1
TANADA v. ANGARA
Facts :
This is a petition seeking to nullify the
Philippine ratification of the World Trade
Organization (WTO) Agreement.
Petitioners question the concurrence of
herein respondents acting in their
capacities as Senators via signing the said
agreement.
The WTO opens access to foreign
markets, especially its major trading
partners, through the reduction of tariffs
on its exports, particularly agricultural and
industrial products. Thus, provides new
opportunities for the service sector cost
and uncertainty associated with exporting
and more investment in the country. These
are the predicted benefits as reflected in
the agreement and as viewed by the
signatory Senators, a “free market”
espoused by WTO.
Petitioners on the other hand viewed the
WTO agreement as one that limits,
restricts and impair Philippine economic
sovereignty and legislative power. That
the Filipino First policy of the
Constitution was taken for granted as it
gives foreign trading intervention.
Issue : Whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
the Senate in giving its concurrence of the
said WTO agreement.
Held:
In its Declaration of Principles and state
policies, the Constitution “adopts the
generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of
the land, and adheres to the policy of
peace, equality, justice, freedom,
cooperation and amity , with all nations.
By the doctrine of incorporation, the
country is bound by generally accepted
principles of international law, which are
considered automatically part of our own
laws. Pacta sunt servanda – international
agreements must be performed in good
faith. A treaty is not a mere moral
obligation but creates a legally binding
obligation on the parties.
Through WTO the sovereignty of the state
cannot in fact and reality be considered as
absolute because it is a regulation of
commercial relations among nations. Such
as when Philippines joined the United
Nations (UN) it consented to restrict its
sovereignty right under the “concept of
sovereignty as autolimitation.” What
Senate did was a valid exercise of
authority. As to determine whether such
exercise is wise, beneficial or viable is
outside the realm of judicial inquiry and
review. The act of signing the said
agreement is not a legislative restriction as
WTO allows withdrawal of membership
should this be the political desire of a
member. Also, it should not be viewed as a
limitation of economic sovereignty. WTO
remains as the only viable structure for
multilateral trading and the veritable forum
for the development of international trade
law. Its alternative is isolation, stagnation
if not economic self-destruction. Thus, the
people be allowed, through their duly
elected officers, make their free choice.
Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
BASCO VS PAGCOR
Municipal Corporation – Local Autonomy
– Imperium in Imperio
I n 1977, the Philippine Amusements and
Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) was
created by Presidential Decree 1067-A. PD
1067-B meanwhile granted PAGCOR the
power “to establish, operate and maintain
gambling casinos on land or water within
the territorial jurisdiction of the
Philippines.”  PAGCOR’s operation was a
success hence in 1978, PD 1399 was
passed which expanded PAGCOR’s
power. In 1983, PAGCOR’s charter was
updated through PD 1869. PAGCOR’s

charter provides that PAGCOR
shall regulate and centralize all games of
chance authorized by existing franchise or
permitted by law. Section 1 of PD 1869
provides:
Section 1.      Declaration of Policy.    It
is hereby declared to be the policy of the
State to centralize and integrate all games
of chance not heretofore authorized by
existing franchises or permitted by law.
Atty. Humberto Basco and several other lawyers
assailed the validity of the law creating
PAGCOR. They claim that PD 1869 is
unconstitutional because a) it violates the equal
protection clause and b) it violates the local
autonomy clause of the constitution.
Basco et al argued that PD 1869 violates the
equal protection clause because it legalizes
PAGCOR-conducted gambling, while most other
forms of gambling are outlawed, together with
prostitution, drug trafficking and other vices.
Anent the issue of local autonomy, Basco et al
contend that P.D. 1869 forced cities like Manila
to waive its right to impose taxes and legal fees
as far as PAGCOR is concerned; that Section 13
par. (2) of P.D. 1869 which exempts PAGCOR,
as the franchise holder from paying any “tax of
any kind or form, income or otherwise, as well
as fees, charges or levies of whatever nature,
whether National or Local” is violative of the
local autonomy principle.
ISSUE:  which are different in fact or opinion to be
1. Whether or not PD 1869 violates the
equal protection clause.
2. Whether or not PD 1869 violates the
local autonomy clause.
HELD:
1. No. Just how PD 1869 in legalizing
gambling conducted by PAGCOR is
violative of the equal protection is not
clearly explained in Basco’s petition. The
mere fact that some gambling activities
like cockfighting (PD 449) horse racing
(RA 306 as amended by RA 983),
sweepstakes, lotteries and races (RA 1169
as amended by BP 42) are legalized under
certain conditions, while others are
prohibited, does not render the applicable
laws, PD. 1869 for one, unconstitutional.
Basco’s posture ignores the well-accepted
meaning of the clause “equal protection of
the laws.” The clause does not preclude
classification of individuals who may be
accorded different treatment under the
law as long as the classification is not
unreasonable or arbitrary. A law does
not have to operate in equal force on all
persons or things to be conformable to
Article III, Sec 1 of the Constitution. The
“equal protection clause” does not prohibit
the Legislature from establishing classes
of individuals or objects upon which
different rules shall operate. The
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Constitution does not require situations
treated in law as though they were the
same.
2. No. Section 5, Article 10 of the 1987
Constitution provides:
Each local government unit shall have the
power to create its own source of revenue
and to levy taxes, fees, and other charges
subject to such guidelines and limitation
as the congress may provide, consistent
with the basic policy on local autonomy.
Such taxes, fees and charges shall accrue
exclusively to the local government.
A close reading of the above provision
does not violate local autonomy
(particularly on taxing powers) as it was
clearly stated that the taxing power of
LGUs are subject to such guidelines and
limitation as Congress may provide.
Further, the City of Manila, being a mere
Municipal corporation has no inherent
right to impose taxes. The Charter of the
City of Manila is subject to control by
Congress. It should be stressed that
“municipal corporations are mere creatures
of Congress” which has the power to
“create and abolish municipal
corporations” due to its “general
legislative powers”. Congress, therefore,
has the power of control over Local

governments. And if Congress can grant
the City of Manila the power to tax certain
matters, it can also provide for exemptions
or even take back the power.
Further still, local governments have no
power to tax instrumentalities of the
National Government. PAGCOR is a
government owned or controlled
corporation with an original charter, PD
1869. All of its shares of stocks are owned
by the National Government. Otherwise,
its operation might be burdened, impeded
or subjected to control by a mere Local
government.
This doctrine emanates from the
“supremacy” of the National Government
over local governments.
Tolentino vs. COMELEC (Jan. 21,
2004)
Petitioners assailed the manner by which
the simultaneous regular and special
elections of 2001 were conducted by the
COMELEC. Petitioners contend that, if
held simultaneously, a special and a
regular election must be distinguished in
the documentation as well as in the
canvassing of their results. Thirteen
senators were proclaimed from the said
election with the 13th placer to serve that
of the remaining term of Sen. Guingona,
who vacated a seat in the senate.
Petitioners sought for the nullification of
the special election and, consequently, the
declaration of the 13th elected senator.
Dissenting Opinion of Justice Puno
The case at bar transcends the political
fortunes of respondent Senator Gregorio
B. Honasan. At issue is the right of the
people to elect their representatives on the
basis and only on the basis of an informed
judgment. The issue strikes at the heart of
democracy and representative government
for without this right, the sovereignty of
the people is a mere chimera and the rule
of the majority will be no more than
mobocracy.
Democracy and Republicanism
The shortest distance between two points
is a straight line. In this case of first
impression, however, the distance between
existing jurisprudence and the resolution
of the issue presented to the Court cannot
be negotiated through a straight and direct
line of reasoning. Rather, it is necessary to
journey through a meandering path and
unearth the root principles of democracy,
republicanism, elections, suffrage, and
freedom of information and discourse in
an open society. As a first step in this
indispensable journey, we should traverse
the democratic and republican landscape
to appreciate the importance of informed
judgment in elections.
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In the ancient days, democracy was
dismissed by thoughtful thinkers. Plato
deprecated democracy as rule by the
masses. He warned that if all the people
were allowed to rule, those of low
quality would dominate the state by
mere numerical superiority. He feared
that the more numerous masses would
govern with meanness and bring about a
tyranny of the majority.
In the Middle Ages, using the scythe of
science and reason, the thinkers of the time
entertained an exaggerated notion of
individualism. They bannered the idea that
all people were equal; no one had a greater
right to rule than another. Dynastical
monarchy was taboo. As all were
essentially equal, no one enjoyed the
moral right to govern another without
the consent of the governed. The people
therefore were the source of legitimate
legal and political authority. This theory
of popular sovereignty revived an
interest in democracy in the seventeenth
century. The refinements of the grant of
power by the people to the government led
to the social contract theory: that is, the
social contract is the act of people
exercising their sovereignty and creating a
government to which they consent. Locke
believed that the people should be
governed by a parliament elected by
citizens who owned property. Although he
argued that the people were sovereign, he

submitted that they should not rule
directly. Jefferson believed that the people,
including the ordinary folk, were the only
competent guardians of their own liberties,
and should thus control their government.
An outstanding feature of the 1987
Constitution is the expansion of the
democratic space giving the people greater
power to exercise their sovereignty. Thus,
under the 1987 Constitution, the people
can directly exercise their sovereign
authority through the following modes,
namely: (1) elections; (2) plebiscite; (3)
initiative; (4) recall; and (5) referendum.
Through elections, the people choose the
representatives to whom they will entrust
the exercise of powers of government. In a
plebiscite, the people ratify any
amendment to or revision of the
Constitution and may introduce
amendments to the constitution. Indeed,
the Constitution mandates Congress to
provide for a system of initiative and
referendum, and the exceptions therefrom,
whereby the people can directly propose
and enact laws or approve or reject any
law or part thereof passed by the Congress
or local legislative body. . . It also directs
Congress to enact a local government code
which shall provide for effective
mechanisms of recall, initiative, and
referendum. Pursuant to this mandate,
Congress enacted the Local Government
Code of 1991 which defines local initiative
as the legal process whereby the registered
directly propose, enact, or amend any
ordinance through an election called for
the purpose. Recall is a method of
removing a local official from office
before the expiration of his term because
of loss of confidence.[21] In a referendum,
the people can approve or reject a law or
an issue of national importance.[22]
Section 126 of the Local Government
Code of 1991 defines a local referendum
as the legal process whereby the registered
voters of the local government units may
approve, amend or reject any ordinance
enacted by the sanggunian.
Kuroda v. Jalandoni, G.R. No. L-2662, March
26, 1949
I. THE FACTS
Petitioner Shigenori Kuroda, the Commanding
General of the Japanese Imperial Forces in the
Philippines during the Japanese occupation, was
charged before the Philippine Military
Commission of war crimes. He questioned the
constitutionality of E.O. No. 68 that created the
National War Crimes Office and prescribed rules
on the trial of accused war criminals. He
contended the Philippines is not a signatory to
the Hague Convention on Rules and Regulations
covering Land Warfare and therefore he is
charged of crimes not based on law, national and
international.
II. THE ISSUES
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Was E.O. No. 68 valid and
constitutional?
III. THE RULING
[The Court DENIED the petition and
upheld the validity and constitutionality of E.O.
No. 68.]
YES, E.O. No. 68 valid and
constitutional.
Article 2 of our Constitution provides in
its section 3, that –
The Philippines renounces war as an
instrument of national policy and adopts
the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of
the nation.
In accordance with the generally accepted
principle of international law of the present day
including the Hague Convention the Geneva
Convention and significant precedents of
international jurisprudence established by the
United Nation all those person military or
civilian who have been guilty of planning
preparing or waging a war of aggression and of
the commission of crimes and offenses
consequential and incidental thereto in violation
of the laws and customs of war, of humanity and
civilization are held accountable therefor.
Consequently in the promulgation and
enforcement of Execution Order No. 68 the
President of the Philippines has acted in
conformity with the generally accepted and
policies of international law which are part of the
our Constitution.

Petitioner argues that respondent Military
Commission has no jurisdiction to try petitioner
for acts committed in violation of the Hague
Convention and the Geneva Convention because
the Philippines is not a signatory to the first and
signed the second only in 1947. It cannot be
denied that the rules and regulation of the Hague
and Geneva conventions form, part of and are
wholly based on the generally accepted
principals of international law. In facts these
rules and principles were accepted by the two
belligerent nations the United State and Japan
who were signatories to the two Convention.
Such rule and principles therefore form part of
the law of our nation even if the Philippines was
not a signatory to the conventions embodying
them for our Constitution has been deliberately
general and extensive in its scope and is not
confined to the recognition of rule and principle
of international law as contained in treaties to
which our government may have been or shall be
a signatory.
Philip Morris vs. Court of Appeals (July
16, 1993)
Facts
Petitioners Philip Morris, Inc., Benson and
Hedges (Canada), Inc., and Fabriques of
TabacReunies, S.A., are ascribing
whimsical exercise of the faculty
conferred upon magistrates by Section 6,
Rule 58 of the Revised Rules of Court
when respondent Court of Appeals lifted
the writ of preliminary injunction it earlier
had issued against Fortune Tobacco
Corporation, herein private respondent,
from manufacturing and selling "MARK"
cigarettes in the local market. Banking on
the thesis that petitioners' respective
symbols "MARK VII", 'MARK TEN", and
"MARK", also for cigarettes, must be
protected against unauthorized
appropriation, Philip Morris, Incorporated
is a corporation organized under the laws
of the State of Virginia, United States of
America, and does business at 100 Park
Avenue, New York, New York, United
States of America. The two other plaintiff
foreign corporations, which are wholly-
ownedsubsidiaries of Philip Morris, Inc.,
are similarly not doing business in the
Philippines but are suing on an isolated
transaction. As registered owners "MARK
VII", "MARK TEN", and "LARK" per
certificates of registration issued by the
Philippine Patent Office on April 26, 1973,
May 28, 1964, and March 25, 1964,
plaintiffs-petitioners asserted that
defendant Fortune Tobacco
Corporation has no right to
manufacture and sell cigarettes bearing
the allegedly identical or confusingly
similar trademark "MARK" in
contravention of Section 22 of the
Trademark Law, and should, therefore,
be precluded during the pendency of the
case from performing the acts
complained of via a preliminary
injunction.
Respondent alleges that it has been
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authorized by the BIR to manufacture and
sell cigarettes bearing the trademark
“MARK,” and that “MARK” is a common
word which cannot be exclusively
appropriated. Petitioners’ prayer for PI was
denied by the RTC because the
circumstances of the case in itself has
created a dispute between the parties
which to the mind of the court does not
warrant the issuance of a WPI, hence the
status quo existing between the parties
prior to the filing is maintained. P filed for
MR but was denied. Second motion for
issuance of the injunctive writ was
likewise denied.
P filed a petition for certiorari before the
Court but was referred to the CA.
CA initially granted the issuance of WPI,
and R’s MR was denied. R then filed a
motion to dissolve the disputed WPI with
offer to post a counterbond, which was
favorably acted upon by the CA. The
counterbond is to answer for whatever
perjuicio petitioners may suffer as a result.
R points out in its motion that lots of
workers employed will be laid off as a
consequence of the injunction and that the
government will stand to lose the amount
of specific taxes being paid by R. P filed
their own motion for re-examination
geared towards imposition of WPI but to
no avail.
Issue

Whether or not Petitioner may afford
protection from the Convention of Paris of
1965.
Held
NO. Petitioners may have the capacity to
sue for infringement irrespective of lack of
business activity in the Philippines on
account of Section 21-A of the Trademark
Law but the question whether they have an
exclusive right over their symbol as to
justify issuance of the controversial writ
will depend on actual use of their
trademarks in the Philippines in line with
Sections 2 and 2-A of the same law. It is
thus incongruous for petitioners to claim
that when a foreign corporation not
licensed to do business in Philippines files
a complaint for infringement, the entity
need not be actually using its trademark in
commerce in the Philippines. Such a
foreign corporation may have the
personality to file a suit for infringement
but it may not necessarily be entitled to
protection due to absence of actual use of
the emblem in the local market.
A point which petitioners considered to be
of significant interest, and which they
desire to impress upon us is the protection
they enjoy under the Paris Convention
of 1965 to which the Philippines is a
signatory. Yet, insofar as this discourse
is concerned, there is no necessity to
treat the matter with an extensive
response because adherence of the
Philippines to the 1965 international
covenant due to pact sunt servanda had
been acknowledged in La Chemise
(supra at page 390).
Given these confluence of existing laws
amidst the cases involving trademarks,
there can be no disagreement to the
guiding principle in commercial law
that foreign corporations not engaged in
business in the Philippines may
maintain a cause of action for
infringement primarily because of
Section 21-A of the Trademark Law
when the legal standing to sue is alleged,
which petitioners have done in the case
at Hand. Following universal
acquiescence and comity, our municipal
law on trademarks regarding the
requirement of actual use in the
Philippines must subordinate an
international agreement in as much as
the apparent clash is being decided by a
municipal tribunal (Mortensen vs. Peters,
Great Britain, High Court of Judiciary of
Scotland, 1906, 8 Sessions 93; Paras,
International Lawand World Organization,
1971 Ed.,p. 20). Withal, the fact that
international law has been made part of
the law of the land does not by any
means imply the primacy of
international law over national law in
the municipal sphere. Under the
doctrine of incorporation as applied in
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most countries, rules of international
law are given a standing equal, not
superior, to national legislative
enactments (Salonga and Yap, Public
International Law, Fourth ed.,1974, p. 16).
Sec. of Justice vs. Lantion (Jan 18, 2000)
FACTS
On January 13, 1977, President Ferdinand
E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No.
1069 “Prescribing the Procedure for the
Extradition of Persons Who Have
Committed Crimes in a Foreign Country.
The Decree is founded on: the Doctrine of
Incorporation under the Constitution; the
mutual concern for the suppression of
crime both in the state where it was
committed and the state where the criminal
may have escaped. Secretary of Justice
Franklin Drilon, representing the
Government of the Republic of the
Philippines, signed in Manila the
“extradition Treaty Between the
Government of the Philippines and the
Government of the U.S.A. The Philippine
Senate ratified the said Treaty.
On June 18, 1999, the Department of
Justice received from the Department of
Foreign Affairs U.S Note Verbale No.
0522 containing a request for the
extradition of private respondent Mark
Jiminez to the United States.
On the same day petitioner designated and
authorized a panel of attorneys to take

charge of and to handle the case. Pending
evaluation of the aforestated extradition
documents, Mark Jiminez through counsel,
wrote a letter to Justice Secretary
requesting copies of the official extradition
request from the U.S Government and that
he be given ample time to comment on the
request after he shall have received copies
of the requested papers but the petitioner
denied the request for the consistency of
Article 7 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty
stated in Article 7 that the Philippine
Government must present the interests of
the United States in any proceedings
arising out of a request for extradition.
ISSUE: Whether or not Jimenez is
deprived of due process.
HELD
Yes. The human rights of person, whether
citizen or alien, and the rights of the
accused guaranteed in our Constitution
should take precedence over treaty rights
claimed by a contracting state. The duties
of the government to the individual
deserve preferential consideration when
they collide with its treaty obligations to
the government of another state. This is so
although we recognize treaties as a source
of binding obligations under generally
accepted principles of international law
incorporated in our Constitution as part of
the law of the land.
The doctrine of incorporation is applied
whenever municipal tribunals are
confronted with situation in which there
appears to be a conflict between a rule
of international law and the provision of
the constitution or statute of the local
state.
Petitioner (Secretary of Justice) is ordered
to furnish Mark Jimenez copies of the
extradition request and its supporting
papers, and to grant him (Mark Jimenez) a
reasonable period within which to file his
comment with supporting evidence.
“Under the Doctrine of Incorporation,
rules of international law form part of the
law of the land and no further legislative
action is needed to make such rules
applicable in the domestic sphere.
“The doctrine of incorporation is applied
whenever municipal tribunals are
confronted with situations in which there
appears to be a conflict between a rule of
international law and the provisions of the
constitution or statute of the local state.
“Efforts should first be exerted to
harmonize them, so as to give effect to
both since it is to be presumed that
municipal law was enacted with proper
regard for the generally accepted
principles of international law in
observance of the incorporation
clause in the above cited constitutional
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provision.
“In a situation, however, where the
conflict is irreconcilable and a choice
has to be made between a rule of
international law and a municipal law,
jurisprudence dictates that municipal
law should be upheld by the municipal
courts, for the reason that such courts
are organs of municipal law and are
accordingly bound by it in all
circumstances.
“The fact that international law has been
made part of the law of the land does not
pertain to or imply the primacy of
international law over national or
municipal law in the municipal sphere.
The doctrine of incorporation, as
applied in most countries, decrees that
rules of international law are given
equal standing with, but are not
superior to, national legislative
enactments. Accordingly, the principle
lex posterior derogate priori takes effect
– a treaty may repeal a statute and a
statute may repeal a treaty. In states
where the Constitution is the highest
law of the land, such as the Republic of
the Philippines, both statutes and
treaties may be invalidated if they are in
conflict with the constitution.
USA v. Hon. Purganan (Sept. 24, 2002)

FACTS
Petition is a sequel to the case “Sec. of
Justice v. Hon. Lantion”. The Secretary
was ordered to furnish Mr. Jimenez copies
of the extradition request and its
supporting papers and to grant the latter a
reasonable period within which to file a
comment and supporting evidence. But, on
motion for reconsideration by the Sec. of
Justice, it reversed its decision but held
that the Mr. Jimenez was bereft of the right
to notice and hearing during the evaluation
stage of the extradition process. On May
18, 2001, the Government of the USA,
represented by the Philippine Department
of Justice, filed with the RTC, the Petition
for Extradition praying for the issuance of
an order for his “immediate arrest”
pursuant to Sec. 6 of PD 1069 in order to
prevent the flight of Jimenez. Before the
RTC could act on the petition, Mr. Jimenez
filed before it an “Urgent
Manifestation/Ex-Parte Motion” praying
for his application for an arrest warrant be
set for hearing. After the hearing, as
required by the court, Mr. Jimenez
submitted his Memorandum.
Therein seeking an alternative prayer that
in case a warrant should issue, he be
allowed to post bail in the amount of
P100,000. The court ordered the issuance
of a warrant for his arrest and fixing bail
for his temporary liberty at P1M in cash.
After he had surrendered his passport and
posted the required cash bond, Jimenez
was granted provisional liberty.
Government of the USA filed a petition for
Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court to set aside the order for the
issuance of a warrant for his arrest and
fixing bail for his temporary liberty at
P1M in cash which the court deems best to
take cognizance as there is still no local
jurisprudence to guide lower court.
ISSUES
I. Whether or not Hon. Purganan acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in adopting a
procedure of first hearing a potential
extraditee before issuing an arrest warrant
under Section 6 of PD No. 1069
II. Whether or not Hon. Purganan acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in granting
the prayer for bail
III. Whether or not there is a violation of
due process
HELD
I. YES. By using the phrase “if it appears,”
the law further conveys that accuracy is
not as important as speed at such early
8
stage. From the knowledge and the
material then available to it, the court is
expected merely to get a good first
impression or a prima facie finding
sufficient to make a speedy initial
determination as regards the arrest and
detention of the accused. The prima facie
existence of probable cause for hearing the
petition and, a priori, for issuing an arrest
warrant was already evident from the
Petition itself and its supporting
documents. Hence, after having already
determined therefrom that a prima facie
finding did exist, respondent judge gravely
abused his discretion when he set the
matter for hearing upon motion of
Jimenez. The silence of the Law and the
Treaty leans to the more reasonable
interpretation that there is no intention to
punctuate with a hearing every little step in
the entire proceedings. It also bears
emphasizing at this point that extradition
proceedings are summary in nature.
Sending to persons sought to be extradited
a notice of the request for their arrest and
setting it for hearing at some future date
would give them ample opportunity to
prepare and execute an escape which
neither the Treaty nor the Law could have
intended. Even Section 2 of Article III of
our Constitution, which is invoked by
Jimenez, does not require a notice or a
hearing before the issuance of a warrant of
arrest. To determine probable cause for the
issuance of arrest warrants, the

Constitution itself requires only the
examination under oath or affirmation of
complainants and the witnesses they may
Produce.
The Proper Procedure to “Best Serve The
Ends Of Justice” In Extradition Cases
Upon receipt of a petition for extradition
and its supporting documents, the judge
must study them and make, as soon as
possible, a prima facie finding whether a)
they are sufficient in form and substance
b) they show compliance with the
Extradition Treaty and Law c) the person
sought is extraditable. At his discretion,
the judge may require the submission of
further documentation or may personally
examine the affiants and witnesses of the
petitioner. If, in spite of this study and
examination, no prima facie finding is
possible, the petition may be dismissed at
the discretion of the judge. On the other
hand, if the presence of a prima facie case
is determined, then the magistrate must
immediately issue a warrant for the arrest
of the extraditee, who is at the same time
summoned to answer the petition and to
appear at scheduled summary hearings.
Prior to the issuance of the warrant, the
judge must not inform or notify the
potential extraditee of the pendency of the
petition, lest the latter be given the
opportunity to escape and frustrate the
proceedings.
II. Yes. The constitutional provision on
bail on Article III, Section 13 of the
Constitution, as well as Section 4 of Rule
114 of the Rules of Court, applies only
when a person has been arrested and
detained for violation of Philippine
criminal laws. It does not apply to
extradition proceedings, because
extradition courts do not render judgments
of conviction or acquittal. Moreover, the
constitutional right to bail “flows from the
presumption of innocence in favor of
every accused who should not be subjected
to the loss of freedom as thereafter he
would be entitled to acquittal, unless his
guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt.
In extradition, the presumption of
innocence is not at issue. The provision in
the Constitution stating that the “right to
bail shall not be impaired even when the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
suspended” finds application “only to
persons judicially charged for rebellion or
offenses inherent in or directly connected
with invasion.”
That the offenses for which Jimenez is
sought to be extradited are bailable in the
United States is not an argument to grant
him one in the present case. Extradition
proceedings are separate and distinct from
the trial for the offenses for which he is
charged. He should apply for bail before
the courts trying the criminal cases against
him, not before the extradition court.
9
Exceptions to the “No Bail” Rule
Bail is not a matter of right in extradition
cases. It is subject to judicial discretion in
the context of the peculiar facts of each
case. Bail may be applied for and granted
as an exception, only upon a clear and
convincing showing 1) that, once granted
bail, the applicant will not be a flight risk
or a danger to the community; and 2) that
there exist special, humanitarian and
compelling circumstances including, as
matter of reciprocity, those cited by the
highest court in the requesting state when
it grants provisional liberty in extradition
cases therein. Since this exception has no
express or specific statutory basis, and
since it is derived essentially from general
principles of justice and fairness, the
applicant bears the burden of proving the
above two-tiered requirement with clarity,
precision and emphatic Forcefulness.
It must be noted that even before private
respondent ran for and won a
congressional seat in Manila, it was
already of public knowledge that the
United States was requesting his
extradition. Therefore, his constituents
were or should have been prepared for the
consequences of the extradition case.
Thus, the court ruled against his claim that
his election to public office is by itself a
compelling reason to grant him bail.

Giving premium to delay by considering it
as a special circumstance for the grant of
bail would be tantamount to giving him
the power to grant bail to himself. It would
also encourage him to stretch out and
unreasonably delay the extradition
proceedings even more. Extradition
proceedings should be conducted with all
deliberate speed to determine compliance
with the Extradition Treaty and Law; and,
while safeguarding basic individual rights,
to avoid the legalistic contortions, delays
and technicalities that may negate that
purpose.
That he has not yet fled from the
Philippines cannot be taken to mean that
he will stand his ground and still be within
reach of our government if and when it
matters; that is, upon the resolution of the
Petition for Extradition. fundamental
fairness. The doctrine of right to due
process and fundamental fairness does not
always call for a prior opportunity to be
heard. A subsequent opportunity to be
heard is enough. He will be given full
opportunity to be heard subsequently,
when the extradition court hears the
Petition for Extradition. Indeed, available
during the hearings on the petition and the
answer is the full chance to be heard and
to enjoy fundamental fairness that is
compatible with the summary nature of
extradition.
It is also worth noting that before the US
government requested the extradition of
respondent, proceedings had already been
conducted in that country. He already had
that opportunity in the requesting state;
yet, instead of taking it, he ran away.
Other Doctrines:
Five Postulates of Extradition
1) Extradition Is a Major Instrument for
the Suppression of Crime In this era of
globalization, easier and faster
international travel, and an expanding ring
of international crimes and criminals, we
cannot afford to be an isolationist state. We
need to cooperate with other states in order
to improve our chances of suppressing
crime in our own country.
By entering into an extradition treaty, the
Philippines is deemed to have reposed its
trust in the reliability or soundness of the
legal and judicial system of its treaty
partner, as well as in the ability and the
willingness of the latter to grant basic
rights to the accused in the pending
criminal case therein. 3) The Proceedings
Are Sui Generis An extradition proceeding
is sui generis: a) It is not a criminal
proceeding which will call into operation
all the rights of an accused as guaranteed
by the Bill of Rights. It does not involve
the determination of the guilt or innocence
of an accused. His guilt or innocence will
be adjudged in the court of the state where
he will be extradited. b) An extradition
10
proceeding is summary in nature while
criminal proceedings involve a full-blown
trial. c) In terms of the quantum of
evidence to be satisfied, a criminal case
requires proof “beyond reasonable doubt”
for conviction while a fugitive may be
ordered extradited “upon showing of the
existence of a prima facie case” d) Unlike
in a criminal case where judgment
becomes executory upon being rendered
final, in an extradition proceeding, our
courts may adjudge an individual
extraditable but the President has the final
discretion to extradite him.
Extradition is merely a measure of
international judicial assistance through
which a person charged with or convicted
of a crime is restored to a jurisdiction with
the best claim to try that person. The
ultimate purpose of extradition
proceedings in court is only to determine
whether the extradition request complies
with the Extradition Treaty, and whether
the person sought is extraditable. 4)
Compliance Shall Be in Good Faith. We
are bound by pacta sunt servanda to
comply in good faith with our obligations
under the Treaty. Accordingly, the
Philippines must be ready and in a position
to deliver the accused, should it be found
proper. 5) There Is an Underlying Risk of
Flight Indeed, extradition hearings would
not even begin, if only the accused were
willing to submit to trial in the requesting

country. Prior acts of herein respondent: a)
leaving the requesting state right before
the conclusion of his indictment
proceedings there; and b) remaining in the
requested state despite learning that the
requesting state is seeking his return and
that the crimes he is charged with are
bailable.
Extradition is Essentially Executive
Extradition is essentially an executive, not
a judicial, responsibility arising out of the
presidential power to conduct foreign
relations and to implement treaties. Thus,
the Executive Department of government
has broad discretion in its duty and power
of implementation.
Ichong vs Hernandez
Constitutional Law – Treaties May Be
Superseded by Municipal Laws in the Exercise
of Police Power
Lao Ichong is a Chinese businessman who
entered the country to take advantage of business
opportunities herein abound (then) – particularly
in the retail business. For some time he and his
fellow Chinese businessmen enjoyed
“monopoly” in the local market in Pasay. Until
in June 1954 when Congress passed the RA 1180
or the Retail Trade Nationalization Act the
purpose of which is to reserve to Filipinos the
right to engage in the retail business. Ichong then
petitioned for the nullification of the said Act on
the ground that it contravened several treaties
concluded by the RP which, according to him,
violates the equal protection clause (pacta sund
servanda). He said that as a Chinese
businessman engaged in the business here in the
country who helps in the income generation of
the country he should be given
opportunity.
ISSUE: Whether or not a law may invalidate or
supersede treaties or generally
principles.
HELD: Yes, a law may supersede a treaty or a
generally accepted principle. In this case, there is
no conflict at all between the raised generally
accepted principle and with RA 1180. The equal
protection of the law clause “does not demand
absolute equality amongst residents; it merely
requires that all persons shall be treated alike,
under like circumstances and conditions both as
to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced”;
and, that the equal protection clause “is not
a infringed by legislation which applies only to
those persons falling within a specified class, if it
applies alike to all persons within such class, and
reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction
11
between those who fall within such class and
those who do not.”
For the sake of argument, even if it would be
assumed that a treaty would be in conflict with a
statute then the statute must be upheld because it
represented an exercise of the police power
which, being inherent could not be bargained
away or surrendered through the medium of a
equal
treaty. Hence, Ichong can no longer assert his
right to operate his market stalls in the Pasay city
market.
accepted
Gonzales vs Hechanova
9 SCRA 230 – Political Law – Constitutional
Law – Treaty vs Executive Agreements – Statutes
Can Repeal Executive Agreements
During the term of President Diosdado
Macapagal, he entered into two executive
agreements with Vietnam and Burma for the
importation of rice without complying with the
requisite of securing a certification from the
National Economic Council showing that there is
a shortage in cereals or rice. Hence, the then
Executive Secretary, Rufino Hechanova,
authorized the importation of 67,000 tons of rice
from abroad to the detriment of our local
planters. Ramon Gonzales, then president of the
Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Association
assailed the executive agreements. Gonzales
averred that Hechanova is without jurisdiction or
in excess of jurisdiction”, because Republic Act
3452 prohibits the importation of rice and corn

by “the Rice and Corn Administration or any
other government agency.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 3452 prevails over
the 2 executive agreements entered into by
Macapagal.
HELD: Yes. Under the Constitution, the main
function of the Executive is to enforce laws
enacted by Congress. The former may not
interfere in the performance of the legislative
powers of the latter, except in the exercise of his
veto power. He may not defeat legislative
enactments that have acquired the status of laws,
by indirectly repealing the same through an
executive agreement providing for the
performance of the very act prohibited by said
laws. In the event of conflict between a treaty
and a statute, the one which is latest in point of
time shall prevail, is not applicable to the case at
bar, Hechanova not only admits, but, also, insists
that the contracts adverted to are not treaties. No
such justification can be given as regards
executive agreements not authorized by previous
legislation, without completely upsetting the
principle of separation of powers and the system
of checks and balances which are fundamental in
our constitutional set up.
As regards the question whether an executive or
an international agreement may be invalidated
by our courts, suffice it to say that the
Constitution of the Philippines has clearly settled
it in the affirmative, by providing that the SC
may not be deprived “of its jurisdiction to
review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on
appeal, certiorari, or writ of error, as the law or
the rules of court may provide, final judgments
and decrees of inferior courts in “All cases in
which the constitutionality or validity of any
treaty, law, ordinance, or executive order or
regulation is in question”. In other words, our
Constitution authorizes the nullification of a
treaty, not only when it conflicts with the
fundamental law, but, also, when it runs counter
to an act of Congress.
Ebralinag, et al vs. Div. Supt. of Schools of
Cebu G.R. No. 95770, March 1, 1993
Facts:
In 1989, DECS Regional Office in Cebu
received complaints about teachers and pupils
belonging to the Jehovah’s Witness, and enrolled
in various public and private schools, which
refused to sing the Phil. National Anthem, salute
the flag and recite the patriotic pledge.
Division Superintendent of schools, Susana B.
Cabahug of the Cebu Division of DECS and her
Assistant issued Division Memorandum No. 108,
dated Nov. 17, 1989, directing District
Supervisors, High School Principals and Heads
of Private Educational institutions to remove
from service, after due process, teachers and
school employees, and to deprive the students
and pupils from the benefit of public education,
if they do not participate in daily flag ceremony
and doesn’t obey flag salute rule.
Members of the Jehovah’s Witness sect find such
memorandum to be contrary to their religious
belief and choose not to obey. Despite a number
of appropriate persuasions made by the Cebu
officials to let them obey the directives, still they
opted to follow their conviction to their belief.
As a result, an order was issued by the district
supervisor of Daan Bantayan District of Cebu,
12
dated July 24, 1990, ordering the ‘dropping from
the list’ in the school register of all Jehovah’s
Witness teachers and pupils from Grade 1 to
Grade 6 who opted to follow their belief which is
against the Flag Salute Law, however, given a
chance to be re-accepted if they change their
mind.
Some Jehovah’s Witness members appealed to
the Secretary of Education but the latter did not
answer to their letter.
On Oct. 31, 1990, students and their parents filed
special civil actions for Mandamus, Certiorari
and prohibition, alleging that the respondents
acted without or in excess of their jurisdiction
and with grave abuse of discretion in ordering
their expulsion without prior notice and hearing,
hence, in violation of their right to due process,
their right to free public education and their right
to freedom of speech, religion and worship.
Petitioners prayed for the voiding of the order of
expulsion or ‘dropping from the rolls’ issued by
the District Supervisor; prohibiting and enjoining
respondent from barring them from classes; and
compelling the respondent and all persons acting
for him to admit and order their(Petitioners) re-
admission I their respective schools.
On November 27, 1990, Court issued a TRO and
writ of preliminary mandatory injunction,
commanding the respondents to immediately re-
admit the petitioners to their respective classes
until further orders.
On May 31, the Solicitor General filed a
consolidated comment to the petitions defending
the expulsion orders issued by the respondents.
Petitioners stressed that while they do not take

part in the compulsory flag ceremony, they do
not engage in ‘external acts’ or behavior that
would offend their countrymen who believe in
expressing their love of country through
observance of the flag ceremony. They quietly
stand at attention during the flag ceremony to
show their respect for the right of those who
choose to participate in the solemn proceedings.
Since they do not engage in disruptive behavior,
there is no warrant for their expulsion.
Issue:
Whether or not the expulsion of the members of
Jehovah’s Witness from the schools violates
right receive free education.
Held:
The expulsion of the members of Jehovah’s
Witness from the schools where they are enrolled
will violate their right as Philippine citizens,
under the 1987 Constitution, to receive free
education, for it is the duty of the state to
‘protect and promote the right of all citizens to
quality education, and to make such education
accessible to all (Sec. I, Art XIV). Nevertheless,
their right not to participate in the Flag
Ceremony does not give them a right to disrupt
such patriotic exercises. If they quietly stand at
attention during flag ceremony while their
classmates and teachers salute the flag, sing the
national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge,
we do not see how such conduct may possibly
disturb the peace, or pose ‘a grave and present
danger of a serious evil to public safety, public
morals, public health or any legitimate public
interest that the state has a right and duty to
prevent.
It is appropriate to recall the Japanese occupation
of our country in 1942-1944 when every
Filipino, regardless of religious persuasion, in
fear of the invader, saluted the Japanese flag and
bowed before every Japanese soldier, perhaps if
petitioners had lived through that dark period of
our history, they would not quibble now about
saluting the Phil. Flag.
The petitions for certiorari and prohibition are
granted and expulsion orders are hereby annulled
and set aside.
Aglipay v. Ruiz, GR No. L-45459,
March 13, 1937
Facts:
Petitioner Aglipay, the head of Phil.
Independent Church, filed a writ of
prohibition against respondent Ruiz, the
Director of Post, enjoining the latter from
issuing and selling postage stamps
commemorative of the 33rd Intl
Eucharistic Congress organized by the
Roman Catholic. The petitioner invokes
that such issuance and selling, as
authorized by Act 4052 by the Phil.
Legislature, contemplates religious
purpose – for the benefit of a particular
sect or church. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the issuing and selling of
commemorative stamps is constitutional?
13
Held/Reason:
The Court said YES, the issuing and
selling of commemorative stamps by the
respondent does not contemplate any favor
upon a particular sect or church, but the
purpose was only ‘to advertise the
Philippines and attract more tourist’ and
the government just took advantage of an
event considered of international
importance, thus, not violating the
Constitution on its provision on the
separation of the Church and State.
Moreover, the Court stressed that
‘Religious freedom, as a constitutional
mandate is not inhibition of profound
reverence for religion and is not denial of
its influence in human affairs’.
Emphasizing that, ‘when the Filipino
people ‘implored the aid of Divine
Providence’, they thereby manifested
reliance upon Him who guides the
destinies of men and nations. The
elevating influence of religion in human
society is recognized here as elsewhere. In
fact, certain general concessions are
indiscriminately accorded to religious
sects and denominations.’
Imbong vs Ochoa
Substantial: Right to Life; Health;
Religion; Free Speech; Privacy; Due
Process Clause; Equal Protection Clause
 14

Procedural: Actual Case; Facial Challenge; The RH Law is “void-for-vagueness” in Whether the Court can exercise its power
Locus Standi; Declaratory Relief; One violation of the due process clause of the of judicial review over the controversy.
Subject One Title Rule Constitution. Actual Case or Controversy
The RH Law intrudes into the zone of Facial Challenge
privacy of one’s family protected by the Locus Standi
Facts: Constitution Declaratory Relief
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise One Subject/One Title Rule
known as the Responsible Parenthood and PROCEDURAL: Whether the Court may
Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH exercise its power of judicial review over Discussions:
Law), was enacted by Congress on the controversy.
December 21, 2012. Power of Judicial Review PROCEDURAL
Actual Case or Controversy
Challengers from various sectors of Facial Challenge Judicial Review Jurisprudence is replete
society are questioning the Locus Standi with the rule that the power of judicial
constitutionality of the said Act. The Declaratory Relief review is limited by four exacting
petitioners are assailing the One Subject/One Title Rule requisites: (a) there must be an actual case
constitutionality of RH Law on the or controversy; (b) the petitioners must
following grounds: Issue/s: possess locus standi; (c) the question of
SUBSTANTIAL ISSUES: constitutionality must be raised at the
SUBSTANTIAL ISSUES: Whether or not (WON) RA earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of
The RH Law violates the right to life of 10354/Reproductive Health (RH) Law is constitutionality must be the lis mota of
the unborn. unconstitutional for violating the: the case.
The RH Law violates the right to health Right to life
and the right to protection against Right to health Actual Controversy: An actual case or
hazardous products. Freedom of religion and right to free controversy means an existing case or
The RH Law violates the right to religious speech controversy that is appropriate or ripe for
freedom. Right to privacy (marital privacy and determination, not conjectural or
The RH Law violates the constitutional autonomy) anticipatory, lest the decision of the court
provision on involuntary servitude. Freedom of expression and academic would amount to an advisory opinion. It
The RH Law violates the right to equal freedom must concern a real, tangible and not
protection of the law. Due process clause merely a theoretical question or issue.
The RH Law violates the right to free Equal protection clause There ought to be an actual and substantial
speech. Prohibition against involuntary servitude controversy admitting of specific relief
through a decree conclusive in nature, as
PROCEDURAL: distinguished from an opinion advising

what the law would be upon a hypothetical
state of facts. Corollary to the requirement
of an actual case or controversy is the
requirement of ripeness. A question is ripe
for adjudication when the act being
challenged has had a direct adverse effect
on the individual challenging it. For a case
to be considered ripe for adjudication, it is
a prerequisite that something has then been
accomplished or performed by either
branch before a court may come into the
picture, and the petitioner must allege the
existence of an immediate or threatened
injury to himself as a result of the
challenged action. He must show that he
has sustained or is immediately in danger
of sustaining some direct injury as a result
of the act complained of
Facial Challenge: A facial challenge, also
known as a First Amendment Challenge, is
one that is launched to assail the validity
of statutes concerning not only protected
speech, but also all other rights in the First
Amendment. These include religious
freedom, freedom of the press, and the
right of the people to peaceably assemble,
and to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances. After all, the
fundamental right to religious freedom,
freedom of the press and peaceful
assembly are but component rights of the
right to one’s freedom of expression, as
they are modes which one’s thoughts are
externalized.
Locus Standi: Locus standi or legal
standing is defined as a personal and
substantial interest in a case such that the
party has sustained or will sustain direct
injury as a result of the challenged
governmental act. It requires a personal
stake in the outcome of the controversy as
to assure the concrete adverseness which
sharpens the presentation of issues upon
which the court so largely depends for
illumination of difficult constitutional
questions.
Transcendental Importance: the Court
leans on the doctrine that “the rule on
standing is a matter of procedure, hence,
can be relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs
like ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and
legislators when the public interest so
requires, such as when the matter is of
transcendental importance, of
overreaching significance to society, or of
paramount public interest.”
One Subject-One Title: The “one title-one
subject” rule does not require the Congress
to employ in the title of the enactment
language of such precision as to mirror,
fully index or catalogue all the contents
and the minute details therein. The rule is
sufficiently complied with if the title is
comprehensive enough as to include the
general object which the statute seeks to
effect, and where, as here, the persons
15
interested are informed of the nature,
scope and consequences of the proposed
law and its operation. Moreover, this Court
has invariably adopted a liberal rather than
technical construction of the rule “so as
not to cripple or impede legislation.” The
one subject/one title rule expresses the
principle that the title of a law must not be
“so uncertain that the average person
reading it would not be informed of the
purpose of the enactment or put on inquiry
as to its contents, or which is misleading,
either in referring to or indicating one
subject where another or different one is
really embraced in the act, or in omitting
any expression or indication of the real
subject or scope of the act.”
Declaration of Unconstitutionality:
Orthodox view: An unconstitutional act is
not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes
no duties; it affords no protection; it
creates no office; it is, in legal
contemplation, as inoperative as though it
had never been passed. Modern view:
Under this view, the court in passing upon
the question of constitutionality does not
annul or repeal the statute if it finds it in
conflict with the Constitution. It simply
refuses to recognize it and determines the
rights of the parties just as if such statute
had no existence. But certain legal effects
of the statute prior to its declaration of
unconstitutionality may be recognized.
Requisites for partial unconstitutionality:

(1) The Legislature must be willing to
retain the valid portion(s), usually shown
by the presence of a separability clause in
the law; and (2) The valid portion can
stand independently as law.
Ruling/s:
SUBSTANTIAL
Majority of the Members of the Court
believe that the question of when life
begins is a scientific and medical issue that
should not be decided, at this stage,
without proper hearing and evidence.
However, they agreed that individual
Members could express their own views
on this matter.
Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution
states: “The State recognizes the sanctity
of family life and shall protect and
strengthen the family as a basic
autonomous social institution. It shall
equally protect the life of the mother and
the life of the unborn from conception.”
In its plain and ordinary meaning (a canon
in statutory construction), the traditional
meaning of “conception” according to
reputable dictionaries cited by the ponente
is that life begins at fertilization. Medical
sources also support the view that
conception begins at fertilization.
The framers of the Constitution also
intended for (a) “conception” to refer to
the moment of “fertilization” and (b) the
protection of the unborn child upon
fertilization. In addition, they did not
intend to ban all contraceptives for being
unconstitutional; only those that kill or
destroy the fertilized ovum would be
prohibited. Contraceptives that actually
prevent the union of the male sperm and
female ovum, and those that similarly take
action before fertilization should be
deemed non-abortive, and thus
constitutionally permissible.
The intent of the framers of the
Constitution for protecting the life of the
unborn child was to prevent the
Legislature from passing a measure
prevent abortion. The Court cannot
interpret this otherwise. The RH Law is in
line with this intent and actually prohibits
abortion. By using the word “or” in
defining abortifacient (Section 4(a)), the
RH Law prohibits not only drugs or
devices that prevent implantation but also
those that induce abortion and induce the
destruction of a fetus inside the mother’s
womb. The RH Law recognizes that the
fertilized ovum already has life and that
the State has a bounded duty to protect it.
However, the authors of the IRR gravely
abused their office when they redefined
the meaning of abortifacient by using the
term “primarily”. Recognizing as
abortifacients only those that “primarily
induce abortion or the destruction of a
16
fetus inside the mother’s womb or the
prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach
and be implanted in the mother’s womb”
(Sec. 3.01(a) of the IRR) would pave the
way for the approval of contraceptives that
may harm or destroy the life of the unborn
from conception/fertilization. This violates
Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.
For the same reason, the definition of
contraceptives under the IRR (Sec 3.01(j)),
which also uses the term “primarily”, must
be struck down.
The RH Law does not intend to do away
with RA 4729 (1966). With RA 4729 in
place, the Court believes adequate
safeguards exist to ensure that only safe
contraceptives are made available to the
public. In fulfilling its mandate under Sec.
10 of the RH Law, the DOH must keep in
mind the provisions of RA 4729: the
contraceptives it will procure shall be from
a duly licensed drug store or
pharmaceutical company and that the
actual distribution of these contraceptive
drugs and devices will be done following a
prescription of a qualified medical
practitioner.
Meanwhile, the requirement of Section 9
of the RH Law is to be considered
“mandatory” only after these devices and
materials have been tested, evaluated and
approved by the FDA. Congress cannot

determine that contraceptives are “safe,
legal, non-abortificient and effective”.
The Court cannot determine whether or
not the use of contraceptives or
participation in support of modern RH
measures (a) is moral from a religious
standpoint; or, (b) right or wrong
according to one’s dogma or belief.
However, the Court has the authority to
determine whether or not the RH Law
contravenes the Constitutional guarantee
of religious freedom.
The State may pursue its legitimate secular
objectives without being dictated upon the
policies of any one religion. To allow
religious sects to dictate policy or restrict
other groups would violate Article III,
Section 5 of the Constitution or the
Establishment Clause. This would cause
the State to adhere to a particular religion,
and thus, establishes a state religion. Thus,
the State can enhance its population
control program through the RH Law even
if the promotion of contraceptive use is
contrary to the religious beliefs of e.g. the
petitioners.
Section 23A (2)(i) of the RH Law, which
permits RH procedures even with only the
consent of the spouse undergoing the
provision (disregarding spousal content),
intrudes into martial privacy and
autonomy and goes against the
constitutional safeguards for the family as
the basic social institution. Particularly,
Section 3, Article XV of the Constitution
mandates the State to defend: (a) the right
of spouses to found a family in accordance
with their religious convictions and the
demands of responsible parenthood and
(b) the right of families or family
associations to participate in the planning
and implementation of policies and
programs that affect them. The RH Law
cannot infringe upon this mutual decision-
making, and endanger the institutions of
marriage and the family.
The exclusion of parental consent in cases
where a minor undergoing a procedure is
already a parent or has had a miscarriage
(Section 7 of the RH Law) is also anti-
family and violates Article II, Section 12
of the Constitution, which states: “The
natural and primary right and duty of
parents in the rearing of the youth for civic
efficiency and the development of moral
character shall receive the support of the
Government.” In addition, the portion of
Section 23(a)(ii) which reads “in the case
of minors, the written consent of parents or
legal guardian or, in their absence, persons
exercising parental authority or next-of-kin
shall be required only in elective surgical
procedures” is invalid as it denies the right
of parental authority in cases where what
is involved is “non-surgical procedures.”
17
However, a minor may receive information
(as opposed to procedures) about family
planning services. Parents are not deprived
of parental guidance and control over their
minor child in this situation and may assist
her in deciding whether to accept or reject
the information received. In addition, an
exception may be made in life-threatening
procedures.
The Court declined to rule on the
constitutionality of Section 14 of the RH
Law, which mandates the State to provide
Age-and Development-Appropriate
Reproductive Health Education. Although
educators might raise their objection to
their participation in the RH education
program, the Court reserves its judgment
should an actual case be filed before it.
Any attack on its constitutionality is
premature because the Department of
Education has not yet formulated a
curriculum on age-appropriate
reproductive health education.
Section 12, Article II of the Constitution
places more importance on the role of
parents in the development of their
children with the use of the term
“primary”. The right of parents in
upbringing their youth is superior to that
of the State.
The provisions of Section 14 of the RH
Law and corresponding provisions of the

IRR supplement (rather than supplant) the
right and duties of the parents in the moral
development of their children.
By incorporating parent-teacher-
community associations, school officials,
and other interest groups in developing the
mandatory RH program, it could very well
be said that the program will be in line
with the religious beliefs of the petitioners.
The RH Law does not violate the due
process clause of the Constitution as the
definitions of several terms as observed by
the petitioners are not vague.
The definition of “private health care
service provider” must be seen in relation
to Section 4(n) of the RH Law which
defines a “public health service provider”.
The “private health care institution” cited
under Section 7 should be seen as
synonymous to “private health care service
provider.
The terms “service” and “methods” are
also broad enough to include providing of
information and rendering of medical
procedures. Thus, hospitals operated by
religious groups are exempted from
rendering RH service and modern family
planning methods (as provided for by
Section 7 of the RH Law) as well as from
giving RH information and procedures.
The RH Law also defines “incorrect
information”. Used together in relation to
Section 23 (a)(1), the terms “incorrect”
and “knowingly” connote a sense of
malice and ill motive to mislead or
misrepresent the public as to the nature
and effect of programs and services on
reproductive health.
To provide that the poor are to be given
priority in the government’s RH program
is not a violation of the equal protection
clause. In fact, it is pursuant to Section 11,
Article XIII of the Constitution, which
states that the State shall prioritize the
needs of the underprivileged, sick elderly,
disabled, women, and children and that it
shall endeavor to provide medical care to
paupers.
The RH Law does not only seek to target
the poor to reduce their number, since
Section 7 of the RH Law prioritizes poor
and marginalized couples who are
suffering from fertility issues and desire to
have children. In addition, the RH Law
does not prescribe the number of children
a couple may have and does not impose
conditions upon couples who intend to
have children. The RH Law only seeks to
provide priority to the poor.
The exclusion of private educational
institutions from the mandatory RH
education program under Section 14 is
valid. There is a need to recognize the
18
academic freedom of private educational
institutions especially with respect to
religious instruction and to consider their
sensitivity towards the teaching of
reproductive health education
The requirement under Sec. 17 of the RH
Law for private and non-government
health care service providers to render 48
hours of pro bonoRH services does not
amount to involuntary servitude, for two
reasons. First, the practice of medicine is
undeniably imbued with public interest
that it is both the power and a duty of the
State to control and regulate it in order to
protect and promote the public welfare.
Second, Section 17 only encourages
private and non-government RH service
providers to render pro bono Besides the
PhilHealth accreditation, no penalty is
imposed should they do otherwise.
However, conscientious objectors are
exempt from Sec. 17 as long as their
religious beliefs do not allow them to
render RH service, pro bono or otherwise
PROCEDURAL
In this case, the Court is of the view that
an actual case or controversy exists and
that the same is ripe for judicial
determination. Considering that the RH
Law and its implementing rules have
already taken effect and that budgetary
measures to carry out the law have already

been passed, it is evident that the subject
petitions present a justiciable controversy.
As stated earlier, when an action of the
legislative branch is seriously alleged to
have infringed the Constitution, it not only
becomes a right, but also a duty of the
Judiciary to settle the dispute.
Moreover, the petitioners have shown that
the case is so because medical
practitioners or medical providers are in
danger of being criminally prosecuted
under the RH Law for vague violations
thereof, particularly public health officers
who are threatened to be dismissed from
the service with forfeiture of retirement
and other benefits. They must, at least, be
heard on the matter now.
In this jurisdiction, the application of
doctrines originating from the U.S. has
been generally maintained, albeit with
some modifications. While the Court has
withheld the application of facial
challenges to strictly penal statues, it has
expanded its scope to cover statutes not
only regulating free speech, but also those
involving religious freedom, and other
fundamental rights. The underlying reason
for this modification is simple. For unlike
its counterpart in the U.S., this Court,
under its expanded jurisdiction, is
mandated by the Fundamental Law not
only to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, but also to
determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the
Government. Verily, the framers of Our
Constitution envisioned a proactive
Judiciary, ever vigilant with its duty to
maintain the supremacy of the
Constitution.
Consequently, considering that the
foregoing petitions have seriously alleged
that the constitutional human rights to life,
speech and religion and other fundamental
rights mentioned above have been violated
by the assailed legislation, the Court has
authority to take cognizance of these
kindred petitions and to determine if the
RH Law can indeed pass constitutional
scrutiny. To dismiss these petitions on the
simple expedient that there exist no actual
case or controversy, would diminish this
Court as a reactive branch of government,
acting only when the Fundamental Law
has been transgressed, to the detriment of
the Filipino people.
Even if the constitutionality of the RH
Law may not be assailed through an “as-
applied challenge, still, the Court has time
and again acted liberally on the locus
standi requirement. It has accorded certain
individuals standing to sue, not otherwise
directly injured or with material interest
19
affected by a Government act, provided a
constitutional issue of transcendental
importance is invoked. The rule on locus
standi is, after all, a procedural technicality
which the Court has, on more than one
occasion, waived or relaxed, thus allowing
non-traditional plaintiffs, such as
concerned citizens, taxpayers, voters or
legislators, to sue in the public interest,
albeit they may not have been directly
injured by the operation of a law or any
other government act.
The present action cannot be properly
treated as a petition for prohibition, the
transcendental importance of the issues
involved in this case warrants that the
Court set aside the technical defects and
take primary jurisdiction over the petition
at bar. One cannot deny that the issues
raised herein have potentially pervasive
influence on the social and moral well
being of this nation, specially the youth;
hence, their proper and just determination
is an imperative need. This is in
accordance with the well-entrenched
principle that rules of procedure are not
inflexible tools designed to hinder or
delay, but to facilitate and promote the
administration of justice. Their strict and
rigid application, which would result in
technicalities that tend to frustrate, rather
than promote substantial justice, must
always be eschewed.

Most of the petitions are praying for
injunctive reliefs and so the Court would
just consider them as petitions for
prohibition under Rule 65, over which it
has original jurisdiction. Where the case
has far-reaching implications and prays for
injunctive reliefs, the Court may consider
them as petitions for prohibition under
Rule 65.
The RH Law does not violate the one
subject/one bill rule. In this case, a textual
analysis of the various provisions of the
law shows that both “reproductive health”
and “responsible parenthood” are
interrelated and germane to the overriding
objective to control the population growth.
As expressed in the first paragraph of
Section 2 of the RH Law:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. – The State
recognizes and guarantees the human
rights of all persons including their right to
equality and nondiscrimination of these
rights, the right to sustainable human
development, the right to health which
includes reproductive health, the right to
education and information, and the right to
choose and make decisions for themselves
in accordance with their religious
convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs, and
the demands of responsible parenthood.
Considering the close intimacy between
“reproductive health” and “responsible
parenthood” which bears to the attainment
of the goal of achieving “sustainable
human development” as stated under its
terms, the Court finds no reason to believe
that Congress intentionally sought to
deceive the public as to the contents of the
assailed legislation.
Accordingly, the Court declares R.A. No.
10354 as NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL
except with respect to the following
provisions which are declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL:
1) Section 7 and the corresponding
provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they:
a) require private health facilities and non-
maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals
owned and operated by a religious group
to refer patients, not in an emergency or
life-threatening case, as defined under
Republic Act No. 8344, to another health
facility which is conveniently accessible;
and b) allow minor-parents or minors who
have suffered a miscarriage access to
modem methods of family planning
without written consent from their parents
or guardian/s;
2) Section 23(a)(l) and the corresponding
provision in the RH-IRR, particularly
Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar as they
punish any healthcare service provider
who fails and or refuses to disseminate
information regarding programs and
services on reproductive health regardless
of his or her religious beliefs.
20
3) Section 23(a)(2)(i) and the
corresponding provision in the RH-IRR
insofar as they allow a married individual,
not in an emergency or life-threatening
case, as defined under Republic Act No.
8344, to undergo reproductive health
procedures without the consent of the
spouse;
4) Section 23(a)(2)(ii) and the
corresponding provision in the RH-IRR
insofar as they limit the requirement of
parental consent only to elective surgical
procedures.
5) Section 23(a)(3) and the corresponding
provision in the RH-IRR, particularly
Section 5.24 thereof, insofar as they
punish any healthcare service provider
who fails and/or refuses to refer a patient
not in an emergency or life-threatening
case, as defined under Republic Act No.
8344, to another health care service
provider within the same facility or one
which is conveniently accessible
regardless of his or her religious beliefs;
6) Section 23(b) and the corresponding
provision in the RH-IRR, particularly
Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar as they
punish any public officer who refuses to
support reproductive health programs or
shall do any act that hinders the full
implementation of a reproductive health
program, regardless of his or her religious
beliefs;
7) Section 17 and the corresponding
prov1s10n in the RH-IRR regarding the

rendering of pro bona reproductive health
service in so far as they affect the
conscientious objector in securing
PhilHealth accreditation; and
8) Section 3.0l(a) and Section 3.01 G) of
the RH-IRR, which added the qualifier
“primarily” in defining abortifacients and
contraceptives, as they are ultra vires and,
therefore, null and void for contravening
Section 4(a) of the RH Law and violating
Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.
Calalang vs. Williams (Dec. 2, 1940)
Facts
In pursuance of Commonwealth Act 548
which mandates the Director of Public
Works, with the approval of the Secretary
of Public Works and Communications,
shall promulgate the necessary rules and
regulations to regulate and control the use
of and traffic on such roads and streets to
promote safe transit upon, and avoid
obstructions on, roads and streets
designated as national roads, the Director
of Public Works adopted the resolution of
the National Traffic Commission,
prohibiting the passing of animal drawn
vehicles in certainstreets in Manila.
The National Traffic Commission
recommended the Director of Public
Works and to the Secretary of Public
Works and Communication that animal-
drawn vehicles be prohibited from passing
along Rosario St. extending from Plaza
Calderon de la Barca to Dasmarinas St.
from 7:30 am to 12 pm and 1:30 pm to
5:30 pm and also along Rizal Avenue from
7 am to 11 pm from a period of one year
from the date of the opening of Colgante
Bridge to traffic. It was subsequently
passed and thereafter enforce by Manila
Mayor and the acting chief of police.
Maximo Calalang then, as a citizen and a
taxpayer challenges its constitutionality.
Petitioner questioned this as it constitutes
an undue delegation of legislative power.
Issues Whether or not the rules and
regulations promulgated by the Director of
Public Works infringe upon the
constitutional precept regarding the
promotion of social justice
Held
No. The promotion of social justice is to
be achieved not through a mistaken
sympathy towards any given group. It is
the promotion of the welfare of all
people. It is neither communism,
despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy
but the humanization of laws and the
equalization of social and economic
forces by the state so that justice in its
rational and objectively secular
conception may at least be
approximated.
Social justice means the promotion of
the welfare of all the people, the
21
adoption by the Government of
measures calculated to insure economic
stability of all then competent elements
of society, through the maintenance of a
proper economic and social equilibrium
in the interrelations of the members of
the community, constitutionally,
through the adoption of measures
legally justifiable, or extra-
constitutionally, through the exercise of
powers underlying the existence of all
governments on the time-honored
principles of salus populi estsuprema
lex. Social justice must be founded on
the recognition of the necessity of
interdependence among divers and
diverse units of a society and of the
protection that should be equally and
evenly extended to all groups as a
combined force in our social and
economic life, consistent with the
fundamental and paramount objective
of the state of promoting health, comfort
and quiet of all persons, and of bringing
about “the greatest good to the greatest
number.”
Oposa vs. Factoran (July 30, 1993)
Facts The plaintiffs in this case are all
minors duly represented and joined by
their parents. The first complaint was filed
as a taxpayer's class suit at the Branch 66
(Makati, Metro Manila), of the Regional
Trial Court, National capital Judicial
Region against defendant (respondent)

Secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Reasources
(DENR). Plaintiffs alleged that they are
entitled to the full benefit, use and
enjoyment of the natural resource treasure
that is the country's virgin tropical forests.
They further asseverate that they represent
their generation as well as generations yet
unborn and asserted that continued
deforestation have caused a distortion and
disturbance of the ecological balance and
have resulted in a host of environmental
tragedies.
Plaintiffs prayed that judgement be
rendered ordering the respondent, his
agents, representatives and other persons
acting in his behalf to cancel all existing
Timber License Agreement (TLA) in the
country and to cease and desist from
receiving, accepting, processing, renewing
or approving new TLAs. Defendant, on the
other hand, filed a motion to dismiss on
the ground that the complaint had no cause
of action against him and that it raises a
political question.
The RTC Judge sustained the motion to
dismiss, further ruling that granting of the
relief prayed for would result in the
impairment of contracts which is
prohibited by the Constitution.
Plaintiffs (petitioners) thus filed the instant
special civil action for certiorari and asked
the court to rescind and set aside the
dismissal order on the ground that the
respondent RTC Judge gravely abused his
discretion in dismissing the action.
Issue
Whether or not the plaintiffs have a cause
of action.
Held
Yes. Respondents aver that the petitioners
failed to allege in their complaint a
specific legal right violated by the
respondent Secretary for which any relief
is provided by law. The Court did not
agree with this. The complaint focuses on
one fundamental legal right -- the right
to a balanced and healthful ecology
which is incorporated in Section 16
Article II of the Constitution. The said
right carries with it the duty to
refrain from impairing the environment
and implies, among many other things,
the judicious management and
conservation of the country's forests.
Section 4 of E.O.
192 expressly mandates the DENR to be
the primary government agency
responsible for the governing and
supervising the exploration, utilization,
development and conservation of the
country's natural resources. The policy
declaration of E.O. 192 is also
substantially re-stated in Title XIV Book
22
IV of the Administrative Code of 1987.
Both E.O. 192 and Administrative Code of
1987 have set the objectives which will
serve as the bases for policy formation,
and have defined the powers and functions
of the DENR. Thus, right of the petitioners
(and all those they represent) to a balanced
and
healthful ecology is as clear as DENR's
duty to protect and advance the said right.
While the right to a balanced and
healthful ecology is to be found under
the Declaration of Principles and State
Policies and not under the Bill of Rights,
it does not follow that it is less
important than any of the civil and
political rights enumerated in the latter.
Such a right belongs to a different
category of rights altogether for it
concerns nothing less than self-
preservation and self-perpetuation
— aptly and fittingly stressed by the
petitioners the advancement of which
may even be said to predate all
governments and constitutions. As a
matter of fact, these basic rights need
not even be written in the Constitution
for they are assumed to exist from the
inception of humankind. If they are now
explicitly mentioned in the fundamental
charter, it is because of the well-founded
fear of its framers that unless the rights
to a balanced and healthful ecology and
to health are mandated as state policies
by the Constitution itself, thereby

highlighting their continuing
importance and imposing upon the state
a solemn obligation to preserve the first
and protect and advance the second, the
day would not be too far when all else
would be lost not only for the present
generation, but also for those to come
generations which stand to inherit
nothing but parched earth incapable of
sustaining life.
A denial or violation of that right by the
other who has the correlative duty or
obligation to respect or protect or respect
the same gives rise to a cause of action.
Petitioners maintain that the granting of
the TLA, which they claim was done with
grave abuse of discretion, violated their
right to a balance and healthful ecology.
Hence, the full protection thereof requires
that no further TLAs should be renewed or
granted.
After careful examination of the
petitioners' complaint, the Court finds it to
be adequate enough to show, prima facie,
the claimed violation of their rights.
The court stated that the petitioners were
able to file a class suit for others of their
generation and for succeeding generations
as “the minors' assertion of their right to a
sound environment constitutes, at the same
time, the performance of their obligation
to ensure the protection of that right for the
generations to come.”
Valmonte vs. Belmonte (Feb 13, 1989)
Facts
Petitioner Valmonte wrote a letter to the
respondent Feliciano Belmonte, then GSIS
General Manager, requesting to be
furnished with the list of names of the
defunct interim and regular Batasang
Pambansa including the ten (10)
opposition members who were able to
secure a clean loan of P 2 million each on
guaranty of Mrs. Imelda Marcos. And if
such is not possible, an access to those
said documents. Apart from Valmonte’s
letter, he is stressing the premise of the
request on the present provision of the
Freedom constitution at that time which is
Art. IV, Sec. 6, that emphasizes the right of
the people to information on matters of
public concern. Mr. Belmonte, aware that
such request contains serious legal
implications seek the help of Mr.
Meynardo A. Tiro, a deputy General
Counsel. In Mr. Tiro’s reply letter, a
confidential relationship exists between
the GSIS and all those who borrow from
it, whoever they may be; that the GSIS has
a duty to its customers to preserve this
confidentiality; and that it would not be
proper for the GSIS to breach this
confidentiality unless so ordered by the
courts.
On June 26, 1986, apparently not having
yet received the reply of the GSIS Deputy
23
General Counsel, Petitioner Valmonte
wrote another letter saying that for failure
to receive a reply, they are now
considering themselves free to do
whatever action necessary within the
premises to pursue their desired objective
in pursuance of public interest.
Separate comments were filed by
respondent Belmonte and the Solicitor
General. After petitioners filed a
consolidated reply, the petition was given
due course and the parties were required to
file their memoranda. The parties having
complied, the case was deemed submitted
for decision. In his comment, respondent
raise procedural objection to the issuance
of a writ of mandamus, among which is
that petitioners have failed to exhaust
administrative remedies. Respondent
claims that actions of the GSIS General
Manager are reviewable by the Board of
Trustees of the GSIS petitioners. However,
did not seek relief from the GSIS Board of
Trustees, It is therefore asserted that since
administrative remedies were not
exhausted, then petitioners have no
causeof action.
Issue
Whether or not that Mr. Valmonte,
together with his co-petitioners, are
entitled to the documents sought, by virtue
of their constitutional right to information.

Held
Yes. The cornerstone of this republican
system of government is delegation of
power by the people to the state.
Governmental agencies and institutions
operate within the limits of the authority
conferred by the people. Yet, like all
constitutional guarantees, the right to
information is not absolute. People’s
right to information is limited to
“matters of public concern” and is
further “subject to such limitations as
may be provided by law.” The GSIS is a
trustee of contributions from the
government and its employees and the
administrator of various insurance
programs for the benefit of the latter.
Undeniably, its funds assume a public
character. More particularly, Secs. 5(b) and
46 of P.D 1146, as amended (the Revised
Government Service Insurance act of 1977
provide for annual appropriations to pay
for contributions, premiums , interest and
other amounts payable to GSIS by the
government, as employer, as well as the
obligations which the Republic of the
Philippines assumes or guarantees to pay.
Considering the nature of its funds, the
GSIS is expected to manage its resources
with utmost prudence and in strict
compliance with the pertinent rules and
regulations. It is therefore the legitimate
concern of the public to ensure that these
funds are managed properly with end in
view of maximizing the benefits that
accrue to the insured
government employees. Moreover, the
supposed borrowers were members of the
defunct Batasang Pambansa who
themselves appropriated funds for the
GSIS and were therefore expected to be
the first to see to it that the GSIS
performed its tasks with the greatest
degree of fidelity and that its transactions
were above board. Respondent maintains
that a confidential relationship exists
between the GSIS and its borrowers. It is
argued that a policy of confidentiality
restricts the indiscriminate dissemination
of information. He further contends that in
view of the right to privacy, which is
equally protected by the Constitution and
by existing laws, the documents,
evidencing loan transactions of the GSIS
must be deemed outside the ambit of the
right to information. There can be no
doubt that the right to privacy is
constitutionally protected.
In the landmark case of Morfe vs. Mutuc,
speaking through then Mr. Justice
Fernando stated that ultimate and
pervasive control of the individual, in all
aspects of his life, is the hallmark of the
absolute state. In contrast, a system of
limited government safeguards a private
sector, which belongs to the individual,
firmly distinguishing it from the public
sector, which the state can control.
24
Apparent from the above-quoted statement
of the court in Morfe is that the right to
privacy belongs to the individual in his
private capacity, and not to public and
the government agencies like the GSIS.
Moreover, the right cannot be invoked by
juridical entities like the GSIS. A
corporation has no right of privacy in
its name since the
entire basis of the right to privacy is an
injury to the feelings and sensibilities of
the party and a corporation would have
no such ground for relief. Neither can the
GSIS through its General manager, the
respondent, invoke the right to privacy of
its borrowers. The right is purely personal
in nature, and hence, may be invoked only
by the person whose privacy is claimed to
be violated.
Respondent next asserts that the
documents evidencing the loan
transactions are private in nature and
hence, are not covered by the
Constitutional right to information on
matters of public concern which
guarantees “access to official records, and
to documents, and papers pertaining to
official acts, transactions or decisions”
only. Further, they argued that GSIS, is a
governmental corporation performing
proprietary functions, are outside the
coverage of the people’s right to access to
official records. This Dichotomy
characterizing government function has
 25

long been repudiated in ACCFA v.

Confederation of Unions and Government
Corporations and Offices, the Court said
that the government, WHETHER
carrying out its sovereign attributes or
running some business, discharges the
SAME FUNCTION of service to the
people. Consequently, that the GSIS , in
granting the loans, was exercising
proprietary function would NOT justify
the exclusion of transactions from the
coverage and scope of right to
information. In sum, the public nature
of the loanable funds of the GSIS and
the public office held by the alleged
borrowers make the information sought
clearly a matter of public interest and
concern.