Alcantara v.

Alcantara
G.R. No. 167746, 28 August 2007

FACTS:

Restituto M. Alcantara filed a petition for annulment of marriage against respondent Rosita A.
Alcantara alleging that on 8 December 1982 he and respondent, without securing the required
marriage license, went to the Manila City Hall for the purpose of looking for a person who could
arrange a marriage for them. They met a person who, for a fee, arranged their wedding before a
certain priest. They got married on the same day. They went through another marriage ceremony in
a church in Tondo, Manila, on 26 March 1983. The marriage was likewise celebrated without the
parties securing a marriage license. The alleged marriage license, procured in Carmona, Cavite,
appearing on the marriage contract, is a sham, as neither party was a resident of Carmona, and they
never went to Carmona to apply for a license. In 1988, they parted ways and lived separate lives.
Petitioner prayed that after due hearing, judgment be issued declaring their marriage void and
ordering the Civil Registrar to cancel the corresponding marriage contract and its entry on file.

Rosita asserted the validity of their marriage and maintained that there was a marriage license
issued as evidenced by a certification from the Office of the Civil Registry of Carmona, Cavite.
Petitioner has a mistress with whom he has three children. Petitioner only filed the annulment of their
marriage to evade prosecution for concubinage. After hearing, the trial court dismissed the petition
for lack of merit. The CA affirmed the decision.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there was an absence of marriage license that would render the marriage between
petitioner and respondent void ab initio? No.

RULING:

No. A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage, the absence of which renders the marriage
void ab initio. The requirement and issuance of a marriage license is the State’s demonstration of its
involvement and participation in every marriage, in the maintenance of which the general public is
interested.

To be considered void on the ground of absence of a marriage license, the law requires that the
absence of such marriage license must be apparent on the marriage contract, or at the very least,
supported by a certification from the local civil registrar that no such marriage license was issued to
the parties. In this case, the marriage contract between the petitioner and respondent reflects a
marriage license number. A certification to this effect was also issued by the local civil registrar of
Carmona, Cavite. The certification moreover is precise in that it specifically identified the parties to
whom the marriage license was issued, namely Restituto Alcantara and Rosita Almario, further
validating the fact that a license was in fact issued to the parties herein. This certification enjoys the
presumption that official duty has been regularly performed and the issuance of the marriage license
was done in the regular conduct of official business. Hence, petitioner cannot insist on the absence
of a marriage license to impugn the validity of his marriage.
Petitioner, in a faint attempt to demolish the probative value of the marriage license, claims that
neither he nor respondent is a resident of Carmona, Cavite. Even then, we still hold that there is no
sufficient basis to annul petitioner and respondent’s marriage. Issuance of a marriage license in a
city or municipality, not the residence of either of the contracting parties, and issuance of a marriage
license despite the absence of publication or prior to the completion of the 10-day period for
publication are considered mere irregularities that do not affect the validity of the marriage.An
irregularity in any of the formal requisites of marriage does not affect its validity but the party or
parties responsible for the irregularity are civilly, criminally and administratively liable.

Likewise, the issue raised by petitioner — which they appeared before a “fixer” who arranged
everything for them and who facilitated the ceremony before a certain priest — will not strengthen
his posture. The authority of the officer or clergyman shown to have performed a marriage ceremony
will be presumed in the absence of any showing to the contrary. Moreover, the solemnizing officer is
not duty-bound to investigate whether or not a marriage license has been duly and regularly issued
by the local civil registrar. All solemnizing officer needs to know is that the license has been issued
by the competent official, and it may be presumed from the issuance of the license that said official
has fulfilled the duty to ascertain whether the contracting parties had fulfilled the requirements of law.

Article 53 of the Civil Code which was the law applicable at the time of the marriage of the parties’
states:

Art. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are complied with:

(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;

(2) Their consent, freely given

(3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and

(4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character.

Petitioner cannot insist on the absence of a marriage license to impugn the validity of his marriage
since all the elements in Article 53 are present in the case at bar.

Agustin v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 16257,15 June 2005

FACTS:

Respondents Fe Angela and her son Martin Prollamante sued Martin’s alleged biological father,
petitioner Arnel Agustin, for support and support pendente lite before the Quezon City RTC.In their
complaint, respondents alleged that Arnel courted Fe, after which they entered into an intimate
relationship. Arnel supposedly impregnated Fe on her 34th birthday but despite Arnel’s insistence on
abortion, Fe decided to give birth to their child out of wedlock, Martin. The baby’s birth certificate was
purportedly signed by Arnel as the father. Arnel shouldered the pre-natal and hospital expenses but
later refused Fe’s repeated requests for Martin’s support despite his adequate financial capacity and
even suggested to have the child committed for adoption. Arnel also denied having fathered the child.

On January 2001, while Fe was carrying five-month old Martin at the Capitol Hills Golf and Country Club
parking lot, Arnel sped off in his van, with the open car door hitting Fe’s leg. This incident was reported
to the police. Several months later, Fe was diagnosed with leukemia and has, since then, been
undergoing chemotherapy. Fe and Martin then sued Arnel for support. Fe and Martin moved for the
issuance of an order directing all the parties to submit themselves to DNA paternity testing, which Arnel
opposed by invoking his constitutional right against self-incrimination and moving to dismiss the
complaint for lack of cause of action.

The trial court denied the MTD and ordered the parties to submit themselves to DNA paternity testing at
the expense of the applicants. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court, thus this petition.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not a complaint for support can be converted or effectively integrated to a petition
for recognition? Yes.
2. Whether DNA paternity testing can be ordered in a proceeding for support without violating
petitioner's constitutional right to privacy and right against self-incrimination? Yes.

Ruling:

Yes. The assailed resolution and order did not convert the action for support into one for recognition but
merely allowed the respondents to prove their cause of action against petitioner who had been denying
the authenticity of the documentary evidence of acknowledgement. But even if the assailed resolution
and order effectively integrated an action to compel recognition with an action for support, such was
valid and in accordance with jurisprudence. In Tayag v. Court of Appeals, we allowed the integration of
an action to compel recognition with an action to claim one's inheritance:

…In Paulino, we held that an illegitimate child, to be entitled to support and successional rights from the
putative or presumed parent, must prove his filiation to the latter. We also said that it is necessary to
allege in the complaint that the putative father had acknowledged and recognized the illegitimate child
because such acknowledgment is essential to and is the basis of the right to inherit. There being no
allegation of such acknowledgment, the action becomes one to compel recognition which cannot be
brought after the death of the putative father. The ratio decidendi in Paulino, therefore, is not the
absence of a cause of action for failure of the petitioner to allege the fact of acknowledgment in the
complaint, but the prescription of the action. Applying the foregoing principles to the case at bar,
although petitioner contends that the complaint filed by herein private respondent merely alleges that
the minor Chad Cuyugan is an illegitimate child of the deceased and is actually a claim for inheritance,
from the allegations therein the same may be considered as one to compel recognition. Further, that
the two causes of action, one to compel recognition and the other to claim inheritance, may be joined in
one complaint is not new in our jurisprudence.

The conclusion above stated, though not heretofore explicitly formulated by this court, is undoubtedly
to some extent supported by our prior decisions. Thus, we have held in numerous cases, and the
doctrine must be considered well settled, that a natural child having a right to compel acknowledgment,
but who has not been in fact legally acknowledged, may maintain partition proceedings for the division
of the inheritance against his coheirs x x x; and the same person may intervene in proceedings for the
distribution of the estate of his deceased natural father, or mother x x x. In neither of these situations
has it been thought necessary for the plaintiff to show a prior decree compelling acknowledgment. The
obvious reason is that in partition suits and distribution proceedings the other persons who might take
by inheritance are before the court; and the declaration of heirship is appropriate to such proceedings.
(Underscoring supplied)

Although the instant case deals with support rather than inheritance, as in Tayag, the basis or rationale
for integrating them remains the same. Whether or not respondent Martin is entitled to support
depends completely on the determination of filiation. A separate action will only result in a multiplicity
of suits, given how intimately related the main issues in both cases are. To paraphrase Tayag, the
declaration of filiation is entirely appropriate to these proceedings.

2. Yes.

Under Philippine law, evidence is relevant when it relates directly to a fact in issue as to induce belief in
its existence or non-existence. Applying the Daubert test to the case at bar, the DNA evidence obtained
through PCR testing and utilizing STR analysis, and which was appreciated by the court a quo is relevant
and reliable since it is reasonably based on scientifically valid principles of human genetics and
molecular biology. Significantly, we upheld the constitutionality of compulsory DNA testing and the
admissibility of the results thereof as evidence. DNA samples from semen recovered from a rape victim's
vagina were used to positively identify the accused as the rapist. The compulsory extraction of blood
sample for DNA testing, as well as the testing itself, is not a violation of the right against
selfincrimination, as embodied in both Sections 12 and 17 of Article III of the Constitution. The kernel of
the right is not against all compulsion, but against testimonial compulsion. The right against self-
incrimination is simply against the legal process of extracting from the lips of the accused an admission
of guilt. It does not apply where the evidence sought to be excluded is not an incrimination but as part
of object evidence. Over the years, we have expressly excluded several kinds of object evidence taken
from the person of the accused from the realm of self-incrimination. These include photographs, hair,
and other bodily substances. We have also declared as constitutional several procedures performed on
the accused such as pregnancy tests for women accused of adultery, expulsion of morphine from one's
mouth and the tracing of one's foot to determine its identity with bloody footprints. In Jimenez v.
Cañizares, we even authorized the examination of a woman's genitalia, in an action for annulment filed
by her husband, to verify his claim that she was impotent, her orifice being too small for his penis. Some
of these procedures were, to be sure, rather invasive and involuntary, but all of them were
constitutionally sound. DNA testing and its results are now similarly acceptable.

Historically, it has mostly been in the areas of legality of searches and seizures, and the infringement of
privacy of communication where the constitutional right to privacy has been critically at issue.
Petitioner's case involves neither and, as already stated, his argument that his right against self-
incrimination is in jeopardy holds no water. His hollow invocation of his constitutional rights elicits no
sympathy here for the simple reason that they are not in any way being violated. If, in a criminal case, an
accused whose very life is at stake can be compelled to submit to DNA testing, we see no reason why, in
this civil case, petitioner herein who does not face such dire consequences cannot be ordered to do the
same.

In case proof of filiation or paternity would be unlikely to satisfactorily establish or would be difficult to
obtain, DNA testing, which examines genetic codes obtained from body cells of the illegitimate child and
any physical residue of the long dead parent could be resorted to. A positive match would clear up
filiation or paternity. In Tijing v Court of Appeals, this Court has acknowledged the strong weight of DNA
testing.

In no uncertain terms, the Court also underscored that the right to privacy does not bar all incursions
into individual privacy. The right is not intended to stifle scientific and technological advancements that
enhance public service and the common good. Intrusions into the right must be accompanied by proper
safeguards that enhance public service and the common good.

In the instant case, the petitioner has in no way shown any arbitrariness, passion, prejudice or personal
hostility that would amount to grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Court of Appeals. The
respondent court acted entirely within its jurisdiction in promulgating its decision and resolution, and
any error made would have only been an error in judgment. As discussed, however, the decision of the
respondent court, being firmly anchored in law and jurisprudence, was correct.

The Petion is DENIED.