VII.

NATURE OF CONFLICTS RULE

G.R. No. 122191 October 8, 1998

SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES,  vs. COURT OF APPEALS, MILAGROS P. MORADA and HON. RODOLFO A. ORTIZ,
in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 89, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City

Facts:

SAUDIA hired MORADA as a Flight Attendant for its airlines based in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia while on a lay-over in
Jakarta, Indonesia, she went to a disco dance with fellow crew members Thamer and Allah, both Saudi nationals.
Because it was almost morning when they returned to their hotels, they agreed to have breakfast together at the
room of Thamer. When they were in the room, Allah left. Thamer attempted to rape Morada. Fortunately, a roomboy
and several security personnel heard her cries for help and rescued her. Later, the Indonesian police came and
arrested Thamer and Allah, the latter as an accomplice.

When she returned to Jeddah, several SAUDIA officials interrogated her about the Jakarta incident. They then
requested her to go back to Jakarta to help arrange the release of Thamer and Allah but morada refused to
cooperate.

through the intercession of the Saudi Arabian government, the Indonesian authorities agreed to deport Thamer and
Allah after two weeks of detention. Eventually, they were again put in service by defendant SAUDI. SAUDIA
transferred plaintiff to Manila.

just when plaintiff thought that the Jakarta incident was already behind her, her superiors requested her to see Chief
Legal Officer of SAUDIA, in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. he brought her to the police station where the police took her
passport and questioned her about the Jakarta incident. the police put pressure on her to make a statement dropping
the case against Thamer and Allah. Not until she agreed to do so did the police return her passport and allowed her to
catch the afternoon flight out of Jeddah.

One year and a half later, the Chief Legal Officer of SAUDIA brought her to a Saudi court where she was asked to sign
a document written in Arabic. They told her that this was necessary to close the case against Thamer and Allah. As it
turned out, plaintiff signed a notice to her to appear before the court on June 27, 1993. Plaintiff then returned to
Manila.

SAUDIA summoned plaintiff to report to Jeddah once again for further investigation. Plaintiff did so after receiving
assurance from SAUDIA's Manila manager, that the investigation was routinary and that it posed no danger to her.

In Jeddah, a SAUDIA legal officer brought plaintiff to the same Saudi court. a Saudi judge interrogated plaintiff
through an interpreter about the Jakarta incident. After one hour of interrogation, they let her go. At the airport,
however, just as her plane was about to take off, a SAUDIA officer told her that the airline had forbidden her to take
flight. At the Inflight Service Office where she was told to go, took away her passport and told her to remain in
Jeddah, at the crew quarters, until further orders.

a SAUDIA legal officer again escorted plaintiff to the same court where the judge, to her astonishment and shock,
rendered a decision, translated to her in English, sentencing her to five months imprisonment and to 286
lashes. Only then did she realize that the Saudi court had tried her, together with Thamer and Allah, for what
happened in Jakarta. The court found plaintiff guilty of (1) adultery; (2) going to a disco, dancing and
listening to the music in violation of Islamic laws; and (3) socializing with the male crew, in
contravention of Islamic tradition. 10

Facing conviction, private respondent sought the help of her employer, petitioner SAUDIA. Unfortunately,
she was denied any assistance. She then asked the Philippine Embassy in Jeddah to help her while her
case is on appeal. Meanwhile, to pay for her upkeep, she worked on the domestic flight of SAUDIA, while
Thamer and Allah continued to serve in the international
flights. 

Because she was wrongfully convicted, the Prince of Makkah dismissed the case against her and allowed
her to leave Saudi Arabia. Shortly before her return to Manila, 12 she was terminated from the service by
SAUDIA, without her being informed of the cause.

Morada filed a Complaint 13 for damages against SAUDIA, and its country manager.

SAUDIA filed Motion To Dismiss which raised the following grounds, to wit: (1) that the Complaint states no cause of
action against Saudia; (2) that defendant Al-Balawi is not a real party in interest; (3) that the claim or demand set
forth in the Complaint has been waived, abandoned or otherwise extinguished; and (4) that the trial court has no
jurisdiction to try the case.

Trial court denied the Motion to Dismiss, SAUDIA filed, its Motion for Reconsideration. It alleged that the trial court
has no jurisdiction to hear and try the case on the basis of Article 21 of the Civil Code, since the proper law applicable
is the law of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.,

Court of Appeals rendered the Decision. It ruled that the Philippines is an appropriate forum considering that the
Amended Complaint's basis for recovery of damages is Article 21 of the Civil Code, and thus, clearly within the
jurisdiction of respondent Court.

ISSUE:

WHETHER OR NOT PHILIPPINE LAW SHOULD GOVERN.

Ruling: yes

As to the choice of applicable law, choice-of-law problems seek to answer two important questions:

(1) What legal system should control a given situation where some of the significant facts occurred in two or more
states; and (2) to what extent should the chosen legal system regulate the situation. 53

Before a choice can be made, it is necessary for us to determine under what category a certain set of
facts or rules fall. This process is known as "characterization", or the "doctrine of qualification". It is the
"process of deciding whether or not the facts relate to the kind of question specified in a conflicts
rule." 55 The purpose of "characterization" is to enable the forum to select the proper law. 56

Our starting point of analysis here is not a legal relation, but a factual situation, event, or operative fact.  An
essential element of conflict rules is the indication of a "test" or "connecting factor" or "point of contact". Choice-of-
law rules invariably consist of a factual relationship (such as property right, contract claim) and a connecting factor or
point of contact, such as the situs of the res, the place of celebration, the place of performance, or the place of
wrongdoing. 58

Note that one or more circumstances may be present to serve as the possible test for the determination of the
applicable law. These "test factors" or "points of contact" or "connecting factors" could be any of the
following:

(1) The nationality of a person, his domicile, his residence, his place of sojourn, or his origin;

(2) the seat of a legal or juridical person, such as a corporation;

(3) the situs of a thing, that is, the place where a thing is, or is deemed to be situated. In particular,
the  lex situs is decisive when real rights are involved;
(4) the place where an act has been done, the locus actus, such as the place where a contract has been
made, a marriage celebrated, a will signed or a tort committed. The lex loci actus is particularly important
in contracts and torts;

(5) the place where an act is intended to come into effect, e.g., the place of performance of contractual
duties, or the place where a power of attorney is to be exercised;

(6) the intention of the contracting parties as to the law that should govern their agreement, the  lex loci
intentionis;

(7) the place where judicial or administrative proceedings are instituted or done. The  lex fori  - the law of
the forum - is particularly important because, matters of "procedure" not going to the substance of the
claim involved are governed by it; and because the  lex fori applies whenever the content of the otherwise
applicable foreign law is excluded from application in a given case for the reason that it falls under one of
the exceptions to the applications of foreign law; and

(8) the flag of a ship, which in many cases is decisive of practically all legal relationships of the ship and
of its master or owner as such. It also covers contractual relationships particularly contracts of
affreightment. 

we are convinced that there is reasonable basis for private respondent's assertion that although she was already
working in Manila, petitioner brought her to Jeddah on the pretense that she would merely testify in an investigation
of the charges she made against the two SAUDIA crew members for the attack on her person while they were in
Jakarta. As it turned out, she was the one made to face trial for very serious charges, including adultery and violation
of Islamic laws and tradition.

the "handing over" or "turning over" of Morada to Jeddah officials, SAUDIA may have acted beyond its duties as
employer. SAUDIA’S purported act contributed to and amplified or even proximately caused additional humiliation,
misery and suffering of private respondent. Petitioner thereby allegedly facilitated the arrest, detention and
prosecution of MORADA under the guise of petitioner's authority as employer, taking advantage of the trust,
confidence and faith she reposed upon it. As purportedly found by the Prince of Makkah, the alleged conviction and
imprisonment of private respondent was wrongful. But these capped the injury or harm allegedly inflicted upon her
person and reputation, for which petitioner could be liable as claimed, to provide compensation or redress for the
wrongs done, once duly proven.

Considering that the complaint is one involving torts, the "connecting factor" or "point of contact" could be the
place or places where the tortious conduct or  lex loci actus occurred. And applying the torts principle in a
conflicts case, we find that the Philippines could be said as a situs of the tort (the place where the alleged
tortious conduct took place). This is because it is in the Philippines where petitioner allegedly deceived
MORADA, a Filipina residing and working here. she had honestly believed that SAUDIA would, in the
exercise of its rights and in the performance of its duties, "act with justice, give her due and observe
honesty and good faith." Instead, petitioner failed to protect her, she claimed. That certain acts or parts of
the injury allegedly occurred in another country is of no moment. For in our view what is important here is the place
where the over-all harm or the totality of the alleged injury to the person, reputation, social standing and human
rights of complainant, had lodged. All told, it is not without basis to identify the Philippines as the situs of the alleged
tort.

Moreover, with the widespread criticism of the traditional rule of  lex loci delicti commissi, modern theories and rules
on tort liability 61 have been advanced to offer fresh judicial approaches to arrive at just results. In keeping abreast
with the modern theories on tort liability, we find here an occasion to apply the "State of the most significant
relationship" rule, which in our view should be appropriate to apply now, given the factual context of this case.

In applying said principle to determine the State which has the most significant relationship, the following contacts
are to be taken into account and evaluated according to their relative importance with respect to the particular issue:
(a) the place where the injury occurred; (b) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred; (c) the
domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the parties, and (d) the place where
the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered. 62

As already discussed, there is basis for the claim that over-all injury occurred and lodged in the Philippines. There is
likewise no question that private respondent is a resident Filipina national, working with petitioner, a resident foreign
corporation engaged here in the business of international air carriage. Thus, the "relationship" between the parties
was centered here, although it should be stressed that this suit is not based on mere labor law violations. From the
record, the claim that the Philippines has the most significant contact with the matter in this dispute, 63 raised by
private respondent as plaintiff below against defendant (herein petitioner), in our view, has been properly established.

Philippines is the situs of the tort complained of and the place "having the most interest in the problem",
we find, by way of recapitulation, that the Philippine law on tort liability should have paramount
application to and control in the resolution of the legal issues arising out of this case. Further, we hold that
the respondent Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of the complaint; the
appropriate venue is in Quezon City, which could properly apply Philippine law. Moreover, we find untenable
petitioner's insistence that "[s]ince private respondent instituted this suit, she has the burden of pleading and proving
the applicable Saudi law on the matter." 64 As aptly said by private respondent, she has "no obligation to plead and
prove the law of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia since her cause of action is based on Articles 19 and 21" of the Civil
Code of the Philippines. In her Amended Complaint and subsequent pleadings, she never alleged that Saudi law
should govern this case. 65 And as correctly held by the CA, "considering that it was the SAUDIA who was invoking the
applicability of the law of Saudi Arabia, then the burden was on it to plead and to establish what the law of Saudi
Arabia is". 66

Petitioner SAUDIA claims that before us is a conflict of laws that must be settled at the outset. It maintains that
private respondent's claim for alleged abuse of rights occurred in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. It alleges that the
existence of a foreign element qualifies the instant case for the application of the law of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia,
by virtue of the lex loci delicti commissi rule. 

On the other hand, private respondent contends that since her Amended Complaint is based on Articles 19 35 and
21 36 of the Civil Code, then the instant case is properly a matter of domestic law. 37

Under the factual antecedents obtaining in this case, there is no dispute that the interplay of events occurred in two
states, the Philippines and Saudi Arabia.

Where the factual antecedents satisfactorily establish the existence of a foreign element, the problem herein could
present a "conflicts" case.

A factual situation that cuts across territorial lines and is affected by the diverse laws of two or more states is said to
contain a "foreign element". The presence of a foreign element is inevitable since social and economic affairs of
individuals and associations are rarely confined to the geographic limits of their birth or conception. 40

The forms in which this foreign element may appear are many. 41 The foreign element may simply consist in the fact
that one of the parties to a contract is an alien or has a foreign domicile, or that a contract between nationals of one
State involves properties situated in another State. In other cases, the foreign element may assume a complex form. 

In the instant case, the foreign element consisted in the fact that private respondent Morada is a resident Philippine
national, and that petitioner SAUDIA is a resident foreign corporation. Also, by virtue of the employment of Morada
with the petitioner Saudia as a flight stewardess, events did transpire during her many occasions of travel across
national borders, particularly from Manila, Philippines to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, and vice versa, that caused a
"conflicts" situation to arise.

After a careful study of the private respondent's Amended Complaint, 44 and the Comment thereon, we note that she
aptly predicated her cause of action on Articles 19 and 21 of the New Civil Code.

On one hand, Article 19 of the New Civil Code provides:

Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice give
everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith.

On the other hand, Article 21 of the New Civil Code provides:

Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for damages.

The aforecited provisions on human relations were intended to expand the concept of torts in this
jurisdiction by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is
impossible for human foresight to specifically provide in the statutes.

Although Article 19 merely declares a principle of law, Article 21 gives flesh to its provisions. Thus, we agree with
private respondent's assertion that violations of Articles 19 and 21 are actionable, with judicially enforceable remedies
in the municipal forum.

Based on the allegations  in the Amended Complaint, read in the light of the Rules of Court on jurisdiction 47 we find
that the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City possesses jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit. 48 Its
authority to try and hear the case is provided for under Section 1 of Republic Act No. 7691, to wit:

Weighing the relative claims of the parties, the court  a quo found it best to hear the case in the Philippines. Had it
refused to take cognizance of the case, it would be forcing plaintiff (private respondent now) to seek remedial action
elsewhere,  i.e. in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia where she no longer maintains substantial connections. That would
have caused a fundamental unfairness to her.

Moreover, by hearing the case in the Philippines no unnecessary difficulties and inconvenience have been shown by
either of the parties. The choice of forum of MORADA should be upheld.

Similarly, the trial court also possesses jurisdiction over the persons of the parties herein. By filing her Complaint and
Amended Complaint with the trial court, MORADA has voluntary submitted herself to the jurisdiction of the court.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for  certiorari is hereby DISMISSED. Civil Case No. Q-93-18394 entitled "Milagros P.
Morada vs. Saudi Arabia Airlines" is hereby REMANDED to Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 89 for further
proceedings.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 172342               July 13, 2009

LWV CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION, vs. MARCELO B. DUPO, 

FACTS:

Petitioner, a domestic corporation which recruits Filipino workers, it hired DUPO as Civil Structural Superintendent
to work in Saudi Arabia for its principal, Mohammad Al-Mojil Group/Establishment (MMG). DUPO signed his first
overseas employment contract, renewable after one year. It was renewed five times.

DUPO WENT FOR VACATION IN THE PH, HE informed MMG, through the petitioner, that he needs to extend his
vacation because his son was hospitalized. He also sought a promotion with salary adjustment.3 
Dupo resigned. He claimed for long service award since he worked for more than seven (7 years] services,
as the Saudi Law stated

DUPO filed a complaint for payment of service award against petitioner before the (NLRC),

Under the Law of Saudi Arabia, an employee who rendered at least five (5) years in a company within the
jurisdiction of Saudi Arabia, is entitled to the so-called long service award which is known to others as longevity
pay of at least one half month pay for every year of service. In excess of five years an employee is entitled to
one month pay for every year of service. In both cases inclusive of all benefits and allowances.

This benefit was offered to complainant before he went on vacation, hence, this was engrained in his mind. He
reconstructed the computation of his long service award or longevity pay and he arrived at the following
computation exactly the same with the amount he was previously offered [which is US$12,640.33].

Respondent said that he did not grab the offer for he intended to return after his vacation.

petitioner offered payment and prescription as defenses. Petitioner maintained that MMG "pays its workers
their Service Award or Severance Pay every conclusion of their Labor Contracts pursuant to Article 87 of
the [Saudi Labor Law]." Under Article 87, "payment of the award is at the end or termination of the Labor Contract
concluded for a specific period." Based on the payroll,9 respondent was already paid his service award or severance
pay for his latest (sixth) employment contract.

Petitioner added that under Article 1310 of the Saudi Labor Law, the action to enforce payment of the service
award must be filed within one year from the termination of a labor contract for a specific period.
Respondent’s contract ended when he left Saudi Arabia on April 30, 1999. Petitioner concluded that the one-year
prescriptive period had lapsed because respondent filed his complaint one year and seven months after his
sixth contract ended.11

 the Labor Arbiter ordered petitioner to pay respondent longevity pay of US$12,640.33 or ₱648,562.69 and
attorney’s fees of ₱64,856.27 or a total of ₱713,418.96.13

NLRC affirmed the Labor Arbiter’s decision.14 The NLRC ruled that respondent is entitled to longevity pay which is
different from severance pay.

Court of Appeals affirmed the NLRC. The Court of Appeals ruled that service award is the same as longevity pay,
and that the severance pay received by respondent cannot be equated with service award.

Petitioner points out that the Labor Arbiter awarded longevity pay although the Saudi Labor Law grants no such
benefit, and the NLRC confused longevity pay and service award. Petitioner maintains that the benefit granted by
Article 87 of the Saudi Labor Law is service award which was already paid by MMG each time respondent’s
contract ended.

Issue: WNOT THE ACTION IS BARRED BY PRESCRIPTION

RULING: NO

DUPO’S action has not yet prescribed. What applies is Article 291 of our Labor Code which reads:

ART. 291. Money claims. — All money claims arising from employer-employee relations accruing during the
effectivity of this Code shall be filed within three (3) years from the time the cause of action accrued; otherwise they
shall be forever barred.
As a general rule, a foreign procedural law will not be applied in the forum.  Procedural matters, such as
1avvphi1

service of process, joinder of actions, period and requisites for appeal, and so forth, are governed by the laws of the
forum. This is true even if the action is based upon a foreign substantive law

A law on prescription of actions is sui generis in Conflict of Laws in the sense that it may be viewed either
as procedural or substantive, depending on the characterization given such a law.

However, the characterization of a statute into a procedural or substantive law becomes irrelevant when the country
of the forum has a "borrowing statute." Said statute has the practical effect of treating the foreign statute of limitation
as one of substance. A "borrowing statute" directs the state of the forum to apply the foreign statute of
limitations to the pending claims based on a foreign law. While there are several kinds of "borrowing statutes,"
one form provides that an action barred by the laws of the place where it accrued, will not be enforced in the forum
even though the local statute has not run against it. Section 48 of our Code of Civil Procedure is of this kind. Said
Section provides:

"If by the laws of the state or country where the cause of action arose, the action is barred, it is also barred
in the Philippine Islands."

In the light of the 1987 Constitution, however, Section 48 [of the Code of Civil Procedure] cannot be
enforced. The courts of the forum will not enforce any foreign claim obnoxious to the forum’s public policy.

Dupo’s complaint was filed well within the three-year prescriptive period under Article 291 of our Labor
Code. This point, however, has already been mooted by our finding that respondent’s service award had
been paid, albeit the payroll termed such payment as severance pay.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated December 6, 2005 and Resolution dated
April 12, 2006, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 76843, as well as the Decision dated June 18, 2001 of
the Labor Arbiter in NLRC Case No. RAB-CAR-12-0649-00 and the Decision dated November 29, 2002 and
Resolution dated January 31, 2003 of the NLRC in NLRC CA No. 028994-01 (NLRC RAB-CAR-12-0649-00) are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Complaint of respondent is hereby DISMISSED.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

BIENVENIDO M. CADALIN, vs. PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION’S

ADMINISTRATOR, NLRC, BROWN & ROOT INTERNATIONAL, INC. AND/OR ASIA
INTERNATIONAL BUILDERS CORPORATION
GRN 104776, December 5,1994.

FACTS:

Cadalin, et al. instituted a class suit by filing an “Amended Complaint” with the POEA for money
claims arising from their recruitment by ASIA INTERNATIONAL BUILDERS CORPORATION
(AIBC) and employment by BROWN & ROOT INTERNATIONAL, INC (BRI) which is a foreign
corporation with headquarters in Houston, Texas, and is engaged in construction; while AIBC is a
domestic corporation licensed as a service contractor to recruit, mobilize and deploy Filipino workers
for overseas employment on behalf of its foreign principals.
It sought the payment of the unexpired portion of the employment contracts, which was terminated
prematurely.

Under the AMIRI DECREE OF BAHRAIN, IT APPEARS THAT THEIR SUIT HAS ALREADY
PRESCRIBED.

CADALIN CONTENDS THAT PRESCRIPTION SHOULD BE 10 YRS AS PROVIDED UNDER CIVIL

CODE.

ISSUE:
whether it is the Bahrain law on prescription of action based on the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 or a Philippine law
on prescription that shall be the governing law.

RULING: PH LAW SHOULD GOVERN

As a general rule, a foreign procedural law will not be applied in the forum (local
court), Procedural matters, such as service of process, joinder of actions, period and
requisites for appeal, and so forth, are governed by the laws of the forum. This is true
even if the action is based upon a foreign substantive law.

A law on prescription of actions is sui generis in Conflict of Laws in the sense that it
may be viewed either as procedural or substantive, depending on the characterization
given such a law.

However the characterization of a statute into a procedural or substantive law becomes

irrelevant when the country of the forum (local Court) has a “borrowing statute.” Said statute has
the practical effect of treating the foreign statute of limitation as one of substance. A
“borrowing statute” directs the state of the forum (local Court) to apply the foreign
statute of limitations to the pending claims based on a foreign law. While there are several
kinds of “borrowing statutes,” one form provides that an action barred by the laws of the place where
it accrued will not be enforced in the forum even though the local statute was not run against it.

Section 48 of Code of Civil Procedure is of this kind. It provides: “If by the laws of the state or
country where the cause of action arose, the action is barred, it is also barred in the Philippine
Islands.”

Section 48 has not been repealed or amended by the Civil Code of the Philippines. In the light of
the 1987 Constitution, however, Section 48 cannot be enforced ex proprio vigore
insofar as it ordains the application in this jurisdiction of Section 156 of the Amiri
Decree No. 23 of 1976.

The courts of the forum (local Court) will not enforce any foreign claim obnoxious to
the forum’s public policy. To enforce the one-year prescriptive period of the Amiri
Decree No. 23 of 1976 as regards the claims in question would contravene the public
policy on the protection to labor.

Constitution emphasized that: “The state shall promote social justice in all phases of national
development” (Sec. 10).
‘The state affirms labor as a primary social economic force. It shall protect the rights of workers and
promote their welfare” (Sec. 18).

In Article XIII on Social Justice and Human Rights, the 1987 Constitution provides:
“Sec. 3. The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and unorganized,
and promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all.”

Thus, the applicable law on prescription is the Philippine law.

whether the prescriptive period governing the filing of the claims is 3 years,
as provided by the Labor Code or 10 years, as provided by the Civil Code of
the Philippines.

Article 1144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides:

“The following actions must be brought within ten years from the time the right of action
accross:

(1) Upon a written contract; (2) Upon an obligation created by law; (3) Upon a
judgment”

In this case, the claim for pay differentials is primarily anchored on the written contracts between
the litigants, the ten-year prescriptive period provided by Art. 1144(l) of the New Civil Code should
govern.

2. NLRC ruled that the prescriptive period for the filing of the claims of the complainants
was 3 years, as provided in Article 291 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, and not ten
years as provided in Article 1144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines nor one year as
provided in the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976.

Article 156 of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 provides:

“A claim arising out of a contract of employment shall not actionable after the lapse of one
year from the date of the expiry of the Contract”.
WHEREFORE, all the three petitioners are DISMISSED

RENVOI DOCTRINE

G.R. No. L-16749             January 31, 1963

IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN, DECEASED.

ADOLFO C. AZNAR, Executor and LUCY CHRISTENSEN, Heir of the deceased,
vs. HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA, 

It is in accordance with the above-quoted provisions that the executor in his final account and project of partition
ratified the payment of only P3,600 to Helen Christensen Garcia and proposed that the residue of the estate be
transferred to his daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen.

Opposition to the approval of the project of partition was filed by Helen Christensen Garcia, insofar as it deprives
her (Helen) of her legitime as an acknowledged natural child, she having been declared by Court an
acknowledged natural child of the deceased Edward E. Christensen.

Issue:

ISSUE: Wnot UNDER THE RENVOI DOCTRINE, THE INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE TESTAMENTARY
DISPOSITION OF THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN
SHOULD BE GOVERNED BY THE LAWS OF THE PHILIPPINES.

RULING: YES

There is no question that Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of the United States and of the State of
California at the time of his death. that at the time of his death he was domiciled in the Philippines,

he was born in New York, migrated to California and resided there for nine years, and since he came to the
Philippines in 1913 he returned to California very rarely and only for short visits (perhaps to relatives), and
considering that he appears never to have owned or acquired a home or properties in that state, which would
indicate that he would ultimately NOT abandon the Philippines and make home in the State of California.

The law that governs the validity of his testamentary dispositions is defined in Article 16 of the Civil Code
of the Philippines, which is as follows:

ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is
situated.

However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and
to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be
regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may
be the nature of the property and regardless of the country where said property may be found.

The application of this article in the case at bar requires the determination of the meaning of the
term "national law" is used therein.

the national law mentioned in Article 16 of our Civil Code is the law on California Civil Code, i.e., Article 946,
which authorizes the reference or return of the question to the law of the testator's domicile.
The conflict of laws rule in California, Article 946, Civil Code, precisely refers back the case, when a decedent is not
domiciled in California, to the law of his domicile, the Philippines in the case at bar. The Philippine court must
apply its own law as directed in the conflict of laws rule of the state of the decedent, if the question has to be
decided, especially as the application of the internal law of California provides no legitime for children while the
Philippine law, Arts. 887(4) and 894, Civil Code of the Philippines, makes natural children legally acknowledged
forced heirs of the parent recognizing them.

We therefore find that as the domicile of the deceased Christensen, a citizen of California, is the
Philippines, the validity of the provisions of his will depriving his acknowledged natural child, the appellant,
should be governed by the Philippine Law, the domicile, pursuant to Art. 946 of the Civil Code of California,
not by the internal law of California..

As to his citizenship, however, We find that the citizenship that he acquired in California when he resided in
Sacramento, California from 1904 to 1913, was never lost by his stay in the Philippines, for the latter was a
territory of the United States (not a state) until 1946 and the deceased appears to have considered himself
as a citizen of California by the fact that when he executed his will in 1951 he declared that he was a citizen
of that State; so that he appears never to have intended to abandon his California citizenship by acquiring
another. This conclusion is in accordance with the following principle expounded by Goodrich in his
Conflict of Laws.

The terms "'residence" and "domicile" might well be taken to mean the same thing, a place of permanent
abode. But domicile, as has been shown, has acquired a technical meaning. Thus one may be domiciled in
a place where he has never been. And he may reside in a place where he has no domicile. The man with
two homes, between which he divides his time, certainly resides in each one, while living in it. But if he went
on business which would require his presence for several weeks or months, he might properly be said to
have sufficient connection with the place to be called a resident. It is clear, however, that, if he treated his
settlement as continuing only for the particular business in hand, not giving up his former "home," he could
not be a domiciled New Yorker. Acquisition of a domicile of choice requires the exercise of intention as well
as physical presence. "Residence simply requires bodily presence of an inhabitant in a given place, while
domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make it one's domicile." Residence,
however, is a term used with many shades of meaning, from the merest temporary presence to the most
permanent abode, and it is not safe to insist that any one use et the only proper one. (Goodrich, p. 29)

There is no single American law governing the validity of testamentary provisions in the United States, each state of
the Union having its own private law applicable to its citizens only and in force only within the state. The "national
law" indicated in Article 16 of the Civil Code above quoted can not, therefore, possibly mean or apply to any general
American law. So it can refer to no other than the private law of the State of California.

The next question is: What is the law in California governing the disposition of personal property?

If there is no law to the contrary, in the place where personal property is situated, it is deemed to follow the
person of its owner, and is governed by the law of his domicile.

The existence of this provision is alleged in appellant's opposition and is not denied. We have checked it in the
California Civil Code and it is there. Appellee, on the other hand, relies on the case cited in the decision and
testified to by a witness. It is argued on executor's behalf that as the deceased Christensen was a citizen of the
State of California, the internal law thereof, which is that given in the abovecited case, should govern the
determination of the validity of the testamentary provisions of Christensen's will, such law being in force in the State
of California of which Christensen was a citizen. Appellant, on the other hand, insists that Article 946 should be
applicable, and in accordance therewith and following the doctrine of the renvoi, the question of the validity of the
testamentary provision in question should be referred back to the law of the decedent's domicile, which is the
Philippines.
The scope of the theory of renvoi has also been defined and the reasons for its application in a country explained by
Prof. Lorenzen in an article in the Yale Law Journal, Vol. 27, 1917-1918, pp. 529-531. The pertinent parts of the
article are quoted herein below:

The recognition of the renvoi theory implies that the rules of the conflict of laws are to be understood as
incorporating not only the ordinary or internal law of the foreign state or country, but its rules of the conflict of
laws as well. According to this theory 'the law of a country' means the whole of its law.

xxx     xxx     xxx

Von Bar presented his views at the meeting of the Institute of International Law, at Neuchatel, in 1900, in the
form of the following theses:

(1) Every court shall observe the law of its country as regards the application of foreign laws.

(2) Provided that no express provision to the contrary exists, the court shall respect:

(a) The provisions of a foreign law which disclaims the right to bind its nationals abroad as regards
their personal statute, and desires that said personal statute shall be determined by the law of the
domicile, or even by the law of the place where the act in question occurred.

(b) The decision of two or more foreign systems of law, provided it be certain that one of them is
necessarily competent, which agree in attributing the determination of a question to the same
system of law.

xxx     xxx     xxx

If, for example, the English law directs its judge to distribute the personal estate of an Englishman who has
died domiciled in Belgium in accordance with the law of his domicile, he must first inquire whether the law of
Belgium would distribute personal property upon death in accordance with the law of domicile, and if he
finds that the Belgian law would make the distribution in accordance with the law of nationality — that is the
English law — he must accept this reference back to his own law.

We note that Article 946 of the California Civil Code is its conflict of laws rule, If the law on succession and the
conflict of laws rules of California are to be enforced jointly, each in its own intended and appropriate sphere, the
principle cited In re Kaufman should apply to citizens living in the State, but Article 946 should apply to such of its
citizens as are not domiciled in California but in other jurisdictions. The rule laid down of resorting to the law of the
domicile in the determination of matters with foreign element involved is in accord with the general principle of
American law that the domiciliary law should govern in most matters or rights which follow the person of the owner.

When a man dies leaving personal property in one or more states, and leaves a will directing the manner of
distribution of the property, the law of the state where he was domiciled at the time of his death will be
looked to in deciding legal questions about the will, almost as completely as the law of situs is consulted in
questions about the devise of land. It is logical that, since the domiciliary rules control devolution of the
personal estate in case of intestate succession, the same rules should determine the validity of an
attempted testamentary dispostion of the property. Here, also, it is not that the domiciliary has effect beyond
the borders of the domiciliary state. The rules of the domicile are recognized as controlling by the Conflict of
Laws rules at the situs property, and the reason for the recognition as in the case of intestate succession, is
the general convenience of the doctrine. The New York court has said on the point: 'The general principle
that a dispostiton of a personal property, valid at the domicile of the owner, is valid anywhere, is one of the
universal application. It had its origin in that international comity which was one of the first fruits of
 civilization, and it this age, when business intercourse and the process of accumulating property take but
little notice of boundary lines, the practical wisdom and justice of the rule is more apparent than ever.

Appellees argue that what Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines pointed out as the national law is
the internal law of California. But as above explained the laws of California have prescribed two sets of
laws for its citizens, one for residents therein and another for those domiciled in other jurisdictions. Reason
demands that We should enforce the California internal law prescribed for its citizens residing therein, and
enforce the conflict of laws rules for the citizens domiciled abroad. If we must enforce the law of California
as in comity we are bound to go, as so declared in Article 16 of our Civil Code, then we must enforce the
law of California in accordance with the express mandate thereof and as above explained, i.e., apply the
internal law for residents therein, and its conflict-of-laws rule for those domiciled abroad.

It is argued on appellees' behalf that the clause "if there is no law to the contrary in the place where the property is
situated" in Sec. 946 of the California Civil Code refers to Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines and that the
law to the contrary in the Philippines is the provision in said Article 16 that the national law of the deceased should
govern. This contention can not be sustained. As explained in the various authorities cited above

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and the case returned to the lower court with
instructions that the partition be made as the Philippine law on succession provides. Judgment reversed, with costs
against appellees.

g.R. No. L-23678             June 6, 1967

TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. BELLIS, deceased.

PEOPLE'S BANK and TRUST COMPANY, executor.
MARIA CRISTINA BELLIS and MIRIAM PALMA BELLIS,  vs. EDWARD A. BELLIS, ET AL., 

FACTS:

Amos G. Bellis, born in Texas, was "a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United States." By his first wife, Mary
E. Mallen, whom he divorced, he had five legitimate children; by his second wife, Violet Kennedy, who survived him,
he had three legitimate children: and finally, he had three illegitimate children

Amos G. Bellis executed a will in the Philippines, in which he directed that after all taxes, obligations, and expenses
of administration are paid for, his distributable estate should be divided, in trust, in the following order and manner:
(a) $240,000.00 to his first wife (b) P120,000.00 to his three illegitimate children, or P40,000.00 each and (c) after
the foregoing two items have been satisfied, the remainder shall go to his seven surviving children by his first and
second wives in equal shares. 1äwphï1.ñët

Amos G. Bellis died a resident of San Antonio, Texas, U.S.A. His will was admitted to probate in the Court of First
Instance of Manila

The People's Bank and Trust Company, as executor of the will, paid all the bequests therein including the amount of
$240,000.00 in the form of shares of stock to Mary E. Mallen and to the three (3) illegitimate children various
amounts totalling P40,000.00 each in satisfaction of their respective legacies, or a total of P120,000.00,

ILLIGETIMATE CHILDREN filed oppositions to the project of partition on the ground that they were deprived of
their legitimes as illegitimate children and, therefore, compulsory heirs of the deceased.
the lower court issued an order overruling the oppositions and approving the executor's final account,
report and administration and project of partition. Relying upon Art. 16 of the Civil Code, it applied the
national law of the decedent, which in this case is Texas law, which did not provide for legitimes.

issue of which law must apply — Texas law or Philippine law. WNOT RENVOI DOCTRINE WILL APPLY

RULING: TEXAS LAW

RENVOI doctrine is usually pertinent where the decedent is a national of one country, and a domicile of another. In
the present case, the decedent was both a national of Texas and a domicile thereof at the time of his death. So that
even assuming Texas has a conflict of law rule providing that the domiciliary system (law of the domicile) should
govern, the same would not result in a reference back (renvoi) to Philippine law, but would still refer to
Texas law.

decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A., and that under the laws of Texas, there are
no forced heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provision of the will and the amount of
successional rights are to be determined under Texas law, the Philippine law on legitimes cannot be applied to the
testacy of Amos G. Bellis.

Nonetheless, if Texas has a conflicts rule adopting the situs theory (lex rei sitae) calling for the application of the law
of the place where the properties are situated, renvoi would arise, since the properties here involved are found in
the Philippines. In the absence, however, of proof as to the conflict of law rule of Texas, it should not be presumed
different from ours.3 Appellants' position is therefore not rested on the doctrine of renvoi. As stated, they never
invoked nor even mentioned it in their arguments. Rather, they argue that their case falls under the circumstances
mentioned in the third paragraph of Article 17 in relation to Article 16 of the Civil Code.

It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our System of legitimes,
Congress has not intended to extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals. For it has specifically chosen
to leave, inter alia, the amount of successional rights, to the decedent's national law. Specific provisions must
prevail over general ones.

Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable the national law of the decedent, in intestate or
testamentary successions, with regard to four items: (a) the order of succession; (b) the amount of successional
rights; (e) the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will; and (d) the capacity to succeed. They provide that —

ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated.

However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to the
amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by
the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may he the nature of the
property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.

ART. 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the decedent.

Appellants would however counter that Art. 17, paragraph three, of the Civil Code, stating that —

Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object public
order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated,
or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.
prevails as the exception to Art. 16, par. 2 of the Civil Code afore-quoted. This is not correct. Precisely,
Congress deleted the phrase, "notwithstanding the provisions of this and the next preceding article" when they
incorporated Art. 11 of the old Civil Code as Art. 17 of the new Civil Code, while reproducing without substantial
change the second paragraph of Art. 10 of the old Civil Code as Art. 16 in the new. It must have been their purpose
to make the second paragraph of Art. 16 a specific provision in itself which must be applied in testate and intestate
succession. As further indication of this legislative intent, Congress added a new provision, under Art. 1039, which
decrees that capacity to succeed is to be governed by the national law of the decedent.

Appellants would also point out that the decedent executed two wills — one to govern his Texas estate and
the other his Philippine estate — arguing from this that he intended Philippine law to govern his Philippine
estate. Assuming that such was the decedent's intention in executing a separate Philippine will, it would
not alter the law, a provision in a foreigner's will to the effect that his properties shall be distributed in
accordance with Philippine law and not with his national law, is illegal and void, for his national law cannot
be ignored in regard to those matters that Article 10 — now Article 16 — of the Civil Code states said
national law should govern.

Wherefore, the order of the probate court is hereby affirmed in toto, with costs against appellants. So ordered.

G.R. No. 124371               November 23, 2000

PAULA T. LLORENTE, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ALICIA F. LLORENTE, 

The Facts

Lorenzo and Paula Llorente were married before a parish priest, Roman Catholic Church, in Nabua, Camarines
Sur. Lorenzo departed for the United States and Paula stayed in the conjugal home in barrio Antipolo, Nabua,
Camarines Sur. 5

Lorenzo was admitted to United States citizenship and Certificate of Naturalization was issued in his favor by the
United States District Court, Southern District of New York. 6

Upon the liberation of the Philippines by the American Forces in 1945, Lorenzo was granted an accrued leave by
the U. S. Navy, to visit his wife and he visited the Philippines. He discovered that his wife Paula was pregnant and
7 

was "living in" and having an adulterous relationship with his brother, Ceferino Llorente. 8

Paula gave birth to a boy as "Crisologo Llorente," with the certificate stating that the child was not legitimate and the
line for the father’s name was left blank.
9

Lorenzo refused to forgive Paula and live with her. In fact, the couple drew a written agreement to the effect that

(1) all the family allowances allotted by the United States Navy as part of Lorenzo’s salary and all other obligations
for Paula’s daily maintenance and support would be suspended;

(2) they would dissolve their marital union in accordance with judicial proceedings;

(3) they would make a separate agreement regarding their conjugal property acquired during their marital life; and
(4) Lorenzo would not prosecute Paula for her adulterous act since she voluntarily admitted her fault and agreed to
separate from Lorenzo peacefully. The agreement was signed by both Lorenzo and Paula and was witnessed by
Paula’s father and stepmother. The agreement was notarized
Lorenzo returned to the United States filed for divorce with the Superior Court of the State of California in and for
the County of San Diego. Paula was represented by counsel, John Riley, and actively participated in the
proceedings. the Superior Court of the State of California, for the County of San Diego found all factual allegations
to be true and issued an interlocutory judgment of divorce. 11

the divorce decree became final. Lorenzo returned to the Philippines.

Lorenzo married Alicia F. Llorente in Manila. Apparently, Alicia had no knowledge of the first marriage even if they
13 

resided in the same town as Paula, who did not oppose the marriage or cohabitation. 14

Lorenzo and Alicia lived together as husband and wife. Their twenty-five (25) year union produced three children,
15 

Raul, Luz and Beverly, all surnamed Llorente.

Lorenzo executed a Last Will and Testament. In the will, Lorenzo bequeathed all his property to Alicia and their
three children,

Lorenzo filed with the RTC Iriga, Camarines Sur, a petition for the probate and allowance of his last will and
testament wherein Lorenzo moved that Alicia be appointed Special Administratrix of his estate. 18

the trial court denied the motion for the reason that the testator Lorenzo was still alive. 19

finding that the will was duly executed, the trial court admitted the will to probate. before the proceedings could be
terminated, Lorenzo died. 21

Paula filed with the same court a petition for letters of administration over Lorenzo’s estate in her favor. Paula
22 

contended (1) that she was Lorenzo’s surviving spouse, (2) that the various property were acquired during their
marriage, (3) that Lorenzo’s will disposed of all his property in favor of Alicia and her children, encroaching on her
legitime and 1/2 share in the conjugal property. 23

Alicia filed, a petition for the issuance of letters testamentary. 24

the trial court gave due course to Paula’s petition. the Regional Trial Court issued a joint decision, thus:

that the divorce decree granted to the late Lorenzo is void and inapplicable in the Philippines, therefore the
marriage he contracted with Alicia at Manila is likewise void. This being so the petition of Alicia F. Llorente for the
issuance of letters testamentary is denied. Likewise, she is not entitled to receive any share from the estate even if
the will especially said so her relationship with Lorenzo having gained the status of paramour which is under Art.
739 (1).

Court of Appeals affirming the decision of the trial court. with the MODIFICATION that Alicia is declared as co-
owner of whatever properties she and the deceased may have acquired during the twenty-five (25) years of
cohabitation.

The Issue

WHICH LAW IS APPLICABLE?

RULING:

The Applicable Law: US LAW

The fact that the late Lorenzo N. Llorente became an American citizen long before and at the time of: (1) his divorce
from Paula; (2) marriage to Alicia; (3) execution of his will; and (4) death, is duly established, admitted and
undisputed.

The Court of Appeals and the trial court applied renvoi doctrine, where the case was "referred back" to the law
of the decedent’s domicile, in this case, Philippine law.

First, there is no such thing as one American law.  The "national law" indicated in Article 16 of the Civil Code
1ªwph!1

cannot possibly apply to general American law. There is no such law governing the validity of testamentary
provisions in the United States. Each State of the union has its own law applicable to its citizens and in force only
within the State. It can therefore refer to no other than the law of the State of which the decedent was a resident. 39 

Second, there is no showing that the application of the renvoi doctrine is called for or required by New York
State law.

The Court of Appeals also disregarded the will. It declared Alice entitled to one half (1/2) of whatever property she
and Lorenzo acquired during their cohabitation, applying Article 144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.

The hasty application of Philippine law and the complete disregard of the will, already probated as duly executed in
accordance with the formalities of Philippine law, is fatal, especially in light of the factual and legal
circumstances here obtaining.

Validity of the Foreign Divorce

owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by
the policy against absolute divorces, the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and
morality. In the same case, the Court ruled that aliens may obtain divorces abroad, provided they are valid
according to their national law.

Citing this landmark case, the Court held in Quita v. Court of Appeals, that once proven that respondent was no
41 

longer a Filipino citizen when he obtained the divorce from petitioner, the ruling in Van Dorn would become
applicable and petitioner could "very well lose her right to inherit" from him.

In Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera, we recognized the divorce obtained by the respondent in his country, the Federal
42 

Republic of Germany. There, we stated that divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines
insofar as respondent is concerned in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the status of persons.

For failing to apply these doctrines, the decision of the Court of Appeals must be reversed. We hold that the divorce
43 

obtained by Lorenzo H. Llorente from his first wife Paula was valid and recognized in this jurisdiction as a matter of
comity. Now, the effects of this divorce (as to the succession to the estate of the decedent) are matters best left to
the determination of the trial court.

Validity of the Will

The Civil Code provides:

"Art. 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public instruments shall be governed by the laws
of the country in which they are executed.

"When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic or consular officials of the Republic of the Philippines
in a foreign country, the solemnities established by Philippine laws shall be observed in their execution."
The clear intent of Lorenzo to bequeath his property to his second wife and children by her is glaringly shown in the
will he executed. We do not wish to frustrate his wishes, since he was a foreigner, not covered by our laws on
"family rights and duties, status, condition and legal capacity."
44

Whether the will is intrinsically valid and who shall inherit from Lorenzo are issues best proved by foreign law which
must be pleaded and proved. Whether the will was executed in accordance with the formalities required is
answered by referring to Philippine law. In fact, the will was duly probated.

As a guide however, the trial court should note that whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our
system of legitimes, Congress did not intend to extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals. Congress
specifically left the amount of successional rights to the decedent's national law.45

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. SP No. 17446
promulgated on July 31, 1995 is SET ASIDE.

In lieu thereof, the Court REVERSES the decision of the Regional Trial Court and RECOGNIZES as VALID the
decree of divorce granted in favor of the deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente by the Superior Court of the State of
California in and for the County of San Diego, made final on December 4, 1952.

Further, the Court REMANDS the cases to the court of origin for determination of the intrinsic validity of Lorenzo N.
Llorente’s will and determination of the parties’ successional rights allowing proof of foreign law with instructions
that the trial court shall proceed with all deliberate dispatch to settle the estate of the deceased within the framework
of the Rules of Court.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

NATIONALITY AND DOMICILE

[G.R. No. 43314. December 19, 1935.]

A. L. VELILLA, administrator of the estate of Arthur Graydon Moody, Plaintiff-Appellant, v.

JUAN POSADAS, JR., Collector of Internal Revenue, Defendant-Appellee.

1. INHERITANCE TAX; DOMICILE OF TAXPAYER. — To effect the abandonment of one’s

domicile, there must be a deliberate and provable choice of a new domicile, coupled with
actual residence in the place chosen, with a declared or provable intent that it should be
one’s fixed and permanent place of abode, one’s home. There is a complete dearth of
evidence in the record that M ever established a new domicile in a foreign country.

2. INHERITANCE AND INCOME TAXES. — As M’s legal domicile at the time of his death was the
Philippine Islands and his estate had its situs here, the inheritance and income taxes here involved
were lawfully collected.

FACTS:

Arthur G. Moody, an American citizen, came to the Philippine Islands in 1902 or 1903 and engaged
actively in business in these Islands up to the time of his death in Calcutta, India, on February 18,
1931. He had no business elsewhere and at the time of his death left an estate consisting
principally of bonds and shares of stock of corporations organized under the laws of the
Philippine Islands, bank deposits and other intangibles and personal property valued by
the commissioners of appraisal and claims at P609,767.58 and by the Collector of Internal
Revenue for the purposes of inheritance tax at P653,657.47. All of said property at the time of his
death was located and had its situs within the Philippine Islands. he left no property of any kind
located anywhere else. In his will, executed without date in Manila in accordance with the formalities
of the Philippine law, in which he bequeathed all his property to his sister, Ida M. Palmer,

the Bureau of Internal Revenue prepared an inheritance tax return, income tax return for the estate
of the Moody.

estate paid under protest the sum which covers the assessment for inheritance tax for income tax
against said estate.

the Collector of Internal Revenue overruled the protest made by Ida M. Palmer through her attorney.
librar

ISSUE:

Where was the legal domicile of Arthur G. Moody at the time of his death?

RULING: PH

Our Civil Code (art. 40) defines the domicile of natural persons as "the place of their usual
residence." Therefore, the "usual residence" of this unfortunate man, whom appellant
describes as a "fugitive" and "outcast", was in Manila where he had lived and toiled for
more than a quarter of a century, rather than in any foreign country he visited during his
wanderings up to the date of his death in Calcutta. To effect the abandonment of one’s
domicile, there must be a deliberate and provable choice of a new domicile, coupled with
actual residence in the place chosen, with a declared or provable intent that it should be
one’s fixed and permanent place of abode, one’s home. There is a complete dearth of
evidence in the record that Moody ever established a new domicile in a foreign country.

There is no statement of Moody, oral or written, in the record that he had adopted a new
domicile while he was absent from Manila. Though he was physically present for some months
in Calcutta prior to the date of his death there, the appellant does not claim that Moody had a
domicile there although it was precisely from Calcutta that he wrote and cabled that he wished to sell
his business in Manila and that he had no intention to live there again. Much less plausible, it seems
to us, is the claim that he established a legal domicile in Paris in February, 1929. The record contains
no writing whatever of Moody from Paris. There is no evidence as to where in Paris he had any fixed
abode that he intended to be his permanent home. There is no evidence that he acquired any
property in Paris or engaged in any settled business on his own account there. There is no evidence
of any affirmative factors that prove the establishment of a legal domicile there.

The negative evidence that he told Cooley that he did not intend to return to Manila does
not prove that he had established a domicile in Paris. His short stay of three months in Paris is
entirely consistent with the view that he was a transient in Paris for the purpose of receiving
treatments at the Pasteur Institute. The evidence in the record indicates clearly that Moody’s
continued absence from his legal domicile in the Philippines was due to and reasonably accounted for
by the same motive that caused his surreptitious departure, namely, to evade confinement in the
Culion Leper Colony; for he doubtless knew that on his return he would be immediately confined,
because his affliction became graver while he was absent than it was on the day of his precipitous
departure and he could not conceal himself in the Philippines where he was well known, as he might
do in foreign parts.

Moody was never married and there is no doubt that he had his legal domicile in the Philippine
Islands from 1902 or 1903 forward during which time he accumulated a fortune from his business in
the Philippine Islands. He lived in the Elks’ Club in Manila for many years and was living there up to
the date he left Manila the latter part of February, 1928, under the following circumstances: He was
afflicted with leprosy in an advanced stage and had been informed by Dr. Wade that he would be
reported to the Philippine authorities for confinement in the Culion Leper Colony as required by the
law. Distressed at the thought of being thus segregated and in violation of his promise to Dr. Wade
that he would voluntarily go to Culion, he surreptitiously left the Islands the latter part of February,
1928, under cover of night, on a freighter, without ticket, passport or tax clearance certificate.

The record does not show where Moody was during the remainder of the year 1928. He lived with a
friend in Paris, France, during the months of March and April of the year 1929 where he was
receiving treatment for leprosy at the Pasteur Institute. The record does not show where Moody was
in the interval between April, 1929, and November 26, 1930, on which latter date he wrote a letter,
to Harry Wendt of Manila, offering to sell him his interest in the Camera Supply Company, a
Philippine corporation, in which Moody owned 599 out of 603 shares. In this letter, among other
things, he states: "Certainly I’ll never return there to live or enter business again."

As Moody died of leprosy less than two months after these letters were written, there can be no
doubt that he would have been immediately segregated in the Culion Leper Colony had he returned
to the Philippine Islands. He was, therefore, a fugitive, not from justice, but from confinement in the
Culion Leper Colony in accordance with the law of the Philippine Islands.

Finding no merit in any of the assignments of error of the appellant, we affirm the judgment of the
trial court, first, because the property in the estate of Arthur G. Moody at the time of his death was
located and had its situs within the Philippine Islands and, second, because his legal domicile up to
the time of his death was within the Philippine Islands. Costs against the Appellant.

G.R. No. 159507             April 19, 2006

ANICETO G. SALUDO, JR., vs.

AMERICAN EXPRESS INTERNATIONAL, INC., and/or IAN T. FISH and DOMINIC MASCRINAS, 

FACTS:

Aniceto G. Saludo, Jr. filed a complaint for damages against the American Express International, Inc. (AMEX)
and/or its officers with the RTC of Maasin City, Southern Leyte.

The complaint's cause of action stemmed from the alleged wrongful dishonor of Saludo's AMEX credit card and the
supplementary card issued to his daughter.
The dishonor of these AMEX credit cards were allegedly unjustified as they resulted from amex’s unilateral act of
suspending Saludo's account for his failure to pay its balance. Saludo denied having received the corresponding
statement of account. his credit card and its supplementary cards were canceled by respondents

Saludo claimed that he suffered great inconvenience, wounded feelings, mental anguish, embarrassment,
humiliation and besmirched political and professional standing as a result of respondents' acts which were
committed in gross and evident bad faith, and in wanton, reckless and oppressive manner.

AMEX raised the affirmative defenses of lack of cause of action and improper venue. respondents averred
that the complaint should be dismissed on the ground that venue was improperly laid because none of the parties
was a resident of Leyte. as evidenced by the fact that his community tax certificate, which was presented when he
executed the complaint's verification and certification of non-forum shopping, was issued at Pasay City. Saludo's
complaint was prepared in Pasay City and signed by a lawyer of the said city.

He asserted hat he was the congressman of the lone district thereof at the time of the filing of his complaint. He
urged the court a quo to take judicial notice of this particular fact. As a member of Congress, he possessed all the
qualifications prescribed by the Constitution including that of being a resident of his district. He was also a member
of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Southern Leyte Chapter, and has been such ever since his admission to the
Bar. His community tax certificate was issued at Pasay City only because he has an office thereat and the office
messenger obtained the same in the said city. In any event, the community tax certificate is not determinative of
one's residence.

The court a quo likewise denied respondents' affirmative defense that venue was improperly laid. It reasoned, thus:

XXX [T]he fact alone that the plaintiff at the time he filed the complaint was and still is, the incumbent Congressman
of the Lone District of Southern Leyte with residence at Ichon, Macrohon, Southern Leyte, is enough to dispell any
and all doubts about his actual residence. As a high-ranking government official of the province, his residence there
can be taken judicial notice of. As such his personal, actual and physical habitation or his actual residence or place
of abode can never be in some other place but in Ichon, Macrohon, Southern Leyte. It is correctly stated by the
plaintiff, that, "residence, for purposes of fixing venue of an action, is synonymous with domicile. This is defined as
the permanent home, the place to which, whenever absent for business or pleasure, one intends to return,
and depends on the facts and circumstances, in the sense that they disclose intent. A person can have but
one domicile at a time. A man can have but one domicile for one and the same purpose at any time, but he
may have numerous places of residence. Venue could be at place of his residence.

CA RULED that Venue was improperly laid because not one of the parties was a resident of Southern Leyte.
Specifically, it declared that Saludo was not a resident thereof.

Issue: wnot Saludo, was a resident of Southern Leyte at the time of filing of the complaint

Ruling: yes

Saludo's complaint for damages against respondents is a personal action.

The choice of venue for personal actions cognizable by the RTC is given to plaintiff either the place where
defendant resides or may be found, or the place where plaintiff resides. If plaintiff opts for the latter, he is
limited to that place.

Following this rule, petitioner Saludo, as plaintiff, had opted to file his complaint with the court a quo which is in
Maasin City, Southern Leyte. He alleged in his complaint that he was a member of the House of Representatives
and a resident of Ichon, Macrohon, Southern Leyte to comply with the residency requirement of the rule.
the term "resides" as employed in the rule on venue on personal actions filed with the courts of first instance means
the place of abode, whether permanent or temporary, of the plaintiff or the defendant, as distinguished from
"domicile" which denotes a fixed permanent residence to which, when absent, one has the intention of
returning.

Since Saludo, as congressman or the lone representative of the district of Southern Leyte, had his residence (or
domicile) therein as the term is construed in relation to election laws, necessarily, he is also deemed to have had
his residence therein for purposes of venue for filing personal actions. Put in another manner, Southern Leyte, as
the domicile of petitioner Saludo, was also his residence, as the term is understood in its popular sense. This is
because "residence is not domicile, but domicile is residence coupled with the intention to remain for an unlimited
time."

petitioner Saludo was the congressman or representative of Southern Leyte at the time of filing of his complaint with
the court a quo. Absent any evidence to the contrary, he is deemed to possess the qualifications for the said
position, including that he was a resident therein. And following the definition of the term "residence" for purposes of
election law, petitioner Saludo not only had the intention to reside in Southern Leyte, but he also had personal
presence therein, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. The latter element, or his bodily presence as an
inhabitant in Southern Leyte, was sufficient for petitioner Saludo to be considered a resident therein for purposes of
venue.

the term domicile is not exactly synonymous in legal contemplation with the term residence, for it is an
established principle in Conflict of Laws that domicile refers to the relatively more permanent abode of a
person while residence applies to a temporary stay of a person in a given place. In fact, this distinction is
very well emphasized in those cases where the Domiciliary Theory must necessarily supplant the
Nationality Theory in cases involving stateless persons.

difference between domicile and residence. Residence is used to indicate a place of abode, whether permanent or
temporary; domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent, one has the intention of returning.
A man may have a residence in one place and a domicile in another. Residence is not domicile, but
domicile is residence coupled with the intention to remain for an unlimited time. A man can have but one
domicile for one and the same purpose at any time, but he may have numerous places of residence. His
place of residence generally is his place of domicile, but is not by any means, necessarily so since no
length of residence without intention of remaining will constitute domicile.

"We note that the law on venue in Courts of First Instance (Section 2, of Rule 4, Rules of Court) in referring to the
parties utilizes the words 'resides or may be found,' and not 'is domiciled,' thus:

'Sec. 2(b) Personal actions - All other actions may be commenced and tried where the defendant or any of the
defendants resides or may be found, or where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs resides, at the election of the
plaintiff.:

What does the term 'resides' mean? Does it refer to the actual residence or domicile of the decedent at the time
of his death? We lay down the doctrinal rule that the term 'resides' connotes ex vi termini

'actual residence' as distinguished from 'legal residence or domicile.' This term 'resides,' like the terms 'residing' and
'residence' is elastic and should be interpreted in the light of the object or purposes of the statute or rule in which it
is employed. In the application of venue statutes and rules - Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of
such nature - residence rather than domicile is the significant factor.

Even where the statute uses the word 'domicile' still it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile
in the technical sense. Some cases make a distinction between the terms 'residence' and 'domicile' but as
generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term
'inhabitant.'

In other words, 'resides' should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or
physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place
and actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is, personal residence, not
legal residence or domicile. Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while
domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make it one's domicile. No particular length
of time of residence is required though; however, the residence must be more than temporary."

There is no dispute that Saludo was the congressman or the representative of the lone district of Southern Leyte at
the time of filing of his complaint with the court a quo. Even the appellate court admits this fact as it states that "it
may be conceded that private respondent ever so often travels to Maasin City, Southern Leyte, because he is its
representative in the lower house."19

As a member of the House of Representatives, Saludo was correctly deemed by the court a quo as possessing the
requirements for the said position,20 including that he was then a resident of the district which he was representing,
i.e., Southern Leyte. Significantly, for purposes of election law, the term "residence" is synonymous with
"domicile,

It can be readily gleaned that the definition of "residence" for purposes of election law is more stringent in that it is
equated with the term "domicile." Hence, for the said purpose, the term "residence" imports "not only an intention to
reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such
intention."22 When parsed, therefore, the term "residence" requires two elements: (1) intention to reside in the
particular place; and (2) personal or physical presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such
intention. As the Court elucidated, "the place where a party actually or constructively has a permanent home, where
he, no matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain, i.e., his domicile, is
that to which the Constitution refers when it speaks of residence for the purposes of election law."23

On the other hand, for purposes of venue, the less technical definition of "residence" is adopted. Thus, it is
understood to mean as "the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode.
It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means merely
residence, that is, personal residence, not legal residence or domicile. Residence simply requires bodily presence
as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make
it one's domicile."

The following ratiocination of the court a quo is apt:

Residence in civil law is a material fact, referring to the physical presence of a person in a place. A person can have
two or more residences, such as a country residence and a city residence. Residence is acquired by living in a
place; on the other hand, domicile can exist without actually living in the place. The important thing for domicile is
that, once residence has been established in one place, there be an intention to stay there permanently, even if
residence is also established in some other place.

Thus, if a person lives with his family habitually in Quezon City, he would have his domicile in Quezon City. If he
also has a house for vacation purposes in the City of Baguio, and another house in connection with his business in
the City of Manila, he would have residence in all three places. so that one’s legal residence or domicile can also be
his actual, personal or physical residence or habitation or place of abode if he stays there with intention to stay
there permanently.

In the instant case, since plaintiff has a house in Makati City for the purpose of exercising his profession or doing
business and also a house in Ichon, Macrohon, Southern Leyte, for doing business and/or for election or political
purposes where he also lives or stays physically, personally and actually then he can have residences in these
two places. Because it would then be preposterous to acknowledge and recognize plaintiff Aniceto G. Saludo, Jr.
as congressman of Southern Leyte without also recognizing him as actually, personally and physically residing
thereat, when such residence is required by law.

The fact then that petitioner Saludo's community tax certificate was issued at Pasay City is of no moment because
granting arguendo that he could be considered a resident therein, the same does not preclude his having a
residence in Southern Leyte for purposes of venue. A man can have but one domicile for one and the same
purpose at any time, but he may have numerous places of residence.29

That petitioner Saludo was the congressman or representative of the lone district of Southern Leyte at the time of
the filing of his complaint was admitted as a fact by the court a quo. In this connection, it consequently held that, as
such, petitioner Saludo's residence in Southern Leyte, the district he was the representing, could be taken judicial
notice of. The court a quo cannot be faulted for doing so because courts are allowed "to take judicial notice of
matters which are of public knowledge, or are capable of unquestionable demonstration, or ought to be known to
judges because of their judicial functions." 30 Courts are likewise bound to take judicial notice, without the
introduction of evidence, of the law in force in the Philippines, 31 including its Constitution.

The concept of "facts of common knowledge" in the context of judicial notice has been explained as those facts that
are "so commonly known in the community as to make it unprofitable to require proof, and so certainly known to as
to make it indisputable among reasonable men." 32 Moreover, "though usually facts of 'common knowledge' will be
generally known throughout the country, it is sufficient as a basis for judicial notice that they be known in the local
community where the trial court sits." 33 Certainly, the fact of petitioner Saludo being the duly elected representative
of Southern Leyte at the time could be properly taken judicial notice of by the court a quo, the same being a matter
of common knowledge in the community where it sits.

Further, petitioner Saludo's residence in Southern Leyte could likewise be properly taken judicial notice of by the
court a quo. It is bound to know that, under the Constitution, one of the qualifications of a congressman or
representative to the House of Representatives is having a residence in the district in which he shall be elected.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated May 22, 2003 and Resolution
dated August 14, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 69553 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Orders dated September 10, 2001 and January 2, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court of Maasin City, Southern Leyte,
Branch 25 thereof, in Civil Case No. R-3172 are REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.