adormeo were the only candidates.
On March 2, 2001, petitioner filed with the Office of the Provincial
Election Supervisor, Lucena City a Petition to Deny Due Course to or
Cancel Certificate of Candidacy and/or Disqualification of Ramon Y.
Talaga, Jr., on the ground that the latter was elected and had served
as city mayor for three (3) consecutive terms as follows:
(1) in the election of May 1992, where he served the full term;
(2) in the election of May 1995, where he again served the full term;
and,
(3) in the recall election of May 12, 2000, where he served only the
unexpired term of Tagarao after having lost to Tagarao in the 1998
election.

Petitioner contended that Talagas candidacy as Mayor constituted a

violation of Section 8, Article X of the 1987 Constitution.
On March 9, 2001, private respondent responded that he was not
elected City Mayor for three (3) consecutive terms but only for two
(2) consecutive terms. He pointed to his defeat in the 1998 election
by Tagarao. Because of his defeat the consecutiveness of his years as
mayor was interrupted, and thus his mayorship was not for three
consecutive terms of three years each.
133
Moreover, his recall term, from May 12, 2000 until June 30, 2001 for
13 months and eighteen (18) days was not a full term, in the
contemplation of the law and the Constitution. He cites Lonzanida
vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 135150, 311 SCRA 602, 611 (1999),
The COMELEC, through the First Division, found private
respondent Ramon Y. Talaga, Jr. disqualified for the position of city
mayor on the ground that he had already served three (3)
consecutive terms, and his Certificate of Candidacy was ordered
withdrawn and/or cancelled.
On April 27, 2001, Talaga filed a motion for reconsideration
reiterating that three (3) consecutive terms means continuous
service for nine (9) years and that the two (2) years‘ service from
1998 to 2000 by Tagarao who defeated him in the election of 1998
prevented him from having three consecutive years of service. He
added that Tagaraos tenure from 1998 to 2000 could not be
considered as a continuation of his mayorship. He further alleged
that the recall election was not a regular election, but a separate
special election aimed at removing incompetent local officials.
On May 9, 2001, the COMELEC en banc ruled in favor of private
respondent Ramon Y. Talaga, Jr.. It reversed the First Divisions
ruling and held that 1) respondent was not elected for three (3)
consecutive terms because he did not win in the May 11, 1998
elections; 2) that he was installed only as mayor by reason of his
victory in the recall elections; 3) that his victory in the recall
elections was not considered a term of office and is not included in
the 3-term disqualification rule, and 4) that he did not fully serve the
three (3) consecutive terms, and his loss in the May 11, 1998
elections is considered an interruption in the continuity of his
service as Mayor of Lucena City.
ISSUE:
Whether or not private respondent, as provided by the Constitution,
had already served three consecutive terms in that office and is
disqualified to run for mayor.
HELD:
NO. The private respondent has not yet served the three consecutive
term.
The Court held that the two conditions for the application of the
disqualification must concur: a) that the official concerned has been
134
elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government
post and 2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms.
For nearly two years Talaga was a private citizen. The continuity of
his mayorship was disrupted by his defeat in the 1998 elections. The
time between his second term and the recall election is sufficient
interruption. Thus, there was no three consecutive terms as
contemplated in the disqualifications in the LGC.
Talaga vacated his post a few months before the next mayoral
elections, not by voluntary renunciation but in compliance with the
legal process of writ of execution issued by the COMELEC to that
effect. Such involuntary severance from office is an interruption of
continuity of service and thus, the petitioner did not fully serve the
1995-1998 mayoral term.
The second sentence of the constitutional provision under scrutiny
states, Voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time shall
not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for
the full term for which he was elected. The clear intent of the
framers of the constitution to bar any attempt to circumvent the
three-term limit by a voluntary renunciation of office and at the same
time respect the people‘s choice and grant their elected official full
service of a term is evident in this provision.

135
 G.R. No. 154512, November 17, 2002
VICTORINO DENNIS M. SOCRATES, Mayor of
Puerto Princesa City, petitioner
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THE
PREPARATORY RECALL ASSEMBLY (PRA) of Puerto
Princesa City, PRA Interim Chairman Bgy. MARK
DAVID HAGEDORN, PRA Interim Secretary Punong
Bgy. BENJAMIN JARILLA, PRA Chairman and
Presiding Officer Punong Bgy. EARL S. BUENVIAJE
and PRA Secretary Punong Bgy. CARLOS ABALLA, JR.,
respondents

FACTS:
Mark David Hagedorn had served as a mayor of Puerto
Princesa City, Palawan for three (3) consecutive terms: in
1993-1995, 1995-1998, and 1998-2001 respectively.
Despite awareness of the three-limit rule principle,
Hagedorn opted not to ran for the same position in the
2001 elections, in which Socrates ran and eventually won
after. Socrates, the incumbent mayor, faced recall
proceedings midway into his term. Hagedorn filed his
certificate of candidacy for mayor in the recall election.
Consequently, Socrates filed a disqualification petition
against Hagedorn on the ground that the latter cannot
run for the said post for his 4th consecutive term having
been elected and having served as mayor for three (3)
consecutive full terms immediately prior to the recall
election for the same post.

ISSUE:
WON one who has been elected and served for three
consecutive full term may be qualified to run for mayor in
the recall election

HELD:

136
 Yes. The three-term limit rule for elective local
officials is found in Section 8, Article X of the
Constitution, which states:
―Section 8. The term of office of elective local
officials, except barangay officials, which shall be
determined by law, shall be three years and no such
official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms.
Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of
time shall not be considered as an interruption in the
continuity of his service for the full term for which he
was elected.‖
This three-term limit rule is reiterated in Section 43
(b) of RA No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local
Government Code, which provides:
―Section 43. Term of Office. – (a) x x x
(b) No local elective official shall serve for more than
three (3) consecutive terms in the same position.
Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of
time shall not be considered as an interruption in the
continuity of service for the full term for which the
elective official was elected.‖
The first part provides that an elective local official
cannot serve for more than three consecutive terms. The
clear intent is that only consecutive terms count in
determining the three-term limit rule. The second part
states that voluntary renunciation of office for any length
of time does not interrupt the continuity of service. The
clear intent is that involuntary severance from office for
any length of time interrupts continuity of service and
prevents the service before and after the interruption
from being joined together to form a continuous service
or consecutive terms.
After three consecutive terms, an elective local
official cannot seek immediate re-election for a fourth
term. The prohibited election refers to the next regular
election for the same office following the end of the third
consecutive term. Any subsequent election, like a recall
election, is no longer covered by the prohibition for two
reasons. First, a subsequent election like a recall election
137
is no longer an immediate re-election after three
consecutive terms. Second, the intervening period
constitutes an involuntary interruption in the continuity
of service.
Based from the deliberations of a Constitutional
Commission, what the Constitution prohibits is an
immediate re-election for a fourth term following three
consecutive terms. The Constitution, however, does not
prohibit a subsequent re-election for a fourth term as
long as the re-election is not immediately after the end of
the third consecutive term. A recall election mid-way in
the term following the third consecutive term is a
subsequent election but not an immediate re-election
after the third term.
Neither does the Constitution prohibit one barred
from seeking immediate re-election to run in any other
subsequent election involving the same term of office.
What the Constitution prohibits is a consecutive fourth
term.
In the case of Hagedorn, his candidacy in the recall
election on September 24, 2002 is not an immediate re-
election after his third consecutive term which ended on
June 30, 2001. The immediate re-election that the
Constitution barred Hagedorn from seeking referred to
the regular elections in 2001.

138
ABOLITION
OF
OFFICE

139
ARSENIO A. LATASA, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, and ROMEO SUNGA, respondents

FACTS:
Petitioner Arsenio A. Latasa, was elected mayor of the Municipality
of Digos, Davao del Sur in the elections of 1992, 1995, and 1998.
During petitioner‘s third term, the Municipality of Digos was
declared a component city, to be known as the City of Digos. This
event also marked the end of petitioner‘s tenure as mayor of the
Municipality of Digos.
On February 28, 2001, petitioner filed his certificate of candidacy for
city mayor for the May 14, 2001 elections. He stated therein that he
is eligible therefor, and likewise disclosed that he had already served
for three consecutive terms as mayor of the Municipality of Digos
and is now running for the first time for the position of city mayor.
On March 1, 2001, private respondent Romeo M. Sunga, also a
candidate for city mayor in the said elections, filed before the
COMELEC a Petition to Deny Due Course, Cancel Certificate of
Candidacy and/ or For Disqualification1 against petitioner Latasa.
Respondent Sunga alleged therein that petitioner falsely represented
in his certificate of candidacy that he is eligible to run as mayor of
Digos City since petitioner had already been elected and served for
three consecutive terms as mayor from 1992 to 2001.
ISSUES:
Whether or not petitioner Latasa is eligible to run as candidate for
the position of mayor of the newlycreated City of Digos immediately
after he served for three consecutive terms as mayor of the
Municipality of Digos.
RULING:
In the present case, petitioner states that a city and a municipality
have separate and distinct personalities. Thus they cannot be treated
as a single entity and must be accorded different treatment
consistent with specific provisions of the Local Government Code.
He does not deny the fact that he has already served for three
consecutive terms as municipal mayor. However, he asserts that
when Digos was converted from a municipality to a city, it attained a
different juridical personality. Therefore, when he filed his certificate

140
of candidacy for city mayor, he cannot be construed as vying for the
same local government post.
For a municipality to be converted into a city, the Local Government
Code provides:
SECTION 450. Requisites for Creation. - (a) A municipality or a
cluster of barangays may be converted into a component city it has
an average annual income, as certified by the Department of Finance,
of at least Twenty million pesos (20,000,000.00) for the last two (2)
consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices, and if it has either
of the following requisites:
(i) a contiguous territory of at least one hundred (100) square
kilometers, as certified by the Land Management Bureau; or,
(ii) a population of not less than one hundred fifty thousand
(150,000) inhabitants, as certified by the National Statistics Office.
Provided, That, the creation thereof shall not reduce the land area,
population, and income of the original unit or units at the time of
said creation to less than the minimum requirements prescribed
herein.
(b) The territorial jurisdiction of a newly-created city shall be
properly identified by metes and bounds. The requirement on land
are shall not apply where the city proposed to be created is
composed of one (1) or more island. The territory need not be
contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands.
(c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to
the general fund, exclusive of special funds, transfers, and non-
recurring income.15
Substantial differences do exist between a municipality and a city.
For one, there is a material change in the political and economic
rights of the local government unit when it is converted from a
municipality to a city and undoubtedly, these changes affect the
people as well.16 It is precisely for this reason why Section 10,
Article X of the Constitution mandates that no province, city,
municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged,
abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, without the approval
by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units
directly affected.

141
As may be gleaned from the Local Government Code, the creation or
conversion of a local government unit is done mainly to help assure
its economic viability. Such creation or conversion is based on
verified indicators:
Section 7. Creation and Conversion. --- As a general rule, the
creation of a local government unit or its conversion from one level
to another shall be based on verifiable indicators or viability and
projected capacity to provide services, to wit:
(a) Income. --- It must be sufficient, based on acceptable standards,
to provide for all essential government facilities and services and
special functions commensurate with the size of its population, as
expected of the local government unit concerned;
(b) Population. --- It shall be determined as the total number of
inhabitants within the territorial jurisdiction of the local government
unit concerned; and
(c) Land Area. --- It must be contiguous, unless it comprises two (2)
or more islands or is separated by a local government unit
independent of the others; properly identified by metes and bounds
with technical descriptions; and sufficient to provide for such basic
services and facilities to meet the requirements of its populace.
Compliance with the foregoing indicators shall be attested to by the
Department of Finance (DOF), the National Statistics Office (NSO),
and the Lands Management Bureau (LMB) of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).17
On the other hand, Section 2 of the Charter of the City of Digos
provides:
Section 2. The City of Digos --- The Municipality of Digos shall be
converted into a component city to be known as the City of Digos,
hereinafter referred to as the City, which shall comprise the present
territory of the Municipality of Digos, Davao del Sur Province. The
territorial jurisdiction of the City shall be within the present metes
and bounds of the Municipality of Digos. x x x
Moreover, Section 53 of the said Charter further states:
Section 53. Officials of the City of Digos. --- The present elective
officials of the Municipality of Digos shall continue to exercise their
powers and functions until such a time that a new election is held

142
and the duly-elected officials shall have already qualified and
assumed their offices. x x x.
As seen in the aforementioned provisions, this Court notes that the
delineation of the metes and bounds of the City of Digos did not
change even by an inch the land area previously covered by the
Municipality of Digos. This Court also notes that the elective
officials of the Municipality of Digos continued to exercise their
powers and functions until elections were held for the new city
officials.
This Court reiterates that the framers of the Constitution specifically
included an exception to the people‘s freedom to choose those who
will govern them in order to avoid the evil of a single person
accumulating excessive power over a particular territorial jurisdiction
as a result of a prolonged stay in the same office. To allow petitioner
Latasa to vie for the position of city mayor after having served for
three consecutive terms as a municipal mayor would obviously
defeat the very intent of the framers when they wrote this exception.
Should he be allowed another three consecutive terms as mayor of
the City of Digos, petitioner would then be possibly holding office as
chief executive over the same territorial jurisdiction and inhabitants
for a total of eighteen consecutive years. This is the very scenario
sought to be avoided by the Constitution, if not abhorred by it.
True, the new city acquired a new corporate existence separate and
distinct from that of the municipality. This does not mean, however,
that for the purpose of applying the subject Constitutional provision,
the office of the municipal mayor would now be construed as a
different local government post as that of the office of the city mayor.
As stated earlier, the territorial jurisdiction of the City of Digos is
the same as that of the municipality. Consequently, the inhabitants
of the municipality are the same as those in the city. These
inhabitants are the same group of voters who elected petitioner
Latasa to be their municipal mayor for three consecutive terms.
These are also the same inhabitants over whom he held power and
authority as their chief executive for nine years.

143
PREVENTIVE
SUSPENSION

144
 SIMON B. ALDOVINO, JR., et.al, vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and WILFREDO F. ASILO
G.R. No. 184836, Dec. 23, 2009
Facts:
Respondent Wilfredo F. Asilo (Asilo) was elected councilor of
Lucena City for three consecutive terms: for the 1998-2001, 2001-
2004, and 2004-2007 terms, respectively. In September 2005 or
during his 2004-2007 term of office, the Sandiganbayan preventively
suspended him for 90 days in relation with a criminal case he then
faced. This Court subsequently lifted the Sandiganbayan‘s
suspension order; hence, he resumed performing the functions of his
office and finished his term.
In the 2007 election, Asilo filed his certificate of candidacy for
the same position. The petitioners Simon B. Aldovino, Jr., Danilo B.
Faller, and Ferdinand N. Talabong (the petitioners) sought to deny
due course to Asilo‘s certificate of candidacy on the ground that he
had been elected and had served for three terms; his candidacy for a
fourth term therefore violated the three-term limit rule under
Section 8, Article X of the Constitution and Section 43(b) of RA
7160.
The COMELEC‘s Second Division ruled against the petitioners
and in Asilo‘s favor in its Resolution of November 28, 2007. It
reasoned out that the three-term limit rule did not apply, as Asilo
failed to render complete service for the 2004-2007 term because of
the suspension the Sandiganbayan had ordered.
The COMELEC en banc refused to reconsider the Second
Division‘s ruling in its October 7, 2008 Resolution; hence, this
petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the preventive suspension of an elected public
official an interruption of his term of office for purposes of the three-
term limit rule under Section 8, Article X of the Constitution and
Section 43(b) of Republic Act No. 7160 (RA 7160, or the Local
Government Code).
Ruling:
No. The preventive suspension imposed to Asilo is not an
interruption of his term of office for purposes of the three-term limit
rule under Section 8, Article X of the Constitution and Section 43(b)

145
of Republic Act No. 7160 (RA 7160, or the Local Government
Code).
Section 8, Article X of the Constitution states:
Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials,
except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be
three years and no such official shall serve for more than three
consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any
length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the
continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.
Section 43 (b) of RA 7160 practically repeats the
constitutional provision, and any difference in wording does not
assume any significance in this case.
As worded, the constitutional provision fixes the term of a
local elective office and limits an elective official‘s stay in office to no
more than three consecutive terms. This is the first branch of the
rule embodied in Section 8, Article X.
The "interruption" of a term exempting an elective official from
the three-term limit rule is one that involves no less than the
involuntary loss of title to office. The elective official must have
involuntarily left his office for a length of time, however short, for an
effective interruption to occur. This has to be the case if the thrust of
Section 8, Article X and its strict intent are to be faithfully served,
i.e., to limit an elective official‘s continuous stay in office to no more
than three consecutive terms, using "voluntary renunciation" as an
example and standard of what does not constitute an interruption.
Thus, based on this standard, loss of office by operation of
law, being involuntary, is an effective interruption of service within a
term. On the other hand, temporary inability or disqualification to
exercise the functions of an elective post, even if involuntary, should
not be considered an effective interruption of a term because it does
not involve the loss of title to office or at least an effective break
from holding office; the office holder, while retaining title, is simply
barred from exercising the functions of his office for a reason
provided by law.
An interruption occurs when the term is broken because the
office holder lost the right to hold on to his office, and cannot be
equated with the failure to render service. The latter occurs during
an office holder‘s term when he retains title to the office but cannot
exercise his functions for reasons established by law. Of course, the
term "failure to serve" cannot be used once the right to office is lost;

146
without the right to hold office or to serve, then no service can be
rendered so that none is really lost.
To put it differently although at the risk of repetition, Section
8, Article X – both by structure and substance – fixes an elective
official‘s term of office and limits his stay in office to three
consecutive terms as an inflexible rule that is stressed, no less, by
citing voluntary renunciation as an example of a circumvention. The
provision should be read in the context of interruption of term, not
in the context of interrupting the full continuity of the exercise of
the powers of the elective position. The "voluntary renunciation" it
speaks of refers only to the elective official‘s voluntary
relinquishment of office and loss of title to this office. It does not
speak of the temporary "cessation of the exercise of power or
authority" that may occur for various reasons, with preventive
suspension being only one of them. To quote Latasa v. Comelec:
―Indeed, the law contemplates a rest period during which the
local elective official steps down from office and ceases to exercise
power or authority over the inhabitants of the territorial jurisdiction
of a particular local government unit.‖
Preventive suspension is a remedial measure that operates
under closely-controlled conditions and gives a premium to the
protection of the service rather than to the interests of the individual
office holder. Even then, protection of the service goes only as far as
a temporary prohibition on the exercise of the functions of the
official‘s office; the official is reinstated to the exercise of his position
as soon as the preventive suspension is lifted. Thus, while a
temporary incapacity in the exercise of power results, no position is
vacated when a public official is preventively suspended. This was
what exactly happened to Asilo.
To recapitulate, Asilo‘s 2004-2007 term was not interrupted
by the Sandiganbayan-imposed preventive suspension in 2005, as
preventive suspension does not interrupt an elective official‘s term.
Thus, the COMELEC refused to apply the legal command of Section
8, Article X of the Constitution when it granted due course to Asilo‘s
certificate of candidacy for a prohibited fourth term. By so refusing,
the COMELEC effectively committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; its action was a refusal to
perform a positive duty required by no less than the Constitution
and was one undertaken outside the contemplation of law.

147
ELECTION
PROTEST

148
 ROMEO LONZANIDA VS. THE HONORABLE COMMISSION
ON ELECTIONS and EUFEMIO MULI2
G.R. No. 135150, July 28, 1999
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
Facts:
Romeo served two consecutive terms as Mayor of San Antonio
in 1989 and 1992. In 1995, Romeo again filed his CoC and won the
elections. Alvez filed an election protest against Romeo. The RTC
found in favor of Alvez and declared the Office of the Mayor vacant.
On appeal to the COMELEC, Alvez was declared the winner. Alvez
assumed office for the remainder of the term. In 1998, Romeo again
filed his CoC for Mayor. This time, Muli sought to disqualify him for
violating the 3-term limit rule under the Constitution and the LGC.
Notwithstanding, Romeo was proclaimed winner. The COMELEC
First Division resolved disqualified Romeo. Upon motion for
reconsideration, the COMELEC En Banc affirmed the First
Division‘s ruling. Romeo argued that he is neither the duly elected
Mayor nor served in full his 1995 term. Thus, he is still eligible to
run for the 1998 elections. Muli countered that Romeo is
disqualified since he served for almost 3 years, save for a month and
few days; thus Romeo is ineligible. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether Romeo is disqualified from running as Mayor of San
Antonio.
Ruling:
Negative.
The 3-term limit rule is found in Art X, Sec 8 of the
Constitution. It is also codified under the LGC, Sec 43(b). The
deliberations of the ConCom reveals that an elective local
government official should be barred from running for the same post
after 3 consecutive terms. After a hiatus of at least 1 term, he may
again run for the same office. In Borja v. COMELEC, the SC pointed
out that the intention of the drafters of the constitution is that the
official‘s assumption of office is by reason of election. The term
referred to under the law is therefore by ‗election‘. For the result to
apply, two things must concur: (1) that the official concerned has
been elected for 3 consecutive terms in the same local government
post and (2) that he has fully served 3 consecutive terms. In this
case, the two requisites are absent. First, Romeo cannot be

149
considered as having been duly elected to the post; and second,
Romeo did not fully serve the term by reason of involuntary
relinquishment of office, i.e. nullity of his proclamation. Be it noted
that void proclamation is no proclamation at all. The service of the
majority of the term cannot also be considered as full term for lack of
legal basis. Accordingly, since Romeo did not relinquished his office,
there was an involuntary renunciation. Voluntary renunciation does
not interrupt the continuity; conversely, involuntary severance for
any length of time short of the full term provided by law is an
interruption of the continuity. Additionally, the prolonged stay of
Romeo in his office is not his fault. There is no specific allegation
nor proof that the delay was due to any political maneuvering on his
part to prolong his stay in office. Lastly, the COMELEC has
jurisdiction on the case even after the election. RA 6646, Sec 6
provides in part: ―If for any reason a candidate is not declared by
final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted
for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the
court or commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the
action, inquiry or protest.‖ The word ‗shall‘ signifies a mandatory
requirement. Hence, the COMELEC is left with no discretion but to
proceed with the disqualification case even after the election.

150
Dizon vs Comelec
Facts:
Roberto L. Dizon, a resident and taxpayer of the Municipality of
Mabalacat, Pampanga, filed a case with the COMELEC to disqualify
Marino P. Morales, incumbent Mayor of the Municipality of
Mabalacat, Pampanga. Petitioner alleged respondent was proclaimed
as the municipal mayor of Mabalcat during the 1995, 1998, 2001 and
2004 elections. Respondent filed his Certificate of Candidacy on
March 28, 2007 again for the same position and same municipality.
Petitioner argued that respondent is no longer eligible and qualified
to run for the same position for the May 14, 2007 elections under
Section 43 of the Local Government Code of 1991. Under the said
provision, no elective official is allowed to serve for more than three
(3) consecutive terms for the same position.
Respondent on the other hand, asserted that he is still eligible and
qualified to run as Mayor of Mabalacat because he was not elected
for the said position in the 1998 elections. He averred that the
Commission en banc in SPA Case No. A-04-058 entitled Atty.
Venancio Q. Rivera III and Normandick P. De Guzman vs. Mayor
Marino P. Morales, affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court
declaring Anthony Dee as duly elected Mayor of Mabalacat in the
1998 elections. Respondent further alleged that his term should be
reckoned from 2001 and that his election in 2004 is only for his
second term.
In its Resolution dated July 27, 2007, COMELEC Second Division
denied the petition. It took judicial notice of the Court‘s ruling in the
Rivera case where the Supreme Court ruled that the respondent has
violated the three-term limit under section 43 of the Local
Government Code and was not considered a candidate in the 2004
Synchronized National and Local Elections. Hence his failure to
qualify for the 2004 elections is a gap and allows him to run again
for the same position in the May 14, 2007 National and Local
Elections.
The COMELEC en bank affirmed the resolution of the COMELEC
Second Division. The three-year limit is not applicable in the instant
case for lack of the two conditions: 1) respondent was not the duly
elected mayor of Mabalacat for the July 1, 2004 to June 30, 2007
term primordially he was not even considered a candidate thereat;
and 2) respondent has failed to serve the entire duration of the term
151
of office because he has already relinquished the disputed office on
May 16, 2007 which is more than a month prior to the end of his
supposed term.
Issues:
1) Whether or not the period served by Morales in the 2004-2007
term should be considered his fourth term.
2) Whether or not the 2007-2010 term of Morales is his fifth term.
Ruling:
1) No. In our decision in the Rivera case promulgated 9 May 2007,
this Court unseated Morales during his fourth term. We cancelled
his Certificate of Candidacy dated 30 December 2003. This
cancellation disqualified Morales from being a candidate in the 2004
elections. The votes cast for Morales were considered stray votes.
Our ruling in the Rivera case served as Morales‘ involuntary
severance from office with respect to the 2004-2007 term.
Involuntary severance from office for any length of time short of the
full term provided by law amounts to an interruption of continuity of
service. Our decision in the Rivera case was promulgated on 9 May
2007 and was effective immediately. The next day, Morales notified
the vice mayor‘s office of our decision. The vice mayor assumed the
office of the mayor from 17 May 2007 up to 30 June 2007. The
assumption by the vice mayor of the office of the mayor, no matter
how short it may seem to Dizon, interrupted Morales‘ continuity of
service. Thus, Morales did not hold office for the full term of 1 July
2004 to 30 June 2007.
2) No. We concede that Morales occupied the position of mayor of
Mabalacat for the following periods: 1 July 1995 to 30 June 1998, 1
July 1998 to 30 June 2001, 1 July 2001 to 30 June 2004 and 1 July
2004 to 16 May 2007. However, because of his disqualification,
Morales was not the duly elected mayor for the 2004-2007 term.
Neither did Morales hold the position of mayor of Mabalacat for the
full term. Morales cannot be deemed to have been served the full
term of 2004-2007 because he was ordered to vacate his post before
the expiration of the term. Morales‘ occupancy of the position of
mayor of Mabalacat from 1 July 2004 to 16 May 2007 cannot be
counted as a term for purposes of computing the three-term limit.
Indeed, the period from 17 May 2007 to 30 June 2007 served as a
gap for purposes of the three-term limit rule. Thus, the present 1

152
July 2007 to 30 June 2010 term is effectively Morales‘ first term for
purposes of the three-term limit rule.

153
 DEFEATED IN AN
ELECTION PROTEST
BUT HAS SERVED
FULL TIME

154
FRANCIS G. ONG, Petitioner, v. JOSEPH STANLEY ALEGRE
and COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondents.
G.R.NO. 163295 JANUARY 23, 2006

Facts:
 Alegre and Ong were candidates who filed certificates of
candidacy for mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte in May
10, 2004 elections. Francis was then the incumbent mayor.
Alegre filed a petition to disqualify Ong for he has served for
three-consecutive terms.The May 1998 elections, both Alegre
and Ong ran for the office of mayor, Ong was proclaimed
winner. Alegre filed a protest and the RTC declared the
opposing party as the duly elected mayor. However, such
decision came out three years after and when the candidate has
already started his third term.

 The First Division of Comelec dismissed the petition of

Alegre. Upon motion for reconsideration, the Comelec en banc
reversed the decision of Comelec‘s First Division and declared
Francis as disqualified to run for mayorin the May 10, 2004
election. Since the COMELEC disqualified the candidate, his
political party nominated the brother of the candidate as a
substitute.

 The COMELEC denied due course the certificate of candidacy

in the same mayoralty election as substitute for his brother.

Issue:
(1) Whether or not the assumption of office as mayor from July 1,
1998 to June 30, 2001, may be considered as one full term service
in the context of the consecutive three-term limit rule.

(2) Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of

discretion when it denied due course to the certificate of
candidacy in the same mayoralty election as substitute for his
brother.

155
Ruling:
(1) We hold that such assumption of office constitutes, "service
for the full term", and should be counted as a full term served
in contemplation of the three-term limit prescribed by the
constitutional and statutory provisions, supra, barring local
elective officials from being elected and serving for more than
three consecutive term for the same position.

For the three-term limit for elective local government officials to

apply, two conditions or requisites must concur, to wit: (1) that
the official concerned has been elected for three (3) consecutive
terms in the same local government post, and (2) that he has fully
served three (3) consecutive terms.

A candidate whose certificate of candidacy has been cancelled or

not given due course cannot be substituted by another belonging
to the same political party as that of the former.

(2) A person without a valid certificate of candidacy cannot

be considered a candidate in much the same way as any
person who has not filed any certificate of candidacy at all
can not, by any stretch of the imagination, be a candidate at
all.

156
MERGER OF
BARANGAY

157
ROBERTO LACEDA, SR., petitioner,
vs.
RANDY L. LIMENA and COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, respondents.

G.R. No. 182867

November 25, 2008

FACTS:

Petitioner Roberto Laceda, Sr., and private respondent Randy L.

Limena were candidates for Punong Barangay of Barangay Panlayaan,
West District, Sorsogon City, during the October 29, 2007 Barangay
and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections. On October 23, 2007, Limena
filed a petition for disqualification and/or declaration as an ineligible
candidate5 against Laceda before the COMELEC, contending that
Laceda had already served as Punong Barangay for Brgy. Panlayaan
for three consecutive terms since 1994, and was thus prohibited
from running for the fourth time under Section 2 of Republic Act
No. 91646 which provides:

SEC. 2. Term of Office.-The term of office of all barangay and

sangguniang kabataan officials after the effectivity of this Act
shall be three (3) years.

No barangay elective official shall serve for more than three (3)
consecutive terms in the same position: Provided,
however, That the term of office shall be reckoned from the
1994 barangay elections. Voluntary renunciation of office for
any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in
the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective
official was elected.

Laceda admitted having served as Punong Barangay of Panlayaan for

three consecutive terms. However, he asserted that when he was
elected for his first two terms, Sorsogon was still a municipality, and
that when he served his third term, the Municipality of Sorsogon had
already been merged with the Municipality of Bacon to form a new
political unit, the City of Sorsogon, pursuant to Republic Act No.
8806.9 Thus, he argued that his third term was actually just his first
in the new political unit and that he was accordingly entitled to run
for two more terms

158
Laceda moved for reconsideration, but his motion was denied by the
COMELEC in a Resolution dated May 7, 2008. Aggrieved, Laceda
filed a petition for certiorari before this Court.

On June 10, 2008, this Court dismissed the petition for failure to
sufficiently show that any grave abuse of discretion was committed
by the COMELEC in rendering the assailed Resolutions of January
15, 2008 and May 7, 2008. Hence, this motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE:‘
WILL MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION PROSPER?

RULING:

Section 2 of Rep. Act No. 9164, like Section 43 of the Local

Government Code from which it was taken, is primarily intended to
broaden the choices of the electorate of the candidates who will run
for office, and to infuse new blood in the political arena by
disqualifying officials from running for the same office after a term of
nine years. This Court has held that for the prohibition to apply, two
requisites must concur: (1) that the official concerned has been
elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government
post and (2) that he or she has fully served three consecutive terms.

In this case, while it is true that under Rep. Act No. 8806 the
municipalities of Sorsogon and Bacon were merged and converted
into a city thereby abolishing the former and creating Sorsogon City
as a new political unit, it cannot be said that for the purpose of
applying the prohibition in Section 2 of Rep. Act No. 9164, the office
of Punong Barangay of Barangay Panlayaan, Municipality of
Sorsogon, would now be construed as a different local government
post as that of the office of Punong Barangay of Barangay
Panlayaan, Sorsogon City. The territorial jurisdiction of Barangay
Panlayaan, Sorsogon City, is the same as before the conversion.
Consequently, the inhabitants of the barangay are the same. They are
the same group of voters who elected Laceda to be their Punong
Barangay for three consecutive terms and over whom Laceda held
power and authority as their Punong Barangay. Moreover, Rep. Act
No. 8806 did not interrupt Laceda's term.

Thus, conformably with the democratic intent of Rep. Act No. 9164
and this Court's ruling in Latasa v. Commission on Elections, we
hold that the prohibition in Section 2 of said statute applies to
Laceda. The COMELEC did not err nor commit any abuse of

159
discretion when it declared him disqualified and cancelled his
certificate of candidacy.

WHEREFORE, petitioner Roberto Laceda, Sr.'s Motion for

Reconsideration18 dated July 25, 2008 assailing this Court's
Resolution dated June 10, 2008 is DENIED with FINALITY.

SO ORDERED.

160
REAPPORTIONED
THIRD DISTRICT
FROM SECOND
DISTRICT

161
 Naval vs COMELEC
G.R. No. 207851
July 8, 2014

FACTS:
From 2004 to 2007 and 2007 to 2010, Naval had been elected
and had served as a member of the Sanggunian, Second Districtm
Province of Camarines Sur.
On October 12, 2009, the President approved R.A. 9716, which
reapportioned the legislative districts in Camarines Sur. 8 out of 10
towns were taken from the old Second District to form the present
Third District.
In the 2010 elections, Naval once again won as a member of the
Sanggunian, Third District. He served until 2013.
In the 2013 elections, Naval ran anew and was re-elected as Member
of the Sangguinian, Third District.
Julia, a member of the Sanggunian Third district, contended that
Naval had fully served the entire Province of Camarines Sir for three
consecutive terms as a member of the Sanggunian, irrespective of the
district he had been elected from. Allowing Naval to run as a
Sanggunian member for the fourth time will violate the three-term
limit rule.
Naval alleges that first, second and third legislative districts of
Camarines Sur are not merely renamed but are composed of new
sets of municipalities. He said that voters from the third legislative
district are no longer the same ones as those who had elected him to
office in the 2004 and 2007 elections.
OSG said Naval violated section 78 of the OEC when he filed his
COC.
COMELEC also cancelled Navals COC on grounds of false material
misrepresentation cognizable under section 78 of the OEC.
COMELEC also denied Navals motion for reconsideration. The
former said it is clear that the position to which Naval filed his
candidacy for the May 13 2013 elections is the same position for
which he had been elected and had served for the past nine years.
R.A. 9716 did not convert Naval‘s position into a different one from
what he previously held.

162
ISSUE:
Whether or not Naval violated the three term limit rule of the
constitution.
RULING:
Yes. R.A. 9716 plainly state that the new Secomd District is to be
created, but the Third District is to be renamed. Same municipalities
are under the Third District and thus, the same voters who voted for
him in the previous elections. Enactment of R.A. 9716 did not
convert Naval‘s position into one different from what he previously
had.
Navals contention would allow him to hold the same office for 15
years and is a clear violation of the three term limit rule set forth by
the Constitution.

163
 RECALL
ELECTION‘S
EFFECT ON THE
DEPOSED
OFFICIAL

164
 JOSELITO R. MENDOZA, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS AND ROBERTO M. PAGDANGANAN,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 191084; March 25, 2010.

FACTS: Petitioner Joselito R. Mendoza was proclaimed the winner

of the 2007 gubernatorial election for the province of Bulacan,
besting respondent Roberto M. Pagdanganan by a margin of 15,732
votes. Respondent filed the Election Protest which, anchored on the
massive electoral fraud allegedly perpetrated by petitioner.

Upon the evidence adduced and the memoranda subsequently filed

by the parties, the COMELEC Second Division went on to render the
1 December 2009 Resolution, which annulled and set aside
petitioners proclamation as governor of Bulacan and proclaimed
respondent duly elected to said position. Coupled with a directive to
the DILG to implement the same, the resolution ordered petitioner
to immediately vacate said office, to cease and desist from
discharging the functions pertaining thereto and to cause a peaceful
turn-over thereof to respondent.

Dissatisfied, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the

foregoing resolution with the COMELEC En Banc on the ground that
lack of concurrence of the majority of the members of the
Commission pursuant to Section 5, Rule 3 of the COMELEC Rules
of Procedure. However, the motion was dismissed in a Resolution
dated 8 Feb 2010. Petitioner filed before the COMELEC an Urgent
Motion to Recall the Resolution Promulgated on February 8, 2010.
Anchored on the same ground, petitioner filed the instant Petition
for Certiorari with an Urgent Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order and/or a Status Quo Order and Writ of
Preliminary Injunction.

In their respective Comments thereto, both respondent and the

Office of the Solicitor General argue that, in addition to its
premature filing, the petition at bench violated the rule against
forum shopping.

ISSUE: Is the assailed COMELEC Resolution valid?

HELD: No, the assailed resolution is not valid. The failure of the
COMELEC En Banc to muster the required majority vote even after

165
the 15 February 2010 re-hearing should have caused the dismissal of
respondent's Election Protest.

Even before petitioners filing of his Urgent Motion to Recall the

Resolution Promulgated on 8 February 2010 and the instant Petition
for Certiorari with an Urgent Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order and/or a Status Quo Order and Writ of
Preliminary Injunction, the record shows that the COMELEC En
Banc issued the 10 February 2010 Resolution, ordering the re-
hearing of the case on the ground that "there was no majority vote of
the members obtained in the Resolution of the Commission En Banc
promulgated on February 8, 2010." Having conceded one of the
grounds subsequently raised in petitioners Urgent Motion to Recall
the Resolution Promulgated on February 8, 2010, the COMELEC En
Banc significantly failed to obtain the votes required under Section
5(a), Rule 3 of its own Rules of Procedure for a second time.
The failure of the COMELEC En Banc to muster the required
majority vote even after the 15 February 2010 re-hearing should have
caused the dismissal of respondents Election Protest. Promulgated
on 15 February 1993 pursuant to Section 6, Article IX-A and Section
3, Article IX-C of the Constitution, the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure is clear on this matter. Without any trace of ambiguity,
Section 6, Rule 18 of said Rule categorically provides as follows:

Sec. 6. Procedure if Opinion is Equally Divided. When the

Commission en banc is equally divided in opinion, or the necessary
majority cannot be had, the case shall be reheard, and if on rehearing
no decision is reached, the action or proceeding shall be dismissed if
originally commenced in the Commission; in appealed cases, the
judgment or order appealed from shall stand affirmed; and in all
incidental matters, the petition or motion shall be denied.

The propriety of applying the foregoing provision according to its

literal tenor cannot be gainsaid. As one pertaining to the election of
the provincial governor of Bulacan, respondents Election Protest was
originally commenced in the COMELEC, pursuant to its exclusive
original jurisdiction over the case. Although initially raffled to the
COMELEC Second Division, the elevation of said election protest on
motion for reconsideration before the Commission En Banc cannot,
by any stretch of the imagination, be considered an appeal.

Tersely put, there is no appeal within the COMELEC itself. As aptly

observed in the lone dissent penned by COMELEC Commissioner
Rene V. Sarmiento, respondents Election Protest was filed with the

166
Commission "at the first instance" and should be, accordingly,
considered an action or proceeding "originally commenced in the
Commission."

There is a difference in the result of the exercise of jurisdiction by

the COMELEC over election contests. The difference inheres in the
kind of jurisdiction invoked, which in turn, is determined by the case
brought before the COMELEC. When a decision of a trial court is
brought before the COMELEC for it to exercise appellate
jurisdiction, the division decides the appeal but, if there is a motion
for reconsideration, the appeal proceeds to the banc where a majority
is needed for a decision. If the process ends without the required
majority at the banc, the appealed decision stands affirmed.

Upon the other hand, and this is what happened in the instant case,
if what is brought before the COMELEC is an original protest
invoking the original jurisdiction of the Commission, the protest, as
one whole process, is first decided by the division, which process is
continued in the banc if there is a motion for reconsideration of the
division ruling. If no majority decision is reached in the banc, the
protest, which is an original action, shall be dismissed. There is no
first instance decision that can be deemed affirmed.

In a protest originally brought before the COMELEC, no completed

process comes to the banc. It is the banc which will complete the
process. If, at that completion, no conclusive result in the form of a
majority vote is reached, the COMELEC has no other choice except
to dismiss the protest. In a protest placed before the Commission as
an appeal, there has been a completed proceeding that has resulted
in a decision. So that when the COMELEC, as an appellate body, and
after the appellate process is completed, reaches an inconclusive
result, the appeal is in effect dismissed and resultingly, the decision
appealed from is affirmed.

167
RA 7941 (2-PERCENTER)
3 CAP RULE

168
 BARANGAY ASSOCIATION FOR NATIONAL
ADVANCEMENT AND TRANSPARENCY (BANAT), Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (sitting as the National Board
of Canvassers), Respondent.
ARTS BUSINESS AND SCIENCE PROFESSIONALS, Intervenor.
AANGAT TAYO, Intervenor.
COALITION OF ASSOCIATIONS OF SENIOR CITIZENS IN
THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (SENIOR CITIZENS), Intervenor.

FACTS:

The House of Representatives, represented by Speaker

Prospero C. Nograles, filed a motion for leave to intervene in G.R.
Nos. 179271 and 179295. The House of Representatives filed a
motion for clarification in intervention and enumerated the issues
for clarification as follows:

A. There are only 219 legislative districts and not 220.

Accordingly, the allotted seats for party-list representation
should only be 54 and not 55. The House of Representatives
seeks clarification on which of the party-list representatives
shall be admitted to the Roll of Members considering that the
Court declared as winners 55 party-list representatives.

B. The House of Representatives wishes to be guided on

whether it should enroll in its Roll of Members the 32 named
party-list representatives enumerated in Table 3 or only such
number of representatives that would complete the 250
member maximum prescribed by Article VI, Sec. 5(1) of the
Constitution. In the event that it is ordered to admit all 32, will
this act not violate the above-cited Constitutional provision
considering that the total members would now rise to 270.

C. The Court declared as unconstitutional the 2% threshold

only in relation to the distribution of additional seats as found
in the second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941. Yet, it
distributed first seats to party-list groups which did not attain
the minimum number of votes that will entitle them to one
seat. Clarification is, therefore, sought whether the term
"additional seats" refer to 2nd and 3rd seats only or all
remaining available seats. Corollary thereto, the House of
Representatives wishes to be clarified whether there is no more

169
 minimum vote requirement to qualify as a party-list
representative.

D. For the guidance of the House of Representatives,

clarification is sought as to whether the principle laid down in
Veterans that "the filling up of the allowable seats for party-list
representatives is not mandatory," has been abandoned.1

On the other hand, Armi Jane Roa-Borje (Roa-Borje), third nominee

of Citizens‘ Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC), filed a motion for
leave for partial reconsideration-in-intervention, alleging that:

The Supreme Court, in ruling on the procedure for distribution of

seats, has deprived without due process and in violation of the equal
protection clause, parties with more significant constituencies, such
as CIBAC, Gabriela and APEC, in favor of parties who did not even
meet the 2% threshold.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the 250 members of the house of
representative as prescribed by Art.6 Sec.5 of the constitution
can rise up to 270 members or more?
2. Whether or not the filling up of the allowable seats for party-
list representatives is not mandatory?
3. Whether or not the 2% threshold in allocation of additional
seats (second round) Requires a minimum vote in order to
obtain a party-list seat?
4. Whether there is no more minimum vote requirement to
qualify as a party-list representative

Ruling:

1.YES, Section 5(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution reads in

part:

The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of

the total number of representatives including those under the party-
list.

The 1987 Constitution fixes the ratio of party-list representatives to

district representatives. This ratio automatically applies whenever
the number of district representatives is increased by law. The

170
mathematical formula for determining the number of seats available
to party-list representatives is

Number of seats
available Number of seats
to legislative districts x .20 = available to
party-list representatives
.80

The formula allows

the corresponding increase in the number of seats available for

party-list representatives whenever a legislative district is
created by law. Thus, for every four district representatives, the
1987 Constitution mandates that there shall be one party-list
representative. There is no need for legislation to create an
additional party-list seat whenever four additional legislative districts
are created by law. Section 5(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
automatically creates such additional party-list seat.

This is clear from the phrase "unless otherwise provided by law" in

Section 5(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. The Legislature
has the option to choose whether the increase in the number of
members of the House of Representatives is done by piecemeal
legislation or by enactment of a law authorizing a general increase.

2. The filling-up of all available party-list seats is not mandatory.

Actual occupancy of the party-list seats depends on the number of
participants in the party-list election. If only ten parties participated
in the 2007 party-list election, then, despite the availability of 54
seats, the maximum possible number of occupied party-list seats
would only be 30 because of the three-seat cap. In such a case, the
three-seat cap prevents the mandatory allocation of all the 54
available seats.

Under Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941, garnering 2% of the total

votes cast guarantees a party one seat. This 2% threshold for the first
round of seat allocation does not violate any provision of the 1987
Constitution. Thus, the Court upholds this 2% threshold for the
guaranteed seats as a valid exercise of legislative power.

3. No. In the second round allocation of additional seats, there is no

minimum vote requirement to obtain a party-list seat because the

171
Court has struck down the application of the 2% threshold in the
allocation of additional seats. Specifically, the provision in Section
11(b) of the Party-List Act stating that "those garnering more than
two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in
the proportion to their total number of votes" can no longer be given
any effect. Otherwise, the 20 percent party-list seats in the total
membership of the House of Representatives as provided in the 1987
Constitution will mathematically be impossible to fill up

However, a party-list organization has to obtain a sufficient number

of votes to gain a seat in the second round of seat allocation. What is
deemed a sufficient number of votes is dependent upon the
circumstances of each election, such as the number of participating
parties, the number of available party-list seats, and the number of
parties with guaranteed seats received in the first round of seat
allocation. To continue the example above, if only ten parties
participated in the 2007 party-list election and each party received
only one thousand votes, then each of the ten parties would receive
10% of the votes cast. All are guaranteed one seat, and are further
entitled to receive two more seats in the second round of seat
allocation.

Similarly, a presidential candidate may win the elections even if he

receives only one thousand votes as long as all his opponents receive
less than one thousand votes. A winning presidential candidate only
needs to receive more votes than his opponents. The same policy
applies in every election to public office, from the presidential to the
barangay level. Except for the guaranteed party-list seat, there is no
minimum vote requirement before a candidate in any election, for
any elective office, can be proclaimed the winner. Of course, the
winning candidate must receive at least one vote, assuming he has
no opponents or all his opponents do not receive a single vote.

In the absence of a minimum vote requirement in the second round

of party-list seat allocation, there is no need to belabor the disparity
between the votes obtained by the first and last ranked winning
parties in the 2007 party-list elections. In the same manner, no one
belabors the disparity between the votes obtained by the highest and
lowest ranked winners in the senatorial elections.

4.. No, only in second round or for the determination for additional
seats, the no minimum vote requirement rule shall apply.

172
The Supreme Court laid down the following rules:
A. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the
highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they garnered
during the elections.
b. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two
percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be
entitled to one guaranteed seat each.
c. Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the
ranking in paragraph 1, shall be entitled to additional seats in
proportion to their total number of votes until all the additional
seats are allocated.
d. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more
than three (3) seats.
Thus, the party-list shall at least obtain 2% of the total votes cast for
the party-list system in order for it to guarantee a One seat.

173
Atong Paglaum, Inc. vs. Commission on Elections
694 SCRA 477 April 2, 2013

FACTS:
Pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 7941 (R.A. No.
7941) and COMELEC Resolution Nos. 9366 and 9531,
approximately 280 groups and organizations registered and
manifested their desire to participate in the 13 May 2013 party-list
elections.
The COMELEC, however, denied the petitions for registration of the
following groups .
These 13 petitioners (ASIN, Manila Teachers, ALA-EH, 1AAAP,
AKIN, AAB, AI, ALONA, ALAM, KALIKASAN, GUARDJAN, PPP,
and PBB) were not able to secure a mandatory injunction from this
Court. The COMELEC, on 7 January 2013 issued Resolution No.
9604, and excluded the names of these 13 petitioners in the printing
of the official ballot for the 13 May 2013 party-list elections.
Pursuant to paragraph 2 of Resolution No. 9513, the COMELEC En
Banc scheduled summary evidentiary hearings to determine whether
the groups and organizations that filed manifestations of intent to
participate in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections have continually
complied with the requirements of R.A. No. 7941 and Ang Bagong
Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC(Ang Bagong Bayani).The
COMELEC disqualified the following groups and organizations from
participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections.
These 39 petitioners (AKB, Atong Paglaum, ARAL, ARC, UNIMAD,
1BRO-PGBI, 1GANAP/GUARDIANS, A BLESSED Party-List, 1-
CARE, APEC, AT, ARARO, AGRI, AKMA-PTM, KAP, AKO-BAHAY,
BANTAY, PACYAW, PASANG MASDA, KAKUSA, AG, ANAD,
GREENFORCE, FIRM 24-K, ALIM, AAMA, SMART, ABP, BAYANI,
AANI, A-IPRA, COCOFED, ABANG LINGKOD, ABROAD, BINHI,
BUTIL, 1st KABAGIS, 1-UTAK, SENIOR CITIZENS) were able to
secure a mandatory injunction from this Court, directing the
COMELEC to include the names of these 39 petitioners in the
printing of the official ballot for the 13 May 2013 party-list elections.
These cases constitute 54 Petitions for Certiorari and Petitions for
Certiorari and Prohibition filed by 52 party-list groups and
organizations assailing the Resolutions issued by the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) disqualifying them from participating in the
13 May 2013 party-list elections, either by denial of their petitions
for registration under the party-list system, or cancellation of their
registration and accreditation as party-list organizations.

ISSUES:
1. Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in disqualifying
petitioners from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list
elections.
2. Whether the criteria for participating in the party-list system
laid down in Ang Bagong Bayani and Barangay Association for
National Advancement and Transparency v. Commission on
Elections (BANAT) should be applied by the COMELEC in the
coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections.

RULING:
1. NO. The 1987 Constitution provides the basis for the party-
list system of representation. Simply put, the party-list system is
174
intended to democratize political power by giving political parties
that cannot win in legislative district elections a chance to win seats
in the House of Representatives. The voter elects two representatives
in the House of Representatives: one for his or her legislative
district, and another for his or her party-list group or organization of
choice.
Indisputably, the framers of the 1987 Constitution intended the
party-list system to include not only sectoral parties but also non-
sectoral parties. The framers intended the sectoral parties to
constitute a part, but not the entirety, of the party-list system. As
explained by Commissioner Wilfredo Villacorta, political parties can
participate in the party-list system ―[F]or as long as they field
candidates who come from the different marginalized sectors that we
shall designate in this Constitution.‖
What the framers intended, and what they expressly wrote in Section
5(1), could not be any clearer: the party-list system is composed of
three different groups, and the sectoral parties belong to only one of
the three groups. The text of Section 5(1) leaves no room for any
doubt that national and regional parties are separate from sectoral
parties. Thus, the party-list system is composed of three different
groups: (1) national parties or organizations; (2) regional parties or
organizations; and (3) sectoral parties or organizations. National and
regional parties or organizations are different from sectoral parties or
organizations. National and regional parties or organizations need
not be organized along sectoral lines and need not represent any
particular sector.
Section 3(a) of R.A. No. 7941 defines a ―party‖ as ―either a political
party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties.‖ Clearly, a political
party is different from a sectoral party. Section 3(c) of R.A. No. 7941
further provides that a ―political party refers to an organized group
of citizens advocating an ideology or platform, principles and policies
for the general conduct of government.‖ On the other hand, Section
3(d) of R.A. No. 7941 provides that a ―sectoral party refers to an
organized group of citizens belonging to any of the sectors
enumerated in Section 5 hereof whose principal advocacy pertains to
the special interest and concerns of their sector.‖ R.A. No. 7941
provides different definitions for a political and a sectoral party.
Obviously, they are separate and distinct from each other.

2. NO. The 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941 allow major
political parties to participate in party-list elections so as to
encourage them to work assiduously in extending their
constituencies to the ―marginalized and underrepresented‖ and to
those who ―lack well-defined political constituencies.‖ The
participation of major political parties in party-list elections must be
geared towards the entry, as members of the House of
Representatives, of the ―marginalized and underrepresented‖ and
those who ―lack well-defined political constituencies,‖ giving them a
voice in lawmaking. Thus, to participate in party-list elections, a
major political party that fields candidates in the legislative district
elections must organize a sectoral wing, like a labor, peasant,
fisherfolk, urban poor, professional, women or youth wing, that can
register under the party-list system. Such sectoral wing of a major
political party must have its own constitution, by-laws, platform or
program of government, officers and members, a majority of whom
must belong to the sector represented. The sectoral wing is in itself
an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a major political party
through a coalition. This linkage is allowed by Section 3 of R.A. No.
7941, which provides that ―component parties or organizations of a
coalition may participate independently (in party-list elections)
provided the coalition of which they form part does not participate in
the party-list system.‖
175
Section 9 of R.A. No. 7941 prescribes the qualifications of party-list
nominees. This provision prescribes a special qualification only for
the nominee from the youth sector. Section 9. Qualifications of
Party-List Nominees.―No person shall be nominated as party-list
representative unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a
registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a period of not less
than one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election, able
to read and write, a bona fide member of the party or organization
which he seeks to represent for at least ninety (90) days preceding
the day of the election, and is at least twenty-five (25) years of age
on the day of the election. In case of a nominee of the youth sector,
he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty (30)
years of age on the day of the election. Any youth sectoral
representative who attains the age of thirty (30) during his term
shall be allowed to continue in office until the expiration of his term.
A party-list nominee must be a bona fide member of the party or
organization which he or she seeks to represent. In the case of
sectoral parties, to be a bona fide party-list nominee one must either
belong to the sector represented, or have a track record of advocacy
for such sector.

176
ANG LADLAD LGBT PARTY represented herein by its Chair,
DANTON REMOTO, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS Respondent
G.R. No. 190582 April 8, 2010

Facts:
Ang Ladlad is an organization composed of men and women who
identify themselves as lesbians, gays, bisexuals, or trans-gendered
individuals (LGBTs).
Ang Ladlad where first applied for registration with the COMELEC
in 2006. The application for accreditation was denied on the ground
that the organization had no substantial membership base. On
August 17, 2009, Ang Ladlad again filed a Petition5 for registration
with the COMELEC.
Petitioner argued that the LGBT community is a marginalized and
under-represented sector that is particularly disadvantaged because
of their sexual orientation and gender identity; that LGBTs are
victims of exclusion, discrimination, and violence; that because of
negative societal attitudes, LGBTs are constrained to hide their
sexual orientation; and that Ang Ladlad complied with the 8-point
guidelines enunciated by this Court in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW
Labor Party v. Commission on Elections.6 Ang Ladlad laid out its
national membership base consisting of individual members and
organizational supporters, and outlined its platform of governance.
On November 11, 2009, Petitioner filed a petition for accreditation
as a party-list organization to public respondent. However, due to
moral grounds, the latter denied the said petition. To buttress their
denial, COMELEC cited certain biblical and quranic passages in their
decision. It also stated that since their ways are immoral and
contrary to public policy, they are considered nuissance. In fact, their
acts are even punishable under the Revised Penal Code in its Article
201.
A motion for reconsideration being denied, Petitioner filed this
instant Petition on Certiorari under Rule 65 of the ROC.
Ang Ladlad argued that the denial of accreditation, insofar as it
justified the exclusion by using religious dogma, violated the
constitutional guarantees against the establishment of religion.
Petitioner also claimed that the Assailed Resolutions contravened its
constitutional rights to privacy, freedom of speech and assembly, and
equal protection of laws, as well as constituted violations of the

177
Philippines‘ international obligations against discrimination based
on sexual orientation.
In its Comment, the COMELEC reiterated that petitioner does not
have a concrete and genuine national political agenda to benefit the
nation and that the petition was validly dismissed on moral grounds.
It also argued for the first time that the LGBT sector is not among
the sectors enumerated by the Constitution and RA 7941, and that
petitioner made untruthful statements in its petition when it alleged
its national existence contrary to actual verification reports by
COMELEC‘s field personnel.

Issue:
Whether or Not Respondent violated the Non-establishment clause
of the Constitution; and
Whether or Not Respondent erred in denying Petitioners application
on moral and legal grounds.

Held:
Ang Ladlad LGBT Party‘s application for registration should be
granted.
The COMELEC denied Ang Ladlad‘s application for registration on
the ground that the LGBT sector is neither enumerated in the
Constitution and RA 7941, nor is it associated with or related to any
of the sectors in the enumeration.
Respondent mistakenly opinions that our ruling in Ang Bagong
Bayani stands for the proposition that only those sectors specifically
enumerated in the law or related to said sectors (labor, peasant,
fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly,
handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and
professionals) may be registered under the party-list system. As we
explicitly ruled in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v.
Commission on Elections, ―the enumeration of marginalized and
under-represented sectors is not exclusive‖. The crucial element is
not whether a sector is specifically enumerated, but whether a
particular organization complies with the requirements of the
Constitution and RA 7941.
Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that ―no law shall
be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof.‖ At bottom, what our non-establishment clause
calls for is ―government neutrality in religious matters.‖ Clearly,
―governmental reliance on religious justification is inconsistent with

178
this policy of neutrality.‖ We thus find that it was grave violation of
the non-establishment clause for the COMELEC to utilize the Bible
and the Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad. Be it noted that
government action must have a secular purpose.
Respondent has failed to explain what societal ills are sought to be
prevented, or why special protection is required for the youth.
Neither has the COMELEC condescended to justify its position that
petitioner‘s admission into the party-list system would be so harmful
as to irreparably damage the moral fabric of society.
We also find the COMELEC‘s reference to purported violations of
our penal and civil laws flimsy, at best; disingenuous, at worst.
Article 694 of the Civil Code defines a nuisance as ―any act,
omission, establishment, condition of property, or anything else
which shocks, defies, or disregards decency or morality,‖ the
remedies for which are a prosecution under the Revised Penal Code
or any local ordinance, a civil action, or abatement without judicial
proceedings. A violation of Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code, on
the other hand, requires proof beyond reasonable doubt to support a
criminal conviction. It hardly needs to be emphasized that mere
allegation of violation of laws is not proof, and a mere blanket
invocation of public morals cannot replace the institution of civil or
criminal proceedings and a judicial determination of liability or
culpability.
As such, we hold that moral disapproval, without more, is not a
sufficient governmental interest to justify exclusion of homosexuals
from participation in the party-list system. The denial of Ang
Ladlad‘s registration on purely moral grounds amounts more to a
statement of dislike and disapproval of homosexuals, rather than a
tool to further any substantial public interest.

179
 COCOFED-PHILIPPINE COCONUT PRODUCERS
FEDERATION v. COMELEC
GR No. 207026, 2013-08-06

Facts:
On August 23, 2012, the COMELEC conducted a summary hearing,
pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. 9513, to determine whether
COCOFED, among several party-list groups that filed manifestations
of intent to participate in the May 13, 2013 party-list elections, had
continuously complied with the legal requirements.
In the November 7, 2012 resolution, the COMELEC cancelled
COCOFED's registration and accreditation as a party-list
organization on several grounds. Notably, the Concurring Opinion of
Commissioner Christian Lim cited as additional ground, that since
COCOFED submitted only two nominees, then it failed to comply
with Section 8 of Republic Act (RA) No. 7941 that requires the party
to submit to COMELEC a list of not less than five nominees.
On December 4, 2012, COCOFED submitted the names of Charles
R. Avila, in substitution of Atty. Espina, as its second nominee and
Efren V. Villaseñor as its third nominee.
COCOFED, among several others, questioned the COMELEC's
cancellation of its registration and accreditation before this Court,
with a prayer for the issuance of preliminary injunction and/or
temporary restraining order. By reason of the status quo ante order
issued by the court, COCOFED's name was included in the printing
of the official ballots for the May 13, 2013 elections.
On May 10, 2013, the COMELEC issued its assailed resolution,
maintaining its earlier ruling cancelling COCOFED's registration and
accreditation for its failure to comply with the requirement of
Section 8 of RA No. 7941, i.e., to submit a list of not less than five
nominees. COCOFED argues that the COMELEC gravely abused its
discretion in issuing the assailed resolution on the following
grounds:
First, the COMELEC's issuance of the assailed resolution violated its
right to due process because the COMELEC did not even conduct a
summary hearing, as ordered by the Court in Atong Paglaum, to give
it an opportunity to explain and comply with the requirement.

180
Second, its failure to submit the required number of nominees was
based on the good faith belief that its submission was sufficient for
purposes of the elections and that it could still be remedied since
COCOFED could simply submit the names of its additional two
nominees.
Third, the COMELEC violated its right to equal protection of the
laws since at least two other party-list groups (ACT-CIS and MTM
Phils.) which failed to submit five nominees were included in the
official list of party-list groups.
Despite the issuance of the assailed resolution three days before the
elections, COCOFED remained in the ballot and its votes were
counted and tallied. As of 8:26:02 a.m. of May 29, 2013, the official
results showed that it only... received 80,397 votes or 0.36% of the
total number of votes cast for the party-list elections. With the
reliefs prayed for already performed, nothing more remained for
COCOFED to ask.
At any rate, the COMELEC claims that it did not abuse, much less
gravely abuse its discretion, when it maintained its earlier ruling
cancelling COCOFED's registration and accreditation; it merely
applied the clear requirement of Section 8, in relation to Section 6, of
RA No. 7941 the submission of a complete list goes into the right of
the voters to know and make intelligent and informed choice.
Lastly, it is not mandatory for the COMELEC to conduct summary
evidentiary hearings under the ruling in Atong Paglaum.
Issues:
Whether or not the COMELEC indeed gravely abused its discretion
in issuing the assailed resolution. We hold that it did not.
Ruling:
Failure to submit the list of five nominees before the election
warrants the cancellation of its registration.
The law expressly requires the submission of a list containing at
least five qualified nominees. Section 8 of RA No. 7941 reads:
Section 8. Nomination of Party-List Representatives. Each registered
party, organization or coalition shall submit to the COMELEC not
later than forty-five (45) days before the election a list of names, not
less than five (5), from which party-list representatives shall be
chosen in case it obtains the required number of votes.

181
COCOFED's failure to submit a list of five nominees, despite ample
opportunity to do so before the elections, is a violation imputable to
the party under Section 6(5) of RA No. 7941.
First, the language of Section 8 of RA No. 7941 does not only use
the word "shall" in connection with the requirement of submitting a
list of nominees; it uses this mandatory term in conjunction with the
number of names to be submitted that is couched negatively, i.e.,
"not less than five. Almost all of the petitioners in Atong Paglaum
were disqualified on the ground that the nominees failed to "qualify,"
as this word was interpreted by the COMELEC. In other words, the
Court in no way authorized a party- list group's inexcusable failure, if
not outright refusal, to comply with the clear letter of the law on the
submission of at least five nominees.
Principles:
Provisions of the law must not be read in isolation but as a whole, as
the law must not be read in truncated parts; its provisions in relation
to the whole law and every part thereof must be considered in fixing
the meaning of any of its parts in order to produce a harmonious
whole.
The party-list system is a constitutional innovation that would
expand opportunities for electoral participation to those who cannot
hope to win in the legislative district elections, but who may
generate votes nationwide equivalent to what a winner in the
legislative district election would garner. In short, the party- list
system operates on the theoretical assumption that a party-list group
has national constituency whose interests, concerns, or ideologies
call for representation in the House of Representatives.

182
 Cipriano vs comelec
Gr no 158830, August 10, 2004
Puno, J.:

Facts: On June 7, 2002, petitioner filed with the COMELEC her

certificate of candidacy as Chairman of the Sangguniang Kabataan
(SK) for the SK elections held on July 15, 2002. On the date of the
elections, July 15, 2002, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 5363
adopting the recommendation of the Commission‘s Law Department
to deny due course to or cancel the certificates of candidacy of
several candidates for the SK elections, including petitioners.
Petitioner, nonetheless, was allowed to vote in the July 15 SK
elections and her name was not deleted from the official list of
candidates. Petitioner was proclaimed by the Barangay Board of
Canvassers the duly elected SK Chairman of Barangay 38, Pasay City.
After learning of Resolution No. 5363, petitioner filed with the
COMELEC a motion for reconsideration of said resolution. She
argued that a certificate of candidacy may only be denied due course
or cancelled via an appropriate petition filed by any registered
candidate for the same position under Section 78 of the Omnibus
Election Code in relation to Sections 5 and 7 of Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 6646. Petitioner further argued that the COMELEC en banc did
not have jurisdiction to act on the cancellation of her certificate of
candidacy on the first instance because it is the Division of the
Commission that has authority to decide election-related cases,
including pre-proclamation controversies. Finally, she contended
that she may only be removed by a petition for quo warranto after
her proclamation as duly-elected SK Chairman. On October 7, 2002,
the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 5781, resolving petitioner‘s
motion for reconsideration.
Issue: whether or not Resolution no 5363 of the COMELEC is valid.
Ruling:
The resolutions are valid but the actions of COMELEC are tainted
with grave abuse of discretion.
The COMELEC is an institution created by the Constitution to
govern the conduct of elections and to ensure that the electoral
process is clean, honest, orderly, and peaceful. It is mandated to
"enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the
conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and
recall."As an independent Constitutional Commission, it is clothed
with the three powers of government - executive or administrative,
legislative, and quasi-judicial powers. The administrative powers of

183
the COMELEC, for example, include the power to determine the
number and location of polling places, appoint election officials and
inspectors, conduct registration of voters, deputize law enforcement
agencies and government instrumentalities to ensure free, orderly,
honest, peaceful and credible elections; register political parties,
organization or coalitions, accredit citizens‘ arms of the Commission,
prosecute election offenses, and recommend to the President the
removal or imposition of any other disciplinary action upon any
officer or employee it has deputized for violation or disregard of its
directive, order or decision. It also has direct control and supervision
over all personnel involved in the conduct of election. It‘s legislative
authority is found in its power to promulgate rules and regulations
implementing the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code or other
laws which the Commission is required to enforce and administer.
The Constitution has also vested it with quasi-judicial powers when
it was granted exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating
to the elections, returns and qualifications of all elective regional,
provincial and city officials; and appellate jurisdiction over all
contests involving elective municipal officials decided by trial courts
of general jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay officials
decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction.
Aside from the powers vested by the Constitution, the Commission
also exercises other powers expressly provided in the Omnibus
Election Code, one of which is the authority to deny due course to or
to cancel a certificate of candidacy. The exercise of such authority,
however, must be in accordance with the conditions set by law. The
Commission may not, by itself, without the proper proceedings,
deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy filed in due
form. When a candidate files his certificate of candidacy, the
COMELEC has a ministerial duty to receive and acknowledge its
receipt. This is provided in Sec. 76 of the Omnibus Election Code,
thus:
Sec. 76. Ministerial duty of receiving and acknowledging receipt. -
The Commission, provincial election supervisor, election registrar or
officer designated by the Commission or the board of election
inspectors under the succeeding section shall have the ministerial
duty to receive and acknowledge receipt of the certificate of
candidacy.
Nonetheless, Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code allows any
person to file before the COMELEC a petition to deny due course to
or cancel a certificate of candidacy on the ground that any material
representation therein is false. It states:

184
Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of
candidacy. - A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to
cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person
exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained
therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may
be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of
the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after
notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election.
It is therefore clear that the law mandates that the candidate must
be notified of the petition against him and he should be given the
opportunity to present evidence in his behalf. In other words, due
process requires that a party be given an opportunity to adduce his
evidence to support his side of the case and that the evidence should
be considered in the adjudication of the case. In a petition to deny
due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy, since the
proceedings are required to be summary, the parties may, after due
notice, be required to submit their position papers together with
affidavits, counter-affidavits, and other documentary evidence in lieu
of oral testimony. When there is a need for clarification of certain
matters, at the discretion of the Commission en banc or Division,
the parties may be allowed to cross-examine the affiants. Contrary to
the submission of the COMELEC, the denial of due course or
cancellation of one‘s certificate of candidacy is not within the
administrative powers of the Commission, but rather calls for the
exercise of its quasi-judicial functions. Administrative power is
concerned with the work of applying policies and enforcing orders as
determined by proper governmental organs.
The determination whether a material representation in the
certificate of candidacy is false or not, or the determination whether
a candidate is eligible for the position he is seeking involves a
determination of fact where both parties must be allowed to adduce
evidence in support of their contentions. Because the resolution of
such fact may result to a deprivation of one‘s right to run for public
office, or, as in this case, one‘s right to hold public office, it is only
proper and fair that the candidate concerned be notified of the
proceedings against him and that he be given the opportunity to
refute the allegations against him. It should be stressed that it is not
sufficient, as the COMELEC claims, that the candidate be notified of
the Commission‘s inquiry into the veracity of the contents of his
certificate of candidacy, but he must also be allowed to present his
own evidence to prove that he possesses the qualifications for the
office he seeks.

185
 MAGDALO V. COMELEC, G.R. NO. 190793, JUNE 19, 2012

TOPIC: Composition of Congress, Qualifications of Members,

and Term of Office

DOCTRINE: The registration of political parties does not

involve administrative liability as it is only limited to the
evaluation of qualifications for registration.

FACTS:
Petitioner Magdalo sa Pagbabago (MAGDALO) filed its Petition for
Registration with the COMELEC, seeking its registration and/or
accreditation as a regional political party based in the National
Capital Region (NCR) for participation in the 10 May 2010 National
and Local Elections.

COMELEC issued its Resolution denying the Petition for

Registration filed by MAGDALO where it held that Magdalo Para sa
Pagbabago should be refused registration in accordance with Art. IX-
C, Section 2(5) of the Constitution. It is common knowledge that
the partys organizer and Chairman, Senator Antonio F. Trillanes IV,
and some members participated in the take-over of the Oakwood
Premier Apartments in Ayala Center, Makati City on July 27, 2003,
wherein several innocent civilian personnel were held hostage. This
and the fact that they were in full battle gear at the time of the
mutiny clearly show their purpose in employing violence and using
unlawful means to achieve their goals in the process defying the laws
of organized societies.

MAGDALO filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was elevated

to the COMELEC En Banc for resolution. MAGDALO filed a
Manifestation and Motion for Early Resolution dated 23 December
2009, in which it clarified its intention to participate in the 10 May
2010 National and Local Elections as a party-list group. COMELEC
En Banc denied the Motion for Reconsideration filed by MAGDALO

The COMELEC asserts that it had the power to ascertain the

eligibility of MAGDALO for registration and accreditation as a
political party. It contends that this determination, as well as that of
assessing whether MAGDALO advocates the use of force, would
entail the evaluation of evidence, which cannot be reviewed by this
Court in a petition for certiorari.

186
However, MAGDALO maintains that although it concedes that the
COMELEC has the authority to assess whether parties applying for
registration possess all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications under the applicable law, the latter nevertheless
committed grave abuse of discretion in basing its determination on
pure conjectures instead of on the evidence on record.

ISSUE:
Whether the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it denied
the Petition for Registration filed by MAGDALO on the ground that
the latter seeks to achieve its goals through violent or unlawful
means.

HELD: NO

A. The COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in

taking judicial notice of the Oakwood incident.
MAGDALO contends that it was grave abuse of discretion for the
COMELEC to have denied the Petition for Registration not on the
basis of facts or evidence on record, but on mere speculation and
conjectures. This argument cannot be given any merit. Under the
Rules of Court, judicial notice may be taken of matters that are of
public knowledge, or are capable of unquestionable demonstration.
Further, Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as the Revised
Administrative Code, specifically empowers administrative agencies
to admit and give probative value to evidence commonly acceptable
by reasonably prudent men, and to take notice of judicially
cognizable facts.

B. The COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in

finding that MAGDALO uses violence or unlawful means to
achieve its goals.
The assertions of MAGDALO that no one was held hostage or that
no shot was fired do not mask its use of impelling force to take over
and sustain the occupation of Oakwood. Neither does its express
renunciation of the use of force, violence and other unlawful means
in its Petition for Registration and Program of Government obscure
the actual circumstances surrounding the encounter. The deliberate
brandishing of military power, which included the show of force, use
of full battle gear, display of ammunitions, and use of explosive
devices, engendered an alarming security risk to the public. At the
very least, the totality of these brazen acts fomented a threat of
violence that preyed on the vulnerability of civilians. The COMELEC
did not, therefore, commit grave abuse of discretion when it treated

187
the Oakwood standoff as a manifestation of the predilection of
MAGDALO for resorting to violence or threats thereof in order to
achieve its objectives.

C. The finding that MAGDALO seeks to achieve its goals

through violence or unlawful means did not operate as a
prejudgment of Criminal Case No. 03-2784.

The power vested by Article IX-C, Section 2(5) of the Constitution

and Section 61 of BP 881 in the COMELEC to register political
parties and ascertain the eligibility of groups to participate in the
elections is purely administrative in character. In exercising this
authority, the COMELEC only has to assess whether the party or
organization seeking registration or accreditation pursues its
goals by employing acts considered as violent or unlawful, and
not necessarily criminal in nature. Although this process does
not entail any determination of administrative liability, as it is
only limited to the evaluation of qualifications for registration.

This Court finds that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of
discretion in denying the Petition for Registration filed by
MAGDALO. However, in view of the subsequent amnesty granted in
favor of the members of MAGDALO, the events that transpired
during the Oakwood incident can no longer be interpreted as acts of
violence in the context of the disqualifications from party
registration.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DISMISSED. The 26 October

2009 and 4 January 2010 Resolutions of the Commission on
Elections are hereby AFFIRMED, without prejudice to the filing
anew of a Petition for Registration by MAGDALO.

188
 Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc (PGBI)
Vs
Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
Gr. No. 190529
April 29, 2010

Facts:

The COMELEC en banc issued a resolution no.

8679dated Oct. 13, 2010 deleting several Party-list groups or
organizations from the list of registered national, regional or
sectoral parties, organization or coalitions. Among the party-
list affected was the PGBI, it was delisted because it failed to
get 2% vote in the last 2004 election and it did not participate
in the 2007 elections.
PGBI file its opposition but likewise sought, through his
pleading the admission ad cautelam of its petition of
accreditation as party-list organization under the party-list
system Act. PGBI asserted that the assailed resolution negate
the rights to movant and those similarly situated to invoke Sec.
4 of RA 7941, which allow any party, organization and
coalition already registered with the commission to no longer
register to a new, that the SC rulings in Minero vs COMELEC
cannot apply to the instant controversy, and that the
implementation of the challenged resolution should be
suspended and/or aborted to prevent a miscarriage of justice in
view to failure to notify the parties in accordance with the
same Sec. 6 (8) of RA 7941.

ISSUE:

WON there is a legal basis for delisting PGBI.

HELD:

The Court said that the MINERO ruling is an erroneous

application of Sec. 6(8) of RA 7941 hence it cannot sustain
PGBI‘s delisting from the roaster of registered national,
regional or sectorial parties, organizations or coalition under
the party-list system. First the law is clear is that the word ―or‖
is adjunctive term signifying disassociation and independence

189
of one things enumerated, it should, as a rule, be construed in
the sense in which it ordinarily implies, disjunctive word.
Thus, the plain, clear and unmistakable language of the law
provides for two separate reasons foe delisting. Second,
MINERO is diametrically opposed to the legislative intent of
section 6(8) of RA 7941 and therefore, simply cannot stand.
What MINERO effectively holds is that does not participate in
an election necessarily gets by default, less than 2% of the
party-list votes.

190
G.R. No. 193643 January 29, 2013
ANTONIO D. DAYAO, ROLANDO P. RAMIREZ and ADELIO
R. CAPCO, Petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and
LPG MARKETERS ASSOCIATION, INC., Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 193704
FEDERATION OF PHILIPPINE INDUSTRIES, INC., Petitioner,
vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and LPG MARKETERS
ASSOCIATION, INC., Respondents
FACTS:
The individual petitioners are dealers of different brands of
liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) while petitioner FPII is an association
comprised of entities engaged in various industries in the country.
Private respondent LPGMA is a non-stock, non-profit association of
consumers and small industry players in the LPG and energy sector
who have banded together in order to pursue their common
objective of providing quality, safe and reasonably priced gas and oil
products.
LPGMA sought to advance its cause by seeking party-list
accreditation with the COMELEC, through a petition for registration
as a sectoral organization for the purpose of participating in the
elections under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7941 or the Party-List
System Act. After the requisite publication, verification and hearing,
and without any apparent opposition, LPGMA‘s petition was
approved by the COMELEC in its Resolution dated January 5, 2010.
Four (4) months thereafter, individual petitioners lodged before the
COMELEC a complaint for the cancellation of LPGMA‘s registration
as a party-list organization. They were later on joined by FPII as a
complainant-in-intervention. It proffered in essence that LPGMA
does not represent a marginalized sector of the society because its
incorporators, officers and members are not marginalized or
underrepresented citizens since they are actually marketers and
independent re-fillers of LPG and have significant ownership
interests in various LPG refilling plants. FPII emphasized that the
business of marketing and refilling LPG requires substantial working
capital.
LPGMA countered that Section 5(2), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution does not require that party-list representatives must be
191
members of the marginalized and/or underrepresented sector of the
society. It also averred that the ground cited by the petitioners is not
one of those mentioned in Section 6 of R.A. No. 7941 and that
petitioners are just trying to resurrect their lost chance to oppose the
petition for registration. COMELEC dismissed the complaint. The
petitioners now implore the Court to determine the correctness of
the COMELEC resolutions, hence this petition.
ISSUE: WON LPGMA’s application became final;
WON cancellation for registration of LPGMA should
prosper; and
WON COMELEC committed a grave abuse of discretion.
HELD:
First, there is no arguing that the COMELEC Resolution dated
January 5, 2010 granting LPGMA‘s registration has since become
final. Such finality, however, pertains only to the Resolution itself
and not to the accreditation of LPGMA as a party-list organization.
The said Resolution, as in any other resolution granting the
registration of any other organization desirous of party list
accreditation, did nothing more but to vest with LPGMA the right to
participate in the party- list elections, i.e. file a manifestation of its
intent to participate and have the same given due course by the
COMELEC, the right to field its nominees, the right to exercise all
that is bestowed by our election laws to election, and the right to
assume office should it obtain the required number of votes. With
respect to such matters, the COMELEC resolution was already final.
LPGMA‘s right to run, as it did so run, during the 2010 party-list
elections is already beyond challenge. However, the Resolution did
not create in LPGMA‘s favour a perpetual and indefeasible right to
its accreditation as a party-list organization. Neither did it grant
finality and indefeasibility to the factual findings of the COMELEC
on the qualifications of the group. Both the accreditation and the
facts substantiating the same, can be reviewed and revoked at any
time by the COMELEC, motu propio, or upon the instance of any
interested party through a complaint for cancellation, as set forth in
Section 6 of R.A. No. 7941.
Second, under paragraph 5 of Section 6, a party-list
organization may be disqualified on the ground that its officers and
members do not belong to the marginalized and underrepresented
sector. The allegation in the complaint for cancellation, that the
192
incorporators, officers and members of LPGMA do not belong to the
marginalized or underrepresented sector, is within the ambit of
paragraph 5 of Section 6. the COMELEC issued Resolution which
subjected to summary evidentiary hearings all existing and registered
party-list groups, including LPGMA, to assess their continuing
compliance with the requirements of R.A. No. 7941 and the
guidelines set in Ang Bagong Bayani. The Resolution stated, among
others, that the registration of all non-compliant groups shall be
cancelled. LPGMA submitted to a factual and evidentiary hearing
before the COMELEC en banc on August 28, 2012. Then, the
COMELEC issued a Resolution identifying and listing the party-list
groups found to have complied with the qualifications set by law and
jurisprudence. The list of retained party-list groups included
LPGMA. Which deliberately states that, ―After exhaustive
deliberation and careful review of the records, the Commission en
banc finds the following groups accredited with the party-list system
compliant with the law and jurisprudence, and thus resolves to
retain their registration for purposes of allowing them to participate
in the 2013 elections‖.
Third, Section 6 clearly does not require that an opposition to
the petition for registration be previously interposed so that a
complaint for cancellation can be entertained. Since the law does not
impose such a condition, the COMELEC, notwithstanding its
delegated administrative authority to promulgate rules for the
implementation of election laws, cannot read into the law that which
it does not provide. The poll body is mandated to enforce and
administer election-related laws. It has no power to contravene or
amend them. In the ordinary course of procedure, the herein
complaint should be remanded to the COMELEC considering that
the poll body did not proceed to make a proximate determination of
the present circumstances of LPGMA‘s qualifications. In view,
however of superseding incidents, the issue involved in the
complaint for cancellation can be deemed to have been already
settled and a remand to the COMELEC would only be circuitous and
dilatory. All told, the COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion in dismissing the complaint for cancellation of LPGMA‘s
party-list accreditation.

193
Coalition of Association of Senior Citizens of the Philippines vs.
COMELEC
Facts: The Partylist group named Senior Citizens signed an
agreement pertaining to the term sharing of their nominees to the
House of Representatives, dividing the fixed 6 year term of an HOR
rep depending on how many seats will they be entitled to. Due to
the Term Sharing agreement which is contrary to Section 7, Article
VI of the 1987 Constitution (which imposes that there is a fixed
term to hold public elective office) the registration and accreditation
of SENIOR CITIZENS under Party-List System of Representation
was cancelled. Two factions (Datol and Arquiza group) of the Senior
Citizen filed separate petition contending that their right to due
process was violated. The court ruled that the party was deprived of
due process.
Issue: Whether or not the right to due process of the Senior Citizens
was violated
HELD: YES
The appropriate due process standards that apply to the COMELEC,
as an administrative or quasi-judicial tribunal, are those outlined in
the seminal case of Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations:
The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which includes the
right of the party interested or affected to present his own case and
submit evidence in support thereof. This right pertain to the
substantive rights of a party at hearing stage of the proceedings.The
essence of this aspect of due process, we have consistently held, is
simply the opportunity to be heard, or as applied to administrative
proceedings, an opportunity to explain ones side or an opportunity
to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. A
formal or trial-type hearing is not at all times and in all instances
essential; in the case of COMELEC, Rule 17 of its Rules of Procedure
defines the requirements for a hearing and these serve as the
standards in the determination of the presence or denial of due
process.
The second, third, fourth, fifth, and sixth aspects of the Ang Tibay
requirements are reinforcements of the right to a hearing and are the
inviolable rights applicable at the deliberative stage, as the decision-
maker decides on the evidence presented during the hearing. These
standards set forth the guiding considerations in deliberating on the
case and are the material and substantial components of decision-
making. Briefly, the tribunal must consider the totality of the
evidence presented which must all be found in the records of the

194
case (i.e., those presented or submitted by the parties); the
conclusion, reached by the decision-maker himself and not by a
subordinate, must be based on substantial evidence.
Finally, the last requirement, relating to the form and substance of
the decision of a quasi-judicial body, further complements the
hearing and decision-making due process rights and is similar in
substance to the constitutional requirement that a decision of a court
must state distinctly the facts and the law upon which it is based. As
a component of the rule of fairness that underlies due process, this is
the "duty to give reason" to enable the affected person to understand
how the rule of fairness has been administered in his case, to expose
the reason to public scrutiny and criticism, and to ensure that the
decision will be thought through by the decision-maker.
In the instant case, the review of the registration of SENIOR
CITIZENS was made pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. 9513
through a summary evidentiary hearing carried out on August 24,
2012 in SPP No. 12-157 (PLM) and SPP No. 12-191 (PLM). In this
hearing, both the Arquiza Group and the Datol Group were indeed
given the opportunity to adduce evidence as to their continuing
compliance with the requirements for party-list accreditation.
Nevertheless, the due process violation was committed when they
were not apprised of the fact that the term-sharing agreement
entered into by the nominees of SENIOR CITIZENS in 2010 would
be a material consideration in the evaluation of the organizations
qualifications as a party-list group for the May 13, 2013 elections. As
it were, both factions of SENIOR CITIZENS were not able to answer
this issue squarely. In other words, they were deprived of the
opportunity to adequately explain their side regarding the term-
sharing agreement and/or to adduce evidence, accordingly, in
support of their position.
It is true that during the April 18, 2012 hearing, the rival groups of
SENIOR CITIZENS admitted to the existence of the term-sharing
agreement. Contrary to the claim of COMELEC, however, said
hearing was conducted for purposes of discussing the petition of the
Arquiza Group asking for the confirmation of the replacement of
Rep. Kho, who had tendered his resignation effective on December
31, 2011.
More specifically, the transcript of the hearing reveals that the focus
thereof was on the petition filed by the Arquiza group and its
subsequent manifestation, praying that the group be allowed to
withdraw its petition. Also, during the hearing, COMELEC
Chairman Brillantes did admonish the rival factions of SENIOR

195
CITIZENS about their conflicts and warned them about the
complications brought about by their term-sharing agreement.
However, E.M. No. 12-040 was not a proceeding regarding the
qualifications of SENIOR CITIZENS as a party-list group and the
issue of whether the term-sharing agreement may be a ground for
disqualification was neither raised nor resolved in that case.
Chairman Brillantess remonstration was not sufficient as to
constitute a fair warning that the term-sharing agreement would be
considered as a ground for the cancellation of SENIOR CITIZENS
registration and accreditation.

196
 CANCELLATION
OF REGISTRATION
VS.
HRET JURISDICTION

197
EN BANC

G.R. No. 189466

DARYL GRACE J. ABAYON, Petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL, PERFECTO C. LUCABAN, JR.,
RONYL S. DE LA CRUZ and AGUSTIN C. DOROGA,
Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 189506
CONGRESSMAN JOVITO S. PALPARAN, JR., Petitioner,
vs.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL
(HRET), DR. REYNALDO LESACA, JR., CRISTINA PALABAY,
RENATO M. REYES, JR., ERLINDA CADAPAN, ANTONIO
FLORES and JOSELITO USTAREZ, Respondents.

February 11, 2010 // ABAD

Facts:
Petitioners Daryl Grace J. Abayon and Jovito S. Palparan Jr., are
the first nominees of the Aangat Tayo and Bantay party-lists
respectively, that won a seat in the House of Representatives during
the 2007 elections.
Respondents filed a petition for quo warranto along with
respondent HRET against Aangat Tayo and Bantay party-list and
their nominees, petitioner Abayon and Palparan respectively,
claiming that said party-lists and their nominees were not eligible for
a party-list seat in the House of Representatives, since both did not
represent the marginalized and underrepresented sectors.
Petitioner Palparan countered that, as in the case of Abayon,
the HRET had no jurisdiction over his person since it was actually
the party-list Bantay, not he, that was elected to and assumed
membership in the House of Representatives. Palparan claimed that
he was just Bantay‘s nominee. Consequently, any question involving
his eligibility as first nominee was an internal concern of Bantay.
Such question must be brought, he said, before that party-list group,
not before the HRET. HRET dropped the cases against the party-lists
but upheld its jurisdiction over the nominees. The court
consolidated the cases.

198
Issue:
Whether or not HRET acted with grave abuse of discretion
when it upheld its jurisdiction over the question of qualifications of
petitioners Abayon and Palparan as nominees of Aangat Tayo and
Bantay party-list organizations, respectively.

Ruling:
The Court holds that respondent HRET did not gravely abuse
its discretion when it dismissed the petitions for quo warranto
against Aangat Tayo party-list and Bantay party-list but upheld its
jurisdiction over the question of the qualifications of petitioners
Abayon and Palparan.

Article VI, Section 17 of the Constitution provides that: ―The

Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral
Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members.
Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of
whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the
Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate
or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be
chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political
parties and the parties or organizations registered under the party-
list system represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral
Tribunal shall be its Chairman.

In the case at bar, what is inevitable is that Sec. 17, Article VI

of the 1987 Constitution provides that the HRET shall be the sole
judge of all contests relating to, among other things, the
qualifications of the members of the House of Representatives.
Since, as pointed out above, party-list nominees are ―elected
members‖ of the House of Representatives no less than the district
representatives are, the HRET has jurisdiction to hear and pass upon
their qualifications. By analogy with the cases of district
representatives, once the party or organization of the party-list
nominee has been proclaimed and the nominee has taken his oath
and assumed office as member of the House of Representatives, the
COMELEC‘s jurisdiction over election contests relating to his
qualifications ends and the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal‘s (HRET‘s) own jurisdiction begins.

199
 Therefore, since the HRET
relating to the qualifications of
Representatives, in upholding its
the qualifications of Abayon and
with grave abuse of discretion.
200
is the sole judge of all contests
the members of the House of
jurisdiction over the question of
Palparan, the HRET did not act
MISREPRESENTATION

201
G.R. No. 206952: OCTOBER 22, 2013

ABANG LINGKOD PARTY-LIST (ABANG LINGKOD),

Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondents.

REYES, J.:

FACTS:

ABANG LINGKOD is a sectoral organization that represents the

interests of peasant farmers and fisherfolks, and was registered
under the party-list system on December 22, 2009. It failed to obtain
the number of votes needed in the May 2010 elections for a seat in
the House of Representatives.

On August 16, 2012, ABANG LINGKOD, in compliance with the

COMELEC August 9, 2012 resolution, filed with the COMELEC
pertinent documents to prove its continuing compliance with the
requirements under R.A. No. 7941.

In a Resolution dated November 7, 2012, the COMELEC En Banc

cancelled ABANG LINGKOD registration as a party-list group. It
pointed out that ABANG LINGKOD failed to establish its track
record in uplifting the cause of the marginalized and
underrepresented; that it merely offered photographs of some
alleged activities it conducted after the May 2010 elections.

ABANG LINGKOD field a petitioner for certiorari alleging that the

COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in cancelling its registration
under the party-list system. The said petition was consolidated with
the separate petitions filed by 51 other party-list groups whose
registration were cancelled or who were denied registration under
the party-list system. The said party-list groups, including ABANG
LINGKOD, were able to obtain status quo ante orders from the
court.

The Court remanded to the COMELEC the cases of previously

registered party-list groups, including that of ABANG LINGKOD, to
determine whether they are qualified under the party-list system
pursuant to the new parameters laid down by the Court and, in the
affirmative, be allowed to participate in the May 2013 party-list
elections.

On May 10, 2013, the COMELEC issued the herein assailed

202
Resolution, which, inter alia, affirmed the cancellation of ABANG
LINGKOD's registration under the party-list system. The COMELEC
issued the Resolution dated May 10, 2013 sans any summary
evidentiary hearing, citing the proximity of the May 13, 2013
elections as the reason therefor.

On May 12, 2013, ABANG LINGKOD sought a reconsideration of

the COMELEC's Resolution dated May 10, 2013. However, on May
15, 2013, ABANG LINGKOD withdrew the motion for
reconsideration it filed with the COMELEC and, instead, instituted
the instant petition with this Court, alleging that there may not be
enough time for the COMELEC to pass upon the merits of its
motion for reconsideration considering that the election returns
were already being canvassed and consolidated by the COMELEC.

ISSUE: Whether or not ABANG LINGKOD was denied due

process?

HELD: BANG LINGKOD was not denied of due process.

POLITICAL LAW: administrative due process

The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or

as applied to administrative or quasi-judicial proceedings, an
opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. A formal or
trial type hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential. The
requirements are satisfied when the parties are afforded fair and
reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy at
hand. What is frowned upon is the absolute lack of notice or hearing.

In the instant case, while the petitioner laments that it was denied
due process, the Court finds that the COMELEC had afforded
ABANG LINGKOD sufficient opportunity to present evidence
establishing its qualification as a party-list group. It was notified
through Resolution No. 9513 that its registration was to be reviewed
by the COMELEC. That ABANG LINGKOD was able to file its
Manifestation of Intent and other pertinent documents to prove its
continuing compliance with the requirements under R.A. No. 7941,
which the COMELEC set for summary hearing on three separate
dates, belies its claim that it was denied due process.

There was no necessity for the COMELEC to conduct further

summary evidentiary hearing to assess the qualification of ABANG

203
LINGKOD pursuant to Atong Paglaum. ABANG LINGKOD's
Manifestation of Intent and all the evidence adduced by it to
establish its qualification as a party-list group are already in the
possession of the COMELEC. Thus, conducting further summary
evidentiary hearing for the sole purpose of determining ABANG
LINGKOD's qualification under the party-list system pursuant to
Atong Paglaumwould just be a superfluity.

Contrary to ABANG LINGKOD's claim, the Court, in Atong

Paglaum, did not categorically require the COMELEC to conduct a
summary evidentiary hearing for the purpose of determining the
qualifications of the petitioners therein pursuant to the new
parameters for screening party-list groups.

POLITICAL LAW: cancellation of party-list registration

Court finds that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in

cancelling the registration of ABANG LINGKOD under the party-list
system. The COMELEC affirmed the cancellation of ABANG
LINGKOD's registration on the ground that it declared untruthful
statement in its bid for accreditation as a party-list group in the May
2013 elections, pointing out that it deliberately submitted digitally
altered photographs of activities to make it appear that it had a track
record in representing the marginalized and underrepresented.
Essentially, ABANG LINGKOD's registration was cancelled on the
ground that it failed to adduce evidence showing its track record in
representing the marginalized and underrepresented.

R.A. No. 7941 did not require groups intending to register under the
party-list system to submit proof of their track record as a group.
The track record requirement was only imposed in Ang Bagong
Bayani where the Court held that national, regional, and sectoral
parties or organizations seeking registration under the party-list
system must prove through their, inter alia, track record that they
truly represent the marginalized and underrepresented.

In Atong Paglaum, the Court has modified to a great extent the

jurisprudential doctrines on who may register under the party-list
system and the representation of the marginalized and
underrepresented. For purposes of registration under the party-list
system, national or regional parties or organizations need not
represent any marginalized and underrepresented sector; that
representation of the marginalized and underrepresented is only
required of sectoral organizations that represent the sectors stated

204
under Section 5 of R.A. No. 7941 that are, by their nature,
economically marginalized and underrepresented.

Contrary to the COMELEC's claim, sectoral parties or organizations,

such as ABANG LINGKOD, are no longer required to adduce
evidence showing their track record, i.e. proof of activities that they
have undertaken to further the cause of the sector they represent.
Indeed, it is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the
special interest and concerns of their sector. Otherwise stated, it is
sufficient that the ideals represented by the sectoral organizations
are geared towards the cause of the sector/s, which they represent.

Dissenting, Mr. Justice Leonen, however, maintains that parties or

organizations intending to register under the party-list system are
still required to present a track record notwithstanding the Court's
pronouncement in Atong Paglaum; that the track record that would
have to be presented would only differ as to the nature of their
group/organization. He opines that sectoral organizations must
prove their links with the marginalized and underrepresented while
national or regional parties or organizations must show that they
have been existing as a bona fide organization. GRANTED.

205
G.R. No. 206987 September 10, 2013

ALLIANCE FOR NATIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY (ANAD)

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (COMELEC).

PEREZ, J.:

Facts:
The COMELEC promulgated a Resolution canceling ANAD‘s
Certificate of Registration and/or Accreditation based on the
following grounds:
a. ANAD does not belong to the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors enumerated in Sec. 5 of the R.A.
7941 (Partylist Law).
b. ANAD, having only (3) nominees, failed to comply with the
procedural requirements set forth in Sec. 4, Rule 3 of
Resolution No. 9366 and Sec. 8 of R.A. No. 7941.
c. ANAD failed to submit its Statement of Contributions and
Expenditures for the 2007 Elections as required by Sec. 14 of
RA No. 7166.
In another Resolution, the COMELEC affirmed the
cancellation of such Certificate and disqualified ANAD from
participating in the 2013 Elections. It held that while ANAD can be
classified as a sectoral party lacking in well-defined political
constituencies, its disqualification still subsists for violation of
election laws and regulations.

Issues:
1. WON the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in
promulgating the assailed Resolution without the benefit of a
summary evidentiary hearing mandated by the due process clause
2. WON the COMELEC erred in finding that ANAD violated election
laws and regulations

Held:
1. NO. For an act to be struck down as having been done with grave
abuse of discretion, the abuse of discretion must be patent and gross.

ANAD was already given the opportunity to prove its qualifications

during the summary hearing of 23 August 2012, during which
ANAD submitted documents and other pieces of evidence to
establish said qualifications. In re-evaluating ANAD‘s qualifications
in accordance with the parameters laid down in Atong Paglaum, Inc.

206
v. COMELEC, the COMELEC need not have called another summary
hearing as it could readily resort to documents and other pieces of
evidence previously submitted by petitioners in re-appraising
ANAD‘s qualifications. After all, it can be presumed that the
qualifications, or lack thereof, which were established during the
summary hearing continued until election day and even thereafter.

2. NO. The COMELEC, being a specialized agency tasked with the

supervision of elections all over the country, its factual findings,
conclusions, rulings and decisions rendered on matters falling within
its competence shall not be interfered with by this Court in the
absence of grave abuse of discretion or any jurisdictional infirmity or
error of law.

Compliance with Sec. 8 of R.A. No. 7941, on the submission of

five nominees, is essential as it is a safeguard against arbitrariness
and it rids a party-list organization of the prerogative to substitute
and replace its nominees, or even to switch the order of the
nominees, after submission of the list to the COMELEC.

ANAD failed to comply with the requirements on the proper

Statement of Contributions and Expenditures as the exhibits it
submitted consisted mainly of a list of total contributions from other
persons, a list of official receipts and amounts without corresponding
receipts, and a list of expenditures based on order slips and
donations without distinction as to whether the amounts listed were
advanced subject to reimbursement or donated. This factual finding
was neither contested nor rebutted by ANAD.

As empowered by law, the COMELEC may motu proprio

cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any party-list
organization if it violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or
regulations relating to elections.

WHEREFORE, the Court Resolves to DISMISS the petition,

finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC.

207
SUBSTITUTION

208
G.R. Nos. 179431-32 June 22, 2010

LUIS K. LOKIN, JR., as the second nominee of CITIZENS

BATTLE AGAINST CORRUPTION (CIBAC), Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and the HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. No. 180443

LUIS K. LOKIN, JR., Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (COMELEC), EMMANUEL
JOEL J. VILLANUEVA, CINCHONA C. GONZALES and ARMI
JANE R. BORJE, Respondents.

CASE DIGEST
FACTS
1. CIBAC through its president Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva
submitted a kist of five nominees for which its representatives
would be chosen should CIBAC obtain the required number of
votes. The list goes :

(1) Villanueva
(2) Lokin
(3) Cruz-Gonzales
(4) Tugna
(5) Galang
2. Prior to elections, CIBAC, through Villanueva, filed a
Certificate of nomination, substitution and amendment
withdrawing the nominations of Lokin, Tugna, and Galang and
substituted Armi Jane R. Borje.
3. To confirm withdrawal of the nominations of Lokin, Tugna,
and Galang and the substitution of Borje, Villanueva sent a
letter to COMELEC transmitting signed petitions of more than
81% of the CIBAC members confirming the withdrawal and
substitution.
4. CIBAC, supposedly through its counsel, filed a motion seeking
the proclamation of Lokin as its second nominee, Villanueva
and Cruz-Gonzales opposed the motion

209
5. Notwithstanding the certificate of nomination, substitution
and amendment filed by Villanueva, COMELEC failed to act on
the matter prompting Villanueva to file a petition to confirm
certification.
6. Then, COMELEC issued a resolution partially proclaiming
those under Party-list system to have won the May elections in
which CIBAC was included and to defer proclamation of
nominees with pending disputes until final resolution.
7. COMELEC then issued another resolution proclaiming CIBAC
to be entitled to another seat, with its formal declaration, the
Secretary General of CIBAC informed the Secretary General of
the House of Representatives of the promulgation of the
resolution and requested that Lokin be formaly sworn by
speaker Venecia Jr. to enable him to assume office. Secretary
General of House of Representatives replied however that he
cannot grant his request because the COMELEC Law Director
had notified him of the pendency of the E.M no.07-054 (matter
pertaining to the validity of withdrawal of the nominations of
Lokin, Tugna, and Galang).
8. The COMELEC then resolved the matter and approved the
withdrawal of the nominations of Atty. Luis Lokin, Tugna and
Galang as second, third and fourth nominees and substitution
of Cruz-Gonzales as second nominee and Borje as third
nominee for CIBAC. The list goes :
(1) Villanueva
(2) Cruz-Gonzales
(3) Borje
9. As a result, the COMELEC en banc proclaimed Cruz-Gonzales
as the official second nominee of CIBAC and took her oath of
office as Party List Representative of CIBAC.
10. In G.R. No. 17931-32, Lokin seeks through mandamus to
compel respondent COMELEC to proclaim him as official
second nominee.
In G.R. No. 180443, Lokin assails sec. 13 of Resolution 7804,
and the resolution approving the CIBAC‘s withdrawal of the
nominations of Lokin, Tugna and Galang. He alleges that Sec.
13 of Resolution NO. 7804 expanded Section 8 of R.A 7941,
the law that COMELEC seeks to thereby implement.
11. CIBAC on its part, posist that Lokin is guilty of forum
shopping for filing a mandamus and a certiorari, considering

210
 that both petitions ultimately seek to have him proclaimed as
second nominee.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Lokin is guilty of forum shopping
2. Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
approving the withdrawal of the nominees of CIBAC and
allowing the amendment of the list of nominees of CIBAC
without any basis in fact or law and after the close of the
polls, and in ruling on matters that were intra-corporate in
nature.
RULING:
1. Lokin is not guilty of forum shopping. The mere filing of
several cases based on the same incident does not
necessarily constitute forum shopping. The test is whether
the several actions filed involve the same transactions and
the same essential facts and circumstances. The actions
must also raise identical causes of action, subject matter,
and issues. Elsewise stated, forum shopping exists where
the elements of litis pendentia are present, or where a final
judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the
other. Applying the test for forum shopping, the consecutive
filing of the action for certiorari and the action for
mandamus did not violate the rule against forum shopping
even if the actions involved the same parties, because they
were based on different causes of action and the reliefs they
sought were different.
2. The COMELEC, despite its role as the implementing arm of
the Government in the enforcement and administration of
all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an
election, has neither the authority nor the license to expand,
extend, or add anything to the law it seeks to implement
thereby. The IRRs the COMELEC issues for that purpose
should always accord with the law to be implemented, and
should not override, supplant, or modify the law. It is basic
that the IRRs should remain consistent with the law they
intend to carry out.

Indeed, administrative IRRs adopted by a particular

department of the Government under legislative authority

211
must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and
should be for the sole purpose of carrying the law‘s general
provisions into effect. The law itself cannot be expanded by
such IRRs, because an administrative agency cannot amend
an act of Congress.

Considering that Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 – to

the extent that it allows the party-list organization to
withdraw its nomination already submitted to the
COMELEC – was invalid, CIBAC‘s withdrawal of its
nomination of Lokin and the others and its substitution of
them with new nominees were also invalid and ineffectual.
It is clear enough that any substitution of Lokin and the
others could only be for any of the grounds expressly stated
in Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941. Resultantly, the COMELEC‘s
approval of CIBAC‘s petition of withdrawal of the
nominations and its recognition of CIBAC‘s substitution,
both through its assailed resolution, should be struck down
for lack of legal basis. Thereby, the COMELEC acted
without jurisdiction, having relied on the invalidly issued
Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 to support its action.

212
 Alauya vs. Comelec
G.R. No. 152151-52
January 2003

FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with a prayer for
the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction or temporary
restraining order to nullify the Orders of the COMELEC en banc
dated January 2, 2002 and February 19, 2002 in SPA Nos. 01454 and
01455 (ARMM). The January 2, 2002 Order directed the Provincial
Board of Canvassers not to proclaim the winning candidates for
regional assemblyman in the 2nd District of Lanao del Sur, while the
February 19, 2002 Order denied the motion to dismiss SPA Nos.
01454 and 01455 (ARMM).

There was a petition to declare a failure of election in Lumbatan and

in the 5 municipalities because of massive substitute voting.
Petitioner Tamano claimed that in almost all of the precincts in the 5
municipalities, either petitioner Alauya or private respondent
Sarangani obtained 100% of the votes such that their votes equalled
the total number of registered voters. Tamano prayed for the
suspension of proclamation of the winning candidates. Alauya filed
his answer with Motion to Dismiss. Sarangani filed his answer and
opposition to the suspension of proclamation.

The special elections in Lumbatan proceeded as scheduled on

January 7, 2002. The Provincial Board of Canvassers canvassed the
election returns. The results of the canvass of Lumbatan and of the
other 20 municipalities showed Menor as the No. 1 winning
candidate followed by Sarangani in the No. 2 spot and Alauya in the
No. 3 spot, The COMELEC en banc issued the order directing the
Provincial Board of Canvassers NOT to proclaim the alleged or
supposed winners and to continue and complete the canvass of
election results in the Second District of Lanao del Sur.

Alauya filed a Motion to Lift Suspension of Proclamation with the

COMELEC. Alauaya subsequently ffiled a TRO with SC. the Court
issued a temporary restraining order directing the COMELEC to

213
CEASE and DESIST from implementing the order of January 7, 2002
in SPA No. 01454 and SPA No. 01455 which suspended the
proclamation insofar only as the petitioner (Alauya) is concerned.
Based on the restraining order of the Court, the Provincial Board of
Canvassers proclaimed Alauya who took his oath and has already
assumed the position of Regional Assemblyman of the Regional
Legislative Assembly of the ARMM.
Meanwhile, Sarangani filed his comment joining Alauya in his
petition praying for the setting aside of the subject COMELEC
orders. Specifically, Sarangani prays that the order suspending
proclamation be extended to him so he may also take his oath and
assume office as regional assembly member.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the order dated January 7, 2002 was issued in
violation of due process of law.
RULING:
NO. Petition is DISMISSED.
A party cannot successfully invoke deprivation of due process if he
was accorded the opportunity of a hearing, through either oral
arguments or pleadings. There is no denial of due process when a
party is given an opportunity through his pleadings. Therefore, the
court found no breach of Alauyas right to due process. Contrary to
the latter‘s claim, it appears that notices dated December 21, 2001
were given to all concerned parties requiring them to file their
answer to the petition and setting the case for hearing on January 4,
2002. In an Order dated January 4, 2002, the COMELEC noted that
Alauya did not appear during the hearing. Subsequently, Alauya filed
his Answer with Motion to Dismiss to the petitions. Certainly,
Alauya was given an opportunity to be heard during the hearing held
on January 4, 2002 which he failed to attend and was in fact heard
through the pleadings he filed with the COMELEC.

214
G.R. No. 177508. August 7, 2009.

Barangay Association for National Advancement and

Transparency (BANAT) Party-List vs. Commission on Elections

Facts:
Petitioner Barangay Association for National Advancement and
Transparency (BANAT) Party List assails the constitutionality of
Republic Act No. 9369 and enjoining respondent Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) from implementing the statute. BANAT party
list filed this petition for prohibition alleging that RA 9369 violated
Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution. Petitioner also assails
the constitutionality of Sections 34, 37, 38, and 43 of RA 9369
alleging that these provisions are of questionable application and
doubtful validity for failing to comply with the provisions of the
Constitution. Petitioner claims that the title of RA 9369 is
misleading because it speaks of poll automation but contains
substantial provisions dealing with the manual canvassing of election
returns. Petitioner also asserts that Sections 34, 37, 38, and 43 are
neither embraced in the title nor germane to the subject matter of
RA 9369.

Issue: Whether or not RA 9369 is unconstitutional.

Held:

RA 9369 is constitutional. The constitutional requirement that

―every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject
which shall be expressed in the title thereof‖ has always been given a
practical rather than a technical construction. The requirement is
satisfied if the title is comprehensive enough to include subjects
related to the general purpose which the statute seeks to achieve.
The title of a law does not have to be an index of its contents and
will suffice if the matters embodied in the text are relevant to each
other and may be inferred from the title. Moreover, a title which
declares a statute to be an act to amend a specified code is sufficient
and the precise nature of the amendatory act need not be further
stated.

Sections 37 and 38 do not violate Section 17, Article VI and

Paragraph 7, Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution. Congress and
the COMELEC en banc do not encroach upon the jurisdiction of the
Presidential Electoral Tribunal and the Senate Electoral Tribunal.

215
There is no conflict of jurisdiction since the powers of Congress and
the COMELEC en banc, on one hand, and the PET and the SET, on
the other, are exercised on different occasions and for different
purposes. The PET is the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of the President or Vice
President. The SET is the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of members of the Senate. The
jurisdiction of the PET and the SET can only be invoked once the
winning presidential, vice presidential or senatorial candidates have
been proclaimed. On the other hand, under Section 37, Congress and
the COMELEC en banc shall determine only the authenticity and
due execution of the certificates of canvass. Congress and the
COMELEC en banc shall exercise this power before the proclamation
of the winning presidential, vice presidential and senatorial
candidates.

Sec 43 does not violate Section 2 (6) Article IX-C of the

Constitution. The Court does not agree with petitioner and the
COMELEC that the Constitution gave the COMELEC the ―exclusive
power‖ to investigate and prosecute cases of violations of election
laws. It is clear that the grant of the ―exclusive power‖ to investigate
and prosecute election offenses to the COMELEC was not by virtue
of the Constitution but by BP 881, a legislative enactment. Given the
plenary power of the legislature to amend or repeal laws, if Congress
passes a law amending Section 265 of BP 881, such law does not
violate the Constitution.

Section 34 does not violate Section 10, Article III of the Constitution
or the non-impairment clause. The non-impairment clause is limited
in application to laws that derogate from prior acts or contracts by
enlarging, abridging or in any manner changing the intention of the
parties. As observed by the OSG, there is no existing contract yet
and, therefore, no enforceable right or demandable obligation will be
impaired.

216
 EN BANC
[ G.R. No. 205505, September 29, 2015 ]
ATTY. ISIDRO Q. LICO, RAFAEL A. PUENTESPINA, PROCULO T.
SARMEN, AMELITO L. REVUELTA, WILLIAM C. YBANEZ,
SILVERIO J. SANCHEZ, GLORIA G. FUTALAN, HILARIO DE
GUZMAN, EUGENE M. PABUALAN, RODOLFO E. PEREZ,
HIPOLITO R. QUILLAN, MARIO ARENAS, TIRSO C.
BUENAVENTURA, LYDIA B. TUBELLA, REYNALDO C. GOLO&
JONATHAN DEQUINA IN THEIR INDIVIDUAL CAPACITIES,
AND AS LEGITIMATE MEMBERS AND OFFICERS OF
ADHIKAING TINATAGUYOD NG KOOPERATIBA (ATING KOOP
PARTY LIST), PETITIONERS,
VS.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC AND THE SELF-
STYLED SHAM ATING KOOP PARTYLIST REPRESENTED BY
AMPARO T. RIMAS, RESPONDENTS.

SERENO, C.J.:

FACTS:
Ating Koop is a multi-sectoral party-list organization which was
registered on 16 November 2009 under Republic Act (R.A.) No.
7941, also known as the Party-List System Act (Party-List Law).
Under Ating Koop's Constitution and By-Laws, its highest
policymaking body is the National Convention. The Central
Committee, however, takes over when the National Convention is
not in session.
On 30 November 2009, Ating Koop filed its Manifestation of Intent
to Participate in the Party-List System of Representation for the 10
May 2010 Elections and on 6 March 2010, it filed with the
COMELEC the list of its nominees, with petitioner Lico as first
nominee and Roberto Mascarina as second nominee. On 8 December
2010, COMELEC proclaimed Ating Koop as one of the winning
party-list groups. Petitioner Lico subsequently took his oath of office
on 9 December 2010 before the Secretary-General of the House of
Representatives, and thereafter assumed office.

217
Several months prior to its proclamation as one of the winning party-
list organizations, or on 9 June 2010, Ating Koop issued Central
Committee Resolution 2010-01, which incorporated a term-sharing
agreement signed by its nominees. Under the agreement, petitioner
Lico was to serve as Party-list Representative for the first year of the
three-year term.
On 14 May 2011, Ating Koop held its Second National Convention,
during which it introduced amendments to its Constitution and By-
laws. Among the salient changes was the composition of the Central
Committee, which would still be composed of 15 representatives but
with five each coming from Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao (5-5-5
equal representation). The amendments likewise mandated the
holding of an election of Central Committee members within six
months after the Second National Convention. In effect, the
amendments cut short the three-year term of the incumbent
members (referred to hereafter as the Interim Central Committee) of
the Central Committee. The Interim Central Committee was
dominated by members of the Rimas Group.
On 5 December 2011, or almost one year after petitioner Lico had
assumed office, the Interim Central Committee expelled him from
Ating Koop for disloyalty. Apart from allegations of malversation and
graft and corruption, the Committee cited petitioner Lico's refusal to
honor the term-sharing agreement as factual basis for disloyalty and
as cause for his expulsion under Ating Koop's Amended Constitution
and By-laws.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the COMELEC has jurisdiction over the expulsion of
a Member of the House of Representatives from his party-list
organization
HELD:
None. The COMELEC has no jurisdiction over the expulsion of a
Member of the House of Representatives from his party-list
organization. Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution endows
the HRET with jurisdiction to resolve questions on the qualifications
of members of Congress. In the case of party-list representatives, the
HRET acquires jurisdiction over a disqualification case upon
proclamation of the winning party-list group, oath of the nominee,
and assumption of office as member of the House of
Representatives.
218
In the present case, the Petition for petitioner Lico's expulsion from
the House of Representatives is anchored on his expulsion from
Ating Koop, which necessarily affects his title as member of
Congress. A party-list nominee must have been, among others, a
bona fide member of the party or organization for at least ninety (90)
days preceding the day of the election. Needless to say, bona fide
membership in the party-list group is a continuing qualification. We
have ruled that qualifications for public office, whether elective or
not, are continuing requirements. They must be possessed not only
at the time of appointment or election, or of assumption of office,
but during the officer's entire tenure.

219
NOMINATION

220
 SENERES V. COMELEC, GR NO. 178678, 4/9/16

Facts:
In 1999, private respondent Robles was elected president and
chairperson of Buhay, a party-list group duly registered with
COMELEC. The constitution of BUHAY provides for a three-year
term for all its party officers, without re-election. BUHAY
participated in the 2001 and 2004 elections, with Robles as its
President. On January 26, 2007, in connection with the May 2007
elections, BUHAY again filed a manifestation of its desire to
participate in the Party-List System of Representation. As in the past
two elections, the manifestation to participate bore the signature of
Robles as BUHAY President. Consequently, on April 17, 2007,
Señeres filed with the COMELEC a petition to deny due course to
Certificate of Nomination. In it, petitioner Señeres alleged that he
was the acting President and Secretary-General of BUHAY, having
assumed that position since August 17, 2004 when Robles vacated
the position. Señeres asserted that under the Cobstitution, Robles
was, disqualified from being an officer of any political party, the
latter being the Acting Administrator of the Light Railway Transport
Authority (LRTA), a government-controlled corporation. On May 10,
2007, the National Council of BUHAY adopted a resolution expelling
Señeres as party member for his act of submitting a Certificate of
Nomination for the party.
Issues:
Whether or not the COMELEC acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in issuing its challenged Resolution dated June
19, 2007, which declared respondent Robles as the duly authorized
representative of BUHAY, and there is no appeal or any other plain,
speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law except the
instant petition.
Ruling:
No, the COMELEC did not act with grave abuse of discretion.
The petition should be dismissed for lack of merit. A crucial matter
in this recourse is whether the petition for certiorari filed by Señeres
is the proper remedy. A special civil action for certiorari may be
availed of when the tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction
and there is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law for the purpose of annulling the

221
proceeding. It is the "proper remedy to question any final order,
ruling and decision of the COMELEC rendered in the exercise of its
adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers." For certiorari to prosper,
however, there must be a showing that the COMELEC acted with
grave abuse of discretion and that there is no appeal or any plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Thus,
once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and
assumed office as a Member of the House of Representatives,
COMELEC's jurisdiction over elections relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRET's own jurisdiction
begins. As such, the proper recourse would have been to file a
petition for quo warranto before the HRET within ten (10) days
from receipt of the July 19, 2007 Resolution and not a petition for
certiorari before this Court. Since Señeres failed to file a petition for
quo warranto before the HRET within 10 days from receipt of the
July 19, 2007 Resolution declaring the validity of Robles' Certificate
of Nomination, said Resolution of the COMELEC has already
become final and executory.

222
G.R. No. 180050 April 12, 2011

RODOLFO G. NAVARRO, VICTOR F. BERNAL, and RENE O.

MEDINA, Petitioners,
vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, representing the
President of the Philippines; Senate of the Philippines, represented
by the SENATE PRESIDENT; House of Representatives, represented
by the HOUSE SPEAKER; GOVERNOR ROBERT ACE S. BARBERS,
representing the mother province of Surigao del Norte; GOVERNOR
GERALDINE ECLEO VILLAROMAN, representing the new Province
of Dinagat Islands, Respondents,
CONGRESSMAN FRANCISCO T. MATUGAS, HON. SOL T.
MATUGAS, HON. ARTURO CARLOS A. EGAY, JR., HON.
SIMEON VICENTE G. CASTRENCE, HON. MAMERTO D.
GALANIDA, HON. MARGARITO M. LONGOS, and HON. CESAR
M. BAGUNDOL, Intervenors

FACTS:

On October 2, 2006, the President of the Republic approved into law

Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9355 (An Act Creating the Province of
Dinagat Islands). On December 3, 2006, the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) conducted the mandatory plebiscite for the
ratification of the creation of the province under the Local
Government Code (LGC). The plebiscite yielded 69,943 affirmative
votes and 63,502 negative votes. With the approval of the people
from both the mother province of Surigao del Norte and the Province
of Dinagat Islands (Dinagat). The President appointed the interim
set of provincial officials who took their oath of office on January 26,
2007. Later, during the May 14, 2007 synchronized elections, the
Dinagatnons elected their new set of provincial officials who
assumed office on July 1, 2007. On November 10, 2006, petitioners
Rodolfo G. Navarro, Victor F. Bernal and Rene O. Medina, former
political leaders of Surigao del Norte, filed before this Court a
petition for certiorari and prohibition (G.R. No. 175158) challenging
the constitutionality of R.A. No. 9355. The Court dismissed the
petition on technical grounds. Their motion for reconsideration was
also denied.

Undaunted, petitioners, as taxpayers and residents of the Province of

Surigao del Norte, filed another petition for certiorari seeking to
nullify R.A. No. 9355 for being unconstitutional. They alleged that
the creation of Dinagat as a new province, if uncorrected, would
perpetuate an illegal act of Congress, and would unjustly deprive the

223
people of Surigao del Norte of a large chunk of the provincial
territory, Internal Revenue Allocation (IRA), and rich resources from
the area. They pointed out that when the law was passed, Dinagat
had a land area of 802.12 square kilometers only and a population of
only 106,951, failing to comply with Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution and of Section 461 of the LGC. On February 10, 2010,
the Court rendered its Decision granting the petition. The Decision
declared R.A. No. 9355 unconstitutional for failure to comply with
the requirements on population and land area in the creation of a
province under the LGC. Consequently, it declared the proclamation
of Dinagat and the election of its officials as null and void. The
Decision likewise declared as null and void the provision on Article
9(2) of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the LGC (LGC-
IRR), stating that, "[t]he land area requirement shall not apply
where the proposed province is composed of one (1) or more
islands" for being beyond the ambit of Article 461 of the LGC,
inasmuch as such exemption is not expressly provided in the law.

The Republic, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, and

Dinagat filed their respective motions for reconsideration of the
Decision. In its Resolution dated May 12, 2010, the Court denied the
said motions. Unperturbed, the Republic and Dinagat both filed
their respective motions for leave of court to admit their second
motions for reconsideration, accompanied by their second motions
for reconsideration. These motions were eventually "noted without
action" by this Court in its June 29, 2010 Resolution.

Meanwhile, the movants-intervenors filed on June 18, 2010 a Motion

for Leave to Intervene and to File and to Admit Intervenors‘ Motion
for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated May 12, 2010. They
alleged that the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8790.

In their motion for reconsideration of the May 12, 2010 Resolution,

movants-intervenors raised three (3) main arguments to challenge
the Resolution No. 8790 of the Comelec namely: (1) that the
passage of R.A. No. 9355 operates as an act of Congress amending
Section 461 of the LGC; (2) that the exemption from territorial
contiguity, when the intended province consists of two or more
islands, includes the exemption from the application of the
minimum land area requirement; and (3) that the Operative Fact
Doctrine is applicable in the instant case.

In the Resolution dated July 20, 2010, the Court denied the Motion
for Leave to Intervene and to File and to Admit Intervenors‘ Motion
for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated May 12, 2010 on the

224
ground that the allowance or disallowance of a motion to intervene
is addressed to the sound discretion of the Court, and that the
appropriate time to file the said motion was before and not after the
resolution of this case.

On September 7, 2010, movants-intervenors filed a Motion for

Reconsideration of the July 20, 2010 Resolution, citing several
rulings of the Court, allowing intervention as an exception to Section
2, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court that it should be filed at any time
before the rendition of judgment. They alleged that, prior to the May
10, 2010 elections, their legal interest in this case was not yet
existent. They averred that prior to the May 10, 2010 elections, they
were unaware of the proceedings in this case. Even for the sake of
argument that they had notice of the pendency of the case, they
pointed out that prior to the said elections, Sol T. Matugas was a
simple resident of Surigao del Norte, Arturo Carlos A. Egay, Jr. was a
member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Second District of
Surigao del Norte, and Mamerto D. Galanida was the Municipal
Mayor of Socorro, Surigao del Norte, and that, pursuant to
COMELEC Resolution No. 8790, it was only after they were elected
as Governor of Surigao del Norte, Vice Governor of Surigao del
Norte and Sangguniang Panlalawigan Member of the First District of
Surigao del Norte, respectively, that they became possessed with
legal interest in this controversy.

ISSUE(S):

1. Whether or not Republic Act No. 9355 (An Act Creating the
Province of Dinagat Islands) is CONSTITUTIONAL, and the
proclamation of the Province of Dinagat Islands and the
election of the officials are VALID
2. Whether or not to Grant the Urgent Motion to Recall Entry of
Judgment by movants-intervenors, dated and filed on October
29, 2010
3. Whether or not to RECONSIDER and SET ASIDE the July 20,
2010 Resolution, and GRANT the Motion for Leave to
Intervene and to File and to Admit Intervenors‘ Motion for
Reconsideration of the Resolution dated July 20, 2010
4. Whether or not GRANT the Intervenors‘ Motion for
Reconsideration of the Resolution dated May 12, 2010

HELD: WHEREFORE, the Court resolved to:

1. GRANT the Urgent Motion to Recall Entry of Judgment by

movants-intervenors, dated and filed on October 29, 2010;

225
2. RECONSIDER and SET ASIDE the July 20, 2010
Resolution, and GRANT the Motion for Leave to Intervene and
to File and to Admit Intervenors‘ Motion for Reconsideration
of the Resolution dated July 20, 2010;

3. GRANT the Intervenors‘ Motion for Reconsideration of the

Resolution dated May 12, 2010. The May 12, 2010 Resolution
is RECONSIDERED and SET ASIDE. The provision in Article
9(2) of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local
Government Code of 1991 stating, "The land area requirement
shall not apply where the proposed province is composed of
one (1) or more islands," is declared VALID. Accordingly,
Republic Act No. 9355 (An Act Creating the Province of
Dinagat Islands) is declared as VALID and
CONSTITUTIONAL, and the proclamation of the Province of
Dinagat Islands and the election of the officials thereof are
declared VALID; and

4. The petition is DISMISSED.

226
[G.R. 188078 January 25, 2010]

VICTORINO B. ALDABA, CARLO JOLETTE S. FAJARDO, JULIO G.

MORADA, AND MINERVA ALDABA MORADA, PETITIONERS,
VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, RESPONDENT.

* This is an original action for Prohibition to declare unconstitutional

Republic Act No. 9591 (RA 9591), creating a legislative district for
the city of Malolos, Bulacan, for violating the minimum population
requirement for the creation of a legislative district in a city.
Facts:
Before 1 May 2009, the province of Bulacan was represented in
Congress through four legislative districts. On 1 May 2009, RA 9591
lapsed into law, amending Malolos' City Charter,[2] by creating a
separate legislative district for the city. The population of Malolos
City on 1 May 2009 is a contested fact but there is no dispute that
House Bill No. 3693 relied on an undated certification issued by a
Regional Director of the National Statistics Office (NSO) that "the
projected population of the Municipality of Malolos will be 254,030
by the year 2010 using the population growth rate of 3.78 between
1995 to 2000.
Petitioners, taxpayers, registered voters and residents of
Malolos City, filed this petition contending that RA 9591 is
unconstitutional for failing to meet the minimum population
threshold of 250,000 for a city to merit representation in Congress as
provided under Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and
Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution. Since
the projected 2010 population of 254,030 for Malolos was only
issued by the National Statistics Office (NSO) Regional Director
Alberto Miranda, it should have no legal effect. This is because an
NSO Regional Director has no basis and authority to issue the
certification. Petitioners also contend that intercensal population
projections should be done in the middle of the year.

Issue:
1. Whether or not RA 9591 is unconstitutional based on the
provisions of Art 6 Sec 5(3)

227
Ruling:
1. R.A. 9591 in unconstitutional for being violative of Sec. 5(3),
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. The law clearly provides
that for a city to have a legislative district, the city must have "a
population of at least two hundred fifty thousand.‖ The
Certification of Regional Director Miranda, which is based on
demographic projections, is without legal effect because
Regional Director Miranda has no basis and no authority to
issue the Certification. First, certifications on demographic
projections can be issued only if such projections are declared
official by the National Statistics Coordination
Board (NSCB). Second, certifications based on demographic
projections can be issued only by the NSO Administrator or his
designated certifying officer. Third, intercensal population
projections must be as of the middle of every year.
The Certification is also void on its face because based on its
own growth rate assumption, the population of Malolos will be
less than 250,000 in the year 2010. Moreover, the Certification
states that "the total population of Malolos, Bulacan as of May
1, 2000 is 175,291." The Certification also states that the
population growth rate of Malolos is 3.78% per year between
1995 and 2000. Based on a growth rate of 3.78% per year, the
population of Malolos of 175,291 in 2000 will grow to only
241,550 in 2010.. In addition, intercensal demographic
projections cannot be made for the entire year. In any event, a
city whose population has increased to 250,000 is entitled to
have a legislative district only in the "immediately following
election"[7] after the attainment of the 250,000 population.

Clearly, there is no official record that the population of the

City of Malolos will be at least 250,000, actual or projected,
prior to the 10 May 2010 elections, the immediately following
election after the supposed attainment of such population.
Thus, the City of Malolos is not qualified to have a legislative
district of its own under Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the
1987 Constitution.

228
INHABITANTS

229
 Sen. Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III and Mayor Jesse Robredo v.
Commission on Elections represented by its Chairman Jose A.R.
Melo and its Commisioners, Rene V. Sarmiento, Nicodemo T. Ferrer,
Lucenito N. Tagle, Armando Velasco, Elias R. Yusoph and Gregorio
Larrazabal
G.R No. 189793
April 7, 2010
Perez, J
FACTS:
Republic Act No. 9716 was signed into law by President Gloria
Macapagal Arroyo on 12 October 2009. It is known as an act
reapportioning the composition of the first (1st) and second (2nd)
legislative districts in the province of Camarines Sur and thereby
creating a new legislative district from such reapportionment.
The first and second districts of Camarines Sur were reconfigured in
order to create an additional legislative district for the province.
Hence, the first district municipalities of Libmanan, Minalabac,
Pamplona, Pasacao, and San Fernando were combined with the
second district municipalities of Milaor and Gainza to form a new
second legislative district.
Petitioners contend that RA 9716, runs afoul of the explicit
constitutional standard that requires a minimum population of two
hundred fifty thousand (250,000) for the creation of a legislative
district. The petitioners claim that the reconfiguration by Republic
Act No. 9716 of the first and second districts of Camarines Sur is
unconstitutional, because the proposed first district will end up with
a population of less than 250,000 or only 176,383.
Petitioners rely on Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
as basis for the cited 250,000 minimum population standard which
states that (3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as
practicable, contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory. Each city
with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each
province, shall have at least one representative.
The respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General, seek
the dismissal of the present petition based on procedural and
substantive grounds.
ISSUE:

230
Whether or not a population of 250,000 is an indispensable
constitutional requirement for the creation of a new legislative
district in a province.
RULING:
No. Any law duly enacted by Congress carries with it the
presumption of constitutionality. Before a law may be declared
unconstitutional by this Court, there must be a clear showing that a
specific provision of the fundamental law has been violated or
transgressed. When there is neither a violation of a specific provision
of the Constitution nor any proof showing that there is such a
violation, the presumption of constitutionality will prevail and the
law must be upheld. To doubt is to sustain.
There is no specific provision in the Constitution that fixes a
250,000 minimum population that must compose a legislative
district.
The second sentence of Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution,
succinctly provides: ―Each city with a population of at least two
hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one
representative.‖
The provision draws a plain and clear distinction between the
entitlement of a city to a district on one hand, and the entitlement of
a province to a district on the other. For while a province is entitled
to at least a representative, with nothing mentioned about
population, a city must first meet a population minimum of 250,000
in order to be similarly entitled.
The use by the subject provision of a comma to separate the phrase
―each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand‖
from the phrase ―or each province‖ point to no other conclusion than
that the 250,000 minimum population is only required for a city, but
not for a province.
Plainly read, Section 5(3) of the Constitution requires a 250,000
minimum population only for a city to be entitled to a
representative, but not so for a province.
The Province of Camarines Sur, with an estimated population of
1,693,821 in 2007 is based on the formula and constant number of
250,000 used by the Constitutional Commission in nationally
apportioning legislative districts among provinces and cities entitled
to two (2) districts in addition to the four (4) that it was given in the
231
1986 apportionment. In other words, Section 5 of Article VI as
clearly written allows and does not prohibit an additional district for
the Province of Camarines Sur, such as that provided for in Republic
Act No. 9786.
Based on the pith and pitch of the exchanges on the Ordinance on
the protests and complaints against strict conformity with the
population standard, and more importantly based on the final
districting in the Ordinance on considerations other than population,
the reapportionment or the recomposition of the first and second
legislative districts in the Province of Camarines Sur that resulted in
the creation of a new legislative district is valid even if the
population of the new district is 176,383 and not 250,000 as insisted
upon by the petitioners.
Population is not the only factor but is just one of several other
factors in the composition of the additional district. Such settlement
is in accord with both the text of the Constitution and the spirit of
the letter, so very clearly given form in the Constitutional debates on
the exact issue presented by this petition.

232
BAI SANDRA S. A. SEMA, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and DIDAGEN P.
DILANGALEN, Respondents.

G.R. No. 177597 July 16, 2008

CARPIO, J.:

The Case
Petition seeks to annul Resolution No. 7902, dated 10 May 2007, of
the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) treating Cotabato City as
part of the legislative district of the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan.

FACTS
The Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution apportioned two
legislative districts for the Province of Maguindanao. The first
legislative district consists of Cotabato City and eight municipalities.
Maguindanao forms part of the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao (ARMM), created under its Organic Act, RA 6734, as
amended by RA 9054.

Although under the Ordinance, Cotabato City forms part of

Maguindanao‘s first legislative district, it is not part of the ARMM
but of Region XII, having voted against its inclusion in the ARMM in
the plebiscite held in November 1989.
On 28 August 2006, the ARMM‘s legislature, the ARMM Regional
Assembly, exercising its power to create provinces under Section 19,
Article VI of RA 9054, enacted Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No.
201 (MMA Act 201) creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan
composed of the eight municipalities in the first district of
Maguindanao. What was left of Maguindanao were the
municipalities constituting its second legislative district. The voters
of Maguindanao ratified Shariff Kabunsuan‘s creation in a plebiscite
held on 29 October 2006.
On 6 February 2007, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cotabato City
passed Resolution No. 3999 requesting the COMELEC to "clarify the
status of Cotabato City in view of the conversion of the First District
of Maguindanao into a regular province" under MMA Act 201.

233
In answer to Cotabato City‘s query, the COMELEC issued
Resolution No. 07-0407 on 6 March 2007 "maintaining the status
quo with Cotabato City as part of Shariff Kabunsuan in the First
Legislative District of Maguindanao."
Considering the foregoing, the Commission RESOLVED, as it
hereby resolves, to adopt the recommendation of the Law
Department that pending the enactment of the appropriate law by
Congress, to maintain the status quo with Cotabato City as part of
Shariff Kabunsuan in the First Legislative District of Maguindanao.
However, in preparation for the 14 May 2007 elections, the
COMELEC promulgated on 29 March 2007 Resolution No. 7845
stating that Maguindanao‘s first legislative district is composed only
of Cotabato City because of the enactment of MMA Act 201.
On 10 May 2007, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 7902,
subject of these petitions, amending Resolution No. 07-0407 by
renaming the legislative district in question as "Shariff Kabunsuan
Province with Cotabato City (formerly First District of Maguindanao
with Cotabato City).i1
In G.R. No. 177597, Sema, who was a candidate in the 14 May 2007
elections for Representative of "Shariff Kabunsuan with Cotabato
City," prayed for the nullification of COMELEC Resolution No. 7902
and the exclusion from canvassing of the votes cast in Cotabato City
for that office.

ARGUMENTS
Petitioner contended that Shariff Kabunsuan is entitled to one
representative in Congress under Section 5 (3), Article VI of the
Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the
Constitution. Thus, Sema asserted that the COMELEC acted ultra
vires in issuing Resolution No. 7902 and usurped Congress‘ power
to create or reapportion legislative districts.
COMELEC, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
merely contended that (1) Sema wrongly availed of the writ of
certiorari to nullify COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 because the
COMELEC issued the same in the exercise of its administrative, not
quasi-judicial, power and (2) Sema‘s prayer for the writ of
prohibition in G.R. No. 177597 became moot with the proclamation
of respondent Didagen P. Dilangalen. COMELEC maintained the

234
validity of COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 as a temporary measure
pending the enactment by Congress of the "appropriate law."

Respondent Dilangalen countered that Sema is estopped from

questioning COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 because in her
certificate of candidacy filed on 29 March 2007, Sema indicated that
she was seeking election as representative of "Shariff Kabunsuan
including Cotabato City." Respondent Dilangalen added that
COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 is constitutional because it did not
apportion a legislative district for Shariff Kabunsuan or reapportion
the legislative districts in Maguindanao but merely renamed
Maguindanao‘s first legislative district. Respondent Dilangalen
further claimed that the COMELEC could not reapportion
Maguindanao‘s first legislative district to make Cotabato City its sole
component unit as the power to reapportion legislative districts lies
exclusively with Congress, not to mention that Cotabato City does
not meet the minimum population requirement under Section 5 (3),
Article VI of the Constitution for the creation of a legislative district
within a city.

ISSUES
(A) Preliminarily –
(1) WON the writs of Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus
are proper to test the constitutionality of COMELEC Resolution
No. 7902
(2) WON the proclamation of respondent Dilangalen as
representative of Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City
mooted the petition in G.R. No. 177597.
(B) On the merits –
(1) WON Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, delegating to the
ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create provinces,
cities, municipalities and barangays, is constitutional
(2) If in the affirmative, WON a province created by the
ARMM Regional Assembly under MMA Act 201 pursuant to
Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is entitled to one
representative in the House of Representatives without need of
a national law creating a legislative district for such province.

235
(C) WON COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 is valid for maintaining
the status quo in the first legislative district of Maguindanao (as
"Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City

RULING
A. ON THE PRELIMINARY MATTERS
1. COMELEC did not issue Resolution No. 7902 in the exercise of
its judicial or quasi-judicial functions. Nor was there a law which
specifically enjoins the COMELEC to exclude from canvassing the
votes cast in Cotabato City for representative of "Shariff Kabunsuan
Province with Cotabato City." However, the writ of Prohibition was
appropriate to test the constitutionality of Election laws, rules and
regulations.
2. Respondent Dilangalen‘s Proclamation as winner in the May 14,
2007 election does not moot the petition, for this case does not
concern respondent Dilangalen‘s election but the constitutionality of
RA 9054.
B. MERITS
The petitions have no merit. Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is
unconstitutional insofar as it grants to the ARMM Regional
Assembly the power to create provinces and cities; MMA Act 201
creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan is void

C. Consequently, the court ruled that COMELEC Resolution No.

7902, preserving the geographic and legislative district of the First
District of Maguindanao with Cotabato City, is valid as it merely
complies with Section 5 of Article VI (election of house of
representatives from legislative districts of apportioned provinces)
and Section 20 of Article X of the Constitution (legislative powers of
autonomous region), as well as Section 1 of the Ordinance appended
to the Constitution is VALID.

236
LEGISLATIVE
DISTRICT

237
 G.R. No. 176970 December 8, 2008

ROGELIO Z. BAGABUYO, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

BRION, J.:

Facts
On October 10, 2006, Cagayan de Oro‘s then Congressman
Constantino G. Jaraula filed and sponsored House Bill No. 5859: An
Act Providing for the Apportionment of the Lone Legislative District
of the City of Cagayan De Oro or RA No. 9371.
It increased Cagayan de Oro‘s legislative district from one to two.
For the election of May 2007, CDO‘s voters would be classified as
belonging to either the first or the second district, depending on
their place of residence. On March 13,2007, COMELEC promulgated
a resolution implementing the said act. Bagabuyo filed a petition at
the Supreme Court asking for the nullification of RA 9371 and
Resolution No. 7837 on constitutional grounds. Petitioner argued
that COMELEC cannot implement a law without the commencement
of a plebiscite which is indispensable for the division and conversion
of a Local Government. unit.
Issue:
Whether or not the law, of which pertains to the legislative
apportionment of a city, involve the division and conversion of a
local government unit, necessitating a plebiscite
Ruling:
Petition is DISMISSED.
The Court upheld respondent‘s arguments saying that such law only
increased the representation of CDO in the House of Representatives
and Sangguniang Panglungsod. Creation, division, merger, abolition,
and alteration of boundaries under Art. X Sec. 10 requires the
commencement of a plebiscite, while legislative apportionment or
reapportionment under Art. VI, Sec.5 need not. There was also no
change in CDO‘s territory, population, income and classification.
Legislative apportionment is defined by Black‘s Law Dictionary as
the determination of the number of representatives which a State,
county or other subdivision may send to a legislative body. It is the

238
allocation of seats in a legislative body in proportion to the
population; the drawing of voting district lines so as to equalize
population and voting power among the districts.
Reapportionment, on the other hand, is the realignment or change in
legislative districts brought about by changes in population and
mandated by the constitutional requirement of equality of
representation. RA 9371 does not have the effect of dividing the City
of Cagayan de Oro into two political and corporate units and
territories. Rather than divide the city either territorially or as a
corporate entity, the effect is merely to enhance voter representation
by giving each city voter more and greater say, both in Congress and
in the Sangguniang Panglunsod
The City, for its part, now has twice the number of congressmen
speaking for it and voting in the halls of Congress. Since the total
number of congressmen in the country has not increased to the point
of doubling its numbers, the presence of two Congressman (instead
of one) from the same city cannot but be a quantitative and
proportional improvement in the representation of Cagayan de Oro
City in the Congress.

239
 Naval vs COMELEC
G.R. No. 207851
July 8, 2014

FACTS:
From 2004 to 2007 and 2007 to 2010, Naval had been elected
and had served as a member of the Sanggunian, Second Districtm
Province of Camarines Sur.
On October 12, 2009, the President approved R.A. 9716, which
reapportioned the legislative districts in Camarines Sur. 8 out of 10
towns were taken from the old Second District to form the present
Third District.
In the 2010 elections, Naval once again won as a member of the
Sanggunian, Third District. He served until 2013.
In the 2013 elections, Naval ran anew and was re-elected as Member
of the Sangguinian, Third District.
Julia, a member of the Sanggunian Third district, contended that
Naval had fully served the entire Province of Camarines Sir for three
consecutive terms as a member of the Sanggunian, irrespective of the
district he had been elected from. Allowing Naval to run as a
Sanggunian member for the fourth time will violate the three-term
limit rule.
Naval alleges that first, second and third legislative districts of
Camarines Sur are not merely renamed but are composed of new
sets of municipalities. He said that voters from the third legislative
district are no longer the same ones as those who had elected him to
office in the 2004 and 2007 elections.
OSG said Naval violated section 78 of the OEC when he filed his
COC.
COMELEC also cancelled Navals COC on grounds of false material
misrepresentation cognizable under section 78 of the OEC.
COMELEC also denied Navals motion for reconsideration. The
former said it is clear that the position to which Naval filed his
candidacy for the May 13 2013 elections is the same position for
which he had been elected and had served for the past nine years.
R.A. 9716 did not convert Naval‘s position into a different one from
what he previously held.

240
ISSUE:
Whether or not Naval violated the three term limit rule of the
constitution.
RULING:
Yes. R.A. 9716 plainly state that the new Secomd District is to be
created, but the Third District is to be renamed. Same municipalities
are under the Third District and thus, the same voters who voted for
him in the previous elections. Enactment of R.A. 9716 did not
convert Naval‘s position into one different from what he previously
had.
Navals contention would allow him to hold the same office for 15
years and is a clear violation of the three term limit rule set forth by
the Constitution.

241
QUALIFICATIONS
OF MEMBER
OF HOR

242
AMORES V. HRET & VILLANUEVA
G.R. No. 189600 June 29, 2010

FACTS:
There was a Petition for certiorari challenging the assumption of
office of Emmanuel Joel Villanueva (Joel Villanueva) as the youth
sector Representative of Citizens‘ Battle Against Corruption
(CIBAC) in the House of Representatives.

Petitioner, Milagros Amores, argues that Villanueva was already 31

years old at the time of filing of nomination, thus, beyond the age
limit of 30 years which was the imposed by RA 7941 or the Party-
List System Act, for "youth sector" representatives. Villanueva's
change of affiliation from Youth Sector to OFWs and their families
was also not effected during the six months prior to elections.
Respondent HRET counters that RA 7941 age requirement only
applied only to those nominated as such during the first three
congressional terms after the ratification of the Constitution or until
1998, unless a sectoral party is thereafter registered exclusively as
representing the youth sector, which CIBAC, a multi-sectoral
organization, is not.

ISSUE: Whether Sections 9 and 15 of RA No. 7941 apply to private

respondent.

RULING:
Yes, Sections 9 and 15 of RA 7941 apply Villanueva.

The Court finds that private respondent was not qualified to be a

nominee of either the youth sector or the overseas Filipino workers
and their families sector in the May, 2007 elections. The records
disclose that private respondent was already more than 30 years of
age in May, 2007, it being stipulated that he was born in August,
1975. Moreover, he did not change his sectoral affiliation at least six
months before May, 2007, public respondent itself having found that
he shifted to CIBAC‘s overseas Filipino workers and their families
sector only on March 17, 2007.

As the law states in unequivocal terms that a nominee of the

youth sector must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more
than thirty (30) years of age on the day of the election, so it
must be that a candidate who is more than 30 on election day is not
qualified to be a youth sector nominee. Since this mandate is

243
contained in RA No. 7941, the Party-List System Act, it covers ALL
youth sector nominees vying for party-list representative seats.

Moreover, it is clear is that the wording of Section 15 covers

changes in both political party and sectoral affiliation. And the latter
may occur within the same party since multi-sectoral party-list
organizations are qualified to participate in the Philippine party-list
system. Hence, a nominee who changes his sectoral affiliation within
the same party will only be eligible for nomination under the new
sectoral affiliation if the change has been effected at least six months
before the elections. Again, since the statute is clear and free from
ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without
attempted interpretation. This is the plain meaning rule or verba
legis, as expressed in the maxim index animi sermo or speech is the
index of intention.

That private respondent is the first nominee of CIBAC, whose

victory was later upheld, is of no moment. A party-list organization‘s
ranking of its nominees is a mere indication of preference, their
qualifications according to law are a different matter.

244
VACANCY

245
LOZADA VS. COMELEC
GR NO. L-59068

FACTS:
Lozada together with Igot filed a petition for mandamus compelling
the COMELEC to hold an election to fill the vacancies in the Interim
Batasang Pambasa (IBP). They anchor their contention on Sec 5 (2),
Art 8 of the 1973 Constitution which provides: ―In the case a
vacancy arises in the Batasang Pambansa eighteen months or more
before a regular election, the Commission on Election shall call a
special election to be held within sixty (60) days after the vacancy
occurs to elect the member to serve the unexpired term.‖ COMELEC
opposes the petition alleging, substantially, that 1) petitioners lack
standing to file the instant petition for they are not the proper
parties to institute the action; 2) this court has no jurisdiction to
entertain this petition; and 3) section 5(2), Article VIII of the 1973
Constitution does not apply to the Interim Batasang Pambansa.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the SC can compel COMELEC to hold a special
election to fill vacancies in the Legislature.

HELD:
THE SC‘s jurisdiction over the COMELEC is only to review by
certiorari the latter‘s decision, orders or rulings. This is as clearly
provided in Article XII-C, section 11 of the New Constitution which
reads: ―Any Decision, order, or ruling of the Commission may be
brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party
within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof.‖ There is in this
case no decision, order or ruling of the COMELEC which is sought
to be reviewed by this court under its certiorari jurisdiction as
provided for in the aforequoted provision, which is the only known
provision conferring jurisdiction or authority on the Supreme Court
over the COMELEC.
It is obvious that the holding of special elections in several regional
districts where vacancies exist, would entail huge expenditure of

246
money. Only the Batasang Pambansa (BP) can make the necessary
appropriation for the purpose, and this power of the BP may neither
be subject to mandamus by the courts much less may COMELEC
compel the BP to exercise its power of appropriation. From the role
BP has to play in the holding of special elections, which is to
appropriate the funds for the expenses thereof, it would seem that
the initiative on the must come from the BP, not the COMELEC,
even when the vacancies would occur in the regular not IBP. The
power to appropriate is the sole and exclusive prerogative of the
legislative body, the exercise of which may not be compelled through
a petition for mandamus. What is more, the provision of section
5(2), Article VIII of the constitution was intended to apply to
vacancies in the regular National Assembly, now BP, not to the IBP.

247
PRIVILEGE OF SPEECH
AND
DEBATE

248
Coffin vs Coffin

Facts:

The plaintiff, William Coffin, has commenced an action of the case,

demanding damages of the defendant for an injury to his character,
committed by the defendant Micajah Coffin, in maliciously uttering
and publishing defamatory words, which imported that the plaintiff
had committed felony by robbing the Nantucket Bank where he was
honorably acquitted.

The defendant and one Mr. Benjamin Russell were members of the
House of Representatives, then in session, were conversing in
relation to the deliberation in the house, concerning the
appointment of a notary public. It was from this conversation that
the defendant was alleged to have uttered defamatory words
addressed to the plaintiff.

To this demand the defendant pleaded not guilty, and also, by leave
of the Court, a special plea in bar, justifying the speaking of the
words, because, as he alleged, at the time when they were spoken, he
and Benjamin Russell were members of the House of
Representatives, then in session, and that he spoke the words to
Russell, in deliberation in the house, concerning the appointment of
a notary public, and that the words had relation to the subject of
their deliberation.

The plaintiff, in his replication, denies these allegations, and avers

that the words were spoken by the defendant of his own wrong, and
without such cause as he had alleged, and tenders an issue to the
country. The defendant does not demur to the replication, but joins
the issue thus tendered.

Issue:
Whether or not the defendant can invoke his privilege of speech and
debate.
Ruling:
The rule was liberally construed in favor of the plaintiff. The facts
presented by the case do not entitle the defendant to the privilege
which he claims. Such privilege is granted and secured not with the
intention of protecting the member against the prosecution for their
own benefit but to support the rights of the people to their chosen

249
representative to execute his function without fear of prosecution,
civil or criminal.
But in actions for defamatory words against a member, he may, in
cases to which his privilege does not extend, defend himself like any
other citizen, by proving that the words were spoken for a justifiable
purpose, not maliciously, nor with a design to defame the character
of any man. And this defense will avail every man charged with
slander, although it may be that the words uttered are not true. The
court do not, therefore, consider any citizen, who is a
representative, answerable in a prosecution for defamation, where
the words charged were uttered in the execution of his official duty,
although they were spoken maliciously; or where they were not
uttered in the execution of his official duty, if they were not spoken
maliciously, with an intent to defame the character of any person.
However, the court considers a representative holden to answer for
defamatory words, spoken maliciously, and not in discharging the
functions of his office. But to consider every malicious slander,
uttered by a citizen, who is a representative, as within his privilege,
because it was uttered in the walls of the representatives' chamber to
another member, but not uttered in executing his official duty,
would be to extend the privilege farther than was intended by the
people, or than is consistent with sound policy, and would render
the representatives' chamber a sanctuary for calumny -- an effect
which never has been endured by any House of Representatives of
Massachusetts.

The House of Representatives not only as an integral branch of the

legislature, and as an essential part of the two houses in convention,
but also as a court having final and exclusive cognizance of all
matters within its jurisdiction, for the purposes for which it was
vested with jurisdiction. It has jurisdiction of the election of its
members; of the choice of its officers; of its rules of proceeding; and
of all contempts against the house, either in its presence, or by
violating the constitutional privileges of its members. When the
house is proceeding as a court, it has, exclusively, authority to decide
whether the matter before it be or be not within its jurisdiction,
without the legal control of any other court. As to contempts, the
house proceeds against the offender to punish the contempt. Courts
of law proceed to punish offences against the state, and to redress
private wrongs. The same act may be a contempt against the house,
an offence against the state, and an injury to an individual; and in all
these respects, proceedings may be had against the offender.

250
The courts of law proceed to punish the offender, and he is
acquitted. The power of the senate is censorial, and exercised to
preserve purity in office. If it should be supposed that the senate
cannot proceed after an acquittal at law, it should be remembered
that, by the express provision of the constitution, courts of law may
proceed after a conviction in senate; and in the proceedings at law
the jury may acquit; and it could not have been intended to place the
senate as subordinate to a court of law. The true design of that
provision was a mere cautionary declaration that the proceedings in
the senate were not to punish offenders against the state, but for a
different end. In the present case, if the house, of which the
defendant was a member, had proceeded against the plaintiff for a
contempt in suing this action, - whatever had been the result of its
proceedings, the Court could not have interfered, or granted any
relief, until the sentence had been performed. And as this judgment
could not have affected those proceedings, so neither could those
proceedings have controlled the authority of this Court. The two
courts are independent, and have each exclusive cognizance of the
matters within its jurisdiction; and although the transaction
animadverted on may be the same, yet the proceedings are for
different purposes, and the judgments of both courts may be
executed without any interference. There cannot, therefore, be any
conflict of jurisdictions.

251
G.R. No. L-15905 August 3, 1966
NICANOR T. JIMENEZ, ET AL., plaintiffs and appellants,
vs.
BARTOLOME CABANGBANG, defendant and appellee.
Liwag and Vivo and S. Artiaga, Jr. for plaintiffs and appellants.
Jose S. Zafra and Associates and V. M. Fortich Zerda for defendant
and appellee.

Facts:
When congress presumably was not in session, an open letter to the
president was published in several newspapers of general circulation
in the Philippines exposing the allegedly operational plans by some
AFP officers regarding a massive political build up of Secretary of
National Defense. Cabangbang ‗s letter mentioned the names of
Nicanor Jimenez and his comrades as subordinates of the planner‘s
behind the alleged operation. They then sued him for the crime of
libel and sought for financial compensation. He latter moved to
dismiss the complaint upon the ground that the letter in question is
not libelous, and that, even if were, said letter is a privileged
communication.
ISSUES
Whether or not the publication in question is a privileged
communication
HELD
No, It was an open letter to the President of the Philippines and he
was not performing his official duty, either as a member of Congress
or as officer or any Committee thereof. Hence, contrary to the
finding made by His Honor, the trial Judge, said communication is
not absolutely privileged.
Under the provisions of sec. 15 article VI ―any speech or debate
therein‖ only refers to the utterances made by Congressmen in the
performance of their official functions, such as speeches delivered,
statements made, or votes cast in the halls of Congress, while the
same is in session, as well as bills introduced in Congress, whether
the same is in session or not, and other acts performed by
Congressmen, either in Congress or outside the premises housing its
offices, in the official discharge of their duties as members of

252
Congress and of Congressional Committees duly authorized to
perform its functions as such, at the time of the performance of the
acts in question.

253
SERGIO OSMEÑA, JR., vs. SALIPADA K. PENDATUN, et. al.
G.R. No. L-17144 October 28, 1960

Digested by: Mervin M. Yabes

Facts:
House Resolution No. 59 was passed by the lower house creating a
special committee in order to investigate the charges made by
Congressman Sergio Osmeña, Jr. in his speech on June 23, 1960
entitled ―A Message to Garcia‖ criticizing then President Carlos
Garcia and his administration. Such special committee is authorized
to summon Congressman Osmeña to appear before it to substantiate
his charges, and if he fails to do so, he may be subjected to
disciplinary actions by the lower house. After giving Congressman
Osmeña a chance to defend himself, the special committee
submitted its reports on July 18, 1960, finding said congressman
guilty of serious disorderly behaviour; and acting on such report, the
House approved on the same day the House Resolution No. 175,
declaring Osmeña guilty as recommended, and suspending him from
office for fifteen months.

Osmeña questioned the validity of the said resolution before the

Supreme Court on the ground of infringement of his parliamentary
immunity for speeches delivered in Congress. Salipada Pendatum
filed an answer where he averred that the Supreme Court has no
jurisdiction over the matter and defended the power of the Congress
to discipline its members thereby upholding Resolution No. 175.

Issue:
Whether or not Congressman Osmeña‘s parliamentary immunity has
been violated.
Whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the matter.

Held:
1.) The answer is in the negative. Section 15, Article VI of the 1935
Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which is a
fundamental privilege cherished in every legislative assembly of the
democratic world. It guarantees the legislator complete freedom of
expression without fear of being made responsible in criminal or
civil actions before the courts or any other forum outside of the
Congressional Hall. However, it does not protect him from
responsibility before the legislative body itself whenever his words
and conduct are considered by the latter disorderly or unbecoming a
member thereof.

254
2.) The answer is in the negative. Supreme Court held that the
House is the judge of what constitutes disorderly behaviour, not only
because the Constitution has conferred jurisdiction upon it, but also
because the matter depends mainly on factual circumstances of
which the House knows best but which cannot be depicted in black
and white for presentation to, and adjudication by the Courts.

Further, the Court reitereited its ruling in Angara vs. Electoral

Commission stating that: ―The theory of separation of powers
fastidiously observed by this Court, demands in such situation a
prudent refusal to interfere. Each department, it has been said, had
exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction and is
supreme within its own sphere.‖

The petition is therefore DISMISSED.

255
 ANTERO J. POBRE, COMPLAINANT, VS. SEN. MIRIAM
DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO, RESPONDENT
THIRD DIVISION
[A.C. No. 7399, August 25, 2009]

FACTS:

In one of her privilege speeches before the Senate, Sen. Miriam

Defensor-Santiago delivered the following remarks:

―I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the mouth. I am

homicidal. I am suicidal. I am humiliated, debased, degraded. And I
am not only that, I feel like throwing up to be living my middle years
in a country of this nature. I am nauseated. I spit on the face of Chief
Justice Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts in the Supreme Court, I
am no longer interested in the position [of Chief Justice] if I was to
be surrounded by idiots. I would rather be in a different environment
than in a Supreme Court of idiots‖.

Her speech came as a response to the decision of the Judicial and Bar
Council (JBC) declaring that only sitting members of the Supreme
Court can be nominated for the impending vacancy of the CJ post.
Consequently, nominees who were not incumbent members of the
Court, including Sen. Defensor-Santiago, were automatically
disqualified.

Private complainant Antero J. Pobre filed the instant petition before

the Court, contending that the lady senator's utterances amounted to
a total disrespect towards then CJ Panganiban and a direct contempt
of Court. Accordingly, he wanted disbarment proceedings or other
disciplinary actions to be taken against Sen. Defensor-Santiago.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there is a ground for Sen. Defensor-Santiago to be

disbarred or subjected to disciplinary action by the Court for her
questioned speech.

HELD:

No, the Court sided with Sen. Defensor-Santiago's defense that she
should be afforded parliamentary immunity from suit pursuant to
Section 11, Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution, which section states in
part that "no Senator shall be questioned nor be held liable in any

256
other place for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any
committee thereof." Although there was no express admission on the
part of the lady senator that she did indeed say those words, there
was no categorical denial either, which the Court ultimately regarded
as an implied admission.

Despite the dismissal of the letter-complaint, the Court heavily

chastised the lady senator for indulging in "insulting rhetoric and
offensive personalities." In fact, her excuse that her questioned
speech was a prelude to crafting remedial legislation on the JBC
struck the Court as being a mere afterthought in light of the
controversy her utterances had managed to stir.

Still, the Court held that parliamentary immunity is essential

because without it, the parliament or its equivalent would
"degenerate into a polite and ineffective forum." However, it should
be noted that legislators are immune from deterrents to the
uninhibited discharge of their legislative duties, not for their private
indulgence, but for the public good.

257
INCOMPATIBLE
OFFICE

258
 Feliciano vs COA
Date: January 14, 2004
Petitioner: Engr. Ranulfo Feliciano
Respondents: COA, Celso Gangan, Raul Flores, et al

Ponente: Carpio

Facts: A Special Audit Team from COA Regional Office No. VIII
audited the accounts of LMWD (Leyte Metropolitan Water District).
Subsequently, LMWD received a letter from COA requesting
payment of auditing fees. As General Manager of LMWD, petitioner
sent a reply that the water district could not pay the auditing fees.
Petitioner then wrote COA asking for refund of all auditing fees
LMWD previously paid to COA. COA Chairman Celso Gangan
denied the request. Petitioner filed this instant petition. Attached to
the petition were resolutions of the Visayas Association of Water
Districts (VAWD) and the Philippine Association of Water Districts
(PAWD) supporting the petition.
The COA ruled that this Court has already settled COA‘s audit
jurisdiction over local water districts. The COA also denied
petitioner‘s request for COA to stop charging auditing fees as well as
petitioner‘s request for COA to refund all auditing fees already paid.

Issue: WON COA has a right to audit LMWD

Held: Yes

Ratio: The Constitution and existing laws mandate COA to

audit all government agencies, including GOCCs with original
charters. LMWD is a GOCC with an original charter. Section 2(1),
Article IX-D of the Constitution provides for COA‘s audit
jurisdiction. The COA‘s audit jurisdiction extends not only to
government ―agencies or instrumentalities,‖ but also to
―government-owned and controlled corporations with original
charters‖ as well as ―other government-owned or controlled
corporations‖ without original charters.

Issue: WON LWDs are private or are not GOCCs with original
charter

Ratio: The Constitution recognizes two classes of corporations.

The first refers to private corporations created under a general law.
The second refers to government-owned or controlled corporations
created by special charters. The Constitution emphatically prohibits

259
the creation of private corporations except by a general law
applicable to all citizens. The purpose of this constitutional provision
is to ban private corporations created by special charters, which
historically gave certain individuals, families or groups special
privileges denied to other citizens.
In short, Congress cannot enact a law creating a private
corporation with a special charter. Such legislation would be
unconstitutional. Private corporations may exist only under a
general law. If the corporation is private, it must necessarily exist
under a general law. Stated differently, only corporations created
under a general law can qualify as private corporations. Under
existing laws, that general law is the Corporation Code, except that
the Cooperative Code governs the incorporation of cooperatives.
The Constitution authorizes Congress to create government-
owned or controlled corporations through special charters. Since
private corporations cannot have special charters, it follows that
Congress can create corporations with special charters only if such
corporations are government-owned or controlled.
Obviously, LWDs are not private corporations because they are
not created under the Corporation Code. LWDs are not registered
with the Securities and Exchange Commission. Section 14 of the
Corporation Code states that ―All corporations organized under this
code shall file with the Securities and Exchange Commission articles
of incorporation.‖ LWDs have no articles of incorporation, no
incorporators and no stockholders or members. There are no
stockholders or members to elect the board directors of LWDs as in
the case of all corporations registered with the Securities and
Exchange Commission. The local mayor or the provincial governor
appoints the directors of LWDs for a fixed term of office. This Court
has ruled that LWDs are not created under the Corporation Code,
thus:
LWDs exist by virtue of PD 198, which constitutes their
special charter. Since under the Constitution only government-
owned or controlled corporations may have special charters, LWDs
can validly exist only if they are government-owned or controlled.
To claim that LWDs are private corporations with a special charter is
to admit that their existence is constitutionally infirm. Unlike private
corporations, which derive their legal existence and power from the
Corporation Code, LWDs derive their legal existence and power
from PD 198.
Clearly, LWDs exist as corporations only by virtue of PD 198,
which expressly confers on LWDs corporate powers. Section 6 of PD
198 provides that LWDs ―shall exercise the powers, rights and
privileges given to private corporations under existing laws.‖

260
Without PD 198, LWDs would have no corporate powers. Thus, PD
198 constitutes the special enabling charter of LWDs. The
ineluctable conclusion is that LWDs are government-owned and
controlled corporations with a special charter.
Petitioner‘s contention that the Sangguniang Bayan resolution
creates the LWDs assumes that the Sangguniang Bayan has the
power to create corporations. This is a patently baseless
assumption. The Local Government Code does not vest in the
Sangguniang Bayan the power to create corporations. What the Local
Government Code empowers the Sangguniang Bayan to do is to
provide for the establishment of a waterworks system ―subject to
existing laws.‖
The Sangguniang Bayan may establish a waterworks system
only in accordance with the provisions of PD 198. The Sangguniang
Bayan has no power to create a corporate entity that will operate its
waterworks system. However, the Sangguniang Bayan may avail of
existing enabling laws, like PD 198, to form and incorporate a water
district. Besides, even assuming for the sake of argument that the
Sangguniang Bayan has the power to create corporations, the LWDs
would remain government-owned or controlled corporations subject
to COA‘s audit jurisdiction. The resolution of the Sangguniang
Bayan would constitute an LWD‘s special charter, making the LWD
a government-owned and controlled corporation with an original
charter. In any event, the Court has already ruled in Baguio Water
District v. Trajano that the Sangguniang Bayan resolution is not the
special charter of LWDs.
The rationale behind the prohibition on private corporations
having special charters does not apply to GOCCs. There is no
danger of creating special privileges to certain individuals, families or
groups if there is one special law creating each GOCC. Certainly,
such danger will not exist whether one special law creates one
GOCC, or one special enabling law creates several GOCCs. Thus,
Congress may create GOCCs either by special charters specific to
each GOCC, or by one special enabling charter applicable to a class
of GOCCs, like PD 198 which applies only to LWDs.
Petitioner also contends that LWDs are private corporations
because Section 6 of PD 198 declares that LWDs ―shall be
considered quasi-public‖ in nature. Petitioner‘s rationale is that only
private corporations may be deemed ―quasi-public‖ and not public
corporations. Put differently, petitioner rationalizes that a public
corporation cannot be deemed ―quasi-public‖ because such
corporation is already public. Petitioner concludes that the term
―quasi-public‖ can only apply to private corporations. Petitioner‘s
argument is inconsequential. Petitioner forgets that the

261
constitutional criterion on the exercise of COA‘s audit jurisdiction
depends on the government‘s ownership or control of a corporation.
The nature of the corporation, whether it is private, quasi-public, or
public is immaterial.
The Constitution vests in the COA audit jurisdiction over
―government-owned and controlled corporations with original
charters,‖ as well as ―government-owned or controlled corporations‖
without original charters. GOCCs with original charters are subject
to COA pre-audit, while GOCCs without original charters are subject
to COA post-audit. GOCCs without original charters refer to
corporations created under the Corporation Code but are owned or
controlled by the government. The nature or purpose of the
corporation is not material in determining COA‘s audit jurisdiction.
Neither is the manner of creation of a corporation, whether under a
general or special law.
Certainly, the government owns and controls LWDs. The
government organizes LWDs in accordance with a specific law, PD
198. There is no private party involved as co-owner in the creation
of an LWD. Just prior to the creation of LWDs, the national or local
government owns and controls all their assets. The government
controls LWDs because under PD 198 the municipal or city mayor,
or the provincial governor, appoints all the board directors of an
LWD for a fixed term of six years. The board directors of LWDs are
not co-owners of the LWDs. LWDs have no private stockholders or
members. The board directors and other personnel of LWDs are
government employees subject to civil service laws and anti-graft
laws.
Petitioner does not allege that some entity other than the
government owns or controls LWDs. Instead, petitioner advances
the theory that the ―Water District‘s owner is the District itself.‖
Assuming for the sake of argument that an LWD is ―self-owned,‖ as
petitioner describes an LWD, the government in any event controls
all LWDs. First, government officials appoint all LWD directors to a
fixed term of office. Second, any per diem of LWD directors in
excess of P50 is subject to the approval of the Local Water Utilities
Administration, and directors can receive no other compensation for
their services to the LWD. Third, the Local Water Utilities
Administration can require LWDs to merge or consolidate their
facilities or operations. This element of control subjects LWDs to
COA‘s audit jurisdiction.
Petitioner argues that upon the enactment of PD 198, LWDs
became private entities through the transfer of ownership of water
facilities from local government units to their respective water
districts as mandated by PD 198. Petitioner is grasping at straws.

262
Privatization involves the transfer of government assets to a private
entity. Petitioner concedes that the owner of the assets transferred
under Section 6 (c) of PD 198 is no other than the LWD itself. The
transfer of assets mandated by PD 198 is a transfer of the water
systems facilities ―managed, operated by or under the control of such
city, municipality or province to such (water) district.‖ In short, the
transfer is from one government entity to another government
entity. PD 198 is bereft of any indication that the transfer is to
privatize the operation and control of water systems.

Finally, petitioner claims that even on the assumption that the

government owns and controls LWDs, Section 20 of PD 198
prevents COA from auditing LWDs. Petitioner argues that PD 198
expressly prohibits COA auditors, or any government auditor for
that matter, from auditing LWDs. Petitioner asserts that this is the
import of the second sentence of Section 20 of PD 198 when it states
that ―Auditing shall be performed by a certified public accountant
not in the government service.‖
PD 198 cannot prevail over the Constitution. No amount of
clever legislation can exclude GOCCs like LWDs from COA‘s audit
jurisdiction. Section 3, Article IX-C of the Constitution outlaws any
scheme or devise to escape COA‘s audit jurisdiction. The framers of
the Constitution added Section 3, Article IX-D of the Constitution
precisely to annul provisions of Presidential Decrees, like that of
Section 20 of PD 198, that exempt GOCCs from COA audit.
There is an irreconcilable conflict between the second sentence
of Section 20 of PD 198 prohibiting COA auditors from auditing
LWDs and Sections 2(1) and 3, Article IX-D of the Constitution
vesting in COA the power to audit all GOCCs. We rule that the
second sentence of Section 20 of PD 198 is unconstitutional since it
violates Sections 2(1) and 3, Article IX-D of the Constitution.

Issue: WON the charges for auditing fees violate the

prohibition in Sec 18 of RA 6758

Held: No

Ratio: Section 18 of RA 6758 prohibits COA personnel from

receiving any kind of compensation from any government entity
except ―compensation paid directly by COA out of its appropriations
and contributions.‖ Thus, RA 6758 itself recognizes an exception to
the statutory ban on COA personnel receiving compensation from
GOCCs.

263
 In Tejada, the Court explained the meaning of the word
―contributions‖ in Section 18 of RA 6758, which allows COA to
charge GOCCs the cost of its audit services: The contributions from
the GOCCs are limited to the cost of audit services which are based
on the actual cost of the audit function in the corporation concerned
plus a reasonable rate to cover overhead expenses. The actual audit
cost shall include personnel services, maintenance and other
operating expenses, depreciation on capital and equipment and out-
of-pocket expenses. In respect to the allowances and fringe benefits
granted by the GOCCs to the COA personnel assigned to the
former‘s auditing units, the same shall be directly defrayed by COA
from its own appropriations.
COA may charge GOCCs ―actual audit cost‖ but GOCCs must
pay the same directly to COA and not to COA auditors. Petitioner
has not alleged that COA charges LWDs auditing fees in excess of
COA‘s ―actual audit cost.‖ Neither has petitioner alleged that the
auditing fees are paid by LWDs directly to individual COA auditors.
Thus, petitioner‘s contention fail

264
 LIMITATIONS TO
THE PRACTICE OF
PROFESSION

265
EUGENIO J. PUYAT, ERWIN L. CHIONGBIAN v. HON. SIXTO T.
J. DE GUZMAN, JR., as Associate Commissioner of the Securities &
Exchange Commission, EUSTAQUIO T. C. ACERO, R. VILDZIUS,
ENRIQUE M. BELO, MANUEL G. ABELLO, SERVILLANO
DOLINA, JUANITO MERCADO and ESTANISLAO A.
FERNANDEZ
G.R. No. L-51122 March 25, 1982

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

FACTS:

On May 14, 1979, an election for the eleven Directors of the

International Pipe Industries Corporation (IPI) a private corporation
was held. Two groups, the Puyat group (on which two were
petitioners) and the Acero group (The private respondents except
Estanilao Fernandez) were elected. The Puyat Group won the
control of the Board and of the management of IPI.

The Acero Group instituted at the Securities and Exchange

Commission (SEC) quo warranto proceedings, docketed as Case No.
1747 (the SEC Case), questioning the election of May 14, 1979. The
Acero Group claimed that the stockholders' votes were not properly
counted.

Justice Estanislao A. Fernandez, then a member of the Interim

Batasang Pambansa orally entered his appearance as counsel for the
respondents Acero group. The Puyat group objected on the
appearance of Justice Estanislao A. Fernandez on constitutional
grounds. Section 11, Article VIII, of the 1973 Constitution states
that no Assemblyman could "appear as counsel before any
administrative body. Since SEC was an administrative body,
Assemblyman Fernandez did not continue his appearance for
respondent Acero.

Assemblyman Estanislao A. Fernandez, had purchased from Augusto

A. Morales ten (10) shares of stock of IPI for P200.00 upon request
of respondent Acero to qualify him to run for election as a Director.

After the notarization, Assemblyman Estanislao A. Fernandez had

filed an Urgent Motion for Intervention in the SEC Case as the
owner of ten (10) IPI shares alleging legal interest in the matter in
litigation.

266
SEC granted the said motion on his legal interest of his shares of
ownership. Assemblyman Estanislao A. Fernandez then appeared as
counsel of the case in annulment of shares sold to Acero.

The court issued a TRO to disallow Fernandez from participating in

the case.

The court ruled that Assemblyman Fernandez could not appear as

counsel in a case originally filed with a Court of First Instance as in
such situation the Court would be one "without appellate
jurisdiction.

Issue: Whether or not an assemblyman can intervene as a

stockholder invoking his legal interest and protecting of ownership?

Ruling:
No. The assemblyman can appear as counsel before any court
without appellate jurisdiction. What the constitution directly
prohibits may not be done by indirection or by a general legislative
act which is intended to accomplish the objects specifically or
impliedly prohibited.

The court finds that there has been an indirect "appearance as

counsel before ... an administrative body" and, in the courts opinion,
that is a circumvention of the Constitutional prohibition. The
"intervention" was an afterthought to enable him to appear actively
in the proceedings in some other capacity. To believe the avowed
purpose, that is, to enable him eventually to vote and to be elected as
Director in the event of an unfavourable outcome of the SEC Case
would be pure naivete. He would still appear as counsel indirectly.

PRINCIPLE:
What the constitution directly prohibits may not be done indirectly.

267
REGULAR SESSION
VS.
SPECIAL SESSION

268
G.R. No. L-2044

J. ANTONIO ARANETA, petitioner,

vs.

RAFAEL DINGLASAN, Judge of First Instance of Manila, and

JOSE P. BENGZON, Fiscal of City of Manila, respondents.

Facts:

The petitions challenged the validity of executive orders issued

by virtue of CA No. 671 or the Emergency Powers Act. CA 671
declared a state of emergency as a result of war and authorized the
President to promulgate rules and regulations to meet such
emergency. However, the Act did not fix the duration of its
effectivity.

EO 62 regulates rentals for houses and lots for residential

buildings. The petitioner, Araneta, is under prosecution in the CFI
for violation of the provisions of this EO 62 and prays for the
issuance of the writ of prohibition.

EO 192, aims to control exports from the Philippines. Leon Ma.

Guerrero seeks a writ of mandamus to compel the Administrator of
the Sugar Quota Office and the Commissioner of Customs to permit
the exportation of shoes. Both officials refuse to issue the required
export license on the ground that the exportation of shoes from the
Philippines is forbidden by this EO.

EO 225, which appropriates funds for the operation of the

Government during the period from July 1, 1949 to June 30, 1950,
and for other purposes was assailed by petitioner Eulogio Rodriguez,
Sr., as a tax-payer, elector, and president of the Nacionalista Party.
He applied for a writ of prohibition to restrain the Treasurer of the
Philippines from disbursing the funds by virtue of this EO.

Finally, EO 226, which appropriated P6M to defray the expenses in

connection with the national elections in 1949. was questioned by
Antonio Barredo, as a citizen, tax-payer and voter. He asked the
Court to prevent "the respondents from disbursing, spending or
otherwise disposing of that amount or any part of it.

269
ISSUE:

Whether or not CA 671 ceased to have any force and effect

RULING:

YES. The Act fixed a definite limited period. The Court held that it
became inoperative when Congress met during the opening of the
regular session on May 1946 and that EOs 62, 192, 225 and 226
were issued without authority of law . The session of the Congress is
the point of expiration of the Act and not the first special session
after it.

Executive Orders No. 62 (dated June 21, 1947) regulating

house and lot rentals, No. 192 (dated December 24, 1948) regulating
exports, Nos. 225 and 226 (dated June 15,1949) the first
appropriation funds for the operation of the Government from July 1,
1949 to June 30, 1950, and the second appropriating funds for
election expenses in November 1949, were therefore declared null
and void for having been issued after Act No. 671 had lapsed and/or
after the Congress had enacted legislation on the same subjects. This
is based on the language of Act 671 that the National Assembly
restricted the life of the emergency powers of the President to the
time the Legislature was prevented from holding sessions due to
enemy action or other causes brought on by the war.

270
QUORUM

271
 G.R. No. L-2821 March 4, 1949
JOSE AVELINO, petitioner,
vs.
MARIANO J. CUENCO, respondent

Short Title: Avelino vs Cuenco

Doctrine: Political Question; Quorum

FACTS:
In a session of the Senate, Senator Tañada‘s request to deliver a
speech in order to formulate charges against the then Senate
President Avelino (petitioner) was approved. All the Senator were
present except Senator Sotto, who was confined in a hospital, and
Senator Confesor who is in the United States. Hours before the
opening of the session Senator Tañada and Senator Sanidad filed
with the Secretary of the Senate a resolution enumerating charges
against the then Senate President and ordering the investigation
thereof. The Senate President, along with his supporters, deliberately
delayed and prevented Senator Tañada from delivering his speech.
Before Senator Tañada could deliver his privilege speech, the Senate
President motu proprio adjourned the session of the Senate and
walked out together with his supporters. The rest of the senators
remained.

Senator Arranz, Senate President Pro-tempore, took the Chair

and proceeded with the session. As put in record, the deliberate
abandonment of the Chair by petitioner made it incumbent upon
Senate President Pro-tempore Arranz and the remaining members of
the Senate to continue the session in order not to paralyze the
functions of the Senate. Senate President Pro-tempore Arranz
suggested that Senator Cuenco (respondent) be designated to
preside over the session which suggestion was carried unanimously.
The respondent, thereupon, took the Chair.

Senator Tañada, after being recognized by the Chair, was then

finally able to deliver his privilege speech. Thereafter, Senator
Sanidad read aloud the complete text of said Resolution No. 68
(Resolution ordering the investigation of charges filed against the
Senate President Jose Avelino), and submitted his motion for
approval thereof and the same was unanimously approved. Senator
Sanidad introduced Resolution No. 67 (Resolution declaring vacant
the position of the President of the Senate and designated the
Honorable Mariano Jesus Cuenco Acting President of the Senate).
Put to a vote, the said resolution was unanimously approved. Senator

272
Cuenco took the oath. The next day, the President of the Philippines
recognized the respondent as acting president of the Philippines
Senate.

Senator Avelino, in a quo warranto proceeding, asked the court

to declare, him the rightful Senate President and oust the
respondent, Cuenco, contending that the latter had not been validly
elected because twelve members did not constitute a quorum (the
majority required of the 24-member Senate).

ISSUES:
1.) WON the Court has jurisdiction over the subject-matter
2.) If the Court has jurisdiction, WON Resolution Nos. 68 and 67
were validly approved
3.) WON the petition be granted

RULING:
1.) No. The Supreme Court has no jurisdiction over the case.
Should the Court will take cognizance over the case, the Court
will be against the doctrine of separation of powers. The
political nature of the controversy and the constitutional grant
to the Senate of the power to elect its own president, which
power should not be interfered with, nor taken over, by the
judiciary.

2.) Yes. Suppose the Court has jurisdiction, Resolution Nos. 68

and 67 were validly approved. During the said session, there
was the majority required by the Constitution for the
transaction of the business of the Senate. In view of the
absence from the country of Senator Confesor, twelve senators
constitute a majority of the Senate of twenty-three senators.
Thus, an absolute majority of (12) of all the members of the
Senate less one (23) constitutes a constitutional majority of
the Senate for the purpose of a quorum.

3.) No. The Court adopts a hands-off policy on this matter. It

would be most injudicious to declare the latter as the rightful
President of the Senate since that office being essentially one
that depends exclusively upon the will of the majority of the
senators, and the rule of the Senate about tenure of the
President of that body amenable at any time by that majority.

273
VOTING

274
DATU MICHAEL ABAS KIDA vs. SENATE OF THE
PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 196271 (and other cases consolidated therewith)

Promulgated, October 18, 2011
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

BRION, J.:

I. THE FACTS

Several laws pertaining to the Autonomous Region in Muslim

Mindanao (ARMM) were enacted by Congress. Republic Act (RA)
No. 6734 is the organic act that established the ARMM and
scheduled the first regular elections for the ARMM regional officials.
RA No. 9054 amended the ARMM Charter and refined the basic
ARMM structure. It also reset the regular elections for the ARMM
regional officials to the second Monday of September 2001.

RA No. 9140 further reset the first regular elections to November

26, 2001. It likewise set the plebiscite to ratify RA No. 9054, which
was successfully held on August 14, 2001. RA No. 9333 reset for
the third time the ARMM regional elections to the 2nd Monday of
August 2005 and on the same date every 3 years thereafter.

Pursuant to RA No. 9333, the next ARMM regional elections should

have been held on August 8, 2011. COMELEC had begun
preparations for these elections and had accepted certificates of
candidacies for the various regional offices to be elected. But
on June 30, 2011, RA No. 10153 was enacted, resetting the next
ARMM regular elections to May 2013 to coincide with the regular
national and local elections of the country.

275
RA No. 10153 originated in the House of Representatives as House
Bill No. 4146, which the House passed on March 22, 2011 with 191
(of the 285) Members voting in its favor. The Senate adopted its own
version, Senate Bill No. 2756, on June 6, 2011. 13 (of the 23)
Senators voted favorably for its passage. On June 7, 2011, the House
of Representative concurred with the Senate amendments and
on June 30, 2011, the President signed RA No. 10153 into law.

In these consolidated petitions filed directly with the Supreme

Court, the petitioners assailed the constitutionality of RA No.
10153.

II. THE ISSUES:

1. Does the 1987 Constitution mandate the synchronization of
elections?
2. Does the passage of RA No. 10153 violate Section 26(2), Article
VI of the 1987 Constitution?
3. Does the passage of RA No. 10153 require a supermajority vote
[at least 2/3 of all members of Congress] and a plebiscite?
a. Does the postponement of the ARMM regular elections constitute
an amendment to Section 7, Article XVIII of RA No. 9054?
b. Does the requirement of a supermajority vote for amendments or
revisions to RA No. 9054 violate Sections 1 and 16(2), Article VI of
the 1987 Constitution and the corollary doctrine [prohibiting]
irrepealable laws?
c. Does the requirement of a plebiscite apply only in the creation of
autonomous regions under Section 18(2), Article X of the 1987
Constitution?
4. Is the grant [to the President] of the power to appoint OICs
constitutional?

III. THE HOLDING

276
[The Supreme Court] DISMISSED the petitions and UPHELD the
constitutionality of RA No. 10153 in toto.]

1. YES, the 1987 Constitution mandates the synchronization of

elections.

While the Constitution does not expressly state that Congress

has to synchronize national and local elections, the clear intent
towards this objective can be gleaned from the Transitory Provisions
(Article XVIII) of the Constitution, which show the extent to which
the Constitutional Commission, by deliberately making adjustments
to the terms of the incumbent officials, sought to attain
synchronization of elections.

The objective behind setting a common termination date for all

elective officials, done among others through the shortening the
terms of the twelve winning senators with the least number of votes,
is to synchronize the holding of all future elections – whether
national or local – to once every three years. This intention finds full
support in the discussions during the Constitutional Commission
deliberations.

The Constitutional Commission exchanges, read with the

provisions of the Transitory Provisions of the Constitution, all
serve as patent indicators of the constitutional mandate to hold
synchronized national and local elections, starting the second
Monday of May, 1992 and for all the following elections.

xxx xxx xxx

Although called regional elections, the ARMM elections should

be included among the elections to be synchronized as it is a
―local‖ election based on the wording and structure of the
Constitution.

277
xxx xxx xxx

From the perspective of the Constitution, autonomous regions are

considered one of the forms of local governments, as evident from
Article X of the Constitution entitled ―Local
Government.‖ Autonomous regions are established and discussed
under Sections 15 to 21 of this Article – the article wholly devoted to
Local Government. That an autonomous region is considered a form
of local government is also reflected in Section 1, Article X of the
Constitution, which provides:

Section 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of

the Philippines are the provinces, cities, municipalities, and
barangays. There shall be autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao,
and the Cordilleras as hereinafter provided.

Thus, we find the contention – that the synchronization mandated

by the Constitution does not include the regional elections of the
ARMM – unmeritorious. xxx.

2. NO, the passage of RA No. 10153 DOES NOT violate

Section 26(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution because the
President certified on the urgency of [the enactment of] RA No.
10153.

The petitioners in G.R. No. 197280 also challenge the validity of RA

No. 10153 for its alleged failure to comply with Section 26(2),
Article VI of the Constitution, which provides that before bills
passed by either the House or the Senate can become laws, they
must pass through three readings on separate days. The exception to
this is when the President certifies to the necessity of the bill‘s
immediate enactment.

The Court, in Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, explained the effect

of the President‘s certification of necessity in the following manner:

278
The presidential certification dispensed with the requirement
not only of printing but also that of reading the bill on separate
days. The phrase "except when the President certifies to the
necessity of its immediate enactment, etc." in Art. VI, Section 26[2]
qualifies the two stated conditions before a bill can become a law: [i]
the bill has passed three readings on separate days and [ii] it has
been printed in its final form and distributed three days before it is
finally approved.

In the present case, the records show that the President wrote
to the Speaker of the House of Representatives to certify the
necessity of the immediate enactment of a law synchronizing
the ARMM elections with the national and local elections.
Following our Tolentino ruling, the President’s certification
exempted both the House and the Senate from having to comply
with the three separate readings requirement.

On the follow-up contention that no necessity existed for the

immediate enactment of these bills since there was no public
calamity or emergency that had to be met, again we hark back to our
ruling in Tolentino:

The sufficiency of the factual basis of the suspension of the writ

of habeas corpus or declaration of martial law Art. VII, Section 18, or
the existence of a national emergency justifying the delegation of
extraordinary powers to the President under Art. VI, Section 23(2) is
subject to judicial review because basic rights of individuals may be
of hazard. But the factual basis of presidential certification of
bills, which involves doing away with procedural requirements
designed to insure that bills are duly considered by members of
Congress, certainly should elicit a different standard of review.

The House of Representatives and the Senate – in the exercise of

their legislative discretion – gave full recognition to the President‘s
certification and promptly enacted RA No. 10153. Under the
circumstances, nothing short of grave abuse of discretion on the part
of the two houses of Congress can justify our intrusion under our
power of judicial review.
279
The petitioners, however, failed to provide us with any cause or
justification for [our intrusion under the power of judicial
review]. Hence, while the judicial department and this Court are
not bound by the acceptance of the President's certification by both
the House of Representatives and the Senate, prudent exercise of our
powers and respect due our co-equal branches of government in
matters committed to them by the Constitution, caution a stay of the
judicial hand.

In any case, despite the President‘s certification, the two-fold

purpose that underlies the requirement for three readings on
separate days of every bill must always be observed to enable our
legislators and other parties interested in pending bills to
intelligently respond to them. Specifically, the purpose with respect
to Members of Congress is: (1) to inform the legislators of the
matters they shall vote on and (2) to give them notice that a measure
is in progress through the enactment process.

We find, based on the records of the deliberations on the law, that

both advocates and the opponents of the proposed measure had
sufficient opportunities to present their views. In this light, no
reason exists to nullify RA No. 10153 on the cited ground.

3. NO, the passage of [RA No. 9333 and] RA No. 10153

DOES NOT require a supermajority vote and a plebiscite

A. RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 are NOT amendments to

RA No. 9054

[N]either RA No. 9333 nor RA No. 10153 amends RA No.

9054. As an examination of these laws will show, RA No. 9054
only provides for the schedule of the first ARMM elections and
does not fix the date of the regular elections. A need therefore
existed for the Congress to fix the date of
the subsequent ARMM regular elections, which it did by enacting

280
RA No. 9333 and thereafter, RA No. 10153. Obviously, these
subsequent laws – RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 – cannot be
considered amendments to RA No. 9054 as they did not change or
revise any provision in the latter law; they merely filled in a gap in
RA No. 9054 or supplemented the law by providing the date of the
subsequent regular elections.

xxx xxx xxx

From these legislative actions, we see the clear intention of Congress

to treat the laws which fix the date of the subsequent ARMM
elections as separate and distinct from the Organic Acts. Congress
only acted consistently with this intent when it passed RA No.
10153 without requiring compliance with the amendment
prerequisites embodied in Section 1 and Section 3, Article XVII of
RA No. 9054.

B. Supermajority voting requirement [under RA No. 9054]

VIOLATES Section 16(2), Article VI for giving RA No. 9054 the
character of an irrepealable law

Even assuming that RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 did in fact
amend RA No. 9054, the supermajority (2/3) voting requirement
required under Section 1, Article XVII of RA No. 9054 has to be
struck down for giving RA No. 9054 the character of an irrepealable
law by requiring more than what the Constitution demands.

Section 16(2), Article VI of the Constitution provides that a

―majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do business.‖
In other words, as long as majority of the members of the House of
Representatives or the Senate are present, these bodies have the
quorum needed to conduct business and hold session. Within a
quorum, a vote of majority is generally sufficient to enact laws or
approve acts.

In contrast, Section 1, Article XVII of RA No. 9054 requires a vote of

281
no less than two-thirds (2/3) of the Members of the House of
Representatives and of the Senate, voting separately, in order to
effectively amend RA No. 9054. Clearly, this 2/3 voting
requirement is higher than what the Constitution requires for
the passage of bills, and served to restrain the plenary powers of
Congress to amend, revise or repeal the laws it had passed. The
Court‘s pronouncement in City of Davao v. GSIS on this subject best
explains the basis and reason for the unconstitutionality:

Moreover, it would be noxious anathema to democratic principles for

a legislative body to have the ability to bind the actions of future
legislative body, considering that both assemblies are regarded with
equal footing, exercising as they do the same plenary
powers. Perpetual infallibility is not one of the attributes desired in a
legislative body, and a legislature which attempts to forestall future
amendments or repeals of its enactments labors under delusions of
omniscience.

Thus, while a supermajority is not a total ban against a repeal,

it is a limitation in excess of what the Constitution requires on
the passage of bills and is constitutionally obnoxious because it
significantly constricts the future legislators’ room for action
and flexibility.

C. Plebiscite requirement only applies to the creation of

autonomous regions; Section 3, Article XVII of RA No. 9054
unconstitutional for excessively enlarging the plebiscite
requirement in Section 18, Article X of the Constitution

[T]he plebiscite requirement under Section 3, Article XVII of RA No.

9054 is excessive to point of absurdity and, hence, a violation of the
Constitution.

Section 18, Article X of the Constitution states that the plebiscite is

required only for the creation of autonomous regions and for [the
determination of] which provinces, cities and geographic areas will
be included in the autonomous regions. While the settled rule is that

282
amendments to the Organic Act have to comply with the plebiscite
requirement in order to become effective, questions on the extent of
the matters requiring ratification may unavoidably arise because of
the seemingly general terms of the Constitution and the obvious
absurdity that would result if a plebiscite were to be required
for every statutory amendment.

Section 18, Article X of the Constitution plainly states that ―The

creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved
by the majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a
plebiscite called for the purpose.‖ With these wordings as standard,
we interpret the requirement to mean that only amendments to, or
revisions of, the Organic Act constitutionally-essential to the
creation of autonomous regions – i.e., those aspects specifically
mentioned in the Constitution which Congress must provide for
in the Organic Act – require ratification through a
plebiscite. These amendments to the Organic Act are those that
relate to: (a) the basic structure of the regional government; (b) the
region‘s judicial system, i.e., the special courts with personal,
family, and property law jurisdiction; and, (c) the grant and extent of
the legislative powers constitutionally conceded to the regional
government under Section 20, Article X of the Constitution.

The date of the ARMM elections does not fall under any of the
matters that the Constitution specifically mandated Congress to
provide for in the Organic Act. Therefore, even assuming that
the supermajority votes and the plebiscite requirements are
valid, any change in the date of elections cannot be construed as
a substantial amendment of the Organic Act that would require
compliance with these requirements.

4. YES, the grant [to the President] of the power to appoint

OICs is constitutional

During the oral arguments, the Court identified the three options
open to Congress in order to resolve the problem on who should sit
as ARMM officials in the interim: (1) allow the elective officials in
the ARMM to remain in office in a hold over capacity until those
283
elected in the synchronized elections assume office; (2) hold special
elections in the ARMM, with the terms of those elected to expire
when those elected in the [2013] synchronized elections assume
office; or (3) authorize the President to appoint OICs, [their terms to
last] also until those elected in the [2013] synchronized elections
assume office.

A. Holdover Option is Unconstitutional

We rule out the [hold over] option xxx violates Section 8,

Article X of the Constitution. This provision states:

Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except

barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three
years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive
terms. [emphases ours]

Since elective ARMM officials are local officials, they are

covered and bound by the three-year term limit prescribed by
the Constitution; they cannot extend their term through a
holdover. xxx.

xxx xxx xxx

In the case of the terms of local officials, their term has been fixed
clearly and unequivocally, allowing no room for any implementing
legislation with respect to the fixed term itself and no vagueness that
would allow an interpretation from this Court. Thus, the term of
three years for local officials should stay at three (3) years as
fixed by the Constitution and cannot be extended by holdover
by Congress.

If it will be claimed that the holdover period is effectively another

term mandated by Congress, the net result is for Congress to create
a new term and to appoint the occupant for the new term. This view

284
– like the extension of the elective term – is constitutionally infirm
because Congress cannot do indirectly what it cannot do
directly, i.e., to act in a way that would effectively extend the term of
the incumbents. Indeed, if acts that cannot be legally done directly
can be done indirectly, then all laws would be illusory. Congress
cannot also create a new term and effectively appoint the
occupant of the position for the new term. This is effectively an
act of appointment by Congress and an unconstitutional
intrusion into the constitutional appointment power of the
President. Hence, holdover – whichever way it is viewed – is a
constitutionally infirm option that Congress could not have
undertaken.

Jurisprudence, of course, is not without examples of cases where the

question of holdover was brought before, and given the imprimatur
of approval by, this Court. The present case though differs
significantly from past cases with contrary rulings, where the Court
ruled that the elective officials could hold on to their positions in a
hold over capacity.

All these past cases refer to elective barangay or Sanggunian

Kabataan officials whose terms of office are not explicitly provided
for in the Constitution; the present case, on the other hand, refers to
local elective officials – the ARMM Governor, the ARMM Vice-
Governor, and the members of the Regional Legislative Assembly –
whose terms fall within the three-year term limit set by Section 8,
Article X of the Constitution. Because of their constitutionally
limited term, Congress cannot legislate an extension beyond the
term for which they were originally elected.

Even assuming that holdover is constitutionally permissible, and

there had been statutory basis for it (namely Section 7, Article VII of
RA No. 9054) in the past, we have to remember that the rule of
holdover can only apply as an available option where no express
or implied legislative intent to the contrary exists; it cannot
apply where such contrary intent is evident.

Congress, in passing RA No. 10153, made it explicitly clear that

285
it had the intention of suppressing the holdover rule that
prevailed under RA No. 9054 by completely removing this
provision. The deletion is a policy decision that is wholly within the
discretion of Congress to make in the exercise of its plenary
legislative powers; this Court cannot pass
upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation,
except where an attendant unconstitutionality or grave abuse of
discretion results.

B. The COMELEC has no authority to order special elections

Another option proposed by the petitioner in G.R. No. 197282 is for

this Court to compel COMELEC to immediately conduct special
elections pursuant to Section 5 and 6 of Batas Pambansa Blg. (BP)
881.

The power to fix the date of elections is essentially legislative in

nature. [N]o elections may be held on any other date for the
positions of President, Vice President, Members of Congress and
local officials, except when so provided by another Act of Congress,
or upon orders of a body or officer to whom Congress may have
delegated either the power or the authority to ascertain or fill in the
details in the execution of that power.

Notably, Congress has acted on the ARMM elections by

postponing the scheduled August 2011 elections and setting
another date – May 13, 2011 – for regional elections
synchronized with the presidential, congressional and other
local elections. By so doing, Congress itself has made a policy
decision in the exercise of its legislative wisdom that it shall not
call special elections as an adjustment measure in synchronizing
the ARMM elections with the other elections.

After Congress has so acted, neither the Executive nor the

Judiciary can act to the contrary by ordering special elections
instead at the call of the COMELEC. This Court, particularly,
cannot make this call without thereby supplanting the legislative

286
decision and effectively legislating. To be sure, the Court is not
without the power to declare an act of Congress null and void for
being unconstitutional or for having been exercised in grave abuse of
discretion. But our power rests on very narrow ground and is merely
to annul a contravening act of Congress; it is not to supplant the
decision of Congress nor to mandate what Congress itself should
have done in the exercise of its legislative powers. Thus, contrary to
what the petition in G.R. No. 197282 urges, we cannot compel
COMELEC to call for special elections.

xxx xxx xxx

Even assuming that it is legally permissible for the Court to compel

the COMELEC to hold special elections, no legal basis likewise
exists to rule that the newly elected ARMM officials shall hold office
only until the ARMM officials elected in the synchronized elections
shall have assumed office.

In the first place, the Court is not empowered to adjust the terms of
elective officials. Based on the Constitution, the power to fix the
term of office of elective officials, which can be exercised only in the
case of barangay officials, is specifically given to Congress. Even
Congress itself may be denied such power, as shown when the
Constitution shortened the terms of twelve Senators obtaining the
least votes, and extended the terms of the President and the Vice-
President in order to synchronize elections; Congress was not
granted this same power. The settled rule is that terms fixed by the
Constitution cannot be changed by mere statute. More particularly,
not even Congress and certainly not this Court, has the authority to
fix the terms of elective local officials in the ARMM for less, or more,
than the constitutionally mandated three years as this tinkering
would directly contravene Section 8, Article X of the Constitution as
we ruled in Osmeña.

Thus, in the same way that the term of elective ARMM officials
cannot be extended through a holdover, the term cannot be
shortened by putting an expiration date earlier than the three
(3) years that the Constitution itself commands. This is what
287
will happen – a term of less than two years – if a call for special
elections shall prevail. In sum, while synchronization is achieved, the
result is at the cost of a violation of an express provision of the
Constitution.

D. The President’s Power to Appoint OICs

The above considerations leave only Congress‘ chosen interim

measure – RA No. 10153 and the appointment by the President of
OICs to govern the ARMM during the pre-synchronization period
pursuant to Sections 3, 4 and 5 of this law – as the only measure that
Congress can make. This choice itself, however, should be examined
for any attendant constitutional infirmity.

At the outset, the power to appoint is essentially executive in nature,

and the limitations on or qualifications to the exercise of this power
should be strictly construed; these limitations or qualifications must
be clearly stated in order to be recognized. The appointing power is
embodied in Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, which
states:

Section 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of
the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the
executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or
naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in
him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of
the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for
by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to
appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other
officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the
heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. [emphasis
ours]

This provision classifies into four groups the officers that the
President can appoint. These are:

288
First, the heads of the executive departments; ambassadors; other
public ministers and consuls; officers of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, from the rank of colonel or naval captain; and other
officers whose appointments are vested in the President in this
Constitution;

Second, all other officers of the government whose appointments are

not otherwise provided for by law;

Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to

appoint; and

Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may

by law vest in the President alone.

Since the President’s authority to appoint OICs emanates from

RA No. 10153, it falls under the third group of officials that the
President can appoint pursuant to Section 16, Article VII of the
Constitution. Thus, the assailed law facially rests on clear
constitutional basis.

If at all, the gravest challenge posed by the petitions to the authority

to appoint OICs under Section 3 of RA No. 10153 is the assertion
that the Constitution requires that the ARMM executive and
legislative officials to be ―elective and representative of the
constituent political units.‖ This requirement indeed is an express
limitation whose non-observance in the assailed law leaves the
appointment of OICs constitutionally defective.

After fully examining the issue, we hold that this

alleged constitutional problem is more apparent than real and
becomes very real only if RA No. 10153 were to be mistakenly read
as a law that changes the elective and representative character of
ARMM positions. RA No. 10153, however, does not in any way
amend what the organic law of the ARMM (RA No. 9054) sets
289
outs in terms of structure of governance. What RA No. 10153
in fact only does is to ―appoint officers-in-charge for the Office
of the Regional Governor, Regional Vice Governor and
Members of the Regional Legislative Assembly who shall
perform the functions pertaining to the said offices until the
officials duly elected in the May 2013 elections shall have
qualified and assumed office.‖ This power is far different from
appointing elective ARMM officials for the abbreviated term
ending on the assumption to office of the officials elected in the
May 2013 elections.

[T]he legal reality is that RA No. 10153 did not amend RA No.
9054. RA No. 10153, in fact, provides only for synchronization
of elections and for the interim measures that must in the
meanwhile prevail. And this is how RA No. 10153 should be
read – in the manner it was written and based on its
unambiguous facial terms. Aside from its order for
synchronization, it is purely and simply an interim measure
responding to the adjustments that the synchronization
requires.

xxx xxx xxx

Furthermore, the ―representative‖ character of the chosen

leaders need not necessarily be affected by the appointment of
OICs as this requirement is really a function of the appointment
process; only the ―elective‖ aspect shall be supplanted by the
appointment of OICs. In this regard, RA No. 10153 significantly
seeks to address concerns arising from the appointments by
providing, under Sections 3, 4 and 5 of the assailed law, concrete
terms in the Appointment of OIC, the Manner and Procedure of
Appointing OICs, and their Qualifications.

Based on these considerations, we hold that RA No. 10153 – viewed

in its proper context – is a law that is not violative of the
Constitution (specifically, its autonomy provisions), and one that is
reasonable as well under the circumstances

290
QUORUM

291
AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, et al. v. SENATE COMMITTEE OF THE
WHOLE
G.R. No. 187714, 8 March 2011,
EN BANC (Carpio, J.)

FACTS: Senator Madrigal introduced P.S. Resolution 706, which

directed the Senate Ethics Committee to investigate the alleged
double insertion of P200 million by Senator Manny Villar into the C5
Extension Project. Thereafter, the Senate adopted the Rules of the
Ethics Committee. In another privilege speech, Senator Villar stated
he will answer the accusations before the Senate, and not with the
Ethics Committee. Senator Lacson, then chairperson of the Ethics
Committee, then moved that the responsibility of the Ethics
Committee be transferred to the Senate as a Committee of the
Whole, which was approved by the majority. In the hearings of such
Committee, petitioners objected to the application of the Rules of
the Ethics Committee to the Senate Committee of the Whole.
Senator Pimentel raised the issue on the need to publish the rules of
the Senate Committee of the Whole.

ISSUES:
1. Whether the transfer of the complaint against Senator Villar from
the Ethics Committee to the Senate Committee of the Whole is
violative of Senator Villar's right to equal protection;
2. Whether the adoption of the Rules of the Ethics Committee as
Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole is violative of Senator
Villar's right to due process and of the majority quorum requirement
under Art. VI, Section 16(2) of the Constitution; and
3. Whether publication of the Rules of the Senate Committee of the
Whole is required for their effectivity

RULING:
1. While ordinarily an investigation about one of its members
alleged irregular or unethical conduct is within the jurisdiction
of the Ethics Committee, the Minority effectively prevented it
from pursuing the investigation when they refused to nominate
their members to the Ethics Committee. The referral of the
investigation to the Committee of the Whole was an
extraordinary remedy undertaken by the Ethics Committee and
approved by a majority of the members of the Senate, and not
violative of the right to equal protection.
2. The adoption by the Senate Committee of the Whole of the
Rules of the Ethics Committee does not violate Senator Villar's
right to due process. The Constitutional right of the Senate to
292
 promulgate its own rules of proceedings has been recognized
and affirmed by this Court in Section 16(3), Article VI of the
Philippine Constitution, which states: "Each House shall
determine the rules of its proceedings."
3. The Constitution does not require publication of the internal
rules of the House or Senate. Since rules of the House or the
Senate that affect only their members are internal to the House
or Senate, such rules need not be published, unless such rules
expressly provide for their publication before the rules can take
effect. Hence, in this particular case, the Rules of the Senate
Committee of the Whole itself provide that the Rules must be
published before the Rules can take effect. Thus, even if
publication is not required under the Constitution, publication
of the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole is required
because the Rules expressly mandate their publication.

293
 POWER TO
SUSPEND AND
EXPEL

294
Santiago vs Sandiganbayan
GR NO. 128055
April 18, 2001

FACTS:
 The court is called upon to review the act of the
Sandiganbayan, and how far it can go in ordering the
preventive suspension of petitioner, Senator Miriam Defensor-
Santiago, in connection with pending criminal cases filed
against her for alleged violation of Republic Act No. 3019, as
amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act.
 The instant case arose from complaints file by a group of
employees of the Commission of Immigration and Deportation
(CID) against petitioner, then CID Commissioner for alleged
violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The
investigating panel that took over the case from Investigator
Gualberto dela Liana after having been constituted by the
Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon upon petitioner‘s request came
up with a resolution which it referred for approval to the Office
of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) and the Ombudsman. In his
Memorandum dated 26 April 1991, the Ombudsman directed
the OSP to file the appropriate information against petitioner.
On 13 May 1991, OSP submitted to Ombudsman the
information for clearance, approved, forthwith, three
information were filed on even date.
 In Criminal Case No. 16698 file before the Sandiganbayan,
petitioner was indicted thusly:

―That on or about October17,1988, or sometime prior or

subsequent thereto, in Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, accused MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, a public
officer, being then the Commissioner of the Commission on
Immigration and Deportation, with evident bad faith and
manifest partiality in the exercise of her official functions, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally approve the
application for legalization of the stay of the following aliens:
Jhamtani Shalini Narendra, Ting Siok Hun, Ching Suat Liong
Ting, Cu Kui Pein Uy, Cu Kui Pwe Uy, Hong Shao Guan,
Hong Xiao Yuan, Xu Li Xuan, Qui Ming Xia Ong, Wu Sui Xin
Quiu, Wu Hong Guan Qui Betty Go, Wu Hong RuQui, Mary
Go Xu Yin Yin Kua, Hong Shao Hua Xu, Hong Shao Wei Xu,

295
 Lu Shing Qing, Lu Shi Tian, Lu Se Chong, Shi Qing Yu, Xu
Angun, Xu An Cin, Xu Pinting, Wang Xiu Jin, Cai Pian Plan,
Cai Wen Xu, Cai Min Min, Cai Ping Ping, Choi Kin Kwok,
Bernardo Suarez, Yen Liang Ju, Jeslyn Gan, Cai Yan Nan, Yen
Ling Chien, Chrismayne Gan, So Chen Yueh-O, CaiYa Rong,
who arrived in the Philippines after January 1,1984 in violation
of Executive Order No.324 dated April 13,1988 which
prohibits the legalization of said disqualified aliens knowing
fully well that said aliens are disqualified, thereby giving
unwarranted benefits to said aliens whose stay in the
Philippines was unlawfully legalized by said accused.‖
• Two other criminal cases, one for violation of the provisions of
Presidential Decree No.46 and the other for libel, were filed
with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, docketed, respectively,
No. 9194555 and No. 91-94897.

• On 24 May 1991, petitioner filed, concurrently, a Petition for

Certiorari with Prohibition and
Preliminary Injunction before the Court, docketed G.R. No.
99289-90, seeking to enjoin the
Sandiganbayan from proceeding with Criminal Case No.16698
and a motion before the Sandiganbayan to mean while defer
her arraignment. The Court taking cognizance of the petition
issued a temporary restraining order.
• The Sandiganbayan, thus informed, issued an order deferring
petitioner‘s arraignment and the consideration of her motion to
cancel the cash bond until further advice from the Court.

• On 13 January 1992, the Court rendered its decision

dismissing the petition and lifting the temporary restraining
order. The subsequent motion for reconsideration filed by
petitioner proved unavailing.

• On 06 July 1992, in the wake of media reports announcing

petitioner‘s intention to accept a fellowship from the John F.
Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, the
Sandiganbayan issued an order to enjoin petitioner from
leaving the country.

• On 15 October 1992, petitioner moved to inhibit

Sandiganbayan Presiding Justice Garchitorena from the case

296
 and to defer her arraignment pending action on her motion to
inhibit. On 09 November 1992, her motion was denied by the
Sandiganbayan. The following day, she filed a new Petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition with urgent Prayer for Preliminary
Injunction with the Court, docketed G.R. No. 99289-90.

• At the same time, petitioner filed a motion for bill of

particulars with the Sandiganbayan asseverating that the names
of the aliens whose applications she purportedly approved and
thereby supposedly extended undue advantage were
conspicuously omitted in the complaint.

• On 07 December 1992, the OSP and the Ombudsman filed

with the Sandiganbayan a motion to admit thirty-two amended
information. Petitioner moved the dismissal of the 32
information. The court, in its 11th March 1993 resolution,
denied her motion to dismiss the said information and directed
her to post bail on the criminal cases, docketed Criminal Case
No. 18371-18402, filed against her.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

• Petitioner moved for the cancellation of her cash bond and

prayed that she be allowed provisional liberty upon a
recognizance.
• PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the
Sandiganbayan

LOWER COURTS DECISIONS

• Pursuant to the information filed with the Sandiganbayan,

Presiding Justice Francis E. Garchitorena issued an order for
the arrest of petitioner, fixing the bail at Fifteen Thousand
(P15,000.00) Pesos.

• Petitioner posted cash bail without need for physical

appearance as she was then recuperating from injuries
sustained in a vehicular accident. The Sandiganbayan granted
her provisional liberty until 05 June 1991 or until her physical
condition would warrant her physical appearance in court.
Upon manifestation by the Ombudsman, however, that

297
 petitioner was able to come unaided to his office on 20 May
1991, Sandiganbayan issued an order setting the arraignment
on 27 May 1991.

• Attention might be called to the fact that Criminal Case No.

16698 has been decided by the First Division of the
Sandiganbayan on 06 December 1999, acquitting herein
petitioner.

ISSUES
1.Whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government.

RULINGS

• The provision allowing the Court to look into any possible

grave abuse of discretion committed by any government
instrumentality has evidently been couched in general terms in
order to make it malleable to judicial interpretation in the light
of any emerging milieu. In its normal concept, the term has
been said to imply an arbitrary, despotic, capricious or
whimsical exercise of judgment amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. When the question, however, pertains to an affair
internal to either of Congress or the Executive, the Court
subscribes to the view that unless an infringement of any
specific Constitutional proscription thereby inheres the Court
should not deign substitute its own judgment over that of any
of the other two branches of government. It is an impairment
or a clear disregard of a specific constitutional precept or
provision that can unbolt the steel door for judicial
intervention. If any part of the Constitution is not, or ceases to
be, responsive to contemporary needs, it is the people, not the
Court, who must promptly react in the manner prescribed by
the Charter itself.
298
• Republic Act No. 3019 does not exclude from its coverage the
members of Congress and that, therefore, the Sandiganbayan
did not err in thus decreeing the assailed preventive suspension
order.

• Congressional Discipline; The order of suspension prescribed

by Republic Act No. 3019 is distinct from the power of
Congress to discipline its own ranks under the Constitution. —
The order of suspension prescribed by Republic Act No. 3019
is distinct from the power of Congress to discipline its own
ranks under the Constitution which provides that each—
―house may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its
Members for disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of
two-thirds of all its Members, suspend or expel a Member. A
penalty of suspension, when imposed, shall not exceed sixty
days.‖ The suspension contemplated in the above
constitutional provision is a punitive measure that is imposed
upon determination by the Senate or the House of
Representatives, as the case maybe, upon an erring member.

DECISIONS

• The Court, nevertheless, deems it appropriate to render this

decision for future guidance on the significant issue raised by
petitioner.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is DISMISSED. No

costs. SO ORDERED.

RELATED/FOUND DOCTRINES OR PRINCIPLES IN THE CASE

Section16(3), Article VI of the Constitution

299
ENROLLED
BILL
THEORY

300
G.R. No. L-1123 March 5, 1947

ALEJO MABANAG, ET AL., petitioners,

vs.
JOSE LOPEZ VITO, ET AL., respondents.

FACTS:
The three of the plaintiff senators were suspended by the Senate on
account of alleged irregularities in their election. For the same
reason, the eight of the plaintiff representatives, although they had
not been formally suspended, were not allowed to take their seat in
the lower House except in the election of the House Speaker.
As a consequence these three senators and eight representatives did
not take part in the passage of the questioned resolution proposing
an amendment of the Constitution. If these members of Congress
had been counted, the affirmative votes in favor of the proposed
amendment would have been short of the necessary three-fourths
vote in either branch of Congress.
Thus, petitioners filed a petition for prohibition to prevent the
enforcement of said resolution.

ISSUES:
1. WON the court has jurisdiction, relying on the conclusiveness on
the courts of an enrolled bill or resolution.
2. WON said resolution was duly enacted by the Congress.

HELD:
1. NO.
If a political question conclusively binds the judges out of respect to
the political departments, a duly certified law or resolution also
binds the judges under the "enrolled bill rule" born of that respect.
It is a doctrine too well established to need citation of authorities,
that political questions are not within the province of the judiciary,
except to the extent that power to deal with such questions has been
conferred upon the courts by express constitutional or statutory

301
provision. (16 C.J.S., 431.) The enrolled bill doctrine is predicated on
the principle of the separation of powers, a principle also too well
known to require elucidation or citation of authorities.
It is to be noted that the amendatory process as provided in section 1
of Article XV of the Philippine Constitution "consists of (only) two
distinct parts: proposal and ratification." Proposal to amend the
Constitution is a highly political function performed by the Congress
in its sovereign legislative capacity and committed to its charge by
the Constitution itself.
2. YES.
It will be seen upon examination of section 313 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, as amended by Act No. 2210, that, roughly, it provides
two methods of proving legislative proceedings: (1) by the journals,
or by published statutes or resolutions, or by copies certified by the
clerk or secretary or printed by their order; and (2) in case of acts of
the Legislature, by a copy signed by the presiding officers and
secretaries thereof, which shall be conclusive proof of the provisions
of such Acts and of the due enactment thereof.
Even if both the journals and an authenticated copy of the Act had
been presented, the disposal of the issue by the Court on the basis of
the journals does not imply rejection of the enrollment theory, for, as
already stated, the due enactment of a law may be proved in either of
the two ways specified in section 313 of Act No. 190 as amended.
This Court found in the journals no signs of irregularity in the
passage of the law and did not bother itself with considering the
effects of an authenticated copy if one had been introduced. It did
not do what the opponents of the rule of conclusiveness advocate,
namely, look into the journals behind the enrolled copy in order to
determine the correctness of the latter, and rule such copy out if the
two, the journals and the copy, be found in conflict with each other.
No discrepancy appears to have been noted between the two
documents and the court did not say or so much as give to
understand that if discrepancy existed it would give greater weight to
the journals, disregarding the explicit provision that duly certified
copies "shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of such Acts and
of the due enactment thereof."

302
TOLENTINO VS. SECRETARY OF FINANCE
249 SCRA 635
FACTS:
Petitioners (Tolentino, kilosbayan, Inc., Philippine Airlines, Roco
and Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Association) seek
reconsideration of the Court‘s previous ruling dismissing the
petitions filed for the declaration of unconstitutionality of R.A No.
7716, the Expanded Value Added Tax Law. Petitioners contend that
the R.A did not ―originated exclusively‖ in the House of
Representative as required by Article 6, Section 24 of the
Constitution. The Senate allegedly did not pass it on second and
third readings, instead passing its own version. Petitioners contend
that it should have amended the house bill by striking out the text of
the bill and substituting it with the text of its own bill, so as to
conform to the Constitution.

ISUUE:
Whether or not the R.A 7716 is unconstitutional for having
―originated‖ from the Senate, and not from the HoR.

HELD:
Petition is unmeritorious. The enactment of the Senate bill has not
been the first instance where the Senate, in the exercise of its power
to propose amendments to bill (required to originate in the House),
passed its own version. An amendment by substitution (striking out
the text and substituting it), as urged by petitioners, concerns a mere
matter of form, and considering the petitioner has not shown what
substantial difference it would make if Senate applied such
substitution in the case, it cannot be applied to the case at bar.
While the aforementioned Constitutional provision states that bills
must ―originate exclusively in the HoR‖, it also adds, ―but the Senate
may propose or concur with amendments.‖ The Senate may then
propose an entirely new bill as a substitute measure. Petitioners
erred in assuming the Senate version to be an independent and
distinct bill. Without the House bill, Senate could not have enacted
the Senate bill, as the latter was a mere amendment of the former.
As such, it did not have to pass the Senate on second and third
readings.

303
Petitioners question the signing of the President on both bills, to
support their contention that such are separate and distinct. The
president certified the bills separately only because the certification
had to be made of the version of the same revenue bill which AT
THE MOMENT was being considered.

Petitioners question the power of the Conference Committee to

insert new provisions. The jurisdiction of the conference committee
is not limited to resolving differences between the Senate and the
House. It may propose an entirely new provision, given that such are
germane to the subject of the conference, and that the respective
houses of congress subsequently approve its report.

Petitioner PAL contends that the amendment of its franchise by the

withdrawal of its exemption from VAT is not expressed in the title of
the law, thereby violating the Constitution. The Court believes that
the title of the R.A satisfies the Constitutional Requirement.

Petitioners claim that the R.A violates their press freedom and
religious liberty, having removed them from the exemption to pay
VAT. Suffice it to say that since the law granted the press a privilege,
the law could take back the privilege anytime without offense to the
Constitution. By granting exemptions, the State does not forever
waive the exercise of its sovereign prerogative.

Lastly, petitioners contend that the R.A violates due process, equal
protection and contract clauses and the rule on taxation. Petitioners
fail to take into consideration the fact that the VAT was already
provided for in E.O no. 273 long before the R.A was enacted. The
latter merely EXPANDS the base of the tax. Equality and uniformity
in taxation means that all taxable articles or kinds of property of the
same class be taxed at the same rate, the taxing power having
authority to make reasonable and natural classifications for purposes
of taxation. It is enough that the statute applies equally to all
persons, forms and corporations placed in similar situation.

304
 ASTORGA vs. VILLEGAS
G.R. NO. L-23475, APRIL 30, 1974

Facts:

House Bill No. 9266, a bill of local application was filed wherein
amendments was recommended by Senator Roxas, which did not
even appear on the journals that action has been acted upon, and by
Senator Tolentino, which has approved in toto by the Senate.

Certification of the Senate was sent to the House of Representative

that House Bill No.9266 has been approved with amendments. But
the amendments that appeared were that of Senator Roxas. The
House of Representative then signified its approval. Printed copies of
the House Bill was then certified attested by the Secretary of the
each House, Speaker of the House and Senate President which was
then presented to the President for approvals. The bill thereupon
became Republic Act No. 4065.

Upon learning that RA. No. 4065 does not contain the amendments
approved by the Senate and the House of Representative, the Senate
President and Chief Executive withdrew their signature.

Issue: WON RA No.4065 was duly enacted

Ruling:

Republic Act No. 4065 is declared not to have been duly enacted and
therefore did not become law.

The signing by the Speaker of the House and Senate President of an

enrolled bill is an official attestation by both Houses that such bill
has passed Congress. It is a declaration by the both of House of
Congress to the President that a bill has received the sanction of the
legislative branch of the government and that it is delivered to him
in obedience to the Constitutional requirements.

Approval of the Congress, not its officers, that is essential to the

valid enactment of a law. Certification and attestation of the officers
do not add to the validity of the law or cure any defect present upon
its passage. Absent such attestation as a result of the disclaimer and
no enrolled bill to speak off, the court then turned to the journals of
each of the house.

305
Journal of the proceedings is no ordinary record. As the Constitution
requires it, the journal discloses that substantial and lengthy
amendments were introduced on the floor and approved by the
Senate but were not incorporated in the printed text sent to the
President and signed by him. The court then declared that the bill
was not duly enacted and therefore did not become law as the
attested by the withdrawal of the Senate President and Chief
Executive of their signatures.

306
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 176951 November 18, 2008

LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP) represented by
LCP National President JERRY P. TREÑAS
vs.
COMELEC

CARPIO, J.:

Facts:

During the 11th Congress, Congress enacted into law 33 bills

converting 33 municipalities into cities. However, Congress did not
act on bills converting 24 other municipalities into cities.

During the 12th Congress, Congress enacted into law Republic Act
No. 9009 (RA 9009), which took effect on 30 June 2001. RA 9009
amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code by increasing
the annual income requirement for conversion of a municipality into
a city from P20 million to P100 million. After the effectivity of RA
9009, the House of Representatives of the 12th Congress adopted
Joint Resolution No. 29, which sought to exempt from the P100
million income requirement in RA 9009 the 24 municipalities whose
cityhood bills were not approved in the 11th Congress. However, the
12th Congress ended without the Senate approving Joint Resolution
No. 29.

During the 13th Congress, the House of Representatives re-adopted

Joint Resolution No. 29 as Joint Resolution No. 1 and forwarded it
to the Senate for approval. 16 municipalities filed, through their
respective sponsors, individual cityhood bills. The 16 cityhood bills
contained a common provision exempting all the 16 municipalities
from the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009.

On 22 December 2006, the House of Representatives approved the

cityhood bills. The Senate also approved the cityhood bills in
February 2007, except that of Naga, Cebu which was passed on 7
June 2007. The cityhood bills lapsed into law (Cityhood Laws) on

307
various dates from March to July 2007 without the President's
signature.11

The Cityhood Laws direct the COMELEC to hold plebiscites to

determine whether the voters in each respondent municipality
approve of the conversion of their municipality into a city.

Petitioners filed the present petitions to declare the Cityhood Laws

unconstitutional for violation of Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution, as well as for violation of the equal protection
clause.12 Petitioners also lament that the wholesale conversion of
municipalities into cities will reduce the share of existing cities in
the Internal Revenue Allotment because more cities will share the
same amount of internal revenue set aside for all cities under Section
285 of the Local Government Code.13

THE ISSUES

1. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article X of the

Constitution; and

2. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate the equal protection clause.

HELD:

We GRANT the petitions and declare UNCONSTITUTIONAL the

Cityhood Laws, namely: Republic Act Nos. 9389, 9390, 9391, 9392,
9393, 9394, 9398, 9404, 9405, 9407, 9408, 9409, 9434, 9435, 9436,
and 9491

The Cityhood Laws violate Sections 6 and 10, Article X of the

Constitution, and are thus unconstitutional.

First, applying the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 to

the present case is a prospective, not a retroactive application,
because RA 9009 took effect in 2001 while the cityhood bills became
law more than five years later.

Second, the Constitution requires that Congress shall prescribe all

the criteria for the creation of a city in the Local Government Code
and not in any other law, including the Cityhood Laws.

308
Third, the Cityhood Laws violate Section 6, Article X of the
Constitution because they prevent a fair and just distribution of the
national taxes to local government units.

Fourth, the criteria prescribed in Section 450 of the Local

Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, for converting a
municipality into a city are clear, plain and unambiguous, needing no
resort to any statutory construction.

Fifth, the intent of members of the 11th Congress to exempt certain

municipalities from the coverage of RA 9009 remained an intent and
was never written into Section 450 of the Local Government Code.

Sixth, the deliberations of the 11th or 12th Congress on unapproved

bills or resolutions are not extrinsic aids in interpreting a law passed
in the 13th Congress.

Seventh, even if the exemption in the Cityhood Laws were written in

Section 450 of the Local Government Code, the exemption would
still be unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection clause.

Applicability of Equal Protection Clause

If Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA

9009, contained an exemption to the P100 million annual income
requirement, the criteria for such exemption could be scrutinized for
possible violation of the equal protection clause. Thus, the criteria
for the exemption, if found in the Local Government Code, could be
assailed on the ground of absence of a valid classification. However,
Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009,
does not contain any exemption. The exemption is contained in the
Cityhood Laws, which are unconstitutional because such exemption
must be prescribed in the Local Government Code as mandated in
Section 10, Article X of the Constitution.

Even if the exemption provision in the Cityhood Laws were written

in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA
9009, such exemption would still be unconstitutional for violation of
the equal protection clause. The exemption provision merely states,
"Exemption from Republic Act No. 9009 ─ The City of x x x shall be
exempted from the income requirement prescribed under Republic
Act No. 9009." This one sentence exemption provision contains no
classification standards or guidelines differentiating the exempted
municipalities from those that are not exempted.

309
NATURE
OF
HRET

310
 G.R. Nos. L-68379-81 September 22, 1986
EVELIO B. JAVIER, petitioner,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and ARTURO
F. PACIFICADOR, respondents.
Raul S. Roco and Lorna Patajo-Kapunan for petitioner.

FACTS:

Evelio Javier and Arturo Pacificador were candidates

in the May 1984 Elections in Antique for the Batasang
Pambansa. On the eve of elections, May 13, 1984, the
bitter contest between the two came to a head when
several followers of the petitioner were ambushed and
killed, allegedly by the latter‘s men. Seven suspects,
including respondent Pacificador, are now facing trial for
these murders.

It was in this atmosphere that the voting was held,

and the post-election developments were to run true to
form. The petitioner went to the Commission on
Elections to question the canvass of the election returns,
owing to what he claimed were attempts to railroad the
private respondent‘s proclamation. Petitioner‘s
complaints were dismissed and consequently, the private
respondent was proclaimed winner by the Second
Division of the said body. The petitioner thereupon came
to this Court, arguing that the proclamation was void
because made only by a division and not by the
Commission on Elections en banc as required by the
Constitution.

The case was still being considered when on

February 11, 1986, the petitioner was gunned down in
cold blood and in broad daylight. And a year later,
Batasang Pambansa was abolished with the advent of the
1987 Constitution.

Respondents moved to dismiss the petition,

contending it to be moot and academic.

311
ISSUES:
1. Whether it is correct for the court to dismiss the
petition due to the petitioner being dead and the
respondent missing.
2. Whether the Second Division of the Commission on
Elections was authorized to promulgate its decision of
July 23, 1984, proclaiming the private respondent the
winner in the election?

HELD:

1. No.

The abolition of the Batasang Pambansa and the

disappearance of the office in dispute between the
petitioner and the private respondent-both of whom have
gone their separate ways-could be a convenient
justification for dismissing this case. But there are larger
issues involved that must be resolved now, once and for
all, not only to dispel the legal ambiguities here raised.
The more important purpose is to manifest in the clearest
possible terms that this Court will not disregard and in
effect condone wrong on the simplistic and tolerant
pretext that the case has become moot and academic.

The Supreme Court is not only the highest arbiter of

legal questions but also the conscience of the
government. The citizen comes to us in quest of law but
we must also give him justice. The two are not always the
same. There are times when we cannot grant the latter
because the issue has been settled and decision is no
longer possible according to the law. But there are also
times when although the dispute has disappeared, as in
this case, it nevertheless cries out to be resolved. Justice
demands that we act then, not only for the vindication of
the outraged right, though gone, but also for the
guidance of and as a restraint upon the future.

2. No.

The applicable provisions are found in Article XII-C,

Sections 2 and 3, of the 1973 Constitution.

312
Section 2 confers on the Commission on Elections the
power to:
(2) Be the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of all member of the
Batasang Pambansa and elective provincial and city
officials.

Section 3 provides:
The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in three
divisions. All election cases may be heard and decided by
divisions except contests involving members of the
Batasang Pambansa, which shall be heard and decided en
banc. Unless otherwise provided by law, all election cases
shall be decided within ninety days from the date of their
submission for decision.

We believe that in making the Commission on

Elections the sole judge of all contests involving the
election, returns and qualifications of the members of the
Batasang Pambansa and elective provincial and city
officials, the Constitution intended to give it full
authority to hear and decide these cases from beginning
to end and on all matters related thereto, including those
arising before the proclamation of the winners.

As correctly observed by the petitioner, the purpose

of Section 3 in requiring that cases involving members of
the Batasang Pambansa be heard and decided by the
Commission en banc was to insure the most careful
consideration of such cases. Obviously, that objective
could not be achieved if the Commission could act en
banc only after the proclamation had been made, for it
might then be too late already. We are all-too-familiar
with the grab-the-proclamation-and-delay-the-protest
strategy of many unscrupulous candidates, which has
resulted in the frustration of the popular will and the
virtual defeat of the real winners in the election. The
respondent‘s theory would make this gambit possible for
the pre- proclamation proceedings, being summary in
nature, could be hastily decided by only three members in
division, without the care and deliberation that would
have otherwise been observed by the Commission en
banc.

313
 WHEREFORE, let it be spread in the records of this
case that were it not for the supervening events that have
legally rendered it moot and academic, this petition
would have been granted and the decision of the
Commission on Elections dated July 23, 1984, set aside
as violative of the Constitution.

314
G.R. No. 165691 June 22, 2005

ROBERT Z. BARBERS, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, NATIONAL BOARD OF
CANVASSERS FOR SENATORS AND PARTY-LIST
REPRESENTATIVES, and RODOLFO G. BIAZON, respondents.

The Facts

Robert Z. Barbers ("Barbers") and Biazon were candidates for re-

election to the Senate of the Philippines in the 10 May 2004
Synchronized National and Local Elections ("elections").

On 2 June 2004, the COMELEC proclaimed Biazon as "the 12th

ranking duly elected 12th Senator of the Republic of the Philippines
in the May 10, 2004 national and local elections, to serve for a term
of 6 years, beginning on June 30, 2004." The COMELEC stated that
after the canvass of the supplemental Provincial COCs from
Maguindanao (Cotabato City), Lanao del Sur and one barangay in
Nueva Vizcaya, Biazon obtained 10,685 more votes than Barbers.

In his petition, Barbers asserted that the proclamation of Biazon was

"illegal and premature being based on an incomplete canvass."
Barbers asserted that the remaining uncanvassed COCs and votes
and the results of the special elections, which were still to be
conducted, would undoubtedly affect the results of the elections.

The Issues

WON: respondent COMELEC gravely abused its discretion,

amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it deliberately
insisted in resorting the still uncanvassed canvas election results.

The Court‘s Ruling

In the present case, the settlement falls under the sole jurisdiction of
the Senatorial Electoral Tribunal since Barbers contests Biazon‘s
proclamation as the 12th winning senatorial candidate. Under Article
6, Sec 17 of the Constitution provides that the Senate and the House
of Representative shall ach have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be
the sole judge of all contests relating to the Elections, returns,and
qualifications of their members. Hence, certiorari will not lie in this
case considering that there is an available and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law to annul the COMELEC‘s assailed
proceedings.

315
EN BANC

G.R. No. 191618 November 23, 2010

ATTY. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL, Petitioner,

vs.
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL, Respondent.

- NACHURA, J:

FACTS:
Atty. Macalintal filed a petition that question the constitutionality of
the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) as an illegal and
unauthorized progeny of Sec. 4, Article VII of the Constitution. The
petitioner highlighted the Supreme Court‘s decision in the case of
Buac vs. COMELEC which declared that contests involving the
President and the Vice-President fell within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the PET, in the exercise of quasi-judicial power. On
this point, petitioner reiterated that the constitution of PET, with the
designation of the Members of the Court as Chairman and Members
thereof, contravenes Section 12, Article VIII of the Constitution,
which prohibits the designation of Members of the Supreme Court
and of other Courts established by law to any agency performing
quasi-judicial or administrative functions.

OSG points out that the petition filed by Atty. Macalintal is

unspecified and without statutory basis; "the liberal approach in its
preparation is a violation of the well-known rules of practice and
pleading in this jurisdiction."

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not PET is constitutional.
2. Whether or not PET exercises quasi-judicial power.

HELD:
1. Yes. The explicit reference of the Members of the Constitutional
Commission to a Presidential Electoral Tribunal, with Fr. Joaquin
Bernas categorically declaring that in crafting the last paragraph of
Sec. 4, Art VII of the 1987 Constitution, they ―constitutionalized
what was statutory.‖ Judicial power granted to the Supreme Court by

316
the same Constitution is plenary. And under the doctrine of
necessary implication, the additional jurisdiction bestowed by the
last paragraph of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution to decide
presidential and vice-presidential elections contests includes the
means necessary to carry it into effect.
2. No. The traditional grant of judicial power is found in Section 1,
Article VIII of the Constitution which provides that the power ―shall
be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law.‖ The set up embodied in the Constitution and
statutes characterize the resolution of electoral contests as
essentially an exercise of judicial power. When the Supreme Court,
as PET, resolves a presidential or vice-presidential election contest, it
performs what is essentially a judicial power.

One final note, this Court has no control over contrary people and
naysayers, we reiterate ―a word of caution against the filing of
baseless petitions which only clog the Court‘s docket.‖ The petition
in the instant case belongs to that classification.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Costs against petitioner.

317
 SENERES V. COMELEC, GR NO. 178678, 4/9/16

Facts:
In 1999, private respondent Robles was elected president and
chairperson of Buhay, a party-list group duly registered with
COMELEC. The constitution of BUHAY provides for a three-year
term for all its party officers, without re-election. BUHAY
participated in the 2001 and 2004 elections, with Robles as its
President. On January 26, 2007, in connection with the May 2007
elections, BUHAY again filed a manifestation of its desire to
participate in the Party-List System of Representation. As in the past
two elections, the manifestation to participate bore the signature of
Robles as BUHAY President. Consequently, on April 17, 2007,
Señeres filed with the COMELEC a petition to deny due course to
Certificate of Nomination. In it, petitioner Señeres alleged that he
was the acting President and Secretary-General of BUHAY, having
assumed that position since August 17, 2004 when Robles vacated
the position. Señeres asserted that under the Cobstitution, Robles
was, disqualified from being an officer of any political party, the
latter being the Acting Administrator of the Light Railway Transport
Authority (LRTA), a government-controlled corporation. On May 10,
2007, the National Council of BUHAY adopted a resolution expelling
Señeres as party member for his act of submitting a Certificate of
Nomination for the party.
Issues:
Whether or not the COMELEC acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in issuing its challenged Resolution dated June
19, 2007, which declared respondent Robles as the duly authorized
representative of BUHAY, and there is no appeal or any other plain,
speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law except the
instant petition.
Ruling:
No, the COMELEC did not act with grave abuse of discretion.
The petition should be dismissed for lack of merit. A crucial matter
in this recourse is whether the petition for certiorari filed by Señeres
is the proper remedy. A special civil action for certiorari may be
availed of when the tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction
and there is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law for the purpose of annulling the

318
proceeding. It is the "proper remedy to question any final order,
ruling and decision of the COMELEC rendered in the exercise of its
adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers." For certiorari to prosper,
however, there must be a showing that the COMELEC acted with
grave abuse of discretion and that there is no appeal or any plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Thus,
once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and
assumed office as a Member of the House of Representatives,
COMELEC's jurisdiction over elections relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRET's own jurisdiction
begins. As such, the proper recourse would have been to file a
petition for quo warranto before the HRET within ten (10) days
from receipt of the July 19, 2007 Resolution and not a petition for
certiorari before this Court. Since Señeres failed to file a petition for
quo warranto before the HRET within 10 days from receipt of the
July 19, 2007 Resolution declaring the validity of Robles' Certificate
of Nomination, said Resolution of the COMELEC has already
become final and executory.

319
 ANGARA v. ELECTORAL COMMISSION
G.R. No. L-45081, July 15, 1936
Facts:
Petitioner Jose Angara was proclaimed winner and took his oath
of office as member of the National Assembly of the
Commonwealth Government. On December 3, 1935, the
National Assembly passed a resolution confirming the election
of those who have not been subject of an election protest prior to
the adoption of the said resolution.

On December 8, 1935, however, private respondent Pedro Ynsua

filed an election protest against the petitioner before the
Electoral Commission of the National Assembly. The following
day, December 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission adopted its
own resolution providing that it will not consider any election
protest that was not submitted on or before December 9, 1935.

Citing among others the earlier resolution of the National

Assembly, the petitioner sought the dismissal of respondent‘s
protest. The Electoral Commission however denied his motion.

Issue:
Whether or not SC has jurisdiction over the Electoral
Commission and the subject matter of the controvers
Held:
In this case, the nature of the present controversy shows the
necessity of a final constitutional arbiter to determine the conflict of
authority between two agencies created by the Constitution. The
court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject
matter of the present controversy for the purpose of determining the
character, scope and extent of the constitutional grant to the
Electoral Commission as "the sole judge of all contests relating to
the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the
National Assembly." (Sec 4 Art. VI 1935 Constitution). It is held,
therefore, that the Electoral Commission was acting within the
legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative in assuming to
take cognizance of the election protest filed by Ynsua.

The creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it ex

necesitate rei the power regulative in character to limit the time with
which protests intrusted to its cognizance should be filed. [W]here a
general power is conferred or duty enjoined, every particular power
320
necessary for the exercise of the one or the performance of the other
is also conferred. In the absence of any further constitutional
provision relating to the procedure to be followed in filing protests
before the Electoral Commission, therefore, the incidental power to
promulgate such rules necessary for the proper exercise of its
exclusive power to judge all contests relating to the election, returns
and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, must be
deemed by necessary implication to have been lodged also in the
Electoral Commission.

321
 PEREZ vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. NO. 133944, October 28, 1999

Facts:

Respondent, Aguinaldo, filed his certificate of candidacy for the

Third District of Cagayan in the 1998 elections. Petitioner, Perez, as
voter and citizen, filed in the COMELEC a petition for the
disqualification of respondent as candidate for the said election
assailing that Aguinaldo has not been a resident of the Third District
of Cagayan for at least one (1) year immediately before the election
as required in the Constitution which has been dismissed for the
respondent Aguinaldo is qualified to run as representative for the
Third District of Cagayan.

After the 1998 election, respondent was elected and proclaimed as

Representative and sworn into position. But, petitioner filed in the
COMELEC a motion for reconsideration for the lack of the
respondent of the requisites to run for office and that the
proclamation of the petitioner was not a legal impediment to the
continuation of the hearing on her motion.

Issue:

WON the Court has jurisdiction to hear such disqualification of the

respondent as Representative of the Third District of Cagayan.

Ruling:

No, the Court has no jurisdiction for the complaint regarding the
disqualification of the respondent.

RA 6646 authorizes the continuation of proceedings for the

disqualification even after the elections provided the respondent has
not been proclaimed. Therefore, the COMELEC has no jurisdiction
to entertain such complaint because the proclamation of respondent
Aguinaldo barred further consideration of the petitioner‘s action

Assuming that the court shall resolve the petition for certiorari, the
Court find no merit to disqualify the respondent for the respondent
did presented enough evidence to constitute her residence in the
Third District of Cagayan. Registration of a person in one district is
no proof that he is not domiciled in another district.

322
 FINAL AND
EXECUTORY
COMELEC
JUDGEMENT
VS. HRET

323
Reyes v. COMELEC
Regina Ongsiako Reyes, Petitioner
Vs.
Commission on Elections and Joseph Socorro B. Tan
Gr. 207264
June 25, 2013

Facts:
Joseph Socorro B. Tan, registered voter and resident of Torrijos,
Marinduque filed a Petition to Drny Due Course or to Cancel the
Certificate of Candidacy of Reyes on the ground that it contained
material misrepresentations, specifically; (1) she is single when she
if married to Congressman Herminaldo I. Mandanan of Batangas; (2)
she is a resident of Brgy. Lupac, Boac, Marinduque when she is a
resident of Bauan, Batangas which is the residence of her husband
and at the same time, when she is also a resident of 135 J. P. Rizal,
Brgy. Milagrosa, Quezon City as admitted in the Directory of
Congressional Spouses of the House of Representatives; (3) that her
date of birth is July 3, 1964 when other documents show that her
birthdate is either July 8, 1959 or July 3, 1960; (4) she is not a
permanent resident of another country when she is a permanent
resident or an immigrant of the United States of America; and (5)
she is a Filipino citizen when she is, in fact, an American citizen.

Petitioner countered saying that her marriage with Congressman

Mandanas is not binding and valid for it did not comply with certain
formal requirements prescribed by the Family Code, hence, void ab
initio. She also submitted a Certificate of Live Birth issued by the
National Statistics Office showing that her birthdate is on July 3,
1964. Lastly, petitioner alleged that her permanent residence being
the United States of America is not supported by evidence.

During the course of the proceedings on February 8, 2013,

respondent filed a Manifestation with Motion to Admit Neely
Discovered Evidence and Amended List of Exhibits consisting of,
among others,: (1) a copy of an article published on the internet on
January 8, 2013 with an Affidavit of Identification and Authenticity
of Document executed by its author, Eliseo J. Obligacion, which
provides a database record of the Bureau of Immigration indicating

324
that petitioner is an American citizen and a holder os a US passport;
and (2) a Certification of Travel Record of petitioner, issued by
Simeon Sanchez, Acting Chief, Verification and Certification Unit of
the Bureau of Immigration which indicates that petitioner used a US
Passport in her various travels abroad.

On March 27, 2013, COMELEC cancelled petitioner‘s COC saying

that petitioner failed to comply with the requirements of RA 9225 or
the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003 and that
she did not have the one-year residency requirement under
Sectionn6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, hence, she is
ineligible to run for the position of Representative for the lone
district of Marinduque.

Petitioner Filed a Motion for Reconsideration on April 8, 2013

claiming that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen and that she has
not lost such status by simply obtaining and using an American
passport. Petitioner also claimed that her marriage to an American
citizen only resulted into her obtaining dual citizenship and
therefore does not require her to comply with the requirements
under RA 9225, however, petitioner attached an Affidavit of
Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship sworn to before a Notary Public
on September 24. 2012. Lastly, she claims that she never became a
naturalized citizen of America hence she never lost her domicile of
origin, which is Boac, Marinduque.

COMELEC denied petitioner‘s Motion for Reconsideration on May

14, 2013. Petitioner was proclaimed winner of the May 13, 2013
Elections on May 18, 2013 and on June 5, 2013, the COMELEC En
Banc issued a Certificate if Finality declaring May 14, 2013
Resolution as final and executory. Petitioner took her oath of office
before Feliciano R. Belmonte, Jr., Speaker of the House if
Representatives, on the same day. However, she is yet to assume
office.

Issues:
In the present Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction and/or Status Quo
Ante Order, petitioner raises the following:

325
1. Whether or not COMELEC has jurisdiction over petitioner who is
a duly proclaimed winner and has already taken her oath of office for
the position of Member of the House of Representatives for the lone
congressional district of Marinduque.
2. Whether or not COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it took cognizance
of Tan‘s alleged newly-discovered evidence without the same havig
been testified on and offered and admitted in evidence which became
the basis for its Resolution of the case without giving the petitioner
the opportunity to question and present controverting evidence, in
violation of Petitioner‘s right to due process of law.
3. Whether or not COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it declared that
Petitioner is not a Filipino citizen and did not meet the residency
requirement for the position of Member of the House of
Representatives.
4. Whether or not COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when by enforcing the
provisions of RA 9225, it imposed additional qualifications to the
qualification of a Member of the House of Representatives as
enumerated in Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.

Held:
1. Yes. COMELEC retains jurisdiction due to the following reasons:
(a) the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal does not acquire
jurisdiction over the issue of petitioner‘s qualifications, as well as
over the assailed COMELEC Resolutions, unless a petition is duly
filed with said tribunal; (b) the jurisdiction of the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal begins only after the candidate is
considered a Member of House of Representatives, as stated in
Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution; (3) petitioner is not
yet a Member of the House of Representatives for she has not yet
assumed office nor is the oath that Petitioner has taken before Hon.
Feliciano Belmonte, Jr., assumed valid for it is unclear whether or
not said oath was made during plenary or in an open session, as
requisite to be considered a Member of the House if Representatives.
2. No. COMELEC is not bound to strictly adhere to the technical
rules of procedure in the presentation of evidence. In view of the fact
that the proceedings in a petition to dent due course or to cancel
certificate if candidacy are summary in nature, the newly discovered
evidence was properly admitted by COMELEC. Furthermore, there

326
was no denial of due process in the case at bar as petitioner was
given every opportunity to argue her case before the COMELEC for
petitioner was given five months, from October 10, 2012 when Tan‘s
petition was filed up to March 27, when the First Division rendered
its resolution, to adduce evidence. Lastly, in administrative
proceedings, procedural due process does not necessarily mean or
require a hearing but simply an opportunity or right to be hear by
verbal presentation or oral arguments through pleadings as held in
Sahali v. COMELEC.
3. Petitioner failed to comply with the requirements of RA 9225 as
follows: (a) to take an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines before the Consul-General of the Philippine Consulate in
the USA; and (b) to make a personal and sworn renunciation of her
American citizenship before any public officer authorized to
administer an oath. There is no showing that respondent complied
with the said requirements, furthermore, due to respondent‘s newly-
discovered evidence establishing the fact that petitioner is a holder of
an American passport, respondent falsely misrepresented in her
COC that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen.
4. Lastly, no, COMELEC did not impose additional qualifications
prescribed for the position of Member of the House of
Representatives. It merely applied the qualifications prescribed by
Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution that the candidate
must be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and must have one-
year residency prior to the date of elections. It did not err when it
inquired into the compliance by petitioner of RA 9225 to determine
if she reacquired her status as a natural-born Filipino citizen. It
simply applied the constitutional provision and nothing more.

327
G.R. Nos. 178831-32

JOCELYN SY LIMKAICHONG, Petitioner,

vs.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, NAPOLEON N. CAMERO and

RENALD F. VILLANDO, Respondents.

Facts:

Limkaichong ran as a Representative in the first district of

Negros Oriental. Her rival Olivia Paras, and some other concerned
citizens filed a disqualification case against Limkaichong. The latter
allegedly not a natural born citizen of the Philippines because when
she was born, her father was still a Chinese and that her mom,
though Filipino, lost her citizenship by virtue of her marriage to
Limkaichong‘s dad. During the pendency of the case, election day
came, and votes were cast. Results came in and Limkaichong won
over Paras. Comelec after due hearing, declared Limkaichong as
disqualified. Notwithstanding their proclamation of disqualification,
Comelec issued a proclamation declaring Limkaichong as the winner.
This is in compliance with Resolution no. 8062 adopting the
disqualification cases which shall be without prejudice to the
continuation of the hearing and resolution of the involved cases.
Paras countered the proclamation, filed a petition before the
Comelec.

ISSUES:

1) Whether or not the citizenship of Limkaichong's parents may be

questioned in an election case.
2) Whether or not the HRET should assume jurisdiction over the
disqualification case.
3) Whether or not the 10-day prescriptive period under 1998 HRET
Rules apply to disqualification based on citizenship.

RULINGS:
1) No. The proper proceeding in cancelling the naturalization
certificate of one person should be in accordance with Section 18 of
CA No. 473. Clearly under the law and jurisprudence, it is the State,
through the Solicitor General or the representative designated by

328
statute, that may question in the appropriate denaturalization
proceeding.

2) Yes. Limkaichong was proclaimed by the Provincial Board of

Canvassers, she had taken her oath of office, and she was allowed to
officially assume office on July 23, 2007. Accordingly, the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal, and no longer the COMELEC,
should now assume the jurisdiction over the disqualification case.
Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and in Section 2509
of the OEC underscore the exclusivity of the Electoral Tribunal's
jurisdiction over election contests relating to its members.

3) No. The ten-day prescriptive period under the 1998 HRET Rules
does not apply to disqualification based on citizenship, because
qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must
be possessed not only at the time of appointment or election or
assumption of office but during the officer's entire tenure.

329
Villando vs. HRET

FACTS:
On March 24, 2010, the HRET dismissed petitions questioning the
citizenship of Limkaichong. The Tribunal declared Limkaichong not
disqualified as Member of the House of Representatives.
Thereafter, Vilando filed a petition for certiorari to the Supreme
Court.

ISSUES:
Does the petition for quo warranto constitute a collateral attack on
the citizenship of Limkaichong‘s father?

Did Limkaichong able to derive Philippine Citizenship from her

mother?

Can HRET, having the plenary, absolute and exclusive jurisdiction to

determine qualification of members of the House of Representatives,
look into the eligibility of Limkaichong even if, as an incident
thereto, would mean looking into the validity of the Certificate of
Naturalization?

RULING:
On the first issue - making reference to the alleged nullity of the
grant of naturalization of Limkaichong‘s father constitute a collateral
attack on the citizenship of the father. An attack on a person‘s
citizenship may only be done through a direct action for its nullity.

On the second issue - there was a failure to prove that the

respondent‘s mother lost her Philippine citizenship.The respondent
had informally elected citizenship after January 17, 1973 during
which time the 1973 Constitution considered as citizens of the
Philippines all those who elect citizenship in accordance with the
1935 Constitution. The respondent was able to elect citizenship
informally when she reached majority age. Respondent participated
in the barangay elections as a young voter in 1976, accomplished
voter‘s affidavit as of 1984, and ran as a candidate and was elected as
Mayor of La Libertad, Negros Oriental in 2004. These are positive
acts of election of Philippine citizenship.

330
On the third issue - the power of the HRET, no matter how complete
and exclusive, does not carry with it the authority to delve into the
legality of the judgment of naturalization in the pursuit of
disqualifying Limkaichong. To rule otherwise would operate as a
collateral attack on the citizenship of the father, which, as already
stated, is not permissible.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Accordingly, the Court

affirms the March 24, 2010 Decision of the HRET declaring that
Limkaichong is not disqualified as Member of the House of
Representatives representing the First District, Negros Orienta

331
Layug V Comelec
Gr No. 192984 Feb 28, 2012
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Facts:
Rolando D Layug, petitioner, filed a pro se a petition to disqualify
Buhay Party-List from participating in May 10, 2010 elections. He
argued that it is just a mere extension of ‗El Shaddai‘ ,headed by
Brother Mike, which is a religious sector. As such, he does not
qualify under paragraph 1 of RA 7941 known as ‗Party-List System
Act‘ and Art VI sec 5 paragraph 2 of the 1987 Constitution.
Buhay Party-List and Brother Mike claimed that Buhay Party-List is
not a religious sect but a political party possessing all the
qualifications of a party-list. It is composed of groups for the elderly,
the women, the youth, the handicapped, as well as the professionals,
and Brother Mike belongs to the marginalized and underrepresented
elderly group. They likewise argued that nominees from a political
party such as Buhay Party-List need not even come from the
marginalized and underrepresented sector.
COMELEC proclaimed Buhay Party-List entitled to TWO house
seats after the elections. This was after Petitioner was found to be a
‗phantom petitioner‘ without address after multiple non-receipt of
sent documents to him by the court. Being the fifth nominee,
however, Brother Mike was not proclaimed as the representative of
Buhay Party-List.
Issues:
I. Whether or Not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to
question the declaration of Buhay Party-List nominees over
the House of Representatives Elective Tribunal?
II. Whether or Not Layug was denied due process?
Ruling:
I. The Court not the HRET has jurisdiction over the present
petition.
Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides that the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) shall be
the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and

332
qualifications of its Members. Section 5 (1) of the same Article
identifies who the "members" of the House are:
Sec. 5. (1). The House of Representatives shall be composed of
not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise
fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative
districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the
Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their
respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and
progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be
elected through a party list system of registered national, regional,
and sectoral parties or organizations

Neither does the HRET have jurisdiction over the qualifications of

Buhay Party-List, as it is vested by law, specifically, the Party-List
System Act, upon the COMELEC. Section 6 of said Act states
that "the COMELEC may motu proprio or upon verified complaint
of any interested party, remove or cancel, after due notice and
hearing, the registration of any national, regional or sectoral
party, organization or coalition xxx." Accordingly, in the case
of Abayon vs. HRET, We ruled that the HRET did not gravely
abuse its discretion when it dismissed the petitions for quo
warranto against Aangat Tayo party-list and Bantay party-list
insofar as they sought the disqualifications of said party-lists.

Thus, it is the Court, under its power to review decisions, orders,

or resolutions of the COMELEC provided under Section 7, Article
IX-A of the 1987 Constitution and Section 1, Rule 37 of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure that has jurisdiction to hear the
instant petition.

II. Layug was not denied due process.

A party may sue or defend an action pro se.Under Section 3, Rule

7 of the Rules of Court, "(e)very pleading must be signed by the
party or counsel representing him, stating in either case his
address which should not be a post office box."

A judicious perusal of the records shows that Layug filed pro

se both the Petition to Disqualify and his Position Paper before
the COMELEC Second Division. In the Petition to Disqualify, he
stated his address as #70 Dr. Pilapil Street, Barangay San Miguel,
Pasig City. While Atty. Rustico B. Gagate appeared as counsel for
Layug during the hearing conducted on April 20, 2010, he
nonetheless failed to provide either his or his client's complete

333
and correct address despite the manifestation that counsel for
private respondents could not personally serve the Answer on
Layug due to the inexistence of the given address. Neither did the
Position Paper that was subsequently filed pro se on April 23,
2010 indicate any forwarding address.

334
INTRA-PARTY
MEMBERS

335
 EN BANC
[ G.R. No. 205505, September 29, 2015 ]
ATTY. ISIDRO Q. LICO, RAFAEL A. PUENTESPINA, PROCULO T.
SARMEN, AMELITO L. REVUELTA, WILLIAM C. YBANEZ,
SILVERIO J. SANCHEZ, GLORIA G. FUTALAN, HILARIO DE
GUZMAN, EUGENE M. PABUALAN, RODOLFO E. PEREZ,
HIPOLITO R. QUILLAN, MARIO ARENAS, TIRSO C.
BUENAVENTURA, LYDIA B. TUBELLA, REYNALDO C. GOLO&
JONATHAN DEQUINA IN THEIR INDIVIDUAL CAPACITIES,
AND AS LEGITIMATE MEMBERS AND OFFICERS OF
ADHIKAING TINATAGUYOD NG KOOPERATIBA (ATING KOOP
PARTY LIST), PETITIONERS,
VS.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC AND THE SELF-
STYLED SHAM ATING KOOP PARTYLIST REPRESENTED BY
AMPARO T. RIMAS, RESPONDENTS.

SERENO, C.J.:

FACTS:
Ating Koop is a multi-sectoral party-list organization which was
registered on 16 November 2009 under Republic Act (R.A.) No.
7941, also known as the Party-List System Act (Party-List Law).
Under Ating Koop's Constitution and By-Laws, its highest
policymaking body is the National Convention. The Central
Committee, however, takes over when the National Convention is
not in session.
On 30 November 2009, Ating Koop filed its Manifestation of Intent
to Participate in the Party-List System of Representation for the 10
May 2010 Elections and on 6 March 2010, it filed with the
COMELEC the list of its nominees, with petitioner Lico as first
nominee and Roberto Mascarina as second nominee. On 8 December
2010, COMELEC proclaimed Ating Koop as one of the winning
party-list groups. Petitioner Lico subsequently took his oath of office
on 9 December 2010 before the Secretary-General of the House of
Representatives, and thereafter assumed office.

336
Several months prior to its proclamation as one of the winning party-
list organizations, or on 9 June 2010, Ating Koop issued Central
Committee Resolution 2010-01, which incorporated a term-sharing
agreement signed by its nominees. Under the agreement, petitioner
Lico was to serve as Party-list Representative for the first year of the
three-year term.
On 14 May 2011, Ating Koop held its Second National Convention,
during which it introduced amendments to its Constitution and By-
laws. Among the salient changes was the composition of the Central
Committee, which would still be composed of 15 representatives but
with five each coming from Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao (5-5-5
equal representation). The amendments likewise mandated the
holding of an election of Central Committee members within six
months after the Second National Convention. In effect, the
amendments cut short the three-year term of the incumbent
members (referred to hereafter as the Interim Central Committee) of
the Central Committee. The Interim Central Committee was
dominated by members of the Rimas Group.
On 5 December 2011, or almost one year after petitioner Lico had
assumed office, the Interim Central Committee expelled him from
Ating Koop for disloyalty. Apart from allegations of malversation and
graft and corruption, the Committee cited petitioner Lico's refusal to
honor the term-sharing agreement as factual basis for disloyalty and
as cause for his expulsion under Ating Koop's Amended Constitution
and By-laws.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the COMELEC has jurisdiction over the expulsion of
a Member of the House of Representatives from his party-list
organization
HELD:
None. The COMELEC has no jurisdiction over the expulsion of a
Member of the House of Representatives from his party-list
organization. Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution endows
the HRET with jurisdiction to resolve questions on the qualifications
of members of Congress. In the case of party-list representatives, the
HRET acquires jurisdiction over a disqualification case upon
proclamation of the winning party-list group, oath of the nominee,
and assumption of office as member of the House of
Representatives.
337
In the present case, the Petition for petitioner Lico's expulsion from
the House of Representatives is anchored on his expulsion from
Ating Koop, which necessarily affects his title as member of
Congress. A party-list nominee must have been, among others, a
bona fide member of the party or organization for at least ninety (90)
days preceding the day of the election. Needless to say, bona fide
membership in the party-list group is a continuing qualification. We
have ruled that qualifications for public office, whether elective or
not, are continuing requirements. They must be possessed not only
at the time of appointment or election, or of assumption of office,
but during the officer's entire tenure.

338
COMMISSION ON
APPOINTMENT

339
 Daza v. Singson
GR. 86344
December 21, 1989
Facts:
The House of Representatives apportioned its 12 seats in the
Commission on Appointments among the several political parties
represented in that chamber, including Lakas ng Bansa, PDP-Laban,
NP-Unido, Liberal Party and KBL in accordance with Art VI Section
18 of the Constitution. Petitioner Raul Daza was among those
chosen and was listed as a representative of the Liberal Party.

On September 16, the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino was

reorganized, resulting in a political realignment in the House of
Representatives. Because of the said realignment, the House of
Representatives revised its representation in the Commission on
Appointments by withdrawing the seat occupied by the petitioner
and giving it to the newly-formed LDP. And in December 5, 1998,
the chamber elected a new set of representatives consisting of the
original members except the petitioner whose seat was given to Luis
C. Singson as the additional member from the LDP.

Petitioner came to this Court on January 23, 1989 to challenge his

removal from the Commission on Appointments with a Petition for
Prohibition and Injunction with Preliminary Injunction. Temporary
Restraining Order has been served to prevent both the petitioner and
the respondent from serving in the Commission on Appointments.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the petition is a political question.
2. Whether or not Singson was improperly impleaded
3. Whether or not the election of Singson as the new member of the
Commission of Appointments is valid.
Held:
1. No. The petition involves a question in the legality of the act of
the chamber in removing the petitioner from the Commission on
Appointments which is not a political question as explained in

340
Tanada v. Cuenco: ―the term political question... refers ―to those
questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the
people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or
executive branch if the Government.‖ Furthermore, even if we were
to assume that the issue was political in nature, we would still not
be precluded from resolving it under the expanded jurisdiction
conferred upon us by Article VIII Section 1 of the Constitution that
now covers, in proper cases, even the political question.
2. The technical flaw in the designation of the party respondent,
assuming the existence of such a defect, may be brushed aside,
conformably to existing doctrine so that the important constitutional
issue raised may be addressed.
3. The authority of the House of Representatives to change its
representation in the Commission on Appointments to reflect at any
time the changes that may transpire in the political alignments of its
membership must be permanent and does not include the temporary
alliances or factional divisions not involving severance of political
koyalties or formal disaffiliation and permanent shifts of allegiance
from one political party to another.
Petition is dismissed and temporary restraining order dated January
13, 1989 is Lifted. The Court holds the respondent has been validly
elected as a member of the Commission on Appointments and is
entitled to assume his seat in that body pursuant to Art. VI Section
18 of the Constitution.

341
 PIMENTEL vs. ERMITA G.R. No. 164978
October 13, 2005 Legal Standing
OCTOBER 30, 2017
FACTS:
Petitioners file for certiorari and prohibition with a prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to declare
unconstitutional the appointments issued by President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo (―President Arroyo‖) through Executive Secretary
Eduardo R. Ermita (―Secretary Ermita‖) to Florencio B. Abad,
Avelino J. Cruz, Jr., Michael T. Defensor, Joseph H. Durano, Raul M.
Gonzalez, Alberto G. Romulo, Rene C. Villa, and Arthur C. Yap
(―respondents‖) as acting secretaries of their respective
departments.The petition also seeks to prohibit respondents from
performing the duties of department secretaries.
ISSUE:
1)The petition questions the constitutionality of President Arroyo's
appointment of respondents as acting secretaries without the
consent of the Commission on Appointments while Congress is in
session.
2)Do the petitioners have legal standing?
RULING:
The petition has no merit.
On the Mootness of the Petition
The Solicitor General argues that the petition is moot because
President Arroyo had extended to respondents ad interim
appointments on 23 September 2004 immediately after the recess of
Congress.
On the Nature of the Power to Appoint
The power to appoint is essentially executive in nature, and the
legislature may not interfere with the exercise of this executive
power except in those instances when the Constitution expressly
allows it to interfere.[6] Limitations on the executive power... to
appoint are construed strictly against the legislature.[7] The scope of
the legislature's interference in the executive's power to appoint is
limited to the power to prescribe the qualifications to an appointive
office. Congress cannot appoint a person... to an office in the guise of
prescribing qualifications to that office. Neither may Congress
342
impose on the President the duty to appoint any particular person to
an office.[8]
On Petitioners' Standing
Thus, on the impairment of the prerogatives of members of the
Commission on Appointments, only Senators Enrile, Lacson,
Angara, Ejercito-Estrada, and Osmeña have standing in the present
petition. This is in contrast to Senators Pimentel, Estrada, Lim, and
Madrigal, who, though... vigilant in protecting their perceived
prerogatives as members of Congress, possess no standing in the
present petition.
The Constitutionality of President Arroyo's Issuance... of
Appointments to Respondents as Acting Secretaries
The essence of an appointment in an acting capacity is its temporary
nature. It is a stop-gap measure intended to fill an office for a limited
time until the appointment of a permanent occupant to the
office.[16] In case of vacancy in an office occupied by... an alter ego
of the President, such as the office of a department secretary, the
President must necessarily appoint an alter ego of her choice as
acting secretary before the permanent appointee of her choice could
assume office.
Congress, through a law, cannot impose on the President the
obligation to appoint automatically the undersecretary as her
temporary alter ego. An alter ego, whether temporary or permanent,
holds a position of great trust and confidence. Congress, in the guise
of... prescribing qualifications to an office, cannot impose on the
President who her alter ego should be.
The office of a department secretary may become vacant while
Congress is in session. Since a department secretary is the alter ego
of the President, the acting appointee to the office must necessarily
have the President's confidence. Thus, by the very nature of the
office... of a department secretary, the President must appoint in an
acting capacity a person of her choice even while Congress is in
session. That person may or may not be the permanent appointee,
but practical reasons may make it expedient that the acting
appointee will also be the... permanent appointee.
The law expressly allows the President to make such acting
appointment. Section 17, Chapter 5, Title I, Book III of EO 292
states that "[t]he President may temporarily designate an officer
already in the government service or any other competent person to
perform the... functions of an office in the executive branch." Thus,
the President may even appoint in an acting capacity a person not yet

343
in the government service, as long as the President deems that
person competent.
Petitioners forget that Congress is not the only source of law. "Law"
refers to the
Constitution, statutes or acts of Congress, municipal ordinances,
implementing rules issued pursuant to law, and judicial
decisions.[17]
Finally, petitioners claim that the issuance of appointments in an
acting capacity is susceptible to abuse. Petitioners fail to consider
that acting appointments cannot exceed one year as expressly
provided in Section 17(3), Chapter 5, Title I, Book III of EO 292. The
law has... incorporated this safeguard to prevent abuses, like the use
of acting appointments as a way to circumvent confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the present petition for certiorari and
prohibition.
Principles:
Ad-interim appointments must be distinguished from appointments
in an acting capacity. Both of them are effective upon acceptance. But
ad-interim appointments are extended only during a recess of
Congress, whereas acting appointments may be extended any time
there is... a vacancy. Moreover ad-interim appointments are
submitted to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation or
rejection; acting appointments are not submitted to the Commission
on Appointments. Acting appointments are a way of temporarily
filling important offices but, if... abused, they can also be a way of
circumventing the need for confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments.[18]

344
 IN AID OF
LEGISLATION

345
Dela Paz vs. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
G.R. No. 184849
February 13, 2009

Petitioners: Spouses PNP Director Eliseo D. Dela Paz (Ret) and

Maria Fe C. Dela Paz
Respondents: Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and the
Senate Sergeant-at Arms Jose Balajadia, Jr.
Facts:

Petitioner (Ret. Gen Dela Paz) who was then the comptroller and
special disbursing officer of the PNP was one of the eight (8)
Philippine delegates who attended the 77 th General Assembly
Session of the International Criminal Police Organization (ICPO)-
INTERPOL held at St. Petersburg. They arrived in Moscow, Russia
but he was apprehended by the local authorities for failure to declare
in written form the 105,000 euros [approximately ₱ 6,930,000.00]
found in his luggage. In addition, he was also found to have in his
possession 45,000 euros (roughly equivalent to ₱2,970,000.00).

Petitioners were detained, however, he and other delegates were

eventually allowed to return to the Philippines but the Russian
government confiscated the said euros.
When Gen. Dela Paza arrived in Manila, awaiting him was a
subpoena earlier issued by the respondent Committee for the
conduct of an investigation regarding the Moscow incident.
The petitioner failed to attend the said hearing instead filed with
respondent Committee a pleading denominated ―Challenge to
Jurisdiction with Motion to Quash Subpoena. Senator Santiago
defended the Committee‘s jurisdiction and commanded Balajadia to
arrest the petitioners.
Hence, petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition
assailing that Respondent Committee rendered grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in taking
cognizance and actions over the said incident.
One of the Petitioners‘ contentions was the Respondent Committee
is devoid of any jurisdiction to investigate the Moscow incident as
the matter does not involve state to state relations as provided in

346
paragraph 12, Section 13, Rule 10 of the Senate Rules of Procedures
(Senate Rules).

Issue:
1. W/N the Respondent Committee has jurisdiction to
investigate the Moscow incident?

Ruling:
1. The issue partakes of the nature of a political question. Article
VI, Section 16 (3) of the Constitution provides that ―each
House shall determine the rules of its proceedings.‖ This
provision has been traditionally construed as a grant of full
discretionary authority to the Houses of Congress in the
formulation, adoption and promulgation of its own rules. As
such, the exercise of this power is generally exempt from
judicial supervision and interference, except on a clear showing
of such arbitrary and improvident use of the power as will
constitute a denial of due process.
Thus, it is not for this Court to intervene in what is clearly a
question of policy, an issue dependent upon the wisdom, not
the legality, of the Senate‘s action.

2. Even if it is within our power to inquire into the validity of the

exercise of jurisdiction over the petitioners by the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, we are convinced that
respondent Committee has acted within the proper sphere of
its authority.

Paragraph 12, Section 13, Rule 10 of the Senate Rules

provides:

12) Committee on Foreign Relations. – Fifteen (15)

members. All matters relating to the relations of
the Philippines with other nations generally;
diplomatic and consular services; the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations; the United Nations
Organization and its agencies; multi-lateral
organizations, all international agreements,
obligations and contracts; and overseas Filipinos.

347
 A reading of the above provision unmistakably shows that the
investigation of the Moscow incident involving petitioners is
well within the respondent Committee‘s jurisdiction.

The Moscow incident could create ripples in the relations

between the Philippines and Russia. Gen. Dela Paz went to
Moscow in an official capacity, as a member of the Philippine
delegation to the INTERPOL Conference in St. Petersburg,
carrying a huge amount of "public" money ostensibly to cover
the expenses to be incurred by the delegation. For his failure to
comply with immigration and currency laws, the Russian
government confiscated the money in his possession and
detained him and other members of the delegation in Moscow.

Furthermore, the matter affects Philippine international

obligations. We take judicial notice of the fact that the
Philippines is a state-party to the United Nations Convention
Against Corruption and the United Nations Convention
Against Transnational Organized Crime. The two conventions
contain provisions dealing with the movement of considerable
foreign currency across borders. The Moscow incident would
reflect on our country‘s compliance with the obligations
required of state-parties under these conventions. Thus, the
respondent Committee can properly inquire into this matter,
particularly as to the source and purpose of the funds
discovered in Moscow as this would involve the Philippines‘
commitments under these conventions.

3. The Philippine Senate has decided that the legislative inquiry

will be jointly conducted by the respondent Committee and the
Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and
Investigations (Blue Ribbon Committee).

Pursuant to paragraph 36, Section 13, Rule 10 of the Senate

Rules, the Blue Ribbon Committee may conduct investigations
on all matters relating to malfeasance, misfeasance and
nonfeasance in office by officers and employees of the
government, its branches, agencies, subdivisions and
instrumentalities, and on any matter of public interest on its
own initiative or brought to its attention by any of its
members. It is, thus, beyond cavil that the Blue Ribbon
Committee can investigate Gen. Dela Paz, a retired PNP
general and member of the official PNP delegation to the
INTERPOL Conference in Russia, who had with him millions
which may have been sourced from public funds.

348
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit and for
being moot and academic.

349
G.R. No. 180308 June 19, 2012

PHILCOMSAT HOLDINGS CORPORATION, ENRIQUE L. LOCSIN

AND MANUEL D. ANDAL, Petitioners,
vs.
SENATE OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, SENATE
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT CORPORATIONS AND PUBLIC
ENTERPRISES, SENATE COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SERVICES,
HON. SEN. RICHARD GORDON AND HON. SEN. JUAN PONCE
ENRILE, Respondents.

FACTS:

The Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation

(PHILCOMSAT) is a wholly-owned subsidiary of the Philippine
Overseas Telecommunications Corporation (POTC), a government-
sequestered organization in which the Republic of the Philippines
holds a 35% interest in shares of stocks.2 Petitioner PHILCOMSAT
Holdings Corporation (PHC), meanwhile, is a private corporation
duly organized and existing under Philippine laws and a holding
company whose main operation is collecting the money market
interest income of PHILCOMSAT.

Petitioners Enrique L. Locsin and Manuel D. Andal are both

directors and corporate officers of PHC, as well as nominees of the
government to the board of directors of both POTC and
PHILCOMSAT.3 By virtue of its interests in both PHILCOMSAT and
POTC, the government has, likewise, substantial interest in PHC.

For the period from 1986 to 1996, the government, through the
Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), regularly
received cash dividends from POTC. In 1998, however, POTC
suffered its first loss. Similarly, in 2004, PHC sustained a ₱7-million
loss attributable to its huge operating expenses. By 2005, PHC's
operating expenses had ballooned tremendously. Likewise, several
PHC board members established Telecommunications Center, Inc.
(TCI), a wholly-owned PHC subsidiary to which PHC funds had
been allegedly advanced without the appropriate accountability
reports given to PHC and PHILCOMSAT.4

On February 20, 2006, in view of the losses that the government

continued to incur and in order to protect its interests in POTC,
PHILCOMSAT and PHC, Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, during
the Second Regular Session of the Thirteenth Congress of the
Philippines, introduced Proposed Senate Resolution (PSR) No.

350
4555 directing the conduct of an inquiry, in aid of legislation, on the
anomalous losses incurred by POTC, PHILCOMSAT and PHC and
the mismanagement committed by their respective board of
directors. PSR No. 455 was referred to respondent Committee on
Government Corporations and Public Enterprises, which conducted
eleven (11) public hearings6 on various dates. Petitioners Locsin and
Andal were invited to attend these hearings as "resource persons."

On June 7, 2007, respondents Senate Committees submitted the

assailed Committee Report No. 312, where it noted the need to
examine the role of the PCGG in the management of POTC,
PHILCOMSAT and PHC. After due proceedings, the respondents
Senate Committees found overwhelming mismanagement by the
PCGG and its nominees over POTC, PHILCOMSAT and PHC, and
that PCGG was negligent in performing its mandate to preserve the
government's interests in the said corporations. In sum, Committee
Report No. 312 recommended, inter alia, the privatization and
transfer of the jurisdiction over the shares of the government in
POTC and PHILCOMSAT to the Privatization Management Office
(PMO) under the Department of Finance (DOF) and the
replacement of government nominees as directors of POTC and
PHILCOMSAT.

On November 15, 2007, petitioners filed the instant petition before

the Court, questioning, in particular, the haste with which the
respondent Senate approved the challenged Committee Report No.
312.7 They also claim that respondent Senator Richard Gordon acted
with partiality and bias and denied them their basic right to
counsel,8 and that respondent Senator Juan Ponce Enrile, despite
having voluntarily recused himself from the proceedings in view of
his personal interests in POTC, nonetheless continued to participate
actively in the hearings.9

ISSUES:

The basic issues advanced before the Court are:

(1) whether the respondent Senate committed grave abuse of

discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction in approving
Committee Resolution No. 312; and

(2) whether it should be nullified, having proposed no piece of

legislation and having been hastily approved by the respondent
Senate.

RULING:
351
The respondents Senate Committees' power of inquiry relative to
PSR No. 455 has been passed upon and upheld in the consolidated
cases of In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Camilo L.
Sabio,10 which cited Article VI, Section 21 of the Constitution, as
follows:

"The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective

committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance
with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons
appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected."

The Court explained that such conferral of the legislative power of

inquiry upon any committee of Congress, in this case the
respondents Senate Committees, must carry with it all powers
necessary and proper for its effective discharge.

On this score, the respondents Senate Committees cannot be said to

have acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in
excess of jurisdiction when it submitted Committee Resolution No.
312, given its constitutional mandate to conduct legislative inquiries.
Nor can the respondent Senate be faulted for doing so on the very
same day that the assailed resolution was submitted. The wide
latitude given to Congress with respect to these legislative inquiries
has long been settled, otherwise, Article VI, Section 21 would be
rendered pointless. Hence, on the basis of the pronouncements in
the Sabio case, and as suggested13 by the parties in their respective
pleadings, the issues put forth in the petition14 have become
academic.

Corollarily, petitioners Locsin and Andal's allegation15 that their

constitutionally-guaranteed right to counsel was violated during the
hearings held in furtherance of PSR No. 455 is specious. The right to
be assisted by counsel can only be invoked by a person under
custodial investigation suspected for the commission of a crime, and
therefore attaches only during such custodial investigation.16 Since
petitioners Locsin and Andal were invited to the public hearings as
resource persons, they cannot therefore validly invoke their right to
counsel. Thus, the petition is DISMISSED

352
G.R. No. 89914 November 20, 1991

BENGZON JR., petitioner, vs. THE SENATE BLUE RIBBON

COMMITTEE AND ITS MEMBERS, represented by and through the
CHAIRMAN, HON. WIGBERTO TAÑADA, respondents, JOSE S.
SANDEJAS, intervenor.

PADILLA, J.:

FACTS: On 30 July 1987, the Republic of the Philippines, filed with

the Sandiganbayan a civil case, wherein petitioner is a defendant, for
the alleged anomalous sale by Koko Romualdez of several
government corporations to the group of Lopa, a brother in law of
President Cory Aquino. On 13 September 1988, the Senate Minority
Floor Leader, Hon. Juan Ponce Enrile delivered a privilege speech
before the Senate on the alleged "take-over of SOLOIL Incorporated,
the flagship of the First Manila Management of Companies (FMMC)
by Ricardo Lopa", and called upon "the Senate to look into the
possible violation of the law in the case, particularly with regard to
Republic Act No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act."

Thereafter, the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee started its

investigation on the matter. Petitioners and Ricardo Lopa were
subpoenaed by the Committee to appear before it and testify on
"what they know" regarding the "sale of thirty-six corporations
belonging to Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez.". Ricardo Lopa declined
to testify on the ground that his testimony may "unduly prejudice"
the defendants in civil case before the Sandiganbayan, and herein
petitioner contended that the aforementioned committee acted in
excess of its jurisdiction and legislative purpose by claiming that the
inquiry conducted was beyond the jurisdiction of the Senate.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee's inquiry

has no valid legislative purpose, i.e., it is not done in aid of
legislation.

HELD: The Senate Blue Ribbon Committee's inquiry has no valid

legislative purpose. Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
expressly recognizes the power of both houses of Congress to
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. The power of both houses of
Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is not, therefore,
absolute or unlimited. Thus, as provided therein, the investigation
353
must be "in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published
rules of procedure" and that "the rights of persons appearing in or
affected by such inquiries shall be respected." It follows then that the
rights of persons under the Bill of Rights must be respected,
including the right to due process and the right not to be compelled
to testify against one's self.

Verily, the speech of Senator Enrile contained no suggestion of

contemplated legislation; he merely called upon the Senate to look
into a possible violation of Sec. 5 of RA No. 3019, otherwise known
as "The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act." In other words, the
purpose of the inquiry to be conducted by respondent Blue Ribbon
committee was to find out whether or not the relatives of President
Aquino, particularly Mr. Ricardo Lopa, had violated the law in
connection with the alleged sale of the 36 or 39 corporations
belonging to Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez to the Lopa Group. It
appeals, therefore, that the contemplated inquiry by respondent
Committee is not really "in aid of legislation" because it is not related
to a purpose within the jurisdiction of Congress, since the aim of the
investigation is to find out whether or not the ralatives of the
President or Mr. Ricardo Lopa had violated Section 5 RA No. 3019,
the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act", a matter that appears
more within the province of the courts rather than of the legislature.

If we presently rule that petitioners may not be compelled by the

respondent Committee to appear, testify and produce evidence
before it, it is only because we hold that the questioned inquiry is
not in aid of legislation and, if pursued, would be violative of the
principle of separation of powers between the legislative and the
judicial departments of government, ordained by the Constitution.

***NOTE: To allow the respondent Committee to conduct its own

investigation of an issue already filed before the Sandiganbayan
would not only pose the possibility of conflicting judgments between
a legislative committee and a judicial tribunal, but if the Committee's
judgment were to be reached before that of the Sandiganbayan, the
possibility of its influence being made to bear on the ultimate
judgment of the Sandiganbayan cannot be discounted.

***NOTE: Inquiries may refer to the implementation or re-

examination of any law or in connection with any proposed

354
legislation or the formulation of future legislation. They may also
extend to any and all matters vested by the Constitution in Congress
and/or in the Senate alone

355
PUBLISHED
RULES OF
PROCEDURE

356
Neri vs. Senate
G.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008

FACTS:
Former NEDA Director General Romulo Neri testified before the
Senate for 11 hours relating to the ZTE-NBN mess. However, when
probed further on what he and the President discussed about the
NBN Project, he refused to answer, invoking ―executive privilege‖. In
particular, he refused to answer 3 questions:
(a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN
Project
(b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it
(c) whether or not she directed him to approve it

Unrelenting, the Senate Committees issued a Subpoena Ad

Testificandum to Neri, requiring him to appear and testify on
November 20, 2007. However, Executive Secretary Eduardo R.
Ermita requested the Senate Committees to dispense with Neri‘s
testimony on the ground of executive privilege. In his letter, Ermita
said ―that the information sought to be disclosed might impair our
diplomatic as well as economic relations with China.‖ Neri did not
appear before the Committees. As a result, the Senate issued an
Order citing him in contempt and ordered his arrest and detention
until such time that he would appear and give his testimony.

ISSUE: Whether the Legislative Branch can assert their power to

conduct legislative inquiries after respondent invoked ―Executive
Privilege‖

RULING:
The members of respondent Committees should not invoke as
justification in their exercise of power a right properly belonging to
the people in general. This is because when they discharge their
power, they do so as public officials and members of Congress. Be
that as it may, the right to information must be balanced with and
should give way, in appropriate cases, to constitutional precepts
particularly those pertaining to delicate interplay of executive-
legislative powers and privileges which is the subject of careful
review by numerous decided cases.

357
Respondent Committees argue as if this were the first time the
presumption in favor of the presidential communications privilege is
mentioned and adopted in our legal system. That is far from the
truth. The Court, in the earlier case of Almonte v. Vasquez, (1995),
affirmed that the presidential communications privilege is
fundamental to the operation of government and inextricably rooted
in the separation of powers under the Constitution. Even Senate v.
Ermita, (2006), the case relied upon by respondent Committees,
reiterated this concept. There, the Court enumerated the cases in
which the claim of executive privilege was recognized, among
them Almonte v. Chavez, Chavez v. Presidential Commission on
Good Government (PCGG), (1998) and Chavez v. PEA, (2002). The
Court articulated in these cases that ―there are certain types of
information which the government may withhold from the public,‖
that there is a ―governmental privilege against public disclosure with
respect to state secrets regarding military, diplomatic and other
national security matters;‖ and that ―the right to information does
not extend to matters recognized as ‗privileged information‘ under
the separation of powers, by which the Court meant Presidential
conversations, correspondences, and discussions in closed-door
Cabinet meetings.‖

358
 VIRGILIO O. GARCILLANO VS.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEES ON
PUBLIC INFORMATION, PUBLIC ORDER AND SAFETY,
NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY, INFORMATION AND
COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY, and SUFFRAGE AND
ELECTORAL REFORMS3
G.R. No. 170338, December 23, 2008
NACHURA, J.:
Facts:
When the Hello Garci tapes, allegedly containing the
conversations between Pres. Arroyo and COMELEC Com. Garcillano
to manipulate in the former‘s favor, the results of the 2004
presidential elections surfaced, the committees of each house of
congress conducted hearings. After long debates, the tapes were
played and the hearings were indefinitely suspended. The members
were ordered to prepare their reports based on the tapes. Garcillano
filed with the SC for prohibition with TRO and WPI to restrain the
House Committees (HC) from using the tape recordings for their
reports. After some time, the Senate delved back to the issue.
Ranada and Agcaoili filed a similar petition seeking to bar the Senate
from conducting their scheduled inquiry. Since the SC did not issue
a TRO, the tapes were played. Some of the senators entered as
respondent-intervenors. Maj. Sagge on the other hand entered as a
petitioner-in-intervention.
Issue:
Whether the HC of the Senate may proceed on the inquiry.
Ruling:
Negative.
Procedural Issues: Petitioners have locus standi. It was alleged
that Garcillano is the person alluded to in the tapes; Ranada and
Agcaoili are concerned citizens, taxpayers, and members of the IBP;
and Sagge alleges violation of his right to due process considering
that he is summoned to attend the Senate hearings.
Garcillano Petition: The Garcillano petition is moot and
academic. The tapes were already played and the committee reports
were completed and submitted to the House in plenary.
Ranada and Agcaoili Petition: Their petition is granted. Senate
cannot be allowed to continue the inquiry without duly published

359
rules of procedure pursuant to Art VI, Sec 21. Publication is
imperative, for it will be the height of injustice to punish or
otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law or rule of
which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.
Notably, respondent HCs admit that the Senate Rules on Legislative
Inquiries was published in newspapers of general circulation only in
1995 and in 2006. The Senate as an institution is continuing, as it is
not dissolved as an entity with each national election or change in
the composition of its members. However, it is not continuing in its
day-to-day business. Consequently, the Rules of Procedure must be
republished by the Senate after every expiration of Congress. Thus,
all pending matters, are considered terminated upon the expiration
of a congress, but may be taken by the succeeding congress as if
presented for the first time. Evidently, the Senate has determined
that its main rules are intended to be valid from the date of their
adoption until they are amended or repealed. Such language is
conspicuously absent from the subject rules. The non-amendment of
the rule is also immaterial. The constitution does not distinguish
among original, amended or revised rules. The invocation of RA
8792 is also misplaced. The law only considers the use of electronics
as a valid document for evidentiary purposes. It does not make the
internet a medium for publishing laws, rules and regulations. Lastly,
the rule‘s recent publication does not cure the infirmity. Insofar as
these cases are concerned, the legislative investigation still could not
be undertaken by the respondents.

360
EXECUTIVE
PRIVELEGE

361
 Senate v. Ermita, G.R. No. 169777, April 20, 2006
FACTS:
In 2005, scandals involving anomalous transactions about the
North Rail Project as well as the Garci tapes surfaced. This prompted
the Senate to conduct a public hearing to investigate the said
anomalies particularly the alleged overpricing in the NRP. The
investigating Senate committee issued invitations to certain
department heads and military officials to speak before the
committee as resource persons. Ermita submitted that he and some
of the department heads cannot attend the said hearing due to
pressing matters that need immediate attention. AFP Chief of Staff
Senga likewise sent a similar letter. Drilon, the senate president,
excepted the said requests for they were sent belatedly and
arrangements were already made and scheduled. Subsequently, GMA
issued EO 464 which took effect immediately. EO 464 basically
prohibited Department heads, Senior officials of executive
departments who in the judgment of the department heads are
covered by the executive privilege; Generals and flag officers of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines and such other officers who in the
judgment of the Chief of Staff are covered by the executive privilege;
Philippine National Police (PNP) officers with rank of chief
superintendent or higher and such other officers who in the
judgment of the Chief of the PNP are covered by the executive
privilege; Senior national security officials who in the judgment of
the National Security Adviser are covered by the executive privilege;
and Such other officers as may be determined by the President, from
appearing in such hearings conducted by Congress without first
securing the president‘s approval. The department heads and the
military officers who were invited by the Senate committee then
invoked EO 464 to except themselves. Despite EO 464, the
scheduled hearing proceeded with only 2 military personnel
attending. For defying President Arroyo‘s order barring military
personnel from testifying before legislative inquiries without her
approval, Brig. Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan were relieved from
their military posts and were made to face court martial proceedings.
EO 464‘s constitutionality was assailed for it is alleged that it
infringes on the rights and duties of Congress to conduct
investigation in aid of legislation and conduct oversight functions in
the implementation of laws.

362
ISSUE: Whether or not EO 464 is constitutional.

HELD:
The SC ruled that EO 464 is constitutional in part. To
determine the validity of the provisions of EO 464, the SC sought to
distinguish Section 21 from Section 22 of Art 6 of the 1987
Constitution. The Congress‘ power of inquiry is expressly recognized
in Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution. Although there is no
provision in the Constitution expressly investing either House of
Congress with power to make investigations and exact testimony to
the end that it may exercise its legislative functions advisedly and
effectively, such power is so far incidental to the legislative function
as to be implied. In other words, the power of inquiry – with process
to enforce it – is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the
legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or
effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions
which the legislation is intended to affect or change; and where the
legislative body does not itself possess the requisite information –
which is not infrequently true – recourse must be had to others who
do possess it. Section 22 on the other hand provides for the
Question Hour. The Question Hour is closely related with the
legislative power, and it is precisely as a complement to or a
supplement of the Legislative Inquiry. The appearance of the
members of Cabinet would be very, very essential not only in the
application of check and balance but also, in effect, in aid of
legislation. Section 22 refers only to Question Hour, whereas,
Section 21 would refer specifically to inquiries in aid of legislation,
under which anybody for that matter, may be summoned and if he
refuses, he can be held in contempt of the House. A distinction was
thus made between inquiries in aid of legislation and the question
hour. While attendance was meant to be discretionary in the
question hour, it was compulsory in inquiries in aid of legislation.
Sections 21 and 22, therefore, while closely related and
complementary to each other, should not be considered as pertaining
to the same power of Congress. One specifically relates to the power
to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation, the aim of which is to elicit
information that may be used for legislation, while the other pertains
to the power to conduct a question hour, the objective of which is to
obtain information in pursuit of Congress‘ oversight function.
Ultimately, the power of Congress to compel the appearance of
executive officials under Section 21 and the lack of it under Section
363
22 find their basis in the principle of separation of powers. While the
executive branch is a co-equal branch of the legislature, it cannot
frustrate the power of Congress to legislate by refusing to comply
with its demands for information. When Congress exercises its
power of inquiry, the only way for department heads to exempt
themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege. They are not
exempt by the mere fact that they are department heads. Only one
executive official may be exempted from this power — the President
on whom executive power is vested, hence, beyond the reach of
Congress except through the power of impeachment. It is based on
her being the highest official of the executive branch, and the due
respect accorded to a co-equal branch of government which is
sanctioned by a long-standing custom. The requirement then to
secure presidential consent under Section 1, limited as it is only to
appearances in the question hour, is valid on its face. For under
Section 22, Article VI of the Constitution, the appearance of
department heads in the question hour is discretionary on their part.
Section 1 cannot, however, be applied to appearances of department
heads in inquiries in aid of legislation. Congress is not bound in such
instances to respect the refusal of the department head to appear in
such inquiry, unless a valid claim of privilege is subsequently made,
either by the President herself or by the Executive Secretary.

When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department

heads are implementing the statutes which it has issued, its right to
such information is not as imperative as that of the President to
whom, as Chief Executive, such department heads must give a report
of their performance as a matter of duty. In such instances, Section
22, in keeping with the separation of powers, states that Congress
may only request their appearance. Nonetheless, when the inquiry in
which Congress requires their appearance is ‗in aid of legislation‘
under Section 21, the appearance is mandatory for the same reasons
stated in Arnault.

364
SUBJUDICE

365
G.R. No. 174105 April 2, 2009

REGHIS M. ROMERO II, EDMOND Q. SESE, LEOPOLDO T.

SANCHEZ, REGHIS M. ROMERO III, MICHAEL L. ROMERO,
NATHANIEL L. ROMERO, and JEROME R.
CANLAS, Petitioners,
vs.
SENATOR JINGGOY E. ESTRADA and SENATE COMMITTEE
ON LABOR, EMPLOYMENT AND HUMAN RESOURCES
DEVELOPMENT, Respondents.

VELASCO, JR., J.:

Facts:

The petitioners were invited by the Senate Committee on

Labor, Employment, and Human Resources Development
(Committee) in connection with its investigation on the investment
of Overseas Workers Welfare Administration (OWWA) funds in the
Smokey Mountain project. The inquiry/investigation is specifically
intended to aid the Senate in the review and possible amendments to
the pertinent provisions of R.A. 8042, "the Migrant Workers Act"
and to craft a much needed legislation relative to the stated subject
matter and purpose of the aforementioned Resolutions.

In a letter-reply, petitioner Romero II requested to be excused

from appearing and testifying before the Committee at its scheduled
hearings. Estrada, as Chairperson of the Committee, caused the
service of a subpoena ad testificandum on petitioner Romero II
directing him to appear and testify before the Committee at its
hearing. Petitioners filed a petition seeking to bar the Committee
from continuing with its inquiry and to enjoin it from compelling
petitioners to appear before it pursuant to the invitations thus
issued.

Issues:

Whether or not:
1. The subject matter of the investigation is sub judice owing to
the pendency of the Chavez petition- Chavez vs National
Housing Authority and a bar to the continuance of the
investigation.
2. The Senate Committee violated the right of the petitioners
against self-incrimination.

366
Held:
1) Sub judice does not bar the continuance of the committee
investigation. The Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in
Aid of Legislation provide that the filing or pendency of any
prosecution or administrative action should not stop or abate any
inquiry to carry out a legislative purpose. A legislative investigation
in aid of legislation and court proceedings has different purposes. On
one hand, courts conduct hearings or like adjudicative procedures to
settle, through the application of a law, actual controversies arising
between adverse litigants and involving demandable rights. On the
other hand, inquiries in aid of legislation are undertaken as tools to
enable the legislative body to gather information and, thus, legislate
wisely and effectively. On-going judicial proceedings do not preclude
congressional hearings in aid of legislation.

2) The Senate Committee does not violate the petitioners‘

right against self-incrimination. When the Committee issued
invitations and subpoenas to petitioners to appear before it in
connection with its investigation of the aforementioned investments,
it did so pursuant to its authority to conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation as provided in Art. VI, Sec. 21 of the Constitution. The
Court emphasizes the importance of the duty of those subpoenaed to
appear before the legislature, even if incidentally incriminating
questions are expected to be asked and if the power of inquiry is
abused, such issue may be presented before the courts.

367
 SELF-
INCRIMINATION

368
G.R. No. 167173 December 27, 2007
STANDARD CHARTERED BANK (Philippine Branch), PAUL
SIMON MORRIS, SUNDARA RAMESH, OWEN BELMAN, SANJAY
AGGARWAL, RAJAMANI CHANDRASHEKAR, MARIVEL
GONZALES, MA. ELLEN VICTOR, CHONA G. REYES, ZENAIDA
IGLESIAS, RAMONA BERNAD, MICHAELANGELO AGUILAR, and
FERNAND TANSINGCO, Petitioners,
vs.
SENATE COMMITTEE ON BANKS, FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
AND CURRENCIES, as represented by its Chairperson, HON.
EDGARDO J. ANGARA, Respondent.

FACTS:
Standard Chartered Bank (SCB)-Philippines is an institution
incorporated in England with limited liability and is licensed to
engage in banking, trust, and other related operations in the
Philippines. It had a criminal and civil charges against them before
the courts in Metro Manila for selling unregistered foreign securities
in violation of Securities Regulation Code (RA 8799). Senator Enrile
delivered a privileged speech, urged the Senate to immediately
conduct an inquiry in aid of legislation, to prevent the occurrences of
a similar fraudulent in the future. The Committee set an initial
hearing to investigate, in aid of legislation thereto. Standard
chartered Bank-Philippines stressed that there were cases allegedly
involving the same issues subject of legislative inquiry, thereby
posting a challenge to the jurisdiction of respondent Committee to
proceed with the inquiry. Petitioner now seeks that respondent
committee be enjoined from proceeding and claiming that since the
issue is already preempted by the courts, the legislative investigation
is an encroachment upon the judicial powers vested solely in the
courts.
Issue:

Whether or not the investigation in aid of legislation by respondent

committee encroaches upon the judicial power of the courts.

Held:

No, The unmistakable objective of the investigation, as set forth in

the said resolution, exposes the error in petitioners‘ allegation that
the inquiry, as initiated in a privilege speech by Senator Enrile, was

369
simply ―to denounce the illegal practice committed by a foreign bank
in selling unregistered foreign securities x x x.‖ At the conclusion of
his privilege speech, Senator Enrile urged the Senate ―to immediately
conduct an inquiry, in aid of legislation, so as to prevent the
occurrence of a similar fraudulent activity in the future.‖

Indeed, the mere filing of a criminal or an administrative complaint

before a court or a quasi-judicial body should not automatically bar
the conduct of legislative investigation. Otherwise, it would be
extremely easy to subvert any intended inquiry by Congress through
the convenient ploy of instituting a criminal or an administrative
complaint. Surely, the exercise of sovereign legislative authority, of
which the power of legislative inquiry is an essential component,
cannot be made subordinate to a criminal or an administrative
investigation.

Neither can the petitioners claim that they were singled out by the
respondent Committee. The Court notes that among those invited as
resource persons were officials of the Securities and Exchange
Commission and the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas. These officials
were subjected to the same critical scrutiny by the respondent
relative to their separate findings on the illegal sale of unregistered
foreign securities by SCB-Philippines. It is obvious that the objective
of the investigation was the quest for remedies, in terms of
legislation, to prevent the recurrence of the allegedly fraudulent
activity.

It may be conceded that Congress is without authority to compel

disclosures for the purpose of aiding the prosecution of pending
suits but the authority of that body, directly or through its
Committees, to require pertinent disclosures in aid of its own
constitutional power is not abridged because the information sought
to be elicited may also be of use in such suits. It is plain that
investigation of the matters involved in suits brought or to be
commenced under the Senate resolution directing the institution of
suits for the cancellation of the leases might directly aid in respect of
legislative action. Wherefore, the petition for prohibition is DENIED
for lack of merit.

370
 WAR AND
NATIONAL
EMERGENCIES

371
G.R. No. L-2044

J. ANTONIO ARANETA, petitioner,

vs.
RAFAEL DINGLASAN, Judge of First Instance of Manila, and
JOSE P. BENGZON, Fiscal of City of Manila, respondents.

Facts:

The petitions challenged the validity of executive orders issued

by virtue of CA No. 671 or the Emergency Powers Act. CA 671
declared a state of emergency as a result of war and authorized the
President to promulgate rules and regulations to meet such
emergency. However, the Act did not fix the duration of its
effectivity.

EO 62 regulates rentals for houses and lots for residential

buildings. The petitioner, Araneta, is under prosecution in the CFI
for violation of the provisions of this EO 62 and prays for the
issuance of the writ of prohibition.

EO 192, aims to control exports from the Philippines. Leon Ma.

Guerrero seeks a writ of mandamus to compel the Administrator of
the Sugar Quota Office and the Commissioner of Customs to permit
the exportation of shoes. Both officials refuse to issue the required
export license on the ground that the exportation of shoes from the
Philippines is forbidden by this EO.

EO 225, which appropriates funds for the operation of the

Government during the period from July 1, 1949 to June 30, 1950,
and for other purposes was assailed by petitioner Eulogio Rodriguez,
Sr., as a tax-payer, elector, and president of the Nacionalista Party.
He applied for a writ of prohibition to restrain the Treasurer of the
Philippines from disbursing the funds by virtue of this EO.

Finally, EO 226, which appropriated P6M to defray the expenses in

connection with the national elections in 1949. was questioned by
Antonio Barredo, as a citizen, tax-payer and voter. He asked the
Court to prevent "the respondents from disbursing, spending or
otherwise disposing of that amount or any part of it.

ISSUE:

Whether or not CA 671 ceased to have any force and effect

372
RULING:

YES. The Act fixed a definite limited period. The Court held that it
became inoperative when Congress met during the opening of the
regular session on May 1946 and that EOs 62, 192, 225 and 226
were issued without authority of law . The session of the Congress is
the point of expiration of the Act and not the first special session
after it.

Executive Orders No. 62 (dated June 21, 1947) regulating

house and lot rentals, No. 192 (dated December 24, 1948) regulating
exports, Nos. 225 and 226 (dated June 15,1949) the first
appropriation funds for the operation of the Government from July 1,
1949 to June 30, 1950, and the second appropriating funds for
election expenses in November 1949, were therefore declared null
and void for having been issued after Act No. 671 had lapsed and/or
after the Congress had enacted legislation on the same subjects. This
is based on the language of Act 671 that the National Assembly
restricted the life of the emergency powers of the President to the
time the Legislature was prevented from holding sessions due to
enemy action or other causes brought on by the war.

373
G.R. No. L-6266 February 2, 1953

Petitioners : EULOGIO RODRIGUEZ, SR., ETC., ET AL.,

vs.
Respondents : VICENTE GELLA, ETC., ET AL.,

Ponente : PARAS, C.J.:

FACTS:

On August 26, 1949, the court passed upon the status of

Commonwealth Act No. 671 approved on December 16, 1941,
"declaring a state of total emergency as a result of war involving the
Philippines and authorizing the President to promulgate rules and
regulations to meet such emergency." Five members held that the
Act ceased to be operative in its totality on May 25, 1946 when the
Congress convened in special session. It was in effect concluded that
the powers delegated to the President had been withdrawn as to
matters already legislated upon by the Congress or on which the
latter had demonstrated its readiness or ability to act. Executive
Orders No. 62 (dated June 21, 1947) regulating house and lot
rentals, No. 192 (dated December 24, 1948) regulating exports, Nos.
225 and 226 (dated June 15,1949) the first appropriation funds for
the operation of the Government from July 1, 1949 to June 30, 1950,
and the second appropriating funds for election expenses in
November 1949, were therefore declared null and void for having
been issued after Act No. 671 had lapsed and/or after the Congress
had enacted legislation on the same subjects.

New petition of the same consideration was filed by the petitioners

to invalidate the Executive Orders Nos. 545 and 546 issued on
November 10, 1952, the first appropriating the sum of P37,850,500
for urgent and essential public works, and the second setting aside
the sum of P11,367,600 for relief in the provinces and cities visited
by typhoons, floods, droughts, earthquakes, volcanic action and
other calamities.

House Bill No. 727 repealing all Emergency Powers Acts was passed,
however, disapproved by the President.

Issue: Whether or not EO 545 and 546 are still operative.

Held:

1. Although House Bill No. 727, had been vetoed by the President
and did not thereby become a regular statute, it may at least be

374
 considered as a concurrent resolution of the Congress formally
declaring the termination of the emergency powers. To
contend that the Bill needed presidential acquiescence to
produce effect, would lead to the anomalous, if not absurd,
situation that, "while Congress might delegate its power by a
simple majority, it might not be able to recall them except by
two-third vote. In other words, it would be easier for Congress
to delegate its powers than to take them back. This is not right
and is not, and ought not to be the law."
2. Act No. 671 may be likened to an ordinary contract of agency,
whereby the consent of the agent is necessary only in the sense
that he cannot be compelled to accept the trust, in the same
way that the principal cannot be forced to keep the relation in
eternity or at the will of the agent. Neither can it be suggested
that the agency created under the Act is coupled with interest.
3. The logical view consistent with constitutionality is to hold
that the powers lasted only during the emergency resulting
from the last world war which factually involved the
Philippines when Act No. 671 was passed on December 16,
1941. That emergency, which naturally terminated upon the
ending of the last world war, was contemplated by the
members of the National Assembly on the foresight that the
actual state of war could prevent it from holding its next
regular session. Shelter may not be sought in the proposition
that the President should be allowed to exercise emergency
powers for the sake of speed and expediency in the interest and
for the welfare of the people because we have the Constitution
designed to establish a government under a regime of justice,
liberty and democracy, and since our government is based on
the system of separation of powers.

Wherefore, Executive Orders Nos. 545 and 546 are hereby declared
null and void, and the respondents are ordered to desist from
appropriating, releasing, allotting, and expending the public funds
set aside therein.

375
DAVID v ARROYO
FACTS
On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20th
Anniversary of the Edsa People Power I, President Arroyo issued
Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 declaring a state of national
emergency and call upon the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP)
and the Philippine National Police (PNP), to prevent and suppress
acts of terrorism and lawless violence in the country. The Office of
the President announced the cancellation of all programs and
activities related to the 20th anniversary celebration of Edsa People
Power I, and revoked the permits to hold rallies issued earlier by
local governments and dispersal of the rallyists along EDSA. The
police arrested (without warrant) petitioner Randolf S. David, a
professor at the University of the Philippines and newspaper
columnist. Also arrested was his companion, Ronald Llamas,
president of party-list Akbayan.
In the early morning of February 25, 2006, operatives of the
Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG) of the PNP, on
the basis of Presidential proclamation 1017 and G.O. No.5, raided
the Daily Tribune offices in Manila in attempt to arrest was made
against representatives of ANAKPAWIS, GABRIELA and BAYAN
MUNA whom suspected of inciting to sedition and rebellion. On
March 3, 2006, President Arroyo issued Presidential Proclamation
1021 declaring that the state of national emergency has ceased to
exist. Petitioners filed seven (7) certiorari with the Supreme Court
and three (3) of those petitions impleaded President Arroyo as
respondent questioning the legality of the proclamation, alleging that
it encroaches the emergency powers of Congress and it violates the
constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press, of speech and
assembly.
ISSUE
6. Whether or not Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 is
unconstitutional?
7. Whether or not the warrantless arrest of Randolf |S. David
and Ronald Llamas and the dispersal of KMU and NAFLU-
KMU members during rallies were valid?
8. Whether or not it is proper to implead President Gloria
Macapagal Arroyo as respondent in the petitions?

376
 9. Whether or not the petitioners have a legal standing in
questioning the constitutionality of the Proclamation?
10. Whether or not the concurrence of congress is necessary
whenever the alarming powers incident to Martial Law are
used?
RULING
6. The Court finds and so holds that Presidential Proclamation
1017 is constitutional insofar as it constitutes a call by the
President for the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence
whenever becomes necessary as prescribe under Section 18,
Article VII of the Constitution. However, there were
extraneous provisions giving the President express or implied
power
a. To issue decrees
b. To direct the AFP to enforce obedience to all laws even
those not related to lawless violence as well as decrees
promulgated by the President
c. To impose standards on media or any form of prior
restraint on press are ultra vires and unconstitutional.
The Court also rules that under Section 17, Article XII of
the Constitution, the President, in the absence of
legislative legislation, cannot take over privately-owned
public utility and private business affected with public
interest. Therefore, the Presidential Proclamation No.
1017 is only partly unconstitutional.
7. The warrantless arrest of Randolf S. David and Ronald Llamas;
the dispersal and warrantless arrest of the KMU and NAFLU-
KMU members during their rallies are illegal, in the absence of
proof that these petitioners were committing acts constituting
lawless violence, invasion or rebellion and violating BP 880;
the imposition of standards on media or any form of prior
restraint on the press, as well as the warrantless search of the
Tribune offices and whimsical seizure of its articles for
publication and other materials, are declared unconstitutional
because there was no clear and present danger of a substantive
evil that the state has a right to prevent.
8. It is not proper to implead President Arroyo as respondent.
Settled is the doctrine that the President, during his tenure of
office or actual incumbency, may not be sued in any civil or

377
 criminal case, and there is no need to provide for it in the
Constitution or law.
9. This Court adopted the ―direct injury‖ test in our jurisdiction.
In People v. Vera, it held that the person who impugns the
validity of a statute must have ―a personal and substantial
interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain
direct injury as a result.‖ Therefore, the court ruled that the
petitioners have a locus standi, for they suffered ―direct injury‖
resulting from ―illegal arrest‖ and ―unlawful search‖
committed by police operatives pursuant to PP 1017.
10. Under Article XII Section 17 of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution, in times of national emergency, when the public
interest so requires, the President may temporarily take over a
privately owned public utility or business affected with public
interest only if there is congressional authority or approval.
There must enactment of appropriate legislation prescribing
the terms and conditions under which the President may
exercise the powers that will serves as the best assurance that
due process of law would be observed.

378
G.R. No. 162272 April 7, 2009

SANTIAGO C. DIVINAGRACIA, Petitioner

vs.
CONSOLIDATED BROADCASTING SYSTEM, INC. and
PEOPLE'S BROADCASTING SERVICE, INC., Respondents.

FACTS:
1. Respondents Consolidated Broadcasting System, Inc. (CBS)
and People‘s Broadcasting Service, Inc. (PBS) were
incorporated in 1961 and 1965, respectively. Both are involved
in the operation of radio broadcasting services in the
Philippines, they being the grantees of legislative franchises by
virtue of two laws, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7477 and R.A. No.
7582.

 R.A. No. 7477, enacted on 5 May 1992, granted

PBS a legislative franchise to construct, install,
maintain and operate radio and television stations
within the Philippines for a period of 25 years.

 R.A. No. 7582, enacted on 27 May 1992, extended

CBS‘s previous legislative franchise to operate radio
stations for another 25 years.

2. Following the enactment of the franshise laws, the National

Telecommunications Commision issued four (4) Provisional
Authorities to PBS and six (6) Provisional Authorities to CBS,
allowing them to install, operate and maintain various AM and
FM broadcast stations in various locations throughout the
nation.

3. On 1 March 1999, the petitioner Santiago C. Divinagracia filed

two complaints with the NTC, respectively lodged against
PBS and CBS.

 He commonly argued in his complaints that the failure

on the part of PBS and CBS "to comply with the mandate
of their legislative franchise is a misuse of the franchise
conferred upon it by law and it continues to exercise its
franchise in contravention of the law to the detriment of
the general public and of complainant who are unable to
enjoy the benefits being offered by a publicly listed

379
 company." He thus prayed for the cancellation of all the
Provisional Authorities or CPCs of PBS and CBS on
account of the alleged violation of the conditions set
therein, as well as in its legislative franchises.

4. On 1 August 2000, the NTC issued a consolidated decision

dismissing both complaints.

 NTC held that the complaints actually constituted

collateral attacks on the legislative franchises of PBS and
CBS since the sole issue for determination was whether
the franchisees had violated the mandate to democratize
ownership in their respective legislative franchises.

 NTC ruled that it was not competent to render a ruling

on that issue, the same being more properly the subject
of an action for quo warranto to be commenced by the
Solicitor General in the name of the Republic of the
Philippines, pursuant to Rule 66 of the Rules of Court

5. On 18 February 2004, the Court of Appeals rendered a

decision upholding the NTC.

ISSUE:

Whether the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) have

jurisdiction over complaints seeking the cancellation of certificates of
public convenience (CPCs) and other licenses it had issued to the
holders of duly-issued legislative franchises on the ground that the
franchisees had violated the terms of their franchises?

RULING:

NO. The authority of the franchisee to engage in broadcast

operations is derived in the legislative mandate. To cancel the
provisional authority or the CPC is, in effect, to cancel the franchise
or otherwise prevent its exercise. By law, the NTC is incapacitated to
frustrate such mandate by unduly withholding or canceling the
provisional authority or the CPC for reasons other than the orderly
administration of the frequencies in the radio spectrum.

The restrictions enacted by Congress on broadcast media franchisees

have to pass the mettle of constitutionality. On the other hand, the
restrictions imposed by an administrative agency such as the NTC on
broadcast media franchisees will have to pass not only the test of

380
constitutionality, but also the test of authority and legitimacy, i.e.,
whether such restrictions have been imposed in the exercise of duly
delegated legislative powers from Congress. If the restriction or
sanction imposed by the administrative agency cannot trace its origin
from legislative delegation, whether it is by virtue of a specific grant
or from valid delegation of rule-making power to the administrative
agency, then the action of such administrative agency cannot be
sustained. The life and authority of an administrative agency
emanates solely from an Act of Congress, and its faculties confined
within the parameters set by the legislative branch of government.

Even as the NTC is vested with the power to issue CPCs to

broadcast stations, it is not expressly vested with the power to cancel
such CPCs, or otherwise empowered to prevent broadcast stations
with duly issued franchises and CPCs from operating radio or
television stations.

381
RIDERS [VI (25(1)]

382
EUSEBIO B. GARCIA, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
HON. ERNESTO S. MATA, Secretary of National Defense, and
GENERAL MANUEL T. YAN, Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of
the Philippines, respondents-appellees.

G.R. No. L-33713 July 30, 1975

CASTRO, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari to review the decision of the Court of

First Instance of Quezon City, Branch IX, in civil case Q-13466,
entitled "Eusebio B. Garcia, petitioner, versus Hon. Ernesto Mata
(Juan Ponce Enrile), et al., respondents," declaring paragraph 11 of
the "Special Provisions for the Armed Forces of the Philippines" of
Republic Act No. 16001 unconstitutional.

FACTS
Petitioner was a reserve officer on active duty with the Armed
Forces of the Philippines until his reversion to inactive status on 15
November 1960, pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No.
2332. At the time of reversion, Petitioner held the rank of Captain
with a monthly emolument of P478.00, comprising his base and
longevity pay, quarters and subsistence allowances;
On June 18, 1955, the date when RA 1382 took effect, petitioner
had a total of 9 years, 4 months and 12 days of accumulated active
commissioned service in the AFP;
On July 11, 1956, the date when RA 1600 took effect, petitioner
had an accumulated active commissioned service of 10 years, 5
months and 5 days in the AFP
Petitioner's reversion to inactive status on 15 November 1960
was pursuant to the provisions of RA 2334, and such reversion was
neither for cause, at his own request, nor after court-martial
proceedings;
From 15 November 1960 up to the present, petitioner has been
on inactive status and as such, he has neither received any
emoluments from the AFP, nor was he ever employed in the
government in any capacity;

383
 As a consequence of his reversion to inactive status, petitioner
filed the necessary petitions with the offices of the AFP Chief of
Staff, the Secretary of National Defense, and the President,
respectively, but received reply only from the Chief of Staff through
the AFP Adjutant General.
On September 17, 1969 the petitioner brought an action for
"Mandamus and Recovery of a Sum of Money" in the court a quo to
compel the respondents Secretary of National Defense and Chief of
Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines2 to reinstate him in the
active commissioned service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
to readjust his rank, and to pay all the emoluments and allowances
due to him from the time of his reversion to inactive status.
On December 2, 1970 the trial court dismissed the petition. The
court ruled that paragraph 11 of the "Special Provisions for the
Armed Forces of the Philippines" in Republic Act 1600 is "invalid,
unconstitutional and inoperative."
Paragraph 11 of the SPECIAL PROVISIONS FOR THE ARMED
FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES (on page 892 of the Act) provided
as follows:
11. After the approval of this Act, and when there is no
emergency, no reserve officer of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines may be called to a tour of active duty for more
than two years during any period of five consecutive years:
PROVIDED, That hereafter reserve officers of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines on active duty for more than two
years on the date of the approval of this Act except those
whose military and educational training, experience and
qualifications are deemed essential to the needs of the service,
shall be reverted to inactive status within one year from the
approval of this Act: PROVIDED, FURTHER, That reserve
officers with at least ten years of active accumulated
commissioned service who are still on active duty at the time
of the approval of this Act shall not be reverted to inactive
status except for cause after proper court-martial proceedings
or upon their request; PROVIDED, FURTHER, That any such
reserve officer reverted to inactive status who has at least five
of active commissioned service shall be entitled to a gratuity
equivalent to one month's authorized base and longevity pay
in the rank held at the time of such reversion for every year of
active commissioned service; PROVIDED, FURTHER, That
any reserve officer who receives a gratuity under the

384
 provisions of this Act shall not except during a National
emergency or mobilization, be called to a tour of active duty
within five years from the date of reversion: PROVIDED,
FURTHER, That the Secretary of National Defense is
authorized to extend the tour of active duty of reserve officers
who are qualified military pilots and doctors; PROVIDED,
FURTHER, That any savings in the appropriations authorized
in this Act for the Department of National Defense
notwithstanding any provision of this Act to the contrary and
any unexpended balance of certification to accounts payable
since 1 July 1949 regardless of purpose of the appropriation
shall be made available for the purpose of this paragraph:
AND PROVIDED, FINALLY, That the Secretary of National
Defense shall render a quarterly report to Congress as to the
implementation of the provisions of this paragraph. ( pp. 892-
893, RA 1600) (emphasis supplied)

ARGUMENTS
The petitioner consequently argues that his reversion to inactive
status on November 15, 1960 was in violation of the abovequoted
provision which prohibits the reversion to inactive status of reserve
officers on active duty with at least ten years of accumulated active
commissioned service.

ISSUES
WON paragraph 11 of the "Special Provisions for the Armed Forces
of the Philippines" of Republic Act No. 1600 is unconstitutional
WON petitioner is entitled for reinstatement and payment of all the
emoluments and allowances due to him from the time of his
reversion to inactive status

RULING
The subject of R.A. 1600, as expressed in its title, is restricted to
"appropriating funds for the operation of the government,‖ for the
fiscal year 1956-1957. Paragraph 11 refers to the fundamental
government policy matters of the calling to active duty and the
reversion to inactive status of reserve officers in the AFP.
The said provision has no relevance or pertinence whatsoever to the
budget in question or to any appropriation item contained therein,

385
and is therefore proscribed by Art. VI, Sec. 19, par. 24 of the 1935
Constitution of the Philippines (Art VI, Sec 25, par. 2 of 1987
Constitution) which reads:
―No provision or enactment shall be embraced in the general
appropriations bill unless it relates specifically to some
particular appropriation therein; and any such provision or
enactment shall be limited in its operation to such
appropriation.‖
The paragraph in question also violated Art. VI, Sec. 21, par. 1 5 of
the 1935 Constitution (Art VI, Sec 26, par 1 of 1987 Constitution)
which provided that,
"No bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than
one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill."
It was a non-appropriation item inserted in an appropriation
measure in violation of the constitutional inhibition against "riders"
to the general appropriation act
As such, Paragraph 11 of the SPECIAL PROVISIONS FOR THE
ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES as unconstitutional, invalid
and inoperative. Being unconstitutional, it confers no right and
affords no protection. In legal contemplation it is as though it has
never been passed.
Additionally, the petitioner had a total of 9 years, 4 months and 12
days of accumulated active commissioned service in the AFP when
Republic Act 1382 took effect on June 18, 1955 and was thus short
of the minimum service requirement prescribed in the aforequoted
provision of R.A. 1382.
Verily, not having shown a clear legal right to the position to which
he desires to be restored, the petitioner cannot compel the
respondents to reinstate and/or call him to active duty, promote or
readjust his rank, much less pay him back emoluments and
allowances.

ACCORDINGLY, the instant petition was denied, and the decision

of the lower court dismissing the complaint was affirmed.

386
BRENDA L. NAZARETH, REGIONAL DIRECTOR,
DEPARTMENT OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY,
REGIONAL OFFICE NO. IX, ZAMBOANGA CITY, Petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. REYNALDO A. VILLAR, HON. JUANITO G.
ESPINO, JR., (COMMISSIONERS OF THE COMMISSION ON
AUDIT), and DIR. KHEM M. INOK, Respondents.
G.R. No. 188635 January 29, 2013

Facts:
On December 22, 1997, Congress enacted R.A. No. 8439 to
address the policy of the State to provide a program for human
resources development in science and technology in order to achieve
and maintain the necessary reservoir of talent and manpower that
would sustain the drive for total science and technology
mastery.3 Section 7 of R.A. No. 8439 grants the following additional
allowances and benefits (Magna Carta benefits) to the covered
officials and employees of the DOST. Under R.A. No. 8439, the
funds for the payment of the Magna Carta benefits are to be
appropriated by the General Appropriations Act (GAA) of the year
following the enactment of R.A. No. 8439.4 The DOST Regional
Office No. IX in Zamboanga City released the Magna Carta benefits
to the covered officials and employees commencing in CY 1998
despite the absence of specific appropriation for the purpose in the
GAA. Subsequently, following the post-audit conducted by COA
State Auditor Ramon E. Vargas on April 23, 1999, October 28, 1999,
June 20, 2000, February 27, 2001, June 27, 2001, October 10, 2001
and October 17, 2001, several NDs were issued disapproving the
payment of the Magna Carta benefits.

Anent the first issue, the law in point is Article VI, Section
25(5) of the 1987 Constitution, which aptly provides that:

"(5) No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of

appropriations, however, the PRESIDENT, x x x may by law, be
authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for
their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective
appropriations."

Issue:

387
Whether or not the release of the Magna Carta funds for 1998, 1999,
and 2001 qualified officials and employees legal and valid.

Held:
It is not valid but the officials and employees do not have to
reimburse the disallowed allowance. According to Section 25 (5)
Article IV of the Constitution, the President, the President of the
Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional
Commissions are authorized to transfer appropriations to augment
any item in the GAA for their respective offices in their respective
appropriations.

When the statute itself enumerates the exceptions to the application

of the general rule, the exceptions are strictly but reasonably
construed. The exceptions extend only as far as their language fairly
warrants, and all doubts should be resolved in favor of the general
provision rather than the exceptions. Where the general rule is
established by a statute with exceptions, none but the enacting
authority can curtail the former. Not even the courts may add to the
latter by implication, and it is a rule that an express exception
excludes all others, although it is always proper in determining the
applicability of the rule to inquire whether, in a particular case, it
accords with reason and justice.

388
 Binamira v. Garrucho
G.R. No. 92008 July 30, 1990
Cruz, J.

Facts:

Ramon P. Binamira seeks reinstatement to the office of

General Manager of the Philippine Tourism Authority from which he
claims to have been removed without just cause in violation of his
security of tenure.

Binamira claims that since assuming office, he had

discharged the duties of PTA General Manager and Vice-Chairman of
its Board of Directors and had been acknowledged as such by various
government offices, including the Office of the President.

He complains, though, that on January 2, 1990, his

resignation was demanded by respondent Garrucho as the new
Secretary of Tourism. Binamira‘s demurrer led to an unpleasant
exchange that led to his filing of a complaint against the Secretary
with the Commission on Human Rights.

Section 23-A of P.D. 564, which created the Philippine

Tourism Authority, provides as follows:

SECTION 23-A. General Manager-Appointment and Tenure. — The

General Manager shall be appointed by the President of the
Philippines and shall serve for a term of six (6) years unless sooner
removed for cause; provided, that upon the expiration of his term, he
shall serve as such until his successor shall have been appointed and
qualified. (As amended by P.D. 1400)

Issue:

Whether Binamira was appointed as General Manager of

the Philippine Tourism Authority or merely designated

Held:

Petitioner was not appointed by the President of the

Philippines but only designated by the Minister of Tourism. There is
a clear distinction between appointment and designation that the
petitioner has failed to consider. Appointment may be defined as
the selection, by the authority vested with the power, of an

389
individual who is to exercise the functions of a given office. When
completed, usually with its confirmation, the appointment results in
security of tenure for the person chosen unless he is replaceable at
pleasure because of the nature of his office. Designation, on the
other hand, connotes merely the imposition by law of additional
duties on an incumbent official, as where, in the case before us, the
Secretary of Tourism is designated Chairman of the Board of
Directors of the Philippine Tourism Authority, or where, under the
Constitution, three Justices of the Supreme Court are designated by
the Chief Justice to sit in the Electoral Tribunal of the Senate or the
House of Representatives. It is said that appointment is essentially
executive while designation is legislative in nature.

Designation may also be loosely defined as an appointment

because it likewise involves the naming of a particular person to a
specified public office. That is the common understanding of the
term. However, where the person is merely designated and not
appointed, the implication is that he shall hold the office only in a
temporary capacity and may be replaced at will by the appointing
authority. In this sense, the designation is considered only an acting
or temporary appointment, which does not confer security of tenure
on the person named.

Even if so understood, that is, as an appointment, the

designation of the petitioner cannot sustain his claim that he has
been illegally removed. The reason is that the decree clearly provides
that the appointment of the General Manager of the Philippine
Tourism Authority shall be made by the President of the Philippines,
not by any other officer. Appointment involves the exercise of
discretion, which because of its nature cannot be delegated. Legally
speaking, it was not possible for Minister Gonzales to assume the
exercise of that discretion as an alter ego of the President. The
appointment (or designation) of the petitioner was not a merely
mechanical or ministerial act that could be validly performed by a
subordinate even if he happened as in this case to be a member of
the Cabinet.

390
CROSS-BORDER TRANSFER

391
No. L-23326. December 18, 1965
Philippine Constitution Assn., Inc. vs. Gimenez
Facts:
Philippine Constitution Association, Inc. assails constitutionality of
Republic Act No. 3836 insofar as the same allows retirement gratuity
and commutation of vacation and sick leave to Senators and
Representatives, and to the elective officials of both houses of
Congress. It is argued that RA 3836, at least to the end that it
provided for the retirement of the members of Congress in the
manner and terms that it did, is unconstitutional and void. Petitioner
contends that the provision on retirement gratuity is an attempt to
circumvent the Constitutional ban on increase of salaries of the
members of Congress during their term of office, contrary to the
provisions of Article VI, Section 14 of the Constitution. The same
provision constitutes "selfish class legislation" because it allows
members and officers of Congress to retire after twelve years of
service and gives them a gratuity equivalent to one year salary for
every four years of service, which is not refundable in case of
reinstatement or re-election of the retiree, while all other officers
and employees of the government can retire only after at least twenty
years of service and are given a gratuity which is only equivalent to
one month salary for every year of service, which, in any case cannot
exceed 24 months. The provision on vacation and sick leave,
commutable at the highest rate received, insofar as members of
Congress are concerned, is another attempt of the legislators to
further increase their compensation in violation of the Constitution.
The Solicitor General argues that the grant of retirement or pension
benefits under Republic Act No. 3836 does not constitute ―forbidden
compensation‖ within the meaning of Section 14 of Article VI of the
Philippine Constitution. It also contends that the law in question
does not constitute class legislation and that the payment of
commutable vacation and sick leave benefits under the said Act is
merely in the nature of a basis for computing the gratuity due each
retiring member and, therefore, is not an indirect scheme to increase
their salary.

Issues:
1. Whether or not Republic Act No. 3836 falls within the
prohibition embodied in Art. VI, section 14 of the
Constitution.
2. Whether or not the law in question violates the equal
protection clause of the Constitution.

392
 3. Whether or not the title of Republic Act No. 3836 is germane
to the subject matter expressed in the act.

Held:
1. Yes. Republic Act 3836 violates the provisions in the Article
VI, Section 14, of the Constitution, regarding increase of the
compensation including other emoluments. It provides for an
increase in the emoluments of Senators and Members of the
House of Representatives, to take effect upon the approval of
said Act, which was on June 22, 1963. Retirement benefits
were immediately available thereunder, without awaiting the
expiration of the full term of all the Members of the Senate and
the House of Representatives approving such increase. Such
provision clearly runs counter to the prohibition in Article VI,
Section 14 of the Constitution.

2. Yes. The features of Republic Act 3836 are discriminatory, and

therefore violate the equal protection clause of the
Constitution. While the said law grants retirement benefits to
Senators and Members of the House of Representatives who
are elective officials, it does not include other elective officials
such as the governors of provinces and the members of the
provincial boards, and the elective officials of the
municipalities and chartered cities. Moreover, all members of
Congress under Republic Act 3836 are given retirement
benefits after serving twelve years, not necessarily continuous,
whereas, most government officers and employees are given
retirement benefits after serving for at least twenty years.
Furthermore, all government officers and employees are given
only one retirement benefit irrespective of their length of
service in the government, whereas, under Republic Act 3836,
because of no age limitation, a Senator or Member of the
House of Representatives upon being elected for 24 years will
be entitled to two retirement benefits or equivalent to six
years' salary. Also, while the payment of retirement benefits
(annuity) to an employee who had been retired and
reappointed is suspended during his new employment, this is
not so under Republic Act 3836. Lastly, Republic Act 3836
grants retirement benefits to officials who are not members of
the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS). Most
grantees of retirement benefits under the various retirement
laws have to be members or must at least contribute a portion
of their monthly salaries to the System.

393
3. No. Under Republic Act No. 3836, amending the first
paragraph of section 12, subsection (c) of Commonwealth Act
186, as amended by Republic Acts Nos, 660 and 3096, the
retirement benefits are granted to members of the GSIS who
have rendered at least twenty years of service regardless of age.
This provision is related and germane to the subject of
Commonwealth Act 186. On the other hand, the succeeding
paragraph of Republic Act No. 3836 refers to members of
Congress and to elective officers thereof who are not members
of the GSIS. To provide retirement benefits, for these officials
would relate to subject matter not germane to Commonwealth
Act No. 186. This portion of the amendment is not related in
any manner to the subject of Commonwealth Act 186
establishing the GSIS and which provides for both retirement
and insurance benefits to its members.

394
 CHR EMPLOYEES' ASSOCIATION vs. CHR
G.R. No. 155336 November 25, 2004

PONENTE:
JUSTICE MINITA CHICO-NAZARIO

DISPOSITIVE:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, the Decision dated
29 November 2001 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 59678
and its Resolution dated 11 September 2002 are hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The ruling dated 29 March 1999 of the Civil Service
Commision-National Capital Region is REINSTATED. The
Commission on Human Rights Resolution No. A98-047 dated 04
September 1998, Resolution No. A98-055 dated 19 October 1998
and Resolution No. A98-062 dated 17 November 1998 without the
approval of the Department of Budget and Management are
disallowed. No pronouncement as to costs.
FACTS:
In 1998, Congress passed the General Appropriations Act
providing for Special Provisions Applicable to All Constitutional
Offices Enjoying Fiscal Autonomy. The last portion of Article XXXIII
covers the appropriations of the CHR.
Pursuant to this, the CHR adopted an upgrading and
reclassification scheme among selected positions in the Commission
and authorized the augmentation of a commensurate amount
generated from savings under Personnel Service for the same.
On CHR‘s request, the DBM disapproved the said scheme as it
effectively involved the elevation of the field units from divisions to
services. In light of this, the CSC-NCR Office recommended to the
CSC Central Office that the subject appointments be rejected owing
to the DBM's disapproval.
CHREA requested the CSC-Central Office to affirm the
recommendation of the CSC-NCR Office, averring that the DBM is
the only agency with appropriate authority to approve matters of
reclassification and upgrading, as well as creation of positions.

395
 The CSC-Central Office denied CHREA's request and reversed
the recommendation of the CSC-NCR Office.
ISSUE:
WON CHR can validly implement an upgrading, reclassification,
creation, and collapsing of plantilla positions in the Commission
without the prior approval of the DBM
RULING:
Under the Salary Standardization Law and Revised
Administrative Code of 1987, it is within the turf of the DBM
Secretary to disallow the upgrading, reclassification, and creation of
additional plantilla positions in the CHR based on its finding that
such scheme lacks legal justification.
Notably, the CHR itself recognizes the authority of the DBM to
deny or approve the proposed reclassification of positions as
evidenced by its three letters to the DBM requesting approval
thereof. As such, it is now estopped from now claiming that the nod
of approval it has previously sought from the DBM is a superfluity.
Article IX of the Constitution states in no uncertain terms that
only the CSC, the Commission on Elections, and the Commission on
Audit shall be tagged as Constitutional Commissions with the
appurtenant right to fiscal autonomy.
As expressed in the oft-repeated maxim expressio unius est
exclusio alterius, the express mention of one person, thing, act or
consequence excludes all others. Stated otherwise, expressium facit
cessare tacitum – what is expressed puts an end to what is implied.
In Blaquera v. Alcala and Bengzon v. Drilon, it is understood
that it is only the Judiciary, the Civil Service Commission, the
Commission on Audit, the Commission on Elections, and the Office
of the Ombudsman, which enjoy fiscal autonomy.
Neither does the fact that the CHR was admitted as a member
by the Constitutional Fiscal Autonomy Group (CFAG) ipso facto
clothed it with fiscal autonomy. Fiscal autonomy is a constitutional
grant, not a tag obtainable by membership.
Even assuming en arguendo that the CHR enjoys fiscal
autonomy, we share the stance of the DBM that the grant of fiscal
autonomy notwithstanding, all government offices must, all the
same, kowtow to the Salary Standardization Law.

396
 Extent of Privilege of
CHR (Fiscal Autonomy)

397
G.R. No. 71977 February 27, 1987

DEMETRIO G. DEMETRIA, M.P., AUGUSTO S. SANCHEZ,

M.P., ORLANDO S. MERCADO, M.P., HONORATO Y.
AQUINO, M.P., ZAFIRO L. RESPICIO, M.P., DOUGLAS R.
CAGAS, M.P., OSCAR F. SANTOS, M.P., ALBERTO G.
ROMULO, M.P., CIRIACO R. ALFELOR, M.P., ISIDORO E.
REAL, M.P., EMIGDIO L. LINGAD, M.P., ROLANDO C.
MARCIAL, M.P., PEDRO M. MARCELLANA, M.P., VICTOR S.
ZIGA, M.P., and ROGELIO V. GARCIA. M.P., petitioners,
vs.
HON. MANUEL ALBA in his capacity as the MINISTER OF
THE BUDGET and VICTOR MACALINGCAG in his capacity as
the TREASURER OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

FERNAN, J.:

Facts:

The petitioners assailed in this petition for prohibition with

prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction is the constitutionality of
the first paragraph of Section 44 of Presidential Decree No. 1177,
otherwise known as the "Budget Reform Decree of 1977" that states:

The President shall have the authority to transfer any fund,

appropriated for the different departments, bureaus, offices
and agencies of the Executive Department, which are included
in the General Appropriations Act, to any program, project or
activity of any department, bureau, or office included in the
General Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment.

Issue:
Whether or not Section 44 of Presidential Decree No. 1177,
otherwise known as the "Budget Reform Decree of 1977"
constitutional.
Held:
The said provision is unconstitutional. Section 16[5] of the
1973 Constitution provides:
No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of
appropriations, however, the President, the Prime Minister, the
Speaker, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads
of constitutional commissions may by law be authorized to
augment any item in the general appropriations law for their
398
 respective offices from savings in other items of their
respective appropriations.
Paragraph 1 of Section 44 of P.D. No. 1177 unduly over extends the
privilege granted under said Section 16[5]. It empowers the
President to indiscriminately transfer funds from one department,
bureau, office or agency of the Executive Department to any
program, project or activity of any department, bureau or office
included in the General Appropriations Act or approved after its
enactment, without regard as to whether or not the funds to be
transferred are actually savings in the item from which the same are
to be taken, or whether or not the transfer is for the purpose of
augmenting the item to which said transfer is to be made. It does not
only completely disregard the standards set in the fundamental law,
thereby amounting to an undue delegation of legislative powers, but
likewise goes beyond the tenor thereof. Indeed, such constitutional
infirmities render the provision in question null and void

399
 Book VI, Chapter I,
Section 1, Par. 9 of the
Administrative Code

400
ARAULLO v. AQUINO III
G.R. No. 209287 February 3, 2015

FACTS:

Before the Court are the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the
respondents (Aquino,et.al), and the Motion for Partial
Reconsideration3 filed by the petitioners (Araullo, et. al) in G.R. No.
209442 assailing the decision promulgated on July 1 2014.

Aquino maintain that the issues in these consolidated cases were

mischaracterized and unnecessarily constitutionalized; that the
Court‘s interpretation of savings can be overturned by legislation
considering that savings is defined in the General Appropriations Act
(GAA), hence making savings a statutory issue; that the withdrawn
unobligated allotments and unreleased appropriations constitute
savings and may be used for augmentation; and that the Court
should apply legally recognized norms and principles, most
especially the presumption of good faith, in resolving their motion.

Araullo prays that augmentation of items beyond the maximum

amounts recommended by the President for the programs, activities
and projects (PAPs) contained in the budget submitted to Congress
should be declared unconstitutional.

The court dismissed the procedural challenges raised by Araullo,

being a mere rehash of the earlier arguments for being already
passed upon in the assailed decision while partially granted the
motion for reconsideration of Aquino thereby modifying certain
declarations in its July 1, 2014 decision as a matter of clarification.

Issue No. 1. Whether or not the interpretation of the GAA and its
definition of savings as a concept which is an ordinary species of
interpretation that calls for legislative, instead of judicial,
determination.

Held: The answer is in the negative. The petition involves

questions of the constitutionality of the acts and practices under the
DAP, particularly their non-conformity with Section 25(5), Article VI
of the Constitution and the principles of separation of power and
equal protection. Hence, the matter is still entirely within the
Court‘s competence, indeed, the interpretation of the GAA and its
definition of savings is a foremost judicial function.

401
Issue No. 2. Whether or not the withdrawn unobligated allotments
and unreleased appropriations constitute savings and may be used
for augmentation.

Held: The answer is in the negative. GAA defines savings as

―portions or balances of any programmed appropriation in this Act
free from any obligation or encumbrance‖ but the definition was
further qualified by the three enumerated instances of when savings
would be realized. As such, unobligated allotments could not be
indiscriminately declared as savings without first determining
whether any of the three instances existed.

Further, the withdrawal and transfer of unobligated allotments

remain unconstitutional when the purpose for which the withdrawn
funds had been appropriated was not yet fulfilled, or did not yet
cease to exist, rendering the declaration of the funds as savings
impossible.

Issue No.3. Whether or not the Court has applied the operative fact
doctrine in good faith.

Held: The answer is in the affirmative. The doctrine of operative fact

can apply only to the PAPs that can no longer be undone, and whose
beneficiaries relied in good faith on the validity of the DAP, but
cannot apply to the authors, proponents and implementers of the
DAP, unless there are concrete findings of good faith in their favor
by the proper tribunals determining their criminal, civil,
administrative and other liabilities.

The Court has neither thrown out the presumption of good faith nor
imputed bad faith to the authors, proponents and implementors of
the DAP. The contrary is true, because the Court has still presumed
their good faith by pointing out that "the doctrine of operative fact
cannot apply to the authors, proponents and implementors of the
DAP, unless there are concrete findings of good faith in their favor
by the proper tribunals determining their criminal, civil,
administrative and other liabilities."

The Court PARTIALLY GRANTS the petitions for certiorari and

prohibition; and DECLARES the following acts and practices under
the Disbursement Acceleration Program, National Budget Circular
No. 541 and related executive issuances UNCONSTITUTIONAL for
being in violation of Section 25(5), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution and the doctrine of separation of powers,

402
Cross-border v. Veto Power
(expense and item)

403
Goh, Pettioner, vs. Bayron and COMELEC, Respondents
G.R. No. 212584
November 24, 2014

FACTS: Alroben J. Goh filed a rcall petition to the Commission on

Elections (COMELEC) due to loss of trust and confidence against
the respondent Hon. Lucilo R. Bayron by violating the provisions of
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Code of Conduct and
Ethical Standards for Public officials and other related gross
negligence of duty, dishonesty and immaturity as mayor of the
Puerto, Princessa City. Then, the COMELEC promulgated
Resolution No. 9864 wherein the said resolution found the recall
petition sufficient in form and substance but the funds of any recall
elections were suspended.
The Office of the Deputy Executive Director (ODEDO) recommends
the COMELEC the issuance of a resolution certifying to the
sufficiency of the petition for recall of the respondent after review of
the reports wherein it was stated in the said resolution that all
expenses incidental to recall elections shall be borne by the
COMELEC as stipulated in Section 75 of the Local Government
Code. Section 75. Expenses Incident to Recall Elections.-All
expenses incidental to recall elections shall be borne by the
COMELEC. For this purpose, there shall be included in the annual
General Appropriations Act as contingency fund at the disposal of
the Commission for the conduct of recall elections.
Respondent filed an Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and
Clarification with the Commission which prayed for the dismissal of
the recall petition. Thereafter, the petitioner filed a comment which
prayed for the COMELEC‘s denial of the respondent‘s motion
wherein Resolution No. 9882 was promulgated by the Commission
which suspends any proceeding relative to recall process, as stated in
the said resolution, does not have an appropriation in the 2014
General Appropriations Act (GAA) and it does not provide the
COMELEC with legal authority to commit public funds for the recall
process.

Issue: Whether the 2014 General Appropriations Act (GAA) has no

budget for the conduct of recall election therefore said recall cannot
be conducted

404
Ruling: No, the 2014 GAA provides the line item appropriation to
allow COMELEC to conduct recall elections.
The Court held that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion in issuing Resolution Nos. 9864 and 9882. The 2014 GAA
provides the line item appropriation to allow the COMELEC to
perform its constitutional mandate of conducting recall elections.
There is no need for supplemental legislation to authorize the
COMELEC to conduct recall elections for 2014. In addition, one of
the specific functions of the Commission is to conduct recall
elections. When the Commission receives a budgetary appropriation
for its ―Current Operating Expenditures,‖ such appropriation
includes expenditures to carry out its constitutional functions,
including the conduct of recall elections.
The Court set aside Resolution No. 9864 insofar as it directed the
suspension of any and all proceedings in the recall petition. The
court set aside Resolution No. 9882 and direct the COMELEC to
immediately carry out the recall elections of the Respondent in
accordance with the provisions of the Local Government Code.

405
COMELEC

406
Lidasan v Comelec
G.R. No. L-28089 October 25, 1967
Sanchez, J.:

Facts:
1. Lidasan, a resident and taxpayer of the detached portion of
Parang, Cotabato, and a qualified voter for the 1967 elections
assails the constitutionality of RA 4790 and petitioned that
Comelec's resolutions implementing the same for electoral
purposes be nullified. Under RA 4790, 12 barrios in two
municipalities in the province of Cotabato are transferred to
the province of Lanao del Sur. This brought about a change in
the boundaries of the two provinces.

2. Barrios Togaig and Madalum are within the municipality

of Buldon in the Province of Cotabato, and that Bayanga,
Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-bo, Digakapan, Magabo, Tabangao,
Tiongko, Colodan and Kabamakawan are parts and parcel of
another municipality, the municipality of Parang, also in
the Province of Cotabato and not of Lanao del Sur.

3. Apprised of this development, the Office of the President,

recommended to Comelec that the operation of the statute be
suspended until "clarified by correcting legislation."

4. Comelec, by resolution declared that the statute should be

implemented unless declared unconstitutional by the Supreme
Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not RA 4790, which is entitled "An Act

Creating the Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao
del Sur", but which includes barrios located in another province
— Cotabato is unconstitutional for embracing more than one
subject in the title

YES. RA 4790 is null and void

407
1. The constitutional provision contains dual limitations upon
legislative power. First. Congress is to refrain from
conglomeration, under one statute, of heterogeneous
subjects. Second. The title of the bill is to be couched in a
language sufficient to notify the legislators and the public and
those concerned of the import of the single subject thereof. Of
relevance here is the second directive. The subject of the
statute must be "expressed in the title" of the bill. This
constitutional requirement "breathes the spirit of
command." Compliance is imperative, given the fact that the
Constitution does not exact of Congress the obligation to read
during its deliberations the entire text of the bill. In fact, in the
case of House Bill 1247, which became RA 4790, only its title
was read from its introduction to its final approval in the
House where the bill, being of local application, originated.

2. The Constitution does not require Congress to employ in the

title of an enactment, language of such precision as to mirror,
fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details
therein. It suffices if the title should serve the purpose of the
constitutional demand that it inform the legislators, the
persons interested in the subject of the bill, and the public, of
the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its
operation. And this, to lead them to inquire into the body of
the bill, study and discuss the same, take appropriate action
thereon, and, thus, prevent surprise or fraud upon the
legislators.

3. The test of the sufficiency of a title is whether or not it is

misleading; and, which technical accuracy is not essential, and
the subject need not be stated in express terms where it is
clearly inferable from the details set forth, a title which is so
uncertain that the average person reading it would not be
informed of the purpose of the enactment or put on inquiry as
to its contents, or which is misleading, either in referring to or
indicating one subject where another or different one is really
embraced in the act, or in omitting any expression or
indication of the real subject or scope of the act, is bad.

4. The title — "An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton, in

the Province of Lanao del Sur" — projects the impression that
only the province of Lanao del Sur is affected by the creation of
408
 Dianaton. Not the slightest intimation is there that
communities in the adjacent province of Cotabato are
incorporated in this new Lanao del Sur town. The phrase "in
the Province of Lanao del Sur," read without subtlety or
contortion, makes the title misleading, deceptive. For, the
known fact is that the legislation has a two-pronged purpose
combined in one statute: (1) it creates the municipality of
Dianaton purportedly from twenty-one barrios in the towns of
Butig and Balabagan, both in the province of Lanao del Sur;
and (2) it also dismembers two municipalities in Cotabato, a
province different from Lanao del Sur.

5. Finally, the title did not inform the members of Congress the
full impact of the law. One, it did not apprise the people in the
towns of Buldon and Parang in Cotabato and in the province of
Cotabato itself that part of their territory is being taken away
from their towns and province and added to the adjacent
Province of Lanao del Sur. Two, it kept the public in the dark
as to what towns and provinces were actually affected by the
bill.

409
No. L-23326. December 18, 1965
Philippine Constitution Assn., Inc. vs. Gimenez
Facts:
Philippine Constitution Association, Inc. assails constitutionality of
Republic Act No. 3836 insofar as the same allows retirement gratuity
and commutation of vacation and sick leave to Senators and
Representatives, and to the elective officials of both houses of
Congress. It is argued that RA 3836, at least to the end that it
provided for the retirement of the members of Congress in the
manner and terms that it did, is unconstitutional and void. Petitioner
contends that the provision on retirement gratuity is an attempt to
circumvent the Constitutional ban on increase of salaries of the
members of Congress during their term of office, contrary to the
provisions of Article VI, Section 14 of the Constitution. The same
provision constitutes "selfish class legislation" because it allows
members and officers of Congress to retire after twelve years of
service and gives them a gratuity equivalent to one year salary for
every four years of service, which is not refundable in case of
reinstatement or re-election of the retiree, while all other officers
and employees of the government can retire only after at least twenty
years of service and are given a gratuity which is only equivalent to
one month salary for every year of service, which, in any case cannot
exceed 24 months. The provision on vacation and sick leave,
commutable at the highest rate received, insofar as members of
Congress are concerned, is another attempt of the legislators to
further increase their compensation in violation of the Constitution.
The Solicitor General argues that the grant of retirement or pension
benefits under Republic Act No. 3836 does not constitute ―forbidden
compensation‖ within the meaning of Section 14 of Article VI of the
Philippine Constitution. It also contends that the law in question
does not constitute class legislation and that the payment of
commutable vacation and sick leave benefits under the said Act is
merely in the nature of a basis for computing the gratuity due each
retiring member and, therefore, is not an indirect scheme to increase
their salary.

Issues:
4. Whether or not Republic Act No. 3836 falls within the
prohibition embodied in Art. VI, section 14 of the
Constitution.
5. Whether or not the law in question violates the equal
protection clause of the Constitution.

410
 6. Whether or not the title of Republic Act No. 3836 is germane
to the subject matter expressed in the act.

Held:
4. Yes. Republic Act 3836 violates the provisions in the Article
VI, Section 14, of the Constitution, regarding increase of the
compensation including other emoluments. It provides for an
increase in the emoluments of Senators and Members of the
House of Representatives, to take effect upon the approval of
said Act, which was on June 22, 1963. Retirement benefits
were immediately available thereunder, without awaiting the
expiration of the full term of all the Members of the Senate and
the House of Representatives approving such increase. Such
provision clearly runs counter to the prohibition in Article VI,
Section 14 of the Constitution.

5. Yes. The features of Republic Act 3836 are discriminatory, and

therefore violate the equal protection clause of the
Constitution. While the said law grants retirement benefits to
Senators and Members of the House of Representatives who
are elective officials, it does not include other elective officials
such as the governors of provinces and the members of the
provincial boards, and the elective officials of the
municipalities and chartered cities. Moreover, all members of
Congress under Republic Act 3836 are given retirement
benefits after serving twelve years, not necessarily continuous,
whereas, most government officers and employees are given
retirement benefits after serving for at least twenty years.
Furthermore, all government officers and employees are given
only one retirement benefit irrespective of their length of
service in the government, whereas, under Republic Act 3836,
because of no age limitation, a Senator or Member of the
House of Representatives upon being elected for 24 years will
be entitled to two retirement benefits or equivalent to six
years' salary. Also, while the payment of retirement benefits
(annuity) to an employee who had been retired and
reappointed is suspended during his new employment, this is
not so under Republic Act 3836. Lastly, Republic Act 3836
grants retirement benefits to officials who are not members of
the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS). Most
grantees of retirement benefits under the various retirement
laws have to be members or must at least contribute a portion
of their monthly salaries to the System.

411
6. No. Under Republic Act No. 3836, amending the first
paragraph of section 12, subsection (c) of Commonwealth Act
186, as amended by Republic Acts Nos, 660 and 3096, the
retirement benefits are granted to members of the GSIS who
have rendered at least twenty years of service regardless of age.
This provision is related and germane to the subject of
Commonwealth Act 186. On the other hand, the succeeding
paragraph of Republic Act No. 3836 refers to members of
Congress and to elective officers thereof who are not members
of the GSIS. To provide retirement benefits, for these officials
would relate to subject matter not germane to Commonwealth
Act No. 186. This portion of the amendment is not related in
any manner to the subject of Commonwealth Act 186
establishing the GSIS and which provides for both retirement
and insurance benefits to its members.

412
Hodge-podge or Log-rolling
legislation

413
 Tobias vs Abalos
G.R. No. L-114783 December 8, 1994
Facts:
1. Petitioners assail the constitutionality of RA 7675, ―An Act
Converting the municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly
Urbanized City to known as the City of Mandaluyong‖.
2. Prior to the enactment of the assailed statute, the
Municipalities of Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged to only
one legislative district. Hon. Ronaldo Zamora, the incumbent
congressional representative of this legislative district, sponsored
the bill which eventually became RA 7675, President Ramos
signed it into law.
3. Pursuant to Local Government Code of 1991, a plebiscite
was held. The people of Mandaluyong were asked whether they
approved the conversion. The turnout at the plebiscite was only
14.41% of the voting population. Nevertheless, 18,621 voted
―yes‖ whereas, 7,911 voted ―no‖. By virtue of the results, RA
7675 was deemed ratified in effect.
4. Petitioners contention were that RA 7675, specifically
Artivle VIII, Section 46 thereof, is unconstitutional. They alleged
that it contravenes the ―one subject - one bill‖ rule. They also
alleged that the subject law embraced two principal subjects,
namely: 1. the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly
urbanized city: 2.the division of the congressional district of San
Juan/Mandaluyong into two separate districts.
5. Petitioners argue that the division has resulted in an
increase on the composition the House of Representative beyond
that provided on the Constitution. Furthermore, petitioners
contend that the said division was not made pursuant to any
census showing that the subject municipalities have attained the
minimum population requirements.
Issue:
1. Whether or not RA 7675 is constitutional.
2. Whether or not the number of the members of the House of
Representative may increase.
3. Whether or not the subject law has resulted in
gerrymandering.
Rulling:

414
1. No.
The conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized
city with a population of not less than 250,000 indubitably
ordains compliance with the ―one city - on representative‖ as
provided in Article VI, Section 5, par.3 of the Constitution.
The creation of separate congressional district for
Mandaluyong is not a subject separate and distinct from the
subject of its conversion into a highly urbanized city but is a
natural and logical consequence of its conversion into a highly
urbanized city. It should be given a practical rather than a
technical construction. It should be sufficient compliance with
such requirement if the title expresses the general subject and
all provisions are germane to that general subject. It suffices if
the title should serve the purpose of the constitutional
demand that it inform the legislators, the persons interested
in the subject of the bill and the public, of the nature, scope
and consequence of the proposed law and its operation.
2. Yes.
The Constitution clearly provides that the House of
Representatives shall be composed of not more than 250
members, unless provided by law. The present
composition of the Congress may be increased, if Congress
itself so mandates through a legislative enactment.

3. No.
Gerrymandering is the practice of creating legislative
districts to favor a particular candidate or party. It should be
noted that Rep. Zamora, the author of the assailed law, is the
incumbent representative of the former San
Juan/Mandaluyong district, having consistently won in both
localities. By dividing San Juan/Mandaluyong, Rep. Zamora‘s
constituency has in fact been diminished, which development
could hardly be considered as favorable to him.
Petition dismissed.

415
G.R. No. 177508. August 7, 2009.

Barangay Association for National Advancement and

Transparency (BANAT) Party-List vs. Commission on Elections

Facts:
Petitioner Barangay Association for National Advancement and
Transparency (BANAT) Party List assails the constitutionality of
Republic Act No. 9369 and enjoining respondent Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) from implementing the statute. BANAT party
list filed this petition for prohibition alleging that RA 9369 violated
Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution. Petitioner also assails
the constitutionality of Sections 34, 37, 38, and 43 of RA 9369
alleging that these provisions are of questionable application and
doubtful validity for failing to comply with the provisions of the
Constitution. Petitioner claims that the title of RA 9369 is
misleading because it speaks of poll automation but contains
substantial provisions dealing with the manual canvassing of election
returns. Petitioner also asserts that Sections 34, 37, 38, and 43 are
neither embraced in the title nor germane to the subject matter of
RA 9369.

Issue: Whether or not RA 9369 is unconstitutional.

Held:

RA 9369 is constitutional. The constitutional requirement that

―every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject
which shall be expressed in the title thereof‖ has always been given a
practical rather than a technical construction. The requirement is
satisfied if the title is comprehensive enough to include subjects
related to the general purpose which the statute seeks to achieve.
The title of a law does not have to be an index of its contents and
will suffice if the matters embodied in the text are relevant to each
other and may be inferred from the title. Moreover, a title which
declares a statute to be an act to amend a specified code is sufficient
and the precise nature of the amendatory act need not be further
stated.

Sections 37 and 38 do not violate Section 17, Article VI and

Paragraph 7, Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution. Congress and
the COMELEC en banc do not encroach upon the jurisdiction of the
Presidential Electoral Tribunal and the Senate Electoral Tribunal.
There is no conflict of jurisdiction since the powers of Congress and

416
the COMELEC en banc, on one hand, and the PET and the SET, on
the other, are exercised on different occasions and for different
purposes. The PET is the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of the President or Vice
President. The SET is the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of members of the Senate. The
jurisdiction of the PET and the SET can only be invoked once the
winning presidential, vice presidential or senatorial candidates have
been proclaimed. On the other hand, under Section 37, Congress and
the COMELEC en banc shall determine only the authenticity and
due execution of the certificates of canvass. Congress and the
COMELEC en banc shall exercise this power before the proclamation
of the winning presidential, vice presidential and senatorial
candidates.

Sec 43 does not violate Section 2 (6) Article IX-C of the

Constitution. The Court does not agree with petitioner and the
COMELEC that the Constitution gave the COMELEC the ―exclusive
power‖ to investigate and prosecute cases of violations of election
laws. It is clear that the grant of the ―exclusive power‖ to investigate
and prosecute election offenses to the COMELEC was not by virtue
of the Constitution but by BP 881, a legislative enactment. Given the
plenary power of the legislature to amend or repeal laws, if Congress
passes a law amending Section 265 of BP 881, such law does not
violate the Constitution.

Section 34 does not violate Section 10, Article III of the Constitution
or the non-impairment clause. The non-impairment clause is limited
in application to laws that derogate from prior acts or contracts by
enlarging, abridging or in any manner changing the intention of the
parties. As observed by the OSG, there is no existing contract yet
and, therefore, no enforceable right or demandable obligation will be
impaired.

417
 COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Petitioner,
vs.
CONRADO CRUZ, Respondents.

FACTS: Before the October 29, 2007 Synchronized Barangay and

Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) Elections, some of the then incumbent
officials of several barangays of Caloocan City 2 filed with the RTC a
petition for declaratory relief to challenge the constitutionality of
Section 2 or RA 9164 which states that ―No barangay elective official
shall serve for more than 3 consecutive terms in the same position:
Provided however, that the term of office shall be reckoned from the
1994 barangay elections. Voluntary renunciation of office for any
length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the
continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official
was elected‖. The RTC agreed with the respondents‘ contention that
the challenged proviso retroactively applied the three-term limit for
barangay officials.

ISSUE/S:
4. Whether or not Sec. 2 of RA 9164 unconstitutional
5. Whether or not the proviso in RA 9164 can be applied
retroactively
6. Whether or not there is violation of equal protection

RULING:
4. NO. We find, under these settled parameters, that the
challenged proviso does not violate the one subject-one title
rule. Constitutional provisions relating to the subject matter
and titles of statutes should not be so narrowly construed as to
cripple or impede the power of legislation. The requirement
that the subject of an act shall be expressed in its title should
receive a reasonable and not a technical construction. It is
sufficient if the title be comprehensive enough reasonably to
include the general object which a statute seeks to effect,
without expressing each and every end and means necessary or
convenient for the accomplishing of that object. Mere details
need not be set forth. The title need not be an abstract or index
of the Act. This Court has held that an act having a single
418
 general subject, indicated in the title, may contain any number
of provisions, no matter how diverse they may be, so long as
they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject,
and may be considered in furtherance of such subject by
providing for the method and means of carrying out the general
subject. First, the title of RA No. 9164, "An Act Providing for
Synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataang Elections,
amending Republic Act No. 7160, as amended, otherwise
known as the Local Government Code of 1991," states the
law‘s general subject matter – the amendment of the LGC to
synchronize the barangay and SK elections and for other
purposes. To achieve synchronization of the barangay and SK
elections, the reconciliation of the varying lengths of the terms
of office of barangay officials and SK officials is necessary.
Closely related with length of term is term limitation which
defines the total number of terms for which a barangay official
may run for and hold office. This natural linkage demonstrates
that term limitation is not foreign to the general subject
expressed in the title of the law. Second, the congressional
debates we cited above show that the legislators and the public
they represent were fully informed of the purposes, nature and
scope of the law‘s provisions. Term limitation therefore
received the notice, consideration, and action from both the
legislators and the public. Finally, to require the inclusion of
term limitation in the title of RA No. 9164 is to make the title
an index of all the subject matters dealt with by law; this is not
what the constitutional requirement contemplates.

5. NO. This Court cannot subscribe to the position of the

respondent that the legislature clearly intended that the
provision of RA No. 9164 be made effective in 1994 and that
such provision is valid and constitutional. If we allow such
premise, then the term of office for those officials elected in
the 1997 barangay elections should have ended in year 2000
and not year 2002 considering that RA No. 9164 provides for a
three-year term of barangay elective officials. The amendment
introduced by R.A. No. 8524 would be rendered nugatory in
view of such retroactive application. This is absurd and
illusory. Our own reading shows that no retroactive application
was made because the three-term limit has been there all along
as early as the second barangay law (RA No. 6679) after the

419
 1987 Constitution took effect; it was continued under the LGC
and can still be found in the current law. We find this obvious
from a reading of the historical development of the law. All
these inevitably lead to the conclusion that the challenged
proviso has been there all along and does not simply retroact
the application of the three-term limit to the barangay
elections of 1994. Congress merely integrated the past
statutory changes into a seamless whole by coming up with the
challenged proviso.
6. NO. The equal protection guarantee under the Constitution is
found under its Section 2, Article III, which provides: "Nor
shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws."
Essentially, the equality guaranteed under this clause is
equality under the same conditions and among persons
similarly situated. It is equality among equals, not similarity of
treatment of persons who are different from one another on
the basis of substantial distinctions related to the objective of
the law; when things or persons are different in facts or
circumstances, they may be treated differently in law.
Appreciation of how the constitutional equality provision
applies inevitably leads to the conclusion that no basis exists in
the present case for an equal protection challenge. The law can
treat barangay officials differently from other local elective
officials because the Constitution itself provides a significant
distinction between these elective officials with respect to
length of term and term limitation. The clear distinction,
expressed in the Constitution itself, is that while the
Constitution provides for a three-year term and three-term
limit for local elective officials, it left the length of term and the
application of the three-term limit or any form of term
limitation for determination by Congress through legislation.
Not only does this disparate treatment recognize substantial
distinctions, it recognizes as well that the Constitution itself
allows a non-uniform treatment. No equal protection violation
can exist under these conditions. From another perspective, we
see no reason to apply the equal protection clause as a standard
because the challenged proviso did not result in any differential
treatment between barangay officials and all other elective
officials. This conclusion proceeds from our ruling on the
retroactivity issue that the challenged proviso does not involve
any retroactive application.

420
 Farinas, et al. v. Executive Secretary
– in view with Section 26(1), Article VI -
G.R. No. 147387, December 10, 2003

FACTS:
The petition before the court seeks to declare Section 14 of RA no.
9006 (The Fair Election Act) unconstitutional as it expressly repeals
Section 67 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (The Omnibus Election Code
– (not verbatim) any elective official running for office except for
pres or vp shall be considered resigned from his office upon the filing
of his certificate of candidacy).

Unconstitutional for violating section 26, article 6 of the constitution

for requiring every law to have only one subject which should be
expressed in its title. Section 14 of RA no. 9006 primarily deals with
the lifting of the ban on the use of media as election propaganda and
the elimination of unfair election practices.

While Section 67 deals with any elective official running for office
except for president or vice president shall be considered resigned
from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.

The repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code is thus not

embraced in the title, nor germane to the subject matter of RA 9006.

Other facts though not essential for Sec. 26, Art. IV of the
constitution:
RA no. 9006 violates the equal protection clause because it repeals
only section 67 and not section 66 which states that appointive
official shall be considered resigned from his office upon filing of
CoC. Thus RA 9006 discriminates appointive officials because
elective officials can still hold office while campaigning with RA no.
9006‘s repeal.

RA 9006 in its entirety is null and void because irregularities

attended to its enactment into law; Section 16 states: ―[t]his Act
shall take effect upon its approval‖ is a violation of the due process
clause. Sec. 67 is a good law; hence, it should not have been
repealed.

ISSUE – in view with Section 26(1), Article VI:

Whether or not Section 14 of RA 9006 is a rider?

RULING:

421
NO. Sec 26(1), Article IV provides:
―Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject
which shall be expressed in the title thereof.‖

Constitutional provisions relating to the subject matter and titles of

statutes should not be so narrowly construed as to cripple or impede
the power of legislation. It is sufficient if the title be comprehensive
enough reasonably to include the general object which a statute
seeks to effect, without expressing each and every end and means
necessary or convenient for the accomplishing of that object.

The title of RA no. 9006 reads: ―An Act to Enhance the Holding of
Free, Orderly, Honest, Peaceful and Credible elections through Fair
Election Practices.‖ Section 2 provides the principles and objectives
thereof: The State shall, during the election period, supervise or
regulate the enjoyment or utilization of all franchises or permits for
the operation of media of communication or information to
guarantee or ensure equal opportunity for public service, including
access to media time and space, and the equitable right to reply, for
public information campaigns and for among candidates and assure
free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections.

The State shall ensure that bona fide candidates for any public office
shall be free from any form of harassment and discrimination. The
Court is convinced that the title and objectives of RA 9006 are
comprehensive enough to include the repeal of Sec. 67 within its
contemplation. RA no. 9006 does not violate the ―one subject-one
title‖ rule. An act having a single general subject , indicated in the
title, may contain any number of provisions as long as they are not
inconsistent or foreign to the general subject, and may be considered
furtherance of such subject by providing for the method and means
of carrying out the general subject.

422
IMBONG VS OCHOA
G.R. No. 204819 April 8, 2014
JAMES M. IMBONG and LOVELY-ANN C. IMBONG, for themselves
and in behalf of their minor children, LUCIA CARLOS IMBONG and
BERNADETTE CARLOS IMBONG and MAGNIFICAT CHILD
DEVELOPMENT CENTER, INC., Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON.
FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and
Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of
Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of
Education, Culture and Sports and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II,
Secretary, Department of Interior and Local Government,
Respondents.
Facts:
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible
Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), was
enacted by Congress on December 21, 2012.
Challengers from various sectors of society are questioning the
constitutionality of the said Act. The petitioners are assailing the
constitutionality of RH Law on the following grounds:
PROCEDURAL: Whether the Court may exercise its power of
judicial review over the controversy.
 Power of Judicial Review
 Actual Case or Controversy
 Facial Challenge
 Locus Standi
 Declaratory Relief
 One Subject/One Title Rule
Issue/s:
SUBSTANTIAL ISSUES:
Whether or not (WON) RA 10354/Reproductive Health (RH) Law is
unconstitutional for violating the:
 Right to life
 Right to health
 Freedom of religion and right to free speech
 Right to privacy (marital privacy and autonomy)
 Freedom of expression and academic freedom
 Due process clause

423
  Equal protection clause
 Prohibition against involuntary servitude
PROCEDURAL:
Whether the Court can exercise its power of judicial review over the
controversy.
 Actual Case or Controversy
 Facial Challenge
 Locus Standi
 Declaratory Relief
 One Subject/One Title Rule
Discussions:
PROCEDURAL
Judicial Review Jurisprudence is replete with the rule that the power
of judicial review is limited by four exacting requisites: (a) there
must be an actual case or controversy; (b) the petitioners must
possess locus standi; (c) the question of constitutionality must be
raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of
constitutionality must be the lis mota of the case.
Actual Controversy: An actual case or controversy means an
existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for
determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, lest the decision of
the court would amount to an advisory opinion. It must concern a
real, tangible and not merely a theoretical question or issue. There
ought to be an actual and substantial controversy admitting of
specific relief through a decree conclusive in nature, as distinguished
from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical
state of facts. Corollary to the requirement of an actual case or
controversy is the requirement of ripeness. A question is ripe for
adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse
effect on the individual challenging it. For a case to be considered
ripe for adjudication, it is a prerequisite that something has then
been accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may
come into the picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence of
an immediate or threatened injury to himself as a result of the
challenged action. He must show that he has sustained or is
immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of
the act complained of
Facial Challenge: A facial challenge, also known as a First
Amendment Challenge, is one that is launched to assail the validity
of statutes concerning not only protected speech, but also all other

424
rights in the First Amendment. These include religious freedom,
freedom of the press, and the right of the people to peaceably
assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances. After all, the fundamental right to religious freedom,
freedom of the press and peaceful assembly are but component
rights of the right to one‘s freedom of expression, as they are modes
which one‘s thoughts are externalized.
Locus Standi: Locus standi or legal standing is defined as a personal
and substantial interest in a case such that the party has sustained or
will sustain direct injury as a result of the challenged governmental
act. It requires a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as
to assure the concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation
of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of
difficult constitutional questions.
Transcendental Importance: the Court leans on the doctrine that
―the rule on standing is a matter of procedure, hence, can be relaxed
for non-traditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and
legislators when the public interest so requires, such as when the
matter is of transcendental importance, of overreaching significance
to society, or of paramount public interest.‖
One Subject-One Title: The ―one title-one subject‖ rule does not
require the Congress to employ in the title of the enactment
language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all
the contents and the minute details therein. The rule is sufficiently
complied with if the title is comprehensive enough as to include the
general object which the statute seeks to effect, and where, as here,
the persons interested are informed of the nature, scope and
consequences of the proposed law and its operation. Moreover, this
Court has invariably adopted a liberal rather than technical
construction of the rule ―so as not to cripple or impede legislation.‖
The one subject/one title rule expresses the principle that the title of
a law must not be ―so uncertain that the average person reading it
would not be informed of the purpose of the enactment or put on
inquiry as to its contents, or which is misleading, either in referring
to or indicating one subject where another or different one is really
embraced in the act, or in omitting any expression or indication of
the real subject or scope of the act.‖
Declaration of Unconstitutionality: Orthodox view: An
unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no
duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is, in legal
contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never been passed.
Modern view: Under this view, the court in passing upon the

425
question of constitutionality does not annul or repeal the statute if it
finds it in conflict with the Constitution. It simply refuses to
recognize it and determines the rights of the parties just as if such
statute had no existence. But certain legal effects of the statute prior
to its declaration of unconstitutionality may be recognized.
Requisites for partial unconstitutionality: (1) The Legislature must
be willing to retain the valid portion(s), usually shown by the
presence of a separability clause in the law; and (2) The valid portion
can stand independently as law.
Ruling/s:
SUBSTANTIAL
Majority of the Members of the Court believe that the question of
when life begins is a scientific and medical issue that should not be
decided, at this stage, without proper hearing and evidence.
However, they agreed that individual Members could express their
own views on this matter.
Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution states: ―The State
recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen
the family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally
protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from
conception.‖
In its plain and ordinary meaning (a canon in statutory
construction), the traditional meaning of ―conception‖ according
to reputable dictionaries cited by the ponente is that life begins at
fertilization. Medical sources also support the view that conception
begins at fertilization.
The framers of the Constitution also intended for (a) ―conception‖ to
refer to the moment of ―fertilization‖ and (b) the protection of the
unborn child upon fertilization. In addition, they did not intend to
ban all contraceptives for being unconstitutional; only those that kill
or destroy the fertilized ovum would be prohibited. Contraceptives
that actually prevent the union of the male sperm and female ovum,
and those that similarly take action before fertilization should be
deemed non-abortive, and thus constitutionally permissible.
The intent of the framers of the Constitution for protecting the life
of the unborn child was to prevent the Legislature from passing a
measure prevent abortion. The Court cannot interpret this
otherwise. The RH Law is in line with this intent and actually
prohibits abortion. By using the word ―or‖ in defining
abortifacient (Section 4(a)), the RH Law prohibits not only drugs or
devices that prevent implantation but also those that induce abortion

426
and induce the destruction of a fetus inside the mother‘s womb. The
RH Law recognizes that the fertilized ovum already has life and that
the State has a bounded duty to protect it.
However, the authors of the IRR gravely abused their office when
they redefined the meaning of abortifacient by using the term
―primarily‖. Recognizing as abortifacients only those that
―primarily induce abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the
mother‘s womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and
be implanted in the mother‘s womb‖ (Sec. 3.01(a) of the IRR) would
pave the way for the approval of contraceptives that may harm or
destroy the life of the unborn from conception/fertilization. This
violates Section 12, Article II of the Constitution. For the same
reason, the definition of contraceptives under the IRR (Sec 3.01(j)),
which also uses the term ―primarily‖, must be struck down.
The RH Law does not intend to do away with RA 4729 (1966). With
RA 4729 in place, the Court believes adequate safeguards exist to
ensure that only safe contraceptives are made available to the public.
In fulfilling its mandate under Sec. 10 of the RH Law, the DOH must
keep in mind the provisions of RA 4729: the contraceptives it will
procure shall be from a duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical
company and that the actual distribution of these contraceptive
drugs and devices will be done following a prescription of a qualified
medical practitioner.
Meanwhile, the requirement of Section 9 of the RH Law is to be
considered ―mandatory‖ only after these devices and materials have
been tested, evaluated and approved by the FDA. Congress cannot
determine that contraceptives are ―safe, legal, non-abortificient and
effective‖.
The Court cannot determine whether or not the use of
contraceptives or participation in support of modern RH measures
(a) is moral from a religious standpoint; or, (b) right or wrong
according to one‘s dogma or belief. However, the Court has the
authority to determine whether or not the RH Law contravenes the
Constitutional guarantee of religious freedom.
The State may pursue its legitimate secular objectives without being
dictated upon the policies of any one religion. To allow religious
sects to dictate policy or restrict other groups would violate Article
III, Section 5 of the Constitution or the Establishment Clause. This
would cause the State to adhere to a particular religion, and thus,
establishes a state religion. Thus, the State can enhance its
population control program through the RH Law even if the

427
promotion of contraceptive use is contrary to the religious beliefs of
e.g. the petitioners.
Section 23A (2)(i) of the RH Law, which permits RH procedures
even with only the consent of the spouse undergoing the provision
(disregarding spousal content), intrudes into martial privacy and
autonomy and goes against the constitutional safeguards for the
family as the basic social institution. Particularly, Section 3, Article
XV of the Constitution mandates the State to defend: (a) the right of
spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious
convictions and the demands of responsible parenthood and (b) the
right of families or family associations to participate in the planning
and implementation of policies and programs that affect them. The
RH Law cannot infringe upon this mutual decision-making, and
endanger the institutions of marriage and the family.
The exclusion of parental consent in cases where a minor undergoing
a procedure is already a parent or has had a miscarriage (Section 7 of
the RH Law) is also anti-family and violates Article II, Section 12 of
the Constitution, which states: ―The natural and primary right and
duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the
development of moral character shall receive the support of the
Government.‖ In addition, the portion of Section 23(a)(ii) which
reads ―in the case of minors, the written consent of parents or legal
guardian or, in their absence, persons exercising parental authority
or next-of-kin shall be required only in elective surgical procedures‖
is invalid as it denies the right of parental authority in cases where
what is involved is ―non-surgical procedures.‖
However, a minor may receive information (as opposed to
procedures) about family planning services. Parents are not deprived
of parental guidance and control over their minor child in this
situation and may assist her in deciding whether to accept or reject
the information received. In addition, an exception may be made in
life-threatening procedures.
The Court declined to rule on the constitutionality of Section 14 of
the RH Law, which mandates the State to provide Age-and
Development-Appropriate Reproductive Health Education. Although
educators might raise their objection to their participation in the RH
education program, the Court reserves its judgment should an actual
case be filed before it.
Any attack on its constitutionality is premature because the
Department of Education has not yet formulated a curriculum on
age-appropriate reproductive health education.

428
Section 12, Article II of the Constitution places more importance on
the role of parents in the development of their children with the use
of the term ―primary‖. The right of parents in upbringing their youth
is superior to that of the State.
The provisions of Section 14 of the RH Law and corresponding
provisions of the IRR supplement (rather than supplant) the right
and duties of the parents in the moral development of their children.
By incorporating parent-teacher-community associations, school
officials, and other interest groups in developing the mandatory RH
program, it could very well be said that the program will be in line
with the religious beliefs of the petitioners.
The RH Law does not violate the due process clause of the
Constitution as the definitions of several terms as observed by the
petitioners are not vague.
The definition of ―private health care service provider‖ must be seen
in relation to Section 4(n) of the RH Law which defines a ―public
health service provider‖. The ―private health care institution‖ cited
under Section 7 should be seen as synonymous to ―private health
care service provider.
The terms ―service‖ and ―methods‖ are also broad enough to include
providing of information and rendering of medical procedures. Thus,
hospitals operated by religious groups are exempted from rendering
RH service and modern family planning methods (as provided for by
Section 7 of the RH Law) as well as from giving RH information and
procedures.
The RH Law also defines ―incorrect information‖. Used together in
relation to Section 23 (a)(1), the terms ―incorrect‖ and ―knowingly‖
connote a sense of malice and ill motive to mislead or misrepresent
the public as to the nature and effect of programs and services on
reproductive health.
To provide that the poor are to be given priority in the government‘s
RH program is not a violation of the equal protection clause. In fact,
it is pursuant to Section 11, Article XIII of the Constitution, which
states that the State shall prioritize the needs of the underprivileged,
sick elderly, disabled, women, and children and that it shall endeavor
to provide medical care to paupers.
The RH Law does not only seek to target the poor to reduce their
number, since Section 7 of the RH Law prioritizes poor and
marginalized couples who are suffering from fertility issues and
desire to have children. In addition, the RH Law does not prescribe
the number of children a couple may have and does not impose
429
conditions upon couples who intend to have children. The RH Law
only seeks to provide priority to the poor.
The exclusion of private educational institutions from the mandatory
RH education program under Section 14 is valid. There is a need to
recognize the academic freedom of private educational institutions
especially with respect to religious instruction and to consider their
sensitivity towards the teaching of reproductive health education
The requirement under Sec. 17 of the RH Law for private and non-
government health care service providers to render 48 hours of pro
bono RH services does not amount to involuntary servitude, for two
reasons. First, the practice of medicine is undeniably imbued with
public interest that it is both the power and a duty of the State to
control and regulate it in order to protect and promote the public
welfare. Second, Section 17 only encourages private and non-
government RH service providers to render pro bono Besides the
PhilHealth accreditation, no penalty is imposed should they do
otherwise.
However, conscientious objectors are exempt from Sec. 17 as long as
their religious beliefs do not allow them to render RH service, pro
bono or otherwise
PROCEDURAL
In this case, the Court is of the view that an actual case or
controversy exists and that the same is ripe for judicial
determination. Considering that the RH Law and its implementing
rules have already taken effect and that budgetary measures to carry
out the law have already been passed, it is evident that the subject
petitions present a justiciable controversy. As stated earlier, when an
action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed
the Constitution, it not only becomes a right, but also a duty of the
Judiciary to settle the dispute.
Moreover, the petitioners have shown that the case is so because
medical practitioners or medical providers are in danger of being
criminally prosecuted under the RH Law for vague violations thereof,
particularly public health officers who are threatened to be dismissed
from the service with forfeiture of retirement and other benefits.
They must, at least, be heard on the matter now.
In this jurisdiction, the application of doctrines originating from the
U.S. has been generally maintained, albeit with some modifications.
While the Court has withheld the application of facial challenges to
strictly penal statues, it has expanded its scope to cover statutes not
only regulating free speech, but also those involving religious

430
freedom, and other fundamental rights. The underlying reason for
this modification is simple. For unlike its counterpart in the U.S.,
this Court, under its expanded jurisdiction, is mandated by the
Fundamental Law not only to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, but also to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch
or instrumentality of the Government. Verily, the framers of Our
Constitution envisioned a proactive Judiciary, ever vigilant with its
duty to maintain the supremacy of the Constitution.
Consequently, considering that the foregoing petitions have
seriously alleged that the constitutional human rights to life, speech
and religion and other fundamental rights mentioned above have
been violated by the assailed legislation, the Court has authority to
take cognizance of these kindred petitions and to determine if the
RH Law can indeed pass constitutional scrutiny. To dismiss these
petitions on the simple expedient that there exist no actual case or
controversy, would diminish this Court as a reactive branch of
government, acting only when the Fundamental Law has been
transgressed, to the detriment of the Filipino people.
Even if the constitutionality of the RH Law may not be assailed
through an ―as-applied challenge, still, the Court has time and again
acted liberally on the locus standi requirement. It has accorded
certain individuals standing to sue, not otherwise directly injured or
with material interest affected by a Government act, provided a
constitutional issue of transcendental importance is invoked. The
rule on locus standi is, after all, a procedural technicality which the
Court has, on more than one occasion, waived or relaxed, thus
allowing non-traditional plaintiffs, such as concerned citizens,
taxpayers, voters or legislators, to sue in the public interest, albeit
they may not have been directly injured by the operation of a law or
any other government act.
The present action cannot be properly treated as a petition for
prohibition, the transcendental importance of the issues involved in
this case warrants that the Court set aside the technical defects and
take primary jurisdiction over the petition at bar. One cannot deny
that the issues raised herein have potentially pervasive influence on
the social and moral well being of this nation, specially the youth;
hence, their proper and just determination is an imperative need.
This is in accordance with the well-entrenched principle that rules of
procedure are not inflexible tools designed to hinder or delay, but to
facilitate and promote the administration of justice. Their strict and
rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to

431
frustrate, rather than promote substantial justice, must always be
eschewed.
Most of the petitions are praying for injunctive reliefs and so the
Court would just consider them as petitions for prohibition under
Rule 65, over which it has original jurisdiction. Where the case has
far-reaching implications and prays for injunctive reliefs, the Court
may consider them as petitions for prohibition under Rule 65.
The RH Law does not violate the one subject/one bill rule. In this
case, a textual analysis of the various provisions of the law shows
that both ―reproductive health‖ and ―responsible parenthood‖ are
interrelated and germane to the overriding objective to control the
population growth. As expressed in the first paragraph of Section 2
of the RH Law:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. – The State recognizes and
guarantees the human rights of all persons including their right to
equality and nondiscrimination of these rights, the right to
sustainable human development, the right to health which includes
reproductive health, the right to education and information, and the
right to choose and make decisions for themselves in accordance
with their religious convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs, and the
demands of responsible parenthood.
Considering the close intimacy between ―reproductive health‖ and
―responsible parenthood‖ which bears to the attainment of the goal
of achieving ―sustainable human development‖ as stated under its
terms, the Court finds no reason to believe that Congress
intentionally sought to deceive the public as to the contents of the
assailed legislation.
Accordingly, the Court declares R.A. No. 10354 as NOT
UNCONSTITUTIONAL except with respect to the following
provisions which are declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL:
1) Section 7 and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar
as they: a) require private health facilities and non-maternity
specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and operated by a religious
group to refer patients, not in an emergency or life-threatening case,
as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to another health facility
which is conveniently accessible; and b) allow minor-parents or
minors who have suffered a miscarriage access to modem methods of
family planning without written consent from their parents or
guardian/s;

432
2) Section 23(a)(l) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR,
particularly Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar as they punish any
healthcare service provider who fails and or refuses to disseminate
information regarding programs and services on reproductive health
regardless of his or her religious beliefs.
3) Section 23(a)(2)(i) and the corresponding provision in the RH-
IRR insofar as they allow a married individual, not in an emergency
or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to
undergo reproductive health procedures without the consent of the
spouse;
4) Section 23(a)(2)(ii) and the corresponding provision in the RH-
IRR insofar as they limit the requirement of parental consent only to
elective surgical procedures.
5) Section 23(a)(3) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR,
particularly Section 5.24 thereof, insofar as they punish any
healthcare service provider who fails and/or refuses to refer a patient
not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under
Republic Act No. 8344, to another health care service provider
within the same facility or one which is conveniently accessible
regardless of his or her religious beliefs;
6) Section 23(b) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR,
particularly Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar as they punish any public
officer who refuses to support reproductive health programs or shall
do any act that hinders the full implementation of a reproductive
health program, regardless of his or her religious beliefs;
7) Section 17 and the corresponding prov1s10n in the RH-IRR
regarding the rendering of pro bona reproductive health service in so
far as they affect the conscientious objector in securing PhilHealth
accreditation; and
8) Section 3.0l(a) and Section 3.01 G) of the RH-IRR, which added
the qualifier ―primarily‖ in defining abortifacients and
contraceptives, as they are ultra vires and, therefore, null and void
for contravening Section 4(a) of the RH Law and violating Section
12, Article II of the Constitution.

433
TOLENTINO VS. SECRETARY OF FINANCE
249 SCRA 635

FACTS:
Petitioners (Tolentino, kilosbayan, Inc., Philippine Airlines, Roco
and Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Association) seek
reconsideration of the Court‘s previous ruling dismissing the
petitions filed for the declaration of unconstitutionality of R.A No.
7716, the Expanded Value Added Tax Law. Petitioners contend that
the R.A did not ―originated exclusively‖ in the House of
Representative as required by Article 6, Section 24 of the
Constitution. The Senate allegedly did not pass it on second and
third readings, instead passing its own version. Petitioners contend
that it should have amended the house bill by striking out the text of
the bill and substituting it with the text of its own bill, so as to
conform to the Constitution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the R.A 7716 is unconstitutional for having
―originated‖ from the Senate, and not from the HoR.
HELD:
Petition is unmeritorious. The enactment of the Senate bill has not
been the first instance where the Senate, in the exercise of its power
to propose amendments to bill (required to originate in the House),
passed its own version. An amendment by substitution (striking out
the text and substituting it), as urged by petitioners, concerns a mere
matter of form, and considering the petitioner has not shown what
substantial difference it would make if Senate applied such
substitution in the case, it cannot be applied to the case at bar.
While the aforementioned Constitutional provision states that bills
must ―originate exclusively in the HoR‖, it also adds, ―but the Senate
may propose or concur with amendments.‖ The Senate may then
propose an entirely new bill as a substitute measure. Petitioners
erred in assuming the Senate version to be an independent and
distinct bill. Without the House bill, Senate could not have enacted
the Senate bill, as the latter was a mere amendment of the former.
As such, it did not have to pass the Senate on second and third
readings.
Petitioners question the signing of the President on both bills, to
support their contention that such are separate and distinct. The
president certified the bills separately only because the certification

434
had to be made of the version of the same revenue bill which AT
THE MOMENT was being considered.
Petitioners question the power of the Conference Committee to
insert new provisions. The jurisdiction of the conference committee
is not limited to resolving differences between the Senate and the
House. It may propose an entirely new provision, given that such are
germane to the subject of the conference, and that the respective
houses of congress subsequently approve its report.
Petitioner PAL contends that the amendment of its franchise by the
withdrawal of its exemption from VAT is not expressed in the title of
the law, thereby violating the Constitution. The Court believes that
the title of the R.A satisfies the Constitutional Requirement.
Petitioners claim that the R.A violates their press freedom and
religious liberty, having removed them from the exemption to pay
VAT. Suffice it to say that since the law granted the press a privilege,
the law could take back the privilege anytime without offense to the
Constitution. By granting exemptions, the State does not forever
waive the exercise of its sovereign prerogative.
Lastly, petitioners contend that the R.A violates due process, equal
protection and contract clauses and the rule on taxation. Petitioners
fail to take into consideration the fact that the VAT was already
provided for in E.O no. 273 long before the R.A was enacted. The
latter merely EXPANDS the base of the tax. Equality and uniformity
in taxation means that all taxable articles or kinds of property of the
same class be taxed at the same rate, the taxing power having
authority to make reasonable and natural classifications for purposes
of taxation. It is enough that the statute applies equally to all
persons, forms and corporations placed in similar situation.

435
DATU MICHAEL ABAS KIDA vs. SENATE OF THE
PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 196271 (and other cases consolidated therewith)
Promulgated, October 18, 2011
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
BRION, J.:
I. THE FACTS
Several laws pertaining to the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao (ARMM) were enacted by Congress. Republic Act (RA)
No. 6734 is the organic act that established the ARMM and
scheduled the first regular elections for the ARMM regional officials.
RA No. 9054 amended the ARMM Charter and refined the basic
ARMM structure. It also reset the regular elections for the ARMM
regional officials to the second Monday of September 2001.
RA No. 9140 further reset the first regular elections to November
26, 2001. It likewise set the plebiscite to ratify RA No. 9054, which
was successfully held on August 14, 2001. RA No. 9333 reset for
the third time the ARMM regional elections to the 2nd Monday of
August 2005 and on the same date every 3 years thereafter.
Pursuant to RA No. 9333, the next ARMM regional elections should
have been held on August 8, 2011. COMELEC had begun
preparations for these elections and had accepted certificates of
candidacies for the various regional offices to be elected. But
on June 30, 2011, RA No. 10153 was enacted, resetting the next
ARMM regular elections to May 2013 to coincide with the regular
national and local elections of the country.
RA No. 10153 originated in the House of Representatives as House
Bill No. 4146, which the House passed on March 22, 2011 with 191
(of the 285) Members voting in its favor. The Senate adopted its own
version, Senate Bill No. 2756, on June 6, 2011. 13 (of the 23)
Senators voted favorably for its passage. On June 7, 2011, the House
of Representative concurred with the Senate amendments and
on June 30, 2011, the President signed RA No. 10153 into law.
In these consolidated petitions filed directly with the Supreme
Court, the petitioners assailed the constitutionality of RA No.

436
10153.
II. THE ISSUES:
1. Does the 1987 Constitution mandate the synchronization of
elections?
2. Does the passage of RA No. 10153 violate Section 26(2), Article
VI of the 1987 Constitution?
3. Does the passage of RA No. 10153 require a supermajority vote
[at least 2/3 of all members of Congress] and a plebiscite?
a. Does the postponement of the ARMM regular elections constitute
an amendment to Section 7, Article XVIII of RA No. 9054?
b. Does the requirement of a supermajority vote for amendments or
revisions to RA No. 9054 violate Sections 1 and 16(2), Article VI of
the 1987 Constitution and the corollary doctrine [prohibiting]
irrepealable laws?
c. Does the requirement of a plebiscite apply only in the creation of
autonomous regions under Section 18(2), Article X of the 1987
Constitution?
4. Is the grant [to the President] of the power to appoint OICs
constitutional?
III. THE HOLDING
[The Supreme Court] DISMISSED the petitions and UPHELD the
constitutionality of RA No. 10153 in toto.]
1. YES, the 1987 Constitution mandates the synchronization of
elections.
While the Constitution does not expressly state that Congress
has to synchronize national and local elections, the clear intent
towards this objective can be gleaned from the Transitory Provisions
(Article XVIII) of the Constitution, which show the extent to which
the Constitutional Commission, by deliberately making adjustments
to the terms of the incumbent officials, sought to attain
synchronization of elections.
The objective behind setting a common termination date for all
elective officials, done among others through the shortening the
terms of the twelve winning senators with the least number of votes,
is to synchronize the holding of all future elections – whether
national or local – to once every three years. This intention finds full
437
support in the discussions during the Constitutional Commission
deliberations.
The Constitutional Commission exchanges, read with the
provisions of the Transitory Provisions of the Constitution, all
serve as patent indicators of the constitutional mandate to hold
synchronized national and local elections, starting the second
Monday of May, 1992 and for all the following elections.
xxx xxx xxx
Although called regional elections, the ARMM elections should
be included among the elections to be synchronized as it is a
―local‖ election based on the wording and structure of the
Constitution.
xxx xxx xxx
From the perspective of the Constitution, autonomous regions are
considered one of the forms of local governments, as evident from
Article X of the Constitution entitled ―Local
Government.‖ Autonomous regions are established and discussed
under Sections 15 to 21 of this Article – the article wholly devoted to
Local Government. That an autonomous region is considered a form
of local government is also reflected in Section 1, Article X of the
Constitution, which provides:
Section 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of
the Philippines are the provinces, cities, municipalities, and
barangays. There shall be autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao,
and the Cordilleras as hereinafter provided.
Thus, we find the contention – that the synchronization mandated
by the Constitution does not include the regional elections of the
ARMM – unmeritorious. xxx.
2. NO, the passage of RA No. 10153 DOES NOT violate
Section 26(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution because the
President certified on the urgency of [the enactment of] RA No.
10153.
The petitioners in G.R. No. 197280 also challenge the validity of RA
No. 10153 for its alleged failure to comply with Section 26(2),
Article VI of the Constitution, which provides that before bills
passed by either the House or the Senate can become laws, they
must pass through three readings on separate days. The exception to

438
this is when the President certifies to the necessity of the bill‘s
immediate enactment.
The Court, in Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, explained the effect
of the President‘s certification of necessity in the following manner:
The presidential certification dispensed with the requirement
not only of printing but also that of reading the bill on separate
days. The phrase "except when the President certifies to the
necessity of its immediate enactment, etc." in Art. VI, Section 26[2]
qualifies the two stated conditions before a bill can become a law: [i]
the bill has passed three readings on separate days and [ii] it has
been printed in its final form and distributed three days before it is
finally approved.
In the present case, the records show that the President wrote
to the Speaker of the House of Representatives to certify the
necessity of the immediate enactment of a law synchronizing
the ARMM elections with the national and local elections.
Following our Tolentino ruling, the President’s certification
exempted both the House and the Senate from having to comply
with the three separate readings requirement.
On the follow-up contention that no necessity existed for the
immediate enactment of these bills since there was no public
calamity or emergency that had to be met, again we hark back to our
ruling in Tolentino:
The sufficiency of the factual basis of the suspension of the writ
of habeas corpus or declaration of martial law Art. VII, Section 18, or
the existence of a national emergency justifying the delegation of
extraordinary powers to the President under Art. VI, Section 23(2) is
subject to judicial review because basic rights of individuals may be
of hazard. But the factual basis of presidential certification of
bills, which involves doing away with procedural requirements
designed to insure that bills are duly considered by members of
Congress, certainly should elicit a different standard of review.
The House of Representatives and the Senate – in the exercise of
their legislative discretion – gave full recognition to the President‘s
certification and promptly enacted RA No. 10153. Under the
circumstances, nothing short of grave abuse of discretion on the part
of the two houses of Congress can justify our intrusion under our
power of judicial review.

439
The petitioners, however, failed to provide us with any cause or
justification for [our intrusion under the power of judicial
review]. Hence, while the judicial department and this Court are
not bound by the acceptance of the President's certification by both
the House of Representatives and the Senate, prudent exercise of our
powers and respect due our co-equal branches of government in
matters committed to them by the Constitution, caution a stay of the
judicial hand.
In any case, despite the President‘s certification, the two-fold
purpose that underlies the requirement for three readings on
separate days of every bill must always be observed to enable our
legislators and other parties interested in pending bills to
intelligently respond to them. Specifically, the purpose with respect
to Members of Congress is: (1) to inform the legislators of the
matters they shall vote on and (2) to give them notice that a measure
is in progress through the enactment process.
We find, based on the records of the deliberations on the law, that
both advocates and the opponents of the proposed measure had
sufficient opportunities to present their views. In this light, no
reason exists to nullify RA No. 10153 on the cited ground.
3. NO, the passage of [RA No. 9333 and] RA No. 10153
DOES NOT require a supermajority vote and a plebiscite
A. RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 are NOT amendments to
RA No. 9054
[N]either RA No. 9333 nor RA No. 10153 amends RA No.
9054. As an examination of these laws will show, RA No. 9054
only provides for the schedule of the first ARMM elections and
does not fix the date of the regular elections. A need therefore
existed for the Congress to fix the date of
the subsequent ARMM regular elections, which it did by enacting
RA No. 9333 and thereafter, RA No. 10153. Obviously, these
subsequent laws – RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 – cannot be
considered amendments to RA No. 9054 as they did not change or
revise any provision in the latter law; they merely filled in a gap in
RA No. 9054 or supplemented the law by providing the date of the
subsequent regular elections.
xxx xxx xxx
From these legislative actions, we see the clear intention of Congress

440
to treat the laws which fix the date of the subsequent ARMM
elections as separate and distinct from the Organic Acts. Congress
only acted consistently with this intent when it passed RA No.
10153 without requiring compliance with the amendment
prerequisites embodied in Section 1 and Section 3, Article XVII of
RA No. 9054.
B. Supermajority voting requirement [under RA No. 9054]
VIOLATES Section 16(2), Article VI for giving RA No. 9054 the
character of an irrepealable law
Even assuming that RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 did in fact
amend RA No. 9054, the supermajority (2/3) voting requirement
required under Section 1, Article XVII of RA No. 9054 has to be
struck down for giving RA No. 9054 the character of an irrepealable
law by requiring more than what the Constitution demands.
Section 16(2), Article VI of the Constitution provides that a
―majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do business.‖
In other words, as long as majority of the members of the House of
Representatives or the Senate are present, these bodies have the
quorum needed to conduct business and hold session. Within a
quorum, a vote of majority is generally sufficient to enact laws or
approve acts.
In contrast, Section 1, Article XVII of RA No. 9054 requires a vote of
no less than two-thirds (2/3) of the Members of the House of
Representatives and of the Senate, voting separately, in order to
effectively amend RA No. 9054. Clearly, this 2/3 voting
requirement is higher than what the Constitution requires for
the passage of bills, and served to restrain the plenary powers of
Congress to amend, revise or repeal the laws it had passed. The
Court‘s pronouncement in City of Davao v. GSIS on this subject best
explains the basis and reason for the unconstitutionality:
Moreover, it would be noxious anathema to democratic principles for
a legislative body to have the ability to bind the actions of future
legislative body, considering that both assemblies are regarded with
equal footing, exercising as they do the same plenary
powers. Perpetual infallibility is not one of the attributes desired in a
legislative body, and a legislature which attempts to forestall future
amendments or repeals of its enactments labors under delusions of
omniscience.
Thus, while a supermajority is not a total ban against a repeal,
441
it is a limitation in excess of what the Constitution requires on
the passage of bills and is constitutionally obnoxious because it
significantly constricts the future legislators’ room for action
and flexibility.
C. Plebiscite requirement only applies to the creation of
autonomous regions; Section 3, Article XVII of RA No. 9054
unconstitutional for excessively enlarging the plebiscite
requirement in Section 18, Article X of the Constitution

[T]he plebiscite requirement under Section 3, Article XVII of RA No.

9054 is excessive to point of absurdity and, hence, a violation of the
Constitution.
Section 18, Article X of the Constitution states that the plebiscite is
required only for the creation of autonomous regions and for [the
determination of] which provinces, cities and geographic areas will
be included in the autonomous regions. While the settled rule is that
amendments to the Organic Act have to comply with the plebiscite
requirement in order to become effective, questions on the extent of
the matters requiring ratification may unavoidably arise because of
the seemingly general terms of the Constitution and the obvious
absurdity that would result if a plebiscite were to be required
for every statutory amendment.
Section 18, Article X of the Constitution plainly states that ―The
creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved
by the majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a
plebiscite called for the purpose.‖ With these wordings as standard,
we interpret the requirement to mean that only amendments to, or
revisions of, the Organic Act constitutionally-essential to the
creation of autonomous regions – i.e., those aspects specifically
mentioned in the Constitution which Congress must provide for
in the Organic Act – require ratification through a
plebiscite. These amendments to the Organic Act are those that
relate to: (a) the basic structure of the regional government; (b) the
region‘s judicial system, i.e., the special courts with personal,
family, and property law jurisdiction; and, (c) the grant and extent of
the legislative powers constitutionally conceded to the regional
government under Section 20, Article X of the Constitution.
The date of the ARMM elections does not fall under any of the

442
matters that the Constitution specifically mandated Congress to
provide for in the Organic Act. Therefore, even assuming that
the supermajority votes and the plebiscite requirements are
valid, any change in the date of elections cannot be construed as
a substantial amendment of the Organic Act that would require
compliance with these requirements.
4. YES, the grant [to the President] of the power to appoint
OICs is constitutional
During the oral arguments, the Court identified the three options
open to Congress in order to resolve the problem on who should sit
as ARMM officials in the interim: (1) allow the elective officials in
the ARMM to remain in office in a hold over capacity until those
elected in the synchronized elections assume office; (2) hold special
elections in the ARMM, with the terms of those elected to expire
when those elected in the [2013] synchronized elections assume
office; or (3) authorize the President to appoint OICs, [their terms to
last] also until those elected in the [2013] synchronized elections
assume office.
A. Holdover Option is Unconstitutional
We rule out the [hold over] option xxx violates Section 8,
Article X of the Constitution. This provision states:

Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except

barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three
years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive
terms. [emphases ours]
Since elective ARMM officials are local officials, they are
covered and bound by the three-year term limit prescribed by
the Constitution; they cannot extend their term through a
holdover. xxx.
xxx xxx xxx
In the case of the terms of local officials, their term has been fixed
clearly and unequivocally, allowing no room for any implementing
legislation with respect to the fixed term itself and no vagueness that
would allow an interpretation from this Court. Thus, the term of
three years for local officials should stay at three (3) years as
fixed by the Constitution and cannot be extended by holdover

443
by Congress.
If it will be claimed that the holdover period is effectively another
term mandated by Congress, the net result is for Congress to create
a new term and to appoint the occupant for the new term. This view
– like the extension of the elective term – is constitutionally infirm
because Congress cannot do indirectly what it cannot do
directly, i.e., to act in a way that would effectively extend the term of
the incumbents. Indeed, if acts that cannot be legally done directly
can be done indirectly, then all laws would be illusory. Congress
cannot also create a new term and effectively appoint the
occupant of the position for the new term. This is effectively an
act of appointment by Congress and an unconstitutional
intrusion into the constitutional appointment power of the
President. Hence, holdover – whichever way it is viewed – is a
constitutionally infirm option that Congress could not have
undertaken.
Jurisprudence, of course, is not without examples of cases where the
question of holdover was brought before, and given the imprimatur
of approval by, this Court. The present case though differs
significantly from past cases with contrary rulings, where the Court
ruled that the elective officials could hold on to their positions in a
hold over capacity.
All these past cases refer to elective barangay or Sanggunian
Kabataan officials whose terms of office are not explicitly provided
for in the Constitution; the present case, on the other hand, refers to
local elective officials – the ARMM Governor, the ARMM Vice-
Governor, and the members of the Regional Legislative Assembly –
whose terms fall within the three-year term limit set by Section 8,
Article X of the Constitution. Because of their constitutionally
limited term, Congress cannot legislate an extension beyond the
term for which they were originally elected.
Even assuming that holdover is constitutionally permissible, and
there had been statutory basis for it (namely Section 7, Article VII of
RA No. 9054) in the past, we have to remember that the rule of
holdover can only apply as an available option where no express
or implied legislative intent to the contrary exists; it cannot
apply where such contrary intent is evident.
Congress, in passing RA No. 10153, made it explicitly clear that
it had the intention of suppressing the holdover rule that

444
prevailed under RA No. 9054 by completely removing this
provision. The deletion is a policy decision that is wholly within the
discretion of Congress to make in the exercise of its plenary
legislative powers; this Court cannot pass
upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation,
except where an attendant unconstitutionality or grave abuse of
discretion results.
B. The COMELEC has no authority to order special elections
Another option proposed by the petitioner in G.R. No. 197282 is for
this Court to compel COMELEC to immediately conduct special
elections pursuant to Section 5 and 6 of Batas Pambansa Blg. (BP)
881.
The power to fix the date of elections is essentially legislative in
nature. [N]o elections may be held on any other date for the
positions of President, Vice President, Members of Congress and
local officials, except when so provided by another Act of Congress,
or upon orders of a body or officer to whom Congress may have
delegated either the power or the authority to ascertain or fill in the
details in the execution of that power.
Notably, Congress has acted on the ARMM elections by
postponing the scheduled August 2011 elections and setting
another date – May 13, 2011 – for regional elections
synchronized with the presidential, congressional and other
local elections. By so doing, Congress itself has made a policy
decision in the exercise of its legislative wisdom that it shall not
call special elections as an adjustment measure in synchronizing
the ARMM elections with the other elections.
After Congress has so acted, neither the Executive nor the
Judiciary can act to the contrary by ordering special elections
instead at the call of the COMELEC. This Court, particularly,
cannot make this call without thereby supplanting the legislative
decision and effectively legislating. To be sure, the Court is not
without the power to declare an act of Congress null and void for
being unconstitutional or for having been exercised in grave abuse of
discretion. But our power rests on very narrow ground and is merely
to annul a contravening act of Congress; it is not to supplant the
decision of Congress nor to mandate what Congress itself should
have done in the exercise of its legislative powers. Thus, contrary to
what the petition in G.R. No. 197282 urges, we cannot compel

445
COMELEC to call for special elections.
xxx xxx xxx
Even assuming that it is legally permissible for the Court to compel
the COMELEC to hold special elections, no legal basis likewise
exists to rule that the newly elected ARMM officials shall hold office
only until the ARMM officials elected in the synchronized elections
shall have assumed office.
In the first place, the Court is not empowered to adjust the terms of
elective officials. Based on the Constitution, the power to fix the
term of office of elective officials, which can be exercised only in the
case of barangay officials, is specifically given to Congress. Even
Congress itself may be denied such power, as shown when the
Constitution shortened the terms of twelve Senators obtaining the
least votes, and extended the terms of the President and the Vice-
President in order to synchronize elections; Congress was not
granted this same power. The settled rule is that terms fixed by the
Constitution cannot be changed by mere statute. More particularly,
not even Congress and certainly not this Court, has the authority to
fix the terms of elective local officials in the ARMM for less, or more,
than the constitutionally mandated three years as this tinkering
would directly contravene Section 8, Article X of the Constitution as
we ruled in Osmeña.
Thus, in the same way that the term of elective ARMM officials
cannot be extended through a holdover, the term cannot be
shortened by putting an expiration date earlier than the three
(3) years that the Constitution itself commands. This is what
will happen – a term of less than two years – if a call for special
elections shall prevail. In sum, while synchronization is achieved, the
result is at the cost of a violation of an express provision of the
Constitution.
D. The President’s Power to Appoint OICs
The above considerations leave only Congress‘ chosen interim
measure – RA No. 10153 and the appointment by the President of
OICs to govern the ARMM during the pre-synchronization period
pursuant to Sections 3, 4 and 5 of this law – as the only measure that
Congress can make. This choice itself, however, should be examined
for any attendant constitutional infirmity.
At the outset, the power to appoint is essentially executive in nature,

446
and the limitations on or qualifications to the exercise of this power
should be strictly construed; these limitations or qualifications must
be clearly stated in order to be recognized. The appointing power is
embodied in Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, which
states:
Section 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of
the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the
executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or
naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in
him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of
the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for
by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to
appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other
officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the
heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. [emphasis
ours]
This provision classifies into four groups the officers that the
President can appoint. These are:
First, the heads of the executive departments; ambassadors; other
public ministers and consuls; officers of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, from the rank of colonel or naval captain; and other
officers whose appointments are vested in the President in this
Constitution;
Second, all other officers of the government whose appointments are
not otherwise provided for by law;
Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to
appoint; and
Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may
by law vest in the President alone.
Since the President’s authority to appoint OICs emanates from
RA No. 10153, it falls under the third group of officials that the
President can appoint pursuant to Section 16, Article VII of the
Constitution. Thus, the assailed law facially rests on clear
constitutional basis.
If at all, the gravest challenge posed by the petitions to the authority
to appoint OICs under Section 3 of RA No. 10153 is the assertion
that the Constitution requires that the ARMM executive and
447
legislative officials to be ―elective and representative of the
constituent political units.‖ This requirement indeed is an express
limitation whose non-observance in the assailed law leaves the
appointment of OICs constitutionally defective.
After fully examining the issue, we hold that this
alleged constitutional problem is more apparent than real and
becomes very real only if RA No. 10153 were to be mistakenly read
as a law that changes the elective and representative character of
ARMM positions. RA No. 10153, however, does not in any way
amend what the organic law of the ARMM (RA No. 9054) sets
outs in terms of structure of governance. What RA No. 10153
in fact only does is to ―appoint officers-in-charge for the Office
of the Regional Governor, Regional Vice Governor and
Members of the Regional Legislative Assembly who shall
perform the functions pertaining to the said offices until the
officials duly elected in the May 2013 elections shall have
qualified and assumed office.‖ This power is far different from
appointing elective ARMM officials for the abbreviated term
ending on the assumption to office of the officials elected in the
May 2013 elections.
[T]he legal reality is that RA No. 10153 did not amend RA No.
9054. RA No. 10153, in fact, provides only for synchronization
of elections and for the interim measures that must in the
meanwhile prevail. And this is how RA No. 10153 should be
read – in the manner it was written and based on its
unambiguous facial terms. Aside from its order for
synchronization, it is purely and simply an interim measure
responding to the adjustments that the synchronization
requires.
xxx xxx xxx
Furthermore, the ―representative‖ character of the chosen
leaders need not necessarily be affected by the appointment of
OICs as this requirement is really a function of the appointment
process; only the ―elective‖ aspect shall be supplanted by the
appointment of OICs. In this regard, RA No. 10153 significantly
seeks to address concerns arising from the appointments by
providing, under Sections 3, 4 and 5 of the assailed law, concrete
terms in the Appointment of OIC, the Manner and Procedure of
Appointing OICs, and their Qualifications.

448
Based on these considerations, we hold that RA No. 10153 – viewed
in its proper context – is a law that is not violative of the
Constitution (specifically, its autonomy provisions), and one that is
reasonable as well under the circumstances

449
CERTIFICATION OF BILLS

450
 PH JUDGES ASSOCIATION vs. PRADO
G.R. No. 105371 November 11, 1993

PONENTE:
JUSTICE ISAGANI CRUZ

DISPOSITIVE:
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is partially GRANTED and
Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
Circular No. 92-28 is SET ASIDE insofar as it withdraws the
franking privilege from the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the
Regional trail Courts, the Municipal trial Courts, and the National
Land Registration Authority and its Register of Deeds to all of which
offices the said privilege shall be RESTORED. The temporary
restraining order dated June 2, 1992, is made permanent.
FACTS:
R.A. No. 7354 titled "An Act Creating the Philippine Postal
Corporation, Defining its Powers, Functions and Responsibilities,
Providing for Regulation of the Industry and for Other Purposes
Connected Therewith." was enacted in 1992 to provide for a more
efficient and effective postal service system in the Philippines.
Section 35 of the said law withdraws the franking privilege
from the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the Regional Trial
Courts, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts,
and the Land Registration Commission and its Registers of Deeds,
along with certain other government offices.
With this, the petitioners who felt that they were prejudiced by
R.A. 7354 assailed the constitutionality of the same. They argue that
(1) its title embraces more than one subject and does not express its
purposes; (2) that it did not pass the required readings in both
Houses of Congress and printed copies of the bill in its final form
were not distributed among the members before its passage; and (3)
that it is discriminatory and encroaches on the independence of the
Judiciary.
ISSUES:
(1) WON R.A. No. 7354‘s has more than one subject and an
unclear purpose

451
 (2) WON Sec. 35(2) of R.A. No. 7354 has been validly added
as an amendment
(3) WON R.A. No. 7354 violates the equal protection clause
RULING:
(1.) The title of the bill is not required to be an index to the body of
the act, or to be as comprehensive as to cover every single detail of
the measure. It has been held that if the title fairly indicates the
general subject, and reasonably covers all the provisions of the act,
and is not calculated to mislead the legislature or the people, there is
sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement.
To require every end and means necessary for the
accomplishment of the general objectives of the statute to be
expressed in its title would not only be unreasonable but would
actually render legislation impossible.
Where a statute repeals a former law, such repeal is the effect
and not the subject of the statute; and it is the subject, not the effect
of a law, which is required to be briefly expressed in its title. As
observed in one case, if the title of an act embraces only one subject,
we apprehend it was never claimed that every other act which
repeals it or alters by implication must be mentioned in the title of
the new act. Any such rule would be neither within the reason of the
Constitution, nor practicable.
The withdrawal of the franking privilege from some agencies is
germane to the accomplishment of the principal objective of R.A.
No. 7354, which is the creation of a more efficient and effective
postal service system.
(2.) A conference committee may, deal generally with the subject
matter or it may be limited to resolving the precise differences
between the two houses. Even where the conference committee is
not by rule limited in its jurisdiction, legislative custom severely
limits the freedom with which new subject matter can be inserted
into the conference bill. But occasionally a conference committee
produces unexpected results, results beyond its mandate. These
excursions occur even where the rules impose strict limitations on
conference committee jurisdiction. This is symptomatic of the
authoritarian power of conference committee (Davies, Legislative
Law and Process: In a Nutshell, 1986 Ed., p.81).
It is a matter of record that the conference Committee Report
on the bill in question was returned to and duly approved by both

452
the Senate and the House of Representatives. Thereafter, the bill was
enrolled with its certification by Senate President Neptali A.
Gonzales and Speaker Ramon V. Mitra of the House of
Representatives as having been duly passed by both Houses of
Congress. It was then presented to and approved by President
Corazon C. Aquino on April 3, 1992.
Under the doctrine of separation powers, the Court may not
inquire beyond the certification of the approval of a bill from the
presiding officers of Congress
(3.) In lumping the Judiciary with the other offices from which the
franking privilege has been withdrawn, Section 35 has placed the
courts of justice in a category to which it does not belong. If it
recognizes the need of the President of the Philippines and the
members of Congress for the franking privilege, there is no reason
why it should not recognize a similar and in fact greater need on the
part of the Judiciary for such privilege.
We also do not believe that the basis of the classification was
mere courtesy, for it is unimaginable that the political departments
would have intended this serious slight to the Judiciary as the third
of the major and equal departments the government. The same
observations are made if the importance or status of the grantee was
the criterion used for the extension of the franking privilege.
We are unable to agree with the respondents that Section 35 of
R.A. No. 7354 represents a valid exercise of discretion by the
Legislature under the police power. On the contrary, we find its
repealing clause to be a discriminatory provision that denies the
Judiciary the equal protection of the laws guaranteed for all persons
or things similarly situated. The distinction made by the law is
superficial. It is not based on substantial distinctions that make real
differences between the Judiciary and the grantees of the franking
privilege.

453
CONFERENCE COMMITTEE

454
 Galicto vs Aquino III
667 SCRA 150 G.R. No. 193978
Promulgated on February 28, 2012
Facts:
President Benigno Simeon Aquino III exposed anomalies in the
financial management of the Metropolitan Waterworks Sewerage
System, the National Power Corporation and the National Food
Authority.
Because of this, the Senate prompted to conduct legislative inquiries
on the matter of activities of GOCC and issued Resolution No. 17 s.
2010, urging the President to order the immediate suspension of the
unusually large and excessive allowances, bonuses, incentives and
other perks of members of the governing boards of GOCC‘s and
government financial institutions (GFIs). President Aquino issued
E.O 7 strengthening the supervision of compensation levels of
GOCCs and GFIs by controlling the grant of excessive salaries,
allowances and other benefits.
However, petitioner Jelbert Galicto allegedly questions the
constitutionality of E.O 7 in his capacity as a lawyer and as an
employee of Phil Health Regional Office. As he allegedly stands to be
prejudiced by E.O 7 because it suspends or imposes a moratorium
on the grant of salary increase and other benefits granted to the
GOCC and GFI officials. Moreover, he claims interest in making sure
that laws and orders by government officials are legally issued and
implemented.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner Galicto has a locus standi in
bringing the petition before the Court.
Ruling:
No, the SC said that petitioner cannot claim legal stance because
petitioner is simply concerned about his entitlement to future salary
increases.
A public officer has a vested right only to salaries already earned or
accrued. Salary increases are a mere expectancy volatile and
dependent on various variables in nature.
His assertion of legal impediment under Section 9 of E.O 7 of any
future increase in petitioner‘s compensation will only depend on
usual factors considered by proper authorities was misleading and
incorrect due to the concept of injury as an element of Locus
455
standi. He only points out the denial of a reasonable expectation
which is not a subject of harm to go against the law.
His membership of Philippine Bar and a Phil Health official does not
suffice to clothe his legal standing. Thus, Petitioner failed to satisfy
irreducible minimum condition to trigger the exercise of judicial
power.
STAT CON PRINCIPLE OF LOCUS STANDI
Locus Standi is the ability of a party to demonstrate to
the court sufficient connection to and harm from the law or action
challenged to support that party's participation in the case.
The party is directly subject to an adverse effect by the statute or
action in question, and the harm suffered will continue unless the
court grants relief in the form of damages or a finding that the law
either does not apply to the party or that the law is void or can be
nullified. This is called the "something to lose" doctrine, in which the
party has standing because they directly will be harmed by the
conditions for which they are asking the court for relief. A person
cannot bring a suit challenging the constitutionality of a law unless
the plaintiff can demonstrate that he/she/it is or will "imminently"
be harmed by the law.
Otherwise, the court will rule that the plaintiff "lacks standing" to
bring the suit, and will dismiss the case without considering the
merits of the claim of unconstitutionality. To have a court declare a
law unconstitutional, there must be a valid reason for the lawsuit.
The party suing must have something to lose in order to sue unless
it has automatic standing by action of law.

456
POCKET VETO

457
 BOLINAO ELECTRONICS CORPORATION, CHRONICLE
BROADCASTING NETWORK, INC., and MONSERRAT
BROADCASTING SYSTEM, INC.
Vs.
BRIGIDO VALENCIA, Secretary of the Department of Public Works
and Communications and ROBERT SAN ANDRES of the Radio
Control Division

Facts:
This is an original petition for prohibition, mandatory injunction
with preliminary injunction filed by the Bolinao Electronics
Corporation, Chronicle Broadcasting Network, Inc., and Monserrat
Broadcasting System, Inc., owners and operators of radio and
television stations enumerated therein, against respondents
Secretary of Public Works and Communications and Acting Chief of
the Radio Control Division. Later the Republic of the Philippines, as
operator of the Philippine Broadcasting Service, sought and was
allowed to intervene in this case, said interveners having been
granted a construction permit to install and operate a television
station in Manila. Petitioners applications for renewal of their station
licenses were denied because it should be filed two month before the
expiration of the license. Pursuant to Section 3 of Act 3846, as
amended by Republic Act 584, on the powers and duties of the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications (formerly
Commerce And Communications), he may approve or disapprove
any application for renewal of station or operator license, provided,
however, That no application for renewal shall bed is approved
without giving the licensee a hearing. Thus the notices of hearing
were sent by respondents to petitioners. Clearly, the intention of the
investigation is to find out whether there is ground to disapprove the
applications for renewal. According to petitioner however, the
violation has ceased to exist when the act of late filing was condoned
or pardoned by respondents by the issuance of the circular dated
July24, 1962.The lone reason given for the investigation of
petitioners' applications, i.e., late filing thereof, is therefore no
longer tenable. The violation, in legal effect, ceased to exist and,
hence, there is no reason nor need for the present investigation.
They were summoned by Valencia, then Secretary of
Communications, for operating even after their permit has expired.
Valencia claimed that because of CBN‘s continued operation sans
license and their continuing operation had caused damage to his
department.

458
Issues:
(1) Whether the investigation being conducted by respondents, in
connection with petitioners' applications for renewal of their station
licenses, has any legal basis;
(2) Whether or not there was abandonment or renunciation by the
Chronicle Broadcasting Network (CBN) of channel 9in favour of
PBS; and
(3) Whether or not Philippine Broadcasting Service can legally
operate Channel 9 and BrigidoValencia is entitled to claim damages,
for Chronicle Broadcasting Network's refusal to give up operations
thereof.

Held:
In the case at bar, the issuance of the said circular, the lone reason
given for the investigation of petitioners' applications, i.e., late filing
thereof, is therefore no longer tenable. The violation, in legal effect,
ceased to exist and, hence, there is neither reason nor need for the
present investigation. There was no express agreement there was
abandonment or renunciation by the Chronicle Broadcasting
Network (CBN) of channel 9 in favour of PBS. The only basis of the
contention of the respondents that there was such renunciation is
the statement "Channel 10assigned in lieu of Channel 9", appearing
in the construction permit to transfer television station DZXL-TV
from Quezon City to Baguio City, issued to petitioner. This
statement alone, however, does not establish any agreement between
the radio control authority and the station operator, on the switch or
change of operations of CBN from Channel 9 to Channel 10.The
Supreme Court ruled in the negative. Valencia failed to show that
any right of his has been violated by the refusal of Chronicle
Broadcasting Network to cease operation. Further, the Supreme
Court noted that as the records show, the appropriation to operate
the Philippine Broadcasting Service as approved by Congress and
incorporated in the 1962-1963Budget of the Republic of the
Philippines does not allow appropriations for TV stations particularly
in Luzon. Hence, since there was no appropriation allotted then
there can be no damage; and if there are expenditures made by
Valencia‘s department they are in fact in violation of the law and
they cannot claim damages therefrom. And even if it is shown that
thethen President vetoed this provision of the Budget Act, this gives
rise to the question of whether the President may legally veto a
condition attached to an appropriation or item in the appropriation
bill. The executive's veto power does not carry with it the power to
strike out conditions or restrictions, has been adhered to in

459
subsequent cases. If the veto is unconstitutional, it follows that the
same produced no effect whatsoever, and the restriction imposed by
the appropriation bill, therefore, remains. Any expenditure made by
the intervener PBS, for the purpose of installing or operating a
television station in Manila, where there are already television
stations in operation, would be in violation of the express condition
for the release of the appropriation and, consequently, null and void.
It is not difficult to see that even if it were able to prove its right to
operate on Channel 9, said intervener would not have been entitled
to reimbursement of its illegal expenditures.

460
BILL VS. RESOLUTION

461
SWEDISH MATCH PHILIPPINES, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
THE TREASURER OF THE CITYOF MANILA, Respondent.

G.R. No. 181277

July 3, 2013

FACTS:

On 20 October 2001, petitioner paid business taxes in the total

amount of ₱470,932.21.4 The assessed amount was based on
Sections 145 and 216 of Ordinance No. 7794, otherwise known as the
Manila Revenue Code.Petitioner wrote a letter8 dated 17 September
2003 to herein respondent claiming a refund of business taxes the
former had paid pursuant to the said provision. Petitioner argued
that payment under Section 21 constituted double taxation in view
of its payment under Section 14. The signatory of the verification
and/or certification of non-forum shopping is Ms. Beleno, the
company‘s Finance Manager, and that there was no board resolution
or secretary's certificate showing proof of Ms. Beleno‘s authority in
acting in behalf of the corporation at the time the initiatory pleading
was filed in the RTC.

ISSUES:

1) Whether Ms. Beleno was authorized to file the Petition for

Refund of Taxes with the RTC; and

2) Whether the imposition of tax under Section 21 of the Manila

Revenue Code constitutes double taxation in view of the tax
collected and paid under Section 14 of the same code

RULING:

The power of a corporation to sue and be sued is lodged in the board

of directors, which exercises its corporate powers. It necessarily
follows that "an individual corporate officer cannot solely exercise
any corporate power pertaining to the corporation without authority
from the board of directors. Thus, physical acts of the corporation,
like the signing of documents, can be performed only by natural
persons duly authorized for the purpose by corporate by-laws or by a
specific act of the board of directors.

462
Consequently, a verification signed without an authority from the
board of directors is defective. However, the requirement of
verification is simply a condition affecting the form of the pleading
and non-compliance does not necessarily render the pleading fatally
defective.The court may in fact order the correction of the pleading if
verification is lacking or, it may act on the pleading although it may
not have been verified, where it is made evident that strict
compliance with the rules may be dispensed with so that the ends of
justice may be served.
We have held that the following officials or employees of the
company can sign the verification and certification without need of a
board resolution: (1) the Chairperson of the Board of Directors, (2)
the President of a corporation, (3) the General Manager or Acting
General Manager, (4) Personnel Officer, and (5) an Employment
Specialist in a labor case.
Additionally, it may be remembered that the Petition filed with the
RTC was a claim for a refund of business taxes. It should be noted
that the nature of the position of Ms. Beleno as the corporation‘s
finance director/manager is relevant to the determination of her
capability and sufficiency to verify the truthfulness and correctness
of the allegations in the Petition. A finance director/manager looks
after the overall management of the financial operations of the
organization and is normally in charge of financial reports, which
necessarily include taxes assessed and paid by the corporation. Thus,
for this particular case, Ms. Beleno, as finance director, may be said
to have been in a position to verify the truthfulness and correctness
of the allegations in the claim for a refund of the corporation‘s
business taxes.
Double taxation means taxing the same property twice when it
should be taxed only once; that is, "taxing the same person twice by
the same jurisdiction for the same thing." It is obnoxious when the
taxpayer is taxed twice, when it should be but once. Otherwise
described as "direct duplicate taxation," the two taxes must be
imposed on the same subject matter, for the same purpose, by the
same taxing authority, within the same jurisdiction, during the same
taxing period; and the taxes must be of the same kind or character.
The Court finds that there is indeed double taxation if respondent is
subjected to the taxes under both Sections 14 and 21 of Tax
Ordinance No. 7794, since these are being imposed: (1) on the same

463
subject matter – the privilege of doing business in the City of Manila;
(2) for the same purpose – to make persons conducting business
within the City of Manila contribute to city revenues; (3) by the
same taxing authority – petitioner City of Manila; (4) within the
same taxing jurisdiction – within the territorial jurisdiction of the
City of Manila; (5) for the same taxing periods – per calendar year;
and (6) of the same kind or character – a local business tax imposed
on gross sales or receipts of the business.
Despite the nullity of Tax Ordinance No. 7988, the court a quo, in
the assailed Order, dated 8 May 2002, went on to dismiss
petitioner‘s case on the force of the enactment of Tax Ordinance No.
8011, amending Tax Ordinance No. 7988. Significantly, said
amending ordinance was likewise declared null and void by the DOJ
Secretary in a Resolution, dated 5 July 2001, elucidating that "Instead
of amending Ordinance No. 7988, herein respondent should have
enacted another tax measure which strictly complies with the
requirements of law, both procedural and substantive. The passage
of the assailed ordinance did not have the effect of curing the defects
of Ordinance No. 7988 which, anyway, does not legally exist." Said
Resolution of the DOJ Secretary had, as well, attained finality by
virtue of the dismissal with finality by this Court of respondents‘
Petition for Review on Certiorari in G.R. No. 157490 assailing the
dismissal by the RTC of Manila, Branch 17, of its appeal due to lack
of jurisdiction in its Order, dated 11 August 2003

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is

GRANTED. Accordingly, the Court of Tax Appeals En Banc Decision
dated 1 October 2007 and Resolution dated 14 January 2008 are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.

464
PARTIAL VETO

465
 Planters products vs fertiphil corporation
Gr no 166006, March 14, 2008
Reyes

Facts:

Petitioner PPI and private respondent Fertiphil are private

corporations incorporated under Philippine laws. They are both
engaged in the importation and distribution of fertilizers, pesticides
and agricultural chemicals..

President Ferdinand Marcos, exercising his legislative powers, issued

LOI No. 1465 which provided, among others, for the imposition of a
capital recovery component (CRC) on the domestic sale of all grades
of fertilizers in the Philippines.
Pursuant to the LOI, Fertiphil paid P10 for every bag of fertilizer it
sold in the domestic market
After the 1986 Edsa Revolution, FPA voluntarily stopped the
imposition of the P10 levy. With the return of democracy, Fertiphil
demanded from PPI a refund of the amounts it paid under LOI No.
1465, but PPI refused to accede to the demand
PPI insists that LOI No. 1465 is a valid exercise either of the police
power or the power of taxation. It claims that the LOI was
implemented for the purpose of assuring the fertilizer supply and
distribution in the country and for benefiting a foundation created by
law to hold... in trust for millions of farmers their stock ownership in
PPI.
Fertiphil counters that the LOI is unconstitutional because it was
enacted to give benefit to a private company. The levy was imposed
to pay the corporate debt of PPI. Fertiphil also argues that, even if
the LOI is enacted under the police power, it is still
unconstitutional... because it did not promote the general welfare of
the people or public interest.
Issues:

THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF LOI 1465 CANNOT BE

COLLATERALLY ATTACKED AND BE DECREED VIA A
DEFAULT JUDGMENT IN A CASE FILED FOR COLLECTION
AND DAMAGES WHERE THE ISSUE OF CONSTITUTIONALITY
IS NOT THE VERY LIS MOTA OF THE CASE. NEITHER CAN LOI
1465 BE CHALLENGED BY ANY PERSON OR ENTITY WHICH
HAS NO STANDING TO DO SO

466
Ruling:

Fertiphil has locus standi because it suffered direct injury; doctrine

of standing is a mere procedural technicality which may be waived.

In this jurisdiction, We have adopted the "direct injury test" to

determine locus standi in public suits. In People v. Vera, it was held
that a person who impugns the validity of a statute must have "a
personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has
sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result." The "direct injury
test" in public suits is similar to the "real party in interest" rule for
private suits under Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure.26

Fertiphil suffered a direct injury from the enforcement of LOI No.

1465. It was required, and it did pay, the ₱10 levy imposed for every
bag of fertilizer sold on the domestic market. It may be true that
Fertiphil has passed some or all of the levy to the ultimate consumer,
but that does not disqualify it from attacking the constitutionality of
the LOI or from seeking a refund. As seller, it bore the ultimate
burden of paying the levy. It faced the possibility of severe sanctions
for failure to pay the levy. The fact of payment is sufficient injury to
Fertiphil.

Moreover, Fertiphil suffered harm from the enforcement of the LOI

because it was compelled to factor in its product the levy. The levy
certainly rendered the fertilizer products of Fertiphil and other
domestic sellers much more expensive. The harm to their business
consists not only in fewer clients because of the increased price, but
also in adopting alternative corporate strategies to meet the demands
of LOI No. 1465. Fertiphil and other fertilizer sellers may have
shouldered all or part of the levy just to be competitive in the
market. The harm occasioned on the business of Fertiphil is
sufficient injury for purposes of locus standi.

The constitutionality of LOI No. 1465 is also the very lis mota of the
complaint for collection. Fertiphil filed the complaint to compel PPI
to refund the levies paid under the statute on the ground that the
law imposing the levy is unconstitutional. The thesis is that an
unconstitutional law is void. It has no legal effect. Being void,
Fertiphil had no legal obligation to pay the levy. Necessarily, all
levies duly paid pursuant to an unconstitutional law should be
refunded under the civil code principle against unjust enrichment.
The refund is a mere consequence of the law being declared
unconstitutional. The RTC surely cannot order PPI to refund

467
Fertiphil if it does not declare the LOI unconstitutional. It is the
unconstitutionality of the LOI which triggers the refund. The issue
of constitutionality is the very lis mota of the complaint with the
RTC.

468
 DOUBLE
TAXATION

469
 AKBAYAN vs. AQUINO
G.R. NO. 170516
July 16, 2008
FACTS
Petitioners non-government organizations, Congresspersons,
citizens and taxpayers seek via the present petition for mandamus
and prohibition to obtain from respondents the full text of the Japan-
Philippines Economic Partnership Agreement (JPEPA) including the
Philippine and Japanese offers submitted during the negotiation
process and all pertinent attachments and annexes thereto.
The JPEPA, which will be the first bilateral free trade
agreement to be entered into by the Philippines with another
country in the event the Senate grants its consent to it, covers a
broad range of topics which respondents enumerate as follows: trade
in goods, rules of origin, customs procedures, paperless trading,
trade in services, investment, intellectual property rights,
government procurement, movement of natural persons,
cooperation, competition policy, mutual recognition, dispute
avoidance and settlement, improvement of the business
environment, and general and final provisions.
The final text of the JPEPA has now been made accessible to
the public since September 11, 2006, respondents do not dispute
that, at the time the petition was filed up to the filing of petitioners'
Reply - when the JPEPA was still being negotiated - the initial drafts
thereof were kept from public view.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the full text as well as negotiation of JPEPA are
under the Executive privilege and thus must be confidential.
RULING:
The petition come within the coverage of executive privilege.
The documents on the proposed JPEPA as well as the text which is
subject to negotiations and legal review by the parties fall under the
exceptions to the right of access to information on matters of public
concern and policy of public disclosure. At the time when the
Committee was requesting for copies of such documents, the
negotiations were ongoing as they are still now and the text of the
proposed JPEPA is still uncertain and subject to change. Considering
the status and nature of such documents then and now, these are
evidently covered by executive privilege consistent with existing
legal provisions and settled jurisprudence.

470
 The "secrecy of negotiations with foreign countries is not
violative of the constitutional provisions of freedom of speech or of
the press nor of the freedom of access to information." The
Resolution went on to state, thus: The nature of diplomacy requires
centralization of authority and expedition of decision which are
inherent in executive action as well essential characteristic of
diplomacy is its confidential nature.
Applying the principles adopted in PMPF v. Manglapus, it is
clear that while the final text of the JPEPA may not be kept
perpetually confidential - since there should be "ample opportunity
for discussion before [a treaty] is approved" - the offers exchange by
the parties during the negotiations continue to be privileged even
after the JPEPA is published. It is reasonable to conclude that the
Japanese representatives submitted their offers with the
understanding that "historic confidentiality" would govern the
same. Disclosing these offers could impair the ability of the
Philippines to deal not only with Japan but with other foreign
governments in future negotiations.
A ruling that Philippine offers in treaty negotiations should
now be open to public scrutiny would discourage future Philippine
representatives from frankly expressing their views during
negotiations. While, on first impression, it appears wise to deter
Philippine representatives from entering into compromises, it bears
noting that treaty negotiations, or any negotiation for that matter,
normally involve a process of quid pro quo, and oftentimes
negotiators have to be willing to grant concessions in an area of
lesser importance in order to obtain more favorable terms in an area
of greater national interest.
To recapitulate, petitioners' demand to be furnished with a
copy of the full text of the JPEPA has become moot and academic, it
having been made accessible to the public since September 11, 2006.
As for their demand for copies of the Philippine and Japanese offers
submitted during the JPEPA negotiations, the same must be denied,
respondents' claim of executive privilege being valid.

471
PUBLIC PURPOSE
REQUIREMENT

472
 LLADOC vs Commissioner of the Internal Revenue

[G. R. No. L-19201, June 16, 1965]

PAREDES, J.:

FACTS:
Sometime in 1957, the M.B. Estate, Inc., of Bacolod City, donated
P10,000.00 in cash to Rev. Fr. Crispin Ruiz, then parish priest of
Victorias, Negros Occidental, and predecessor of herein petitioner,
for the construction of a new Catholic Church in the locality. The
total amount was actually spent for the purpose intended.
On March 3, 1958, the donor M.B. Estate filed the donor's gift tax
return. Under date of April 29, 1960, Commissioner of Internal
Revenue issued an assessment for the donee's gift tax against the
Catholic Parish of Victorias of which petitioner was the parish priest.
The priest lodged a protest to the assessment and requested the
withdrawal thereof.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the Catholic Parish is tax exempt
2. Who is liable to pay the gift tax

HELD:

1. The phrase ―exempt from taxation‖ should not be interpreted

to mean exemption from all kinds of taxes. The exemption is
only from the payment of taxes assessed on such properties as
property taxes as contradistinguished from excise taxes. A
donee‘s gift tax is not a property tax but an excise tax imposed
on the transfer of property by way of gift inter vivos. It does
not rest upon general ownership, but an excise upon the use
made of the properties, upon the exercise of the privilege of
receiving the properties. The imposition of such excise tax on
property used for religious purpose, do not constitute an
impairment of the Constitution. Thus, the tax exemption of
the parish does not extend to excise taxes.

2. The head of the Diocese and not the parish priest is the real
party in interest in the imposition of the donee's tax on the
property donated to the church for religious purpose.

473
POWER TO FIX TARIFF
RATES

474
ANGELES UNIVERSITY, Petitioner, vs.
CITY OF ANGELES, JULIET G. QUINSAAT, in her capacity as
Treasurer of Angeles City and ENGR. DONATO N. DIZON, in his
capacity as Acting Angeles City Building Official, Respondents.
G.R. No. 189999, June 27, 2012

Facts:
Angeles University was converted into a non-stock, non-profit
education foundation under the provisions of Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 6055. Petitioner filed with the Office of the City Building Official
an application for a building permit for the construction of an 11-
storey building of the Angeles University Foundation Medical Center
in its main campus the said office issue a Building permit fee and
Locational Clearance Fee. Petitioner make a letter to respondent
City Tresurer Juliet G. Quinssat and City Building Official Donato Z.
Dizon alleging that it is exempt from payment of the building permit
and locational clearance fee. Petitioner also reminded the respondent
that they have previously issued building permit acknowledging such
exemption from payment of building permit fees. The DOJ and trial
court render decision in favor to petitioner for exempting in
payment. But the CA reverse the decision of court in favor to
respondent. Petitioner file a MR but it was denied by CA.

Issue:
WON the Angeles University is exempted in Building permit fee
and Locational Clearance Fee.

Ruling:
No.
Under R.A. No. 6055, petitioner was granted exemption only from
income tax derived from its educational activities and real
property used exclusively for educational purposes. Regardless of
the repealing clause in the National Building Code, the CA held that
petitioner is still not exempt because a building permit cannot be
considered as the other ―charges‖(A ―charge‖ is broadly defined as
the ―price of, or rate for, something,‖ while the word ―fee‖ pertains
to a ―charge fixed by law for services of public officers or for use of a
privilege under control of government‖) mentioned in Sec. 8 of R.A.
No. 6055 which refers to impositions in the nature of tax, import
duties, assessments and other collections for revenue purposes,

475
following the ejusdem generis rule. The CA further stated that
petitioner has not shown that the fees collected were excessive and
more than the cost of surveillance, inspection and regulation. And
while petitioner may be exempt from the payment of real property
tax, petitioner in this case merely alleged that ―the subject property
is to be used actually, directly and exclusively for educational
purposes,‖ declaring merely that such premises is intended to house
the sports and other facilities of the university but by reason of the
occupancy of informal settlers on the area, it cannot yet utilize the
same for its intended use.

Thus, the CA concluded that petitioner is not entitled to the

refund of building permit and related fees, as well as real
property tax it paid under protest.

476
TAX EXEMPTION(ADE)

477
LUNG CENTER OF THE PHILIPPINES V. QUEZON CITY, GR
NO. 144104, 6/29/04
FACTS:
Petitioner is a non-stock, non-profit entity established by virtue of
PD No. 1823, seeks exemption from real property taxes when the
City Assessor issued Tax Declarations for the land and the hospital
building. Petitioner predicted on its claim that it is a charitable
institution. The request was denied, and a petition hereafter filed
before the Local Board of Assessment Appeals of Quezon City (QC-
LBAA) for reversal of the resolution of the City Assessor. Petitioner
alleged that as a charitable institution, is exempted from real
property taxes under Sec 28(3) Art VI of the Constitution. QC-LBAA
dismissed the petition and the decision was likewise affirmed on
appeal by the Central Board of Assessment Appeals of Quezon City.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the CBAA.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner is a charitable institution within the

context of PD 1823, the Constitution, and Section 234(b) of RA
7160.

Whether or not petitioner is exempted from real property taxes.

RULING:

Yes. The Court held that the petitioner is a charitable institution

within the context of the 1973 and 1987 Constitution. Under PD
1823, the petitioner is a non-profit and non-stock corporation which,
subject to the provisions of the decree, is to be administered by the
Office of the President with the Ministry of Health and the Ministry
of Human Settlements. The purpose for which it was created was to
render medical services to the public in general including those who
are poor and also the rich, and become a subject of charity. Under
PD 1823, petitioner is entitled to receive donations, even if the gift
or donation is in the form of subsidies granted by the government.

Partly No. Under PD 1823, the lung center does not enjoy any
property tax exemption privileges for its real properties as well as
the building constructed thereon. The property tax exemption under

478
Sec. 28(3), Art. VI of the Constitution is the property taxes only.
This provision was implanted by Sec.243 (b) of RA 7160 which
provides that in order to be entitled to the exemption, the lung
center must be able to prove that: it is a charitable institution and;
its real properties are actually, directly and exclusively used for
charitable purpose. Accordingly, the portions occupied by the
hospital used for its patients are exempt from real property taxes
while those leased to private entities are not exempt from such
taxes.

479
SMART COMMUNICATIONS, INC. vs. CITY OF DAVAO
G.R. No. 155491, September 16, 2008
NACHURA, J.:

FACTS:

This case arose when Smart Communications Inc. filed a

special civil action for declaratory relief under Rule 63 of the Rules of
Court for the ascertainment of its rights and obligations under the
Tax Code of the City of Davao, particularly Section 1, Article 10
which imposes a franchise tax on businesses enjoying a franchise
within the territorial jurisdiction of Davao. Herein petitioner
contends that its telecenter in Davao City is exempt from payment of
franchise tax to the City which raised on the following grounds: (a)
the issuance of its franchise under Republic Act No. 7294 (RA 7294)
subsequent to R.A. No. 7160 shows the clear legislative intent to
exempt it from the provisions of R.A 7160; (b) Section 137 of R.A
No. 7160 can only apply to exemptions already existing at the time
of its effectivity and not to future exemptions; (c) the power of the
City of Davao to impose a franchise tax is subject to statutory
limitations such as the ―in lieu of all taxes‖ clause found in Section 9
of R.A 7294: and (d) the imposition of franchise tax by the City of
Davao would amount to a violation of the constitutional provision
against impairment of contracts.

Respondents filed their answer in which they contested the tax

exemption claimed by Smart Communications Inc. They invoked the
power granted by the Constitution to local government units (LGU)
to create their own sources of revenue.

The RTC rendered its Decision denying the petition. The trial
court noted that the ambiguity of the in ―lieu of all taxes‖ provision
in R.A. No. 7294, on whether it covers both national and local taxes,
must be resolved against the taxpayer.

ISSUE:

Whether the imposition of local franchise tax by the City of

Davao violated Article 3, Section 10 of the Philippine Constitution
against impairment of contracts

Held:

No. The SC held that there is no violation of Article III, Section

10 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution. Tax exemptions are never

480
presumed and are strictly construed against the taxpayer and
liberally in favor of the taxing authority. They can only be given force
when the grant is clear and categorical. Moreover, Smarts franchise
was granted with the express condition that it is subject to
amendment, alteration, or repeal. In this case since there is doubt it
must be resolved in favor of the City of Davao. The ―in lieu‖ of all
taxes clause applies only to national internal revenue taxes and not
to local taxes. Smart Communications Inc. is still liable to pay the
local franchise tax, unless it is expressly and unequivocally exempted
from the payment thereof under its legislative franchise. The ―in lieu
of all taxes‖ clause in a legislative franchise should categorically state
that the exemption applies to both local and national taxes;
otherwise, the exemption claimed should be strictly construed
against the taxpayer and liberally in favor of the taxing authority.
Republic Act No. 7716, otherwise known as the ―Expanded VAT
Law,‖ did not remove or abolish the payment of local franchise tax. It
merely replaced the national franchise tax that was previously paid
by telecommunications franchise holders and in its stead imposed a
ten percent (10%) VAT in accordance with Section 108 of the Tax
Code. VAT replaced the national franchise tax, but it did not prohibit
nor abolish the imposition of local franchise tax by cities or
municipalities.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of

merit. Cost against petitioner.

481
EN BANC

G.R. No. 163072

MANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT
AUTHORITY, Petitioner,
vs.
CITY OF PASAY, SANGGUNIANG PANGLUNGSOD NG
PASAY, CITY MAYOR OF PASAY, CITY TREASURER OF
PASAY, and CITY ASSESSOR OF PASAY, Respondents.

April 2, 2009 // CARPIO

Facts:
Petitioner Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA)
operates and administers the Ninoy Aquino International Airport
(NAIA). Approximately 600 hectares of land, including the runways,
the airport tower, and other airport buildings, were transferred to
MIAA. The NAIA Complex is located along the border between
Pasay City and Parañaque City.
MIAA received Final Notices of Real Property Tax Delinquency
from the City of Pasay for the taxable years 1992 to 2001.
The City of Pasay issued notices of levy and warrants of levy for
the NAIA Pasay properties. Thereafter, the City Mayor of Pasay
threatened to sell at public auction the NAIA Pasay properties if the
delinquent real property taxes remain unpaid.
MIAA filed with the CA a petition for prohibition and injunction
with prayer for preliminary injunction or temporary restraining
order. The petition sought to enjoin the City of Pasay from imposing
real property taxes on, levying against, and auctioning for public sale
the NAIA Pasay properties.
The CA dismissed the petition and upheld the power of the
City of Pasay to impose and collect realty taxes on the NAIA Pasay
properties. MIAA filed a motion for reconsideration, which the CA
denied. Hence, this petition.

The Court of Appeals’ Ruling:

The Court of Appeals held that Sections 193 and 234 of
Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local Government Code, which took
effect on 1 January 1992, withdrew the exemption from payment of
real property taxes granted to natural or juridical persons, including
government-owned or controlled corporations, except local water
districts, cooperatives duly registered under Republic Act No. 6938,
non-stock and non-profit hospitals and educational institutions.
Since MIAA is a government-owned corporation, it follows that its

482
tax exemption under Section 21 of EO 903 has been withdrawn upon
the effectivity of the Local Government Code.

Issue:
Whether or not the NAIA Pasay properties of MIAA are
exempt from real property tax.

The Court’s Ruling:

MIAA is a government "instrumentality" that does not qualify
as a "government-owned or controlled corporation. Under Section
133(o) of the Local Government Code, local government units have
no power to tax instrumentalities of the national government.
Therefore, MIAA is exempt from any kind of tax from the local
governments.

A government "instrumentality" may or may not be a

"government-owned or controlled corporation" (Section 2(10) of the
Introductory Provisions of the Administrative Code of 1987). A
government-owned or controlled corporation must be "organized as
a stock or non-stock corporation." MIAA is not organized as a stock
or non-stock corporation. It is not a stock corporation because it has
no capital stock divided into shares. It is also not a non-stock
corporation because it has no members. The Government cannot be
considered as the sole member of MIAA because non-stock
corporations cannot distribute any part of their income to their
members. Section 11 of the MIAA Charter mandates MIAA to remit
20% of its annual gross operating income to the National Treasury.

MIAA is like any other government instrumentality, but is

vested with corporate powers to perform efficiently its governmental
functions. When the law vests in a government instrumentality
corporate powers, the instrumentality does not become a
corporation.

The airport lands and buildings of MIAA are properties of

public dominion intended for public use, and as such are exempt
from real property tax under Section 234(a) of the Local Government
Code.

(Note: In Manila International Airport Authority v. Court of

Appeals (2006 MIAA case), the Court already resolved the issue of

483
whether the airport lands and buildings of MIAA are exempt from
tax under existing laws. The court merely reiterated its ruling in that
case.)

Opinions:
Ynares-Santiago, dissenting.
The Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA ) ruling was
incorrectly rationalized, particularly on the unwieldy characterization
of MIAA as a species of a government instrumentality.
However, there is no more need to belabor the issue of whether the
MIAA is a government-owned or controlled corporation (GOCC) or
a government instrumentality. What needs only to be ascertained is
whether the airport properties are owned by the Republic, and if
such, then said properties are exempt from real property tax. In this
case, MIAA is only holding the properties for the benefit of the
Republic in its capacity as agent thereof. Despite the conveyance of
the title to the said properties to the MIAA, the latter could not
dispose of the same through sale or through any other mode unless
specifically approved by the President of the Republic. Thus, it is
exempt from real property tax.

Tinga, dissenting.
The cited statutory definition of an "instrumentality" is
incomplete. The majority opinion omitted portions from Section
2(10) of the Administrative Code of 1987. The matter of whether
MIAA is a GOCC or an instrumentality or a "government corporate
entity" is irrelevant in determining whether or not the MIAA or other
government instrumentalities or GOCCs are exempt from real
property taxes.
The Supreme Court refuses to clarify whether its Decision in the
Mactan Cebu International Airport case is deemed repealed. There
are no good reasons why the Court should not reassert the Mactan
Cebu doctrine. Under that ruling, real properties owned by the
Republic of the Philippines or any of its political subdivisions are
exempted from the payment of real property taxes, while
instrumentalities or GOCCs are generally exempted from local
government taxes, save for real property taxes.
MIAA properties are not of public dominion. The fact is that the
MIAA may, by law, alienate, lease or place the airport properties as
the subject matter of contracts. Otherwise, why does Section 3 of

484
MIAA's charter authorize the President of the Philippines to approve
the sale of any of these properties?
While MIAA was liable for the realty taxes, its properties could not
be foreclosed upon by the local government unit seeking the taxes.
Section 3 of the MIAA charter states that any portion of the lands
transferred, conveyed and assigned to the ownership and
administration of the MIAA shall not be disposed through sale or
through any other mode unless specifically approved by the
President of the Philippines. Nothing in the Local Government Code
can be deemed as repealing this prohibition under Section 3. Thus,
the LGU has to find another way to collect the taxes due from MIAA,
paving the way for a mutually acceptable negotiated solution.

Nachura, Separate Opinion.

What need only be ascertained is whether the airport
properties are owned by the Republic if the airport Authority is to be
freed from the burden of paying the real property tax. Indeed,
emphasis should be made on the ownership of the property, rather
than on the airport Authority being a taxable entity. This strategy
makes it unnecessary to determine whether MIAA is an
instrumentality or a GOCC. In this case, even if MIAA holds the
record title over the airport properties, such holding can only be for
the benefit of the Republic, especially when we consider that MIAA
exercises an essentially public function. In fine, the properties
comprising the NAIA being of public dominion which pertain to the
State, the same should be exempt from real property tax following
Section 234(a) of the LGC.

The rulings in Mactan Cebu and MIAA do not really contradict, but,
instead, complement each one. Mactan Cebu provides the proper
rule that, in order to determine whether airport properties are
exempt from real property tax, it is Section 234, not Section 133, of
the LGC that should be determinative of the properties exempt from
the said tax. MIAA then lays down the correct doctrine that airport
properties are of public dominion pertaining to the state, hence,
falling within the ambit of Section 234(a) of the LGC.

485
J. CASANOVAS vs JNO. S. HORD
8 Phil 125; G.R. No. 3473; March 22, 1907

FACTS:
In January, 1897, the Spanish Government, in accordance with the
provisions of the royal decree of the 14th of May, 1867, granted to
J. Casanovas certain mines in the Province of Ambos Camarines, of
which mines the plaintiff is now the owner.

The Collector of Internal Revenue imposed tax on the properties,

contending that they were valid perfected mine concessions and it
falls within the provisions of Sec. 13 of Act No. 1189 known as the
Internal Revenue Act. That section is as follows:

SEC. 134. On all valid perfected mining concessions granted prior to

April eleventh, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, there shall be
levied and collected on the after January first, nineteen hundred and
five, the following taxes:
2. (a) On each claim containing an area of sixty thousand square
meters, an annual tax of one hundred pesos; (b) and at the same
rate proportionately on each claim containing an area in excess of,
or less than, sixty thousand square meters.
3. On the gross output of each an ad valorem tax equal to three per
centum of the actual market value of such output.

The defendant accordingly imposed upon these properties the tax

mentioned in section 134, which tax, the plaintiff paid under protest.
He brought an action against the defendant Collector of Internal
Revenue to recover the sum of Php. 9,600.00 paid by him as taxes.
Judgment was rendered in favor of the defendant, so the plaintiff
appealed.

ISSUE: Whether Sec. 134 of the Internal Revenue Law (Act No.
1189) is valid or void.

HELD: The deed constituted a contract between the Spanish

government and the plaintiff. The obligation of which contract was
impaired by the enactment of sec. 134 of the Internal Revenue Law
infringing Sec. 5 of the Act of Congress which provides that ―no law
impairing the obligation of contracts shall be enacted‖. Sec. 134 of
the Internal Revenue Law of 1904 is then void because it impairs the
obligation of contracts contained in the concessions of mine made by
the Spanish Government. Judgment reversed.

486
TAX EXEMPTION V. NON-
IMPAIRMENT CLAUSE

487
 MACTAN-CEBU INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY
(MCIAA), petitioner v. CITY OF LAPU-LAPU, respondent
G.R. No. 181756. June 15, 2015

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

FACTS:

Petitioner Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority

(MCIAA) was created by Congress under Republic Act No. 6958.
Upon its creation, petitioner enjoyed exemption from realty taxes
imposed by the National Government or any of its political
subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities (Sec. 14, RA No. 6958).
However, upon the effectivity of Republic Act. No. 7160 the
Supreme Court rendered a decision declaring that the petitioner was
no longer exempt from real estate taxes.

Respondent City issued to petitioner a Statement of Real

Estate Tax assessing the lots comprising the Mactan International
Airport which, according to the petitioner, included lots utilized
exclusively for public or governmental purposes. Petitioner contends
that these properties should not be subject to real estate taxes.
Petitioner‘s claim for exemption was based on Opinion No. 50
issued by the Secretary of the Department of Justice.

Respondent sent petitioner a Statement of Real Property Tax

Balances up to the year 2002 but the petitioner again states its
previous claim. Respondent then issued Notices of Levy on 18 sets of
real properties of petitioner. Petitioner filed a petition for prohibition
with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lapu-Lapu City with prayer
for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or a
writ of preliminary injunction. The petition for prohibition sought to
enjoin respondent City from issuing a warrant of levy against
petitioner‘s properties and from selling them at public auction for
delinquency in realty tax obligations.

Respondent City auctioned 27 properties of the petitioner

upon the issuance of an Order denying the motion for extension of
the TRO. The respondent City forfeited and purchased said
properties because there was no interested bidder participated in the
auction sale.

488
 Petitioner claimed before the RTC that it had discovered that
respondent City did not pass any ordinance authorizing the
collection of real property tax, a tax for the special education fund
(SEF), and a penalty interest for its nonpayment. Petitioner claimed
that in the absence of the said ordinance, the respondent City could
not impose and collect real property taxes and the like.

The RTC granted petitioner‘s application for a writ of

preliminary injunction which was subsequently lifted upon the
motion of the respondents.
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals
(Cebu City), with urgent prayer for the issuance of a TRO and/or
writ of preliminary injunction. The Court of Appeals granted the
petitioner‘s prayer.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not petitioner is a government instrumentality

exempt from paying real property taxes;
2. Whether or not respondent City can impose realty tax, Special
Education Fund and penalty interest;
3. Whether or not the airport terminal building, airfield, runway,
taxiway including the lots on which they are situated are
exempt from realty taxes.

COURT OF APPEALS’ RULING:

The Court of Appeals held that the petitioner is a government-

owned or -controlled corporation and its properties are subject to
realty tax reasoning as follows:

Under the Local Government Code (LGC for brevity), enacted

pursuant to the constitutional mandate of local autonomy, all natural
and juridical persons, including government-owned or -controlled
corporations (GOCCs), instrumentalities and agencies, are no longer
exempt from local taxes even if previously granted an exemption.
The only exemptions from local taxes are those specifically provided
under the Code itself, or those enacted through subsequent
legislation.

489
 WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby
rendered by us as follows:
a. We DECLARE the airport terminal building, the airfield,
runway, taxiway and the lots on which they are situated NOT
EXEMPT from the real estate tax imposed by the respondent
City of Lapu-Lapu;
b. We DECLARE the imposition and collection of the real estate
tax, the additional levy for the Special Education Fund and the
penalty interest as VALID and LEGAL. However, pursuant to
Section 255 of the Local Government Code, respondent city
can only collect an interest of 2% per month on the unpaid tax
which total interest shall, in no case, exceed thirty-six (36)
months;
c. We DECLARE the sale in public auction of the aforesaid
properties and the eventual forfeiture and purchase of the
subject property by the respondent City of Lapu-Lapu
as NULL and VOID. However, petitioner MCIAA‘s property is
encumbered only by a limited lien possessed by the respondent
City of Lapu-Lapu in accord with Section 257 of the Local
Government Code.

SUPREME COURT’S RULING:

The petition has merit. The petitioner is an instrumentality of the

government; thus, its properties actually, solely and exclusively used
for public purposes, consisting of the airport terminal building,
airfield, runway, taxiway and the lots on which they are situated, are
not subject to real property tax and respondent City is not justified
in collecting taxes from petitioner over said properties.

The Court of Appeals erred in declaring that MCIAA was a

government-owned or -controlled corporation. In this case, the 2006
MIAA case governs. MIAA, just like the petitioner, is not a
government-owned or -controlled corporation under Section 2(13) of
the Introductory Provisions of the Administrative Code of 1987
because it is not organized as a stock or non-stock corporation.
MIAA is a government instrumentality vested with corporate powers
to perform efficiently its governmental functions. MIAA as a
government instrumentality, pursuant to Section 133(o) of the Local
Government Code, is not subject to any kind of tax. The properties

490
of MIAA, same with the petitioner, are properties of public dominion
because they are intended for public use.
As properties of public dominion, they indisputably belong to the
State or the Republic of the Philippines.

The Court has also ruled that property of public dominion,

being outside the commerce of man, cannot be the subject of an
auction sale. Properties of public dominion, being for public use, are
not subject to levy, encumbrance or disposition through public or
private sale.

WHEREFORE, we hereby GRANT the petition.

We REVERSE and SET ASIDE the Decision dated October 8,
2007 and the Resolution dated February 12, 2008 of the Court of
Appeals (Cebu City) in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 01360. Accordingly,
we DECLARE:

1. Petitioner‘s properties that are actually, solely and exclusively

used for public purpose, consisting of the airport terminal
building, airfield, runway, taxiway and the lots on which they
are situated, EXEMPT from real property tax imposed by the
City of Lapu-Lapu.
2. VOID all the real property tax assessments, including the
additional tax for the special education fund and the penalty
interest, as well as the final notices of real property tax
delinquencies, issued by the City of Lapu-Lapu on petitioner‘s
properties, except the assessment covering the portions that
petitioner has leased to private parties.
3. NULL and VOID the sale in public auction of 27 of
petitioner‘s properties and the eventual forfeiture and purchase
of the said properties by respondent City of Lapu-Lapu. We
likewise declare VOID the corresponding Certificates of Sale of
Delinquent Property issued to respondent City of Lapu-Lapu.

Notes.—For real property taxes, the incidental generation of

income is permissible because the test of exemption is the use
of the property; The effect of failing to meet the use
requirement is simply to remove from the tax exemption that
portion of the property not devoted to charity. (Commissioner
of Internal Revenue vs. St. Luke’s Medical Center, Inc. , 682
SCRA 66 [2012])
The requirement of ―payment under protest‖ is a
condition sine qua non before a protest or an appeal

491
questioning the correctness of an assessment of real property
tax may be entertained. (Camp John Hay Development
Corporation vs. Central Board of Assessment Appeals, 706
SCRA 547 [2013])

492
 GOVERNMENT
INSTRUMENTALITY

493
G.R. No. 172267 August 20,
2008
NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY (NHA), petitioner,
vs.
ILOILO CITY, as represented by its Mayor, HON. JERRY
TREÑAS, ILOILO CITY TREASURER CATHERINE TINGSON,
and ROSALINA FRANCISCO, respondents.

TINGA, J.:

Facts:
For nonpayment of realty taxes, respondents auctioned off a
portion of NHA‘s Lot. Such auction sale was allegedly done without
notice to NHA, in addition to the fact that NHA is a tax-exempt
agency of the government. There being no private individual who
offered to bid for the property, the City of Iloilo bought the same
under its name. After the one-year redemption period expired, the
City executed a Final Bill of Sale in its favor. Subsequently, Rosalina
Francisco purchased the land. As a result, NHA‘s Transfer Certificate
of Title was cancelled, and a new TCT No. was issued in the name of
Francisco.
NHA filed a Complaint for annulment of the auction sale and
the certificate of re-purchase executed in favor of Francisco.
Respondents filed separate Motions to Dismiss on the grounds
of lack of jurisdiction and forum shopping. According to them, the
lower court did not acquire jurisdiction for failure of plaintiff to
comply with the deposit mandated under Section 267, R.A. 7160, to
wit:
Sec. 267. Acting Assailing Validity of Tax Sale.—No court shall
entertain any action assailing the validity of any sale at public
auction of real property or rights therein under this Title until
the taxpayer shall have deposited with the court the amount
for which the real property was sold, together with interest of
two (2%) per month from the date of sale to the time of the
institution of the action. The amount so deposited shall be paid
to the purchaser at the auction sale if the deed is declared
invalid but it shall be returned to the depositor if the action
fails.
Neither shall any court declare a sale at public auction invalid
by reason of irregularities or informalities in the proceedings
unless the substantive rights of the delinquent owner of the
real property or the person having legal interest therein have
been impaired.

494
 The trial court dismissed petitioner‘s Complaint. The CA affirmed
the order.

Issue: WON NHA's tax-exempt status vests it with immunity as well

from the deposit requirement under Section 267 of R.A. No. 7160

Held:
The deposit requirement is not a tax measure. As expressed in
Section 267, the amount deposited shall be paid to the purchaser at
the auction sale if the deed is declared invalid; otherwise, it shall be
returned to the depositor. The deposit is essentially meant to
reimburse the purchaser of the amount he had paid at the auction
sale should the court declare the sale invalid. Clearly, the deposit
precondition is an ingenious legal device to guarantee the
satisfaction of the tax delinquency, with the local government unit
keeping the payment on the bid price no matter the final outcome of
the suit to nullify the tax sale.

Thus, the requirement is not applicable if the plaintiff is the

government or any of its agencies as it is presumed to be solvent,
and more so where the tax exempt status of such plaintiff as basis of
the suit is acknowledged. In this case, NHA is indisputably a tax-
exempt entity whose exemption covers real property taxes and so its
property should not even be subjected to any delinquency sale.
Perforce, the bond mandated in Section 267, whose purpose it is to
ensure the collection of the tax delinquency should not be required
of NHA before it can bring suit assailing the validity of the auction
sale.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED.

495
G.R. No. 178030 December 15, 2010

PHILIPPINE FISHERIES DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY

(PFDA), Petitioner,
vs.
CENTRAL BOARD OF ASSESSMENT APPEALS, LOCAL
BOARD OF ASSESSMENT APPEALS OF LUCENA CITY, CITY
OF LUCENA, LUCENA CITY ASSESSOR AND LUCENA CITY
TREASURER, Respondents.

The Facts

On October 26, 1999, in a letter addressed to PFDA, the City

Government of Lucena demanded payment of realty taxes on the
LFPC property for the period from 1993 to 1999 in the total amount
of P39,397,880.00. This was received by PFDA on November 24,
1999.

On October 17, 2000 another demand letter was sent by the

Government of Lucena City on the same LFPC property, this time in
the amount of P45,660,080.00 covering the period from 1993 to
2000.

The Issue

WON: PFDA is liable for the real property tax assessed on the
Lucena Fishing Port Complex.

The Ruling of the Court

The petition is meritorious.

The ruling of the Court of Tax Appeals is anchored on the wrong

premise that the PFDA is a government-owned or controlled
corporation. On the contrary, this Court has already ruled that the
PFDA is a government instrumentality and not a government-owned
or controlled corporation.

The exercise of the taxing power of local government units is subject

to the limitations enumerated in Section 133 of the Local
Government Code. Under Section 133 of the Local Government
Code, local government units have no power to tax instrumentalities
of the national government like the PFDA. Thus, PFDA is not liable
to pay real property tax assessed by the Office of the City Treasurer
of Lucena City on the Lucena Fishing Port Complex, except those
portions which are leased to private persons or entities.

496
Moreover, the Lucena Fishing Port Complex is a property of public
dominion intended for public use, and is therefore exempt from real
property tax under Section 234(a) of the Local Government Code.
Properties of public dominion are owned by the State or the Republic
of the Philippines.

497
G.R. No. 196425 July 24, 2012

PROSPERO A. PICHAY, JR., Petitioner,

vs.
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY FOR LEGAL
AFFAIRS INVESTIGATIVE AND ADJUDICATORY DIVISION,
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., in his capacity as Executive
Secretary, and HON. CESAR V. PURISIMA, in his capacity as
Secretary of Finance, and as an ex-officio member of the Monetary
Board, Respondents.

FACTS: On November 15, 2010, President Benigno Simeon Aquino

III issued Executive Order No. 13 (E.O. 13), abolishing E.O. 12 or
the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC), and transferring its
investigative, adjudicatory and recommendatory functions to the
Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs
(ODESLA), more particularly to its newly-established Investigative
and Adjudicatory Division (IAD). Subsequently, a complaint
affidavit for grave misconduct was filed before the IAD-ODESLA
against petitioner Prospero A. Pichay, Jr., Chairman of the Board of
Trustees of the Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA), as
well as the incumbent members of the LWUA Board of Trustees
which arose from the purchase by the LWUA of Four Hundred
Forty-Five Thousand Three Hundred Seventy Seven (445,377) shares
of stock of Express Savings Bank, Inc..

On April 14, 2011, petitioner received an Order signed by Executive

Secretary Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr. requiring him and his co-respondents
to submit their respective written explanations under oath. In
compliance therewith, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss Ex
Abundante Ad Cautelam manifesting that a case involving the same
transaction and charge of grave misconduct entitled "Rustico B.
Tutol, et al. v. Prospero Pichay, et al." is already pending before the
Office of the Ombudsman. Petitioner also contends that E.0. 13 is
unconstitutional for usurping the power of the legislature to create a
public office, appropriate funds, and delegate quasi-judicial powers
to administrative agencies.

ISSUE: Whether or not E.O. 13 is unconstitutional for the ff.

grounds:
a. Usurping the power of the legislature to create a public office.
b. Usurping the power of the legislature to appropriate funds.

498
c. Usurping the power of the Congress to delegate quasi-judicial
powers to administrative agencies.

HELD: 1. NO, the reorganization did not entail the creation of a

new, separate and distinct office. Under Section 31, Book III of
Executive Order No. 292 (otherwise known as the Administrative
Code of 1987), "the President, subject to the policy of the Executive
Office and in order to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency,
shall have the continuing authority to reorganize the administrative
structure of the Office of the President.".

The President is limited to merely transferring functions or agencies

from the Office of the President to Departments or Agencies, and
vice versa. The abolition of the PAGC did not require the creation of
a new, additional and distinct office as the duties and functions that
pertained to the defunct anti-graft body were simply transferred to
the ODESLA, which is an existing office within the Office of the
President Proper.
The reorganization required no more than a mere alteration of the
administrative structure of the ODESLA through the establishment
of a third division – the Investigative and Adjudicatory Division –
through which ODESLA could take on the additional functions it has
been tasked to discharge under E.O. 13.
Since both of these offices belong to the Office of the President
Proper, the reorganization by way of abolishing the PAGC and
transferring its functions to ODESLA is properly within the
prerogative of the President under his continuing "delegated
legislative authority to reorganize".

2. NO, there is no usurpation of the legislative power to appropriate

public funds.

In the chief executive dwell the powers to run government. Placed

upon him is the power to recommend the budget necessary for the
operation of the Government, which implies that he has the
necessary authority to evaluate and determine the structure that
each government agency in the executive department would need to
operate in the most economical and efficient manner. Hence, the
express recognition under Section 78 of R.A. 9970 or the General
Appropriations Act of 2010 of the President‘s authority to "direct
changes in the organizational units or key positions in any
department or agency." The aforecited provision, often and

499
consistently included in the general appropriations laws, recognizes
the extent of the President‘s power to reorganize the executive
offices and agencies under him, which is, "even to the extent of
modifying and realigning appropriations for that purpose."

3.NO. IAD-ODESLA is a fact-finding and recommendatory body not

vested with quasi-judicial powers. While the term "adjudicatory"
appears part of its appellation, the IAD-ODESLA cannot try and
resolve cases, its authority being limited to the conduct of
investigations, preparation of reports and submission of
recommendations. E.O. 13 explicitly states that the IAD-ODESLA
shall "perform powers, functions and duties xxx, of PAGC.". Under
E.O. 12, the PAGC was given the authority to "investigate or hear
administrative cases or complaints against all presidential appointees
in the government" and to "submit its report and recommendations
to the President.". The IAD-ODESLA is a fact-finding and
recommendatory body to the President, not having the power to
settle controversies and adjudicate cases.

**NOTE: Reorganization- takes place when there is an alteration of

the existing structure of government offices or units therein,
including the lines of control, authority and responsibility between
them. It involves a reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices,
or abolition thereof by reason of economy or redundancy of
functions.
Elements of valid reorganization: 1. Must be exercised through
legitimate authority 2. Must be pursued in good faith
*Reorganization is said to be carried out in good faith if it is done for
purposes of economy and efficiency.

500
 EN BANC
[ G.R. No. 196418, February 10, 2015 ]
TECHNICAL EDUCATION AND SKILLS DEVELOPMENT
AUTHORITY (TESDA), PETITIONER,
VS.
THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT; CHAIRMAN REYNALDO A.
VILLAR; COMMISSIONER JUANITO G. ESPINO, JR.; AND
COMMISSIONER EVELYN R. SAN BUENAVENTURA,
RESPONDENTS.
BERSAMIN, J.:
FACTS:
The TESDA, an instrumentality of the Government established
under Republic Act No. 7796, is an attached agency of the
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE). In view of the
inadequate policy on basic health and safety conditions of work
experienced by government personnel, then DOLE Secretary Patricia
Sto. Tomas issued Administrative Order (AO) No. 430, series of
2003, authorizing the payment of healthcare maintenance allowance
of P5,000.00 to all officials and employees of the DOLE, including its
bureaus and attached agencies. AO No. 430 was purportedly based
on Civil Service Commission (CSC) Memorandum Circular (MC)
No. 33, series of 1997, and Section 34 of the General Provisions of
the 2003 General Appropriations Act.
Upon post-audit, COA State Auditor IV Rosemarie A. Valenzuela
issued AOM No. 04-005 on January 26, 2004, and later endorsed the
matter to the COA Director of the LAO-National for appropriate
legal action. AOM No. 04-005 stated in part:
2. The basis of payment made by management was CSC
Memorandum Circular No. 33 series of 1997 and Section 34 of the
General Provisions of the 2003 General Appropriations Act (GAA).
Following these provisions, the Department of Labor and
Employment issued DOLE Administrative Order No 430, series of
2003 authorizing payment of said medical allowance to all its
personnel including those of its bureau and attached agencies at
P5,000.00 each and pro rata equivalent for those employees who
have less than four (4) months continuous service.

501
3. CSC Director Imelda Laceras of Region VII, in her letter to DOLE
Region VII Auditor, Ms. Damiana Pelino, informed the latter that
there are no existing guidelines authorizing the grant of Health Care
Maintenance Allowance and medical Allowance to all government
officials and employees. In the absence therefore of specific legal
authority, payment of said benefit cannot be allowed under existing
rules. Hence, DOLE Administrative Order No. 430, series of 2003 is
clearly without legal basis.
Atty. Rebecca Mislang, Officer In-Charge of the COA LAO-National,
subsequently issued Notice of Disallowance (ND) No. 2006-015
dated May 26, 2006, addressed to then TESDA Director General
Augusto Syjuco, indicating that the payment of the allowance had no
legal basis, it being contrary to Republic Act No. 6758 (Salary
Standardization Law of 1989). ND No. 2006-015 identified the
persons who are liable for the disallowance and all TESDA officials
and employees per attached payroll as recipients.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the COA is correct in disallowing the petitioner‘s
payment of health care maintenance allowance to its main office
employees.
HELD:
Yes. In the context of the foregoing, we uphold the disallowance by
the COA of the payment of the P5,000.00 as healthcare maintenance
allowance. The COA did not act without or in excess of jurisdiction,
or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction because it properly exercised its powers and discretion in
disallowing the payment of the P5,000.00 as healthcare maintenance
allowance.
It bears reminding that pursuant to Article VI Section 29 (1) of the
1987 Constitution, no money shall be paid out of the Treasury
except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law. Hence, the
GAA should be purposeful, deliberate, and precise in its contents
and stipulations. Also, the COA was correct when it held that the
provisions of the GAA were not self-executory. This meant that the
execution of the GAA was still subject to a program of expenditure
to be approved by the President, and such approved program of
expenditure was the basis for the release of funds. For that matter,
Section 34, Chapter 5, Book VI of the Administrative Code
(Executive Order No. 292) states that –
502
Section 34. Program of Expenditure - The Secretary of Budget shall
recommend to the President the year‘s program of expenditure for
each agency of the government on the basis of authorized
appropriations. The approved expenditure program shall constitute
the basis for fund release during the fiscal period, subject to such
policies, rules and regulations as may be approved by the President.
The rules on National Government Budgeting as prescribed by the
Administrative Code are not idle or empty exercises. The mere
approval by Congress of the GAA does not instantly make the funds
available for spending by the Executive Department. The funds
authorized for disbursement under the GAA are usually still to be
collected during the fiscal year. The revenue collections of the
Government, mainly from taxes, may fall short of the approved
budget, as has been the normal occurrence almost every year. Hence,
it is important that the release of funds be duly authorized,
identified, or sanctioned to avert putting the legitimate programs,
projects, and activities of the Government in fiscal jeopardy.

503
NATIONAL TREASURY
(SOURCE)

504
 GR. No. 212381 April 22, 2015
REYNALDO M. JACOMILLE, petitioner, vs. HON. JOSEPH EMILIO
A. ABAYA, respondent
Mendoza, J.

FACTS:

LTO, one of DOTC‘s line agencies, is required to issue motor vehicle

plates. The LTO formulated the Motor Vehicle License Plate
Standardization Program (MVPSP) to supply the new license plates
for both old and new vehicle registrants.

On February 20, 2013, the DOTC published in newspapers of

general circulation the Invitation To Bid for the supply and delivery
of motor vehicle license plates. The LTO, through the General
Appropriations Act (GAA), intends to apply the sum of Php
3,851,600,100.00 being the Approved Budget for the Contract.

On July 22, 2013, the DOTC issued the Notice of Award to JKG-
Power Plates for having the lowest offer in their financial proposals.

On May 19, 2014, petitioner Reynaldo M. Jacomille filed a petition

for certiorari and prohibition, assailing the legality of MVPSP.

The petitioner instituted a taxpayer suit averring that he was a

diligent citizen paying his correct taxes; that he was a registered
vehicle owner; that he would be affected by the government issuance
of vehicle plates thru its MVPSP upon his renewal of the registration
of his vehicle; that not being a participant to the bidding process, he
could not avail of the administrative remedies and procedure
provided under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9184 or the Government
Procurement Reform Act, and its IRR ; that as far as he was
concerned,there was no appeal or any plain or speedy remedy
available to him.

As for the respondent, the OSG stated that the issues presented had
been rendered moot and academic as the gap in the budget of
MVPSP was already bridged and covered by the full and specific
funding by GAA 2014. With the signing of MVPSP on February 21,
2014, after the enactment of GAA 2014, the OSG claimed that
petitioners objection had been rendered naught.

Assuming arguendo that the petition had not yet been rendered
moot and academic, the OSG asserted that the same must be

505
dismissed on the ground of lack of locus standi because petitioner
failed to prove that he had a personal and substantial interest in
the case at hand.

JKG-Power Plates averred that petitioner had no locus standi. It

pointed out that petitioner had admitted that he was not one of the
bidders in MVPSP and so he would not suffer any direct injury.
Likewise, the present case was not a proper subject of taxpayer suit
because no taxes would be spent for this project. The money to be
paid for the plates would not come from taxes,

ISSUES:

1. Whether the petition should be dismissed fe being moot and

aademic, considering the assailed defiiencies in appropriation have
been substantially copmplied with, and
2. Whether the petitioner has a legal standing or locus standi to file
the present suit

HELD:

No. The rule is well-settled that for a court to exercise its power of
adjudication, there must be an actual case or controversy —one
which involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal
claims susceptible of judicial
resolution. The case must not be moot or academic or based on
extralegal or other similar considerations not cognizable by a court
of justice. Where the issue has become moot and academic, there is
no justiciable controversy, and an adjudication thereon would be of
no practical use or value as courts do not sit to adjudicate mere
academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest, however
intellectually challenging.

The Court agrees with the OSG that the present controversy has
been rendered moot by the passage of GAA 2014. Said appropriation
―cured‖ whatever defect the process had. Nevertheless, there were
occasions in the past when the Court passed upon issues although
supervening events had rendered those petitions moot and academic.
The moot and academic principle cannot automatically dissuade the
courts from resolving a case. Courts will decide cases, otherwise
moot and academic, if:

first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution;

506
second, the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount
public interest is involved;

third, when the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of

controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and

fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading review

In the case at bar, the issues presented must still be passed upon
because paramount public interest is involved as to the
taxpayers’ money and the case is capable of repetition yet
evading review for procurement process under R.A. No. 9184 is
regularly made by various government agencies. Hence, it is but
prudent for the Court to rule on the substantial merits of the case.

2. Yes. The Court has provided the following instructive guides to

determine whether a matter is of transcendental importance, namely:

(1) the character of the funds or other assets involved in the case;

(2) the presence of a clear case of disregard of a constitutional or

statutory prohibition by the public respondent agency or
instrumentality of the government; and

(3) the lack of any other party with a more direct and specific
interest in the questions being raised.
The petitioner sufficiently showed that his case presents a matter of
transcendental importance based on the above cited determinants.

Petitioner sufficiently showed that his case presents a matter of

transcendental importance based on the above cited determinants.

Conclusion;

At the outset, however, the Court has stated that the present
petition has been rendered moot and academic by the appropriation
for the full amount of the project fund in GAA 2014. Said
appropriation ―cured‖ whatever defect the process had. As to
whether the responsible public officials should be held accountable
for the irregularities in the procurement process of MVPSP, the
Court deems that it is not the proper forum to resolve the issue as it
is not a trier of facts and it cannot receive new evidence from the
parties to aid it in the prompt resolution of the issue.

507
Wherefore, the petition is dismissed for being moot and academic.

508
 GAA-EXECUTORY OR NOT?
VS.
SECTION 34 CHAPTER 5, BOOK
VI OF THE ADMIN CODE

509
 DARAGA PRESS, INC., v. COMMISSION ON
AUDIT and DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION-AUTO -
NOMOUS REGION IN MUSLIM MINDANAO
G.R. No. 201042. June 16, 2015
DEL CASTILLO, J.
FACTS:
Daraga Press, Inc. (DPI), allegedly delivered textbooks worth of
P63,638,032.00 on July 03, 1998. In November 15, 2007, DBM
Secretary Rolando Andaya, requested Commission on Audit to
validate and evaluate the request of the then Regional Director Nur
Misuari such unpaid obligation. During the audit, the actual receipt
of the subject textbooks could not be ascertained. Commission on
Audit denied the money claim as it found no convincing proof that
the subject textbooks were delivered. It shows no proof that
receipt/acceptance/inspection of the alleged deliveries was done by
the DECS-ARMM Regional Secretary. The audited financial
statements of Daraga Press did not as well reflect the transaction
amounting to P63,638,032.00. Infact, there were inconsistencies on
the document presented (Purchase orders, sales invoice, delivery
receipts and certifications) which shows that the documents were
falsified. The commission on audit was also led to conclude that
there was no such transaction ocurred since the Special Allotment
Release Order (SARO) amounting to P63,638,750.00 which is
almost the same amount of transaction is not for the payment of the
textbooks but for the payment of salaries for teachers. The
commission on audit decided that since the delivery of the textbooks
were not established then; principle of quantum meruit could not be
applied. Quantum meruit principle means to allow a party to recover
―as much as he reasonably deserves‖.

Issue:
1. Whether or not COA committed grave abuse of discretion in
denying the money claim.

Ruling:
1. No. COA did not committed grave abuse of discretion on
denying DPI‘s money claim.

a. Grave abuse of discretion exists when there is an evasion of

a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty
enjoined by law or to act in contemplation of law as when

510
 the judgment rendered is not based on law and evidence but
on caprice, whim, and despotism.

As to the case at bar, the inconsistencies, discrepancies, and

inaccuracies in the documents are enough reasons for the
respondent COA to deny the money claim. Petitioner DPI‘s
documentary evidence could hardly be considered
substantial evidence as these contain so many
inconsistencies, discrepancies, and inaccuracies, which
would cause a reasonable person to doubt the veracity and
authenticity of the money claim.

b. There was no appropriation for the purchase of the subject

textbooks.

The records shows no funds when DECS-ARMM entered

contract with DPI. The SARO available and released was for
the payments of salaries the teacher I.

There are no records to show that the funds were available

when DECS-ARMM entered into contract with [petitioner
DPI]
because SARO No. B-98-03383 dated October 10, 1998 was
released by DBM for payment of salaries and compensation
benefits of 490 positions of Teacher I.

Since there was no appropriation for the purchase of the

subject textbooks, the respondent COA had reason to deny
the money claim as Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution provides that: „No money shall be paid out of
the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made
by law.

c. The letters and certifications issued by high-ranking officials

do not prove the actual delivery of the subject textbooks.

The said letters and certifications are not sufficient to prove

that there was an actual delivery of the subject textbooks as
these persons were not present during the delivery of said
text books. Moreover, said certifications cannot outweigh
the findings and recommendations contained in the findings
and recommendations in the memorandum and in the
report were arrived at as a result of an exhaustive and
extensive investigation conducted by the auditors.

511
d. The principle of quantum meruit does not apply.

The principle of quantum meruit presupposes that an actual

delivery of the goods has been made. In this case, petitioner
DPI failed to present any convincing evidence to prove the
actual delivery of the subject textbooks. Thus, the principle
of quantum meruit invoked by petitioner DPI cannot be
applied.

PRINCIPLE: The factual findings of the respondent COA must

be accorded great respect and finality.

512
 Carlos Young vs. City of Manila
Facts:
The plaintiff is the owner of the Antipolo Subdivision situated near
the northern boundary of the city of Manila, of which the various
lots involved in this litigation form part. Five of said lots, with an
aggregate area of 25,498.70 square meters and are known as street
areas, that is to say, they are named and indicated as streets on the
subdivision plan; and fifteen of said lots scattered in eight different
blocks, with an aggregate area of 5,174.30 square meters are
residential lots.
All of said lots were by the Director of Health declared a nuisance
and a menace to public health because they were so low or excavated
as to admit and cause the formation of stagnant and foul water and
that they should be filled to at least fifteen centimeters above street
grade in accordance with the provisions of Act No. 3352.
Accordingly, the City Engineer notified and required the plaintiff to
fill said lots within ninety days, with a warning that should he fail to
do so, the City Engineer would cause the said lots to be filled,
subject to the provisions of said Act.
No formal offer, however, appears to have been made by the City for
the residential lots. The plaintiff refused to reimburse to the City the
amount spent by the latter for the filling of the lots in question and
insisted on his option to sell said lots to the City at the current
market value, under section 3 of Act No. 3352. Respondent,
contending that it was not under obligation to buy said lots, and
invoking section 5 of Act No. 3352 in relation to section 2498 of the
Revised Administrative Code, the City advertised said lots for sale at
public auction on September 29, 1937, in order to satisfy the
expenses of filling them; and, because of the absence of bidders at
such sale, the said lots were forfeited to the city of Manila under the
provisions of section 2501 of the Revised Administrative Code,
subject to plaintiff's right of redemption. The plaintiff having failed
to redeem said lots, the City Treasurer, on January 9, 1939, declared
the forfeiture absolute and conveyed said lots to the city of Manila.

Issue:
Whether the plaintiff may compel the respondent to purchase said
lots at its current market value.

513
Whether the refund of taxes paid under protest is proper.

HELD:
Street areas are marked and set apart for the use of the public in
general and the buyers of the building lots in particular. The owner
of a subdivision cannot sell the residential lots unless he provides
streets therefor. He adds the cost of the street areas to the price he
charges for the residential lots. He cannot sell the streets being
outside the commerce of man, nor use them for any other purpose
without violating his contract with the buyers of the building lots.
Indeed, after adding the cost of the streets to the price of the
building lots, the owner of the subdivision has no legal nor moral
right to sell those street areas. The city shall dispose of the land by
public auction to the highest and best bidder, but no award shall be
made unless the amount of the offer is at least equal to the cost of
the land, including the cost of filling and incidental expenses. Since
the City cannot sell the streets, it is obvious that it is not under any
obligation to purchase the street areas in question.
As to the residential lots in question, we are of the opinion that the
defendant city of Manila is under obligation to purchase them from
the plaintiff at the market price in view of the option exercised by
him under section 3 of Act No. 3352. The law expressly provides
that, should the cost of filling any lot exceed one-half of the assessed
value thereof, the owner shall have the option to either sell the
property to the City at current market value or reimburse the
amount expended for filling it. It also provides that "in case the
owner decides to sell his property for inability to pay the cost of
filling, the city shall purchase it and the cost thereof shall be charged
to the special fund herein created." With reference to plaintiff's
claim for the refund of the land taxes paid under protest, we find
that he is not entitled thereto for the reason that his offer to sell the
land in question did not relieve him of the obligation to pay taxes
thereon.

514
PUBLIC PURPOSE OF
EXPENDITURE

515
G.R. No. 148357 June 30, 2006

ANIANO A. ALBON, Petitioner,

vs.
BAYANI F. FERNANDO, City Mayor of Marikina, ENGR.
ALFONSO ESPIRITO, City Engineer of Marikina, ENGR. ANAKI
MADERAL, Assistant City Engineer of Marikina, and NATIVIDAD
CABALQUINTO, City Treasurer of Marikina, Respondents.

FACTS:
In May 1999, the City of Marikina undertook a public works project
to widen, clear and repair the existing sidewalks of Marikina
Greenheights Subdivision. It was undertaken by the city government
pursuant to Ordinance No. 59, s. 19933 like other infrastructure
projects relating to roads, streets and sidewalks previously
undertaken by the city. On June 14, 1999, petitioner Aniano A.
Albon filed with the Regional Trial Court of Marikina, Branch 73, a
taxpayer‘s suit for certiorari, prohibition and injunction with
damages against respondents (who were at that time officials of
Marikina), namely, City Mayor Bayani F. Fernando, City Engineer
Alfonso Espirito, Assistant City Engineer Anaki Maderal and City
Treasurer Natividad Cabalquinto. It was docketed as SCA Case No.
99-331-MK. Petitioner claimed that it was unconstitutional and
unlawful for respondents to use government equipment and
property, and to disburse public funds, of the City of Marikina for
the grading, widening, clearing, repair and maintenance of the
existing sidewalks of Marikina Greenheights Subdivision. He alleged
that the sidewalks were private property because Marikina
Greenheights Subdivision was owned by V.V. Soliven, Inc. Hence,
the city government could not use public resources on them. In
undertaking the project, therefore, respondents allegedly violated the
constitutional proscription against the use of public funds for private
purposes4 as well as Sections 335 and 336 of RA 71605 and the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Petitioner further alleged that
there was no appropriation for the project. On June 22, 1999, the
trial court denied petitioner‘s application for a temporary restraining
order (TRO) and writ of preliminary injunction. The trial court
reasoned that the questioned undertaking was covered by PD 1818
and Supreme Court Circular No. 68-94 which prohibited courts from
issuing a TRO or injunction in any case, dispute or controversy
involving an infrastructure project of the government.
On November 15, 1999, the trial court rendered its decision6
dismissing the petition. It ruled that the City of Marikina was

516
authorized to carry out the contested undertaking pursuant to its
inherent police power. Invoking this Court‘s 1991 decision in White
Plains Association v. Legaspi,7 the roads and sidewalks inside the
Marikina Greenheights Subdivision were deemed public property.
Petitioner sought a reconsideration of the trial court‘s decision but it
was denied. Thereafter, petitioner elevated the case to the Court of
Appeals via a petition for certiorari, prohibition, injunction and
damages. On December 22, 2000, the appellate court sustained the
ruling of the trial court and held that Ordinance No. 59, s. 1993, was
a valid enactment. The sidewalks of Marikina Greenheights
Subdivision were public in nature and ownership thereof belonged to
the City of Marikina or the Republic of the Philippines following the
1991 White Plains Association decision. Thus, the improvement and
widening of the sidewalks pursuant to Ordinance No. 59, s. 1993
was well within the LGU‘s powers. On these grounds, the petition
was dismissed. Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the appellate
court‘s decision but it was denied. Undaunted, he instituted this
petition.

ISSUE:
May a local government unit (LGU) validly use public funds to
undertake the widening, repair and improvement of the sidewalks of
a privately-owned subdivision?
HELD:
Like all LGUs, the City of Marikina is empowered to enact
ordinances for the purposes set forth in the Local Government Code
(RA 7160). It is vested police power and may discharge functions
and responsibilities as may be necessary, appropriate or incidental to
efficient and effective provisions of the basic services and facilities,
including infrastructure facilities intended primarily to service the
needs of their residents and which are financed by their own funds.
There is no question about the public nature and use of the
sidewalks in the Marikina Greenheights Subdivision. One of the
"whereas clauses" of PD 121612 (which amended PD 95713)
declares that open spaces, roads, alleys and sidewalks in a residential
subdivision are for public use and beyond the commerce of man. In
conjunction herewith, PD 957, as amended by PD 1216, mandates
subdivision owners to set aside open spaces which shall be devoted
exclusively for the use of the general public. Thus, the trial and
appellate courts were correct in upholding the validity of Ordinance
No. 59, s. 1993. It was enacted in the exercise of the City of
Marikina‘s police powers to regulate the use of sidewalks. However,
both the trial and appellate courts erred when they invoked the

517
Supreme Court‘s 1991 decision in White Plains Association and
automatically applied it in this case.
The ruling in the 1991 White Plains Association decision relied on
by both the trial and appellate courts was modified by this Court in
1998 in White Plains Association v. Court of Appeals, citing Young
v. City of Manila. This Court held in its 1998 decision that
subdivision streets belonged to the owner until donated to the
government or until expropriated upon payment of just
compensation. The word "street," in its correct and ordinary usage,
includes portion used for pedestrian travel (sidewalk). Ownership of
the sidewalks in a private subdivision belongs to the subdivision
owner/developer until it is either transferred to the government
(donation) or acquired by the government (expropriation).Section
335 of RA 7160 is clear and specific that no public money or
property shall be appropriated or applied for private purposes. The
implementing rules of PD 957, as amended by PD 1216, provide that
it is the registered owner or developer of a subdivision who has the
responsibility for the maintenance, repair and improvement of road
lots and open spaces of the subdivision prior to their donation to the
concerned LGU. Therefore, the use of LGU funds for the widening
and improvement of privately-owned sidewalks is unlawful as it
directly contravenes Section 335 of RA 7160. This conclusion finds
further support from the language of Section 17 of RA 7160 which
mandates LGUs to efficiently and effectively provide basic services
and facilities. The law speaks of infrastructure facilities intended
primarily to service the needs of the residents of the LGU and "which
are funded out of municipal funds." It particularly refers to
"municipal roads and bridges" and "similar facilities." Applying the
rules of ejusdem generis, the phrase "similar facilities" refers to or
includes infrastructure facilities like sidewalks owned by the LGU.
Thus, RA 7160 contemplates that only the construction,
improvement, repair and maintenance of infrastructure facilities
owned by the LGU may be bankrolled with local government funds.
The question of ownership of the open spaces (including the
sidewalks) in Marikina Greenheights Subdivision is material to the
determination of the validity of the challenged appropriation and
disbursement made by the City of Marikina. Similarly significant is
the character of the direct object of the expenditure, that is, the
sidewalks.

WHEREFORE, this case is hereby ordered REMANDED to the

Regional Trial Court of Marikina City for the reception of evidence to
determine (1) whether V.V. Soliven, Inc. has retained ownership of
the open spaces and sidewalks of Marikina Greenheights Subdivision

518
or has donated them to the City of Marikina and (2) whether the
public has full and unimpeded access to, and use of, the roads and
sidewalks of the subdivision. The Marikina City Regional Trial Court
is directed to decide the case with dispatch.

519
ALTON J. LEMON, ET AL., V. DAVID H. KURTZMAN,
SUPERINTENDENT OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION OF THE
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, ET AL.; JOHN R.
EARLEY, ET AL. V. JOHN DICENSO, ET AL.; WILLIAM P.
ROBINSON, JR. V. JOHN DICENSO, ET AL.

FACTS:
In the late 1960s, the states of Rhode Island and Pennsylvania
enacted statutes that provided non-secular religious private schools
with financial support for the teaching of secular subjects. Secular
subjects are nonreligious and are not limited by teachings of a
religious order. The Rhode Island and Pennsylvania cases were
brought separately but decided in a joint decision upon reaching the
Supreme Court.

Rhode Island – Earley et al. v. DiCenso

Plaintiffs, citizens and taxpayers of Rhode Island, brought suit
against the State of Rhode Island to have the 1969 Salary
Supplement Act declared unconstitutional. Rhode Island‘s 1969
Salary Supplement Act provided that the State could supplement
15% of teacher‘s salaries who taught secular subjects at religious
schools. Eligible teachers must have agreed to not teach courses in
religion and only teach courses, using the same materials, as those
offered in public schools. Appellees argued that the statute violated
the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The District
Court agreed, finding the statute unconstitutional under the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment and holding that the
statute ―fostered ‗excessive entanglement‘ between government and
religion… the Act had the impermissible effect of giving ‗significant
aid to a religious enterprise.‖ The State appealed and the case was
granted certiorari by the Supreme Court.

Pennsylvania – Lemon v. Kurtzman

Plaintiffs, citizens and taxpayers of Pennsylvania, brought suit
against the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania to have Pennsylvania‘s
Nonpublic Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1968
declared unconstitutional. The Act reimbursed religious schools for
teachers‘ salaries, textbooks, and materials related to secular
subjects. The Act provided that all textbooks and materials must be
pre-approved by the Superintendent and no payment could be made
towards any course that expressed religious teachings. The Act was

520
originally funded by a new tax on horse racing. One of the Plaintiffs,
Alton J. Lemon, was the father of a child who attended Pennsylvania
Public Schools. Lemon claimed to have paid the specific tax to
support non-secular schools under the Act. The District Court found
that the Act did not violate the Establishment or Free Exercise
Clauses of the First Amendment. The Plaintiffs appealed and the
case was brought before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:
Do statutes that provide state funding for non-public, non-secular
schools violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment?

HELD:
YES
Chief J. Burger delivered the opinion of the Court. The Court found
that both the Rhode Island and Pennsylvania statutes were
unconstitutional. The Court held that the statutes violated the
Establishment and Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment as
well as the Due Process Clause of Fourteenth Amendment.

The Court firstly highlighted the ―three main evils‖ which the
Establishment Clause was intended to prevent: ―sponsorship,
financial support and involvement of the sovereign in religious
activity.‖ The Court then specified the three tests that had been used
previously by the Court to determine whether a State is guilty of one
of the‖three main evils‖. First, the statute must have a secular
legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be
one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute
must not foster ―an excessive government entanglement with
religion‖. The Court found that both the Rhode Island and
Pennsylvania statutes passed the first test and that, in fact, the
statutes clearly stated an intention to enhance the quality of secular
education.

The Court then considered the conclusion reached by the State

legislators that secular and religious education are identifiable and
separable with which, it said, it had no quarrel in the abstract.
However the Court said that the States‘ recognition that church-
related elementary and secondary schools have a significant religious
mission and that a substantial portion of their activities is religiously
oriented, had led them to create statutory restrictions designed to

521
guarantee the separation between secular and religious educational
functions and to ensure that State financial aid supports only the
former. The Court said that these provisions were precautions taken
in candid recognition that the programs approached, even if they did
not intrude upon, the forbidden areas under the Religion Clauses. In
these circumstances, the Court said it didn‘t need to decide whether
the legislative precautions restricted the principal or primary effect of
the programs to the point where they did not offend the Religion
Clauses because it concluded ―that the cumulative impact of the
entire relationship arising under the statutes in each State involve[d]
excessive entanglement between government and religion.‖

The Court explained that the aim of the Establishment Clause is not
absolute separation and that it was not possible for such an absolute
to exist. It said that there are situations in which the state must have
a relationship with religious institutions, for example, ensuring
churches follow building regulations and requiring religious schools
to comply with compulsory school attendance laws. However, the
objective of the Establishment Clause is to prevent, as much as
possible, the encroachment of religion onto the state and vice versa.
An excessive entanglement of government and religion is determined
by ―the character and purposes of the institutions that are benefited,
the nature of the aid that the State provides, and the resulting
relationship between the government and the religious authority‖.

Rhode Island –Earley et al.v. DiCenso

With respect to the Rhode Island statute, the Court stated the
following: Roman Catholic elementary schools are the sole
beneficiaries of the 1969 Salary Supplement Act. The environment in
such schools is entrenched with the values of the church, so far as
catholic schools are considered to be ―integral to the religious
mission of the Catholic Church.‖ Approximately 75% of teachers at
these elementary schools are nuns where nuns are taught to enhance
the religious atmosphere while non-secular individuals are appointed
to positions of authority and the schools in question had policies
that aimed to keep a one-to-one ratio between nuns and secular
teachers.
Finally, in order to receive funding, the government must have
access to the school‘s records to determine how much is spent on
secular versus non-secular activities. The state‘s observation of the
religious activity is further proof of the entanglement the

522
Constitution forbids. It places the government in a position to
unduly influence religious schools and, thereby, religious
institutions. The government‘s interference here would violate the
First Amendment.

Pennsylvania –Lemon v. Kurtzman

With respect to the Pennsylvania statute, the Court expressed
similar concerns that non-secular elementary and secondary schools
have an ingrained interest in promoting religious faith. The Court
noted that direct funds to non-secular institutions vary by level of
state control and surveillance. The Pennsylvania statute in no way
indicated to the Court what level of surveillance the state would
adopt, therefore, the Court could not determine how great the
relationship between the government and religious schools would be
in this instance. However, entanglement is still present through the
potential for these state programs to be politically divisive. As
tuition rises or any number of scenarios occur, supporters of the
religious schools (parents, teachers, churches) could politically align
themselves solely based on faith. While democracies usually favor
increased political discourse, the Court stressed that political
division based on religious faith was ―one of the evils‖ the First
Amendment aimed to prevent. The Court noted that while the lower
courts did not per se discuss this issue, the Court feared that
political discourse would pressure Pennsylvania into expanding
funding. The Court noted that the pressure to expand aid had caused
the Pennsylvania state legislature to include a portion of state
revenue cigarette taxes to fund the program.
The Court reversed and remanded the Pennsylvania case (Lemon) to
be decided in compliance with this decision.
In conclusion, the Court emphasized that religion must be a private
matter for the individual, the family, and the institutions of private
choice, and that, while some involvement and entanglement are
inevitable, lines must be drawn. It said that programs like the ones
created in the Pennsylvania and Rhode Island statutes ―too greatly
blur the separation of church and state. Such entanglement is
extremely dangerous and violates the First Amendment‖.

523
Ruivivar vs. Ombudsman
Facts:

On May 24, 2002, the private respondent filed an Affidavit-

Complaint charging the petitioner before the Ombudsman of serious
misconduct, conduct unbecoming of a public official, abuse of
authority, and violations of the Revised Penal Code and of the Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act.

The private respondent stated in her complaint that she is the

President of the Association of Drug Testing Centers (Association)
that conducts drug testing and medical examination of applicants for
driver‘s license. In this capacity, she went to the Land Transportation
Office (LTO) on May 17, 2002 to meet with representatives from the
Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC) and to
file a copy of the Association‘s request to lift the moratorium
imposed by the LTO on the accreditation of drug testing clinics.
Before proceeding to the office of the LTO Commissioner for these
purposes, she passed by the office of the petitioner to conduct a
follow up on the status of her company‘s application for
accreditation. While there, the petitioner -- without provocation or
any justifiable reason and in the presence of other LTO employees
and visitors -- shouted at her in a very arrogant and insulting
manner, hurled invectives upon her person, and prevented her from
entering the office of the LTO Commissioner. The petitioner also
accused the private respondent of causing intrigues against her at the
DOTC. To prove her allegations, the private respondent presented
the affidavits of three witnesses.

The Ombudsman furnished the petitioner a copy of the Complaint-

Affidavit and required her to file her counter-affidavit. In her
Counter-Affidavit, the petitioner denied the private respondent's
allegations and claimed that she merely told the private respondent
to bring her request to the LTO Assistant Secretary who has the
authority to act on the matter, not to the DOTC. The petitioner also
claimed that the private respondent also asked her to lift the
moratorium and pressured her to favorably act on the private
respondent‘s application for accreditation. To prove these claims,
petitioner presented the affidavits of her two witnesses.

The Ombudsman rendered the November 4, 2002 Decision based on

the pleadings and the submitted affidavits. It found the petitioner
administratively liable for discourtesy in the course of her official
functions and imposed on her the penalty of reprimand.

524
The petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration arguing that she
was deprived of due process because she was not furnished copies of
the affidavits of the private respondent‘s witnesses and questioned
the Ombudsman‘s disregard of the evidence she had presented, and
disagreed with the Ombudsman‘s statement that she has ascendancy
over the private respondent.

The Ombudsman responded to the petitioner‘s motion for

reconsideration by ordering that the petitioner be furnished with
copies of the affidavits of the private respondent‘s witnesses.

Records show that the petitioner received copies of the private

respondent‘s witnesses‘ affidavits but she did not choose to
controvert these affidavits or to file a supplement to her motion for
reconsideration. She simply maintained in her Manifestation that her
receipt of the affidavits did not alter the fact the she was deprived of
due process nor cure the irregularity in the November 4, 2002
Decision. Under these developments, the Ombudsman ruled that the
petitioner was not denied due process. It also maintained the
findings and conclusions in its November 4, 2002 Decision,
declaring them supported by substantial evidence.

The petitioner‘s chosen remedy, in light of the Ombudsman ruling,

was to file a petition for certiorari with the CA. In its Decision dated
May 26, 2004, the CA dismissed the petition on the ground that the
petitioner used the wrong legal remedy and failed to exhaust
administrative remedies before the Ombudsman

The CA said: as held in Fabian v. Desierto, a party aggrieved by the

decision of the Office of the Ombudsman may appeal to this Court
by way of a petition for review under Rule 43.

Issues:

1) Whether or not a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is the

proper and only available remedy.

2) Whether or not petitioner was denied of the constitutional

guarantee to due process.

Ruling:

1) Yes. In Lopez v. CA and Herrera v. Bohol, we recognized that no

appeal is allowed in administrative cases where the penalty of public
censure, reprimand, suspension of not more than one month, or a
fine equivalent to one month salary, is imposed. We pointed out that

525
decisions of administrative agencies that are declared by law to be
final and unappealable are still subject to judicial review if they fail
the test of arbitrariness or upon proof of gross abuse of discretion,
the complainant‘s legal recourse is to file a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, applied as rules suppletory to
the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, The use of
this recourse should take into account the last paragraph of Section
4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court – i.e., the petition shall be filed in
and be cognizable only by the CA if it involves the acts or omissions
of a quasi-judicial agency, unless otherwise provided by law or by the
Rules.

In the present case, The Ombudsman‘s decision and order imposing

the penalty of reprimand on the petitioner are final and
unappealable. Thus, the petitioner availed of the correct remedy
when she filed a petition for certiorari before the CA to question the
Ombudsman‘s decision to reprimand her.

2) No. The records show that the petitioner duly filed a motion for
reconsideration on due process grounds (i.e., for the private
respondent‘s failure to furnish her copies of the affidavits of
witnesses) and on questions relating to the appreciation of the
evidence on record. The Ombudsman acted on this motion by
issuing its Order of January 17, 2003 belatedly furnishing her with
copies of the private respondent‘s witnesses, together with the
"directive to file, within ten (10) days from receipt of this Order,
such pleading which she may deem fit under the circumstances.‖

Given this opportunity to act on the belatedly-furnished affidavits,

the petitioner simply chose to file a "Manifestation" where she took
the position that "The order of the Ombudsman dated 17 January
2003 supplying her with the affidavits of the complainant does not
cure the 04 November 2002 order," and on this basis prayed that the
Ombudsman‘s decision "be reconsidered and the complaint
dismissed for lack of merit."

In the February 12, 2003 Order, the Ombudsman denied the

petitioner‘s motion for reconsideration after finding no basis to alter
or modify its ruling. Significantly, the Ombudsman fully discussed in
this Order the due process significance of the petitioner‘s failure to
adequately respond to the belatedly-furnished affidavits. The
Ombudsman said:

"Undoubtedly, the respondent herein has been furnished by this

Office with copies of the affidavits, which she claims she has not

526
received. Furthermore, the respondent has been given the
opportunity to present her side relative thereto, however, she chose
not to submit countervailing evidence or argument. The respondent,
therefore (sic), cannot claim denial of due process for purposes of
assailing the Decision issued in the present case. On this score, the
Supreme Court held in the case of People v. Acot, 232 SCRA 406,
that "a party cannot feign denial of due process where he had the
opportunity to present his side". This becomes all the more
important since, as correctly pointed out by the complainant, the
decision issued in the present case is deemed final and unappealable
pursuant to Section 27 of Republic Act 6770, and Section 7, Rule III
of Administrative Order No. 07. Despite the clear provisions of the
law and the rules, the respondent herein was given the opportunity
not normally accorded, to present her side, but she opted not to do
so which is evidently fatal to her cause."

Under these circumstances, we cannot help but recognize that the

petitioner‘s cause is a lost one, not only for her failure to exhaust her
available administrative remedy, but also on due process grounds.
The law can no longer help one who had been given ample
opportunity to be heard but who did not take full advantage of the
proffered chance.

527
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE

528
RAUL L. LAMBINO and ERICO B. AUMENTADO, TOGETHER
WITH 6,327,952 REGISTERED VOTERS, Petitioners,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

FACTS:
On 15 February 2006, petitioners Raul L. Lambino and Erico B.
Aumentado ("Lambino Group"), with other groups1 and individuals,
commenced gathering signatures for an initiative petition to change
the 1987 Constitution by modifying Sections 1-7 of Article VI
(Legislative Department) and Sections 1-4 of Article VII (Executive
Department) and by adding Article XVIII entitled "Transitory
Provisions." These proposed changes will shift the present
Bicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary form of
government.
Lambino group alleged that their petition had the support of
6,327,952 individuals constituting at least twelve per centum (12%)
of all registered voters, with each legislative district represented by
at least three per centum (3%) of its registered voters.
On 30 August 2006, the Lambino Group filed an Amended Petition
with the COMELEC indicating modifications in the proposed Article
XVIII (Transitory Provisions) of their initiative.
On 31 August 2006, the COMELEC issued its Resolution denying
due course to the Lambino Group's petition for lack of an enabling
law governing initiative petitions to amend the Constitution. The
COMELEC invoked this Court's ruling in Santiago v. Commission on
Elections declaring RA 6735 inadequate to implement the initiative
clause on proposals to amend the Constitution.
Thereafter, Lambino Group prayed for the issuance of the writs of
certiorari and mandamus to set aside the COMELEC Resolution of
31 August 2006 and to compel the COMELEC to give due course to
their initiative petition. The Lambino Group contends that the
COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying due
course to their petition since Santiago is not a binding precedent.
ISSUES:

529
1. Whether the Lambino Group's initiative petition complies with
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on amendments to the
Constitution through a people's initiative;

2. Whether this Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago declaring

RA 6735 "incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential terms and
conditions" to implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend
the Constitution; and

3. Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in

denying due course to the Lambino Group's petition.

RULING:

1. The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2,

Article XVII of the Constitution on Direct Proposal by the
People.

―Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution is

the governing constitutional provision that
allows a people's initiative to propose
amendments to the Constitution. This section
states:

Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may

likewise be directly proposed by the people
through initiative upon a petition of at least
twelve per centum of the total number of
registered voters of which every legislative district
must be represented by at least three per
centum of the registered voters therein. x x x x
(Emphasis supplied)‖

The essence of amendments "directly proposed by the people

through initiative upon a petition" is that the entire proposal on its
face is a petition by the people‖. This means two essential elements
must be present.

 First, the people must author and thus sign the entire
proposal. No agent or representative can sign on their behalf.
 Second, as an initiative upon a petition, the proposal must be
embodied in a petition.

Moreover, "an initiative signer must be informed at the time of

signing of the nature and effect of that which is proposed" and failure

530
to do so is "deceptive and misleading" which renders the initiative
void.

Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution does not expressly state

that the petition must set forth the full text of the proposed
amendments. However, the deliberations of the framers of our
Constitution clearly show that the framers intended to adopt the
relevant American jurisprudence on people's initiative. In particular,
the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission explicitly
reveal that the framers intended that the people must first see the
full text of the proposed amendments before they sign, and that the
people must sign on a petition containing such full text.

In the case at bar, The Lambino Group did not attach to their present
petition a copy of the paper that the people signed as their initiative
petition they only submitted to the Court a copy of a signature sheet.

Moreover, there is not a single word, phrase, or sentence of text of

the Lambino Group's proposed changes in the signature sheet.
Neither does the signature sheet state that the text of the proposed
changes is attached to it. This omission is fatal. The failure to so
include the text of the proposed changes in the signature sheets
renders the initiative void for non-compliance with the constitutional
requirement that the amendment must be "directly proposed by the
people through initiative upon a petition."

The signature sheet merely asks a question whether the people

approve a shift from the Bicameral-Presidential to the Unicameral-
Parliamentary system of government. The signature sheet does not
show to the people the draft of the proposed changes before they are
asked to sign the signature sheet. Clearly, the signature sheet is not
the "petition" that the framers of the Constitution envisioned when
they formulated the initiative clause in Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution.

a. The Initiative Violates Section 2, Article XVII of the

Constitution Disallowing Revision through Initiatives.

ARTICLE XVII
AMENDMENTS OR REVISIONS

2. Sec. 1. Any amendment to, or revision

of, this Constitution may be proposed by:
3. (1) The Congress, upon a vote of three-
fourths of all its Members, or
4. (2) A constitutional convention.
531
 5. Sec. 2. Amendments to this
Constitution may likewise be directly
proposed by the people through initiative x
x x. (Emphasis supplied)

Section 1 of Article XVII, referring to the first and second modes,

applies to "Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution." In
contrast, Section 2 of Article XVII, referring to the third mode,
applies only to "Amendments to this Constitution."

The framers of the Constitution intended, and wrote, a clear

distinction between "amendment" and "revision" of the Constitution.
The framers intended, and wrote, that only Congress or a
constitutional convention may propose revisions to the Constitution.
The framers intended, and wrote, that a people's initiative may
propose only amendments to the Constitution. Where the intent and
language of the Constitution clearly withhold from the people the
power to propose revisions to the Constitution, the people cannot
propose revisions even as they are empowered to propose
amendments.

Courts have long recognized the distinction between an amendment

and a revision of a constitution. Revision broadly implies a change
that alters a basic principle in the constitution, like altering the
principle of separation of powers or the system of checks-and-
balances. There is also revision if the change alters the substantial
entirety of the constitution, as when the change affects substantial
provisions of the constitution. On the other hand, amendment
broadly refers to a change that adds, reduces, or deletes without
altering the basic principle involved. Revision generally affects
several provisions of the constitution, while amendment generally
affects only the specific provision being amended.

A change in the structure of government is a revision of the

Constitution, as when the three great co-equal branches of
government in the present Constitution are reduced into two. This
alters the separation of powers in the Constitution. A shift from
the present Bicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral-
Parliamentary system is a revision of the Constitution. Merging the
legislative and executive branches is a radical change in the structure
of government.

The abolition alone of the Office of the President as the locus of

Executive Power alters the separation of powers and thus constitutes
a revision of the Constitution. Likewise, the abolition alone of one

532
chamber of Congress alters the system of checks-and-balances within
the legislature and constitutes a revision of the Constitution.

Thus, there is no doubt whatsoever that the Lambino Group's

initiative is a revision and not an amendment. Therefore, the present
initiative is void and unconstitutional because it violates Section 2,
Article XVII of the Constitution limiting the scope of a people's
initiative to "Amendments to this Constitution."

2. A Revisit of Santiago v. COMELEC is Not Necessary

The present petition warrants dismissal for failure to comply with

the basic requirements of Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution
on the conduct and scope of a people's initiative to amend the
Constitution. There is no need to revisit this Court's ruling
in Santiago declaring RA 6735 "incomplete, inadequate or wanting
in essential terms and conditions" to cover the system of initiative to
amend the Constitution. An affirmation or reversal of Santiago will
not change the outcome of the present petition.
3. The COMELEC Did Not Commit Grave Abuse of Discretion
in Dismissing the Lambino Group's Initiative.
In dismissing the Lambino Group's initiative petition, the COMELEC
en banc merely followed this Court's ruling in Santiago and People's
Initiative for Reform, Modernization and Action (PIRMA) v.
COMELEC. For following this Court's ruling, no grave abuse of
discretion is attributable to the COMELEC

533
 APPELLATE
JURISDICTION OF SC

534
 DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 127325 - March 19, 1997

Facts:
Private respondent Atty. Jesus Delfin, president of People‘s
Initiative for Reforms, Modernization and Action (PIRMA), filed
with COMELEC a petition to amend the constitution to lift the term
limits of elective officials, through People‘s Initiative. He based this
petition on Article XVII, Sec. 2 of the 1987 Constitution, which
provides for the right of the people to exercise the power to directly
propose amendments to the Constitution. Subsequently the
COMELEC issued an order directing the publication of the petition
and of the notice of hearing and thereafter set the case for hearing.
At the hearing, Senator Roco, the IBP, Demokrasya-Ipagtanggol ang
Konstitusyon, Public Interest Law Center, and Laban ng
Demokratikong Pilipino appeared as intervenors-oppositors. Senator
Roco filed a motion to dismiss the Delfin petition on the ground that
one which is cognizable by the COMELEC. The petitioners herein
Senator Santiago, Alexander Padilla, and Isabel Ongpin filed this civil
action for prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court against
COMELEC and the Delfin petition rising the several arguments,
such as the following: (1) The constitutional provision on people‘s
initiative to amend the constitution can only be implemented by law
to be passed by Congress. No such law has been passed; (2) The
people‘s initiative is limited to amendments to the Constitution, not
to revision thereof. Lifting of the term limits constitutes a revision,
therefore it is outside the power of people‘s initiative. The Supreme
Court granted the Motions for Intervention.

Issues:
(1) Whether or not Sec. 2, Art. XVII of the 1987 Constitution
is a self-executing provision.

(2) Whether or not COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 regarding

the conduct of initiative on amendments to the Constitution is valid,
considering the absence in the law of specific provisions on the
conduct of such initiative.

(3) Whether the lifting of term limits of elective officials would

constitute a revision or an amendment of the Constitution.

535
Held:
Sec. 2, Art XVII of the Constitution is not self executory, thus,
without implementing legislation the same cannot operate. Although
the Constitution has recognized or granted the right, the people
cannot exercise it if Congress does not provide for its
implementation.

The portion of COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 which

prescribes rules and regulations on the conduct of initiative on
amendments to the Constitution, is void. It has been an established
rule that what has been delegated, cannot be delegated (potestas
delegata non delegari potest). The delegation of the power to the
COMELEC being invalid, the latter cannot validly promulgate rules
and regulations to implement the exercise of the right to people‘s
initiative.

The lifting of the term limits was held to be that of a revision,

as it would affect other provisions of the Constitution such as the
synchronization of elections, the constitutional guarantee of equal
access to opportunities for public service, and prohibiting political
dynasties. A revision cannot be done by initiative. However,
considering the Court‘s decision in the above Issue, the issue of
whether or not the petition is a revision or amendment has become
academic.

536