CLEAN AIR ACT

MODULE 7

F. Pollution from Stationary Sources- (Secs.19)

40. MMDA vs. JANCOM Environment Corp., G.R. No. 147465, Jan. 30, 2002

Sec. 20 of the Clean Air Act pertinently reads:

SECTION 20. Ban on Incineration.—Incineration, hereby defined as the burning

of municipal, bio-chemical and hazardous wastes, which process emits poisonous
and toxic fumes, is hereby prohibited: x x x.”

Section 20 does not absolutely prohibit incineration as a mode of waste disposal;

rather only those burning processes which emit poisonous and toxic fumes are
banned.

FACTS:

After bidding for a waste management project with the MMDA, Jancom won a
contract for the MMDA’s San Mateo waste management project. a BOT contract
for the waste to energy project was signed on Dec. 19, 1997, between Jancom and
the Philippine Government, represented by the Presidential Task Force on Solid
Waste Management through DENR Secretary Victor Ramos, CORD-NCR chair
Dionisio del Serna, and MMDA chair Prospero Oreta.

The contract, however, was never signed by President Ramos as it was too close to
the end of his term. He endorsed it to President Estrada, but Estrada refused to sign
it, for two reasons: the passage of R.A. 8749, or the Clean Air Act of 1999 and the
clamor of San Mateo residents for the closure of the dumpsite.

When the MMDA published another call for proposals for solid wast management
projects for Metro Manila, Jancom filed a petition with the Pasig RTC asking the
court to declare as void the resolution of the Greater Metropolitan Manila Sodli
Waste Management Committee disregarding the BOT contract with Jancom, and
the call for bids for a new waste management contract.

On May 29, 2000, the lower court decided i favor of Jancom. When the CA
dismissed the petition, the MMDA went to the Supreme Court, arguing that the
contract with Jancom was not binding because it was not signed by the President,

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the conditions precedent to the contract were not complied with, and there was no
valid notice of award.

ISSUE: Whether or not the contract between the Republic of Me Philippines and
Jancom was a valid and a perfected contract.

HELD: It is valid. The Court of Appeals did not err when it declared the existence
of a valid and perfected contract between the Republic of the Philippines and
JANCOM. IT IS A GENERAL PRINCIPLE OF LAW THAT NO ONE MAY BE
PERMITTED TO CHANGE HIS MIND OR DISAVOW AND GO BACK UPON
HIS OWN ACTS, OR TO PROCEED CONTRARY THERETO, TO THE
PREJUDICE OF THE OTHER PARTY.
There being a perfected contract, MMDA cannot revoke or renounce the same
without the consent of the other. From the moment of perfection, the parties are
bound not only to the fulfillment of what has been expressly stipulated but also to
all the consequences which, according to their nature, may be in keeping with good
faith, usage, and law (Article 1315, Civil Code). The contract has the force of law
between the parties and they are expected to abide in good faith by their respective
contractual commitments, not weasel out of them. Just as nobody can be forced to
enter into a contract, in the same manner, once a contract is entered into, no party
can renounce it unilaterally or without the consent of the other.

In the case at bar, the reasons cited by MMDA for not pushing through with the
subject contract were: 1) the passage of the Clean Air Act, which allegedly bans
incineration; 2) the closure of the San Mateo landfill site; and 3) the costly tipping
fee.
The SC made reference to the insightful declarations of the CA:

Sec. 20 of the Clean Air Act pertinently reads:

SECTION 20. Ban on Incineration.—Incineration, hereby defined as the burning
of municipal, bio-chemical and hazardous wastes, which process emits poisonous
and toxic fumes, is hereby prohibited: x x x.”
Section 20 does not absolutely prohibit incineration as a mode of waste disposal;
rather only those burning processes which emit poisonous and toxic fumes are
banned.
As regards the projected closure of the San Mateo landfill vis-à- vis the
implementability of the contract, Art. 2.3 thereof expressly states that “[i]n the
event the project Site is not delivered x x x, the Presidential task Force on Solid

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Waste Management (PTFSWM) and the Client, shall provide within a reasonable
period of time, a suitable alternative acceptable to the BOT COMPANY.”

A. Pollution from Motor Vehicles- (Sec. 21)

Pollution from Motor Vehicles. — a) The DOTC shall implement the emission
standards for motor vehicles set pursuant to and as provided in this Act. To further
improve the emission standards, the Department shall review, revise and publish
the standards every two (2) years, or as the need arises. It shall consider the
maximum limits for all major pollutants to ensure substantial improvement in air
quality for the health, safety and welfare of the general public.

---SEE R.A. 8749--

41. Henares vs. LTFRB & DOTC, G.R. No. 158290, Oct. 23, 2006

FACTS
Citing statistics from National and International agencies, petitioners prayed for a
writ of mandamus commanding respondents Land Transportation Franchising and
Regulatory Board (LTFRB) and the Department of Transportation and
Communications (DOTC) to require public utility vehicles (PUVs) to use
compressed natural gas (CNG) as alternative fuel. Petitioners allege that the
particulate matters (PM) – complex mixtures of dust, dirt, smoke, and liquid
droplets, varying in sizes and compositions emitted into the air from various engine
combustions – have caused detrimental effects on health, productivity,
infrastructure and the overall quality of life. In addition, they allege that with the
continuing high demand for motor vehicles, the energy and transport sectors are
likely to remain the major sources of harmful emissions. They cited studies
showing that vehicular emissions in Metro Manila have resulted to the prevalence
of chronic obstructive pulmonary diseases (COPD); that pulmonary tuberculosis is
highest among jeepney drivers; and that the children in Metro Manila showed more
compromised pulmonary function than their rural counterparts. Petitioners infer
that these are mostly due to the emissions of PUVs.
Asserting their right to clean air, petitioners contend that the bases for their petition
for a writ of mandamus to order the LTFRB to require PUVs to use CNG as an
alternative fuel, lie in Section 16,12 Article II of the 1987 Constitution, in Oposa v.

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Factoran, Jr. and Section 414 of Republic Act No. 8749 otherwise known as the
“Philippine Clean Air Act of 1999.”

Petitioners insist that since it is the LTFRB and the DOTC that are the government
agencies clothed with power to regulate and control motor vehicles, particularly
PUVs, and with the same agencies’ awareness and knowledge that the PUVs emit
dangerous levels of air pollutants, then, the responsibility to see that these are
curbed falls under respondents’ functions and a writ of mandamus should issue
against them.
On the other hand, the Solicitor General said that the respondent government
agencies, the DOTC and the LTFRB, are not in a position to compel the PUVs to
use CNG as alternative fuel. He explained that the function of the DOTC is limited
to implementing the emission standards set forth in Rep. Act No. 8749 and the said
law only goes as far as setting the maximum limit for the emission of vehicles, but
it does not recognize CNG as alternative engine fuel. He recommended that the
petition should be addressed to Congress for it to come up with a policy that would
compel the use of CNG as alternative fuel.
 
ISSUES
1. Whether the respondent is the agency responsible to implement the
suggested alternative of requiring public utility vehicles to use compressed natural
gas (cng)
2. Whether the respondent can be compelled to require public utility vehicles to
use compressed natural gas through a writ of mandamus
RULING
1. Mandamus is available only to compel the doing of an act specifically
enjoined by law as a duty. Here, there is no law that mandates the respondents
LTFRB and the DOTC to order owners of motor vehicles to use CNG. At most the
LTFRB has been tasked by E.O. No. 290 in par. 4.5 (ii), Section 4 “to grant
preferential and exclusive Certificates of Public Convenience (CPC) or franchises
to operators of NGVs based on the results of the DOTC surveys.”
In addition, under the Clean Air Act, it is the DENR that is tasked to set the
emission standards for fuel use and the task of developing an action plan. As far as
motor vehicles are concerned, it devolves upon the DOTC and the line agency
whose mandate is to oversee that motor vehicles prepare an action plan and
implement the emission standards for motor vehicles, namely the LTFRB.
2. No. Petitioners are unable to pinpoint the law that imposes an indubitable
legal duty on respondents that will justify a grant of the writ of mandamus
compelling the use of CNG for public utility vehicles. The legislature should

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provide first the specific statutory remedy to the complex environmental problems
bared by herein petitioners before any judicial recourse by mandamus is taken.
In addition, the petition had been mooted by the issuance of Executive Order No.
290, which implemented a program on the use of CNG by public vehicles. The
court was assured that the implementation for a cleaner environment is being
addressed.

J. Institutional Mechanisms - (Sec. 34)

SECTION 34. Lead Agency. — The Department, unless otherwise provided

herein, shall be the primary government agency responsible for the implementation
and enforcement of this Act. To be more effective in this regard, the Department's
Environmental Management Bureau (EMB) shall be converted from a staff bureau
to a line bureau for a period of no more than two (2) years, unless a separate,
comprehensive, environmental management agency is created.

42. Ortigas & Co. vs. FEATI Bank, G.R. No. L-24670, Dec.14,1979

FACTS:

Ortigas and Co. is engaged in real estate business developing and selling lots to the
public.  It sold to Augusto Padilla and Natividad Angeles Lots Nos. 5 and 6, Block
31 of the Highway Hills Subdivision, Mandaluyong by sale on instalments.  The
vendees then transferred their rights and interests over the aforesaid lots in favour
of one Emma Chavez.  The agreements of sale on instalment and the deeds of sale
contained the restriction that “The parcel of land subject of this deed of sale shall
be used by the Buyer exclusively for residential purposes, and she shall not be
entitled to take or remove soil, stones or gravel from it or any other lots belonging
to the Seller.” 

Feati Bank and Trust Co. later bought said lots from Emma Chavez in the name of
Republic Flour Mills.  Ortigas and Co. claims that the restrictions were imposed as
part of its general building scheme designed for the beautification and development
of the Highway Hills Subdivision which forms part of its big landed estate.  Feati
Bank, on the other hand, maintains that the area along the western part of EDSA
from Shaw Boulevard to Pasig River has been declared a commercial and

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industrial zone, per Resolution No. 27 S-1960 of the Municipal Council of

Mandaluyong, Rizal.  Later on, Feati Bank commenced construction on the said
lots for a building devoted to banking purposes.  It refused to comply with the
demands of Ortigas & Co. to stop the said construction.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Resolution No. 27 s-1960 can nullify or supersede the contractual
obligations assumed by the defendant.

HELD:

Yes.  While non-impairment of contracts is constitutionally guaranteed, the rule is

not absolute, since it has to be reconciled with the legitimate exercise of police
power, i.e. “ the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals,
peace, education, good order or safety of the general welfare of the people.”  This
general welfare clause shall be liberally interpreted in case of doubt, so as to give
more power to local governments in promoting the economic conditions, social
welfare and material progress of the people in the community.  The only
exceptions under Section 12 of the Local Autonomy Act (R.A. 2264) are existing
vested rights arising out of a contract between a province, city or municipality on
one hand and a third party on the other hand.  Said case is not present in this
petition. 

Resolution No. 27 s-1960 declaring the western part of EDSA as an industrial and
commercial zone was passed in the exercise of police power to safeguard or
promote the health, safety, peace, good order and general welfare of the people in
the locality. 

43. Technology Developers vs. CA, G.R. No.94759, Jan.21,1991

K. Actions - (Sec. 40)

SECTION 40. Administrative Action. — Without prejudice to the right of any

affected person to 􏰆le an administrative action, the Department shall, on its own
instance or upon veri􏰆ed complaint by any person, institute administrative
proceedings against any person who violates:

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1. a)  Standards or limitation provided under this Act; or

2. b)  Any order, rule or regulation issued by the Department with respect to

such standard or limitation.

FACTS:

Petitioner, a domestic private corporation engaged in the manufacture and export

of charcoal briquette, received a letter from acting mayor Pablo N. Cruz, ordering
the full cessation of the operation of the petitioner's plant located at Guyong, Sta.
Maria, Bulacan, until further order. 

The letter likewise requested the Plant Manager to bring with him to the office of
the mayor on February 20, 1989 the following: 
a) Building permit; 
b) Mayor's permit; 
c) Region III-Pollution of Environment and Natural Resources Anti-Pollution
Permit; and of other document.

At the requested conference, petitioner, through its representative, undertook to

comply with respondent's request for the production of the required documents.

Petitioner's attention having been called to its lack of mayor's permit, it sent its
representatives to the office of the mayor to secure the same but were not
entertained.

On April 6, 1989, without previous and reasonable notice upon petitioner,

respondent acting mayor ordered the Municipality's station commander to padlock
the premises of petitioner's plant, thus effectively causing the stoppage of its
operation.

Left with no recourse, petitioner instituted an action for certiorari, prohibition,

mandamus with preliminary injunction against private respondent

ISSUE:

Whether the action for preliminary injunction will prosper

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HELD:

No.

The Supreme Court held in this case that No mayor's permit had been secured. It
must also be recognized that the mayor of a town has as much responsibility to
protect its inhabitants from pollution, and by virtue of his police power, he may
deny the application for a permit to operate a business or otherwise close the same
unless appropriate measures are taken to control and/or avoid injury to the health
of the residents of the community from the emissions in the operation of the
business,

 The closure order of the Acting Mayor was issued only after an investigation was
made and it was observed that the fumes emitted by the plant of petitioner goes
directly to the surrounding houses and that no proper air pollution device has been
installed. Petitioner also failed to produce a building permit from the municipality
of Sta. Maria, but instead presented a building permit issued by an official of
Makati on March 6, 1987. 

While petitioner was able to present a temporary permit to operate by the then
National Pollution Control Commission on December 15, 1987, the permit was
good only up to May 25, 1988. 

Petitioner had not exerted any effort to extend or validate its permit much less to
install any device to control the pollution and prevent any hazard to the health of
the residents of the community.

44. AC Enterprises vs. Frabelle Properties, G.R.NO.166744,Nov. 02,2006

FACTS: Petitioner, owns the 10-storey Feliza Building located along Herrera

Street, Legaspi Village, Makati City. The building was subdivided into
commercial/office units which were leased to private persons and entities. There
are 36 blowers from 18 air- cooled type airconditioning units in the building, four
blowers on each floor, from the 2nd to the 10th floors. The blowers are
aesthetically covered by vertical concrete type baffles.
Respondent Frabelle Properties Corporation 3 (FPC), owns a 29- storey
commercial/residential condominium located at 109 Rada Street, Legaspi Village,
Makati City. It owned some units in the condominium which it leased to its
tenants.

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On April 11, 1995, respondent wrote petitioner demanding that the latter abate the
daily continuous, intense and “unbearable noise” and the hot air blast coming from
the 36 blowers in the Feliza Building.
On August 11, 1995, it received a report from the EMB that the noise generated by
the blowers of Feliza Building is beyond the legal allowable level under Section
78(b) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 984, as amended.
The Regional Trial Court rendered in favor of complainant and against the
respondent. The latter then sought relief from the CA via petition for certiorari.

ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not noise emanating from a blower of the air-conditioning units of a
building is nuisance is to be resolved only by the courts in due course of
proceedings.

HELD:

(1) NO. The plaintiff must prove that the noise is a nuisance and the consequences.
Noise is not a nuisance per se; Noise becomes actionable only when it passes the
limits of reasonable adjustment to the conditions of the locality and of the needs of
the maker to the needs of the listener; Injury to a particular person in a peculiar
position or of especially sensitive characteristics will not render the noise an
actionable nuisance—in the conditions of present living, noise seems inseparable
from the conduct of many necessary occupations.

Under Section 447(a)(3)(i) of R.A. No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local
Government Code, the Sangguniang Panglungsod is empowered to enact
ordinances declaring, preventing or abating noise and other forms of nuisance. It
bears stressing, however, that the Sangguniang Bayan cannot declare a particular
thing as a nuisance per se and order its condemnation. It does not have the power
to find, as a fact, that a particular thing is a nuisance when such thing is not a
nuisance per se; nor can it authorize the extrajudicial condemnation and
destruction of that as a nuisance which in its nature, situation or use is not
such. Those things must be determined and resolved in the ordinary courts of
law. If a thing be in fact, a nuisance due to the manner of its operation, that
question cannot be determined by a mere resolution of the Sangguniang Bayan.
(Emphasis supplied.)

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