"The designs of the international global democracy in Rawlsian realistic utopia”

Maria João Cabrita♦

Abstract:
Rawls’ realistic utopia refers two levels of democracy: a democracy of domestic
societies and the international global democracy. In the first, Rawls acknowledges the well-
ordered constitutional democracy as a deliberative democracy - characterized by the
specificities of an idea of public reason, of an institutional framework that determines the
realization of deliberative and legislative bodies, and by the knowledge and desire of citizens
to pursue public reason and fulfill their ideals in their political behavior. In the second,
bumping against the boundaries of reality, he proceeds with the proposal of a democracy that
is based on the expansive trend of the well-ordered society of peoples, into international
cooperation that integrates values and practices different from those of the West and fosters
respect for basic human rights.
The international global democracy embodies, therefore, a vision that assimilates the
plurality of ideas of democracy as a benefit. The global and active promotion of democracy
depends on this recognition. In this sense, the Rawlsian realistic utopia admits that there are
well-ordered societies distinct from constitutional democracies, societies that, just as these do,
belong to the society of peoples and respect its laws; and sees international global democracy
as a correction of the democratic deficit in domestic societies.

Keywords: “realistic utopia”; deliberative democracy”; “international global

democracy”; “democratic peace”; “human rights”.

Introduction:

In the last decade apologies for "global democracy" (developed by Richard

Falk, Daniele Archibugi, David Held and Tony McGrew, among others) have

emerged within political theory and international relations, in parallel with apologies

for "global justice" (developed by Barry, Beitz , Onorra O'Neil, Pogge, Peter Singer

and Shue, among others). The influx of Rawls’s comprehensive theory of justice as

fairness, as developed in A Theory of Justice (1971), is visible in the issue of “global

justice”; and the discussion of global democracy reflects the influence of Rawls’ turn

towards the purely political domain, with Political Liberalism (1993), and of his

reflections on the international society, as synthesized in the realistic utopia of The

Law of Peoples (1999).

♦
Postdoctoral researcher at CEHUM (Postdoctoral scholarship of FCT: SFRH/BPD/44993/2008) - see
https://sites.google.com/site/majcabrita/.

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 While Rawls did not develop a theory of democracy, he contributed to the

democratic thought (see Cohen, 2003): first, through a conception of justice whose

ideas and purposes substantiate the most reasonable philosophical approach to a

constitutional democracy1; then through his reflections on public reason and the ideal

of democratic citizenship (1993), deliberative democracy (1997), democratic peace

and human rights (1999). In particular, he contributed to the understanding of

democracy in a broader sense than that of "mere voting and elections," as an "exercise

of public reason" towards a view that, Amartya Sen has pointed out, allows us to

grasp its roots beyond its traditional institutions2.

In the context of international society, Rawls questioned the feasibility of a

realistic utopia and the conditions which express it, in terms of extending the

boundaries of the political practice that reconciles the individual with the social

world. The idea of realistic utopia is based on two ideas: 1) the great evils of

humanity derived from political injustice; and 2) once this political injustice is

suppressed, by following just (or at least decent) social policies and by establishing

just (or at least decent) basic institutions, such evils will then become extinct (see

Rawls, 1999: 6s). The realistic utopia translates “a world in which these great evils

have been eliminated and just (or at least decent) basic institutions established by both

liberal and decent peoples who honor the Law of Peoples” (Idem: 126). Ultimately, it

1
In the preface to the revised edition of TJ, Rawls writes:”The central ideas and aims of this
conception [justice as fairness] I see as those of a philosophical conception for a constitutional
democracy. My hope is that justice as fairness will seem reasonable and useful, even if not fully
convincing, to a wide range of thoughtful political opinions and thereby express an essential part of the
common core of the democratic tradition”, in Rawls, 1999b: xi. Under political liberalism, he reaffirms
this position to assert: “(…) the aim of justice as fairness as a political conception is to resolve the
impasse in the democratic tradition as to the way in which social institutions are to be arranged if they
are to conform to the freedom and equality of citizens as moral persons”, in Idem, 1993a: 338.
2
“La vision beaucoup plus large de la démocratie en termes de débat public nous permet (…) de
comprendre pourquoi les racines de la démocratie vont bien au-delà des limites étroites de certains
récits et chroniques rapportant des pratiques définies et considérées maintenant comme des institutions
spécifiquement démocratiques», in Sen, 2003: 15.

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demonstrates the possibility of a reasonably fair constitutional democracy within the

context of a well-ordered society of peoples.

In this way, the Rawlsian realistic utopia concerns two levels of democracy: a

democracy of domestic societies and the international global democracy. At the first

level, when he says that “the grounds of constitutional democracy and the basis of its

rights and duties need to be continually discussed in all the many associations of civil

society as part of citizens’ understanding and education prior to taking part in political

life” (Idem: 102), he recognizes constitutional democracy as a deliberative

democracy. At the second level, bumping against the limits of reality, he proposes a

"global democracy" which, unlike the cosmopolitan one, is based on the expansive

trend of the well-ordered society of peoples, on an international cooperation that

integrates values and practices different from those of the West and fosters respect for

basic human rights.

I. Deliberative Democracy

As Rawls makes clear in "The Idea of Public Reason Revisited" (1997),

"deliberative democracy” is characterized by three key elements: an idea of public

reason; an institutional framework that determines the realization of deliberative

legislative bodies; and the knowledge and desire of citizens to follow the public

reason and to realize its ideal in their political conduct (see Rawls 1997: 139). These

ideas have as immediate implications the public financing of elections and the

promotion of public events where key policy issues are seriously discussed.

Deliberative democracy is feasible because citizens have the capacities they need to

participate in political debate, and they are rational and reasonable persons, and they

are informed about the most pressing problems of their society. Moreover, it is

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important that public deliberation should be separated from economic and corporate

interests, if it is to constitute the basic characteristic of democracy.

I now focus on the idea of public reason, which is crucial to the notion that

public debate encourages revision of political opinions. As Rawls points out in

Political Liberalism: “in a democratic society public reason is the reason of equal

citizens who, as a collective body, exercise final political and coercive power over

one another in enacting law and in amending their constitution” (Idem, 1993a: 214)3.

Consequently, its limits coincide with the set of policy issues that encompass essential

constitutional elements and matters of basic justice to governance. This means that

not all political issues are resolved by invoking the values of public reason - when

they occur, for example, in merely personal contexts, or in the context of the family or

associations. In a constitutional system the political field is not emotional as in the

personal and family fields, or voluntary as in the associative sphere. The idea of

public reason applies only to the discussion of political issues in the public forum -

the pronouncements of judges, government officials, candidates for public office and

the campaign directors4. In contrast, when citizens engage in political debate in the

3
The essential constitutional elements are of two types: those that describe the general structure of the
system of government and of the political process; and those that specify the same basic rights and
freedoms of citizens. The first type concern the legislative, executive and judicial powers, and the
scope of application of majority rule; the second type relates to voting rights and participation in
political life, to freedom of conscience, thought and association, or the protections arising from the
principle of the rule of law. This group does not include either the principle of fair equality of
opportunity, or the difference principle, those principles of justice as fairness that cover the economic
and social inequalities. But this does not mean that these principles do not express political values - it
should be kept in mind that they are the basis for the establishment of background institutions of social
and economic justice appropriate to free and equal citizens.
4
«It is imperative to realize that the idea of public reason does not apply to all political discussions of
fundamental questions, but only to discussions of those questions in what I refer to as the public
political forum. This forum may be divided into three parts: the discourse of judges in their decisions,
and especially of the judges of a supreme court; the discourse of government officials, especially chief
executives and legislators; and finally, the discourse of candidates for public office and their campaign
managers, especially in their public oratory, party platforms, and political statements», in Rawls, 1997:
133s.

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public forum - through their electoral vote or their party participation, or by running

for offices - what prevails is the ideal of public reason.

The liberal principle of legitimacy illuminates the reason why citizens should

respect the limits of public reason when debating and voting on key policy issues. The

exercise of political power is legitimate when practiced according to a constitution,

whose essential elements are underwritten by citizens given principles and ideals

accepted as reasonable and rational. And because political power must be legitimate,

the ideal of citizenship imposes as a moral duty that citizens must be able to explain

to each other how the principles and policies they advocate and vote for are based on

the political values of public reason - this is the duty of civility. This duty also

includes the willingness to hear the arguments of others and a spirit of loyalty and

fairness in the deliberation of adjustments to be made in order to accommodate their

perspectives5. In the context of domestic society, citizens comply with the duty of

civility if they do what they can to ensure that those in power are guided by public

reason.

The fusion of the duty of civility with political values produces the ideal of

democratic citizenship - this is, as noted by Rawls, “the ideal of citizens governing

themselves in ways that each thinks the others might reasonably be expected to

accept; and this ideal in turn is supported by the comprehensive doctrines reasonable

persons affirm» (Idem: 218). Political liberalism is based on the following

assumption: the rights and duties and basic values in question are sufficiently

determinant so that the limits of public reason are justified by the global evaluation of

5
«(...) Since the exercise of the political power itself must be legitimate, the ideal of citizenship
imposes a moral, not a legal, duty - the duty of civility – to be able to explain to one another on those
fundamental questions how the principles and policies they advocate and vote for can be supported by
the political values of public reason. This duty also involves a willingness to listen to others and a
fairmindedness in deciding when accommodations to their views should reasonably be made», in Idem,
1993a: 217.

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those reasonable comprehensive doctrines, that adopt the political conception of

justice as fairness.

In brief, the limits of public reason are the limits we honor when we respect

the ideal of democratic citizens. Public reason asks us to believe that the balance of

political values that we hold as reasonable is also reasonable for others, or if this is

not the case, that at least it is not regarded as unreasonable. According to Rawls, this

shared of sense of political values preserves the bonds of civic solidarity and is

consistent with the duty of civility.

In the Society of Peoples public reason plays a role among free and equal

peoples similar to that exercised in a constitutional democracy among free and equal

citizens. In the words of Rawls, it is “the public reason of free and equal liberal

peoples debating their mutual relations as peoples” (Rawls, 1999: 55), whose content

is revealed in the eight principles of the Law of Peoples (see Idem: 37) and not in the

family of liberal principles of justice in a democratic constitutional regime. Moreover,

just as the ideal of public reason leads citizens to question the political practices of

their domestic societies, it also leads them to be indignant in the face of any practice

that violates the public reason of free and equal peoples.

II. International Global Democracy

Having elucidated the concepts of constitutional democracy as deliberative

democracy and of public reason, I shall now focus my analysis on the notion of

"international global democracy”. To this end, I will resort to the authority of one of

its greatest defenders, Kok-Chor Tan. In questioning the possibility of rectifying the

democratic deficit - one of the adverse effects of globalization on democracy, together

with disparities and asymmetries - Tan argues that the solution consists in the

6
reconceptualization of democracy not so much as a national ideal but as a global ideal

(Tan, 2008). In this context, two views emerge: the cosmopolitan and the

international.

In the cosmopolitan conception democracy is regarded primarily as a

transnational ideal applied directly to the individuals of the world, with the world

conceived as a simple social scheme. This view is based on the idea that individuals

are citizens of the world and not just citizens of their country and that they must be

participatory members of the global community. However, because it excludes the

defense of a "world state", it restricts the idea of "world citizen" to the moral realm,

and leads to an excessively metaphorical political language.

In contrast, the international view conceives democracy as a global democracy

among the representatives of democratic nations. Contrary to cosmopolitan

democracy, it requires two steps - first, the democratization of nations; second, the

democratization of existing international institutions - and shows how global

citizenship begins with the education of democratic citizens6. This approach conforms

with the adoption of the Rawlsian international contract, the application of which sets

up a process on two levels - starting with the principles of justice of the basic

structure of domestic society and, only then, progressing to a well-ordered society of

peoples.

In Rawls’s realistic utopia the designs of international global democracy are

based on the ideas of "democratic peace" and "human rights" - although the latter are

6
“We must take education for democratic citizenship at the national level seriously if this is necessary
for greater global democracy, and if the nation is the place where individuals can best act effectively to
promote justice both at home and abroad. With respect to the last point, Gutmann writes: ‘Democratic
citizens have institutional means at their disposal that solidarity individuals, or citizens of the world
only, do not’ (1996: 71). Global democracy, in short, begins with the education of democratic citizens”
in Tan, 2008: 175.

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usually associated with the cosmopolitan vision7. Before examining these two ideas, I

recall two fundamental questions. Firstly, in the Law of Peoples Rawls gives

prominence to the peoples and not to the states - just peoples are prepared to ensure

the same respect and recognize others as equals within the international society. The

concept of "peoples" substantiates a device of representation in the sphere of the

Rawlsian international contract, which gives individuals the status of “members of the

peoples" and not that of "world citizens". Such an understanding reveals Rawls’

distance from the cosmopolitan perspective both on justice and on democracy.

Secondly, although the Law of Peoples is constituted from a liberal conception

of political justice, it is not purely ethnocentric and western. The Law of Peoples does

not involve the application of an ideal model of domestic society - constitutional

democracy - to the international context; but it requires of any decent society that it

should impose duties and moral obligations to all persons who are within its territory,

through a legal system guided by a conception of justice that seeks the common good

and that respects the rules of peace and basic human rights. To distinguish between

two types of well-ordered society, constitutional democracies and the decent

consultation hierarchy, Rawls strengthens the international vision of global

democracy.

I return now to the idea of "democratic peace", or absence of wars between

and among democratic states. Rawls analyzes this idea in the ideal theory of the Law

of Peoples (See Rawls, 1999: 44-54). Initiated by Kant in "Perpetual Peace" (1795)

and currently stimulated by theorists such as Michael Doyle, this perspective

concerning the democratization of the international system maintains that national

stability leads to international stability. Rawls agrees with this assessment and he

7
On the relationship between human rights and global democracy, I refer you to Goodhart, 2008.

8
clarifies the notion of “stability for the right reasons" in contrast to the "stability as

balance of forces” or as a modus vivendi. In a liberal domestic society, "stability for

the right reasons" describes a situation in which, over time, citizens acquire a sense of

justice that leads them to accept the principles of political justice and to act in

conformity to them8.

The society of peoples should incorporate a process similar to that of domestic

society: a process leading liberal and decent peoples to accept the Law of Peoples and

act in conformity to it; and this, over time, creates bonds of trust between them and

compels them to adopt such a law as an ideal of conduct9. In this sense, once the

contents of the Law of Peoples, the principles that define the basic equality among

peoples, have been established, three types of cooperative organizations established:

a commercial organization, in order to ensure fair trade between peoples; a financial

organization, granting loans to people (if necessary), and a confederation of peoples

with a role similar to that of the UN, carrying out a kind of vigilance over the world,

publicly denouncing "the unjust and cruel institutions of oppressive and expansionist

regimes and their violations of human rights» (Rawls, 1993b: 557).

Both the stability of international society and the stability of domestic society,

need a progressive moral learning on the part of individuals - this psychological

process is a crucial aspect of the idea of realistic utopia according to the Law of

Peoples. The peoples, unlike the states, have a moral nature - embodied in their own

pride and sense of honor - and are driven by rational interests, which are guided in

harmony with equality and respect among them, and it is these interests that make the

8
“Stability for the right reasons means stability brought about by citizens acting correctly according to
the appropriate principles of their sense of justice, which they have acquired by growing up under and
participating in just institutions”, in Rawls, 1999: 13, n.2.
9
“The hypothesis of democratic peace plays a central role in explaining why the defense and extension
of the society of liberal and decent peoples should be the fundamental goal of liberal foreign policy” in
Beitz, 2000: 671.

9
democratic peace possible. However, this assumption requires historic confirmation -

as Rawls states, the success of the liberal society of the peoples has to do with

“achievement of political and social justice for all its citizens, securing their basic

freedoms, the fullness and expressiveness of the society’s civic cultures, as well as the

decent economic well-being of all its people” (Idem, 1999: 45).

While “democratic peace" is empirically proven by the absence of war among

established democracies, this is not a given. In the Rawlsian perspective the conduct

of constitutional democratic peoples is consistent with this idea of peace while

ensuring: (a) a certain fair equality of opportunity; (b) a decent distribution of income

and wealth; (c) the society as employer of last resort through general or local

government, or other social and economic policies; (d) basic health care for all

citizens; and (e) public financing of elections and ways of assuring the availability of

public information on matters of policy (see Idem: 50). In such a case, the democratic

peoples would undertake war in self-defense only.

Two ideas converge in the notion of democratic peace: the idea that between

the constant misery of life, on the one hand, and fatalism, on the other hand, there are

political and social institutions that can be changed by people in order to make them

happier and more satisfied10; and Montesquieu’s idea of moeurs douces, the notion

that the virtues promoted in citizens by the commercial society, such as assiduity,

industriousness, punctuality and probity, lead to peace. Both within and between

liberal societies, or constitutional democracies, people live in a state of "peace by

satisfaction", as described by Raymond Aron in Paix et Guerre Entre les Nations

(1962) in opposition to “peace by power” and “peace by impotence” (see Aron, 1962:

10
“(...) political and social institutions could be revised and reformed for the purpose of making
peoples happier and more satisfied”,in Rawls, 1999: 46.

10
231s). This is a situation which is much more durable when it is more general and

conforms to the order of international law. In this sense, under the aegis of the Law of

Peoples, a well-ordered society of peoples needs to develop new institutions and

practices - among these we highlight the respect and promotion of human rights.

Rawls conceives human rights as essential to the legal rights of society, as

rights that establish the boundary of pluralism between peoples, and which specify the

limits of the internal sovereignty of a state, and justify war in case of self-defense. In

this sense, he presents a list of basic human rights that includes: the right to life (to the

means of subsistence and security); to liberty (to freedom from slavery, serfdom, and

forced occupation, and to a sufficient measure of liberty of conscience to ensure

freedom of religion and thought); to property (personal property); and to formal

equality as expressed by the rules of natural justice (Rawls, 1999: 65). The imposition

of obligations arising from these rights presupposes a conception of justice that seeks

the common good and the good faith of legal justification of the law. Applying these

conditions implies the concept of "person" specific to a decent hierarchical society, as

a responsible and cooperative member of the groups to which he/she belongs, and not

the liberal conception of person as a free and equal citizen.

Not politically parochial, human rights are the necessary conditions for any

system of social cooperation. These are universal rights in that “they are intrinsic to

the Law of Peoples and have a political (moral) effect whether or not they are

supported locally” (Idem: 80). This means that they are binding to all people, even

those who still failed to establish just political and social institutions, or at least decent

ones, as is the case of outlaw states. Deriving neither from a conception of human

nature, nor from an intercultural and inter-social contract, the Rawlsian conception of

11
human rights centers on their political function, their special role in the public reason

of the Society of Peoples. It is, as noted by Beitz (2009: 102s), a practical design.

By broadening the base of the society of peoples through the inclusion of

decent people, whose political culture is distinct from that of liberal peoples, Rawls

puts forward a minimal list of human rights, the requirements for which are fixed by

the political principles that govern those societies. But the exclusion of certain

democratic rights (political participation, freedom of expression and freedom of

association) from this list of basic human rights does not mean they do not constitute

an ideal to which all societies should aspire (see Freeman, 2006: 35). However, the

international community, which is responsible for the substantive conditions that

allow the flourishing of well-ordered societies, does not impose this ideal. This does

not rule out the possibility that, in the long term, the society of peoples has as a

hidden aim the intention to increase the scope of its reach, according to the idea that

global democracy requires democratic civility and, first of all, educating individuals

towards democracy.

Following this analysis, I conclude that the Rawlsian conceptions of

"democratic peace" and "human rights" pave the way for a vision of global

democracy both realistic and utopian, which is recognized as international rather than

cosmopolitan. It is a vision that recognizes that plurality of ideas is a great asset and

that presents itself as a corrective to the democratic deficit in domestic societies.

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