295

Review essay

Agnes Heiler on everyday life

A discussion of Agnes Heller, Everyday Life (London: Routledge and

Kegan Paul, 1984)

R I C H A R D WOLIN
Department o f History; Rice UniversiO'

The attempt to render everyday life accessible to philosophical categor-

ies, or to bring philosophical categories to bear on everyday life, is cer-
tainly not without precedent. Perhaps it is to Aristotle that one's
thoughts turn first because it was he, in the Niehomochean Ethics, who
recaptured the specificity of phronesis or the practical life, a specificity
that had seemingly been lost in Plato's attempts in the Republic to sub-
sume the sphere o f practical knowledge directly under categories drawn
from the theoretical sphere. In this sense, Aristotle's penchant for analyt-
ical reasoning served him well, because his famous distinction between
different types o f knowledge - theoria, phronesis, and techne - al-
lowed him, unlike Plato, to perceive the all i m p o r t a n t fact that the sphere
o f practical life does not admit o f the type o f apodeictic certainty we
have come to expect o f the theoretical sphere; rather it yields a type o f
knowledge that admits o f judgments o f degree, o f the " m o r e or the less"
rather than absolute judgments. In this sense, it was Aristotle who was
able to h a r k back to the " m o r a l " spirit o f Socratic inquiry, for which
questions concerning the nature o f the good or just life occupied center
stage. It is an admirable sensitivity to these matters that pervades the en-
tirety o f the Nichomachean Ethics, which is in effect an elaborate
philosophical justification o f the " g o o d life" - the summurn bonurn in
the practicaI sphere - vis-a-vis "mere life"; even if he concludes the
work in eminently neo-Platonic fashion by singing the praises o f the con-
templative life as the noblest life o f all. Heller quite legitimately ac-
knowledges Aristotle (on w h o m she has written an earlier work) as one
o f her precursors in this sphere o f practical philosophical inquiry.

Theory and Society 16:295-304 (1987)

@ ~Iartinus N i j h o f f Publishers, Dordrecht - Printed in the Netherlands
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As a rule, the history o f philosophy has failed to live up to Aristotle's

precedent, viz., his sanctification o f everyday life as a valid field o f
philosophical investigation. To be sure, "ethics" has been enthroned
(along with epistemology and aesthetics) as one o f the three m a j o r
branches o f philosophical research. Yet, for the most part, the official
c a n o n o f ethical philosophy has in a neo-Platonic vein scorned the world
of the everyday as unworthy o f serious philosophical scrutiny, treating
its subject matter in abstracto, so as to make it all the more amenable
to absolute, as opposed to relative (the type categorized by Aristotle as
admitting o f distinctions o f "the more or the less,") judgments. Perhaps
the extreme manifestation o f this tendency was Kant's second Critique,
in which it is suggested that we can realize our essence as moral beings
only in the other-worldly sphere o f n o u m e n a l existence, whereas the
everyday sphere o f empirical reality is c o n d e r m e d a priori to endure a
contingent and senseless fate.

If such tendencies have been ameliorated in the case o f twentieth-century

philosophy, it is largely owing to the gains o f the phenomenological
movement, which appeared on the intellectual scene in opposition to the
stale academicism o f neo-Kantianism, inspired we are told by the battle-
cry "Back to the things themselves!" Indeed, in her "Preface to the En-
glish E d i t i o n , " Hetler openly acknowledges the manifest p h e n o m e n o -
logical influences that inform the method, if not the value-standpoint,
o f Everyday Life. It is, to be sure, a rich and copious philosophical tradi-
tion to draw from, especially when one's theme is o f such a concrete na-
ture. In this tradition, one has works o f magisterial stature on which one
can build - Heidegger's Being and Time and Husserl's The Crisis of the
European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. Yet what lends
Heller's work its own unique and infinitely valuable character is the
specific way in which she departs from the classical texts of twentieth-
century phenomenology. Indeed, her singular and laudable achievement
in Everyday Life is to have supplemented the healthy phenomenological
regard for the concrete detail with a value-framework drawn from the
Hegelian-Marxist tradition; a process that goes far toward transforming
a doctrine - p h e n o m e n o l o g y - at times stultifyingly conservative in its
implications into a m o d e o f analysis fraught with emancipatory sig-
nificance and potential.

The radicaldifference that makes itself felt immediately in Heller's trans-

figuration o f ' t h e phenomenological m e t h o d can be simply stated as fol-
lows. In o r t h o d o x phenomenological discussions o f the everyday, one
often has the feeling that the latter is treated as an insurmountable given,
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a series o f untranscendentable existential constants. Indeed, the

methodological prejudices of traditional p h e n o m e n o l o g y would seem to
preclude reaching any other conclusion. In Heidegger's case, for exam-
ple, the biases o f " f u n d a m e n t a l o n t o l o g y " lead to the suppression o f his-
tory, hence potential for change, and the search for the essential struc-
tures o f h u m a n existence that hold sway with the iron necessity o f fate.
In Being and Time there is no Bildungsprozess at work through which
one might bridge the gap between the analytic o f Dasein in its ordinary
everydayness, on the one hand, and that o f Dasein as authenticity, on
the other. Rather there are the " m a n y " (das Man) and the "elect"; and
thus a new elite spiritual aristocracy is ordained. F r o m this markedly un-
democratic vantage point, it is but a small step to Heidegger's invidious
political life-choices in the 1930s.

One could register complaints o f a kindred nature with reference to the

later Husserl's interest in a transcendental p h e n o m e n o l o g y o f the life-
world. By virtue o f the phenomenological reduction he seeks to repro-
duce the essential structures o f the life-world - whose distinguishing
feature is a pre-scientific "natural attitude" - in their original, pristine
givenness. Yet, herein the far from inconsequential biases o f the
phenomenological project make themselves keenly felt. Insofar as the
stated desideratum o f p h e n o m e n o l o g y is the recapturing o f the life-
world in its quasi-natural immediacy, any and every evaluative dimen-
sion o f the project drops out o f account, and one is in essence left with
a servile reduplication o f the given as such, however glorified via the tech-
nique o f Wesenerschauung or intuition o f essences. Moreover, like
Heidegger, the ontological biases o f Husserl's approach tend to hyposta-
tize structures o f the life-world that are eminently historical in nature by
treating them as eternal, unalterable constants. Hence, unless it is subject
to some thoroughgoing revisions, the phenomenological m e t h o d invites
an attitude that is complacent to the extreme concerning prospects o f
transforming the given life-world along more h u m a n e lines.

It is through the normative framework that she develops - one o f (ear-

ly) Marxian and Luk~icsian inspiration - and brings to bear on
p h e n o m e n o l o g y as m e t h o d that Heller is able to give the latter school
o f thought the radical twist it needs to become serviceable for emancipa-
tory ends. To be sure, this is not an undertaking by any means without
precedent. In this respect, one finds significant precursors in the
" p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l Marxist" tradition, in which the names o f Merleau-
Ponty, Sartre, and Kosik stand out, along with the Italian school, A. Ban-
fi, E. Paci, P. A. Rovatti, and others. Yet, that Heller's Everyday Life
298

represents a uniquely successful merger o f these two theoretical currents,

p h e n o m e n o l o g y and Hegelian Marxism, c a n n o t be explained in terms o f
the history o f ideal alone. Instead, this is a work (written in 1970) that
fully bears the stamp o f the events o f May 1968; the latter are clearly the
immediate historical circumstances in which Everyday Life was nurtured
and brought to fruition. A n d no matter how distant these events might
seem from the present historical vantage point, they represent neverthe-
less a type o f watershed in the history o f radical praxis as the definitive
reminder that radical social change remains irreducible to, e.g., a given
series o f economic reforms, or, say, a wholesale change in political struc-
tures, but instead concerns the entirety o f a way o f life, including the
realm o f everyday h u m a n interpersonal relationships. Undoubtedly, this
was very much the point Marx had in mind in the Paris Manuscripts
when he suggests that under socialism even the five senses will be trans-
formed.

In one sense, Heller's interests remain ontological: like phenomenology,

she, too, is interested in fleshing out the essential structures o f h u m a n
life in its everydayness. On the other hand, she escapes the latent
positivistic complacency o f o r t h o d o x phenomenological approaches
through an extremely incisive and subtle employment of Hegelian cate-
gories. Methodologically, one might describe her undertaking as both an
Hegelian overcoming (Aufhebung) o f p h e n o m e n o l o g y and a
phenomenological overcoming o f Hegel. This is because one o f the dis-
tinctive features o f Everyday Life is that one finds neither the sphere o f
concrete particularity exhausted by an abstract conceptual framework,
nor the conceptual framework itself obsequiously sacrificed on the altar
o f concrete immediacy. Instead, the Hegelian dimension of the work,
which accords it its fluidity, allows it to break through the rigidity o f the
phenomenological yearning for fixed structures, insofar as everyday life
and its elements are conceived o f from the standpoint o f becoming rath-
er than being, i.e., as a reality in process and hence susceptible to histori-
cal influence and change. In a word, what distinguishes Heller's treat-
ment o f the thematic o f everyday life from her phenomenological
precursors is the category o f mediation: that is, rather than being al-
lowed to languish into its indigent immediate state, everyday life is exam-
ined in terms o f its intrinsic potential for self-transcendence in the direc-
tion o f what Heller, following the early Marx, refers to as its
"species-essential" character; viz., its capacity to attain a level in which
its content becomes truly universal from the standpoint o f the interests
o f humanity in general.
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In Everyday Life Heller expands and deepens this highly mediated treat-
m e n t o f the category itself via the introduction o f a series o f extremely
rich and original philosophical categories. One such category is that o f
the " p e r s o n " conceived o f in terms o f the modalities o f " p a r t i c u l a r i t y "
a n d "individuality." It is soon apparent that the latter two concepts
stand in relation to each other as " i m m e d i a c y " to " m e d i a t i o n . " Yet, as
Hegel knew best, " m e d i a t i o n " can only be obtained by way o f the
(necessary) detour o f immediacy; or, as he expresses it tersely in the
Science of Logic, "Essence must a p p e a r . " Hence, the m o m e n t s o f " i m -
m e d i a c y " a n d " m e d i a t i o n " stand in a necessary relation to one another.
It is ill-advised (not to m e n t i o n impossible) to a t t e m p t to skip the f o r m e r
a n d proceed directly to the latter. As far as the category o f the " p e r s o n "
in its particularity is concerned, the latter a p p e a r s as its sine qua n o n for
its a t t a i n m e n t o f the mediated, higher plateau of "individuality." For to
begin with, the category o f " p e r s o n - c u r e - p a r t i c u l a r i t y " indicates a fun-
d a m e n t a l capacity for self-expression without which it would be
meaningless to speak o f the person as an entity. This capacity for self-
expression comes to fruition in the objective world. Heller proceeds to
clarify the species-essential character o f this category as follows: " W i t h -
out self-expression there can be no self-determination or self-
preservation for the h u m a n being; and self-awareness as the synthesis o f
consciousness takes shape as the world becomes objectivized - primari-
ly in work and language. Only one who generalizes can have self-
awareness, self-awareness o f his or her particularity. Work is such a
generalization, and so is the m o s t primitive f o r m o f linguistic exchange.
W h e r e there is no p r o m u l g a t i o n o f h u m a n species-essentiality, there is
no h u m a n particularity" (9). Yet, insofar as the person remains b o u n d
to this p r i m a r y level o f species-objectification - the level o f particulari-
ty - it remains narrow a n d unfulfilled, wedded to the narrow sphere o f
self-interest, perpetually in danger o f lapsing into a type o f " b a d faith"
insofar as it fails to own up to its m o r e universal, hence authentic, poten-
tialities.

It is precisely such potentialities that are outlined in the ensuing discus-

sion o f the person as "individuality. . . . . We give the n a m e o f 'individu-
al,' " observes Heller, "to the person for w h o m his own life is conscious-
ly an object, since he is a conscious species-being" (17). It is far f r o m
accidental that one o f the p a r a m o u n t categories f r o m the young M a r x
- the notion o f species-being - reappears in this context. For the at-
t a i n m e n t o f true individuality entails the dissolution o f all narrow, par-
ticularistic self-interested allegiances, and the elevation to a standpoint
o f total#v, whence the general goals and aspirations o f the species as a
300

whole are perceptible. Hence, the transition f r o m " p a r t i c u l a r i t y " to "in-

dividuality" is an act o f self-transcendence, a type o f passage f r o m "con-
sciousness" to "self-consciousness." This is precisely what the M a r x o f
the Paris Manuscripts identified as one o f the key aspects o f "species-
b e i n g , " i.e., that h u m a n projects are realized according to a conscious
plan and intention, that h u m a n i t y does not merely labor under the dic-
tates o f necessity, but is simultaneously capable of free creation accord-
ing to the laws o f beauty.

Heller observes that authentic individualities b e c o m e the representative

figures o f an epoch, those persons w h o embody, as it were, the highest
qualities o f a given age f r o m the s t a n d p o i n t o f its potential c o n t r i b u t i o n
to the realm o f humanistic ends. As Heller c o m m e n t s : " I t is the in-
dividualities - particularly those m o s t developed individualities who
have m o s t successfully a b s o r b e d the value-substances, to w h o m we shall
refer as 'representative individuals' - who individually incorporate the
evolutionary generic m a x i m a o f a given society" (16). It is the emphasis
on the generalizability o f the principles e m b o d i e d in the "representative
individuals" that strongly differentiates t h e m f r o m the parallel discus-
sion o f "authenticity" in Heidegger's Being and Time.

A n o t h e r key distinction employed by Heller to distinguish species-

objectifications that merely exist at the level o f pure being a n d those that
have been elevated to the realm o f essentiality is that between objectiva-
tion "in itself" and " f o r itself." To begin with, Heller differentiates "ob-
jectifications" f r o m "objectivations." The latter tend to be characterized
by some relation to the plane o f species-essentiality, either at the level o f
the in-itself or the for-itself, whereas the f o r m e r possess what might be
described as a more contingent status vis-/t-vis the realm o f h u m a n
projects. Yet, according to Heller, all species-essential objectivations, be
they at the level o f the in-itself or the for-itself, c o m e to fruition in one
o f three media: "tools and products, customs, and finally, language"
(118).

For Heller, the struggles o f species life very m u c h transpire between these
two poles, the in-itself and the for-itself, the two essential and irreducible
ontological coordinates o f our existence, as it were. However, the real
d r a m a and telos o f h u m a n existence might be described as a constant ef-
fort to t r a n s f o r m what is blind and nature-like - the realm o f the in-
itself - into something consciously produced and a p p r o p r i a t e d - the
realm o f the for-itself. There are u n q u e s t i o n a b l y limits o f an ontological
character to the prospects for t r a n s f o r m i n g the f o r m e r into the latter,
 301

a n d here Heller's p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l instincts stand her in g o o d stead.

For there will always be a substrate o f species-objectification that will re-
m a i n unassimilable f r o m the s t a n d p o i n t o f the " h i g h e r " sphere o f the
for-itself; which is to say that realistically speaking the " n a t u r a l " side o f
h u m a n existence - in philosophical terms, often referred to as the realm
o f necessity - will remain ineradicable. N o r is there any reason to sug-
gest or desire that this " n a t u r a l " sphere o f existence should b e c o m e one
d a y eliminable. These are the dreams o f a reductive a n d precipitate wish
for social-epistemological transparency, a world that would have suc-
ceeded s o m e h o w in reducing all res extensa to res congitans, that would
have fulfilled the M u n c h a u s e n e s q u e desire o f constituting itself wholly
a n d without remainder f r o m some infallible, transcendent, A r c h i m e d e a n
point. H e identifies this with the early m o d e r n project o f the
" m a t h e m a t i c i z a t i o n o f the universe," and one whose deleterious effects
m a k e themselves felt in the c o n t e m p o r a r y world through a process that
has recently been described as the "colonization o f the Iife-world."

At the s a m e time, when speaking o f that s t r a t u m o f the in-itself that will

forever remain irreducible to the sphere o f conscious species design, one
does not want to fall victim to the opposite extreme and thus a t t e m p t to
m a k e a virtue out o f a necessity. This is a trap one finds all too often
in hermeneutics o f Heideggerian derivation, which tend to celebrate
aspects o f h u m a n contingency by endowing t h e m with a false aura o f
g r a n d e u r - the category o f Geworfenheit or " t h r o w n n e s s , " for example.
It is conversely to Heller's credit that while she, on the one hand, ac-
knowledges the " o n t o l o g i c a l " side o f the ledger, on the other h a n d her
Hegelian impulses prevent her f r o m resting content with an a p o c r y p h a l
glorification o f the given for its own sake. Rather, in principle the telos
o f h u m a n i t y (considered in its species-essential aspects) m u s t be viewed
as a labor o f t r a n s f o r m i n g w h a t is merely in-itself into something "in
a n d for itself"). Here an admirable moral c o m p o n e n t enters into Heller's
thought, a dimension inconceivable f r o m a Heideggerian standpoint
where m o r a l i t y is s u b m e r g e d under the oppressive weight o f unalterable
ontological structures. This so-called " m o r a l d i m e n s i o n " is p e r h a p s best
captured in the following claim: "All objectivations 'for itself', e m b o d y
h u m a n freedom, and express the degree o f f r e e d o m achieved by h u m a n i -
ty at any given time" (119). In this sense "progress in the consciousness
o f f r e e d o m " - which was also Hegel's criterion - becomes the stan-
dard t h r o u g h which the m o r a l progress o f h u m a n i t y becomes susceptible
to m e a s u r e m e n t . W h e n viewed f r o m a n o t h e r perspective, viz., that o f the
early Marx, advances in the realm o f h u m a n f r e e d o m entail a parallel
d i m i n u t i o n o f h u m a n alienation, in terms o f a progressive t r a n s f o r m a -
302

tion o f those species-objectifications that are in principle capable o f be-

ing elevated to the plane of the for-itself, yet which remain unjustly im-
prisoned at the level o f the in-itself. In s u m m a r y , to the extent to which
customs and habits that are " s i m p l y there," with the blind force o f tradi-
tion behind them, b e c o m e explicitly thematized and reflected u p o n -
a conscious object o f h u m a n m o r a l intention - the in-itself is translated
into the for-itself and the world becomes increasingly a d e q u a t e to the de-
m a n d s o f h u m a n freedom. Hence, in salutary contrast to the ethical,
decisionism/relativism that characterizes the m o r a l reflections o f Leben-
sphilosophie in this century and has recently found its way into so-called
poststructuralism, Heller insists on the indispensable necessity o f bring-
ing questions o f truth to bear on ethical matters - a point in terms o f
which she is clearly aligned with the m o r a l t h o u g h t o f Jfirgen H a b e r m a s .
It is the process o f t r a n s f o r m i n g " m e r e " persons into fulfilled individual-
ities, o f t r a n s f o r m i n g objectivations that are merely in-itself into ones
that are " f o r us," that Heller seems to identify as the species-essential
project o f the m o d e r n age.

I f one passes f r o m the level o f the everyday to that o f the less par-
ticularistic plane o f the "generic," one is compelled to take into con-
sideration aspects o f non-everyday life that nevertheless penetrate and
shape the latter, often in decisive fashion. At this "generic" level, Heller
locates the activities o f science, philosophy, a n d art and their effects on
the sphere o f the everyday. Scientific knowledge was b o r n with a
defetishizing mission, which in the m o d e r n age runs the perpetual risk
o f turning into a new fetish: the a s s u m p t i o n that empirical knowledge
o f the scientific type represents the only valid access to truth; a self-
misunderstanding whose p r o n o u n c e d repercussions for the sphere o f
everyday life can be universally felt, e.g. in terms o f the d e m o t i o n to the
r a n k o f " s e c o n d - o r d e r " questions the t h e m a t i z a t i o n o f essential norma-
tive a n d value-related issues, u p o n which the at least as crucial non-
technical a d v a n c e m e n t o f the species hinges - progress in the advance-
m e n t o f freedom, to take just one example. W h e n such n o r m a t i v e ques-
tions are unfairly a n a t h e m a t i z e d as pre-scientific or even n o n - r a t i o n a l
one fosters a "positivistic c o m m o n consciousness" ( H a b e r m a s ) charac-
terized by a blind trust in scientific/technologicaI solutions to the value-
d i l e m m a s of humanity, a faith in the "experts" controlling this knowl-
edge, and a disastrous a b a n d o n m e n t o f the political sphere to a
bureaucratic-administrative elite. Only in recent years has a dim aware-
ness o f the social, environmental, and cultural consequences o f this men-
tality surfaced, an awareness that has often taken the f o r m o f new issue-
oriented social movements, whose flaw is often a type of over-
c o m p e n s a t i o n b o r d e r i n g on (at times) neo-primitivism.
 303

"Art is the self-consciousness o f m a n k i n d , " observes Heller, "and works

o f art are always bearers o f species-essence ' f o r - i t s e l f ' . . . at the summit
o f art's scale o f values we find those individuals . . . who have entered
most fully into the process o f species-essential efflorescence" (107). This
discussion o f the "generic" function o f art reveals an (acknowledged) in-
debtedness to the later aesthetics of Luk~ics. Art deals with essentialities,
it paints in strokes that are larger than life in its everyday contingency;
as Heller aptly observes, the sphere o f particularity is foreign to it. Art
is in fact the medium o f pure "individualities" (in Heller's sense o f the
word) rather than " p e r s o n s ; " or at least the " p e r s o n s " who are por-
trayed therein are clearly distinguished by their particularity. In this
sense one might say, to continue Heller's terminological distinction, that
in successful works o f art, even "persons" appear as "individualities,"
while remaining nevertheless " p e r s o n s . " W h e n viewed in these terms art
itself can be seen to play a crucial defetishizing mission vis-~t-vis everyday
life in its particularity; when compared with the essentialities o f art,
everyday life cannot help but seem indigent and wanting. O f course,
historically the separation o f art from the sphere o f the everyday (e.g.,
"art for art's sake"), has always been a double-edged sword. For it has,
under the guise o f aestheticism or the "religion o f a r t , " often fostered
a p e r m a n e n t uncoupling o f the aesthetic sphere from that o f everyday
life, such that the realm o f aesthetic values becomes a pure end in itself.
Hence, it is clearly the mission o f responsible criticism to effectuate the
re-coupling o f art and everyday life; something that cannot be achieved
at the level o f aesthetic objectivation per se, which can itself only subsist
in the sphere o f pure individuality, that is, a sphere in which all par-
ticularity is immediately associated with more universalistic meanings.
As Heller remarks: " W h e n we enjoy and 'appropriate' a work o f art, we
are lifted to the species-essential, like the creator o f the work. It is for
this reason that creative art can act as a morally purifying agent by in-
ducing catharsis" (107).

Philosophical thinking too is beyond the sphere o f the everyday and en-
tails a direct relation to the realm o f species-essentiality. Were it to deal
solely with particularity it would relapse to the level o f the everyday. In
this sense, philosophy also possesses a crucial defetishizing mission, one
Heller has c o m m e n t e d on at length in another recently translated work,
A Radical Philosophy. It is philosophy above all that represents the form
o f species objectivation charged with examining the essential value-
determinations o f humanity; albeit not so that it might present the latter
to the world at an independently derived fair accompli, but so that this
meta-theoretical level o f reflection might influence and mediate in a
304

selective m a n n e r value-controversies on the plane o f the everyday, there-

by elevating the latter sphere, however temporarily, f r o m the plane o f un-
reflected immediacy. For unless it is broken by the power o f reflective
thought, i m m e d i a c y often has the force o f blind compulsion. As such,
it remains alien to the d e m a n d s o f h u m a n freedom. A n d philosophy,
when it steers clear o f its two m o s t dangerous pitfalls, d o g m a t i s m and
relativism, is an essential precondition for the "infinite t a s k " o f trans-
f o r m i n g mere particularity into something consciously chosen and creat-
ed. In this sense, philosophy presents itself as an indispensable concomi-
tant in the struggle for h u m a n autonomy.

F r o m the foregoing discussion - which in truth only scratches the sur-

face o f the work under consideration - it should be a p p a r e n t that
Everyday Life is to say the least an extremely provocative and stimulating
work, one that has the advantage o f transcending the traditional aca-
demic division o f l a b o r in a way that allows it to m a t c h the diversity and
richness o f its subject matter: everyday life in its various m o d e s o f given-
ness, as a conflicting plurality o f i m m e d i a t e and mediated structures. As
such, Heller's b o o k itself represents an a d m i r a b l y cohesive and sustained
l a b o r o f conceptual mediation. It lays crucial g r o u n d w o r k for distin-
guishing between those structures o f everyday life that are at a certain
level necessary and i n s u r m o u n t a b l e - the sphere o f the in-itself - and
those that t h r o u g h the efforts o f a philosophically i n f o r m e d praxis are
subject to the influence o f a self-conscious, e m a n c i p a t o r y intentionality.
To be sure, the hiatus between these two realms o f h u m a n activity is by
no m e a n s something fixed once a n d for all, b u t rather is often indeter-
minate and fluid. In the same vein, Heller's meditations on these themes
c o m e to use in the f o r m o f an " o p e n p h i l o s o p h y " rather t h a n a series
o f received truths. While retaining the rigor o f the philosophical esprit
systematique, there is nonetheless not the least trace o f d o g m a t i s m
a m o n g them. Instead, virtually every line o f Everyday Life implores the
reader to m a k e the transition f r o m the plane o f meta-theoretical reflec-
tion to that o f his or her own everyday life itself, to bridge the gap be-
tween the l a b o r o f conceptual m e d i a t i o n and that o f e m a n c i p a t i o n in the
here and now. In this sense, Everyday Life, like all great works, places
d e m a n d s on its readers.