I.
14 LINGKOD MANGGAGAWA SA RUBBERWORLD, ADIDAS-ANGLO, its
officers and members as represented by SONIA ESPERANZA, Petitioners, vs.
RUBBERWORLD (PHILS.) INC. and ANTONIO YANG, LAYA MANANGHAYA
SALGADO & CO., CPA’s (In its capacity as liquidator of Rubberworld (Phils.,
Inc.), Respondents.
G.R. No. 153882, January 29, 2007
FACTS:
 Rubberworld filed with the Department of Labor and Employment
(DOLE) a Notice of Temporary Partial Shutdown due to severe
financial crisis, therein announcing the formal actual company
shutdown a copy of which was served on the recognized labor union
of Rubberworld, the Bisig Pagkakaisa-NAFLU, the union with which
the corporation had a collective bargaining agreement.
 Bisig Pagkakaisa-NAFLU staged a strike. It set up a picket line in
front of the premises of Rubberworld and even welded its gate. As
a result, Rubberworld's premises closed prematurely even before the
date set for the start of its temporary partial shutdown.
 Herein petitioner union, the Lingkod Manggagawa Sa Rubberworld,
Adidas-Anglo (Lingkod, for brevity), represented by its President,
Sonia Esperanza, filed a complaint against Rubberworld and its Vice
Chairperson, Mr.Antonio Yang, for unfair labor practice (ULP), illegal
shutdown, and non-payment of salaries and separation pay. The said
complaint was referred to Labor Arbiter Ernesto Dinopol for
appropriate action.
 While the aforementioned complaint was pending with Labor Arbiter
Dinopol, Rubberworld filed with the SEC a Petition for Declaration of a
State of Suspension of Payments with Proposed Rehabilitation Plan.
Notwithstanding the SEC's aforementioned suspension order and
despite Rubberworld's submission of a Motion to Suspend
Proceedings, Labor Arbiter Dinopol went ahead with the ULP case and
rendered his decision denying respondents motion to suspend
proceedings and declaring respondent Rubberworld Phils., Inc. to
have committed unfair labor practice. Its motion for reconsideration
of the same Order having been denied by the NLRC in its Resolution,
Rubberworld directly went to the Supreme Court on a Petition for
Certiorari.
 The SEC issued an Order finding that the continuance in business of
Rubberworld would neither be feasible/profitable nor work to the
best of interest of the stockholders, parties-litigants, creditors, or the
general public, Rubberworld Philippines, Inc. was hereby declared as
DISSOLVED under Section 6(d) of P.D. 902-A.
 Eventually, in the herein assailed Decision, the CA granted
Rubberworld’s petition on the finding that the Labor Arbiter had
indeed committed grave abuse of discretion when it proceeded with
the ULP case despite the SEC’s suspension order and accordingly
declared the proceedings before it, including the subsequent orders
by the NLRC dismissing Rubberworld’s appeal and the writ of
execution, null and void. Hence, the petition was filed.
ISSUES:
1) Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction or an excess in the exercise thereof when it gave
due course to the petition filed by Rubberworld (Phils.), Inc. and
annulled and set aside the decisions rendered by the labor arbiter a
quo and the NLRC, when the said decisions had become final and
executory warranting the outright dismissal of the aforesaid petition?
2) Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion and
reversible error when it applied Section 5(d) and Section 6 (c) of P.D.
No. 902-A, as amended, to the case at bar?
HELD:
1. No, CA did not commit grave abuse of discretion. It cannot be said
that the decision of the Labor Arbiter, or the decision/dismissal
order and writ of execution issued by the NLRC, could ever attain
final and executory status. The Labor Arbiter completely
disregarded and violated Section 6(c)of Presidential Decree 902-
A, as amended, which categorically mandates the suspension
of all actions for claims against a corporation placed under a
management committee by the SEC. Thus, the proceedings before
the Labor Arbiter and the order and writ subsequently issued by
the NLRC are all null and void for having been undertaken or
issued in violation of the SEC suspension Order. As such, the Labor
Arbiter’s decision, including the dismissal by the NLRC of
Rubberworld’s appeal, could not have achieved a final and
executory status. The Labor Arbiter's decision in this case is void
ab initio, and therefore, non-existent.
Acts executed against the provisions of mandatory or
prohibitory laws shall be void, except when the law itself
authorizes their validity. The Labor Arbiter's decision in this case
is void ab initio, and therefore, non-existent. A void judgment is
in effect no judgment at all. No rights are divested by it nor
obtained from it. Being worthless in itself, all proceedings upon
which the judgment is founded are equally worthless. It neither
binds nor bars anyone. All acts performed under it and all claims
flowing out of it are void. In other words, a void judgment is
regarded as a nullity, and the situation is the same as it would be
if there was no judgment. It accordingly leaves the party-litigants
in the same position they were in before the trial.
2. No, the CA did not commit grave abuse of discretion. The Court
addressed the more substantial issue in this case, namely, the
applicability of the provisions of Section 5 (d) and Section 6 (c) of
P.D. No. 902-A, as amended, reorganizing the SEC, vesting it with
additional powers and placing it under the Office of the President.
The law is clear: upon the creation of a management committee
or the appointment of a rehabilitation receiver, all claims for
actions "shall be suspended accordingly." No exception in favor of
labor claims is mentioned in the law. Since the law makes no
distinction or exemptions, neither should this Court. Ubi lex non
distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos. To rule otherwise would
open the floodgates to other similarly situated claimants and
forestall if not defeat the rescue efforts being inconsistent with
the doctrine of stari decisis. Besides, even if the NLRC awards the
claims of private respondents, its ruling could not be enforced as
long as the petitioner is under the management committee.
Petitioners argue, however, that the doctrines laid down in the
two aforecited cases cannot be made to apply to the instant
controversy because the SEC order therein only mandates that all
pending cases against Rubberworld Philippines, Inc. should be
deemed suspended. Petitioners contend that the decision of the
Labor Arbiter in the present case, as well the order of dismissal
and writ of execution issued by NLRC, have become final and
executory by reason of Rubberworld's failure to perfect its appeal
by not upgrading or completing the required cash or surety bond
as ordained by the NLRC. Petitioners thus conclude that the
doctrine of stare decisis cannot apply to the instant case. The SC
disagreed and ruled that it is incontrovertible that the denial of
Rubberworld's motion to suspend proceedings in the principal
 case was incorporated in the decision of the Labor Arbiter.
Obviously, then, the Labor Arbiter's decision of August 16, 1995
was rendered at a time when Lingkod's complaint against
Rubberworld in NLRC-NCR-Case No. 00-09-06637-94 ought to
have been suspended. In short, at the time the SEC issued its
suspension Order of December 28, 1994, the proceedings before
the Labor Arbiter were still very much pending. As such, no final
and executory decision could have validly emanated therefrom.
There is no any reason why the doctrine of stare decisis will not
apply to this case.

The instant petition is DENIED and the assailed decision and

resolution of the CA are AFFIRMED.

Note:

The doctrine of stare decisis et non quieta movere (to adhere to precedents
and not to unsettle things which are established) is embodied in Article 8 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines which provides, thus:

ART. 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution

shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines.

The doctrine of stare decisis enjoins adherence to judicial precedents. It

requires courts in a country to follow the rule established in a decision of
the Supreme Court thereof. That decision becomes a judicial precedent to
be followed in subsequent cases by all courts in the land. The doctrine of
stare decisis is based on the principle that once a question of law has been II.31 UYPITCHING vs. QUIAMCO 510 SCRA 172
examined and decided, it should be deemed settled and closed to further GR No. 146322
argument. December 06, 2006
  Petitioner Uypitching filed a criminal complaint for qualified theft
FACTS: and/or violation of the Anti-Fencing Law against respondent but was
dismissed.
 In 1982, respondent Quiamco was approached by Davalan, Gabutero
 Respondent filed an action for damages against petitioners in the
and Generoso to settle the civil aspect of a criminal case for robbery
RTC.
filed by Quiamco against them.
 The trial court rendered a decision finding that petitioner Uypitching
 They surrendered to him a red Honda motorcycle and a photocopy of
was motivated with malice and ill will when he called respondent a
its certificate of registration. Respondent asked for the original
thief, took the motorcycle in an abusive manner and filed a baseless
certificate of registration but the three accused never came to see
complaint for qualified theft and/or violation of the Anti-Fencing Law
him again. 
 Petitioners appealed the RTC decision but the CA affirmed the trial
 Meanwhile, the motorcycle was parked in an open space inside
court‘s decision. Hence, this petition.
respondent‘s business establishment, where it was visible and
accessible to the public. ISSUE:
 It turned out that, in October 1981, the motorcycle had been sold on
installment basis to Gabutero by Uypitching Sons, Inc. And to secure WON the respondent is entitled to moral damages, exemplary damages,
its payment, the motorcycle was mortgaged to petitioner corporation. attorney‘s fees and costs based on the action for damages? YES.
 When Gabutero could no longer pay the installments, Davalan
assumed the obligation and continued the payments.
 In September 1982, however, Davalan stopped paying the remaining HELD:
installments.
Yes. Petitioner is liable for damages not only for instituting a groundless
 Nine years later, petitioner Uypitching, accompanied by policemen,
complaint against respondent but also for making a slanderous remark and
went to Avesco-AVNE Enterprises to recover the motorcycle.
for taking the motorcycle from respondent’s establishment in an abusive
 The leader of the police team talked to the clerk in charge and asked
manner. Petitioner abused his right of recovery as mortgagee(s).
for respondent. While P/Lt. Vendiola and the clerk were talking,
A mortgagee may take steps to recover the mortgaged property to enable it
petitioner Uypitching paced back and forth inside the establishment
to enforce or protect its foreclosure right there on. There is, however, a well-
uttering "Quiamco is a thief of a motorcycle."
defined procedure for the recovery of possession of mortgaged property: if a
 Unable to find respondent, the policemen on petitioner Uypitching‘s
mortgagee is unable to obtain possession of a mortgaged property for its sale
instruction and over the clerk‘s objection, took the motorcycle.
on foreclosure, he must bring a civil action either to recover such possession
as a preliminary step to the sale, or to obtain judicial foreclosure. Petitioner The exercise of a right must be in accordance with the purpose for which it
corporation failed to bring the proper civil action necessary to acquire legal was established and must not be excessive or unduly harsh. There must be
possession of the motorcycle. Instead, petitioner Uypitching descended on no intention to harm another.
respondent‘s establishment with his policemen and ordered the seizure of
In this case, the manner by which the motorcycle was taken at petitioners‘
the motorcycle without a search warrant or court order. Worse, in the course
instance was not only attended by bad faith but also contrary to the
of the illegal seizure of the motorcycle, petitioner Uypitching even mouthed a
procedure laid down by law. Considered in conjunction with the defamatory
slanderous statement.
statement, petitioners’ exercise of the right to recover the mortgaged
Petitioners’ acts violated the law as well as public morals, and transgressed vehicle was utterly prejudicial and injurious to respondent. Petitioners
the proper norms of human relations. The basic principle of human relations, acted in an excessively harsh fashion to the prejudice of respondent.
embodied in Article 19 of the Civil Code, provides:

Art. 19. Every person must in the exercise of his rights and in the The Petition is hereby denied.
performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and
observe honesty and good faith.

Article 19, also known as the "principle of abuse of right," prescribes that a
person should not use his right unjustly or contrary to honesty and good
faith, otherwise he opens himself to liability. It seeks to preclude the use of,
or the tendency to use, a legal right (or duty) as a means to unjust ends.

There is an abuse of right when it is exercised solely to prejudice or injure

another.] The exercise of a right must be in accordance with the purpose for
which it was established and must not be excessive or unduly harsh; there
must be no intention to harm another. Otherwise, liability for damages to the
injured party will attach. II.47 TE vs. CA (Te v. Choa)
G.R. 126746
November 29, 2000
FACTS:
 Arthur Te and Liliana Choa were married on September 14, 1988.
They did not live together after marriage although they would meet
each other regularly.
 In 1989, Liliana gave birth to a girl. Thereafter, Arthur Te stopped
visiting her.
 In 1990, Arthur contracted a second marriage while marriage with
Liliana was subsisting.
 Liliana filed bigamy case against Arthur and subsequently an
administrative case (revocation of engineering license for grossly
immoral act) against Arthur and Julieta Santella (second wife of
Arthur).
 Arthur Te petitioned for the nullity of his marriage with Liliana. RTC
and PRC Board rendered decision while the petition for annulment of
first marriage was pending.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the annulment of marriage case is a prejudicial question
and had to be resolved first before criminal and administrative case be
rendered judgment? NO.
HELD:
NO. A prejudicial question has been defined as one based on a fact
distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it
that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to
suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only that said case
involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal
prosecution would be based but also that in the resolution of the issue or
issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would
necessarily be determined. The rationale behind the principle of
suspending a criminal case in view of a prejudicial question is to avoid
two conflicting decisions.
The Court of Appeals did not err when it ruled that the pendency of the
civil case for annulment of marriage filed by petitioner against private
respondent did not pose a prejudicial question which would necessitate
that the criminal case for bigamy be suspended until said civil case is
terminated. The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioner's
marriage to private respondent had no bearing upon the determination
of petitioner's innocence or guilt in the criminal case for bigamy, because
all that is required for the charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first
marriage be subsisting at the time the second marriage is contracted.
Petitioner's argument that the nullity of his marriage to private
respondent had to be resolved first in the civil case before the criminal
proceedings could continue, because a declaration that their marriage
was void ab initio would necessarily absolve him from criminal liability, is
untenable.
A marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed valid
until declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding. Thus, it cannot be used
as a prejudicial question to the prior criminal case and administrative
case against the petitioner. Moreover, the second marriage was clearly a
void ab initio. Lastly, Article 40 of the Family Code is the prevailing rule:
the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may not be invoked for
purposes of remarriage unless there is a final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void.

The Petition is hereby DENIED.