Oropesa vs.

Oropesa

GR No. 184528 April 25, 2012

Facts: Petitioner filed with the RTC of Parañaque a petition for him and a certain Ms. Louie
Ginez to be appointed as guardians over the property of his father, the (respondent) Cirilo
Oropesa.

 In the said petition, it is alleged among others that the (respondent) has been afflicted with
several maladies and has been sickly for over ten (10) years already having suffered a stroke
on April 1, 2003 and June 1, 2003, that his judgment and memory [were] impaired and such has
been evident after his hospitalization; that even before his stroke, the (respondent) was
observed to have had lapses in memory and judgment, showing signs of failure to manage his
property properly; that due to his age and medical condition, he cannot, without outside aid,
manage his property wisely, and has become an easy prey for deceit and exploitation by people
around him, particularly Ms. Ma. Luisa Agamata, his girlfriend.

Issue: Whether or not respondent is considered an “incompetent” person as defined under

section 2, Rule 92 of the ROC who should be placed under guardianship

Held: The Supreme Court ruled in the negative.

In a guardianship proceeding, a court may appoint a qualified guardian if the prospective ward is
proven to be a minor or an incompetent.

A reading of Section 2, Rule 92 of the Rules of Court tells us that who is considered as an
incompetent: Under this rule, the word “incompetent” includes persons suffering the penalty of
civil interdiction or who are hospitalized lepers, prodigals, deaf and dumb who are unable to
read and write, those who are of unsound mind, even though they have lucid intervals, and
persons not being of unsound mind, but by reason of age, disease, weak mind, and other
similar causes, cannot, without outside aid, take care of themselves and manage their property,
becoming thereby an easy prey for deceit and exploitation.
 
We have held in the past that a “finding that a person is incompetent should be anchored on
clear, positive and definite evidence.”  We consider that evidentiary standard unchanged and,
thus, must be applied in the case at bar. 
 
In this particular case, petitioner failed to formally offer his documentary evidence, proof of his
father’s incompetence consisted purely of testimonies given by himself and his sister (who were
claiming interest in their father’s real and personal properties) and their father’s former caregiver
(who admitted to be acting under their direction).  These testimonies, which did not include any
expert medical testimony, were insufficient to convince the trial court of petitioner’s cause of
action and instead lead it to grant the demurrer to evidence that was filed by respondent.

Even if we were to overlook petitioner’s procedural lapse in failing to make a formal offer of
evidence, his documentary proof were comprised mainly of certificates of title over real
properties registered in his, his father’s and his sister’s names as co-owners, tax declarations,
and receipts showing payment of real estate taxes on their co-owned properties, which do not in
any way relate to his father’s alleged incapacity to make decisions for himself.  The only medical
document on record is the aforementioned “Report of Neuropsychological Screening” which was
attached to the petition for guardianship but was never identified by any witness nor offered as
evidence. 

In an analogous guardianship case wherein the soundness of mind of the proposed ward was at
issue, we had the occasion to rule that “where the sanity of a person is at issue, expert opinion
is not necessary [and that] the observations of the trial judge coupled with evidence establishing
the person’s state of mental sanity will suffice.”

Thus, it is significant that in its Order dated November 14, 2006 which denied petitioner’s motion
for reconsideration on the trial court’s unfavorable September 27, 2006 ruling, the trial court
highlighted the fatal role that petitioner’s own documentary evidence played in disproving its
case and, likewise, the trial court made known its own observation of respondent’s physical and
mental state, to wit: The Court noted the absence of any testimony of a medical expert which
states that Gen. Cirilo O. Oropesa does not have the mental, emotional, and physical capacity
to manage his own affairs. On the contrary, Oppositor’s evidence includes a Neuropsychological
Screening Report which states that Gen. Oropesa, (1) performs on the average range in most of
the domains that were tested; (2) is capable of mental calculations; and (3) can provide
solutions to problem situations. The Report concludes that Gen. Oropesa possesses intact
cognitive functioning, except for mildly impaired abilities in memory, reasoning and orientation. It
is the observation of the Court that oppositor is still sharp, alert and able.
Advent Capital and Finance Corporation vs. Alcantara

GR No. 183050 January 25, 2012

Facts: Advent Capital filed a petition for rehabilitation with the RTC of Makati City.
Subsequently, the RTC named Atty. Danilo L. Concepcion as rehabilitation receiver. Upon audit
of Advent Capital’s books, Atty. Concepcion found that respondents Nicasio and Editha
Alcantara (collectively, the Alcantaras) owed Advent Capital P27,398,026.59, representing trust
fees that it supposedly earned for managing their several trust accounts.

Prompted by this finding, Atty. Concepcion requested Belson Securities, Inc. (Belson) to deliver
to him, as Advent Capital’s rehabilitation receiver, the P7,635,597.50 in cash dividends that
Belson held under the Alcantaras’ Trust Account 95-013.  Atty. Concepcion claimed that the
dividends, as trust fees, formed part of Advent Capital’s assets.  Belson refused, however, citing
the Alcantaras’ objections as well as the absence of an appropriate order from the rehabilitation
court.

Thus, Atty. Concepcion filed a motion before the rehabilitation court to direct Belson to release
the money to him.  

The Alcantaras made a special appearance before the rehabilitation court to oppose Atty.
Concepcion’s motion.  They claimed that the money in the trust account belonged to them under
their Trust Agreement with Advent Capital.  The latter, they said, could not claim any right or
interest in the dividends generated by their investments since Advent Capital merely held these
in trust for the Alcantaras, the trustors-beneficiaries.  For this reason, Atty. Concepcion had no
right to compel the delivery of the dividends to him as receiver.  The Alcantaras concluded that,
under the circumstances, the rehabilitation court had no jurisdiction over the subject dividends.

Issue: Whether or not the cash dividends in Belson’s possession formed part of Advent
Capital’s assets that the rehabilitation court may, upon motion, require to be conveyed to the
rehabilitation receiver for his disposition.

Held: The Supreme Court ruled in the negative.

Paragraph 9 of the Trust Agreement with the Alcantaras, states that: As compensation for its
services hereunder, the TRUSTEE shall be entitled to a trust or management fee of 1 (one) %
per annum based on the quarterly average market value of the Portfolio or a minimum annual
fee ofP5,000.00, whichever is higher.  The said trust or management fee shall automatically be
deducted from the Portfolio at the end of each calendar quarter.  The TRUSTEE shall likewise
be reimbursed for all reasonable and necessary expenses incurred by it in the discharge of its
powers and duties under this Agreement, and in all cases, the TRUSTEE shall have a first lien
on the Portfolio for the payment of the trust fees and other reimbursable expenses.

According to Advent Capital, it could automatically deduct its management fees from the
Alcantaras’ portfolio that they entrusted to it.  

But the problem is that the trust fees that Advent Capital’s receiver was claiming were for past
quarters. Based on the stipulation, these should have been deducted as they became due.  As it
happened, at the time Advent Capital made its move to collect its supposed management fees,
it neither had possession nor control of the money it wanted to apply to its claim.  Belson, a third
party, held the money in the Alcantaras’ names.  Whether it should deliver the same to Advent
Capital or to the Alcantaras is not clear.  What is clear is that the issue as to who should get the
same has been seriously contested.   

The practice in the case of banks is that they automatically collect their management fees from
the funds that their clients entrust to them for investment or lending to others.  But the banks
can freely do this since it holds or has control of their clients’ money and since their trust
agreement authorized the automatic collection.  If the depositor contests the deduction, his
remedy is to bring an action to recover the amount he claims to have been illegally deducted
from his account.

Here, Advent Capital does not allege that Belson had already deducted the management fees
owing to it from the Alcantaras’ portfolio at the end of each calendar quarter.  Had this been
done, it may be said that the money in Belson’s possession would technically be that of Advent
Capital.  Belson would be holding such amount in trust for the latter.  And it would be for the
Alcantaras to institute an action in the proper court against Advent Capital and Belson for
misuse of its funds. 

But the above did not happen.  Advent Capital did not exercise its right to cause the automatic
deduction at the end of every quarter of its supposed management fee when it had full control of
the dividends.  That was its fault.  For their part, the Alcantaras had the right to presume that
Advent Capital had deducted its fees in the manner stated in the contract. The burden of
proving that the fees were not in fact collected lies with Advent Capital.

Further, Advent Capital or its rehabilitation receiver cannot unilaterally decide to apply the entire
amount of cash dividends retroactively to cover the accumulated trust fees.  Advent Capital
merely managed in trust for the benefit of the Alcantaras the latter’s portfolio, which under
Paragraph 2 of the Trust Agreement, includes not only the principal but also its income or
proceeds.  The trust property is only fictitiously attributed by law to the trustee “to the extent that
the rights and powers vested in a nominal owner shall be used by him on behalf of the real
owner.”

The real owner of the trust property is the trustor-beneficiary.  In this case, the trustors-
beneficiaries are the Alcantaras.  Thus, Advent Capital could not dispose of the Alcantaras’
portfolio on its own.  The income and principal of the portfolio could only be withdrawn upon the
Alcantaras’ written instruction or order to Advent Capital. The latter could not also assign or
encumber the portfolio or its income without the written consent of the Alcantaras. All these are
stipulated in the Trust Agreement.  
Mangila vs. Pangilinan

GR No. 160739 July 17, 2013

Facts: Seven criminal complaints charging petitioner Anita Mangila and four others with
syndicated estafa in violation of Article 315 of the RPC, in relation to PD No. 1689, and with
violations of Section 7(b) of RA 8042 were filed in the MTCC in Puerto Princesa City. he
complaints arose from the recruiting and promising of employment by Mangila and the others to
the private complainants as overseas contract workers in Toronto, Canada, and from the
collection of visa processing fees, membership fees and on-line application the private
complainants without lawful authority from the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration
(POEA).

On the following day, Judge Pangilinan , Presiding Judge of the MTCC, conducted a preliminary
investigation on the complaints. After examining Miguel Aaron Palayon, one of the
complainants, Judge Pangilinan issued a warrant for the arrest of Mangila and her cohorts
without bail. On the next day, the entire records of the cases, including the warrant of arrest,
were transmitted to the City Prosecutor of Puerto Princesa City for further proceedings and
appropriate action in accordance with the prevailing rules.

As a consequence, Mangila was arrested and detained at the headquarters on Taft Avenue,
Manila of the NBI.

Mangila filed in the Court of Appeals (CA) a petition for habeas corpus to obtain her release
from detention.

The CA denied the petition for habeas corpus for its lack of merit

Issue: Did the CA err in ruling that habeas corpus was not the proper remedy to obtain the
release of Mangila from detention?

Held: The Supreme Court affirmed the CA’s finding.

The high prerogative writ of habeas corpus has been devised as a speedy and effective remedy
to relieve persons from unlawful restraint.

Habeas corpus is not in the nature of a writ of error; nor intended as substitute for the trial
court’s function. It cannot take the place of appeal, certiorari or writ of error. The writ cannot be
used to investigate and consider questions of error that might be raised relating to procedure or
on the merits. 

Habeas corpus is a summary remedy. It is analogous to a proceeding in rem when instituted for
the sole purpose of having the person of restraint presented before the judge in order that the
cause of his detention may be inquired into and his statements final. The writ of habeas corpus
does not act upon the prisoner who seeks relief, but upon the person who holds him in what is
alleged to be the unlawful authority. Hence, the only parties before the court are the petitioner
(prisoner) and the person holding the petitioner in custody, and the only question to be resolved
is whether the custodian has authority to deprive the petitioner of his liberty. The writ may be
denied if the petitioner fails to show facts that he is entitled thereto ex merito justicias.
The object of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into the legality of the detention, and, if the
detention is found to be illegal, to require the release of the detainee. Equally well-settled
however, is that the writ will not issue where the person in whose behalf the writ is sought is out
on bail, or is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge with
jurisdiction or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record.

There is no question that when the criminal complaints were lodged against Mangila and her
cohorts on June 16, 2003,Judge Pangilinan, as the Presiding Judge of the MTCC, was
empowered to conduct preliminary investigations involving "all crimes cognizable by the proper
court in their respective territorial jurisdictions." His authority was expressly provided in Section
2, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

Under Section 6(b) of Rule 112of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the investigating
judge could issue a warrant of arrest during the preliminary investigation even without awaiting
its conclusion should he find after an examination in writing and under oath of the complainant
and the witnesses in the form of searching questions and answers that a probable cause
existed, and that there was a necessity of placing the respondent under immediate custody in
order not to frustrate the ends of justice.1âwphi1 In the context of this rule, Judge Pangilinan
issued the warrant of arrest against Mangila and her cohorts. Consequently, the CA properly
denied Mangila’s petition for habeas corpus because she had been arrested and detained by
virtue of the warrant issued for her arrest by Judge Pangilinan, a judicial officer undeniably
possessing the legal authority to do so.

It is relevant to point out at this juncture that the authority of the MTC and MTCC judges to
conduct preliminary investigations was removed only effective on October 3, 2005 pursuant to
A.M. No. 05-8-26-SC.

With Mangila’s arrest and ensuing detention being by virtue of the order lawfully issued by
Judge Pangilinan, the writ of habeas corpus was not an appropriate remedy to relieve her from
the restraint on her liberty. This is because the restraint, being lawful and pursuant to a court
process, could not be inquired into through habeas corpus. Her proper recourse was to bring
the supposed irregularities attending the conduct of the preliminary investigation and the
issuance of the warrant for her arrest to the attention of the City Prosecutor, who had been
meanwhile given the most direct access to the entire records of the case, including the warrant
of arrest, following Judge Pangilinan’s transmittal of them to the City Prosecutor for appropriate
action. We agree with the CA, therefore, that the writ of habeas corpus could not be used as a
substitute for another available remedy.
Republic vs. Kho

GR No. 170340 June 29, 2007

Facts: Carlito and his siblings Michael, Mercy Nona and Heddy Moira filed before the RTC of
Butuan City a verified petition for correction of entries in the civil registry of Butuan City to effect
changes in their respective birth certificates.  Carlito also asked the court in behalf of his minor
children, Kevin and Kelly, to order the correction of some entries in their birth certificates.

In the case of Carlito, he requested the correction in his birth certificate of the citizenship of his
mother to “Filipino” instead of “Chinese,” as well as the deletion of the word “married” opposite
the phrase “Date of marriage of parents” because his parents, Juan Kho and Epifania Inchoco
(Epifania), were allegedly not legally married.
 
The same request to delete the “married” status of their parents from their respective birth
certificates was made by Carlito’s siblings Michael, Mercy Nona, and Heddy Moira.
 
With respect to the birth certificates of Carlito’s children, he prayed that the date of his and his
wife’s marriage be corrected fromApril 27, 1989 to January 21, 2000, the date appearing in their
marriage certificate.
 
As required, the petition was published for three consecutive weeks in Mindanao Daily Patrol-
CARAGA, a newspaper of general circulation, after which it was set for hearing.

By Decision , the trial court directed the local civil registrar of Butuan City to correct the entries
in the record of birth of Carlito and his siblings Michael, Mercy Nona and Heddy Moira.

Petitioner, Republic of the Philippines, appealed the RTC Decision to the CA, faulting the trial
court in granting the petition for correction of entries in the subject documents for non-
compliance with the requirements under Rule 103.
 
The CA denied petitioner’s appeal and affirmed the decision of the trial court.
 
Issue: Whether or not Kho’s petition which entail substantial and controversial amendments can
be made under Rule 108

Held: The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative.

The Supreme Court held that Kho’s petition involves the correction of not just clerical errors of a
harmless and innocuous nature. Rather the changes entail substantial and controversial
amendments.

In Republic v. Valencia, however, this Court ruled, and has since repeatedly ruled, that even
substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected through a petition filed under Rule 108.

The enactment in March 2001 of Republic Act No. 9048, otherwise known as “AN ACT
AUTHORIZING THE CITY OR MUNICIPAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OR THE CONSUL GENERAL
TO CORRECT A CLERICAL OR TYPOGRAPHICAL ERROR IN AN ENTRY AND/OR CHANGE
OF FIRST NAME OR NICKNAME IN THE CIVIL REGISTER WITHOUT NEED OF JUDICIAL
ORDER,” has been considered to lend legislative affirmation to the judicial precedence that
substantial corrections to the civil status of persons recorded in the civil registry may be effected
through the filing of a petition under Rule 108.

Thus, this Court in Republic v. Benemerito observed that the obvious effect of Republic Act No.
9048 is to make possible the administrative correction of clerical or typographical errors or
change of first name or nickname in entries in the civil register, leaving to Rule 108 the
correction of substantial changes in the civil registry in appropriate adversarial proceedings.

 
When all the procedural requirements under Rule 108 are thus followed, the appropriate
adversary proceeding necessary to effect substantial corrections to the entries of the civil
register is satisfied. The pertinent provisions of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court read:

 
SEC. 3.  Parties. – When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil
registrar is sought, the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any
interest which would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding.
 
SEC. 4.  Notice and publication. — Upon the filing of the petition, the
court shall, by an order, fix the time and place for the hearing of the same, and
cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons named in the petition.
The court shall also cause the order to be published once in a week for three (3)
consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province.
 
SEC. 5. Opposition. — The civil registrar and any person having or
claiming any interest under the entry whose cancellation or correction is sought
may, within fifteen (15) days from notice of the petition, or from the last date of
publication of such notice, file his opposition thereto. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
 
Republic vs. Silverio

GR No. 174689 October 22, 2007

Facts: Petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a petition for the change of his first name
and sex in his birth certificate in the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 8.

Petitioner alleged in his petition that he was born in the City of Manila to the spouses Melecio
Petines Silverio and Anita Aquino Dantes on April 4, 1962. His name was registered as
"Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio" in his certificate of live birth (birth certificate). His sex was
registered as "male."

He further alleged that he is a male transsexual, that is, "anatomically male but feels, thinks and
acts as a female" and that he had always identified himself with girls since childhood. Feeling
trapped in a man’s body, he consulted several doctors in the United States. He underwent
psychological examination, hormone treatment and breast augmentation. His attempts to
transform himself to a "woman" culminated on January 27, 2001 when he underwent sex
reassignment surgery in Bangkok, Thailand. He was thereafter examined by Dr. Marcelino
Reysio-Cruz, Jr., a plastic and reconstruction surgeon in the Philippines, who issued a medical
certificate attesting that he (petitioner) had in fact undergone the procedure.

From then on, petitioner lived as a female and was in fact engaged to be married. He then
sought to have his name in his birth certificate changed from "Rommel Jacinto" to "Mely," and
his sex from "male" to "female."

Issue: Whether or not change in name and sex in birth certificate are allowed by reason of sex
reassignment

Held: The Supreme Court ruled in the negative.

A change of name is a privilege, not a right. Petitions for change of name are controlled by
statutes. In this connection, Article 376 of the Civil Code provides:

ART. 376. No person can change his name or surname without judicial authority.

This Civil Code provision was amended by RA 9048 (Clerical Error Law). In particular, Section 1
of RA 9048 provides:

SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and Change of First

Name or Nickname. – No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a
judicial order, except for clerical or typographical errors and change of first name or
nickname which can be corrected or changed by the concerned city or municipal civil
registrar or consul general in accordance with the provisions of this Act and its
implementing rules and regulations.

RA 9048 likewise provides the grounds for which change of first name may be allowed:

SECTION 4. Grounds for Change of First Name or Nickname. – The petition for change
of first name or nickname may be allowed in any of the following cases:
 (1) The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous, tainted with dishonor
or extremely difficult to write or pronounce;

(2) The new first name or nickname has been habitually and continuously used by the
petitioner and he has been publicly known by that first name or nickname in the
community; or

(3) The change will avoid confusion.

Petitioner’s basis in praying for the change of his first name was his sex reassignment.  RA
9048 does not sanction a change of first name on the ground of sex reassignment. Rather than
avoiding confusion, changing petitioner’s first name for his declared purpose may only create
grave complications in the civil registry and the public interest.

Before a person can legally change his given name, he must present proper or reasonable
cause or any compelling reason justifying such change. In addition, he must show that he will be
prejudiced by the use of his true and official name. In this case, he failed to show, or even
allege, any prejudice that he might suffer as a result of using his true and official name.

No Law Allows The Change of Entry In The Birth Certificate As To Sex On the Ground of Sex
Reassignment

The determination of a person’s sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal issue and the
court must look to the statutes. In this connection, Article 412 of the Civil Code provides:

ART. 412. No entry in the civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial
order

Together with Article 376 of the Civil Code, this provision was amended by RA 9048 in so far
as clerical or typographical errors are involved. 

Section 2(c) of RA 9048 defines what a "clerical or typographical error" is: (3) "Clerical or
typographical error" refers to a mistake committed in the performance of clerical work in writing,
copying, transcribing or typing an entry in the civil register that is harmless and innocuous, such
as misspelled name or misspelled place of birth or the like, which is visible to the eyes or
obvious to the understanding, and can be corrected or changed only by reference to other
existing record or records: Provided, however, That no correction must involve the change
of nationality, age, status or sex of the petitioner. 

Under RA 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is not a mere
clerical or typographical error. It is a substantial change for which the applicable procedure is
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.

The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable under Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court are those provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil Code:

ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall
be recorded in the civil register.

ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:

 (1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments of marriage;
(6) judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (7) legitimations; (8)
adoptions; (9) acknowledgments of natural children; (10) naturalization; (11) loss, or (12)
recovery of citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14) judicial determination of filiation; (15)
voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (16) changes of name.

The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the Civil Code include even
those that occur after birth. However, no reasonable interpretation of the provision can justify
the conclusion that it covers the correction on the ground of sex reassignment.

To correct simply means "to make or set aright; to remove the faults or error from" while to
change means "to replace something with something else of the same kind or with something
that serves as a substitute." The birth certificate of petitioner contained no error. All entries
therein, including those corresponding to his first name and sex, were all correct. No correction
is necessary.

Moreover, under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical record of the facts as
they existed at the time of birth. Thus, the sex of a person is determined at birth, visually done
by the birth attendant (the physician or midwife) by examining the genitals of the infant.
Considering that there is no law legally recognizing sex reassignment, the determination of a
person’s sex made at the time of his or her birth, if not attended by error, is immutable.
Republic vs. Uy

GR No. 198010 August 12, 2013

Facts: Respondent filed a Petition for Correction of Entry in her Certificate of Live
Birth. Impleaded as respondent is the Local Civil Registrar of Gingoog City. She alleged that
she was born on February 8, 1952 and is the illegitimate daughter of Sy Ton and Sotera
Lugsanay Her Certificate of Live Birth shows that her full name is "Anita Sy" when in fact she is
allegedly known to her family and friends as "Norma S. Lugsanay." She further claimed that her
school records, Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) Board of Medicine Certificate, and
passport bear the name "Norma S. Lugsanay." She also alleged that she is an illegitimate child
considering that her parents were never married, so she had to follow the surname of her
mother. She also contended that she is a Filipino citizen and not Chinese, and all her siblings
bear the surname Lugsanay and are all Filipinos.

The RTC issued an Order finding the petition to be sufficient in form and substance and setting
the case for hearing, with the directive that the said Order be published in a newspaper of
general circulation in the City of Gingoog and the Province of Misamis Oriental at least once a
week for three (3) consecutive weeks at the expense of respondent, and that the order and
petition be furnished the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) and the City Prosecutor’s Office
for their information and guidance. Pursuant to the RTC Order, respondent complied with the
publication requirement.

The CA affirmed in toto the RTC Order. The CA held that respondent’s failure to implead other
indispensable parties was cured upon the publication of the Order setting the case for hearing in
a newspaper of general circulation for three (3) consecutive weeks

Issue: Whether or not the failure of respondent to implead her parents and siblings as required
under Rule 108 can be cured by the fact that the notice of hearing was published in a
newspaper of general circulation

Held: The Supreme Court ruled in the negative.

Respondent’s birth certificate shows that her full name is Anita Sy, that she is a Chinese citizen
and a legitimate child of Sy Ton and Sotera Lugsanay. In filing the petition, however, she seeks
the correction of her first name and surname, her status from "legitimate" to "illegitimate" and
her citizenship from "Chinese" to "Filipino." Thus, respondent should have impleaded and
notified not only the Local Civil Registrar but also her parents and siblings as the persons who
have interest and are affected by the changes or corrections respondent wanted to make.

The fact that the notice of hearing was published in a newspaper of general circulation and
notice thereof was served upon the State will not change the nature of the proceedings taken. A
reading of Sections 4 and 5, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court shows that the Rules mandate two
sets of notices to different potential oppositors: one given to the persons named in the petition
and another given to other persons who are not named in the petition but nonetheless may be
considered interested or affected parties. Summons must, therefore, be served not for the
purpose of vesting the courts with jurisdiction but to comply with the requirements of fair play
and due process to afford the person concerned the opportunity to protect his interest if he so
chooses.
While there may be cases where the Court held that the failure to implead and notify the
affected or interested parties may be cured by the publication of the notice of hearing, earnest
efforts were made by petitioners in bringing to court all possible interested parties. Such failure
was likewise excused where the interested parties themselves initiated the corrections
proceedings; when there is no actual or presumptive awareness of the existence of the
interested parties; or when a party is inadvertently left out. Such are not present in this case.

It is clear from the foregoing discussion that when a petition for cancellation or correction of an
entry in the civil register involves substantial and controversial alterations, including those on
citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, a strict compliance with
the requirements of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is mandated. If the entries in the civil register
could be corrected or changed through mere summary proceedings and not through appropriate
action wherein all parties who may be affected by the entries are notified or represented, the
door to fraud or other mischief would be set open, the consequence of which might be
detrimental and far reaching.
People vs. Merlinda Olaybar

GR No. 189538 February 10, 2014

Facts: Respondent requested from the National Statistics Office (NSO) a Certificate of No
Marriage (CENOMAR) as one of the requirements for her marriage with her boyfriend of five
years. Upon receipt thereof, she discovered that she was already married to a certain Ye Son
Sune, a Korean National, on June 24, 2002, at the Office of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities
(MTCC), Palace of Justice. She denied having contracted said marriage and claimed that she
did not know the alleged husband; she did not appear before the solemnizing officer; and, that
the signature appearing in the marriage certificate is not hers. She, thus, filed a Petition for
Cancellation of Entries in the Marriage Contract, especially the entries in the wife portion thereof
before the RTC. Respondent impleaded the Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City, as well as her
alleged husband, as parties to the case.

The RTC granted the petition and directed the Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City to cancel all the
entries in the WIFE portion of the alleged marriage contract of the petitioner and respondent Ye
Son Sune.

Issue: Whether or not the cancellation of entries in the marriage contract which, in effect,
nullifies the marriage may be undertaken in a Rule 108 proceeding

Held: The Supreme Court in this case ruled in the affirmative.

Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provides the procedure for cancellation or correction of entries in
the civil registry. The proceedings may either be summary or adversary. If the correction is
clerical, then the procedure to be adopted is summary. If the rectification affects the civil status,
citizenship or nationality of a party, it is deemed substantial, and the procedure to be adopted is
adversary. Since the promulgation of Republic v. Valencia in 1986, the Court has repeatedly
ruled that “even substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected through a petition filed
under Rule 108, with the true facts established and the parties aggrieved by the error availing
themselves of the appropriate adversarial proceeding.” An appropriate adversary suit or
proceeding is one where the trial court has conducted proceedings where all relevant facts have
been fully and properly developed, where opposing counsel have been given opportunity to
demolish the opposite party’s case, and where the evidence has been thoroughly weighed and
considered.

In filing the petition for correction of entry under Rule 108, respondent made the Local Civil
Registrar of Cebu City, as well as her alleged husband Ye Son Sune, as parties–respondents. It
is likewise undisputed that the procedural requirements set forth in Rule 108 were complied
with. The Office of the Solicitor General was likewise notified of the petition which in turn
authorized the Office of the City Prosecutor to participate in the proceedings. More importantly,
trial was conducted where respondent herself, the stenographer of the court where the alleged
marriage was conducted, as well as a document examiner, testified. Several documents were
also considered as evidence. With the testimonies and other evidence presented, the trial court
found that the signature appearing in the subject marriage certificate was different from
respondent’s signature appearing in some of her government issued identification cards. The
court thus made a categorical conclusion that respondent’s signature in the marriage certificate
was not hers and, therefore, was forged. Clearly, it was established that, as she claimed in her
petition, no such marriage was celebrated.
Indeed the Court made a pronouncement in the recent case of Minoru Fujiki v. Maria Paz Galela
Marinay et al that: To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil
registry cannot substitute for an action to invalidate a marriage. A direct action is necessary to
prevent circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under the
Family Code, A.M. No. 02–11–10–SC and other related laws. n the civil registry.

Aside from the certificate of marriage, no such evidence was presented to show the existence of
marriage. Rather, respondent showed by overwhelming evidence that no marriage was entered
into and that she was not even aware of such existence. The testimonial and documentary
evidence clearly established that the only “evidence” of marriage which is the marriage
certificate was a forgery. While we maintain that Rule 108 cannot be availed of to determine the
validity of marriage, we cannot nullify the proceedings before the trial court where all the parties
had been given the opportunity to contest the allegations of respondent; the procedures were
followed, and all the evidence of the parties had already been admitted and examined.
Respondent indeed sought, not the nullification of marriage as there was no marriage to speak
of, but the correction of the record of such marriage to reflect the truth as set forth by the
evidence. Otherwise stated, in allowing the correction of the subject certificate of marriage by
cancelling the wife portion thereof, the trial court did not, in any way, declare the marriage void
as there was no marriage to speak of.
Canlas vs. Napico Homeowners Association

GR No. 182795 June 5, 2008

Facts: The present petition filed on May 26, 2008 seeks the issuance of a Writ of Amparo.

It appears that petitioners are settlers in a certain parcel of land situated in Barangay

Manggahan, Pasig City.  Their dwellings/houses have either been demolished as of the time of
filing of the petition, or is about to be demolished pursuant to a court judgment.

Issue: Whether or not the petition for writ of amparo is proper in this case

Held: The Supreme Court ruled in the negative.

The Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides: SECTION 1. Petition. – The petition for a writ
of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated
or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of
a private individual or entity. The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances or threats thereof.  

The threatened demolition of a dwelling by virtue of a final judgment of the court, which in this
case was affirmed with finality by this Court in G.R. Nos. 177448, 180768, 177701, 177038, is
not included among the enumeration of rights as stated in the above-quoted Section 1 for which
the remedy of a writ of amparo is made available.  Their claim to their dwelling, assuming they
still have any despite the final and executory judgment adverse to them, does not constitute
right to life, liberty and security.  There is, therefore, no legal basis for the issuance of the writ
of amparo.
Razon vs. Tagitis

GR No. 182498 December 3, 2009

Facts: Tagitis, a consultant for the World Bank and the Senior Honorary Counselor for the
Islamic Development Bank (IDB) Scholarship Programme, was last seen in Jolo,
Sulu.  Together with Arsimin Kunnong (Kunnong), an IDB scholar, Tagitis arrived in Jolo by boat
in the early morning of October 31, 2007 from a seminar in Zamboanga City.  They immediately
checked-in at ASY Pension House.  Tagitis asked Kunnong to buy him a boat ticket for his
return trip the following day to Zamboanga. When Kunnong returned from this errand, Tagitis
was no longer around. The receptionist related that Tagitis went out to buy food at around 12:30
in the afternoon and even left his room key with the desk. Kunnong looked for Tagitis and even
sent a text message to the latter’s Manila-based secretary who did not know of Tagitis’
whereabouts and activities either; she advised Kunnong to simply wait.

On November 4, 2007, Kunnong and Muhammad Abdulnazeir N.  Matli, a UP professor of

Muslim studies and Tagitis’ fellow student counselor at the IDB, reported Tagitis’ disappearance
to the Jolo Police Station.  On November 7, 2007, Kunnong executed a sworn affidavit attesting
to what he knew of the circumstances surrounding Tagitis’ disappearance.
 
More than a month later (on December 28, 2007), the respondent filed a Petition for the Writ
of Amparo (petition) with the CA through her Attorney-in-Fact, Atty. Felipe P. Arcilla.  The
petition was directed against Lt. Gen. Alexander Yano, Commanding General, Philippine Army;
Gen. Avelino I. Razon, Chief, Philippine National Police (PNP); Gen. Edgardo M. Doromal,
Chief, Criminal Investigation and Detention Group (CIDG); Sr. Supt. Leonardo A. Espina, Chief,
Police Anti-Crime and Emergency Response; Gen. Joel Goltiao, Regional Director, ARMM-
PNP; and Gen. Ruben Rafael, Chief, Anti-Terror Task Force Comet [collectively referred to as
petitioners].

On the same day the petition was filed, the CA immediately issued the Writ of Amparo, set the
case for hearing on January 7, 2008, and directed the petitioners to file their verified return
within seventy-two (72) hours from service of the writ.

On March 7, 2008, the CA issued its decision confirming that the disappearance of Tagitis was
an “enforced disappearance” under the United Nations (UN) Declaration on the Protection of All
Persons from Enforced Disappearances.  

Issue: Whether or not the petition for writ of amparo is proper in this case

Held: The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative.

The framers of the Amparo Rule never intended Section 5(c) to be complete in every detail in
stating the threatened or actual violation of a victim’s rights.  As in any other initiatory pleading,
the pleader must of course state the ultimate facts constituting the cause of action, omitting the
evidentiary details.

To read the Rules of Court requirement on pleadings while addressing the unique Amparo
situation, the test in reading the petition should be to determine whether it contains the
details available to the petitioner under the circumstances, while presenting a cause of action
showing a violation of the victim’s rights to life, liberty and security through State or private party
action.  The petition should likewise be read in its totality, rather than in terms of its isolated
component parts, to determine if the required elements – namely, of the disappearance, the
State or private action, and the actual or threatened violations of the rights to life, liberty or
security – are present.

In the present case, the petition amply recites in its paragraphs 4 to 11 the circumstances under
which Tagitis suddenly dropped out of sight after engaging in normal activities, and thereafter
was nowhere to be found despite efforts to locate him.  The petition alleged, too, under its
paragraph 7, in relation to paragraphs 15 and 16, that according to reliable information, police
operatives were the perpetrators of the abduction.  It also clearly alleged how Tagitis’ rights to
life, liberty and security were violated when he was “forcibly taken and boarded on a motor
vehicle by a couple of burly men believed to be police intelligence operatives,” and then taken
“into custody by the respondents’ police intelligence operatives since October 30, 2007,
specifically by the CIDG, PNP Zamboanga City, x x x held against his will in an earnest attempt
of the police to involve and connect [him] with different terrorist groups.”

These allegations, in our view, properly pleaded ultimate facts within the pleader’s knowledge
about Tagitis’ disappearance, the participation by agents of the State in this disappearance, the
failure of the State to release Tagitis or to provide sufficient information about his whereabouts,
as well as the actual violation of his right to liberty.  Thus, the petition cannot be faulted for any
failure in its statement of a cause of action.

If a defect can at all be attributed to the petition, this defect is its lack of supporting affidavit, as
required by Section 5(c) of the Amparo Rule.  Owing to the summary nature of the proceedings
for the writ and to facilitate the resolution of the petition, the Amparo Rule incorporated the
requirement for supporting affidavits, with the annotation that these can be used as the affiant’s
direct testimony. This requirement, however, should not be read as an absolute one that
necessarily leads to the dismissal of the petition if not strictly followed.  Where, as in this case,
the petitioner has substantially complied with the requirement by submitting a verified petition
sufficiently detailing the facts relied upon, the strict need for the sworn statement that an
affidavit represents is essentially fulfilled.  We note that the failure to attach the required
affidavits was fully cured when the respondent and her witness (Mrs. Talbin) personally testified
in the CA hearings held on January 7 and 17 and February 18, 2008 to swear to and flesh out
the allegations of the petition. Thus, even on this point, the petition cannot be faulted.    

We reject the petitioners’ argument that the respondent’s petition did not comply with the
Section 5(d) requirements of the Amparo Rule (that a prior investigation must have been made),
as the petition specifies in its paragraph 11 that Kunnong and his companions immediately
reported Tagitis’ disappearance to the police authorities in Jolo, Sulu as soon as they were
relatively certain that he indeed had disappeared.   The police, however, gave them the “ready
answer” that Tagitis could have been abducted by the Abu Sayyaf group or other anti-
government groups.  The respondent also alleged in paragraphs 17 and 18 of her petition that
she filed a “complaint” with the PNP Police Station in Cotobato and in Jolo, but she was told of
“an intriguing tale” by the police that her husband was having “a good time with another
woman.” The disappearance was alleged to have been reported, too, to no less than the
Governor of the ARMM, followed by the respondent’s personal inquiries that yielded the factual
bases for her petition.

Based on these considerations, we rule that the respondent’s petition for the Writ of Amparo is
sufficient in form and substance and that the Court of Appeals had every reason to proceed with
its consideration of the case.
The Amparo Rule expressly provides that the “writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances or threats thereof.” We note that although the writ specifically covers “enforced
disappearances,” this concept is neither defined nor penalized in this jurisdiction. 

As the law now stands, extra-judicial killings and enforced disappearances in this jurisdiction are
not crimes penalized separately from the component criminal acts undertaken to carry out these
killings and enforced disappearances and are now penalized under the Revised Penal Code
and special laws.

Even without the benefit of directly applicable substantive laws on extra-judicial killings and
enforced disappearances, however, the Supreme Court is not powerless to act under its own
constitutional mandate to promulgate “rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights, pleading, practice and procedure in all courts,”

Lest this Court intervention be misunderstood, we clarify once again that we do not rule on any
issue of criminal culpability for the extrajudicial killing or enforced disappearance.  This is an
issue that requires criminal action before our criminal courts based on our existing penal
laws.  Our intervention is in determining whether an enforced disappearance has taken place
and who is responsible or accountable for this disappearance, and to define and impose the
appropriate remedies to address it.  The burden for the public authorities to discharge in these
situations, under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, is twofold.  The first is to ensure that all efforts
at disclosure andinvestigation are undertaken under pain of indirect contempt from this Court
when governmental efforts are less than what the individual situations require.  The second is to
address the disappearance, so that the life of the victim is preserved and his or her liberty and
security restored. 

Article 2 of the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced
Disappearance defined enforced disappearance as follows:
 
For the purposes of this Convention, “enforced disappearance” is
considered to be the arrest, detention, abduction or any other form of deprivation
of liberty by agents of the State or by persons or groups of persons acting with
the authorization, support or acquiescence of the State, followed by a refusal to
acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or by concealment of the fate or
whereabouts of the disappeared person, which place such a person outside the
protection of the law.

The Convention is the first universal human rights instrument to assert that there is a right not to
be subject to enforced disappearance and that this right is non-derogable.

 To date, the Philippines has neither signed nor ratified the Convention, so that the country is
not yet committed to enact any law penalizing enforced disappearance as a crime.  The
absence of a specific penal law, however, is not a stumbling block for action from this Court, as
heretofore mentioned; underlying every enforced disappearance is a violation of the
constitutional rights to life, liberty and security that the Supreme Court is mandated by the
Constitution to protect through its rule-making powers.  

As a matter of human right and fundamental freedom and as a policy matter made in a UN
Declaration, the ban on enforced disappearance cannot but have its effects on the country,
given our own adherence to “generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law
of the land.”
We characterized “generally accepted principles of international law” as norms of general or
customary international law that are binding on all states.  We held further: [G]enerally accepted
principles of international law, by virtue of the incorporation clause of the Constitution, form part
of the laws of the land even if they do not derive from treaty obligations. The classical
formulation in international law sees those customary rules accepted as binding result from the
combination [of] two elements: the established, widespread, and consistent practice on the part
of States; and apsychological element known as the opinion juris sive necessitates (opinion as
to law or necessity). Implicit in the latter element is a belief that the practice in question is
rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it. 

While the Philippines is not yet formally bound by the terms of the Convention on enforced
disappearance (or by the specific terms of the Rome Statute) and has not formally declared
enforced disappearance as a specific crime, the above recital shows that enforced
disappearance as a State practice has been repudiated by the international community, so that
the ban on it is now a generally accepted principle of international law, which we should
consider a part of the law of the land, and which we should act upon to the extent already
allowed under our laws and the international conventions that bind us.
Burgos vs. Esperon

GR No. 178497 February 4, 2014

Facts: These incidents stemmed from our June 22, 2010 Resolution referring the present case
to the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) as the Court’s directly commissioned agency,
tasked with the continuation of the investigation of Jonas Joseph T. Burgos’ abduction with the
obligation to report its factual findings and recommendations to this Court. This referral was
necessary as the investigation by the Philippine National Police–Criminal Investigation and
Detection Group (PNP–CIDG), by the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) Provost Marshal,
and even the initial CHR investigation had been less than complete. In all of them, there were
significant lapses in the handling of the investigation. In particular, we highlighted the PNP–
CIDG’s failure to identify the cartographic sketches of two (one male and one female) of the five
abductors of Jonas, based on their interview with the eyewitnesses to the abduction.

On March 15, 2011, the CHR submitted to the Court its Investigation Report on the Enforced
Disappearance of Jonas Burgos (CHR Report), in compliance with our June 22, 2010
Resolution.

On July 5, 2011, in light of the new evidence and leads the CHR uncovered, we issued a
Resolution: (1) issuing anew a Writ of Habeas Corpus and referring the habeas corpus petition
to the CA; (2)holding in abeyance our ruling on the merits of the Amparo aspect of the case;
referring back the same to the CA in order to allow Lt. Harry A. Baliaga, Jr. and the
presentAmparo respondents to file their Comments on the CHR Report; and ordering Lt.
Baliaga to be impleaded as a party to the Amparo petition; and (3) affirming the dismissal of the
petitioner’s petition for Contempt, without prejudice to the re–filing of the contempt charge as
may be warranted by the results of the subsequent CHR investigation. 

On August 23, 2011, we issued a Resolution requiring the submission of certain documents.

On September 23, 2011, the respondents submitted a Manifestation and Motion in compliance
with the Court’s August 23, 2011 Resolution. Attached to this Manifestation and Motion are the
following documents:

a. The Summary of Information (SOI) of the officers and enlisted personnel of the 56 th IB,
7th ID from January 1, 2004 to June 30, 2007;
b. The Summary of Information (SOI) of the intelligence operatives who were involved in
the ERAP 5 incident; and

c. The Summary of Information (SOI) of 2Lt. Fernando, who was a member of the 56 th IB,
7th ID.

On August 19, 2011, the petitioner filed a Manifestation and a Motion for Clarificatory Order
praying among others that she be allowed to examine the documents submitted to the Court
pursuant to paragraph III (i) of the Court’s July 5, 2011 Resolution.  In our September 6, 2011
Resolution, we deny the petitioner’s request to be allowed to examine the documents submitted
to this Court per paragraph (i) of the fallo of our July 5, 2011 Resolution, without prejudice to our
later determination of the relevance and of the advisability of public disclosure of those
documents/materials
On October 11, 2011, we issued a Resolution requiring the CHR to secure Virgilio Eustaquio’s
affidavit, and to submit a report of its ongoing investigation of Jonas’ abduction

On November 2, 2011, we received a letter dated October 28, 2011 from Commissioner Jose
Manuel S. Mamauag, Team Leader, CHR Special Investigation Team, requesting photocopies
of the following documents:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

i. SOI of the officers and enlisted personnel of the 56 th IB, 7th ID from January 1, 2004 to
June 30, 2007;
ii. SOI of the intelligence operatives who were involved in the ERAP 5 incident; and

iii. SOI of 2Lt. Fernando who was a member of the 56th IB, 7th ID.8

In our November 29, 2011 Resolution, we denied the CHR’s request considering the
confidential nature of the requested documents and because the relevance of these documents
to the present case had not been established. 

On March 20, 2012, the CHR submitted its Progress Report detailing its efforts to secure the
affidavit of witness Eustaquio in relation with his allegation that one of the male abductors of
Jonas, appearing in the cartographic sketch, was among the raiders who abducted him and four
others, identified as Jim Cabauatan, Jose Curament, Ruben Dionisio and Dennis Ibona
(otherwise known as the “ERAP FIVE”). Attached to this Report is Eustaquio’s sworn affidavit
dated March 16, 2012.

On March 18, 2013, the CA issued its decision pursuant to the Court’s July 5, 2011 Resolution
referring the Amparo and Habeas Corpus aspects of the case to the CA for appropriate
hearings and ruling on the merits of the petitions.

The CA held that the issue in the petition for habeas corpus is not the illegal confinement or
detention of Jonas, but his enforced disappearance. Considering that Jonas was a victim of
enforced disappearance, the present case is beyond the ambit of a petition for habeas corpus.

Based on its finding that Jonas was a victim of enforced disappearance, the CA concluded that
the present case falls within the ambit of the Writ of Amparo. The CA found that the totality of
the evidence supports the petitioner’s allegation that the military was involved in the enforced
disappearance of Jonas. The CA took note of Jeffrey Cabintoy’s positive identification of Lt.
Baliaga as one of the abductors who approached him and told him not to interfere because the
man being arrested had been under surveillance for drugs; he also remembered the face of Lt.
Baliaga – the face he identified in the pictures because he resembles his friend Raven. The CA
also held that Lt. Baliaga’s alibi and corroborative evidence cannot prevail over Cabintoy’s
positive identification, considering especially the absence of any indication that he was impelled
by hatred or any improper motive to testify against Lt. Baliaga. Thus, the CA held that Lt.
Baliaga was responsible and the AFP and the PNP were accountable for the enforced
disappearance of Jonas.

The Solicitor General, in behalf of the public respondents, filed a motion for partial
reconsideration of the March 18, 2013 CA decision. 

On May 23, 2013, the CA issued its resolution denying the respondents’ motion for partial
reconsideration. The CA ruled that as far as the PNP was concerned, its failure to elicit leads
and information from Cabintoy who witnessed Jonas’ abduction is eloquent proof of its failure to
exercise extraordinary diligence in the conduct of its investigation. As far as the AFP was
concerned, the CA held that the fact that Lt. Baliaga of the Philippine Army was positively
identified as one of the abductors of Jonas, coupled with the AFP’s lack of serious effort to
conduct further investigation, spoke loudly of the AFP leadership’s accountability.

To date, the respondents have not appealed to this Court, as provided under Section 19 of the
Rule on the Writ of Amparo.

On April 1, 2013, the petitioner filed an Ex Parte Motion Ex Abundanti Cautela asking the Court
to: (1) order the persons named in the sealed documents to be impleaded in CA–G.R. SP No.
00008–WA and G.R. No. 183713; (2) issue a writ of Amparo on the basis of the newly
discovered evidence (the sealed attachment to the motion); and (3) refer the cases to the CA for
further hearing on the newly discovered evidence.

The petitioner alleged that she received from a source (who requested to remain anonymous)
documentary evidence proving that an intelligence unit of the 7th Infantry Division of the
Philippine Army and 56th Infantry Battalion, operating together, captured Jonas on April 28, 2007
at Ever Gotesco Mall, Commonwealth Avenue, Quezon City. This documentary evidence
consists of: (1) After Apprehension Report dated April 30, 2007; (2) Psycho Social Processing
Report dated April 28, 2007; and (3) Autobiography of Jonas. The petitioner also claimed that
these are copies of confidential official reports on file with the Philippine Army.

Issue: Whether or not a writ of amparo should be issued anew in light of newly discovered
evidence

Held: The Supreme Court ruled in the negative.

We note and conclude, based on the developments highlighted above, that the beneficial
purpose of the Writ of Amparo has been served in the present case. As we held in Razon, Jr. v.
Tagitis, the writ merely embodies the Court’s directives to police agencies to undertake
specified courses of action to address the enforced disappearance of an individual. The Writ
of Amparo serves both a preventive and a curative role. It is curative as it facilitates the
subsequent punishment of perpetrators through the investigation and remedial action that it
directs.The focus is on procedural curative remedies rather than on the tracking of a specific
criminal or the resolution of administrative liabilities. The unique nature of Amparo proceedings
has led us to define terms or concepts specific to what the proceedings seek to achieve.
In Razon Jr., v. Tagitis, we defined what the terms “responsibility” and “accountability” signify in
an Amparo case. We said:

Responsibility refers to the extent the actors have been established by substantial evidence to
have participated in whatever way, by action or omission, in an enforced disappearance, as a
measure of the remedies this Court shall craft, among them, the directive to file the appropriate
criminal and civil cases against the responsible parties in the proper courts. Accountability, on
the other hand, refers to the measure of remedies that should be addressed to those who
exhibited involvement in the enforced disappearance without bringing the level of their
complicity to the level of responsibility defined above; or who are imputed with knowledge
relating to the enforced disappearance and who carry the burden of disclosure; or those who
carry, but have failed to discharge, the burden of extraordinary diligence in the investigation of
the enforced disappearance.an

In the present case, while Jonas remains missing, the series of calculated directives issued by
the Court outlined above and the extraordinary diligence the CHR demonstrated in its
investigations resulted in the criminal prosecution of Lt. Baliaga. We take judicial notice of the
fact that the Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 216, has already found probable cause
for arbitrary detention against Lt. Baliaga and has ordered his arrest in connection with Jonas’
disappearance.

We also emphasize that the CA in its March 18, 2013 decision already ruled with finality on the
entities responsible and accountable (as these terms are defined in Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis) for the
enforced disappearance of Jonas. In its March 18, 2013 decision, the CA found, by substantial
evidence, that Lt. Baliaga participated in the abduction on the basis of Cabintoy’s positive
identification that he was one of the abductors of Jonas who told him not to interfere because
the latter had been under surveillance for drugs. In the same Decision, the CA also held the
AFP and the PNP accountable for having failed to discharge the burden of extraordinary
diligence in the investigation of the enforced disappearance of Jonas.

We note that the respondents did not appeal the March 18, 2013 CA decision and the May 23,
2013 CA resolution denying their motion for partial reconsideration.

Based on the above considerations, in particular, the final ruling of the CA that confirmed the
validity of the issuance of the Writ of Amparo and its determination of the entities responsible for
the enforced disappearance of Jonas, we resolve to deny the petitioner’s prayer to issue the writ
ofAmparo anew and to refer the case to the CA based on the newly discovered evidence. We
so conclude as the petitioner’s request for the reissuance of the writ and for the rehearing of the
case by the CA would be redundant and superfluous in light of: (1) the ongoing investigation
being conducted by the DOJ through the NBI; (2) the CHR investigation directed by the Court in
this Resolution; and (3) the continuing investigation directed by the CA in its March 18, 2013
decision.

We emphasize that while the Rule on the Writ of Amparo accords the Court a wide latitude in
crafting remedies to address an enforced disappearance, it cannot (without violating the nature
of the writ ofAmparo as a summary remedy that provides rapid judicial relief) grant remedies
that would complicate and prolong rather than expedite the investigations already ongoing. Note
that the CA has already determined with finality that Jonas was a victim of enforced
disappearance.

To expedite proceedings, we refer the petitioner’s motion, this Resolution and its covered cases
to the DOJ for investigation, for the purpose of filing the appropriate criminal charges in the
proper courts against the proper parties, if warranted, based on the gathered evidence. For this
purpose, we direct the petitioner to furnish the DOJ and the NBI copies of her Urgent Ex Parte
Motion Ex Abundanti Cautela, together with the sealed attachments to the Motion, within five (5)
days from receipt of this Resolution.

As a final note, we emphasize that our ROLE in a writ of Amparo proceeding is merely to

determine whether an enforced disappearance has taken place; to determine who is
responsible or accountable; and to define and impose the appropriate remedies to address the
disappearance.

As shown above, the beneficial purpose of the Writ of Amparo has been served in the present
case with the CA’s final determination of the persons responsible and accountable for the
enforced disappearance of Jonas and the commencement of criminal action against Lt. Baliaga.
At this stage, criminal, investigation and prosecution proceedings are already beyond the reach
of the Writ ofAmparo proceeding now before us.