THE DIOCESE OF BACOLOD VS.

COMELEC

FACTS: On February 21, 2013, petitioners posted two (2) tarpaulins within a
private compound housing the San Sebastian Cathedral of Bacolod. Each
tarpaulin was approximately six feet (6’) by ten feet (10’) in size. They were
posted on the front walls of the cathedral within public view. The first tarpaulin
contains the message “IBASURA RH Law” referring to the Reproductive Health
Law of 2012 or Republic Act No. 10354. The second tarpaulin is the subject of
the present case. This tarpaulin contains the heading “Conscience Vote” and lists
candidates as either “(Anti-RH) Team Buhay” with a check mark, or “(Pro-RH)
Team Patay” with an “X” mark. The electoral candidates were classified
according to their vote on the adoption of Republic Act No. 10354, otherwise
known as the RH Law. Those who voted for the passing of the law were
classified by petitioners as comprising “Team Patay,” while those who voted
against it form “Team Buhay.”

Respondents conceded that the tarpaulin was neither sponsored nor paid for by
any candidate. Petitioners also conceded that the tarpaulin contains names of
candidates for the 2013 elections, but not of politicians who helped in the
passage of the RH Law but were not candidates for that election.

ISSUES:
 1.) Whether or not the size limitation and its reasonableness of the tarpaulin
is a political question, hence not within the ambit of the Supreme Court’s
power of review.
2.) Whether or not the petitioners violated the principle of exhaustion of
administrative remedies as the case was not brought first before the
COMELEC En Banc or any if its divisions.
3.) Whether or not COMELEC may regulate expressions made by private
citizens.
4.) Whether or not the assailed notice and letter for the removal of the
tarpaulin violated petitioners’ fundamental right to freedom of expression.
5.) Whether the order for removal of the tarpaulin is a content-based or
content-neutral regulation.
6.) Whether or not there was violation of petitioners’ right to property.
7.) Whether or not the tarpaulin and its message are considered religious
speech.

HELD:

1.) No. The Court ruled that the present case does not call for the exercise of
prudence or modesty. There is no political question. It can be acted upon by this
court through the expanded jurisdiction granted to this court through Article VIII,
Section 1 of the Constitution. The concept of a political question never precludes
judicial review when the act of a constitutional organ infringes upon a
fundamental individual or collective right. Even assuming arguendo that the
COMELEC did have the discretion to choose the manner of regulation of the
tarpaulin in question, it cannot do so by abridging the fundamental right to
expression.

Also the Court said that in our jurisdiction, the determination of whether an issue
involves a truly political and non-justiciable question lies in the answer to the
question of whether there are constitutionally imposed limits on powers or
functions conferred upon political bodies. If there are, then our courts are duty-
bound to examine whether the branch or instrumentality of the government
properly acted within such limits.

A political question will not be considered justiciable if there are no

constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon political
bodies. Hence, the existence of constitutionally imposed limits justifies subjecting
the official actions of the body to the scrutiny and review of this court.
In this case, the Bill of Rights gives the utmost deference to the right to free
speech. Any instance that this right may be abridged demands judicial scrutiny. It
does not fall squarely into any doubt that a political question brings.

2.) No. The Court held that the argument on exhaustion of administrative
remedies is not proper in this case. Despite the alleged non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies, it is clear that the controversy is already ripe for
adjudication. Ripeness is the “prerequisite that something had by then been
accomplished or performed by either branch or in this case, organ of government
before a court may come into the picture.”

Petitioners’ exercise of their right to speech, given the message and their
medium, had understandable relevance especially during the elections.
COMELEC’s letter threatening the filing of the election offense against petitioners
is already an actionable infringement of this right. The impending threat of
criminal litigation is enough to curtail petitioners’ speech.

In the context of this case, exhaustion of their administrative remedies as

COMELEC suggested in their pleadings prolongs the violation of their freedom of
speech.

3.) No. Respondents cite the Constitution, laws, and jurisprudence to support
their position that they had the power to regulate the tarpaulin. However, the
Court held that all of these provisions pertain to candidates and political parties.
Petitioners are not candidates. Neither do they belong to any political party.
COMELEC does not have the authority to regulate the enjoyment of the preferred
right to freedom of expression exercised by a non-candidate in this case.

4.) Yes. The Court held that every citizen’s expression with political
consequences enjoys a high degree of protection. Moreover, the respondent’s
argument that the tarpaulin is election propaganda, being petitioners’ way of
endorsing candidates who voted against the RH Law and rejecting those who
voted for it, holds no water.

The Court held that while the tarpaulin may influence the success or failure of the
named candidates and political parties, this does not necessarily mean it is
election propaganda. The tarpaulin was not paid for or posted “in return for
consideration” by any candidate, political party, or party-list group.
By interpreting the law, it is clear that personal opinions are not included, while
sponsored messages are covered.
The content of the tarpaulin is a political speech. Political speech refers to
speech “both intended and received as a contribution to public deliberation about
some issue,” “fostering informed and civic minded deliberation.” On the other
hand, commercial speech has been defined as speech that does “no more than
propose a commercial transaction.” The expression resulting from the content of
the tarpaulin is, however, definitely political speech.

5.) Content-based regulation. Content-based restraint or censorship refers to

restrictions “based on the subject matter of the utterance or speech.” In contrast,
content-neutral regulation includes controls merely on the incidents of the speech
such as time, place, or manner of the speech. The Court held that the regulation
involved at bar is content-based. The tarpaulin content is not easily divorced from
the size of its medium.

Content-based regulation bears a heavy presumption of invalidity, and this court

has used the clear and present danger rule as measure. Under this rule, “the evil
consequences sought to be prevented must be substantive, ‘extremely serious
and the degree of imminence extremely high.’” “Only when the challenged act
has overcome the clear and present danger rule will it pass constitutional muster,
with the government having the burden of overcoming the presumed
unconstitutionality.”

Even with the clear and present danger test, respondents failed to justify the
regulation. There is no compelling and substantial state interest endangered by
the posting of the tarpaulin as to justify curtailment of the right of freedom of
expression. There is no reason for the state to minimize the right of non-
candidate petitioners to post the tarpaulin in their private property. The size of the
tarpaulin does not affect anyone else’s constitutional rights.

6.) Yes. The Court held that even though the tarpaulin is readily seen by the
public, the tarpaulin remains the private property of petitioners. Their right to use
their property is likewise protected by the Constitution.

Any regulation, therefore, which operates as an effective confiscation of private

property or constitutes an arbitrary or unreasonable infringement of property
rights is void, because it is repugnant to the constitutional guaranties of due
process and equal protection of the laws.

The Court in Adiong case held that a restriction that regulates where decals and
stickers should be posted is “so broad that it encompasses even the citizen’s
private property.” Consequently, it violates Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution
which provides that no person shall be deprived of his property without due
process of law.

7.) No. The Court held that the church doctrines relied upon by petitioners are not
binding upon this court. The position of the Catholic religion in the Philippines as
regards the RH Law does not suffice to qualify the posting by one of its members
of a tarpaulin as religious speech solely on such basis. The enumeration of
candidates on the face of the tarpaulin precludes any doubt as to its nature as
speech with political consequences and not religious speech.

Doctrine of benevolent neutrality

With religion looked upon with benevolence and not hostility, benevolent
neutrality allows accommodation of religion under certain circumstances.
Accommodations are government policies that take religion specifically into
account not to promote the government’s favored form of religion, but to allow
individuals and groups to exercise their religion without hindrance. Their purpose
or effect therefore is to remove a burden on, or facilitate the exercise of, a
person’s or institution’s religion.

As Justice Brennan explained, the “government may take religion into

account . . . to exempt, when possible, from generally applicable governmental
regulation individuals whose religious beliefs and practices would otherwise
thereby be infringed, or to create without state involvement an atmosphere in
which voluntary religious exercise may flourish.”

Lemon test
A regulation is constitutional when:
1.) It has a secular legislative purpose;
2.) It neither advances nor inhibits religion; and
3.) It does not foster an excessive entanglement with religion.