DUTCH POLICY TOWARDS ISLAM IN INDONESIA (1945-1949) by ISMAIL HAKKI GOKSOY Thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy SCHOOL OF ORIENTAL AND AFRICAN STUDIES UNIVERSITY OF LONDON April 1991el ABSTRACT The aim of this study is to examine the attitude and policy of the Netherlands Indies Government towards Indonesian Islam during Indonesia's struggle for independence between 1945 and 1949. Chapter one contains a brief discussion of the Dutch attitude towards Islam during the Second World War period. Chapter two examines Islamic developments in Indonesia in 1945, such as the constitutional debate on the ideological basis of the Indonesian Republic and the role of Muslim leaders in the Indonesian Revolution. Chapter three discusses Dutch attempts to restore their authority in Indonesia and the reactions of Muslim leaders to those attempts. The debates on the formulation of a liberal Islamic policy, conducted by the senior Dutch authorities in Jakarta in early 1946 are also explored in detail. The next three chapters give a detailed description of this policy in practise, especially in the strongholds of Islam in Kalimantan, East Indonesia and in the Dutch-occupied territories of Java and Sumatra in 1946 and 1947. Dutch activities in the Islamic field and the process of state formation in the Dutch-occupied territories of Indonesia are discussed. At the same time, attention is paid to the relations between the Netherlands and the Republic and to the attitude of the Masjumi Islamic party towards negotiations with the Dutch. Chapter seven examines the issue of religious freedom and other political developments in Indonesia during 1948 and 1949. Finally, chapter eight discusses Dutch policy towards the haj (pilgrimage to Mecca) between 1946 and 1949. The study concludes that the Dutch pursued a liberal policy towards Indonesian Islam after 1945, hoping to regain the sympathy of the Indonesian Muslims.2 TABLE OF CONTENTS ABSTRACT... 1 TABLE OF CONTENTS...... 2 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS. 4 NOTE ON THE SPELLING OF INDONESIAN NAMES AND TERMS... 5 LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS... 6 INTRODUCTION. CHAPTER ONE: THE SECOND WORLD WAR PERIOD, 1942-1945........... 26 CHAPTER TWO: ISLAM AND THE EMERGENCE OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA, MAY-DECEMBER 1945.. 44 1. Islam and Its Place in the Constitution. 44 2. Islamic Developments after the Proclamation of Independence.. 55 CHAPTER THREE: THE PROGRESS TOWARDS A LIBERAL ISLAMIC POLICY, AUGUST 1945-APRIL 1946. 70 1. Islam and the Attempts to Restore Dutch Rule.. 70 2. In Search of a Liberal Islamic Policy 89 CHAPTER FOUR: DUTCH ISLAMIC POLICY IN EAST INDONESIA AND KALIMANTAN , APRIL 1946-JANUARY 1948... 1. Van der Plas and his contact with Muslim Leaders in South Kalimantan and South Sulawesi... 2. The Malino and Pangkal Pinang Conferences. 3. The Place of Islam in the State of East Indonesia..... 4. Islam and the Political Reconstruction of Kalimantan...... CHAPTER FIVE: DUTCH ISLAMIC POLICY IN JAVA3 AND SUMATRA, APRIL 1946-JANUARY 1948. . 153 1. Administration of Islam in the Dutch-Controlled Territories of Java and Sumatra..... - 153 2. Masjumi and the Linggadjati Agreement. 161 3. The First Military Action: Its Background and Aftermath........... 166 4. The Demands of BPI and New Directives on Islamic Policy........ 178 5. Masjumi and the Renville Discussions... 195 CHAPTER SIX: ISLAM AND THE EXTENSION OF FEDERALISM IN JAVA AND SUMATRA, AUGUST 1947-DECEMBER 1948... 210 1. West Java... . 2i1 2. East Java... 3. Central Java... 4. Madura... . 245 5. East Sumatra... 6. South Sumatra... . 255 CHAPTER SEVEN: ISLAM AND THE POST-RENVILLE. DEVELOPMENTS, JANUARY 1948-DECEMBER 1949. 269 1. Islam and Religious Freedom in the Federation 269 2. Masjumi and the Post-Renville Political Developments. 280 3. The Second Military Action and Its Consequences. 290 4. Islam and the Van Roijen-Roem Agreement. 299 CHAPTER EIGHT: DUTCH POLICY TOWARDS THE HAM, 1946-1949... 313 CONCLUSION. . 344 GLOSSARY... BIBLIOGRAPHY.......4 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This study is the result of four. years of research carried out in various countries. During my research in this period, many friends and scholars helped me in one way or another. | owe a great debt of gratitude to every one of them. | am particularly grateful to Prof. R.B. Smith and Dr. E.U. Kratz of the School of Oriental and African Studies of the University of London, who jointly supervised this study, for their generous advice and encouragement. | would like to thank the other staff members of that School, and the librarians and archivists at the Public Records Office, the British Museum Library and the University of London Library. Thanks must also be expressed for the help given by the staff members of the following institutions in the Netherlands: the General State Achives, the archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Royal Library, all of which are located in The Hague; the Royal Tropical Institute in Amsterdam; the Royal Institute of Linguistics and Anthropology at Leiden. | also wish to express my gratitude to the staff members of the Indonesian Institute of Sciences, the National Archives of the Republic of Indonesia and the National Library in Jakarta. | wish to thank the Turkiye Diyanet Vakfi for its financial support without which the completion of this study would have been impossible. My thanks are also due to R. Chapman who helped me with my English. Last but not least, | am indebted to my wife, Ayse, who has always been a gracious companion. Our little son, Gékalp, has also been a great joy to the family. | therefore dedicate this work to them. Needless to say, | alone am responsible for any shortcomings there may be.5 A NOTE ON THE SPELLING OF INDONESIAN NAMES AND TERMS The official Indonesian spelling system, initially derived from Dutch orthography, has been altered twice since the early revolution. In this study, the names of organisations and associations are spelt according to their usage found in the documents that were drawn up during the period under consideration. Thus, the old spelling has been retained for Masjumi, but Muhammadiyah and Nahdatul Ulama which are still in existence, are spelled according to the new rules. Indonesian place names are given their con.temporary Indonesian spellings. Dutch-dtived names for some Indonesian cities are added between brackets when they are used for the first time in the text. For personal names, the spelling used by the persons concerned themselves was chosen. However, the old "oe" is generally written as new “u". i Dutch, Indonesian and other foreign words in the text are italicized. Indonesian words of Arabic origin are written according to the Indonesian spelling. The plural form of some common words is made by adding a Roman s, such as kiais, priais and even ulamas (as this Arabic plural term is used in Indonesian to indicate the singular). For the benefit of readers unfamiliar with the Indonesian language, it should be pointed out that the consonants ch, j, nj, sj and tj of the old ‘spelling have become respectively kh, y, ny, sy and c in the new one introduced on 17 August 1972.AFNEI AMACAB. ARC BAPRIS BB BFO BIO BKR BPI BPKH BPRI CMI 6 ‘LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS Allied Forces Netherlands East Indies Allied Military Administration Civil Affairs Branch Algemeen Regerings Commissaris voor Borneo en Grote Oost (General Government Commissioner for Borneo and the Great East) Badan Perwakilan Rakjat Indonesia Semarang (\ndonesian People's Representative Body of Semarang) Binnenlandse Bestuur (Internal Affairs) Bijeenkomst voor Federaal Overleg (Conference for Federal Consultations) Bewindvoering Indonesié in Overgangstijd (Government of _ Indonesia in Transition Period) Badan Keamanan Rakjat (People's Security Force) Badan Penjiaran Islam (Organisation for the Spread of Islam) Badan Pengoeroes Keselamatan Hadji (Management Committee for the Safety of Pilgrims) Barisan Pemberontakan Republik Indonesia (Revolutionary Corps of the Indonesian Republic) Centrale Militaire Inlichtingendienst (Central Military Intelligence Service) COAMACAB Commanding Officer Allied Military Administration Civil CONICA DIRVO FDR Affairs Branch Commanding Officer Netherlands Indies Civil Administration Directie Verre Oost (Far East Directorate) Front Demokrasi Rakjat (People's Democratic Front)GPII KIS KNIL KNIP Kopindo Masjumi MBZ Minog MIT NDT Nedinreg NEFIS NI NICA NIGIS NII NIT NU NST PARMUSI 7 Good Offices Committee Gerakan Pemuda Islam Indonesia (Indonesian Muslim Youth Movement) Komite Indonesia Serikat (Federal Indonesia Committee) Koninklijk Nederlands Indische Leger (Royal Netherlands Indies Army) Komite Nasional Indonesia Pusat (Central Indonesian National Committee) Komite Pertolongan Indonesia (|Indonesian Help Committee) Madjlis Sjura Muslimin Indonesia (Consultative Council of Indonesian Muslims) Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) Ministerie van Overzeese Gebiedsdelen (Ministry of Overseas Territories) Madjlis Islam Tinggi (High Islamic Council) Negara Djawa Timoer (East Java State) Nederlands-Indische Regering (Netherlands Indies Government) Netherlands Forces Intelligence Service Netherlands Indies Netherlands Indies Civil Administration Netherlands Indies Government Information Service Negara Islam Indonesia (\slamic State of Indonesia) Negara Indonesia Timoer (East Indonesia State) Nahdatul Ulama (Renaissance of the Ulamas) Negara Soematera Timoer (East Sumatra State) Partai Muslimin Indonesia (Party of Indonesian Muslims)Permi Perti Pesindo PDI PDRI PIL PKI PNI POW PRIS PRP PSII PU PUSA Recomba RTC RVD SACSEA SEAC. Sermi SKI SRI 8 Persatuan Muslimin Indonesia (Indonesian Muslim Union) Persatuan Tarbijah_ Islamijah (\slamic Education Association) Pemuda Sosialis Indonesia (Indonesian Socialist Youth) Perserikatan Democrat Indonesia (Indonesian Democratic Union). Pemerintahan Darurat Republik Indonesia (Emergency Government of the Republic of Indonesia) Partai Islam Indonesia (Indonesian Muslim Party) Partai Komunis Indonesia (Indonesian Communist Party) Partai Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian National Party) Prisoners of War Partai Rakjat Indonesia Sarikat (Federal Indonesian People's Party) Partai Rakjat Pasoendan (Pasoendan People's Party) Partai Sarikat Islam Indonesia (\ndonesian Muslim Association Party) Persjarikatan Ulama (Ulama Association) Persatuan Ulama Seluruh Aceh (All Aceh Ulama Union) Regeringscommissaris voor Bestuuraangelegenheden (Government Commissioner for Administrative Affairs) Round Table Conference Regerings Voorlichtingsdienst (Government Information Service) Supreme Allied Commander of South East Asia South East Asia Command Serikat Muslimin Indonesia (Indonesian Muslim Union) Serikat Kerakjatan Indonesia (Indonesian People's Union) Serikat Rakjat Islam (Muslim People's Union)saQL SWPA TKR Til TNI TRI UN UNCI USI VFR Status Quo Line South West Pacific Area Tentara Keamanan Rakjat (People's Security Army) Tentara Islam Indonesia (Indonesian Muslim Army) Tentara Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian National Army) Tentara Republik Indonesia (Indonesian Republican Army) United Nations United Nations Commission for Indonesia United States of Indonesia Voorlopige Federale Regering (Provisional Federal Government) Abbreviations of Official Records: ARA Arch. AS Arch. Kol. ANRI Arsip AS Algemeen Rijksarchief, The Hague. Archief van de Algemene Secretarie in Nederlands- Indié. Archief van het Ministerie van Kolonién na 1900. Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia, Jakarta. Archief van de Algemene Secretarie en het Kabinet van de Gouverneur-General, 1944-1950. Arsip BPKNIP Arsip Badan Pekerja Komite Nasional Indonesia Pusat. Arsip Kempen Arsip Kementerian Penerangan, 1945-1949. Arsip PDRI Fo Arsip Pemerintahan Darurat Republik Indonesia. Archives of Foreign Office, London.10 Abbreviations of Official Publications: ECR IDD IVVN OBNIB Enquete Commissie Regeringsbeleid, 1940-1945: Militair Beleid 1940-1945. Indonesische Documentatie Dienst van Aneta-A.N.P. Indonesié in de Veiligheidsraad van de Verenigde Naties. Officiéle Bescheiden betreffende de Nederlandse- Indonesische Betrekkingen, 1945-1950.oh INTRODUCTION The period between 1945 and 1949 in which the Republic of Indonesia succeeded in obtaining her independence from the Dutch, constitutes an important episode of Indonesian history. The political history of the Indonesian Revolution and Dutch-Indonesian relations during that period have received considerable attention from Indonesian as well as Western scholars. The history of Indonesian Islam on the other hand, especially the Islamic aspect of the Dutch-Indonesian, relations during that period has been neglected in most of their works. A small number of scholarly studies written in English has touched indirectly upon questions relating to Islam in Indonesia between 1945 and 1949, but these studies were confined to a great extent to the Indonesian side of the question. The attitude and policy of the Netherlands Indies Government towards Islam and her leaders were, however, left out of the discussion. It might be useful at this stage to provide a brief survey of the literature and primary sources that have a bearing on the subject. Such a survey will, at the same time, indicate the limitations of secondary works! and availability of primary sources. The publications that have already appeared, such as those of George Mc. T. Kahin, A. Reid, J.R.W. Smail and B.R.O’G. Anderson Primarily dealt with the political, cultural and sociological aspects of Indonesian history. They, therefore, contributed little to the specific study of Islam in Indonesia. G.Mc.T. Kahin's book, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia, gave a detailed account of Indonesian politics during the period of the revolutionary war. The Struggle against the Dutch was essentially seen as being based on nationalism; but ‘the role of Islam, as organised in the Islamic party12 of Masjumi, was also recognised in that national struggle. In his study, Kahin gave more emphasis to the "progressive" leaders of the Masjumi party, who “drew much. of their inspirations from the teachings of Muhammad Abduh", leader of Islamic modernism in Egypt. He characterised them as "Religious Socialists" representing the party's left wing and mentioned even such names as Muhammad Natsir, Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, Muhammad Roem, Jusuf Wibisono and Abu Hanifah. On the other hand, “the conservative older-generation religious leaders" based on the Nahdatul Ulama and more conservative elements of the Muhammadiyah Islamic organisations fotmed the party's right wing (Kahin,1952:157-158). Kahin also placed emphasis on the socio- economic aspects of the Masjumi party, summarising the party's 1946 "Urgency Program" of which "the Religious Socialists and those closest to them were the Principal architects". The collection of the zakat (alms-tax) by the party and introduction of financial aid to the smaller traders were mentioned as the sole achivements of the party in that field (Kahin,1952: 307-309, 311). In 1974, A. Reid published an important book on the Indonesian revolution entitled The Indonesian National Revolution, 1945-1950. Although this study viewed Islam as a source of national awareness for the Indonesian people in the Dutch colonial era, it did not do full justice to the important role that Muslim leaders, either ulamas (Muslim religious leaders) or Muslim politicians, played in the national revolution, 1945-1950 (Reid,1974:4,5). Although the Masjumi party had "the largest membership of any party in Java", in Reid's opinion this did not imply "similar effectiveness in national Politics" (Reid,1974:84). He ve greater priority to the other Parties, such as the Indonesian Socialist Party, Indonesian National13 Party, Indonesian Communist Party and most important the army and pemuda (youth) organisations (Reid,1974:78-85). Other major works on the Indonesian revolution were written by social historians, namely J.R.W. Smail, Bandung in the Early Revolution 1945-1946: a Study in the Social History of the Indonesian Revolution and B.R.O'G. Anderson, Java in a Time of Revolution: Occupation and Resistance, 1944-1946. The book written by Anderson essentially described the revolutionary struggle of 1945 and 1946, led mainly by the pemudas (youths) who were organised in a number of socialist-\_/oriented parties and organisations, such as the Indonesian Socialist Party and the Socialist Youth Movement. Anderson paid little attention to the Muslim pemudas who were affiliated to the Gerakan Pemuda Islam Indonesia (or the Indonesian Muslim Youth Movement), the Hizbullah and the Barisan Sabilillah. Although he discussed the establishment of the Masjumi Islamic party, he did not lay any stress on the role of Muslim leaders jn the early days of the revolution. According to Anderson, the Masjumi party lacked charismatic leadership and well-defined programs in the political and social fields (Anderson,1972:219-224). The above works touched on Islam and her leaders in one way or another. However, none was written for the specific purpose of examining Islam in Indonesia. More serious attempts to study Islam in Indonesia, in particular for the period of the revolutionary war, were made by Dutch scholars: namely, C.O.A. van Nieuwenhuijze, B.J. Boland and C. van Dijk. But, their works were essentially confined again to the Indonesian side. Very little was said about the post-war Dutch policy towards Islam in Indonesia. Van Niewenhuijze, a Dutch Islamologist who’ wrote books and articles on the recent history of Ky14 Islam in Indonesia and at the same time worked as Adviser for Islamic Affairs for the Lieutenant Governor-General's (i.e. Van Mook's) Cabinet in Indonesia after 1945, will be discussed in later pages in connection with other advisers in that office. In 1971, B.J. | Boland, a Dutch theologian who studied history of religions at Leiden, produced a dissertation on the recent history of Islam in Indonesia. Entitled The Struggle of Islam in Modern Indonesia, the study viewed Islam and its community as a driving force to put Islamic principles into practice in the Indonesian state and society since 1945. He discussed in detail the long and fierce debates on Islam and its position in the constitution, which continued from May 31st till the middle of August 1945, among the representatives of the Study Committee for Indonesia's Independence (Boland, 1971:16-38). However, in his study, Boland did not give much ‘priority to the period between August 1945 and December 1949 ‘which he characterised “as the period of relative unity-in-the struggle, a unity among Muslim factions themselves as much as between the Muslims and the secular factions" (Boland,1971:40). Given that only six pages were devoted to this eventful period, it is not possible to expect a great deal from it (Boland,1971:39-45). C. van Dijk contributed to the study of contemporary Islam in Indonesia with ja sociological dissertation on the Darul Islam Movement in Indonesia, a movement which strove for the establishment of an Islamic State of Indonesia. The movement started originally in West Java where the Islamic State of Indonesia (Negara Islam Indonesia) was proclaimed on 7 August, 1949, and it subsequently spread to parts of Central Java, to South Kalimantan, to South Sulawesi and to Aceh. Entitled Rebellion under the Banner15 of Islam: The Darul Islam in Indonesia, the study, with its enormous volume of data from original Indonesian sources, provides an indispensable reference book for all those who want to know about the Darul Islam Movement in Indonesia as well as to study the recent history of Islam there. Van Dijk's book not only covers the actual period of Darul Islam activities (1948-1965), but also it gives a considerable amount of information about the history and background of the movement starting from 1945. Mention should also be made of the Indonesian scholar Deliar Noer, who wrote, a Master's thesis on the Masjumi |slamic party in 1960. Entitled Masjumi: Its Organisation, Ideology and Political Role in Indonesia, this study essentially elaborated the Masjumi party's organisational structure, ideology, leadership and its increasing role in Indonesian politics during the revolutionary period and afterwards. By using largely the party's own publications and statements of its informants, Noer provides a good account of literature on the Masjumi for any English reader who may wish to know something about that party from the Indonesian Muslim point of view. Noer is also the author of The Modernist Muslim Movement in Indonesia: 1900-1942 and of Administration of Islam in Indonesia which both stand as reference works for the modern history of Islam in Indonesia. " Turning to paman sources, first, mention should be made of the archives which provide a tremendous quantity of materials for the subject. In the Netherlands, the main archival sources, which are now open to the public, can be found in the Algemene Rijksarchief (or ARA) in the Hague. The ARA posseses the archives of the former Ministry of Colonies (after 1945 Ministry of Overseas Territories) and of General Secretariat of Netherlands Indies, which both were of16 vital importance ifor the completion of this study. The archives jof the Ministry of Colonies include the documents and reports sent by the Netherlands Indies government to that Ministry in the form of mail reports (mailrapporten) classified either as ordinary (niet-geheim) or as secret (geheim) files and numbered serially each year. The archives of the General Secretariat of Netherlands Indies, first and second dispatches, 1945-1949 (Algemene Secretarie van Nederlands Indié, eerste en tweede zending) contains the documents and the official papers of the departments of the Netherlands Indies Government including those of its section, the ‘Office of Advisers for Islamic Affairs during 1945 and 1949. With the end of Dutch rule in Indonesia in December 1949, the archives of this Secretariat were brought to the Netherlands in two different shipments. They were located first at the Indies Collections in the Archives of the Ministry of Internal Affairs; but after 1980 they were transferred to the ARA in the Hague. In 1988, their previous catalogue was replaced by a better-classified and well-documented one. The general titles of the files in the old catalogue were changed and the documents were classified in smaller files and under new names. For example, the files listed under the general name of "/slam-Politiek" (or Islam-Policy) in the old catalogue came under the title of "Godsdiensten: Islam" (or Religions: Islam) iin the new catalogue. In addition to these archives, there are two other smaller archives in the ARA, namely, Indische/Indonesische Archief and Rapportage Indonesie, 1945-1950, which are also of great interest, especially the file: Map JA 136 in the Indische/Indonesische Archief, which includes some reports and memorandums on Islamic developments in Indonesia.17 Another important archive in the Hague is the semi-statical archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs which covers some reports and telegrams sent by the representatives of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs abroad, especially the Dutch Consul-General in Jeddah (Saudi Arabia), on questions of the Mecca pilgrimage and tne sending of haj missions to Saudi Arabia during the pilgrimage seasons. Reference should also be made to the Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia (or ANRI) in Jakarta, which provides some source materials for this study. The ANRI/ possesses the archives of the Republic of Indonesia and of the Netherlands Indies Government for the period, 1945 and 1949. The archives of the Republic of Indonesia contain mainly the official papers of some ministerial departments, but the quantity of these papers is very limited, as the majority of government premises were damaged during the Dutch military operations against the Republic in 1947 and 1948. The archives ‘of the Netherlands Indies Government in the ANAI, namely the archives of the Algemene Secretarie en Kabinet van de Gouverneur-General, 1944-1950, (or General Secretariat and Cabinet of the Governor-General) include basically the remaining official Papers of the Netherlands Indies Government, but they are mostly of secondary importance, as the greater part of the Dutch archives was taken to the Netherlands after 1949. With regard to the archives, mention should also be made of the archives of the Public Record Office in London: its FO 371 series contains some ‘extensive reports on the political situation in Indonesia sent by British representatives in Indonesia and in the Hague. : Mention should now be made of the main Dutch and Indonesian18 newspapers and magazines published in Indonesia during the period of the Indonesian struggle for independence. The Het Dagblad, Indische Courant and De Nieuwsgier (all published in Jakarta) are useful Dutch newspapers which contain information on the ulama conferences organised by the Netherlands Indies government, the annoucements of that Government on pilgrimages to Mecca (haj) and other matters that related to Islam. In this respect, the publication of the Dutch news agency, Indische Documentatie Dienst van A.N.P.-Aneta (1946-1950 Series 3), also deserves special mention, because it includes the summaries of the important articles and news printed in the major Dutch and Indonesian newspapers during that period. The’ Indonesian newspapers and magazines published in Jakarta and Yogyakarta, such as The Voice of Free Indoneisa, Merdeka, Berita ‘indonesia, Kedaulatan Rakyat, Al-Djihad and Djiwa Islam are relevant Newspapers and magazines for this study; they reveal largely the views of the Republic of Indonesia on political and other developments in Indonesia during that period. With regard to the official publications, mention should be made of a Dutch series which includes some of the important documents on Dutch Islamic policy in Indonesia after 1945. This is the Officiele Bescheiden Betreffende de Nederlandse-Indonesische Betrekkingen, 1945-1950, which stands as an important reference work for this study. In 1969,, the Dutch Government through its Ministry of Education and Sciences entrusted the Rijkscommissie voor Vaderlandse Geschiedenis in the Hague to publish official documents concerning Dutch and Indonesian relations between the years of 1945 and 1950. Since 1971 fifteen volumes of this fundamental and valuable series have appeared: the latest volume ends with November 1948. Seven volumes were edited by S. L. van der Wal. After his19 death in December 1978, the work was carried on by P.J. Drooglever and M.J.B. Schouten. As indicated in the preface of the first volume, the purpose ofithis publication was to make accessible, without restriction, not only the documents that concerned Dutch and Indonesian relations in the political sense, but also archival materials covering other aspects of the Dutch-Indonesian relations during the period of 1945-1950 (1). Although the majority of the papers that were included in these fifteen volumes essentially dealt with the political, economic and military relations between the Dutch and Indoriesians, it also includes some of the most important archival documents concerning Islam and the Indonesian Muslim community. These documents were, primarily, the notes and memorandums of the Netherlands Indies Government officials in Jakarta and reports of the civil and military officials on the situation in their work places. Reference should now be made to a number of Dutch officials who worked as Advisers for Islamic Affairs for the Lieutenant Governor-General's Cabinet after 1945. They were Ch.O. van der Plas, C.A.O. van Nieuwenhuijze and L.|. Graf, who all were experts on Islam. Van der Plas always advocated the idea of following a policy through Islamic channels’ in Indonesia. He certainly played an important role in the making’ of a liberal policy towards Islam in post-war Indonesia. His memorandums and reports on Islam and the Indonesian Muslim community presented to the cabinet provide for us substantial information to know the Government's attitudes and Policies towards Islam in Indonesia. After finishing his studies in Leiden, especially in Indology, in 1921, Van der Plas became a consul in Jeddah where he at the same time improved his knowledge of Arabic and Islam. From 1929 to20 1931, he worked at the Office for Native Affairs in Jakarta. Then, he continued his career as a civil servant in the Department of Internal Affairs (Binnenlandse Bestuur), as Assistant-Resident in Blitar (East Java), Resident of Ceribon (West Java), and Governor of East Java.-In 1940,.he became a member of the Netherlands Indies People's Council known as Volksraad. During the Second World War, Van der Plas spent his time in Australia. When the War ended in the Pacific area in .August 1945, he returned to Jakarta where he advised and otherwise assisted the authorities in connection with Indonesian and Islamic affairs. In April 1946, he was appointed Adviser for Islamic Affairs to the Lieutenant Governor-General's Cabinet. He remained in this post until August 1947. Van der Plas became a semi-legendary figure in Indonesia. Surely he was an extraordinary person who knew more about the Indonesian people than any other Dutchman. Many Dutchmen in Indonesia had a very considerable respect for his ability. While most of the Indonesian nationalist and Islamic leaders regarded him as one of their most dangerous opponents, because he had undeniable personal courage. In describing Van der Plas, they usually attributed the Indonesian term, pintar busuk, which can be translated literally as "malignantly clever" (Kahin,1952:379,n.72). Because of his interest in Islam and the Muslim leaders, especially the ulamas, in some Muslim circles he was nicknamed a “false kiai or false haji", who tried to regain the hearts of the Indonesian Muslim community (2). Mention should, now, be made of Van Nieuwenhuijze. Before the Second World War, he took the academic course for civil servants in Indonesia at Leiden, and as part of it studied Arabic and Islam. After obtaining his Ph.D. in 1945 on the basis of a thesis on Sjamsuddin of Pasai (a 17th century Sumatran mystic), he arrived in Jakarta in21 that year as a staff member of the Lieutenant Governor-General's Cabinet. Initially, he worked as Van der Plas’ assistant in Islamic Affairs. In January 1948, he was appointed as Adviser for Islamic Affairs for the Lieutenant Governor-General's Cabinet together with L.l. Graf. In this capacity, he advised the Cabinet on matters concerning Islam. In addition to his official work, he also continued to undertake research on Islam, especially in the context of political developments immediately after 1945. The principal results of his research in Indonesia were recorded in Mens en Vrijheid in Indonesie (1949) and Aspects of Islam in Post-Colonial Indonesia (1958). His book, Mens en Vrijheid in Indonesie, contained basically his views on the question of religious freedom in Indonesia and some of his proposals put forward to the Lieutenant Governor-General's Cabinet on that, issue. This book also dealt with the theoretical aspects of Dutch policy-making for Islam in Indonesia. After discussing the relations between a modern (secular) state and religion (in this case: Islam) from the theoretical point of view, Van Nieuwenhuijze continued his discussions on political construction and religious freedom in Indonesia. He stated that "Indonesian Islam has been overshadowed by the political use made of the socio-religious values of Islam, first by the Japanese, then by the Republic of Indonesia and by the Netherlands Indies Government" (Van Nieuwenhuijze,1949:18,19). Therefore, he maintained, the Netherlands Indigs Government should conduct “an active policy of religious freedom" in Indonesia to separate Islam from politics and to guarantee freedom of religion to the adherents of all Indonesian religions; namely, Islam, Christianity, Hinduism and other smaller animistic beliefs. In order to secure freedom of religion, Van Nieuwenhuijze advocated the setting up of a government body called22 "Permanent Advisory Commission for Religious Freedom and Religious Affairs", which would consist of experts on each Indonesian religion (Van Nieuwenhuijze,1949:33-36). The book, Aspects of Islam in Post-Colonial Indonesia, contained his five articles, including "Japanese Islam Policy in Java, 1942-1945" and "The Darul Islam Movement In Western Java till 1949". Another article was devoted to the philosophical foundation of the Indonesian state, Pancasila, , and the establishment of Ministry of Religious Affairs by the Republic. It was entitled "The Indonesian State and "Deconfessionalized" Muslim concepts". Van Nieuwenhuijze believed that the Pancasila and the Ministry of Religion were ‘essentially "deconfessionalised Muslim concepts” which were incorporated in the structure of the Indonesian state by the "secular" nationalist leaders in order to counter the “revivalist religious movement" of Darul Islam (Van Nieuwenhuijze,1958: 181-243). Van Nieuwenhuijze also placed emphasis on the sociological approach to Indonesian Islam as a socio-cultural phenomenon in Indonesian society. In his Aspects of Islam, he described the Indonesian Muslim community as a "closed community" which tended to appeal to Islam as a source of its identity, when the traditional community life began to disintegrate as a result of the introduction of modern ideas into Indonesian society (Van Nieuwenhuijze,1958: 38). Another able adviser who dealt with Islamic affairs in the Lieutenant Governor-General's Cabinet after 1945, was L.I. Graf. Like other advisers, he also studied Arabic and other Islamic sciences at Leiden. He obtained his Ph.D. in 1934 on the basis of a thesis on Imam Syafi, famous Muslim jurist and founder of the Syafi school of23 Islamic thought which Indonesian Muslims follow. In the same year, he arrived in Indonesia where he became a colonial officer at the Department of Internal Affairs. He worked, first in Purwokerto (Central Java), then in Jambi (Central Sumatra) as a Resident until he was interned by the Japanese in April 1942. After his release from a Prisoner’ of War camp in Indonesia by the Allied forces in August 1945, he became the head of the information section of the Department of Internal Affairs. In January 1948, after he had taken sick-leave for six months in the Netherlands, he was appointed by the government as an Adviser for Islamic Affairs to the Lieutenant Governor-General's Cabinet. In this capacity, he, together with Van Nieuwenhuijze, served the Government until 27 December, 1949, when the Dutch formally transferred sovereignty over Indonesia to the United States of Indonesia (3). Finally, a few remarks should be made about the purpose and composition of this thesis. The main purpose of the thesis is to study the attitude and policy of the Netherlands Indies Government towards Indonesian Islam during the Indonesian struggle for independence between 1945 and 1949. To gain a proper understanding of the Islamic policy pursued by the Dutch, the important political developments during that period are also taken into consideration. Thus, the relevent events in the various regions concerned are described in some length to provide a background for the discussions of the main subject. The thesis is divided into eight chapters. The first chapter traces the Dutch attitude towards Islam and its leaders during the Second World War period. The second chapter is confined to the Indonesian side of the question. In that chapter, attention is given to the constitutional debate in 1945 on the ideological basis of the24 Indonesian Republic and to the Islamic developments after the declaration of independence on 17 August, 1945. In the third chapter, first, a sketch of the Dutch attempts to restore their authority in Indonesia in late 1945 is given; then, the discussions on the formulation of a liberal Islamic policy, conducted by the senior Dutch authorities in Jakarta in early 1946 are explored. In the next two chapters, a detailed description of this policy in practi e, especially in the strongholds of Islam in Kalimantan, East Indonesia and in the Dutch-occupied territories of Java and Sumatra in 1946 and 1947 is outlined. At the same time, attention is paid to the relations between the Netherlands and the Republic and to the attitude of the Masjumi party towards negotiations with the Dutch. In chapter six, ithe Dutch activities in the Islamic field and the process of state formation in Java and Sumatra are discussed. In chapter seven, the issue of religious freedom and other political developments in Indonesia during the course of 1948 and 1949 are examined. In the final chapter, a discussion of the Dutch policy towards the haj between 1946 and 1949 is given.25 NOTES 1. Officiele Bescheiden Betreffende de Nederlandse-Indonesische Betrekkingen, 1945-1950, Vol.,l, pp.vi-vii. Henceforth, this publication will be abbreviated as OBNIB. 2. Djiwa Islam, 11 July 1947. 3. Interview with Graf in the Hague, 25 April 1988.26 CHAPTER ONE THE SECOND WORLD WAR PERIOD, 1942-1945. With the Japanese invasion of Malaya on 8 December 1941, the situation in the Far East brought with it the danger of occupation for Indonesia. Three weeks later, on 29 December, the Netherlands Queen, Wilhelmina, who had formed a Government-in-exile in London after the German occupation of the Netherlands in May 1940, appointed HJ. van Mook, then Director of the Department of Economic Affairs in Indonesia, as Lieutenant Governor-General under the Governor-General A.M.L. Tjarda van Starkenborgh Stachouwer, the officer in command. In February 1942, the Governor-General Van Starkenborgh entrusted Van Mook with the task of selecting a group of officials to proceed to Australia to protect the interests of the Dutch East Indies which were on the point of imminent capitulation. Van Mook left for Australia on 6 March 1942, and two days later the Dutch capitulated to the Japanese and were interned in camps together with the Governor-General. On 25 May 1942, Van Mook, having arrived in London, was appointed by the Queen as Minister for the Colonies. Soon after his appointment, Van Mook however was faced with the anti-colonial sentiment of America in 1942 when Roosevelt, the President of the United States of America, felt that the colonial powers should adopt a “clearly progressive policy" in their colonial territories (Yong, 1982:28). The State Department officials also argued repeatedly that the war should ensure the sovereign equality of all peoples and should be followed by the liberation of all peoples in the world in accordance with the principles of the Atlantic Charter (McMahon, 1981 :55).27 Roosevelt therefore discussed with Queen Wilhelmina the possibility of making an announcement on Dutch policy for the future political status of Indonesia during. the latter's visit to America in July and August ‘1942. During the meeting, Roosevelt maintained that such ‘an announcement was necessary for the satisfaction of American public’ opinion as well as for the conduct of the war in Indonesia. The Queen told him however "This is such an important matter that | would like to consult first with my Prime Minister and Minister for the Colonies" (Jong,1986:81). After returning to England, the Queen consulted Van Mook and the other Ministers in London, who all agreed that such an announcement would be appropriate. In fact the Netherlands, as a small colonial power, could not be expected to maintain its position in Indonesia without the assistance of the United States, because, with the exception of the island of Sumatra, the Indonesian Archipelago fell under the military operational sphere of the South West Pacific Area (SWPA), under the command of the American General MacArthur. The ultimate liberation of the Netherlands Indies would depend on the policies of the United States (Yong,1982:28,29). On 6 December, 1942, the Queen therefore made a radio speech in which she promised a Commonwealth, composed of the motherland, the Netherlands,) and her colonies, Indonesia, Surinam and Curacao. The speech also; called for the convening of a conference to discuss the re-organisation of the Kingdom of the Netherlands into a Commonwealth as soon as the war was over. It also indicated that an acceptable result of the conference would be “complete self-reliance and freedom of conduct for each part regarding its internal affairs, but with the readiness to render mutual assistance" (1).i 28 The American public reacted to the Queen's speech reasonably positively. President Roosevelt was quite pleased and he thought that the Queen's speech would strengthen the Dutch position among the Allies (MacMahon,1981:63). The Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, stated at a press conference that "the proposals made in the (Queen's) speech showed good statemanship". The majority of the American press also considered it as a first step in the right direction, although some viewed it as unsatisfactory (Jong,1986:99). Nevertheless, ; the speech made no mention of independence for Indonesia for the future or for its internal political structure after the war. It was made in English and it was not for Indonesians. It was simply thought that such an announcement would serve the Purpose of winning American support to regain Indonesia from the Japanese. The then Prime Minister, P.S. Gerbrandy, stated later (in 1950) that "The Royal message did not indicate the relinquishment of one jot of the responsibility of the Netherlands Government for the administration of the Indies. What it did, was to outline a distant prospect in general terms" (Gerbrandy,1950:60). Meanwhile, the Indies delegation left in Australia formed a Commission called the Netherlands Indies Commission for Australia and New Zealand. Its seat was in Melbourne where the headquarters of MacArthur was situated. The Commission was initially headed by J.E. van Hoogstraten, but in December 1942 he was succeeded by Ch.O. van der Plas, an important figure who had great responsibility for the administration of the Netherlands Indies affairs until the establishment of a Netherlands Indies Government-in-exile in Australia in early 1945. Van der Plas was also the first Dutch official who awoke to the necessity of winning the hearts of the Indonesian Muslims for the re-conquest of the Netherlands Indies29 from the Japanese. In this chapter, we will mainly examine the actions undertaken by the Dutch concerning Islam and the Indonesian Muslims during the war with Japan. These included basically the recruitment of some Muslim leaders into the Dutch civil and secret services in Australia and the Islamic propaganda campaign against Japan. \ As a result of!the conquest of Indonesia by Japan, a large number of Indonesian Muslims in Saudi Arabia who had gone there before the War for the purposes of making their pilgrimage and to study Islamic sciences, stayed behind in Mecca, deprived of their remittances from Indonesia. Therefore from May 1942 the Netherlands Government through its Jeddah representative, began to provide financial help for about three thousand mukims, the Indonesian residents in Mecca, who were for the greater part intellectually prominent youths and middle-aged men, The help was given in money and in rice which had been imported from Egypt. At the same time, presents and teaching materials were offered to the Indonesian students at the Indonesian religious schools in Mecca, Darul Ulum and Madrasah Indonesia, especially on the occasions of Muslim festivals, Ramadan and /dul Adha. To qualify for a monthly payment, it was sufficient to be of Indonesian descent although claimants did not always produce their passports (Van der Meulen,1977:149,153). During the Second World War, action was undertaken to recruit Indonesians from this settlement in Mecca for the recovery of the Netherlands Indies from the Japanese. For this purpose, several recruitment missions were sent to Saudi Arabia. The first mission was undertaken ‘by B.A. van Deinse, formerly agent for the (Dutch) Royal Packet Company in Singapore, and Pitt Hardacre, a British Intelligence officer who had been previously a planter in South30 Sumatra. In October 1942, they went to Saudi Arabia to assemble some Indonesian: and Malaysian volunteers for the secret intelligence operations in the Indonesian Archipelago, but they were not allowed to enter Mecca, as entry to the Holy city is forbidden to non-Muslims. With the assistance of the Netherlands Vice-Consul in Mecca, Hardacre and Van Deinse made known that volunteers were needed for some risky work in the struggle against Japan. Anyone who accepted that work, would get, first, a sum of three hundred Saudi Arabian riyals to meet their urgent needs, later, they would receive an allowance of £15 per month regularly. Food, lodging and clothing during the period of instruction would be provided freely. In the event of the: agent being killed in the performance of his duties, his widow -if the person was married- would immediately get £250. At the end of hostilities, the agent would be paid a sum of money as a bonus, but such sum would be decided on the termination of his service and would depend upon the services he had rendered. The agent would undertake all duties other than those of an active combatant nature. At the end of hostilities, the agent would return to Saudi Arabia or alternatively his family would be repatriated to Indonesia (2). As a result of that recruitment drive, twenty Indonesians and eleven Malaysians were assembled to go to the island of Sumatra. But first they were sent to Ceylon under the leadership of an Indonesian official at the Dutch consulate in Jeddah, Dr. Raden Mamoen Ar-Rasjid Kusumadilaga, to be trained there by the British Special Operations Executive. For Java, another twenty Indonesians, of whom ten were from Sumatra, three from Java, two from Kalimantan, two from Timor, one from Sulawasi, one from Ambon and one from Banka island, were recruited and sent to Australia for; 31 training (Jong, 1986:191,192). A few months later, eight people (five Indonesians and three Malaysians) from the Ceylon group were found to be unsuitable for the mission and returned to Mecca having been partially trained. The rest of the group, however, remained in training. In October 1943, Van Deinse reported to Van Mook that they were “moderately satisfactory" and "a limited number of them have been doing quite well, but even with these we found that their mental capacity is very limited" (Jong,1986:193). Nevertheless, in 1953, Van Deinse told the Enquéte Commissie (Inquiry Commission) that "The whole group which came from Mecca, was a great disappointment and we were finally glad to get rid of them" (3). As far as the second group of twenty Indonesian Muslims were concerned, they stayed in a camp in Melbourne for sometime without the knowledge of the Dutch authorities there and then were brought to Brisbane where they were kept at the disposal of a British Training Intelligence Officer, Captain Roy Kendall who headed Section B, Secret Intelligence of the Allied Intelligence Branch in Australia (4). Initially, the Dutch authorities in Australia were not informed about the plan, but there was contact with Van Mook in London. Van der Plas and G.B. Salm, the head of the Netherlands Forces Intelligence Service (NEFIS) were informed of the plan in January 1943. According to the plan, the twenty Indonesians would be sent to Java as merchants, but the real intention was to collect intelligence and information on the Japanese military and civil measures in Indonesia regarding the people and country. If posible they would bring, back newspapers, pamphlets and important notes. In the middle of [February 1943, Salm prepared a list of goods which the merchant agents could take with them from Indonesia, such as32 sarongs, cottons, native shirts and needles (Jong,1986:194). Approximately at the time of Salm's preparations, Kendall met Van der Plas. He showed Van der Plas a telegram that he had received from London which stated that the Netherlands Government wished to transfer the twenty pilgrims to the Netherlands Indies authorities in Australia. On 24 February 1943, Van der Plas telegraphed to Van Mook that he would supervise the twenty hajis in their training and then have them sent to Indonesia as spies. Kendall would only arrange the transport (5). Apart from the training given by Kendall for special operations, Van der Plas instructed the twenty Indonesians in the fields of Administration, Jurisdiction, Religious Affairs, Indonesian Politics, Transport, Radic Affairs, and various other things (Jong,1986:194). Van der Plas wished to employ them also in other services, such as information and; subversive propaganda against Japan through Islamic channels.’ On 23 March, 1943, he therefore sent a telegram to Van Mook in which he argued that most of the recruited Indonesian "volunteers" could be used conveniently for the execution of subversive Islamic propaganda against Japan and for information services, but not for the special operations (6). In July, Kendall reported to London that he thought that “all the hadji party can be sent in at the western end of Java without risk for the people" (Jong, 1986:195).: However, all the hajis did not leave for Indonesia. Out of twenty, only two hajis were sent to Java by a submarine, but they did not return to Australia (7). On 7 May, 1943, Van der Plas sent a telegram to the Netherlands Minister in Jeddah, Tarbidin, in which he stated that "the Netherlands Government has organised the fullest spiritual guidance and help to the Indonesian Muslims in Australia including building33 mosques and organising Friday prayers; thereby assuring that they return to the Netherlands Indies faithful to Islam and will be Prepared to contribute to the spiritual side of re-construction". Van der Plas requested the Minister to give full publicity to the care of the Dutch authorities in Australia for their Muslim subjects, so that more Indonesians could be recruited into the Dutch secret and civil services (8). On 21 May, R.T. Suriawinata, a senior official at the Dutch Consulate in Jeddah, reported to the Minister of Foreign Affairs in London that Van der Plas’ telegram had been received by “our mukims in Mecca with great gratitude and joy". "The erection of mosques and the holding of Friday prayers in an unknown country for them were very qnuch appreciated" (9). On 7 July, 1943, Hardacre and R. Abdulkadir Widjojoatmodjo went to Jeddah via Cairo to recruit about 100 Indonesians for secret operations in Indonesia. However, they were able to recruit only twenty seven Indonesians: two Javanese, seventeen Sumatrans, two from Kalimantan, one from Sulawesi, one Ambonese and four Timorese. Most of the Indonesian mukims in Mecca whom Abdulkadir Personally spoke to, gave the impression that "it is not our struggle" (Jong, 1986:233)., In the second recruitment mission carried out by Abdulkadir and Hardacre the twenty three of them wished to leave for Australia, while the remaining four candidates expressed their readiness to go to Ceylon. Nevertheless, all the candidates were, finally, sent to Australia where Kendall and Van der Plas received them for training. However, none of them were used as secret agents (Jong,1986: 233,234). The plan to employ Indonesian Muslims from the Holy cities of Islam in the secret services achieved almost nothing. Some of them i| : 34 worked for the Netherlands Indies Government Information Service (NIGIS) in Australia; some were employed in the Dutch Islamic propaganda activities against Japan. Others became housewarders in Rumah Indonesia in Brisbane, which was established in 1943 at the initiative of Van der Plas for the Indonesians who spent the war in Australia (10). A different source of contact with the Indonesian Muslims was from the Boven Digul prison in West Irian (formerly New Guinea). At the beginning of 1943, the Allied forces re-captured some parts of West Irian from’the Japanese. Then, MacArthur recommended that the Indonesian prisoners in Boven Digul who had been jailed by the Dutch before the war, should be transported to Australia, because he felt that the Japanese might free and use them for their own propaganda purposes in Indonesia. The recommendation was approved by the Netherlands and the Australian Governments. In March 1943, several hundred prisoners in Boven Digul were transported to Australia where the majority of them were released by the Dutch a few months later. According to Van der Plas, most of them were anti-Japanese Muslim and communist leaders who had been still kept in prison by the Japanese (Jong,1986:134). Among these Islamic leaders there were H. Djalaluddin Thaib and H. Muchtar Luthfi, who had been imprisoned by the Netherlands Indies Government in 1933, because of their nationalist activities based on Islam. Both of them came originally from the West Coast of Sumatra and were leaders of a political Islamic organisation called Persatuan Muslinin Indonesia (Indonesian Muslim Union or PERMI/) (Noer,19" :50-51 ,154-156) In Australia, Van der Plas established a close contact with these Muslim leaders during the war and appointed them to a section of +35 NIGIS which administered the radio programmes to the Netherlands Indies. In October 1943, he reported to Van Mook that "a number of former Digul exiles openly became my trusty co-operators in anti-Japanese propaganda". They were "especially Muslim leaders from the West Coast of Sumatra" and other nationalist leaders from Java, who all believed that the Queen's speech of December 6 would offer radical changes in Indonesia after the war (Jong,1986:137). Later in 1953 he also told to the Enquéte Commissie that "A very respectful religious leader from the West Coast of Sumatra, namely, H. Muchtar Luthfi, was accommodated in a teahouse (Rumah Indonesia) in Australia. He remained loyal to us and worked together with us. He was an old man; a man whom | respected so much. He had a very important; function in our broadcasts (to Indonesia) and he did excellent work" (Jong, 1986:127). Propaganda was seen by the Allied forces as an important channel to influence public opinion in Indonesia during the war with Japan. At the beginning of 1943, they therefore set up a body called the Allied Political Warfare Committee, of which Van der Plas was a member. Van der Plas expected that propaganda for Islam could be a strong factor in weakening the Japanese position in Indonesia and in turn in maintaining the position of the Dutch there. In that Committee, Van der Plas proposed the guidelines for propaganda, among which there were some suggestions for Islamic propaganda: Van der Plas noted that Islamic propaganda should be directed against certain Japanese measures in Indonesia such as bowing towards the Emperor of Japan in Tokyo and other polytheistic beliefs which were fundamentally against the native culture and especially against Islam. Van der Plas warned the Committee not "to say or write anything which might be construed as siding with a particular; 36 trend in Islam", las Islam had various trends in Indonesia. He said that "in spite of many divisions, Muslims react as a unity as soon as they feel that their religion is attacked from outside, especially by a Christian power". He also warned the Committee not to interfere into affairs of Islam, as this would lead to strong reaction of the Muslims. In his opinion, Islamic propaganda should be made "very carefully and insidiously by or in the name of Muslims, preferably if available, of well-known Muslims" (11). Therefore, in May 1943, an Indo-Arab in Mecca, namely Sayyid Abdurrahman Al-\Massawa who had been a leader of the Arab Islamic and Economic Society in Palembang (Sumatra) before the war was called upon by the Ministry of Colonies in London to take part in Indonesian radio broadcasts for Islamic propaganda in Melbourne (12). In August 1943, Sayyid Al-Massawa was sent to Australia where he developed an Islamic propaganda campaign against Japan (13). As far as the content of these Dutch Islamic propaganda broadcasts was concerned, we know only what we can learn from the letters and memorandums of Van der Plas to senior civil and military authorities. All the texts of the broadcasts which took place under the ‘guidance of NIGIS from Australia to Indonesia were lost during and after the War (Jong,1986:151). In one of his memorandums sent to Bell, Wing-Commander and Officer-in-Charge of Political Warfare of South East Asia, on 22 March 1944, Van der Plas stated that the prudent sermons, based on Quranic texts, were regularly broadcast from Melbourne to Indonesia. Priority in the broadcasts was given to the incompatibility of Islam with Shintoism, ,and to Japanese interference with Islam. In this memorandum, van der Plas also pointed out two specific matters,37 which were to be avoided in Islamic propaganda to Indonesia. First, the so-callec/uli! emr" verses from the Quran which say "Obey Allah and obey His prophet and those of command among you" (Quran:4,59), should not be used in the broadcasts, as they led to controversy especially among the u/amas in Indonesia in the past. Some of the Indonesian ulamas interpreted the word "those" in the verses quoted as referring to the Sultans and Regents; others as to the ulamas as the rightful leaders of the Muslim community. Second, Van der Plas warned against:using Ahmadiya adherents and their leaflets for broadcasts, as they were considered to be heretical by the majority of the Muslims. in Indonesia (14). In another memorandum to MacArthur and Van Mook, Van der Plas stated that "in our broadcasts and leaflets, distributed as far as East Java, obeisance to the Emperor of Japan and to his palace has been called worship of berhala or idol", which was contrary to the Islamic faith (15). The Information from Indonesia collected by the Dutch was mainly confined ‘to radio broadcasts. Therefore, the Dutch officials in Australia knew little about the attitude of the Japanese military authorities towards Islam and its leaders in Indonesia, as the entire country was seaied off by the Japanese. The prevailing idea among them was that the Japanese were acting against Islam and hurting the religious feelings of the pious Muslim people. In March 1944, Van der Plas maintained in one of his memorandums to MacArthur and Van Mook that the kiais were forced by intimidation to follow courses in Japanese ideology and propaganda, which, in his view, would be considéred by many kiais as a sacrilege against Islam. In his memorandum, Van der Plas also stated that the Religious Affairs Office (Kantor Urusan Agama), established by the Japanese in 1943, "has asked everyone who prays, to pray also for the Japanese final38 victory during or after prayers each day". Van der Plas considered this announcement as a "blunder" which would certainly cause great resentment among the Indonesian Muslims (16). In the meantime, On 22 April, 1944, the first piece of Dutch colonial territory; namely Hollandia (now Jayapura) in West Irian, was re-conquered by the American troops of SWPA under the command of General MacArthur. A series of landings were also made along the north coast of West Irian, culminating finally in the occupation of Morotai, a small island off Halmahera, on 15 September 1944. The United States Government, in particular its representative in the SWPA, General MacArthur, did not however wish to interfere in the civil administration of the territories liberated from Japan, because the SWPA had no civil affairs section. On 10 December, 1944, Van Mook and the SWPA therefore concluded a Civil Affairs Agreement recognising the Netherlands Indies Civil Administration (NICA) as the sole authority on matters related to the civil population. It was agreed that the NICA would resume as rapidly as practicable, throughout combat areas, full responsibility for the civil administration of the re-occupied former Netherlands territories (17). Thus, the NICA detachments always accompanied the military forces in the areas liberated from Japan and, with the advantage of access to the American war machine, they were able to re-establish the’ Dutch administration in West Irian shortly after American troops had arrived. In anticipation of an eventual Allied victory, the Dutch officials in London also felt that a provisional Netherlands Indies Government somewhere near Indonesia should be established. On 14 December, 1944, Van Mook was therefore re-appointed as the Lieutenant Governor-General (or Acting Governor-General) in the Netherlands39 Indies. However, it was not till 3 March 1945 that he reached Australia to set up a Netherlands Indies Government-in-exile in Camp Columbia ‘near Brisbane. This Government-in-exile consisted of Van Mook and seven Heads of Departments, which together with the Lieutenant Governor-General constituted a Council. It carried constitutional responsibility under the supreme control of the Minister of Colonies, who himself remained responsible to the Netherlands Parliament for the government of the Netherlands Indies (Van Mook,1949:50). In the following months, this Government-in-exile in Australia was busy laying: down its plans and policies for the restoration of Dutch rule in the Indonesian Archipelago. The establishment of the civil administration during the restoration period was one of its main concerns. On 17 March, 1945, Van der Plas, then Director of Binnenlandse Bestuur, submitted a memorandum to Van Mook, in which he argued that the Dutch forces could face great difficulties on their arrival in Indonesia, and that the civil affairs, with the assistance of Allied forces, could not be run properly if the co-operation of ‘indonesian native administrators, police, eminent intellectuals and Muslim leaders was not secured. He stressed the need for a firm, Indonesian administrative corps with distinguished Regents at the top and prominent intellectuals, police and Muslim leaders under them (Nortier,1985:295). On 14 August, 1945, the Netherlands Indies Council gathered in Camp Colombia to discuss the measures to be taken by the Government in the event of the Japanese capitulation. The Council decided to send four top NICA representatives to Jakarta, Padang, Vein Lame) Makassat-and Banjarmasin to assist the Allied military forces on their arrival in ‘these cities. During the meeting, Van der Plas Cy40 advocated the idea of co-operation with the Muslim leaders during the restoration period. He put forward a proposal to appoint a Muslim leader to the Royal Netherlands Indies Army (Koninklijk Nederlands Indisch Leger’ or KNIL) as the Army Religious Officer (or Leger-Ulama) who, at the same time, would serve as an adviser to the Chief Commanding Officer, NICA for Sumatra. The proposal was accepted by other members of the Council. It was agreed that H. Djalaluddin Thaib should be appointed "leger-ulama" for the detachment of Padang, whose commander was Colonel De Rooy (18). Van der Plas described H. Djalaluddin Thaib as "a respectful Muslim leader" not only among the modernist Muslims in West Sumatra, but also among the adat parties there, because he was not strongly opposed to the adat (19). In accordance with this decision, H. Thaib was officially appointed by the government as the temporary “reserve leger-ulama" with the rank of a first class Major in the KNIL on 20 August, 1945 (20). The following: day, the Netherlands Indies Government-in-exile, through its Department of Internal Affairs, also released a Government decree which provided for the establishment of a High Council for Islamic Affairs (Hogen Raad voor Islamitische Zaken). The main task of the Council would be to advise the Government in all affairs that concerned Islam. However, the decree provided the Government with a strong voice in the activities and recommendations of the Council. It would consist of a Chairman and seven members at most, chosen from the authoritative people in Islam and from the penghulus (or mosque directors). The chairman and the seven members should be appointed by the Governor-General for a period of five years and could be dismissed by him only with the full agreement of the members of the Council for the following41 reasons: at their own request for health reasons; if they had been given a prison sentence, except for an minor offence; or because of their immoral i life-style. The Council could put forward recommendations to the government and be asked by the Governor-General and Governors about all affairs concerning Islam. The Governor-General could also instruct the members of the Council to set up local inquiries. Most important, the Governor-General had the ultimate authority to approve and to make Public the recommendations of the Council. The meetings of the Council would not be open to the public, while the regulation of the meetings was to be left to the members themselves. In addition, the decree included a provision which stated that the President of the Court for Islamic Affairs would be an ex-officio member of that Council. H. Djalaluddin Thaib and Sayyid Abdurrahman Al-Massawa were the only available members for the Council at that time. The former was named temporarily as the Acting Chairman of the Council, while the latter became its only other member (21). The designation by the Government of such a High Council for Islamic Affairs appeared to meet the need for a body to act as go-between, linking the government and the Muslim Community. However, the Council never functioned, although Van der Plas urged Van Mook to proceed with its establishment later in March 1946. The then Secretary ot the Government J. Kist who signed the decree told the author that Van der Plas was the architect of the decree and Van Mook agreed with him. (22). One of the Advisers attached to the Lieutenant Governor-General's Cabinet for Islamic Affairs, L. Graf, Stated that he had never seen such a decree. After | told him about its substance, he said, "This can only be a Publicity stunt of Van der Plas" (23).42 ' NOTES 1. See for the full text of the Queen's speech, Yong,1982:200-202. 2. "Memorandum of the Terms of Employment of ....(Agents)", ANRI, Arsip AS, No:754. 3. Enquéte-Commissie Regeringsbeleid, 1940-1945: Militair Beleid 1940-1945. Terugkeer naar Nederlands-Indié, Vol.,VIl|, p.1081 (Getuige B.A. van Deinse). Hereafter ECR. 4. F.W. Coster to Van der Plas, 1 January 1943, ARA, Arch. AS,1, 22,35. ; 5. Van der Plas to Van Mook, 24 February 1943, ARA, Arch. AS,1,22,35. 6. Van der Plas to Van Mook, 23 March 1943, ARA, Arch. AS,1, 22,35. 7. C.G, Roberts to Van der Plas, 14 February 1943, ARA, Arch. AS,1, 22,35. 8. Van der Plas to Tarbidin, 7 May 1943, ARA, Arch. AS,1,22,35. 9. R.T. Suriawinata to Van Kleffens and Van der Plas, 21 May 1943, ARA, Arch. AS,1,22,35. 10. The recruitment work among the mukims in Mecca was organised later in 1944 and 1945 by the Netherlands representatives in Saudi Arabia: in October 1944, 16 and in January 1945, 9 recruits were sent by ship to Australia (Jong,1986:234,no.1). With regard to the previous recruits Roy Kendall later (1954) said that "A very specialised unit called Secret Intelligence Australia, namely Section Secret Intelligence of the Allied Intelligence Bureau was formed to deal with subversive actions. Some of its more interesting operations concerned the introduction of native Muslim priests (namely Indonesian mukims: Islam does not recognise any priesthood) into Indonesia and elswhere. The real43 Purpose was to collect intelligence, but it also contributed to maintaining Islamic solidarity to offset the current racial Propaganda" (Jong,1986:276). 11. A memorandum of Van der Plas, "Draft for a Tentative Master Plan of Political Warfare directed to the Netherlands Indies", 15 April 1943, ARA, Van Mook Collection, No:8. 12. Van Mook to:Van der Plas, 7 May 1943 and Van der Plas to Van Mook, 8 May 4943, ARA, Arch. AS,1,22,35. 13. Van Mook to Van der Plas, 16 August 1943, ARA, Arch. AS,1,22,35. 14. Van der Plas to Bell, "Islam Propaganda and Observations in New Delhi", 22 March 1944, ARA, Van der Plas Collection, B-5,15. 15. Van der Plas to MacArthur and Van Mook, 22 March 1944, ARA, Arch. AS,1,22,35. 16. Van der Plag to MacArthur and Van Mook, 27 March 1944, ARA, Arch. AS,1,22,35. For the Japanese policy towards Indonesian Islam, see Benda, 1958:103-194. 17. ECR, Vol.,VIll, pp.632-634. 18. OBNIB, Vol.,|, p.22 19. Van der Plas to Van Mook, "Leger-Oelamas", 11 and 13 August 1945, ANRI, Arsip AS, No:753. 20. J.G. Kist, Decree No:8, 20 August 1945, ARA, Arch. AS,2,3411. 21. J.G. Kist, Decree No:3, 21 August 1945, ARA, Arch. AS,1,22,25. 22. Interview with J.G. Kist (by phone), The Hague, 25 April, 1988. 23. Interview with L. Graf, Zeist, 14 May, 1988. ‘44 CHAPTER TWO ISLAM AND THE EMERGENCE OF THE REPUBLIC OF " INDONESIA, MAY-DECEMBER 1945. 1. Islam and Its place in the Constitution. The establishment of an independent state of Indonesia was a long-held desire of the Indonesian people. The Indonesians got their real chance to fulfill this desire at the end of the Second World War. On 7 September, 1944, the Japanese Prime Minister Koiso promised officially and publicly to give Indonesia its independence "sometime in the near future". From September 1944, the Japanese also made some goodwill gestures. The singing of "Indonesia Raya" (Indonesial the Great), later to become the national anthem of Indonesia, was no| longer prohibited. ‘again. The Indonesian red and white flag was also allowed to be flown beside with the Japanese flag (Darmaputera,1982:288). The promised independence by the Japanese began to come into reality with the governmental declaration of March 1st, 1945, which resulted in the setting up of a Study Committee for the Preparation of Indonesian Independence. This Study Committee was instituted in Jakarta on 29 April, 1945; and it was composed of 62 of the leading members of Indonesian society including the leaders of the Islamic organisations, such as Muhammadiyah, Nahdatul Ulama and Masjumi. Dr. Radjiman Wediodiningrat, a Javanese nobleman and veteran of the independence movement before the War, was appointed by the Japanese to chair the meetings of the Committee. The Study Committee was to consider the basic questions and to draft major plans for the future independent state of Indonesia. It held two45 plenary meetings, the first from May 29 to June 1, and the second from July 10 to July 17, 1945. The Committee members gathered on 29 May, 1945 to study and discuss the question of the structure of the state that was going to be proclaimed. The basic matters concerned questions of the form, boundaries, and philosophical basis of the state and the making of a state constitution. While discussions about form and boundaries went smoothly, the debates about the basic philosophy of the state were the most! difficult and heated ones. To gain a proper understanding of the political aims of the Indonesian Muslim community, it ‘appeared to be necessary to examine these discussions at some length. During the discussions there emerged two opposing groups: the Muslim leaders and the "secular" nationalists. The political aspirations of the Muslim leaders were that the state should be based on the principles of Islam and that this be explicitly stated in the Constitution. This idea was supported by 20% of the members of the Committee. The "secular" nationalist members, who were the majority in the Committee, consisting of 80% of the membership argued that religion (in this respect: Islam) must be separated from politics and they advocated the establishment of a national state based on secular nationalism. Muhammad Hatta, personally a devout Muslim from the West Coast of Sumatra, argued that Indonesia should be a unitary state; if so, it necessarily followed that state affairs should be separated from religious matters. A Javanese member of the Study Committee, Supomo, supported him and explained in some detail that the future Indonesian state should not be an Islamic one, but a national unitary one. Supomo said:46 “Supposing we create an Islamic State - then dissension will also arise in our society, and this Study Committee will probably also get into difficulties when deliberating the question. But gentlemen, creating an Islamic State in Indonesia would mean that we are not creating a unitary state. Creating an Islamic State in Indonesia would mean setting up a state that is going to link itself to the largest group, the Islamic group. If an Islamic State is created in Indonesia, then certainly the problem of minorities will arise, the problem of small religious groups, of Christians and others. Although an Islamic State will safeguard the interests of other, groups as well as possible, these smaller religious groups will certainly not be able to feel involved in the state. Therefore, the ideals of an Islamic state do not agree with the ideals of a unitary state which we all have so passionately looked forward to (Boland,1982:20). On the closing day of the session, June 1st, 1945, Sukarno made a speech before the Study Committee. First, he emphasized the unity between all groups in the Committee, and then he outlined his five principles, Pancasila, to be the philosophical foundation of the independent Indonesian state. The first principle was nationalism in the sense of an awareness of being together as one nation, but not in the narrow chauvinistic sense like “Indonesia Uber Alles". The second principle was, therefore, to be internationalism or humanitarianism. The third should be democracy or mutual deliberation by means of representation in order to bring about general agreement. While speaking of the third principle, he said: “For Muslims, this is the best place to promote religion. We, | too, we are Muslims - a thousand apologies, my being a Muslim is far from perfect | - but if you opened my breast and could see my heart, then what you would see is surely an Islamic heart. ‘And this Islamic heart of "Bung Karo" wants to defend Islam by mutual agreement, achieved by deliberation, namely in Parliament... That is the place to prométe the demands of Islam... If we really are an Islamic people, let us then work as hard as we can, to see that the greatest number of seats in the Parliament which we shall form will be held by Islamic representatives... If we take it that Parliament has 100 members, then let us work, work as hard as Possible, so that 60, 70, 80 ,90, of the representatives sitting in Parliament will be Muslims, Islamic leaders. Then the laws which Parliament promulgates47 will naturally’be Islamic laws. Yes, | am even convinced that only when something ike this happens, only then can it be said that Islam really lives in the soul of the people, so that 60%, 70%, 80% ,90%, of the representatives are Muslims, Islamic'ileaders, Islamic ulamas... Accept principle number three ... And let the Muslims and Christians work as hard as possible in Parliament. If, for instance, the Christians want every letter of the regulations of the state of Indonesia to be in agreement with the Bible, let them work as if their lives depended on it, so that a large propotion of the representatives who are members of parliament will be Christians. That is reasonable -"fair play" (Boland, 1982:22,23). Sukarno proposed the fourth principle as the social welfare and the fifth, Belief in God, which was not only of importance for the Indonesian people in general, but also for every Indonesian personally. Each: one should believe in his own God in accordance with his own religion: the Muslims should believe in God in accordance with Islamic faith and the Christians believe in God in conformity with Christian faith and so on...(Feith and Castles, 1970:40-49). For several days after the first meeting was adjourned on June ist, Islam and Pancasila confronted each other in the making of a Constitution for’ the Indonesian state. Disagreements between the advocates and opponents of a state on the basis of Islam or on the Pancasila did ‘not come to an end. In view of the fact that the majority of the Indonesian people adhered to the Islamic faith, the voting system was also not used to solve the problem. It was felt that this might cause a serious political conflict among the people. Therefore, a modus vivendi was sought to bring the opinions of the two sides closer to each other (Maarif,1985:89). At the initiative of Sukarno, on 22 June, a sub-committee of 9 was appointed, consisting of Sukarno, Muhammad Hatta, Muhammad Yamin, Subardjo and A.A. Maramis (a Christian) representing the48 "secular" and Wahid Hasjim, H. Agus Salim, Abdulkahar Muzakkir and Abikusno Tjokrosujoso representing the Islamic camp to study further the constitutional place of Islam in the state. In the end, the sub-committee reached a compromise, which became known later as the Jakarta Charter. In this compromise, the Pancasila was accepted as the basis of the state, but the principle of Belief in God was given first place expanded with the following clause "with the obligation for adherents of Islam to practise Islamic law". This clause was also to be included in the preamble of the Constitution and its Article on religion (Boland,1982:25,26; Van Dijk,1981:47,48). The Study Committee met again from July 10 to 17, 1945. First, Sukarno told about the initial difficulties between the representatives of the Islamic and "secular" (nationalist) bloc and the final agreement achieved by the nine members of the sub-committee. Then, the Jakarta Charter was read before the members of the Study Committee as a draft for the preamble of the Constitution. Finally, debates were conducted firstly on the form of government (republic or kingdom) for the new state and 55 members out of 64 voted for a Republic. Then, preparatory discussions were held on the coming Constitution. A sub-committee of 19 members was formed to draft the Constitution. On the following day, when this sub-committee met under the chairmanship of Sukarno for a preliminary discussion of the main problems in connection with the Constitution, objections arose from the Christian and "secular" nationalist members to the inclusion of the clause at issue in the preamble of the Constitution. On the Christian side, Uatuharhary (from Maluku) expressed his objections to the clause, although it did not apply to the adherents of the Christian faith. He stated that the clause in the Constitution could49 have considerable consequences for other religions and could lead to difficulties in connection with the adat (customary) law. He was supported by Wongsonegoro and Husein Djajadiningrat who both had a traditional Javanese aristocratic background. They argued that the clause "may create fanaticism, because it seems that Muslims would be forced to keep the sharia (Islamic law)". Sukarno reminded them that the preamble had been arrived at with great difficulty and was the result of an agreement between the Islamic and "secular" nationalist factions; the omission of this one sentence, he said, would be unacceptable to Muslims. In the end, Sukarno appointed a working-committee which was to Prepare a draft. Constitution. This working-committee consisted of Supomo (as chairman), Wongsonegoro, Subardjo, Maramis, Singgih, H. Agus Salim and Sukiman (as members). The draft Constitution Prepared by this working-committee did not include the clause, “with the obligation for adherents of Islam to practise Islamic law", in its Article on religion, which had been agreed upon by the nine signatories of the Jakarta Charter. The Article on religion in the draft Constitution ran as follows: "The State shall guarantee for every inhabitant to adhere to whatever religion he wants and to worship according to his own religion". On 13 July, 1945, the sub-committee discussed the draft Constitution. It was obvious that a crisis was threatening again during the discussions. The leader of the Masjumi K. Wahid Hasjim, who was not included in the working-committee, Proposed that Islam should be the religion of the state and the head of state, the president, be of the Islamic faith. The Article on religion, which he Proposed should read as follows: "The religion of the state is Islam, with the guarantee of freedom for adherents of other religions to