Bill of Rights Raw Cases

EN BANC
G.R. No. 118127 April 12, 2005
CITY OF MANILA, HON. ALFREDO S. LIM as the Mayor of the City of Manila, HON. JOSELITO
L. ATIENZA, in his capacity as Vice-Mayor of the City of Manila and Presiding Officer of the
City Council of Manila, HON. ERNESTO A. NIEVA, HON. GONZALO P. GONZALES, HON.
AVELINO S. CAILIAN, HON. ROBERTO C. OCAMPO, HON. ALBERTO DOMINGO, HON.
HONORIO U. LOPEZ, HON. FRANCISCO G. VARONA, JR., HON. ROMUALDO S. MARANAN,
HON. NESTOR C. PONCE, JR., HON. HUMBERTO B. BASCO, HON. FLAVIANO F.
CONCEPCION, JR., HON. ROMEO G. RIVERA, HON. MANUEL M. ZARCAL, HON. PEDRO S. DE
JESUS, HON. BERNARDITO C. ANG, HON. MANUEL L. QUIN, HON. JHOSEP Y. LOPEZ, HON.
CHIKA G. GO, HON. VICTORIANO A. MELENDEZ, HON. ERNESTO V.P. MACEDA, JR., HON.
ROLANDO P. NIETO, HON. DANILO V. ROLEDA, HON. GERINO A. TOLENTINO, JR., HON. MA.
PAZ E. HERRERA, HON. JOEY D. HIZON, HON. FELIXBERTO D. ESPIRITU, HON. KARLO Q.
BUTIONG, HON. ROGELIO P. DELA PAZ, HON. BERNARDO D. RAGAZA, HON. MA. CORAZON
R. CABALLES, HON. CASIMIRO C. SISON, HON. BIENVINIDO M. ABANTE, JR., HON. MA.
LOURDES M. ISIP, HON. ALEXANDER S. RICAFORT, HON. ERNESTO F. RIVERA, HON.
LEONARDO L. ANGAT, and HON. JOCELYN B. DAWIS, in their capacity as councilors of the
City of Manila, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. PERFECTO A.S. LAGUIO, JR., as Presiding Judge, RTC, Manila and MALATE TOURIST
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
I know only that what is moral is what you feel good after and what is immoral is what you
feel bad after.
Ernest Hermingway
Death in the Afternoon, Ch. 1
It is a moral and political axiom that any dishonorable act, if performed by oneself, is less
immoral than if performed by someone else, who would be well-intentioned in his dishonesty.
J. Christopher Gerald
Bonaparte in Egypt, Ch. I
The Court's commitment to the protection of morals is secondary to its fealty to the fundamental law
of the land. It is foremost a guardian of the Constitution but not the conscience of individuals. And if it
need be, the Court will not hesitate to "make the hammer fall, and heavily" in the words of Justice
Laurel, and uphold the constitutional guarantees when faced with laws that, though not lacking in
zeal to promote morality, nevertheless fail to pass the test of constitutionality.
The pivotal issue in this Petition under Rule 45 (then Rule 42) of the Revised Rules on Civil
1
Procedure seeking the reversal of the Decision in Civil Case No. 93-66511 of the Regional Trial
2
Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 18 (lower court), is the validity of Ordinance No. 7783
3
(the Ordinance) of the City of Manila. 4

The antecedents are as follows:
Private respondent Malate Tourist Development Corporation (MTDC) is a corporation engaged in the
business of operating hotels, motels, hostels and lodging houses. It built and opened Victoria Court
5
in Malate which was licensed as a motel although duly accredited with the Department of Tourism as
a hotel. On 28 June 1993, MTDC filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief with Prayer for a Writ of
6
Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order (RTC Petition) with the lower court
7
impleading as defendants, herein petitioners City of Manila, Hon. Alfredo S. Lim (Lim), Hon. Joselito
L. Atienza, and the members of the City Council of Manila (City Council). MTDC prayed that
the Ordinance, insofar as it includes motels and inns as among its prohibited establishments, be
declared invalid and unconstitutional.
8
Enacted by the City Council on 9 March 1993 and approved by petitioner City Mayor on 30 March
9
1993, the said Ordinance is entitled–
AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE ESTABLISHMENT OR OPERATION OF

BUSINESSES PROVIDING CERTAIN FORMS OF AMUSEMENT, ENTERTAINMENT,
SERVICES AND FACILITIES IN THE ERMITA-MALATE AREA, PRESCRIBING
PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION THEREOF, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES. 10
The Ordinance is reproduced in full, hereunder:
SECTION 1. Any provision of existing laws and ordinances to the contrary

notwithstanding, no person, partnership, corporation or entity shall, in the Ermita-
Malate area bounded by Teodoro M. Kalaw Sr. Street in the North, Taft Avenue in the East,
Vito Cruz Street in the South and Roxas Boulevard in the West, pursuant to P.D. 499 be
allowed or authorized to contract and engage in, any business providing certain forms
of amusement, entertainment, services and facilities where women are used as tools
in entertainment and which tend to disturb the community, annoy the inhabitants, and
adversely affect the social and moral welfare of the community, such as but not limited
to:
1. Sauna Parlors
2. Massage Parlors
3. Karaoke Bars
4. Beerhouses
5. Night Clubs
6. Day Clubs
7. Super Clubs
8. Discotheques
9. Cabarets
10. Dance Halls

11. Motels
12. Inns
SEC. 2 The City Mayor, the City Treasurer or any person acting in behalf of the said
officials are prohibited from issuing permits, temporary or otherwise, or from granting
licenses and accepting payments for the operation of business enumerated in the
preceding section.
SEC. 3. Owners and/or operator of establishments engaged in, or devoted to, the

businesses enumerated in Section 1 hereof are hereby given three (3) months from the
date of approval of this ordinance within which to wind up business operations or to
transfer to any place outside of the Ermita-Malate area or convert said businesses to
other kinds of business allowable within the area, such as but not limited to:
1. Curio or antique shop
2. Souvenir Shops
3. Handicrafts display centers
4. Art galleries
5. Records and music shops
6. Restaurants
7. Coffee shops
8. Flower shops
9. Music lounge and sing-along restaurants, with well-defined activities for

wholesome family entertainment that cater to both local and foreign clientele.
10. Theaters engaged in the exhibition, not only of motion pictures but also of cultural
shows, stage and theatrical plays, art exhibitions, concerts and the like.
11. Businesses allowable within the law and medium intensity districts as provided
for in the zoning ordinances for Metropolitan Manila, except new warehouse or open-
storage depot, dock or yard, motor repair shop, gasoline service station, light industry
with any machinery, or funeral establishments.
SEC. 4. Any person violating any provisions of this ordinance, shall upon conviction,
be punished by imprisonment of one (1) year or fine of FIVE THOUSAND (P5,000.00)
PESOS, or both, at the discretion of the Court, PROVIDED, that in case of juridical person,
the President, the General Manager, or person-in-charge of operation shall be liable thereof;
PROVIDED FURTHER, that in case of subsequent violation and conviction, the
premises of the erring establishment shall be closed and padlocked permanently.
SEC. 5. This ordinance shall take effect upon approval.

Enacted by the City Council of Manila at its regular session today, March 9, 1993.
Approved by His Honor, the Mayor on March 30, 1993. (Emphasis supplied)
In the RTC Petition, MTDC argued that the Ordinance erroneously and improperly included in its
enumeration of prohibited establishments, motels and inns such as MTDC's Victoria Court
considering that these were not establishments for "amusement" or "entertainment" and they were
not "services or facilities for entertainment," nor did they use women as "tools for entertainment," and
neither did they "disturb the community," "annoy the inhabitants" or "adversely affect the social and
moral welfare of the community." 11
MTDC further advanced that the Ordinance was invalid and unconstitutional for the following
reasons: (1) The City Council has no power to prohibit the operation of motels as Section 458 (a) 4
(iv) of the Local Government Code of 1991 (the Code) grants to the City Council only the power to
12
regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance of hotels, motels, inns, pension houses,
lodging houses and other similar establishments; (2) The Ordinance is void as it is violative of
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 499 which specifically declared portions of the Ermita-Malate area as
13
a commercial zone with certain restrictions; (3) The Ordinance does not constitute a proper exercise
of police power as the compulsory closure of the motel business has no reasonable relation to the
legitimate municipal interests sought to be protected; (4) The Ordinance constitutes an ex post
facto law by punishing the operation of Victoria Court which was a legitimate business prior to its
enactment; (5) The Ordinance violates MTDC's constitutional rights in that: (a) it is confiscatory and
constitutes an invasion of plaintiff's property rights; (b) the City Council has no power to find as a fact
that a particular thing is a nuisance per se nor does it have the power to extrajudicially destroy it; and
(6) The Ordinance constitutes a denial of equal protection under the law as no reasonable basis
exists for prohibiting the operation of motels and inns, but not pension houses, hotels, lodging
houses or other similar establishments, and for prohibiting said business in the Ermita-Malate area
but not outside of this area. 14
In their Answer dated 23 July 1993, petitioners City of Manila and Lim maintained that the City
15
Council had the power to "prohibit certain forms of entertainment in order to protect the social and
moral welfare of the community" as provided for in Section 458 (a) 4 (vii) of the Local Government
Code, which reads, thus:
16
Section 458. Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. (a) The sangguniang
panlungsod, as the legislative body of the city, shall enact ordinances, approve resolutions
and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the city and its inhabitants pursuant to
Section 16 of this Code and in the proper exercise of the corporate powers of the city as
provided for under Section 22 of this Code, and shall:
....
(4) Regulate activities relative to the use of land, buildings and structures within the city in
order to promote the general welfare and for said purpose shall:
....
(vii) Regulate the establishment, operation, and maintenance of any entertainment or

amusement facilities, including theatrical performances, circuses, billiard pools,
public dancing schools, public dance halls, sauna baths, massage parlors, and other
places for entertainment or amusement; regulate such other events or activities for
amusement or entertainment, particularly those which tend to disturb the community
or annoy the inhabitants, or require the suspension or suppression of the same; or,
prohibit certain forms of amusement or entertainment in order to protect the social
and moral welfare of the community.
Citing Kwong Sing v. City of Manila, petitioners insisted that the power of regulation spoken of in the
17
above-quoted provision included the power to control, to govern and to restrain places of exhibition
and amusement. 18
Petitioners likewise asserted that the Ordinance was enacted by the City Council of Manila to protect
the social and moral welfare of the community in conjunction with its police power as found in Article
III, Section 18(kk) of Republic Act No. 409, otherwise known as the Revised Charter of the City of
19
Manila (Revised Charter of Manila) which reads, thus:

20
ARTICLE III
THE MUNICIPAL BOARD
. . .
Section 18. Legislative powers. – The Municipal Board shall have the following legislative
powers:
. . .
(kk) To enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and proper for the sanitation and safety,
the furtherance of the prosperity, and the promotion of the morality, peace, good order,
comfort, convenience, and general welfare of the city and its inhabitants, and such others as
may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred by this
chapter; and to fix penalties for the violation of ordinances which shall not exceed two
hundred pesos fine or six months' imprisonment, or both such fine and imprisonment, for a
single offense.
Further, the petitioners noted, the Ordinance had the presumption of validity; hence, private
respondent had the burden to prove its illegality or unconstitutionality.
21
Petitioners also maintained that there was no inconsistency between P.D. 499 and the Ordinance as
the latter simply disauthorized certain forms of businesses and allowed the Ermita-Malate area to
remain a commercial zone. The Ordinance, the petitioners likewise claimed, cannot be assailed
22
as ex post facto as it was prospective in operation. The Ordinance also did not infringe the equal
23
protection clause and cannot be denounced as class legislation as there existed substantial and real
differences between the Ermita-Malate area and other places in the City of Manila. 24
On 28 June 1993, respondent Judge Perfecto A.S. Laguio, Jr. (Judge Laguio) issued an ex-parte
temporary restraining order against the enforcement of the Ordinance. And on 16 July 1993, again
25
in an intrepid gesture, he granted the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for by MTDC.26
After trial, on 25 November 1994, Judge Laguio rendered the assailed Decision, enjoining the
petitioners from implementing the Ordinance. The dispositive portion of said Decision reads: 27
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring Ordinance No. 778[3], Series of
1993, of the City of Manila null and void, and making permanent the writ of preliminary
injunction that had been issued by this Court against the defendant. No costs.
SO ORDERED. 28
Petitioners filed with the lower court a Notice of Appeal on 12 December 1994, manifesting that they
29
are elevating the case to this Court under then Rule 42 on pure questions of law. 30
On 11 January 1995, petitioners filed the present Petition, alleging that the following errors were
committed by the lower court in its ruling: (1) It erred in concluding that the subject ordinance is ultra
vires, or otherwise, unfair, unreasonable and oppressive exercise of police power; (2) It erred in
holding that the questioned Ordinance contravenes P.D. 499 which allows operators of all kinds of
31
commercial establishments, except those specified therein; and (3) It erred in declaring
the Ordinance void and unconstitutional. 32
In the Petition and in its Memorandum, petitioners in essence repeat the assertions they made

33
before the lower court. They contend that the assailed Ordinance was enacted in the exercise of the
inherent and plenary power of the State and the general welfare clause exercised by local
government units provided for in Art. 3, Sec. 18 (kk) of the Revised Charter of Manila and
conjunctively, Section 458 (a) 4 (vii) of the Code. They allege that the Ordinance is a valid exercise
34
of police power; it does not contravene P.D. 499; and that it enjoys the presumption of validity. 35
In its Memorandum dated 27 May 1996, private respondent maintains that the Ordinance is ultra

36
vires and that it is void for being repugnant to the general law. It reiterates that the
questioned Ordinance is not a valid exercise of police power; that it is violative of due process,
confiscatory and amounts to an arbitrary interference with its lawful business; that it is violative of the
equal protection clause; and that it confers on petitioner City Mayor or any officer unregulated
discretion in the execution of the Ordinance absent rules to guide and control his actions.
This is an opportune time to express the Court's deep sentiment and tenderness for the Ermita-
Malate area being its home for several decades. A long-time resident, the Court witnessed the area's
many turn of events. It relished its glory days and endured its days of infamy. Much as the Court
harks back to the resplendent era of the Old Manila and yearns to restore its lost grandeur, it
believes that the Ordinance is not the fitting means to that end. The Court is of the opinion, and so
holds, that the lower court did not err in declaring the Ordinance, as it did, ultra vires and therefore
null and void.
The Ordinance is so replete with constitutional infirmities that almost every sentence thereof violates
a constitutional provision. The prohibitions and sanctions therein transgress the cardinal rights of
persons enshrined by the Constitution. The Court is called upon to shelter these rights from attempts
at rendering them worthless.
The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of decisions has held that for an
ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local government unit to
enact and must be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to the
following substantive requirements: (1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2) must
not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial or discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may
regulate trade; (5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and (6) must not be
unreasonable. 37
Anent the first criterion, ordinances shall only be valid when they are not contrary to the Constitution
and to the laws. The Ordinance must satisfy two requirements: it must pass muster under the test of
38
constitutionality and the test of consistency with the prevailing laws. That ordinances should be
constitutional uphold the principle of the supremacy of the Constitution. The requirement that the
enactment must not violate existing law gives stress to the precept that local government units are
able to legislate only by virtue of their derivative legislative power, a delegation of legislative power
from the national legislature. The delegate cannot be superior to the principal or exercise powers
higher than those of the latter. 39
This relationship between the national legislature and the local government units has not been
enfeebled by the new provisions in the Constitution strengthening the policy of local autonomy. The
national legislature is still the principal of the local government units, which cannot defy its will or
modify or violate it. 40
The Ordinance was passed by the City Council in the exercise of its police power, an enactment of
the City Council acting as agent of Congress. Local government units, as agencies of the State, are
endowed with police power in order to effectively accomplish and carry out the declared objects of
their creation. This delegated police power is found in Section 16 of the Code, known as the general
41
welfare clause, viz:
SECTION 16. General Welfare.Every local government unit shall exercise the powers
expressly granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary,
appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective governance, and those which are
essential to the promotion of the general welfare. Within their respective territorial
jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure and support, among other things, the
preservation and enrichment of culture, promote health and safety, enhance the right of the
people to a balanced ecology, encourage and support the development of appropriate and
self-reliant scientific and technological capabilities, improve public morals, enhance
economic prosperity and social justice, promote full employment among their residents,
maintain peace and order, and preserve the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants.
Local government units exercise police power through their respective legislative bodies; in this
case, the sangguniang panlungsod or the city council. The Code empowers the legislative bodies to
"enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the
province/city/municipality and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of the Code and in the proper
exercise of the corporate powers of the province/city/ municipality provided under the Code. The42
inquiry in this Petition is concerned with the validity of the exercise of such delegated power.
The Ordinance contravenes

the Constitution
The police power of the City Council, however broad and far-reaching, is subordinate to the
constitutional limitations thereon; and is subject to the limitation that its exercise must be reasonable
and for the public good. In the case at bar, the enactment of the Ordinance was an invalid exercise
43
of delegated power as it is unconstitutional and repugnant to general laws.
The relevant constitutional provisions are the following:
SEC. 5. The maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty, and property, and
the promotion of the general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the
blessings of democracy. 44
SEC. 14. The State recognizes the role of women in nation-building, and shall ensure the
fundamental equality before the law of women and men. 45
SEC. 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law,
nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of laws. 46
Sec. 9. Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. 47
A. The Ordinance infringes
the Due Process Clause
The constitutional safeguard of due process is embodied in the fiat "(N)o person shall be deprived of
life, liberty or property without due process of law. . . ."
48
There is no controlling and precise definition of due process. It furnishes though a standard to which
governmental action should conform in order that deprivation of life, liberty or property, in each
appropriate case, be valid. This standard is aptly described as a responsiveness to the supremacy
of reason, obedience to the dictates of justice, and as such it is a limitation upon the exercise of the
49
police power.50
The purpose of the guaranty is to prevent governmental encroachment against the life, liberty and
property of individuals; to secure the individual from the arbitrary exercise of the powers of the
government, unrestrained by the established principles of private rights and distributive justice; to
protect property from confiscation by legislative enactments, from seizure, forfeiture, and destruction
without a trial and conviction by the ordinary mode of judicial procedure; and to secure to all persons
equal and impartial justice and the benefit of the general law. 51
The guaranty serves as a protection against arbitrary regulation, and private corporations and
partnerships are "persons" within the scope of the guaranty insofar as their property is concerned. 52
This clause has been interpreted as imposing two separate limits on government, usually called
"procedural due process" and "substantive due process."
Procedural due process, as the phrase implies, refers to the procedures that the government must
follow before it deprives a person of life, liberty, or property. Classic procedural due process issues
are concerned with what kind of notice and what form of hearing the government must provide when
it takes a particular action.
53
Substantive due process, as that phrase connotes, asks whether the government has an adequate
reason for taking away a person's life, liberty, or property. In other words, substantive due process
looks to whether there is a sufficient justification for the government's action. Case law in the United
54
States (U.S.) tells us that whether there is such a justification depends very much on the level of
scrutiny used. For example, if a law is in an area where only rational basis review is applied,
55
substantive due process is met so long as the law is rationally related to a legitimate government
purpose. But if it is an area where strict scrutiny is used, such as for protecting fundamental rights,
then the government will meet substantive due process only if it can prove that the law is necessary
to achieve a compelling government purpose. 56
The police power granted to local government units must always be exercised with utmost
observance of the rights of the people to due process and equal protection of the law. Such power
cannot be exercised whimsically, arbitrarily or despotically as its exercise is subject to a
57
qualification, limitation or restriction demanded by the respect and regard due to the prescription of
the fundamental law, particularly those forming part of the Bill of Rights. Individual rights, it bears
emphasis, may be adversely affected only to the extent that may fairly be required by the legitimate
demands of public interest or public welfare. Due process requires the intrinsic validity of the law in
58
interfering with the rights of the person to his life, liberty and property.
59
Requisites for the valid exercise

of Police Power are not met
To successfully invoke the exercise of police power as the rationale for the enactment of
the Ordinance, and to free it from the imputation of constitutional infirmity, not only must it appear
that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require an
interference with private rights, but the means adopted must be reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. It must be evident that
60
no other alternative for the accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of private rights can work.
A reasonable relation must exist between the purposes of the police measure and the means
employed for its accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting the public interest, personal
rights and those pertaining to private property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded.
61
Lacking a concurrence of these two requisites, the police measure shall be struck down as an
arbitrary intrusion into private rights a violation of the due process clause.
62
The Ordinance was enacted to address and arrest the social ills purportedly spawned by the
establishments in the Ermita-Malate area which are allegedly operated under the deceptive veneer
of legitimate, licensed and tax-paying nightclubs, bars, karaoke bars, girlie houses, cocktail lounges,
hotels and motels. Petitioners insist that even the Court in the case of Ermita-Malate Hotel and
Motel Operators Association, Inc. v. City Mayor of Manila had already taken judicial notice of the
63
"alarming increase in the rate of prostitution, adultery and fornication in Manila traceable in great part
to existence of motels, which provide a necessary atmosphere for clandestine entry, presence and
exit and thus become the ideal haven for prostitutes and thrill-seekers." 64
The object of the Ordinance was, accordingly, the promotion and protection of the social and moral
values of the community. Granting for the sake of argument that the objectives of the Ordinance are
within the scope of the City Council's police powers, the means employed for the accomplishment
thereof were unreasonable and unduly oppressive.
It is undoubtedly one of the fundamental duties of the City of Manila to make all reasonable
regulations looking to the promotion of the moral and social values of the community. However, the
worthy aim of fostering public morals and the eradication of the community's social ills can be
achieved through means less restrictive of private rights; it can be attained by reasonable restrictions
rather than by an absolute prohibition. The closing down and transfer of businesses or their
conversion into businesses "allowed" under the Ordinance have no reasonable relation to the
accomplishment of its purposes. Otherwise stated, the prohibition of the enumerated establishments
will not per se protect and promote the social and moral welfare of the community; it will not in itself
eradicate the alluded social ills of prostitution, adultery, fornication nor will it arrest the spread of
sexual disease in Manila.
Conceding for the nonce that the Ermita-Malate area teems with houses of ill-repute and
establishments of the like which the City Council may lawfully prohibit, it is baseless and
65
insupportable to bring within that classification sauna parlors, massage parlors, karaoke bars, night
clubs, day clubs, super clubs, discotheques, cabarets, dance halls, motels and inns. This is not
warranted under the accepted definitions of these terms. The enumerated establishments are lawful
pursuits which are not per se offensive to the moral welfare of the community.
That these are used as arenas to consummate illicit sexual affairs and as venues to further the
illegal prostitution is of no moment. We lay stress on the acrid truth that sexual immorality, being a
human frailty, may take place in the most innocent of places that it may even take place in the
substitute establishments enumerated under Section 3 of the Ordinance. If the flawed logic of
the Ordinance were to be followed, in the remote instance that an immoral sexual act transpires in a
church cloister or a court chamber, we would behold the spectacle of the City of Manila ordering the
closure of the church or court concerned. Every house, building, park, curb, street or even vehicles
for that matter will not be exempt from the prohibition. Simply because there are no "pure" places
where there are impure men. Indeed, even the Scripture and the Tradition of Christians churches
continually recall the presence and universality of sin in man's history.
66
The problem, it needs to be pointed out, is not the establishment, which by its nature cannot be said
to be injurious to the health or comfort of the community and which in itself is amoral, but the
deplorable human activity that may occur within its premises. While a motel may be used as a venue
for immoral sexual activity, it cannot for that reason alone be punished. It cannot be classified as a
house of ill-repute or as a nuisance per se on a mere likelihood or a naked assumption. If that were
so and if that were allowed, then the Ermita-Malate area would not only be purged of its supposed
social ills, it would be extinguished of its soul as well as every human activity, reprehensible or not,
in its every nook and cranny would be laid bare to the estimation of the authorities.
The Ordinance seeks to legislate morality but fails to address the core issues of morality. Try as
the Ordinance may to shape morality, it should not foster the illusion that it can make a moral man
out of it because immorality is not a thing, a building or establishment; it is in the hearts of men. The
City Council instead should regulate human conduct that occurs inside the establishments, but not to
the detriment of liberty and privacy which are covenants, premiums and blessings of democracy.
While petitioners' earnestness at curbing clearly objectionable social ills is commendable, they
unwittingly punish even the proprietors and operators of "wholesome," "innocent" establishments. In
the instant case, there is a clear invasion of personal or property rights, personal in the case of those
individuals desirous of owning, operating and patronizing those motels and property in terms of the
investments made and the salaries to be paid to those therein employed. If the City of Manila so
desires to put an end to prostitution, fornication and other social ills, it can instead impose
reasonable regulations such as daily inspections of the establishments for any violation of the
conditions of their licenses or permits; it may exercise its authority to suspend or revoke their
licenses for these violations; and it may even impose increased license fees. In other words, there
67
are other means to reasonably accomplish the desired end.
Means employed are

constitutionally infirm
The Ordinance disallows the operation of sauna parlors, massage parlors, karaoke bars,

beerhouses, night clubs, day clubs, super clubs, discotheques, cabarets, dance halls, motels and
inns in the Ermita-Malate area. In Section 3 thereof, owners and/or operators of the enumerated
establishments are given three (3) months from the date of approval of the Ordinance within which
"to wind up business operations or to transfer to any place outside the Ermita-Malate area or convert
said businesses to other kinds of business allowable within the area." Further, it states in Section 4
that in cases of subsequent violations of the provisions of the Ordinance, the "premises of the erring
establishment shall be closed and padlocked permanently."
It is readily apparent that the means employed by the Ordinance for the achievement of its purposes,
the governmental interference itself, infringes on the constitutional guarantees of a person's
fundamental right to liberty and property.
Liberty as guaranteed by the Constitution was defined by Justice Malcolm to include "the right to
exist and the right to be free from arbitrary restraint or servitude. The term cannot be dwarfed into
mere freedom from physical restraint of the person of the citizen, but is deemed to embrace the right
of man to enjoy the facilities with which he has been endowed by his Creator, subject only to such
restraint as are necessary for the common welfare." In accordance with this case, the rights of the
68
citizen to be free to use his faculties in all lawful ways; to live and work where he will; to earn his
livelihood by any lawful calling; and to pursue any avocation are all deemed embraced in the
concept of liberty.69
The U.S. Supreme Court in the case of Roth v. Board of Regents, sought to clarify the meaning of
70
"liberty." It said:
While the Court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty. . . guaranteed [by the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments], the term denotes not merely freedom from bodily
restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common
occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up
children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to
enjoy those privileges long recognized…as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by
free men. In a Constitution for a free people, there can be no doubt that the meaning of
"liberty" must be broad indeed.
In another case, it also confirmed that liberty protected by the due process clause includes personal
decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and
education. In explaining the respect the Constitution demands for the autonomy of the person in
making these choices, the U.S. Supreme Court explained:
These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a
lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected
by the Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own concept
of existence, of meaning, of universe, and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs about these
matters could not define the attributes of personhood where they formed under compulsion
of the State. 71
Persons desirous to own, operate and patronize the enumerated establishments under Section 1 of
the Ordinance may seek autonomy for these purposes.
Motel patrons who are single and unmarried may invoke this right to autonomy to consummate their
bonds in intimate sexual conduct within the motel's premisesbe it stressed that their consensual
sexual behavior does not contravene any fundamental state policy as contained in the
Constitution. Adults have a right to choose to forge such relationships with others in the confines of
72
their own private lives and still retain their dignity as free persons. The liberty protected by the
Constitution allows persons the right to make this choice. Their right to liberty under the due process
73
clause gives them the full right to engage in their conduct without intervention of the government, as
long as they do not run afoul of the law. Liberty should be the rule and restraint the exception.
Liberty in the constitutional sense not only means freedom from unlawful government restraint; it
must include privacy as well, if it is to be a repository of freedom. The right to be let alone is the
beginning of all freedomit is the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by
civilized men. 74
The concept of liberty compels respect for the individual whose claim to privacy and interference
demands respect. As the case of Morfe v. Mutuc, borrowing the words of Laski, so very aptly stated:
75
Man is one among many, obstinately refusing reduction to unity. His separateness, his
isolation, are indefeasible; indeed, they are so fundamental that they are the basis on which
his civic obligations are built. He cannot abandon the consequences of his isolation, which
are, broadly speaking, that his experience is private, and the will built out of that experience
personal to himself. If he surrenders his will to others, he surrenders himself. If his will is set
by the will of others, he ceases to be a master of himself. I cannot believe that a man no
longer a master of himself is in any real sense free.
Indeed, the right to privacy as a constitutional right was recognized in Morfe, the invasion of which
should be justified by a compelling state interest. Morfe accorded recognition to the right to privacy
independently of its identification with liberty; in itself it is fully deserving of constitutional protection.
Governmental powers should stop short of certain intrusions into the personal life of the citizen. 76
There is a great temptation to have an extended discussion on these civil liberties but the Court
chooses to exercise restraint and restrict itself to the issues presented when it should. The previous
pronouncements of the Court are not to be interpreted as a license for adults to engage in criminal
conduct. The reprehensibility of such conduct is not diminished. The Court only reaffirms and
guarantees their right to make this choice. Should they be prosecuted for their illegal conduct, they
should suffer the consequences of the choice they have made. That, ultimately, is their choice.
Modality employed is
unlawful taking
In addition, the Ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive as it substantially divests the respondent

of the beneficial use of its property. The Ordinance in Section 1 thereof forbids the running of the
77
enumerated businesses in the Ermita-Malate area and in Section 3 instructs its owners/operators to
wind up business operations or to transfer outside the area or convert said businesses into allowed
businesses. An ordinance which permanently restricts the use of property that it can not be used for
any reasonable purpose goes beyond regulation and must be recognized as a taking of the property
without just compensation. It is intrusive and violative of the private property rights of individuals.
78
The Constitution expressly provides in Article III, Section 9, that "private property shall not be taken
for public use without just compensation." The provision is the most important protection of property
rights in the Constitution. This is a restriction on the general power of the government to take
property. The constitutional provision is about ensuring that the government does not confiscate the
property of some to give it to others. In part too, it is about loss spreading. If the government takes
away a person's property to benefit society, then society should pay. The principal purpose of the
guarantee is "to bar the Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which,
in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole. 79
There are two different types of taking that can be identified. A "possessory" taking occurs when the
government confiscates or physically occupies property. A "regulatory" taking occurs when the
government's regulation leaves no reasonable economically viable use of the property. 80
In the landmark case of Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, it was held that a taking also could be found if
81
government regulation of the use of property went "too far." When regulation reaches a certain
magnitude, in most if not in all cases there must be an exercise of eminent domain and
compensation to support the act. While property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation
goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.
82
No formula or rule can be devised to answer the questions of what is too far and when regulation
becomes a taking. In Mahon, Justice Holmes recognized that it was "a question of degree and
therefore cannot be disposed of by general propositions." On many other occasions as well, the U.S.
Supreme Court has said that the issue of when regulation constitutes a taking is a matter of
considering the facts in each case. The Court asks whether justice and fairness require that the
economic loss caused by public action must be compensated by the government and thus borne by
the public as a whole, or whether the loss should remain concentrated on those few persons subject
to the public action.
83
What is crucial in judicial consideration of regulatory takings is that government regulation is a taking
if it leaves no reasonable economically viable use of property in a manner that interferes with
reasonable expectations for use. A regulation that permanently denies all economically beneficial or
84
productive use of land is, from the owner's point of view, equivalent to a "taking" unless principles of
nuisance or property law that existed when the owner acquired the land make the use
prohibitable. When the owner of real property has been called upon to sacrifice all economically
85
beneficial uses in the name of the common good, that is, to leave his property economically idle, he
has suffered a taking. 86
A regulation which denies all economically beneficial or productive use of land will require
compensation under the takings clause. Where a regulation places limitations on land that fall short
of eliminating all economically beneficial use, a taking nonetheless may have occurred, depending
on a complex of factors including the regulation's economic effect on the landowner, the extent to
which the regulation interferes with reasonable investment-backed expectations and the character of
government action. These inquiries are informed by the purpose of the takings clause which is to
prevent the government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness
and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole. 87
A restriction on use of property may also constitute a "taking" if not reasonably necessary to the
effectuation of a substantial public purpose or if it has an unduly harsh impact on the distinct
investment-backed expectations of the owner. 88
The Ordinance gives the owners and operators of the "prohibited" establishments three (3) months
from its approval within which to "wind up business operations or to transfer to any place outside of
the Ermita-Malate area or convert said businesses to other kinds of business allowable within the
area." The directive to "wind up business operations" amounts to a closure of the establishment, a
permanent deprivation of property, and is practically confiscatory. Unless the owner converts his
establishment to accommodate an "allowed" business, the structure which housed the previous
business will be left empty and gathering dust. Suppose he transfers it to another area, he will
likewise leave the entire establishment idle. Consideration must be given to the substantial amount
of money invested to build the edifices which the owner reasonably expects to be returned within a
period of time. It is apparent that the Ordinance leaves no reasonable economically viable use of
property in a manner that interferes with reasonable expectations for use.
The second and third options to transfer to any place outside of the Ermita-Malate area or to
convert into allowed businessesare confiscatory as well. The penalty of permanent closure in
cases of subsequent violations found in Section 4 of the Ordinance is also equivalent to a "taking" of
private property.
The second option instructs the owners to abandon their property and build another one outside the
Ermita-Malate area. In every sense, it qualifies as a taking without just compensation with an
additional burden imposed on the owner to build another establishment solely from his coffers. The
proffered solution does not put an end to the "problem," it merely relocates it. Not only is this
impractical, it is unreasonable, onerous and oppressive. The conversion into allowed enterprises is
just as ridiculous. How may the respondent convert a motel into a restaurant or a coffee shop, art
gallery or music lounge without essentially destroying its property? This is a taking of private
property without due process of law, nay, even without compensation.
The penalty of closure likewise constitutes unlawful taking that should be compensated by the
government. The burden on the owner to convert or transfer his business, otherwise it will be closed
permanently after a subsequent violation should be borne by the public as this end benefits them as
a whole.
Petitioners cannot take refuge in classifying the measure as a zoning ordinance. A zoning ordinance,
although a valid exercise of police power, which limits a "wholesome" property to a use which can
not reasonably be made of it constitutes the taking of such property without just compensation.
Private property which is not noxious nor intended for noxious purposes may not, by zoning, be
destroyed without compensation. Such principle finds no support in the principles of justice as we
know them. The police powers of local government units which have always received broad and
liberal interpretation cannot be stretched to cover this particular taking.
Distinction should be made between destruction from necessity and eminent domain. It needs
restating that the property taken in the exercise of police power is destroyed because it is noxious or
intended for a noxious purpose while the property taken under the power of eminent domain is
intended for a public use or purpose and is therefore "wholesome." If it be of public benefit that a
89
"wholesome" property remain unused or relegated to a particular purpose, then certainly the public
should bear the cost of reasonable compensation for the condemnation of private property for public
use.90
Further, the Ordinance fails to set up any standard to guide or limit the petitioners' actions. It in no
way controls or guides the discretion vested in them. It provides no definition of the establishments
covered by it and it fails to set forth the conditions when the establishments come within its ambit of
prohibition. The Ordinance confers upon the mayor arbitrary and unrestricted power to close down
establishments. Ordinances such as this, which make possible abuses in its execution, depending
upon no conditions or qualifications whatsoever other than the unregulated arbitrary will of the city
authorities as the touchstone by which its validity is to be tested, are unreasonable and invalid.
The Ordinance should have established a rule by which its impartial enforcement could be secured. 91
Ordinances placing restrictions upon the lawful use of property must, in order to be valid and
constitutional, specify the rules and conditions to be observed and conduct to avoid; and must not
admit of the exercise, or of an opportunity for the exercise, of unbridled discretion by the law
enforcers in carrying out its provisions. 92
Thus, in Coates v. City of Cincinnati, as cited in People v. Nazario, the U.S. Supreme Court
93 94
struck down an ordinance that had made it illegal for "three or more persons to assemble on any
sidewalk and there conduct themselves in a manner annoying to persons passing by." The
ordinance was nullified as it imposed no standard at all "because one may never know in advance
what 'annoys some people but does not annoy others.' "
Similarly, the Ordinance does not specify the standards to ascertain which establishments "tend to
disturb the community," "annoy the inhabitants," and "adversely affect the social and moral welfare
of the community." The cited case supports the nullification of the Ordinance for lack of
comprehensible standards to guide the law enforcers in carrying out its provisions.
Petitioners cannot therefore order the closure of the enumerated establishments without infringing
the due process clause. These lawful establishments may be regulated, but not prevented from
carrying on their business. This is a sweeping exercise of police power that is a result of a lack of
imagination on the part of the City Council and which amounts to an interference into personal and
private rights which the Court will not countenance. In this regard, we take a resolute stand to uphold
the constitutional guarantee of the right to liberty and property.
Worthy of note is an example derived from the U.S. of a reasonable regulation which is a far cry from
the ill-considered Ordinance enacted by the City Council.
In FW/PBS, INC. v. Dallas, the city of Dallas adopted a comprehensive ordinance regulating
95
"sexually oriented businesses," which are defined to include adult arcades, bookstores, video stores,
cabarets, motels, and theaters as well as escort agencies, nude model studio and sexual encounter
centers. Among other things, the ordinance required that such businesses be licensed. A group of
motel owners were among the three groups of businesses that filed separate suits challenging the
ordinance. The motel owners asserted that the city violated the due process clause by failing to
produce adequate support for its supposition that renting room for fewer than ten (10) hours resulted
in increased crime and other secondary effects. They likewise argued than the ten (10)-hour
limitation on the rental of motel rooms placed an unconstitutional burden on the right to freedom of
association. Anent the first contention, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the reasonableness of the
legislative judgment combined with a study which the city considered, was adequate to support the
city's determination that motels permitting room rentals for fewer than ten (10 ) hours should be
included within the licensing scheme. As regards the second point, the Court held that limiting motel
room rentals to ten (10) hours will have no discernible effect on personal bonds as those bonds that
are formed from the use of a motel room for fewer than ten (10) hours are not those that have played
a critical role in the culture and traditions of the nation by cultivating and transmitting shared ideals
and beliefs.
The ordinance challenged in the above-cited case merely regulated the targeted businesses. It
imposed reasonable restrictions; hence, its validity was upheld.
The case of Ermita Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. v. City Mayor of Manila, it 96
needs pointing out, is also different from this case in that what was involved therein was a measure
which regulated the mode in which motels may conduct business in order to put an end to practices
which could encourage vice and immorality. Necessarily, there was no valid objection on due
process or equal protection grounds as the ordinance did not prohibit motels. The Ordinance in this
case however is not a regulatory measure but is an exercise of an assumed power to prohibit. 97
The foregoing premises show that the Ordinance is an unwarranted and unlawful curtailment of
property and personal rights of citizens. For being unreasonable and an undue restraint of trade, it
cannot, even under the guise of exercising police power, be upheld as valid.
B. The Ordinance violates Equal

Protection Clause
Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as
to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. Similar subjects, in other words, should not be
treated differently, so as to give undue favor to some and unjustly discriminate against others. The
98
guarantee means that no person or class of persons shall be denied the same protection of laws
which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in like circumstances. The "equal protection of
99
the laws is a pledge of the protection of equal laws." It limits governmental discrimination. The
100
equal protection clause extends to artificial persons but only insofar as their property is concerned. 101
The Court has explained the scope of the equal protection clause in this wise:
… What does it signify? To quote from J.M. Tuason & Co. v. Land Tenure Administration:
"The ideal situation is for the law's benefits to be available to all, that none be placed outside
the sphere of its coverage. Only thus could chance and favor be excluded and the affairs of
men governed by that serene and impartial uniformity, which is of the very essence of the
idea of law." There is recognition, however, in the opinion that what in fact exists "cannot
approximate the ideal. Nor is the law susceptible to the reproach that it does not take into
account the realities of the situation. The constitutional guarantee then is not to be given a
meaning that disregards what is, what does in fact exist. To assure that the general welfare
be promoted, which is the end of law, a regulatory measure may cut into the rights to liberty
and property. Those adversely affected may under such circumstances invoke the equal
protection clause only if they can show that the governmental act assailed, far from being
inspired by the attainment of the common weal was prompted by the spirit of hostility, or at
the very least, discrimination that finds no support in reason." Classification is thus not ruled
out, it being sufficient to quote from the Tuason decision anew "that the laws operate equally
and uniformly on all persons under similar circumstances or that all persons must be treated
in the same manner, the conditions not being different, both in the privileges conferred and
the liabilities imposed. Favoritism and undue preference cannot be allowed. For the principle
is that equal protection and security shall be given to every person under circumstances
which, if not identical, are analogous. If law be looked upon in terms of burden or charges,
those that fall within a class should be treated in the same fashion, whatever restrictions cast
on some in the group equally binding on the rest. 102
Legislative bodies are allowed to classify the subjects of legislation. If the classification is
reasonable, the law may operate only on some and not all of the people without violating the equal
protection clause. The classification must, as an indispensable requisite, not be arbitrary. To be
103
valid, it must conform to the following requirements:
1) It must be based on substantial distinctions.
2) It must be germane to the purposes of the law.
3) It must not be limited to existing conditions only.
4) It must apply equally to all members of the class. 104
In the Court's view, there are no substantial distinctions between motels, inns, pension houses,
hotels, lodging houses or other similar establishments. By definition, all are commercial
establishments providing lodging and usually meals and other services for the public. No reason
exists for prohibiting motels and inns but not pension houses, hotels, lodging houses or other similar
establishments. The classification in the instant case is invalid as similar subjects are not similarly
treated, both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed. It is arbitrary as it does not rest on
substantial distinctions bearing a just and fair relation to the purpose of the Ordinance.
The Court likewise cannot see the logic for prohibiting the business and operation of motels in the
Ermita-Malate area but not outside of this area. A noxious establishment does not become any less
noxious if located outside the area.
The standard "where women are used as tools for entertainment" is also discriminatory as
prostitutionone of the hinted ills the Ordinance aims to banishis not a profession exclusive to
women. Both men and women have an equal propensity to engage in prostitution. It is not any less
grave a sin when men engage in it. And why would the assumption that there is an ongoing immoral
activity apply only when women are employed and be inapposite when men are in harness? This
discrimination based on gender violates equal protection as it is not substantially related to important
government objectives. Thus, the discrimination is invalid.
105
Failing the test of constitutionality, the Ordinance likewise failed to pass the test of consistency with
prevailing laws.
C. The Ordinance is repugnant

to general laws; it is ultra vires
The Ordinance is in contravention of the Code as the latter merely empowers local government units
to regulate, and not prohibit, the establishments enumerated in Section 1 thereof.
The power of the City Council to regulate by ordinances the establishment, operation, and
maintenance of motels, hotels and other similar establishments is found in Section 458 (a) 4 (iv),
which provides that:
. . .
. . .
(iv) Regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance of cafes, restaurants,

beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses, and other similar
establishments, including tourist guides and transports . . . .
While its power to regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance of any entertainment or
amusement facilities, and to prohibit certain forms of amusement or entertainment is provided under
Section 458 (a) 4 (vii) of the Code, which reads as follows:
. . .
. . .
(vii) Regulate the establishment, operation, and maintenance of any entertainment or

amusement facilities, including theatrical performances, circuses, billiard pools,
public dancing schools, public dance halls, sauna baths, massage parlors, and other
places for entertainment or amusement; regulate such other events or activities for
amusement or entertainment, particularly those which tend to disturb the community
or annoy the inhabitants, or require the suspension or suppression of the same; or,
prohibit certain forms of amusement or entertainment in order to protect the social
and moral welfare of the community.
Clearly, with respect to cafes, restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension houses,
lodging houses, and other similar establishments, the only power of the City Council to legislate
relative thereto is to regulate them to promote the general welfare. The Code still withholds from
cities the power to suppress and prohibit altogether the establishment, operation and maintenance of
such establishments. It is well to recall the rulings of the Court in Kwong Sing v. City of Manila that:
106
The word "regulate," as used in subsection (l), section 2444 of the Administrative Code,
means and includes the power to control, to govern, and to restrain; but "regulate" should not
be construed as synonymous with "suppress" or "prohibit." Consequently, under the power to
regulate laundries, the municipal authorities could make proper police regulations as to the
mode in which the employment or business shall be exercised. 107
And in People v. Esguerra, wherein the Court nullified an ordinance of the Municipality of Tacloban
108
which prohibited the selling, giving and dispensing of liquor ratiocinating that the municipality is
empowered only to regulate the same and not prohibit. The Court therein declared that:
(A)s a general rule when a municipal corporation is specifically given authority or power to
regulate or to license and regulate the liquor traffic, power to prohibit is impliedly withheld. 109
These doctrines still hold contrary to petitioners' assertion that they were modified by the Code
110
vesting upon City Councils prohibitory powers.
Similarly, the City Council exercises regulatory powers over public dancing schools, public dance
halls, sauna baths, massage parlors, and other places for entertainment or amusement as found in
the first clause of Section 458 (a) 4 (vii). Its powers to regulate, suppress and suspend "such other
events or activities for amusement or entertainment, particularly those which tend to disturb the
community or annoy the inhabitants" and to "prohibit certain forms of amusement or entertainment in
order to protect the social and moral welfare of the community" are stated in the second and third
clauses, respectively of the same Section. The several powers of the City Council as provided in
Section 458 (a) 4 (vii) of the Code, it is pertinent to emphasize, are separated by semi-colons (;), the
use of which indicates that the clauses in which these powers are set forth are independent of each
other albeit closely related to justify being put together in a single enumeration or paragraph. These
111
powers, therefore, should not be confused, commingled or consolidated as to create a

conglomerated and unified power of regulation, suppression and prohibition. 112
The Congress unequivocably specified the establishments and forms of amusement or

entertainment subject to regulation among which are beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension
houses, lodging houses, and other similar establishments (Section 458 (a) 4 (iv)), public dancing
schools, public dance halls, sauna baths, massage parlors, and other places for entertainment or
amusement (Section 458 (a) 4 (vii)). This enumeration therefore cannot be included as among "other
events or activities for amusement or entertainment, particularly those which tend to disturb the
community or annoy the inhabitants" or "certain forms of amusement or entertainment" which the
City Council may suspend, suppress or prohibit.
The rule is that the City Council has only such powers as are expressly granted to it and those which
are necessarily implied or incidental to the exercise thereof. By reason of its limited powers and the
nature thereof, said powers are to be construed strictissimi juris and any doubt or ambiguity arising
out of the terms used in granting said powers must be construed against the City
Council. Moreover, it is a general rule in statutory construction that the express mention of one
113
person, thing, or consequence is tantamount to an express exclusion of all others. Expressio unius

est exclusio alterium. This maxim is based upon the rules of logic and the natural workings of human
mind. It is particularly applicable in the construction of such statutes as create new rights or
remedies, impose penalties or punishments, or otherwise come under the rule of strict construction. 114
The argument that the City Council is empowered to enact the Ordinance by virtue of the general
welfare clause of the Code and of Art. 3, Sec. 18 (kk) of the Revised Charter of Manila is likewise
without merit. On the first point, the ruling of the Court in People v. Esguerra, is instructive. It held
115
that:
The powers conferred upon a municipal council in the general welfare clause, or section
2238 of the Revised Administrative Code, refers to matters not covered by the other
provisions of the same Code, and therefore it can not be applied to intoxicating liquors, for
the power to regulate the selling, giving away and dispensing thereof is granted specifically
by section 2242 (g) to municipal councils. To hold that, under the general power granted by
section 2238, a municipal council may enact the ordinance in question, notwithstanding the
provision of section 2242 (g), would be to make the latter superfluous and nugatory, because
the power to prohibit, includes the power to regulate, the selling, giving away and dispensing
of intoxicating liquors.
On the second point, it suffices to say that the Code being a later expression of the legislative will
must necessarily prevail and override the earlier law, the Revised Charter of Manila. Legis
posteriores priores contrarias abrogant, or later statute repeals prior ones which are repugnant
thereto. As between two laws on the same subject matter, which are irreconcilably inconsistent, that
which is passed later prevails, since it is the latest expression of legislative will. If there is an
116
inconsistency or repugnance between two statutes, both relating to the same subject matter, which
cannot be removed by any fair and reasonable method of interpretation, it is the latest expression of
the legislative will which must prevail and override the earlier.117
Implied repeals are those which take place when a subsequently enacted law contains provisions
contrary to those of an existing law but no provisions expressly repealing them. Such repeals have
been divided into two general classes: those which occur where an act is so inconsistent or
irreconcilable with an existing prior act that only one of the two can remain in force and those which
occur when an act covers the whole subject of an earlier act and is intended to be a substitute
therefor. The validity of such a repeal is sustained on the ground that the latest expression of the
legislative will should prevail.
118
In addition, Section 534(f) of the Code states that "All general and special laws, acts, city charters,
decrees, executive orders, proclamations and administrative regulations, or part or parts thereof
which are inconsistent with any of the provisions of this Code are hereby repealed or modified
accordingly." Thus, submitting to petitioners' interpretation that the Revised Charter of Manila
empowers the City Council to prohibit motels, that portion of the Charter stating such must be
considered repealed by the Code as it is at variance with the latter's provisions granting the City
Council mere regulatory powers.
It is well to point out that petitioners also cannot seek cover under the general welfare clause
authorizing the abatement of nuisances without judicial proceedings. That tenet applies to a
nuisance per se, or one which affects the immediate safety of persons and property and may be
summarily abated under the undefined law of necessity. It can not be said that motels are injurious
to the rights of property, health or comfort of the community. It is a legitimate business. If it be a
nuisance per accidens it may be so proven in a hearing conducted for that purpose. A motel is
not per se a nuisance warranting its summary abatement without judicial intervention. 119
Notably, the City Council was conferred powers to prevent and prohibit certain activities and
establishments in another section of the Code which is reproduced as follows:
(1) Approve ordinances and pass resolutions necessary for an efficient and effective city
government, and in this connection, shall:
. . .
(v) Enact ordinances intended to prevent, suppress and impose appropriate penalties for
habitual drunkenness in public places, vagrancy, mendicancy, prostitution, establishment
and maintenance of houses of ill repute, gambling and other prohibited games of chance,
fraudulent devices and ways to obtain money or property, drug addiction, maintenance of
drug dens, drug pushing, juvenile delinquency, the printing, distribution or exhibition of
obscene or pornographic materials or publications, and such other activities inimical to the
welfare and morals of the inhabitants of the city;
. . .
If it were the intention of Congress to confer upon the City Council the power to prohibit the
establishments enumerated in Section 1 of the Ordinance, it would have so declared in uncertain
terms by adding them to the list of the matters it may prohibit under the above-quoted Section.
The Ordinance now vainly attempts to lump these establishments with houses of ill-repute and
expand the City Council's powers in the second and third clauses of Section 458 (a) 4 (vii) of the
Code in an effort to overreach its prohibitory powers. It is evident that these establishments may only
be regulated in their establishment, operation and maintenance.
It is important to distinguish the punishable activities from the establishments themselves. That these
establishments are recognized legitimate enterprises can be gleaned from another Section of the
Code. Section 131 under the Title on Local Government Taxation expressly mentioned proprietors or
operators of massage clinics, sauna, Turkish and Swedish baths, hotels, motels and lodging houses
as among the "contractors" defined in paragraph (h) thereof. The same Section also defined
"amusement" as a "pleasurable diversion and entertainment," "synonymous to relaxation, avocation,
pastime or fun;" and "amusement places" to include "theaters, cinemas, concert halls, circuses and
other places of amusement where one seeks admission to entertain oneself by seeing or viewing the
show or performances." Thus, it can be inferred that the Code considers these establishments as
legitimate enterprises and activities. It is well to recall the maxim reddendo singula singulis which
means that words in different parts of a statute must be referred to their appropriate connection,
giving to each in its place, its proper force and effect, and, if possible, rendering none of them
useless or superfluous, even if strict grammatical construction demands otherwise. Likewise, where
words under consideration appear in different sections or are widely dispersed throughout an act the
same principle applies. 120
Not only does the Ordinance contravene the Code, it likewise runs counter to the provisions of P.D.
499. As correctly argued by MTDC, the statute had already converted the residential Ermita-Malate
area into a commercial area. The decree allowed the establishment and operation of all kinds of
commercial establishments except warehouse or open storage depot, dump or yard, motor repair
shop, gasoline service station, light industry with any machinery or funeral establishment. The rule is
that for an ordinance to be valid and to have force and effect, it must not only be within the powers of
the council to enact but the same must not be in conflict with or repugnant to the general law. As 121
succinctly illustrated in Solicitor General v. Metropolitan Manila Authority:

122
The requirement that the enactment must not violate existing law explains itself. Local
political subdivisions are able to legislate only by virtue of a valid delegation of legislative
power from the national legislature (except only that the power to create their own sources of
revenue and to levy taxes is conferred by the Constitution itself). They are mere agents
vested with what is called the power of subordinate legislation. As delegates of the
Congress, the local government units cannot contravene but must obey at all times the will of
their principal. In the case before us, the enactment in question, which are merely local in
origin cannot prevail against the decree, which has the force and effect of a statute. 123
Petitioners contend that the Ordinance enjoys the presumption of validity. While this may be the rule,
it has already been held that although the presumption is always in favor of the validity or
reasonableness of the ordinance, such presumption must nevertheless be set aside when the
invalidity or unreasonableness appears on the face of the ordinance itself or is established by proper
evidence. The exercise of police power by the local government is valid unless it contravenes the
fundamental law of the land, or an act of the legislature, or unless it is against public policy or is
unreasonable, oppressive, partial, discriminating or in derogation of a common right. 124
Conclusion
All considered, the Ordinance invades fundamental personal and property rights and impairs
personal privileges. It is constitutionally infirm. The Ordinance contravenes statutes; it is
discriminatory and unreasonable in its operation; it is not sufficiently detailed and explicit that abuses
may attend the enforcement of its sanctions. And not to be forgotten, the City Council under the
Code had no power to enact the Ordinance and is therefore ultra vires, null and void.
Concededly, the challenged Ordinance was enacted with the best of motives and shares the
concern of the public for the cleansing of the Ermita-Malate area of its social sins. Police power
legislation of such character deserves the full endorsement of the judiciary we reiterate our
support for it. But inspite of its virtuous aims, the enactment of the Ordinance has no statutory or
constitutional authority to stand on. Local legislative bodies, in this case, the City Council, cannot
prohibit the operation of the enumerated establishments under Section 1 thereof or order their
transfer or conversion without infringing the constitutional guarantees of due process and equal
protection of laws not even under the guise of police power.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the decision of the Regional Trial Court declaring
the Ordinance void is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Quisumbing, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-
Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, Chico-Nazario and Garcia, JJ., concur
Panganiban, J., in the result.
Ynares- Santiago, J., concur in the result only.
Footnotes
Dated 11 January 1995; Rollo, pp. 6-73 with annexes.

1
Id. at 64-72.
2
The lower court declared the Ordinance to be null and void.

3
In the case of Cotton Club Corporation, etc. v. Hon. Alfredo S. Lim, etc, et al. before RTC,
4
Branch 55 of Manila, docketed as Civil Case No. 93-66551, Judge Hermogenes R. Liwag
declared the Ordinance void and unconstitutional. The defendants elevated the case to the
Court of Appeals which denied their petition on procedural grounds in its Decision dated 21
May 2003. It appears that defendants Hon. Alfredo S. Lim and the City Council of Manila did
not elevate the case before the Court. Entry of Judgment of the CA Decision was made on
22 April 2003.
Rollo, p. 37.
5
Id. at. 75; It now calls itself Hotel Victoria.

6
Id. at 35-47.
7
Id. at 46.
8
The principal authors of the Ordinance are: Hons. Bienvenido M. Abante, Jr.; Humberto B.

9
Basco; Nestor C. Ponce, Jr.; Ernesto A. Nieva; Francisco G. Varona, Jr.; Jhosep Y. Lopez;
Ma. Paz E. Herrera; Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr; Ma. Lourdes M. Isip; Flaviano F. Concepcion,
Jr.; Ernesto V.P. Maceda, Jr.; Victoriano A. Melendez; Ma. Corazon R. Caballes; Bernardito
C. Ang; Roberto C. Ocampo; Rogelio B. dela Paz; Romeo G. Rivera; Alexander S. Ricafort;
Avelino S. Cailian; Bernardo D. Ragasa; Joey D. Hizon; Leonardo L. Angat; and Jocelyn B.
Dawis.
10
Rollo, p. 8.
11
RTC Records, pp. 10-11.
12
Paragraph (a) 4 (iv), Section 458, Chapter 3 of the Code reads, thus:
. . .
(4) Regulate activities relative to the use of land, buildings and structures within the city
in order to promote the general welfare and for said purpose shall:
. . . .
(iv) Regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance of cafes, restaurants,

beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses, and other similar
establishments, including tourist guides and transports; . . .
Presidential Decree No. 499; Dated 28 June 1974; Declaring Portions of the Ermita-Malate
13
Area as Commercial Zones with Certain Restrictions. It reads in full:
WHEREAS, the government is committed to the promotion and development of tourism

in the country, particularly in the City of Manila which is the hub of commercial and cultural
activities in Manila Metropolitan Area;
WHEREAS, certain portions of the districts of Ermita and Malate known as the Tourist
Belt are still classified as Class "A" Residential Zones and Class "B" Residential Zones
where hotels and other business establishments such as curio stores, souvenir shops,
handicraft display centers and the like are not allowed under the existing zoning plan in the
City of Manila;
WHEREAS, the presence of such establishments in the area would not only serve as an
attraction for tourists but are dollar earning enterprises as well, which tourist areas all over
the world cannot do without;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue

of the powers vested in me under the Constitution as Commander-in-Chief of all the Armed
Forces of the Philippines and pursuant to Proclamation No. 1081, dated September 21,
1972, and General Order No. 1, dated September 22, 1972, as amended, do hereby order
and decree the classification as a Commercial Zone of that portion of the Ermita-Malate area
bounded by Teodoro M. Kalaw, Sr. Street in the north; Taft Avenue in the east; Vito Cruz
Street in the south and Roxas Boulevard in the west. PROVIDED, HOWEVER, That no
permit shall be granted for the establishment of any new warehouse or open storage depot,
dump or yard, motor repair shop, gasoline service station, light industry with any machinery
or funeral establishment in these areas, and PROVIDED, FURTHER, That for purposes of
realty tax assessment on properties situated therein, lands and buildings used exclusively for
residential purposes by the owners themselves shall remain assessed as residential
properties.
All laws, ordinances, orders, rules and regulations which are inconsistent with this
Decree are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
This Decree shall take effect immediately.
Done in the City of Manila this 28th day of June in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred
and seventy-four.
14
RTC Records, pp. 11-13.
15
Id. at 158-171.
16
Id. at 160.
41 Phil. 103 (1920); see also Samson v. Mayor of Bacolod City, G.R. No. L-28745, 23

17
October 1974, 60 SCRA 267.
18
RTC Records, p. 161.
19
Approved on 18 June 1949.
20
RTC Records, p. 160.
21
Supra note 18.
22
Id. at 164.
23
Ibid.
24
Id. at 165-169.
25
Id. at 84.
26
Id. at 453.
27
Rollo, pp. 6 and 72.
28
Id. at 6.
29
Dated 12 December 1994; Id. at 73.
30
Id. at 2.
31
Supra note 13.
32
Rollo, p. 13.
33
Id. at 190-201.
34
Id. at 16, 194, 198.
35
Id. at 19, 22, 25-26, 199.
36
Id. at 150-180.
Tatel v. Municipality of Virac, G.R. No. 40243, 11 March 1992, 207 SCRA 157, 161;
37
Solicitor General v. Metropolitan Manila Authority, G.R. No. 102782, 11 December 1991, 204
SCRA 837, 845; Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp., Inc., G.R. No. 111097, 20 July 1994,
234 SCRA 255, 268-267.
38
See ART. 7, par. (3) of the Civil Code which reads, thus:
. . .
Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are
not contrary to the laws or the Constitution.
Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp, Inc., G.R. No. 111097, 20 July 1994, 234 SCRA 255,
39
270-271.
40
Id. at 273.
41
Acebedo Optical Company, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 385 Phil. 956, 968-969 (2000).
Metropolitan Manila Devt. Authority v. Bel-Air Village Asso., 385 Phil. 586, 603
42
(2000), citing Sections 468 (a), 458 (a), and 447 (a), Book III, Local Government Code of
1991.
43
16 C.J.S., pp. 562-565.
44
Art. II, Declaration of principles and state policies, 1987 const.
45
Ibid.
46
Art. III, Bill of Rights, 1987 Const.
47
Ibid.
48
Id. at Sec. 9; See also Cruz, Isagani A., Constitutional Law 97 (1998).
Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. v. City Mayor of Manila, 20 Phil.
49
849, 860 (1967).
50
See In re Lutker, Okl. Cr., 274 P. 2d 786, 789, 790.
51
Supra note 43 at 1150-1151.
52
See Smith, Bell & Co. v. Natividad, 40 Phil. 136, 145 (1919).
53
Chemerinsky, Erwin, Constitutional Law Principles And Policies, 2nd Ed. 523 (2002).
54
Id. at 523-524.
55
See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 840 (1998).
56
Chemerinsky, supra note 53 at 524.
Lim v. Court of Appeals, 435 Phil. 857, 868 (2002); This is a related case involving the
57
same Ordinance challenged in this case. The Court denied the petition questioning the writ
of prohibitory preliminary injunction issued by the RTC, enjoining the closure of a certain
establishment pursuant to the Ordinance.
Homeowners' Asso. of the Phil., Inc. v. Municipal Board of the City of Manila, 133 Phil. 903,
58
907 (1968).
59
Cruz, Isagani A., Constitutional Law 104 (1998).
See U.S. v. Toribio, 15 Phil. 85 (1910); Fabie v. City of Manila, 21 Phil. 486 (1912);

60
Case v. Board of Health, 24 Phil. 256 (1913).
61
Balacuit v. CFI of Agusan del Norte, No. L-38429, 30 June 1988, 163 SCRA 182, 191-193.
62
Cruz, supra note 59 at 56.
Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Assoc. Inc. v. City Mayor of Manila, supra note
63
49.
64
Id. at 858-859.
65
Section 458 (a) 1 (v), the Code.
Catechism of the Catholic Church, Definitive Edition, p. 101; ECCE and Word & Life
66
Publications, Don Bosco Compound, Makati.
67
Lim v. Court of Appeals, supra note 57 at 867.
Rubi v. Provincial Board 39 Phil. 660 (1919), as cited in Morfe v. Mutuc, 130 Phil. 415
68
(1968).
69
Morfe v. Mutuc, 130 Phil. 415, 440 (1968).
70
408 U.S. 572.
71
See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
Concerned Employee v. Glenda Espiritu Mayor, A.M. No. P-02-1564, 23 November

72
2004, J. Tinga, ponente.
73
Lawrence v. Texas, supra note 70.
74
Morfe v. Mutuc, supra note 68 at 442.
75
Id. at 442-443, citing Laski, Liberty in the Modern State, 44 (1944).
Id. at 444-445, citing Emerson, Nine Justices in Search of a Doctrine, 64 Mich. Law.
76
Rev. 219, 229 (1965).
77
People v. Fajardo, et al., 104 Phil. 443, 447 (1958).
78
Ibid. citing Arverne Bay Const. Co. v. Thatcher (N.Y.) 117 ALR. 1110, 1116.
79
80
Id. at 617.
81
260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
82
Id. at 413-415.
83
See Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
84
Chemerinsky , supra note 53 at 623-626.
85
See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
86
Ibid.
87
88
Supra note 82.
89
People v. Fajardo, supra note 76 at 443, 448 citing Tews v. Woolhiser (1933) 352 I11. 212,

90
185 N.E. 827.
91
Id. at 446-447.
Id. at 447, citing Schloss Poster Adv. Co., Inc. v. City of Rock Hill, et al., 2 SE (2d), pp. 394-
92
395; People v. Nazario, No. L-44143, 31 August 1988, 165 SCRA 186, 195.
93
402 U.S. 611 (1971).
94
No. L-44143, 31 August 1988, 165 SCRA 186, 195.
95
493 U.S. 215 (1990).
96
Supra note 49.
97
De la Cruz, et al. v. Hon. Paras, et al., 208 Phil. 490, 503 (1983).
98
See Ichong v. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155 (1957).
16B Am Jur 2d 779 299 citing State of Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337, 59
99
S. Ct. 232, 83 L. Ed. 208 (1938), reh'g denied, 305 U.S. 676, 59 S. Ct. 356, 83 L. Ed. 437
(1939) and mandate conformed to, 344 Mo. 1238, 131 S.W. 2d 217 (1939).
16B Am Jur 2d 779 299 citing Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 134 L. Ed.
100
2d 855, 109 Ed. Law Rep. 539, 70 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1180, 68 Empl. Prac. Dec.
(CCH) 44013 (1996); Walker v. Board of Supervisors of Monroe County, 224 Miss. 801, 81
So. 2d 225 (1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 887, 76 S. Ct. 142, 100 L. Ed. 782 (1955);
Preisler v. Calcaterra, 362 Mo. 662, 243 S.W. 2d 62 (1951).
101
Supra note 52 at 145.
102
Nuñez v. Sandiganbayan, 197 Phil. 407 (1982).
103
104
See People v. Cayat, 68 Phil. 12 (1939).
105
See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
106
Supra note 17.
107
Id. at 108 (1920).
108
81 Phil. 33 (1948).
109
Id. at 38.
110
Rollo, p. 19.
RTC Records, p. 409; The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 55 in the
111
case of Cotton Club Corporation, Inc. v. Hon. Alfredo S. Lim, etc., et al., Civil Case No. 93-
66551; Dated 28 July 1993; Penned by Judge Hermogenes R. Liwag; Citing Shaw, Harry,
Punctuate it Right! Everday Handbooks 125-126.
112
Id. at 408.
113
City of Ozamis v. Lumapas, No. L-30727, 15 July 1975, 65 SCRA 33, 42.
Francisco, Vicente J., Statutory Construction, Second Edition 172 (1959); See Pepsi-Cola

114
Bottling Company of the Philippines, Inc. v. Municipality of Tanauan, Leyte, et al., 161 Phil.
591, 605 (1976).
115
Supra note 107 at 33.
116
Agpalo, Ruben F., Statutory Construction 296 (1986).
117
Francisco, supra note 113 at 271.
Crawford, Earl T., The Construction of Statutes 196-197
118
(1940); See Mecano v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 103982, 11 December 1992, 216

SCRA 500, 505.
See Estate of Gregoria Francisco v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 95279, 25 July 1991, 199
119
SCRA 595, 601.
Francisco, supra note 113 at 178-179; See King, et al. v. Hernaez, etc., et al., 114 Phil.

120
730, 739 (1962).
Chua Lao, etc., et al. v. Raymundo, etc., et al., 104 Phil. 302, 307 (1958).
121
G.R. No. 102782, 11 December 1991, 204 SCRA 837.

122
Id. at 847.
123
Balacuit v. CFI of Agusan del Norte, supra note 61 at 198-199.

124
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 151931. September 23, 2003
ANAMER SALAZAR,, Petitioner, v. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and J.Y. BROTHERS MARKETING

CORPORATION, Respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Criminal Procedure of the
Order1 of the Regional Trial Court, 5th Judicial Region, Legazpi City, Branch 5,2 dated November 19,
2001, and its Order3 dated January 14, 2002 denying the motion for reconsideration of the decision of
the said court on the civil aspect thereof and to allow her to present evidence thereon.
On June 11, 1997, an Information for estafa was filed against herein petitioner Anamer D. Salazar and
co-accused Nena Jaucian Timario with the Regional Trial Court of Legazpi City, docketed as Criminal
Case No. 7474 which reads as follows:
That sometime in the month of October, 1996, in the City of Legazpi, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named-accused, conspiring and confederating with
each other, with intent to defraud by means of false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed
simultaneously with the commission of the fraud, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, on the part of accused NENA JAUCIAN TIMARIO, drew and issue[d] PRUDENTIAL BANK,
LEGASPI CITY BRANCH CHECK NO. 067481, dated October 15, 1996, in the amount of P214,000.00 in
favor of J.Y. BROTHERS MARKETING CORPORATION, represented by its Branch Manager, JERSON O.
YAO, and accused ANAMER D. SALAZAR endorsed and negotiated said check as payment of 300
cavans of rice obtained from J.Y. BROTHERS MARKETING CORPORATION, knowing fully well that at
that time said check was issued and endorsed, Nena Jaucian Timario did not have sufficient funds in or
credit with the drawee bank to cover the amount called for therein and without informing the payee of
such circumstance; that when said check was presented to the drawee bank for payment, the same
was consequently dishonored and refused payment for the reason of ACCOUNT CLOSED; that despite
demands, accused failed and refused and still fail and refuse to pay and/or make arrangement for the
payment of the said check, to the damage and prejudice of said J.Y. BROTHERS MARKETING
CORPORATION.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4 cräläwvirtualibräry
Upon arraignment, the petitioner, assisted by counsel, entered a plea of not guilty. Trial thereafter
ensued.
The Evidence of the Prosecution
On October 15, 1996, petitioner Anamer Salazar purchased 300 cavans of rice from J.Y. Brothers
Marketing Corporation, through Mr. Jerson Yao. As payment for these cavans of rice, the petitioner
gave the private complainant Check No. 067481 drawn against the Prudential Bank, Legazpi City
Branch, dated October 15, 1996, by one Nena Jaucian Timario in the amount of P214,000. Jerson Yao
accepted the check upon the petitioners assurance that it was a good check. The cavans of rice were
picked up the next day by the petitioner. Upon presentment, the check was dishonored because it was
drawn under a closed account (Account Closed). The petitioner was informed of such dishonor. She
replaced the Prudential Bank check with Check No. 365704 drawn against the Solid Bank, Legazpi
Branch, which, however, was returned with the word DAUD (Drawn Against Uncollected Deposit).
After the prosecution rested its case, the petitioner filed a Demurrer to Evidence with Leave of
Court5 alleging that she could not be guilty of the crime as charged for the following reasons: (a) she
was merely an indorser of the check issued by Nena Timario, and Article 315, paragraph 2(d) on
estafa penalizes only the issuer of the check and not the indorser thereof; (b) there is no sufficient
evidence to prove that the petitioner conspired with the issuer of the check, Nena Jaucian Timario, in
order to defraud the private complainant; (c) after the first check was dishonored, the petitioner
replaced it with a second one. The first transaction had therefore been effectively novated by the
issuance of the second check. Unfortunately, her personal check was dishonored not for insufficiency
of funds, but for DAUD, which in banking parlance means drawn against uncollected deposit.
According to the petitioner, this means that the account had sufficient funds but was still restricted
because the deposit, usually a check, had not yet been cleared.
The prosecution filed its comment/opposition to the petitioners demurrer to evidence.
On November 19, 2001, the trial court rendered judgment acquitting the petitioner of the crime
charged but ordering her to remit to the private complainant the amount of the check as payment for
her purchase. The trial court ruled that the evidence for the prosecution did not establish the existence
of conspiracy beyond reasonable doubt between the petitioner and the issuer of the check, her co-
accused Nena Jaucian Timario, for the purpose of defrauding the private complainant. In fact, the
private complainant, Jerson Yao, admitted that he had never met Nena Jaucian Timario who remained
at large. As a mere indorser of the check, the petitioners breach of the warranty that the check was a
good one is not synonymous with the fraudulent act of falsely pretending to possess credit under
Article 315(2)(d). The decretal portion of the trial courts judgment reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the accused Anamer D. Salazar is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime
charged but is hereby held liable for the value of the 300 bags of rice. Accused Anamer D. Salazar is
therefore ordered to pay J.Y. Brothers Marketing Corporation the sum of P214,000.00. Costs against
the accused.6cräläwvirtualibräry
Within the reglementary period therefor, the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration on the civil
aspect of the decision with a plea that he be allowed to present evidence pursuant to Rule 33 of the
Rules of Court. On January 14, 2002, the court issued an order denying the motion.
In her petition at bar, the petitioner assails the orders of the trial court claiming that after her
demurrer to evidence was granted by the trial court, she was denied due process as she was not given
the opportunity to adduce evidence to prove that she was not civilly liable to the private respondent.
The petitioner invokes the applicability of Rule 33 of the Rules of Civil Procedure in this case,
contending that before being adjudged liable to the private offended party, she should have been first
accorded the procedural relief granted in Rule 33.
The Petition Is Meritorious
According to Section 1, Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. (a) When a criminal action is instituted, the civil
action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with
the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it
separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
The reservation of the right to institute separately the civil action shall be made before the prosecution
starts presenting its evidence and under circumstances affording the offended party a reasonable
opportunity to make such reservation.
When the offended party seeks to enforce civil liability against the accused by way of moral, nominal,
temperate, or exemplary damages without specifying the amount thereof in the complaint or
information, the filing fees therefor shall constitute a first lien on the judgment awarding such
damages.
Where the amount of damages, other than actual, is specified in the complaint or information, the
corresponding filing fees shall be paid by the offended party upon the filing thereof in court.
Except as otherwise provided in these Rules, no filing fees shall be required for actual damages.
No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint may be filed by the accused in the criminal case,
but any cause of action which could have been the subject thereof may be litigated in a separate civil
action.
(b) The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to include the
corresponding civil action. No reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed.
Upon filing of the aforesaid joint criminal and civil actions, the offended party shall pay in full the filing
fees based on the amount of the check involved, which shall be considered as the actual damages
claimed. Where the complaint or information also seeks to recover liquidated, moral, nominal,
temperate or exemplary damages, the offended party shall pay additional filing fees based on the
amounts alleged therein. If the amounts are not so alleged but any of these damages are
subsequently awarded by the court, the filing fees based on the amount awarded shall constitute a
first lien on the judgment.
Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof has not yet commenced, it may be
consolidated with the criminal action upon application with the court trying the latter case. If the
application is granted, the trial of both actions shall proceed in accordance with section 2 of this Rule
governing consolidation of the civil and criminal actions.
The last paragraph of Section 2 of the said rule provides that the extinction of the penal action does
not carry with it the extinction of the civil action. Moreover, the civil action based on delict shall be
deemed extinguished if there is a finding in a final judgment in the criminal action that the act or
omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist.7 cräläwvirtualibräry
The criminal action has a dual purpose, namely, the punishment of the offender and indemnity to the
offended party. The dominant and primordial objective of the criminal action is the punishment of the
offender. The civil action is merely incidental to and consequent to the conviction of the accused. The
reason for this is that criminal actions are primarily intended to vindicate an outrage against the
sovereignty of the state and to impose the appropriate penalty for the vindication of the disturbance
to the social order caused by the offender. On the other hand, the action between the private
complainant and the accused is intended solely to indemnify the former.8 cräläwvirtualibräry
Unless the offended party waives the civil action or reserves the right to institute it separately or
institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action, there are two actions involved in a criminal case.
The first is the criminal action for the punishment of the offender. The parties are the People of the
Philippines as the plaintiff and the accused. In a criminal action, the private complainant is merely a
witness for the State on the criminal aspect of the action. The second is the civil action arising from
the delict. The private complainant is the plaintiff and the accused is the defendant. There is a merger
of the trial of the two cases to avoid multiplicity of suits.
The quantum of evidence on the criminal aspect of the case is proof beyond reasonable doubt, while in
the civil aspect of the action, the quantum of evidence is preponderance of evidence.9 Under Section
3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Rules of Criminal Procedure, the said rules shall govern the procedure to be
observed in action, civil or criminal.
The prosecution presents its evidence not only to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt but also to prove the civil liability of the accused to the offended party. After the prosecution
has rested its case, the accused shall adduce its evidence not only on the criminal but also on the civil
aspect of the case. At the conclusion of the trial, the court should render judgment not only on the
criminal aspect of the case but also on the civil aspect thereof:
SEC. 2. Contents of the judgment. If the judgment is of conviction, it shall state (1) the legal
qualification of the offense constituted by the acts committed by the accused and the aggravating or
mitigating circumstances which attended its commission; (2) the participation of the accused in the
offense, whether as principal, accomplice, or accessory after the fact; (3) the penalty imposed upon
the accused; and (4) the civil liability or damages caused by his wrongful act or omission to be
recovered from the accused by the offended party, if there is any, unless the enforcement of the civil
liability by a separate civil action has been reserved or waived.
In case the judgment is of acquittal, it shall state whether the evidence of the prosecution absolutely
failed to prove the guilt of the accused or merely failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In
either case, the judgment shall determine if the act or omission from which the civil liability might
arise did not exist.10
cräläwvirtualibräry
The acquittal of the accused does not prevent a judgment against him on the civil aspect of the case
where (a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required;
(b) where the court declared that the liability of the accused is only civil; (c) where the civil liability of
the accused does not arise from or is not based upon the crime of which the accused was acquitted.
Moreover, the civil action based on the delict is extinguished if there is a finding in the final judgment
in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist or
where the accused did not commit the acts or omission imputed to him.
If the accused is acquitted on reasonable doubt but the court renders judgment on the civil aspect of
the criminal case, the prosecution cannot appeal from the judgment of acquittal as it would place the
accused in double jeopardy. However, the aggrieved party, the offended party or the accused or both
may appeal from the judgment on the civil aspect of the case within the period therefor.
After the prosecution has rested its case, the accused has the option either to (a) file a demurrer to
evidence with or without leave of court under Section 23, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, or to (b) adduce his evidence unless he waives the same. The aforecited rule reads:
Sec. 23. Demurrer to evidence. After the prosecution rests its case, the court may dismiss the action
on the ground of insufficiency of evidence (1) on its own initiative after giving the prosecution the
opportunity to be heard or (2) upon demurrer to evidence filed by the accused with or without leave of
court.
If the court denies the demurrer to evidence filed with leave of court, the accused may adduce
evidence in his defense. When the demurrer to evidence is filed without leave of court, the accused
waives his right to present evidence and submits the case for judgment on the basis of the evidence
for the prosecution.
The motion for leave of court to file demurrer to evidence shall specifically state its grounds and shall
be filed within a non-extendible period of five (5) days after the prosecution rests its case. The
prosecution may oppose the motion within a non-extendible period of five (5) days from its receipt.
If leave of court is granted, the accused shall file the demurrer to evidence within a non-extendible
period of ten (10) days from notice. The prosecution may oppose the demurrer to evidence within a
similar period from its receipt.
The order denying the motion for leave of court to file demurrer to evidence or the demurrer itself
shall not be reviewable by appeal or by certiorari before the judgment.
In criminal cases, the demurrer to evidence partakes of the nature of a motion to dismiss the case for
failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In a case where the accused
files a demurrer to evidence without leave of court, he thereby waives his right to present evidence
and submits the case for decision on the basis of the evidence of the prosecution. On the other hand,
if the accused is granted leave to file a demurrer to evidence, he has the right to adduce evidence not
only on the criminal aspect but also on the civil aspect of the case if his demurrer is denied by the
court.
If demurrer is granted and the accused is acquitted by the court, the accused has the right to adduce
evidence on the civil aspect of the case unless the court also declares that the act or omission from
which the civil liability may arise did not exist. If the trial court issues an order or renders judgment
not only granting the demurrer to evidence of the accused and acquitting him but also on the civil
liability of the accused to the private offended party, said judgment on the civil aspect of the case
would be a nullity for the reason that the constitutional right of the accused to due process is thereby
violated. As we held in Alonte v. Savellano, Jr.:11 cräläwvirtualibräry
Section 14, paragraphs (1) and (2), of Article III, of the Constitution provides the fundamentals.
(1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law.
(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved,
and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face
to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of
evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of
the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable.
Jurisprudence acknowledges that due process in criminal proceedings, in particular, require (a) that
the court or tribunal trying the case is properly clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the
matter before it; (b) that jurisdiction is lawfully acquired by it over the person of the accused; (c) that
the accused is given an opportunity to be heard; and (d) that judgment is rendered only upon lawful
hearing.
The above constitutional and jurisprudentially postulates, by now elementary and deeply imbedded in
our own criminal justice system, are mandatory and indispensable. The principles find universal
acceptance and are tersely expressed in the oft-quoted statement that procedural due process cannot
possibly be met without a law which hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and
renders judgment only after trial.12cräläwvirtualibräry
This is so because when the accused files a demurrer to evidence, the accused has not yet adduced
evidence both on the criminal and civil aspects of the case. The only evidence on record is the
evidence for the prosecution. What the trial court should do is to issue an order or partial judgment
granting the demurrer to evidence and acquitting the accused; and set the case for continuation of
trial for the petitioner to adduce evidence on the civil aspect of the case, and for the private
complainant to adduce evidence by way of rebuttal after which the parties may adduce their sur-
rebuttal evidence as provided for in Section 11, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure:
Sec. 11. Order of trial. The trial shall proceed in the following order:
(a) The prosecution shall present evidence to prove the charge and, in the proper case, the civil
liability.
(b) The accused may present evidence to prove his defense and damages, if any, arising from the
issuance of a provisional remedy in the case.
(c) The prosecution and the defense may, in that order, present rebuttal and sur-rebuttal evidence
unless the court, in furtherance of justice, permits them to present additional evidence bearing upon
the main issue.
(d) Upon admission of the evidence of the parties, the case shall be deemed submitted for decision
unless the court directs them to argue orally or to submit written memoranda.
(e) When the accused admits the act or omission charged in the complaint or information but
interposes a lawful defense, the order of trial may be modified.
Thereafter, the court shall render judgment on the civil aspect of the case on the basis of the evidence
of the prosecution and the accused.
In this case, the petitioner was charged with estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised
Penal Code. The civil action arising from the delict was impliedly instituted since there was no waiver
by the private offended party of the civil liability nor a reservation of the civil action. Neither did he file
a civil action before the institution of the criminal action.
The petitioner was granted leave of court to file a demurrer to evidence. The court issued an order
granting the demurrer on its finding that the liability of the petitioner was not criminal but only civil.
However, the court rendered judgment on the civil aspect of the case and ordered the petitioner to
pay for her purchases from the private complainant even before the petitioner could adduce evidence
thereon. Patently, therefore, the petitioner was denied her right to due process.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Petition is GRANTED. The Orders dated November 19, 2001
and January 14, 2002 are SET ASIDE AND NULLIFIED. The Regional Trial Court of Legazpi City,
Branch 5, is hereby DIRECTED to set Criminal Case No. 7474 for the continuation of trial for the
reception of the evidence-in-chief of the petitioner on the civil aspect of the case and for the rebuttal
evidence of the private complainant and the sur-rebuttal evidence of the parties if they opt to adduce
any.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Quisumbing, Austria-Martinez, and Tinga, JJ., concur.
Endnotes:
1
Annex A, Rollo, pp. 24-25.
2
Penned by Judge Vladimir B. Brusola.
3
Annex C, Rollo, p. 29.
4
Rollo, p. 30.
5
Annex E, id. at 32.
6
Id. at 14.
7
Sec. 2, Rule 111.
8
Herrera, Remedial Law, Vol. IV, 2001 ed., p. 160.
9
Section 1, Revised Rules of Evidence.
10
Section 2, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. (Emphasis supplied).
11
287 SCRA 245 (1998).
12
Id. at 261.
EN BANC
G.R. Nos. 149382-149383. March 5, 2003
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RICARDO

BODOSO y BOLOR, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
TRIAL COURTS MUST TAKE HEED that in criminal cases involving

capital offenses the waiver of the right to present evidence and be
heard should not be considered haphazardly, perfunctorily, lightly or
trivially, because the right is inherent in due process, but must at all
times be scrutinized by means of a test and procedure to ascertain
that the waiver was done voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently
with sufficient awareness of its relevant circumstances and likely
consequences.
In Crim. Cases Nos. T-3285 and T-3286 the Regional Trial Court of
Tabaco City, found Ricardo Bodoso y Bolor guilty of raping his
fourteen (14)-year old daughter on two (2) occasions. He was
sentenced to death on each count and ordered to pay P50,000.00
for moral damages and another P50,000.00 as civil indemnity also
for every count.[1
On 10 January 2000 Jenny Rose Bausa Bodoso filed a complaint-

affidavit accusing her father Ricardo Bodoso of qualified rape
committed on 14 July 1999 by means of force and intimidation and
repeated sometime the following September. Accused-appellant was
arrested and detained by virtue of a warrant of arrest issued by the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Malilipot and Bacacay, Albay. He was
subjected by the same court to preliminary investigation where he
failed to submit counter affidavit/rebuttal evidence against his
daughters complaint-affidavit.[2 cräläwvirtualibräry
On 10 March 2000 two (2) Informations charging accused-appellant

with qualified rape were filed as to which he pleaded not guilty.
On 4 July 2000 the trial court called the parties to a pre-trial

conference. The prosecution and the defense stipulated that Jenny
Rose was the daughter of accused-appellant and that she was
fourteen (14) years old during the alleged incidents of rape. The
admitted facts were stated in the pre-trial order that was signed by
accused-appellant and his counsel de oficio from the Public
Attorneys Office and by the public prosecutor.
On 3 October 2000 the trial court commenced the consolidated trial

of Crim. Cases Nos. T-3285 and T-3286. The prosecution presented
only two (2) witnesses, namely, the private complainant herself who
affirmed the contents of her complaint-affidavit, and Dr. Arsenia L.
Manosca-Moran who physically examined the complaining witness
and issued the pertinent medical certificate. Subsequently, the
defense counsel cross-examined the prosecution witnesses.
Incidentally, Jenny Rose did not substantiate the allegation that she
was only fourteen (14) years old when the crimes of rape were
supposedly perpetrated.
On 19 March 2001, after offering its documentary evidence and the

admission thereof by the trial court for whatever it may be worth,
the prosecution rested its case against accused-appellant. However,
upon the manifestation of the counsel de oficio, reception of the
evidence for the defense was deferred to 2 April 2001.
A sudden twist of events changed the complexion of the otherwise
orderly proceedings. On 2 April 2001, as booked in the trial
calendar, the defense was summoned to present its evidence.
Lamentably, unlike in the previous settings of the trial court, the
consolidated records of Crim. Cases Nos. T-3285 and T-3286 do not
indicate whether accused-appellant was present on the scheduled
trial date. There were also no transcript of stenographic notes nor
minutes of the proceedings on that date that would have elucidated
on the cryptic order of the trial judge of even date tersely stating
Upon the manifestation of counsel for the accused, Atty. Danilo

Brotamonte, that the defense is not intending to present any
evidence and now resting its case today, this case therefore is now
submitted for decision (underscoring supplied). SO ORDERED.
On 9 July 2001 the trial court promulgated its judgment convicting

accused-appellant of two (2) counts of qualified rape against his
fourteen (14)-year old daughter; hence, this automatic review.
In the Appellants Brief now before us, counsel de oficio for accused-

appellant suggests that the charges against him were trumped up
by the purported boyfriend of his daughter, and further claims that
no evidence proved beyond reasonable doubt the elements of force,
intimidation or moral ascendancy exerted by him during their sexual
trysts, assuming these had taken place. It was also argued by way
of an alternative defense that the victims minority was not
sufficiently corroborated by any evidence. Clearly, the attorneys of
accused-appellant assail the findings of fact of the lower court but
do not seek relief from the Order of 2 April 2001 that inexplicably
waived their clients constitutional right to present evidence and be
heard.
We are not about to jump willy-nilly over the issues raised by the
Public Attorneys Office that cut deeply into the merits of accused-
appellants culpability simply because these were the only questions
that the counsel de oficio found worthy of our review. In the
automatic review of cases, this Court has the concomitant power to
review and sift through the entire case to correct any error, even if
unassigned, since the transcendental matter of life and liberty,
especially of a person who possesses nothing but life and liberty, is
at stake. As we have emphasized quite frequently, there can be no
stake higher and no penalty more severe than the termination of
human life.[3 Thus, although there was not even the slightest
protestation by counsel regarding the issue of accused-appellants
waiver, we shall consider the same in the interest of justice.
The rules on the validity or invalidity of a waiver are not something

we have crafted overnight to suit the instant case. They have been
extant since time that is now immaterial to recall. In civil cases, we
overturn decisions because the waiver of certain rights was not
done in accordance with the requisites. Hence, in Intestate Estate of
the Late Vito Borromeo v. Borromeo,[4 this Court set aside the
waiver of hereditary rights because it was not clearly and
convincingly shown that the heir had the intention to waive his right
or advantage voluntarily. In criminal cases where life, liberty and
property are all at stake, obviously, the rule on waiver cannot be
any less. In this light, we are at a loss why counsel de oficio for
accused-appellant did not touch upon this point when something
more valuable than any property that a person could ever inherit in
his lifetime is in danger of being taken away eternally.
It is elementary that the existence of waiver must be positively

demonstrated since a waiver by implication cannot be presumed.
[5 The standard of waiver requires that it not only must be
voluntary, but must be knowing, intelligent, and done with sufficient

awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.
[6 There must thus be persuasive evidence of an actual intention to
relinquish the right. Mere silence of the holder of the right should
not be easily construed as surrender thereof; the courts must
indulge every reasonable presumption against the existence and
validity of such waiver.[7 Necessarily, where there is a reservation as
to the nature of any manifestation or proposed action affecting the
rights of the accused to be heard before he is condemned, certainly,
the doubt must be resolved in his favor to be allowed to proffer
evidence in his behalf.
Our criminal rules of procedure strictly provide the step-by- step

formula to be followed by courts in cases punishable by death. The
reason for this is to ensure that the constitutional presumption of
innocence in favor of the accused is preserved and the State makes
no mistake in taking life and liberty except that of the guilty. Hence,
any deviation from the regular course of trial should always take
into consideration that such a different or extraordinary approach
has been undertaken voluntarily and intelligently. For otherwise, as
in the instant case, denial of due process can be successfully
invoked since no valid waiver of rights has been made.[8 cräläwvirtualibräry
This Court notes with deep regret the failure of the trial court to
inquire from accused-appellant himself whether he wanted to
present evidence; or submit his memorandum elucidating on the
contradictions and insufficiency of the prosecution evidence, if any;
or in default thereof, file a demurrer to evidence with prior leave of
court, if he so believes that the prosecution evidence is so weak
that it need not even be rebutted. The inquiry is simply part and
parcel of the determination of the validity of the waiver, i.e., not
only must be voluntary, but must be knowing, intelligent, and done
with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely
consequences, which ought to have been done by the trial court not
only because this was supposed to be an uncomplicated and routine
task on its part, but more importantly since accused-appellant
himself did not personally, on a person-to-person basis, manifest to
the trial court the waiver of his own right.
As things stand, both this Court and the trial court are being asked
hook, line and sinker to take the word of counsel de oficio whose
own concern in that particular phase of the proceedings a quo may
have been compromised by pressures of his other commitments.
For all we know, the statutory counsel of the indigent accused at
that time of the trial, although not evident in the other aspects of
his representation, only wanted to get rid of dreary work rather
than protect the rights of his client.[9 Of course, it may be stretching
the argument too much to ascribe fatal incompetence upon herein
accuseds counsel for this solitary instance of faux pas. But, for sure,
we must inquire if the waiver was validly done.
Worse, the consolidated records of Crim. Cases Nos. T-3285 and T-

3286 do not contain any instructive summary of the proceedings
which would have clarified counsel de oficios inscrutable action to
unceremoniously waive his clients constitutional right to be heard.
In the same deplorable manner, absolutely no transcripts of
stenographic account for what had transpired at that pivotal
moment. Hence, whether accused-appellant really intended to
relinquish his own right to be heard, as manifested by the public
defender, is something we must determine with absolute certainty
in the interest of complete and compassionate justice.10 cräläwvirtualibräry
The inquiry sought herein is not unprecedented. In People v.

Bernas,[11 the trial court found it necessary after the prosecution had
rested its case to satisfy itself that the representation of defense
counsel that his client was waiving the presentation of his evidence
constituted a voluntary and intelligent waiver of an important
constitutional right. It was only after being convinced of the validity
of the waiver that the lower court considered the case submitted for
decision. In the automatic review that followed the trial courts
decision, no one in this Court ever thought that the apparently
prudent and sensible action of the trial court in Bernas to determine
the legitimacy of the waiver was a new procedure impetuously
concocted for the satisfaction of over-eager civil libertarians, and
was in fact adjudged by us to be still lacking in assiduity according
to the standards of a searching inquiry as used in cases where there
is a plea of guilty to a capital offense.
In People v. Court of Appeals,[12 the colloquy between magistrate

and accused centered into the latters voluntariness and intelligence
to make the waiver of his right to present evidence, an
undemanding ceremony which did not intrude into precious court
time nor upset judicial economy to deal with and dispose of criminal
cases at optimum speed
There is no question that per the record of the hearing of July 10,
1979, respondents-accused affirmed personally and through counsel
that they categorically waived their right to present their evidence
in the trial of the criminal case. Thus, Justice de la Fuente expressly
asked: You have to be consistent. If the case is denied and returned
to the court of origin, you want to present witnesses of their
counsel, Atty. Balgos, who replied No more, and so that our position
is this inasmuch as Mr. Justice de la Fuente asked whether if the
petition were denied and the case were returned to the court of
origin whether we will still present evidence. We are not presenting
already. Their counsel further replied to Justice Gaviola: Precisely I
asked my client to come here today and for the record make
manifest that they are not presenting any further evidence.
Respondent-accused affirmed their counsels manifestations to
respondent court as reproduced in respondent courts September 18,
1979 Resolution quoted hereinabove, wherein they expressed
undertook that if a verdict were found against them, they could no
longer go back to the court of origin for a new trial and that their
only area of relief is with the Supreme Court. Such express waiver is
binding upon them and the trial court has no alternative but to
decide the case upon the evidence presented by the prosecution
alone.[13
People v. Flores[14 is indubitably in point and on all fours with the

instant case to correct the injustice resulting from the improvident
waiver of the right to present defense evidence. In that case we
ruled
The lower court, in view of the severity of the imposable penalty,

ought to have inquired into the voluntariness and full knowledge of
the consequences of accused-appellants waiver. Though the Rules
require no such inquiry to be undertaken by the court for the
validity of such waiver or any judgment made as result of the
waiver, prudence however requires the Court to ascertain the same
to avoid any grave miscarriage of justice. Although accused-
appellants' waiver amazed the lower court, nevertheless, the record
is devoid of any facts which would indicate that the lower court took
steps to assure itself of accused-appellants' voluntariness and full
knowledge of the consequences of their waiver. Besides, counsels
waiver should have put the court on guard x x x x [A] counsel who
files a demurrer with leave of court, but at the same time expressly
waives his right to present evidence should put a judge on guard
that said counsel may not entirely comprehend the consequences of
the waiver. The trial court should have exercised prudence by
warning counsel about the prejudicial effects of their waiver, that
with such a waiver, the case would be deemed submitted for
decision, and their leave to file motion for demurrer to evidence will
have no effect.[15
The above-quoted portion of the Flores case is plain enough for us

to see clear similarities with the instant criminal case so as to be
considered an authority for our decision herein. To emphasize, the
lower court ought to have inquired into the voluntariness and full
knowledge of the consequences of accused-appellants waiver, and
prudence requires this Court to ascertain the same if only to avoid
any grave miscarriage of justice.
Sure enough, there are precedents where the accused was correctly
denied the right to present defense evidence after he had waived
his right to be heard. These cases however involved
a valid, verified, clear and convincing renunciation of an accuseds
right to offer contrary proof, circumstances that are sorely missing
in the instant case.
In these cases, it was indubitably shown that the express waiver

made by accused of his right to rebut the prosecution evidence was
done after he had personally manifested to the trial court his
belated desire to change his plea of not guilty to guilty, thus
indicating his wholehearted willingness to forego reception of his
evidence and uncompromised admission of complicity in the crimes
charged therein;[16 or that the waiver was made only after the trial
court informed accused-appellant of the consequences if he failed to
present evidence in his defense, specifically that the prosecution
was able to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt but
accused-appellant nonetheless insisted that he had no intention of
presenting evidence in his behalf;[17 or that his waiver was inferred
from a valid and enforceable stipulation of facts in the pre-trial
order signed by him and his counsel, which amounted to a
surrender of his right to present evidence to contradict the
stipulation,[18 among other situations which veritably evinced a
voluntary and intelligent relinquishment of the right. None of these
situations nor analogous ones obtain in the case at bar.
Henceforth, to protect the constitutional right to due process of

every accused in a capital offense and to avoid any confusion about
the proper steps to be taken when a trial court comes face to face
with an accused or his counsel who wants to waive his clients right
to present evidence and be heard, it shall be the unequivocal duty
of the trial court to observe, as a prerequisite to the validity of such
waiver, a procedure akin to a searching inquiry as specified
in People v. Aranzado[19 when an accused pleads guilty, particularly
1. The trial court shall hear both the prosecution and the accused
with their respective counsel on the desire or manifestation of the
accused to waive the right to present evidence and be heard.
2. The trial court shall ensure the attendance of the prosecution and
especially the accused with their respective counsel in the hearing
which must be recorded. Their presence must be duly entered in the
minutes of the proceedings.
3. During the hearing, it shall be the task of the trial court to
a. ask the defense counsel a series of questions to determine

whether he had conferred with and completely explained to the
accused that he had the right to present evidence and be heard as
well as its meaning and consequences, together with the
significance and outcome of the waiver of such right. If the lawyer
for the accused has not done so, the trial court shall give the latter
enough time to fulfill this professional obligation.
b. inquire from the defense counsel with conformity of the accused

whether he wants to present evidence or submit a memorandum
elucidating on the contradictions and insufficiency of the prosecution
evidence, if any, or in default thereof, file a demurrer to evidence
with prior leave of court, if he so believes that the prosecution
evidence is so weak that it need not even be rebutted. If there is a
desire to do so, the trial court shall give the defense enough time
for this purpose.
c. elicit information about the personality profile of the accused,

such as his age, socio-economic status, and educational
background, which may serve as a trustworthy index of his capacity
to give a free and informed waiver.
d. all questions posed to the accused should be in a language known
and understood by the latter, hence, the record must state the
language used for this purpose as well as reflect the corresponding
translation thereof in English.
In passing, trial courts may also abide by the foregoing procedure

even when the waiver of the right to be present and be heard is
made in criminal cases involving non-capital offenses. After all, in
whatever action or forum the accused is situated, the waiver that he
makes if it is to be binding and effective must still be exhibited in
the case records to have been validly undertaken, that is, it was
done voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently with sufficient
awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.
As a matter of good court practice, the trial court would have to rely
upon the most convenient, if not primary, evidence of the validity of
the waiver which would amount to the same thing as showing its
adherence to the step-by-step process outlined above.
Clearly, the rationale behind the foregoing requirements is that

courts must proceed with more care where the possible punishment
is in its severest form, namely death, for the reason that the
execution of such a sentence is irrevocable and experience has
shown that innocent persons have at times thrown caution to the
wind and given up defending themselves out of ignorance or
desperation.[20 Moreover, the necessity of taking further evidence
would aid this Court in determining on appellate review the
propriety or impropriety of the waiver.[21
As in the case of an improvident plea of guilty, an invalid waiver of

the right to present evidence and be heard per se does not work to
vacate a finding of guilt in the criminal case and enforce an
automatic remand thereof to the trial court. In People v. Molina,[22 to
warrant the remand of the case it must also be proved that as a
result of such irregularity there was inadequate representation of
facts by either the prosecution or the defense during the trial -
In People v. Abapo we found that undue reliance upon an invalid

plea of guilty prevented the prosecution from fully presenting its
evidence, and thus remanded the criminal case for further
proceedings. Similarly in People v. Durango where an improvident
plea of guilty was followed by an abbreviated proceeding with
practically no role at all being played by the defense, we ruled that
this procedure was just too meager to accept as being the standard
constitutional due process at work enough to forfeit a human life
and so threw back the criminal case to the trial court for appropriate
action. Verily the relevant matter that justifies the remand of the
criminal case to the trial court is the procedural unfairness or
complete miscarriage of justice in the handling of the proceedings a
quo as occasioned by x x x the attendant circumstances.
Conversely, where facts are adequately represented in the criminal

case and no procedural unfairness or irregularity has prejudiced
either the prosecution or the defense as a result of the invalid
waiver, the rule is that the guilty verdict may nevertheless be
upheld where the judgment is supported beyond reasonable doubt
by the evidence on record. Verily, in such a case, it would be a
useless ritual to return the case to the trial court for further
proceedings.
After a careful examination of the records, we find that the alleged

waiver of accused-appellant of his right to present evidence and be
heard has affected the adequate representation of facts in favor of
the accused-appellant during the trial. In this regard, we note the
allegation of the Public Attorneys Office in its Appellants Brief that
the charges against accused-appellant were trumped up by the
purported boyfriend of the alleged victim. This matter could perhaps
be further explored, among other things, in the court a quo.
In fine, the instant criminal cases must be remanded to the trial

court for supplementary proceedings. With grave doubts in our mind
as to the voluntariness of the waiver and whether the same was
done with full comprehension, we feel uneasy to bring this case to a
conclusion without exercising utmost prudence. The trepidation is
especially true in this case where accused-appellants side of the
story was never offered for consideration from the preliminary
investigation conducted by the MCTC until his conviction for a
capital offense, despite his plea of not guilty. Our observations in
the Molina case[23 where the accused-appellant improvidently offered
a plea of guilty to the capital offense of qualified rape, likewise ring
a soul-inspiring guidance to our task at hand
x x x obviously we could have learned more about the crimes

alleged by the prosecution if accused-appellant had also participated
meaningfully in all the proceedings below. His voice could better
assure the fairness of any action for or against him x x x x Given
the attendant circumstances in the instant case, we are not
therefore about to order the execution of accused-appellant because
of default by both the public defender and, to a certain degree, the
trial court. This Court cannot send him to the death chamber for no
matter how outrageous the crime might be or how depraved the
offender would appear to be, the uncompromising rule of law must
still prevail. Tru ly, there is in the ethics of judgeship the caution
expected of every judge, all the more in this case where the
accused stands to be executed a superfluous four (4) times. The
advocate Hugh P. MacMillan drives this point poignantly: There is
almost always something to be said either way. And it is of the
greatest importance that something should be said, not only in
order that each party may leave the judgment seat satisfied that,
whatever has been the decision, the case has had a fair hearing,
but in order that the Court may not reach its judgment without
having had in view all that could be urged to the contrary effect x x
x x Clearly we are not unmindful that the charges against accused-
appellant carry the punishment that is most severe. The death
penalty is irrevocable, and deplorably, experience has shown that
innocent persons have at times pleaded guilty. The dispossessed of
fortune should not be disinherited in law. But neither are we
oblivious of Brenda's claim that she was molested and abused
successfully by her father four (4) times. When truth stands, to no
person will we sell, or deny, or delay, right or justice, and rightly
then would the consequent public condemnation and punishment of
the perpetrator reassure the victim that she has public recognition
and support.
This Court is left with no better option than to remand this case to
the trial court to ascertain accused-appellants volition to such
waiver as expressed in its Order of 2 April 2001, his knowledge of
its consequences, and to receive his evidence if the contrary is
found, so that justice may be properly administered. As stated, the
defense counsel may also delve into the claim of accused-appellant
in his Brief that he had been a victim of intrigue by his daughters
supposed fianc. Finally, since the case would have to be sent back
to the court a quo, we have carefully avoided making any statement
or reference that might be construed as prejudging or pre-empting
the trial court in the proper disposition of Crim. Cases Nos. T-3285
and T-3286, where excellent and discerning judgeship is to be
exercised as herein discussed.
WHEREFORE, the consolidated Decision of 9 July 2001 in Crim.

Cases Nos. T-3285 and T-3286 is SET ASIDE. Criminal Cases Nos.
T-3285 (now G.R. No. 149382) and T-3286 (now G.R. No. 149383)
are REMANDED to the court a quo for their proper disposition,
particularly to ascertain the voluntariness and understanding of
accused-appellant RICARDO BODOSOs waiver of his right to present
evidence as expressed in the Order of the trial court dated 2 April
2001, his knowledge of its consequences, and to receive his
evidence and further appropriate proceedings if the contrary is
found, in accordance with the procedure outlined in this Decision.
For this purpose, the proper law enforcement officers are directed to
TRANSFER accused-appellant from the New Bilibid Prison where he
is presently incarcerated to the Tabaco BJMP District Jail in San
Lorenzo, Tabaco City, with adequate security escort, where he shall
be DETAINED for the duration of the proceedings in the trial court.
The Regional Trial Court of Tabaco City is directed to dispose of

these cases without further delay.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Panganiban,

Quisumbing, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez,
Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Ynares-Santiago and Corona, JJ., on leave.

Endnotes:
1
Decision penned by Judge Cezar A. Bordeos, RTC-Br. 16, Tabaco City, now G.R. Nos. 149382 and 149383, respectively.
2
Resolution finding probable cause for two (2) counts of qualified rape penned by Judge Edwin C. Ma-alat.
3
People v. Yambot, G.R. No. 120350, 13 October 2000, 343 SCRA 20, 40.
4
G.R. No. 41171, 23 July 1987, 152 SCRA 171.
5
Alonte v. Savellano, G.R. Nos. 131652 and G.R. No. 131728, 9 March 1998, 287 SCRA 245.
6
Id. at 263.
7
Ibid.
8
People v. Yambot, G.R. No. 120350, 13 October 2000, 343 SCRA 20, 40.
9
See People v. Bernas, G.R. Nos. 133583-85, 20 February 2002.
10
See Dans v. People, G.R. Nos. 127073 and 126995, 29 January 1998, 285 SCRA 504.
11
See note 9.
12
204 Phil. 511 (1982).
13
Id., at 520, 521, 529-530.
14
G.R. No. 106581, 3 March 1997, 269 SCRA 62.
15
Id. at 68; underscoring supplied.
See e.g. People v. Cabodoc, G.R. No. 118320, 15 October 1996, 263 SCRA 187; People v. Ramilla, G.R. No. 127485, 19
16
July 1999, 310 SCRA 499.
17
People v. Banihit, G.R. No. 132045, 25 August 2000, 339 SCRA 110.
18
Alano v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 111244, 15 December 1997, 283 SCRA 269.
19
G.R. Nos. 132442-44, 24 September 2001.
20
People v. Pastor, G.R. No. 140208, 12 March 2002.
21
Ibid.
22
G.R. Nos. 141129-33, 14 December 2001.
23
See note 22.
EN BANC
G.R. No. 155087 November 28, 2003
EDUARDO T. SAYA-ANG, SR., and RICARDO T. LARA, petitioners,

vs.
HON. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, HONORABLE PIO JOSE S. JOSON, HONORABLE JOSE
P. BALBUENA, HONORABLE LIRIO T. JOQUINO and MANTIL D. LIM, respondents.
DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:
Petitioners herein, Eduardo T. Saya-ang, Sr. and Ricardo T. Lara, were candidates for the Office of
Barangay Captain of Barangays Congan and New Aklan respectively for the July 15, 2002
Synchronized Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) and Barangay Elections. Petitioner Saya-ang filed his
certificate of candidacy in Barangay Congan on June 6, 2002. On the other hand, petitioner Lara
filed his own certificate of candidacy in Barangay New Aklan on June 8, 2002. On July 19, 2002, a
letter-report was submitted by Acting Election Officer Alim to the Law Department of the Comelec
which stated that petitioners herein are not residents of the barangays they wish to be elected in. In
turn, the Law Department of the Commission on Elections (Comelec) submitted its study to the
Comelec en banc on July 9, 2002 recommending the denial of due course to the certificates of
candidacy of petitioners. On the day of the elections or on July 15, 2002, the Comelec, issued En
Banc Resolution No. 5393, which essentially denied due course to the certificates of candidacy of
petitioners herein.
The pertinent portion of the assailed Resolution states:
Considering the foregoing, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to approve the

recommendation of the Law Department as follows:
1. To deny due course to the Certificates of Candidacy of Romeo P. Sumayog, Sandigan

Damie, James Ceasar I. Young, Eduardo T. Saya-ang, Sr., and Ricardo L. Lara; and
2. To direct the Election Officer of Glan, Sarangani to delete their names from the Certified
List of Candidates for Barangay Kagawad and Punong Barangay of Barangays E. Alegado,
Baliton, Cross, Congan, and New Aklan, respectively.
Without prejudice to the filing of criminal cases against them as the evidence so warrants under the
circumstances.
Let the Law Department implement this resolution.
SO ORDERED.
Despite the abovementioned Resolution, petitioners were still proclaimed as winners on July 16,
2002, having garnered the most number of votes in their respective barangays. On July 31, 2002,
petitioners took their oath of office before Alfredo L. Barcelona, Jr., the First Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor of Sarangani Province.
On August 9, 2002, Pio Jose S. Joson, Deputy Executive Director for Operations of the Comelec,
issued a Memorandum for all Regional Election Directors, Provincial Election Supervisors and
City/Municipal Election Officers. This memorandum directed all election officers to delete the names
of those candidates whose certificates of candidacy were denied due course despite the fact that
said denial did not arrive on time. It also ordered the candidates concerned to desist from taking their
oaths and from assuming the positions to which they have been elected, unless the Supreme Court
issued a temporary restraining order. Lastly, the said memorandum ordered the Board of
Canvassers to reconvene for the purpose of proclaiming the duly-elected candidates and correcting
the certificates of canvass and proclamation.
On August 10, 2002, the Comelec en banc promulgated Resolution No. 5584, entitled "In the Matter
of the Policy of the Commission on Proclaimed Candidates Found to be Ineligible for Being Not
Registered Voters in the Place Where They Were Elected and on the Failure/ Omission of the Board
of Canvassers to Include Certain Election Returns in the Canvass." 1
On August 14, 2002, Acting Election Officer Alim, invoking and acting pursuant to Comelec
Resolution No. 5393 and Resolution No. 5584, issued a directive commanding petitioners to cease
and desist from taking their oath of office and from assuming the position to which they were elected.
He also directed the Barangay Board of Canvassers for Barangays Congan and New Aklan to
reconvene immediately and proclaim the duly-elected candidates and to correct the certificates of
canvass and proclamation.
Petitioners received the aforementioned directive on August 19, 2002. On August 21, 2002, the
Comelec en banc promulgated Resolution No. 5666 amending its Resolution No. 5584 on the basis
of the approved recommendations of Commissioner Sadain. Pertinent portions of the amended
resolution state:
I.
ON PROCLAIMED CANDIDATES FOUND TO BE INELIGIBLE FOR BEING NOT REGISTERED

VOTERS IN THE PLACE WHERE THEY WERE ELECTED
xxx
(d) For both (a) and (b), in the event that the disqualified candidate is proclaimed the winner despite
his disqualification or despite the pending disqualification case filed before his proclamation, but
which is subsequently resolved against him, the proclamation of said disqualified candidate is
hereby declared void from the beginning, with notice to the candidate concerned, even if the
dispositive portion of the resolution disqualifying him or cancelling his certificate of candidacy does
not provide for such an annulment. 2
On September 4, 2002, Acting Election Officer Alim, using as his basis Comelec en banc Resolution
No. 5666 issued a memorandum directing the Board of Canvassers of Barangay Congan, Glan,
Sarangani Province to reconvene at his office on September 13, 2002.
Hence, the instant petition anchored on the sole assignment of error:
THAT THE PROMULGATION OF THE EN BANC RESOLUTION NO. 5393, DATED 15 JULY 2002,
BY RESPONDENT HONORABLE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS IS PATENTLY ERRONEOUS
BEING WITHOUT BASIS IN FACT AND IN LAW AND THE ISSUANCE OF WHICH IS IN GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING EVEN AS IT DOES TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION. 3
At the very outset, it must be made clear that the Comelec has jurisdiction to deny due course to or
cancel a certificate of candidacy. Such jurisdiction continues even after the elections, if for any
4
reason no final judgment of disqualification is rendered before the elections, and the candidate
facing disqualification is voted for and receives the highest number of votes, and provided further
that the winning candidate has not been proclaimed or taken his oath of office. Furthermore, a
5
decision by the Comelec to disqualify a candidate shall become final and executory only after a
period of five days:
Sec. 3. Decisions After Five Days.--- Decisions in pre-proclamation cases and petitions to deny due
course to or cancel certificates of candidacy, to declare a candidate as nuisance candidate or to
disqualify a candidate, and to postpone or suspend elections shall become final and executory after
the lapse of five (5) days from their promulgation, unless restrained by the Supreme Court. 6
In the present case, the assailed Resolution denying due course to petitioners’ certificates of
candidacy was promulgated on June 15, 2002, or on the very day of the elections. On that day,
therefore, the decision of the Comelec had not yet become final and executory since petitioners still
had until June 20, 2002 to file their motion for reconsideration. The Barangay Board of Canvassers
rightly retained petitioners’ names in the list of qualified candidates and could not be faulted from
counting the votes cast in favor of the petitioners. Petitioners were, therefore, validly proclaimed as
winners of the elections on June 16, 2002, having garnered the most number of votes. On the day of
the elections or on June 15, 2002, petitioners, for all intents and purposes, were still in the running.
The Resolution of respondent Comelec ordering their names to be deleted from the list of qualified
candidates only became final and executory on June 20, 2002, or five days from the promulgation
thereof.
Petitioners also maintain that they were never served a copy of the assailed Resolution and were
never given the chance to present their evidence. They claim that they only knew about Resolution
5393 on August 19, 2002, when they were served a copy of the directive issued by Acting Election
Officer Alim ordering them to cease and desist from taking their oath of office and from assuming the
position to which they are elected. This allegation was not disproved by respondent Comelec.
Instead, it cites Resolution No. 4801, which was published in the Manila Standard and Manila
Bulletin on May 25, 2002, wherein it was stated that the administrative inquiry of the Comelec on the
eligibility of candidates starts from the time they filed their certificates of candidacy. The Comelec
maintains, therefore, that by virtue of the said resolution, all candidates are deemed to have
constructive notice of any administrative inquiry against them. Also, it asserts that by virtue of its
administrative powers, it may motu proprio deny or cancel, without any kind of hearing whatsoever,
the certificates of candidacy of those who are found not to be registered voters in the place where
they seek to run for public office.
1âwphi1
It is clear, however, that under Section 3, Rule 23 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure, a petition to
cancel a certificate of candidacy shall be heard summarily after due notice. The same rules also
provide that when the proceedings are authorized to be summary, in lieu of oral testimonies, the
parties may, after due notice, be required to submit their position papers together with affidavits,
counter-affidavits and other documentary evidence; and when there is a need for clarification of
certain matters, at the discretion of the Commission en banc or the Division, the parties may be
allowed to cross-examine the affiants. 7
The rules providing for the abovementioned summary hearing were mandated to accord due
process of law to candidates during elections. The right to due process is a cardinal and primary
right which must be respected in all proceedings. It is the embodiment of the sporting idea of fair
8
play, the cornerstone of every democratic society. In any proceeding, the essence of procedural due
9
process is embodied in the basic requirement of notice and a real opportunity to be

heard. Respondent Comelec’s argument that petitioners have already been constructively notified of
10
the inquiry against them cannot be given merit. Petitioners herein were not even informed of the
administrative inquiry against them, nor were they called upon to adduce their own evidence and to
meet and refute the evidence against them. Petitioners certainly cannot read the minds of those
tasked to look into their certificates of candidacy, nor did they have any way of knowing that a
proceeding had already been instituted against them and that they were entitled to present evidence
on their behalf.
Finally, the Court notes again that petitioners have already been proclaimed as the winners in the
elections. They have already taken their oaths of office and are, at present, serving their constituents
in their respective barangays. In Lambonao v. Tero, the Court held that defects in the certificates of
11
candidacy should have been questioned on or before the election and not after the will of the people
has been expressed through the ballots. It was further held in the said case that while provisions
relating to certificates of candidacy are mandatory in terms, it is an established rule of interpretation
as regards election laws, that mandatory provisions requiring certain steps before elections will be
construed as directory after the elections, to give effect to the will of the electorate. The rationale for
this principle was explained in Lino Luna v. Rodriguez, where the Court said that these various and
12
numerous provisions were adopted to assist the voters in their participation in the affairs of the
government and not to defeat that object. When voters have honestly cast their ballots, the same
should not be nullified simply because the officers tasked under the law to direct the elections and
guard the purity of the ballot did not do their duty.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. Resolution No. 5393 of the respondent
Commission on Elections en banc is SET ASIDE. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez,

Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., and Tinga, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
Annex "B-4" of Petition; Rollo, pp. 38-49.

1
Annex "C-1" of Petition; Rollo, pp. 51-54.

2
Petition, p. 15; rollo, p. 20.

3
Section 78, Article IX of the Omnibus Election Code.

4
Juan Domino v. Comelec, et. al., 310 SCRA 549, 571 (1999).
5
Section 3, Rule 39, Part VII, Comelec Rules of Procedure.

6
Section 3, Rule 17, Comelec Rules of Procedure.

7
Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations, 69 Phil. 635 (1940).

8
Isagani A. Cruz, Constitutional Law, p. 95 citing Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Holmes and the
9
Supreme Court, pp. 32-33.

Fabella v. Court of Appeals, 282 SCRA 256, 269 (1997) citing Bernas, Joaquin G., The
10
1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary, p. 108 (1996).
15 SCRA 716, 719 (1965) citing De Guzman v. Board of Canvassers and Lucero, 48 Phil.
11
211, 215-216.
12
39 Phil. 208.
G. R. No. 136911 - February 11, 2003
SPOUSES LEON CASIMIRO and PILAR PASCUAL, doing business under the name and style
"CASIMIRO VILLAGE SUBDIVISION", substituted by their heirs: EMILIO, TEOFILO and
GABRIEL, all surnamed CASIMIRO, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, former Thirteenth
Division, NILDA A. PAULIN, MANOLITO A. PAULIN, SUSAN P. MARTIN, SYLVIA P. FARRES,
CYNTHIA P. LAZATIN, CELESTINO P. PAULIN and UNIWIDE SALES REALTY AND RESOURCES
CORPORATION, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This resolves the Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioners, seeking to set aside our Decision
dated July 3, 2002, which affirmed the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
16165.
The facts as set forth in the Decision are as follows:
Respondents were the registered owners of a 25,000 square meter parcel of land situated in
Pamplona, Las Piñas City, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. S-74375. Adjoining their
property on the northern side was petitioners land, covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 5975.
Sometime in 1979, during a relocation survey conducted by Geodetic Engineer Emilio Paz at the
instance of respondents, it was discovered that the Casimiro Village Subdivision, owned by petitioners,
encroached by 3,110 square meters into respondents land. Respondents notified petitioners and
demanded that they desist from making further development in the area. Subsequently, on March 13,
1980, respondents demanded that petitioners remove all constructions in the area.
Failing in their efforts to regain possession of the disputed premises, respondents filed with the Court
of First Instance of Pasay City an action for recovery of possession with damages against petitioners
and the latters lot buyers, docketed as Civil Case No. LP-8840-P. Respondents alleged that 3,110
square meters of their property, which has a market value of P640,000.00, computed at the then
prevailing price of P200.00 per square meter, have been encroached upon and fenced in by petitioners
as part of the Casimiro Village Subdivision, and subdivided and sold to lot buyers. In support of their
contention, respondents presented the geodetic engineer who conducted the actual ground relocation
survey.
In their defense, petitioners denied that there was an encroachment in respondents land. They
presented Geodetic Engineers Lino C. Reyes and Felipe Venezuela from the Bureau of Lands.
Meanwhile, defendant-lot buyers interposed a cross-claim against petitioners spouses Casimiro,
averring that they were innocent purchasers in good faith and for value of their respective lots.
On December 29, 1982, the Court of First Instance, Branch XXVIII, Pasay City, rendered a decision in
favor of respondents, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants
Casimiros sentencing the latter to pay the former the sum of P640,000.00 with interest thereon at the
legal rate from March 13, 1980 until the same is fully paid and to pay attorneys fees equivalent to
25% of the total amount due and the costs. On the cross-claim, cross defendants Casimiros are
ordered to pay cross plaintiffs the sum of P5,000.00 as attorneys fees.
SO ORDERED.
Ruling on petitioners motion for reconsideration, the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch CXI,
set aside its earlier decision, and held that the report of the engineers from the Bureau of Lands were
more credible and accurate, and enjoy the presumption of regularity and accuracy.
On July 15, 1987, respondents moved for reconsideration of the above Order, but the same was
denied on January 19, 1988.
Respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals on the sole question of the proper location of the
common boundary separating the adjoining lots of petitioners and respondents. The Court of Appeals
ordered that a relocation survey be conducted by a team of surveyors composed of a surveyor
designated by the respondents, a surveyor designated by the petitioners, and a third member-
surveyor chosen by the said two surveyors. Petitioners designated Engr. Nicolas Bernardo, while
respondents designated Engr. Manuel P. Lopez. Upon agreement of the parties that the third member
shall be from the Land Registration Commission, Engr. Felino Cortez, Chief, Ordinary and Cadastral
Division, Land Registration Commission, was designated third member and chairman of the relocation
survey.
Petitioners complained of irregularities in the conduct of the relocation survey, namely, (a) the actual
field work was conducted by a separate survey team composed of employees of the LRC without the
knowledge and presence of Engr. Bernardo; (b) the relocation plan and computations were done
without consultation and coordination among the members of the survey team; and (c) the relocation
plan that was prepared by Engr. Cortez did not conform to the verification plan earlier approved by
the Bureau of Lands in January 1982.
However, the Court of Appeals found nothing irregular in the conduct of the relocation survey.
Petitioners representative, Engr. Bernardo, admitted that he was furnished copies of the field notes
and data gathered by the LRA team, but did not enter any objection thereto. If at all, Engr. Bernardos
exclusion from the actual field work was rectified by the opportunity given him to comment on the
final report prepared by Engr. Cortez, which Engr. Bernardo did not do.
After the survey, the Court of Appeals found that the final relocation survey report yielded the
"indisputable and inevitable conclusion" that petitioners encroached on a portion of the respondents
property comprising an area of 3,235 square meters. On November 11, 1996, a judgment was
rendered as follows:
The foregoing considered, We hereby REVERSE and SET ASIDE the order of the trial court dated June
25 1987 and REINSTATE the decision dated December 29, 1982 as prayed for by the Appellants
[spouses Paulin].
SO ORDERED.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied for lack of merit. Hence, the instant petition for
review.1 cräläwvirtualibräry
In denying the petition for review, we upheld the factual findings of the Court of Appeals, citing the
rule that we are not a trier of facts,2 and that factual findings of the Court of Appeals, when supported
by substantial evidence, are conclusive and binding on the parties and are not reviewable by this
Court.3cräläwvirtualibräry
In their Motion for Reconsideration, petitioners argue that this case falls within the exceptions when
review of the factual findings of the Court of Appeals is proper. According to them, the findings of fact
of the appellate court were contrary to those of the trial court. Moreover, it was alleged that there was
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Court of Appeals when it approved the Report of the
Relocation Survey Team without the signature of petitioners representative therein, Engr. Nicolas
Bernardo. Likewise, the inference of the Court of Appeals as to the conclusiveness of the survey report
was manifestly mistaken because the same were arrived at without the participation and conformity of
Engr. Bernardo. Finally, the assailed Decision was based on the assumption that Engr. Bernardo was
furnished copies of the field notes and data gathered by the team of surveyors.
In their Comment, respondents countered that this Court is not tasked with the duty to review
findings of fact; that the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Court are not
contrary to each other; and that the Court of Appeals did not commit grave abuse of discretion.4 cräläwvirtualibräry
Considering the seriousness of the allegation of irregularity in the manner of the resurvey, we resolved
to take a second look at the evidence on record of this case, particularly those before the Court of
Appeals pertaining to the composition of the resurvey team and the conduct of the resurvey field
work.
As narrated above, the Court of Appeals, upon agreement of both parties, ordered that a relocation
survey on the questioned properties be conducted by a team of surveyors. The Court of Appeals
Resolution reads:
Finding the proposal well-taken as the only issue in this controversy is the correctness of the
relocation survey to determine the true location of the common boundary between the lot of the
plaintiffs and the lot of the defendants, the Court pursuant to Section 9 (3) of B.P. 129, hereby directs
that a relocation survey of the strip of land in question in this case, be conducted by a team of
surveyors composed of (1) a surveyor designated by the appellants, (2) a surveyor designated by the
appellees and (3) a surveyor to be chosen by the said two surveyors. The resurvey shall be conducted
in the presence of both parties or their authorized representatives. In view of the manifestation of
defendants-appellees that they are willing to advance the cost of said relocation survey, reimbursable
to them contingently as part of the costs of this action, should they win, the costs of such relocation
survey shall be advanced by the defendants appellees.5 cräläwvirtualibräry
Subsequently, the Court of Appeals designated the following as members of the survey team:
(1) Engr. Manuel P. Lopez (for respondents);
(2) Engr. Nicolas R. Bernardo (for petitioners);
(3) Engr. Felino M. Cortez of the Land Registration Commission.6
On July 10, 1992, Engr. Cortez submitted a report stating, among others, that the members of the
resurvey team have agreed that the actual field work will be undertaken by five technical personnel,
three of whom shall come from the Land Registration Authority and the remaining two shall be Engrs.
Lopez and Bernardo or their respective representatives.7 cräläwvirtualibräry
By February 9, 1993, the field work had already been completed, pursuant to the Report of Engr.
Cortez to the Court of Appeals.8 On May 10, 1993, petitioners filed a "Motion to Require Engineer
Cortez to Comply with the Terms and Conditions of this Honorable Courts Resolution of March 21,
1990,"9 wherein they complained that the actual survey field work was done without the knowledge
and presence of their representative, Engr. Bernardo, in contravention of the appellate courts directive
that the resurvey shall be conducted in the presence of both parties or their authorized
representatives.
Subsequently, Engr. Cortez submitted his Report which states that the actual field work was
undertaken by a survey team created by the Administrator of the LRA composed of Engrs. Cortez,
Ildefonso Padigos, Jr., Porfirio Encisa, Jr., and Alexander Montemayor. The team found that petitioners
property encroached on respondents property by 3,235 square meters. The Report was signed by
Engrs. Cortez and Lopez. Engr. Bernardo did not sign above his typewritten name.10 cräläwvirtualibräry
Engr. Bernardo filed a Comment, setting forth the alleged irregularities in the relocation survey.
According to him, he never received notice of the time and exact date of the field survey, as agreed
upon by the team; that the designation of the LRA engineers who undertook the field work was not
authorized by the court; and that the official survey team appointed by the Court of Appeals never
met to perform the survey.11 cräläwvirtualibräry
On January 17, 1994, the Court of Appeals denied petitioners motion to require the chairman of the
relocation survey team to comply with the resolution of the court dated March 20,
1990.12 Subsequently, it rendered judgment in favor of respondents, finding that the Report submitted
by the Relocation Survey Team was arrived at after a careful and deliberate process of survey,
computation and assessment of its technical findings. Hence, it sustained the finding that petitioners
property encroached on respondents property by 3,235 square meters.13 cräläwvirtualibräry
The reason for the requirement of representation of both parties in the resurvey team is to ensure
that the interests of both sides are protected. If this requirement is breached, then serious prejudice
can result. This is especially true in this case where the purpose of the resurvey is to determine the
boundaries of the parties adjacent lots. The placing of boundary lines and demarcation points on the
soil must be precise, and the smallest error in alignment may result in the loss of a large portion of
ones property. Hence, it is crucial that each party must have a representative present to ensure that
the fixing of the metes and bounds on the soil is accurately performed.
Indeed, the requirement of notice and representation in the proceedings is an essential part of due
process of law. In Roxas & Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals,14 we held:
Respondent DAR, on the other hand, avers that surveys on the land covered by the four titles were
conducted in 1989, and that petitioner, as landowner, was not denied participation therein. The results
of the survey and the land valuation summary report, however, do not indicate whether notices to
attend the same were actually sent to and received by petitioner or its duly authorized representative.
To reiterate, Executive Order No. 229 does not lay down the operating procedure, much less the
notice requirements, before the VOS is accepted by respondent DAR. Notice to the landowner,
however, cannot be dispensed with. It is part of administrative due process and is an
essential requisite to enable the landowner himself to exercise, at the very least, his right of retention
guaranteed under the CARL. (emphasis ours)15 cräläwvirtualibräry
Poring over the records of the Court of Appeals regarding the resurvey of the subject properties, it
appears that the actual field work was performed by engineers from LRA, without the representatives
of petitioners and respondents being present. There was no clear showing that notices of the field
work were sent to petitioners and respondents. Worse, the actual field work was undertaken by only
four engineers, all of whom were designated from the LRA. This is in violation of the agreement of the
parties that the actual field work should be done by five technical personnel, three of whom shall come
from the Land Registration Authority and the remaining two shall be Engrs. Lopez and Bernardo or
their respective representatives.16 cräläwvirtualibräry
As stated above, the representatives of petitioners and respondents were not notified of and thus
failed to participate in the survey. This is evident from the Report submitted by Engr. Cortez himself,
stating that the actual field work was undertaken by a survey team created by the Administrator of
the LRA composed of Engrs. Cortez, Ildefonso Padigos, Jr., Porfirio Encisa, Jr., and Alexander
Montemayor.17 It is clear that Engrs. Lopez and Bernardo were not present at the field survey.
The failure of Engr. Cortez, as chairman of the resurvey team, to notify Engr. Bernardo of the actual
field work to enable him to participate therein constituted as serious violation of petitioners right to
due process, especially considering that it resulted in a deprivation of their property to the extent of
3,235 square meters. The actual survey proceedings must, therefore, be conducted anew, ensuring
this time that the interests of both parties are adequately protected. Hence, this case must be
remanded to the Court of Appeals for the retaking of the survey of the boundaries on the parties
respective properties.
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, the Decision dated July 3, 2002 in G.R. No. 136911 is SET
ASIDE. The instant petition is REMANDED to the Court of Appeals, which is ordered to forthwith cause
the resurvey the boundaries on the parties respective properties by the team of surveyors agreed
upon by the parties, and thereafter to decide the case accordingly.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Vitug, and Austria-Martinez, JJ., concur.
Endnotes:
1
Decision, pp. 1-4; Rollo, pp. 476-479; citations omitted.
2
Spouses Uy v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 109197, June 21, 2001, citing Valmonte v. Court of Appeals, 303 SCRA 278
[1999].
3
Atillo v. Court of Appeals, 334 Phil. 546 [1997].
4
Rollo, pp. 501-510.
5
Resolution dated September 1, 1989; CA Record, p. 54.
6
Resolution dated May 4, 1990; Ibid., p. 81.
7
Id., p. 117.
8
Id., p. 131.
9
Id., pp. 139-142.
10
Id., pp. 144-147.
11
Id., pp. 173-180.
12
Id., pp. 186-190.
13
Id., pp. 264-275.
14
312 SCRA 106 [1999].
15
Ibid., at p. 149.
16
Op. cit., note 7.
17
Op. cit., note 10.
EN BANC
G.R. No. 143540. April 11, 2003
JOEL G. MIRANDA,, Petitioner, v. ANTONIO C. CARREON,

MILAGROS B. CASCO, ELSIE S. ESTARES, JULIUS N. MALLARI,
ELINORA A. DANAO, JOVELYN G. RETAMAL, MARIFE S. ALMAZAN,
JONALD R. DALMACIO, JENNIFER C. PLAZA, RIZALDY B. AGGABAO,
VILMA T. VENTURA, BENEDICT B. PANGANIBAN, JOSE L. GOMBIO,
MELCHOR E. SORIANO, ZARINA C. PANGANIBAN, EMELITA D.
TAUYA, EVANGELINE A. SICAM, MATABAI AQUARIOUS Q. CULANG,
MELVIN L. GARCIA, JOHNNY N. YU, JR., LOIDA J. PURUGGANAN,
EDUARDO S. VALENCIA, EDITHA A. REGLOS, HENRY P. MAPALAD,
RAMIL C. GALANG, JUSTINA M. MACASO, MARTHA B. ALLAM, and
ARSENIA A. CATAINA, respondents.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari1 assailing the

Decision2 dated May 21, 1999 and the Resolution dated June 5,
2000 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 36997.
In the early part of 1988, Vice Mayor Amelita Navarro, while serving
as Acting Mayor of the City of Santiago because of the suspension of
Mayor Jose Miranda, appointed the above-named respondents to
various positions in the city government. Their appointments were
with permanent status and based on the evaluation made by the
City Personnel Selection and Promotion Board (PSPB) created
pursuant to Republic Act No. 7160.3 The Civil Service Commission
(CSC) approved the appointments.
When Mayor Jose Miranda reassumed his post on March 5, 1998

after his suspension, he considered the composition of the PSPB
irregular since the majority party, to which he belongs, was not
properly represented.4 He then formed a three-man special
performance audit team composed of Roberto C. Bayaua, Antonio
AL. Martinez and Antonio L. Santos, to conduct a personnel
evaluation audit of those who were previously screened by the PSPB
and those on probation. After conducting the evaluation, the audit
team submitted to him a report dated June 8, 1998 stating that the
respondents were found wanting in (their) performance.
On June 10, 1998, or three months after Mayor Miranda reassumed

his post, he issued an order terminating respondents services
effective June 15, 1998 because they performed poorly during the
probationary period.
Respondents appealed to the CSC, contending that being employees

on probation,5 they can be dismissed from the service on the ground
of poor performance only after their probationary period of six
months, not after three (3) months. They also denied that an
evaluation on their performance was conducted, hence, their
dismissal from the service violated their right to due process.
On October 19, 1998, the CSC issued Resolution No. 982717

reversing the order of Mayor Miranda and ordering that respondents
be reinstated to their former positions with payment of backwages,
thus:
xxx
Granting that the complainant-employees (now respondents)

indeed rated poorly, the question that remains is whether they can
be terminated from the service on that ground.
xxx
x x x, at the time of their termination the complainants have not

finished the six (6) months probationary period. x x x, they may be
terminated even before the expiration of the probationary period
pursuant to Section 26, par. 1, Chapter 5, Book V, Title I-A of the
Revised Administrative Code of 1987. Said Section provides:
All such persons (appointees who meet all the requirements of the
position) must serve a probationary period of six months
following their original appointment and shall undergo a thorough
character investigation in order to acquire a permanent civil service
status. A probationer may be dropped from the service
for unsatisfactory conduct or for want of capacity anytime
before the expiration of the probationary period: Provided,
that such action is appealable to the Commission.
It is, however, clear from the foregoing quoted provision that an

employee on probation status may be terminated only for
unsatisfactory conduct or want of capacity. In this case, the
services of the complainants were terminated on the ground
of poor performance x x x. Although poor performance may
come near the concept of want of capacity, the latter, as held
by this Commission, implies opportunity on the part of the
head of office to observe the performance and demeanor of
the employee concerned (Charito Pandes, CSC Resolution No.
965592). At this point, considering that Mayor Jose Miranda
reassumed his post only on March 5, 1998 after serving his
suspension, it is quite improbable that he can already gauge
the performance of the complainants through the mere lapse
of three months considering that the date of the letter of
termination is June 10, 1998 and its effectivity date June 15,
1998.6 (emphasis supplied)
Meanwhile, the COMELEC disqualified Mayor Jose Miranda as a

mayoralty candidate in the 1998 May elections. His son Joel G.
Miranda, herein petitioner, substituted for him and was proclaimed
Mayor of Santiago City. He then filed a motion for reconsideration of
the CSC Resolution No. 982717 (in favor of respondents) but it was
denied in the CSC Resolution No. 990557 dated March 3, 1999.
Petitioner then filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review
on certiorari, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 36997. On May 21, 1999,
the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision affirming in toto the CSC
Resolution No. 982717. Forthwith, petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration, but before it could be resolved by the Court of
Appeals, several events supervened. This Court, in G.R. No.
136351, Joel G. Miranda vs. Antonio M. Abaya and the COMELEC,
set aside the proclamation of petitioner as Mayor of Santiago City
for lack of a certificate of candidacy and declared Vice Mayor
Amelita Navarro as City Mayor by operation of law.7 cräläwvirtualibräry
On December 20, 1999, Mayor Navarro filed with the Court of
Appeals a Motion to Withdraw the Motion for Reconsideration
(previously submitted by former Mayor Joel G. Miranda).
On June 5, 2000, the Court of Appeals denied petitioners motion for

reconsideration of its Decision.
On June 11, 2000, the Court of Appeals granted Mayor Navarros

Motion to Withdraw the Motion for Reconsideration. In effect, the
CSC Resolution reinstating respondents to their positions stays.
In this petition, petitioner Joel G. Miranda contends that the Court

of Appeals erred in affirming the CSC Resolution declaring that the
termination of respondents services is illegal and ordering their
reinstatement to their former positions with payment of backwages.
In their comment, respondents claim that since petitioner ceased to

be Mayor of Santiago City, he has no legal personality to file the
instant petition and, therefore, the same should be dismissed. They
insist that they were not actually evaluated on their performance.
But assuming there was indeed such an evaluation, it should have
been done by their immediate supervisors, not by those appointed
by former Mayor Jose Miranda.
In his reply, petitioner contends that as a taxpayer, he has a legal

interest in the case at bar, hence, can lawfully file this petition.
Section 17, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as

amended, provides:
Sec. 17. Death or separation of a party who is a

public officer. When a public officer is a party in an action in his
official capacity and during its pendency dies, resigns or otherwise
ceases to hold office, the action may be continued and maintained
by or against his successor if, within thirty (30) days after the
successor takes office or such time as may be granted by the Court,
it is satisfactorily shown by any party that there is substantial need
for continuing or maintaining it and the successor adopts or
continues or threatens to adopt or continue the action of his
predecessor.
It is clear from the above Rule that when petitioner ceased to be
mayor of Santiago City, the action may be continued and
maintained by his successor, Mayor Amelita Navarro, if there is
substantial need to do so.
Mayor Navarro, however, found no substantial need to continue and

maintain the action of her predecessor in light of the CSC Resolution
declaring that respondents services were illegally terminated by
former Mayor Jose Miranda. In fact, she filed with the Court of
Appeals aMotion to Withdraw the Motion for Reconsideration (lodged
by petitioner). She likewise reinstated all the respondents to their
respective positions and approved the payment of their salaries.
Petitioner insists though that as a taxpayer, he is a real party-in-

interest and, therefore, should continue and maintain this suit. Such
contention is misplaced. Section 2, Rule 3 of the same Rules
provides:
Section 2. Parties in interest. - A real party in interest is the party

who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the
suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless
otherwise authorized by law or these Rules, every action must
be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest.
(emphasis supplied)
Even as a taxpayer, petitioner does not stand to be benefited or

injured by the judgment of the suit. Not every action filed by a
taxpayer can qualify to challenge the legality of official acts done by
the government.8 It bears stressing that a taxpayers suit refers to a
case where the act complained of directly involves the illegal
disbursement of public funds from taxation.9 The issue in this
case is whether respondents services were illegally terminated.
Clearly, it does not involve the illegal disbursement of public
funds, hence, petitioners action cannot be considered a taxpayers
suit.
At any rate, to put to rest the controversy at hand, we shall resolve

the issue of whether respondents services were illegally terminated
by former Mayor Jose Miranda.
The 1987 Constitution provides that no officer or employee of the
civil service shall be removed or suspended except for cause
provided by law.10 Under the Revised Administrative Code of
1987, a government officer or employee may be removed from the
service on two (2) grounds: (1) unsatisfactory conduct and (2) want
of capacity. While the Code does not define and delineate the
concepts of these two grounds, however, the Civil Service Law
(Presidential Decree No. 807, as amended) provides specific
grounds for dismissing a government officer or employee from the
service. Among these grounds are inefficiency and incompetence in
the performance of official duties. In the case at bar, respondents
were dismissed on the ground of poor performance. Poor
performance falls within the concept of inefficiency and
incompetence in the performance of official duties which, as earlier
mentioned, are grounds for dismissing a government official or
employee from the service.
But inefficiency or incompetence can only be determined after the

passage of sufficient time, hence, the probationary period of six (6)
months for the respondents. Indeed, to be able to gauge whether a
subordinate is inefficient or incompetent requires enough time on
the part of his immediate superior within which to observe his
performance. This condition, however, was not observed in this
case. As aptly stated by the CSC, it is quite improbable that Mayor
Jose Miranda could finally determine the performance of
respondents for only the first three months of the probationary
period.
Not only that, we find merit in respondents claim that they were
denied due process. They cited Item 2.2 (b), Section VI of the
Omnibus Guidelines on Appointments and Other Personnel Actions
(CSC Memorandum Circular No. 38, Series of 1993, as amended by
CSC Memorandum Circular No. 12, Series of 1994) which provides:
2.2. Unsatisfactory or Poor Performance
xxx
b. An official or employee who, for one evaluation period, is

rated poor in performance, may be dropped from the
rolls after due notice. Due notice shall mean that the
officer or employee is informed in writing of the status
of his performance not later than the fourth month
of that rating period with sufficient warning that
failure to improve his performance within the
remaining period of the semester shall warrant his
separation from the service. Such notice shall also
contain sufficient information which shall enable the
employee to prepare an explanation.11 (emphasis supplied)
Respondents vehemently assert that they were never notified in

writing regarding the status of their performance, neither were they
warned that they will be dismissed from the service should they fail
to improve their performance. Significantly, petitioner did not refute
respondents assertion. The records show that what respondents
received was only the termination order from Mayor Jose Miranda.
Obviously, respondents right to due process was violated.
Moreover, respondents contend that the only reason behind their

arbitrary dismissal was Mayor Jose Mirandas perception that they
were not loyal to him, being appointees of then Acting Mayor
Navarro. This contention appears to be true considering that all
those who were accepted and screened by the PSPB during the
incumbency of Acting Mayor Navarro were rated to have performed
poorly by an audit team whose three members were personally
picked by Mayor Jose Miranda.
The Constitution has envisioned the civil service to be a career

service based on merit and rewards system that will truly be
accountable and responsive to the people and deserving of their
trust and support.12 These noble objectives will be frustrated if the
tenure of its members is subject to the whim of partisan politics. A
civil servant who lives in ceaseless fear of being capriciously
removed from office every time a new political figure assumes
power will strive to do anything that pleases the latter. In this way,
he will hardly develop efficiency, accountability and a sense of
loyalty to the public service. Such a climate will only breed
opportunistic, inefficient and irresponsible civil servants to the
detriment of the public. This should not be countenanced.
In fine, we hold that petitioner, not being a real party in interest,
has no legal personality to file this petition. Besides, his motion for
reconsideration was validly withdrawn by the incumbent Mayor.
Even assuming he is a real party in interest, we see no reason to
disturb the findings of both the CSC and the Court of Appeals. The
reinstatement of respondents who, unfortunately, were victims of
political bickerings, is in order.
WHEREFORE, thepetition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated

May 21, 1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 36997
is AFFIRMED.
Treble costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Panganiban,

Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, Austria-Martinez,
Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Endnotes:
1
Filed under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.
2
Penned by Justice Artemio G. Tuquero, retired, and concurred in by Justice Eubulo G. Verzola and Justice Candido V.
Rivera, retired.
3
Otherwise known as The Local Government Code of 1991.
4
Former Mayor Jose Mirandas preferred Councilor, a partymate, was substituted by another Councilor through the
intervention of Acting Mayor Navarro.
5
Although respondents original appointments were with permanent status, they must serve a probationary period of
six (6) months as provided in Section 2, Rule VII of the Omnibus Civil Service Rules and Regulations, which reads:
SEC. 2. Original appointment refers to initial entry into the career service under a permanent status of a person who meets
all the requirements of the position including the civil service eligibility.
(a) All such persons must serve a probationary period of six (6) months following their original appointment and shall
undergo a thorough character investigation. A probationer may be dropped from the service for unsatisfactory conduct or
want of capacity any time before the expiration of the probationary period: Provided, That such action is appealable to the
Commission.
(b) All original appointments of qualified persons to the position in the career service shall henceforth be proposed as
permanent. It is understood that the first six (6) months of service will be probationary in nature. However, if no notice of
termination or unsatisfactory conduct or want of capacity is given by the appointing authority to the employee before the
expiration of the six-month probationary period, the appointment automatically becomes permanent.
6
Rollo at 6.
7
370 Phil. 642 (1999).
8
Joya v. Presidential Commission on Good Government, 225 SCRA 568 (1993).
9
Bayan (Bagong Alyansang Makabayan) v. Zamora, G.R. No. 138570, October 10, 2000, 342 SCRA 449, citing
Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works, 110 Phil. 331 (1960); Maceda v. Macaraig, 197 SCRA 771 (1991);
Lozada v. COMELEC, 120 SCRA 337 (1983); Dumlao v. COMELEC, 95 SCRA 392 (1980); Gonzales v. Marcos, 65 SCRA 624
(1975).
10
Section 2(3), Article IX-B, 1987 Constitution.
11
CA Records at 260-261.
12
Section 3, Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution.
EN BANC
G.R. No. 148571 September 24, 2002
GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Represented by the Philippine Department of Justice, petitioner,
vs.
HON. GUILLERMO PURGANAN, Presiding Judge Regional Trial Court of Manila and
MARC JIMENEZ a.k.a. MARCIO BATACAN CRESPO, respondent
Davide Jr., CJ, Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago,
Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Morales and Callejo, Sr.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
In extradition proceedings, are prospective extraditees entitled to notice and hearing before warrants
for their arrest can be issued? Equally important, are they entitled to the right to bail and provisional
liberty while the extradition proceedings are pending? In general, the answer to these two novel
questions is "No." The explanation of and the reasons for, as well as the exceptions to, this rule are
laid out in this Decision.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking to void and set
aside the Orders dated May 23, 2001 1 and July 3, 2001 2 issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Manila, Branch 42. 3 The first assailed Order set for hearing petitioner’s application for the issuance
of a warrant for the arrest of Respondent Mark B. Jimenez.
The second challenged Order, on the other hand, directed the issuance of a warrant, but at the
same time granted bail to Jimenez. The dispositive portion of the Order reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the [Court] finds probable cause against
respondent Mark Jimenez. Accordingly let a Warrant for the arrest of the respondent be
issued. Consequently and taking into consideration Section 9, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure, this Court fixes the reasonable amount of bail for respondent’s
temporary liberty at ONE MILLION PESOS (Php 1,000,000.00), the same to be paid in cash.
Furthermore respondent is directed to immediately surrender to this Court his passport and
the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation is likewise directed to include the name of the
respondent in its Hold Departure List." 4
Essentially, the Petition prays for the lifting of the bail Order, the cancellation of the bond, and the
taking of Jimenez into legal custody.
The Facts
This Petition is really a sequel to GR No. 139465 entitled Secretary of Justice v. Ralph C. Lantion. 5
Pursuant to the existing RP-US Extradition Treaty, 6 the United States Government, through
diplomatic channels, sent to the Philippine Government Note Verbale No. 0522 dated June 16, 1999,
supplemented by Note Nos. 0597, 0720 and 0809 and accompanied by duly authenticated
documents requesting the extradition of Mark B. Jimenez, also known as Mario Batacan Crespo.
Upon receipt of the Notes and documents, the secretary of foreign affairs (SFA) transmitted them to
the secretary of justice (SOJ) for appropriate action, pursuant to Section 5 of Presidential Decree
(PD) No. 1069, also known as the Extradition Law.
Upon learning of the request for his extradition, Jimenez sought and was granted a Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO) by the RTC of Manila, Branch 25. 7 The TRO prohibited the Department of
Justice (DOJ) from filing with the RTC a petition for his extradition. The validity of the TRO was,
however, assailed by the SOJ in a Petition before this Court in the said GR No. 139465. Initially, the
Court -- by a vote of 9-6 -- dismissed the Petition. The SOJ was ordered to furnish private
respondent copies of the extradition request and its supporting papers and to grant the latter a
reasonable period within which to file a comment and supporting evidence. 8
Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the SOJ, this Court issued its October 17, 2000
Resolution. 9 By an identical vote of 9-6 -- after three justices changed their votes -- it reconsidered
and reversed its earlier Decision. It held that private respondent was bereft of the right to notice and
hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process. This Resolution has become final and
executory.
Finding no more legal obstacle, the Government of the United States of America, represented by the
Philippine DOJ, filed with the RTC on May 18, 2001, the appropriate Petition for Extradition which
was docketed as Extradition Case No. 01192061. The Petition alleged, inter alia, that Jimenez was
the subject of an arrest warrant issued by the United States District Court for the Southern District of
Florida on April 15, 1999. The warrant had been issued in connection with the following charges in
Indictment No. 99-00281 CR-SEITZ: (1) conspiracy to defraud the United States and to commit
certain offenses in violation of Title 18 US Code Section 371; (2) tax evasion, in violation of Title 26
US Code Section 7201; (3) wire fraud, in violation of Title 18 US Code Sections 1343 and 2; (4) false
statements, in violation of Title 18 US Code Sections 1001 and 2; and (5) illegal campaign
contributions, in violation of Title 2 US Code Sections 441b, 441f and 437g(d) and Title 18 US Code
Section 2. In order to prevent the flight of Jimenez, the Petition prayed for the issuance of an order
for his "immediate arrest" pursuant to Section 6 of PD No. 1069.
Before the RTC could act on the Petition, Respondent Jimenez filed before it an "Urgent
Manifestation/Ex-Parte Motion," 10 which prayed that petitioner’s application for an arrest warrant be
set for hearing.
In its assailed May 23, 2001 Order, the RTC granted the Motion of Jimenez and set the case for
hearing on June 5, 2001. In that hearing, petitioner manifested its reservations on the procedure
adopted by the trial court allowing the accused in an extradition case to be heard prior to the
issuance of a warrant of arrest.
After the hearing, the court a quo required the parties to submit their respective memoranda. In his
Memorandum, Jimenez sought an alternative prayer: that in case a warrant should issue, he be
allowed to post bail in the amount of P100,000.
The alternative prayer of Jimenez was also set for hearing on June 15, 2001. Thereafter, the court
below issued its questioned July 3, 2001 Order, directing the issuance of a warrant for his arrest and
fixing bail for his temporary liberty at one million pesos in cash. 11 After he had surrendered his
passport and posted the required cash bond, Jimenez was granted provisional liberty via the
challenged Order dated July 4, 2001. 12
Hence, this Petition. 13
Issues
Petitioner presents the following issues for the consideration of this Court:
I.
The public respondent acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in adopting a procedure of first hearing
a potential extraditee before issuing an arrest warrant under Section 6 of PD No. 1069.
II.
The public respondent acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in granting the prayer for bail and in
allowing Jimenez to go on provisional liberty because:
‘1. An extradition court has no power to authorize bail, in the absence of any law that
provides for such power.
‘2. Section 13, Article III (right to bail clause) of the 1987 Philippine Constitution and
Section 4, Rule 114 (Bail) of the Rules of Court, as amended, which [were] relied
upon, cannot be used as bases for allowing bail in extradition proceedings.
‘3. The presumption is against bail in extradition proceedings or proceedings leading

to extradition.
‘4. On the assumption that bail is available in extradition proceedings or proceedings

leading to extradition, bail is not a matter of right but only of discretion upon clear
showing by the applicant of the existence of special circumstances.
‘5. Assuming that bail is a matter of discretion in extradition proceedings, the public
respondent received no evidence of ‘special circumstances’ which may justify
release on bail.
‘6. The risk that Jimenez will flee is high, and no special circumstance exists that will
engender a well-founded belief that he will not flee.
‘7. The conditions attached to the grant of bail are ineffectual and do not ensure
compliance by the Philippines with its obligations under the RP-US Extradition
Treaty.
‘8. The Court of Appeals Resolution promulgated on May 10, 2001 in the case
entitled ‘Eduardo T. Rodriguez et al. vs. The Hon. Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 17,
Manila,’ CA-G.R. SP No. 64589, relied upon by the public respondent in granting
bail, had been recalled before the issuance of the subject bail orders.’" 14
In sum, the substantive questions that this Court will address are: (1) whether Jimenez is entitled to
notice and hearing before a warrant for his arrest can be issued, and (2) whether he is entitled to bail
and to provisional liberty while the extradition proceedings are pending. Preliminarily, we shall take
up the alleged prematurity of the Petition for Certiorari arising from petitioner’s failure to file a Motion
for Reconsideration in the RTC and to seek relief in the Court of Appeals (CA), instead of in this
Court. 15 We shall also preliminarily discuss five extradition postulates that will guide us in disposing
of the substantive issues.
The Court’s Ruling
The Petition is meritorious.
Preliminary Matters
Alleged Prematurity of Present Petition
Petitioner submits the following justifications for not filing a Motion for Reconsideration in the
Extradition Court: "(1) the issues were fully considered by such court after requiring the parties to
submit their respective memoranda and position papers on the matter and thus, the filing of a
reconsideration motion would serve no useful purpose; (2) the assailed orders are a patent nullity,
absent factual and legal basis therefor; and (3) the need for relief is extremely urgent, as the
passage of sufficient time would give Jimenez ample opportunity to escape and avoid extradition;
and (4) the issues raised are purely of law." 16
For resorting directly to this Court instead of the CA, petitioner submits the following reasons: "(1)
even if the petition is lodged with the Court of Appeals and such appellate court takes cognizance of
the issues and decides them, the parties would still bring the matter to this Honorable Court to have
the issues resolved once and for all [and] to have a binding precedent that all lower courts ought to
follow; (2) the Honorable Court of Appeals had in one case 17 ruled on the issue by disallowing bail
but the court below refused to recognize the decision as a judicial guide and all other courts might
likewise adopt the same attitude of refusal; and (3) there are pending issues on bail both in the
extradition courts and the Court of Appeals, which, unless guided by the decision that this Honorable
Court will render in this case, would resolve to grant bail in favor of the potential extraditees and
would give them opportunity to flee and thus, cause adverse effect on the ability of the Philippines to
comply with its obligations under existing extradition treaties." 18
As a general rule, a petition for certiorari before a higher court will not prosper unless the inferior
court has been given, through a motion for reconsideration, a chance to correct the errors imputed to
it. This rule, though, has certain exceptions: (1) when the issue raised is purely of law, (2) when
public interest is involved, or (3) in case of urgency. 19 As a fourth exception, the Court has also ruled
that the filing of a motion for reconsideration before availment of the remedy of certiorari is not a sine
qua non, when the questions raised are the same as those that have already been squarely argued
and exhaustively passed upon by the lower court. 20 Aside from being of this nature, the issues in the
present case also involve pure questions of law that are of public interest. Hence, a motion for
reconsideration may be dispensed with.
Likewise, this Court has allowed a direct invocation of its original jurisdiction to issue writs of
certiorari when there are special and important reasons therefor. 21 In Fortich v. Corona 22 we stated:
[T]he Supreme Court has the full discretionary power to take cognizance of the petition filed
directly [before] it if compelling reasons, or the nature and importance of the issues raised,
warrant. This has been the judicial policy to be observed and which has been reiterated in
subsequent cases, namely: Uy vs. Contreras, et. al., Torres vs. Arranz, Bercero vs. De
Guzman, and, Advincula vs. Legaspi, et. al. As we have further stated in Cuaresma:
‘x x x. A direct invocation of the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction to issue these

writs should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor,
clearly and specifically set out in the petition. This is established policy. x x x.’
Pursuant to said judicial policy, we resolve to take primary jurisdiction over the present
petition in the interest of speedy justice and to avoid future litigations so as to promptly put
an end to the present controversy which, as correctly observed by petitioners, has sparked
national interest because of the magnitude of the problem created by the issuance of the
assailed resolution. Moreover, x x x requiring the petitioners to file their petition first with the
Court of Appeals would only result in a waste of time and money.
That the Court has the power to set aside its own rules in the higher interests of justice is well-
entrenched in our jurisprudence. We reiterate what we said in Piczon vs. Court of Appeals: 23
‘Be it remembered that rules of procedure are but mere tools designed to facilitate the
attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that
tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must always be avoided. Time and
again, this Court has suspended its own rules and excepted a particular case from their
operation whenever the higher interests of justice so require. In the instant petition, we
forego a lengthy disquisition of the proper procedure that should have been taken by the
parties involved and proceed directly to the merits of the case.’
In a number of other exceptional cases, 24 we held as follows:
This Court has original jurisdiction, concurrent with that of Regional Trial Courts and the
Court of Appeals, over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto and
habeas corpus, and we entertain direct resort to us in cases where special and important
reasons or exceptional and compelling circumstances justify the same."
In the interest of justice and to settle once and for all the important issue of bail in extradition
proceedings, we deem it best to take cognizance of the present case. Such proceedings constitute a
matter of first impression over which there is, as yet, no local jurisprudence to guide lower courts.
Five Postulates of Extradition
The substantive issues raised in this case require an interpretation or construction of the treaty and
the law on extradition. A cardinal rule in the interpretation of a treaty or a law is to ascertain and give
effect to its intent. 25 Since PD 1069 is intended as a guide for the implementation of extradition
treaties to which the Philippines is a signatory, 26 understanding certain postulates of extradition will
aid us in properly deciding the issues raised here.
1. Extradition Is a Major Instrument for the Suppression of Crime.
First, extradition treaties are entered into for the purpose of suppressing crime 27 by facilitating
the arrest and the custodial transfer 28 of a fugitive 29 from one state to the other.
With the advent of easier and faster means of international travel, the flight of affluent
criminals from one country to another for the purpose of committing crime and evading
prosecution has become more frequent. Accordingly, governments are adjusting their
methods of dealing with criminals and crimes that transcend international boundaries.
Today, "a majority of nations in the world community have come to look upon extradition as
the major effective instrument of international co-operation in the suppression of crime." 30 It is
the only regular system that has been devised to return fugitives to the jurisdiction of a court
competent to try them in accordance with municipal and international law. 31
An important practical effect x x x of the recognition of the principle that criminals

should be restored to a jurisdiction competent to try and punish them is that the
number of criminals seeking refuge abroad will be reduced. For to the extent that
efficient means of detection and the threat of punishment play a significant role in the
deterrence of crime within the territorial limits of a State, so the existence of effective
extradition arrangements and the consequent certainty of return to the locus delicti
commissi play a corresponding role in the deterrence of flight abroad in order to
escape the consequence of crime. x x x. From an absence of extradition
arrangements flight abroad by the ingenious criminal receives direct encouragement
and thus indirectly does the commission of crime itself." 32
In Secretary v. Lantion 33 we explained:
The Philippines also has a national interest to help in suppressing crimes and one way to do
it is to facilitate the extradition of persons covered by treaties duly entered [into] by our
government. More and more, crimes are becoming the concern of one world. Laws involving
crimes and crime prevention are undergoing universalization. One manifest purpose of this
trend towards globalization is to deny easy refuge to a criminal whose activities threaten the
peace and progress of civilized countries. It is to the great interest of the Philippines to be
part of this irreversible movement in light of its vulnerability to crimes, especially
transnational crimes."
Indeed, in this era of globalization, easier and faster international travel, and an expanding ring of
international crimes and criminals, we cannot afford to be an isolationist state. We need to cooperate
with other states in order to improve our chances of suppressing crime in our own country.
2. The Requesting State Will Accord Due Process to the Accused
Second, an extradition treaty presupposes that both parties thereto have examined, and that both
accept and trust, each other’s legal system and judicial process. 34 More pointedly, our duly
authorized representative’s signature on an extradition treaty signifies our confidence in the capacity
and the willingness of the other state to protect the basic rights of the person sought to be
extradited. 35 That signature signifies our full faith that the accused will be given, upon extradition to
the requesting state, all relevant and basic rights in the criminal proceedings that will take place
therein; otherwise, the treaty would not have been signed, or would have been directly attacked for
its unconstitutionality.
3. The Proceedings Are Sui Generis
Third, as pointed out in Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, 36 extradition proceedings are not criminal in
nature. In criminal proceedings, the constitutional rights of the accused are at fore; in extradition
which is sui generis -- in a class by itself -- they are not.
An extradition [proceeding] is sui generis. It is not a criminal proceeding which will call into
operation all the rights of an accused as guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. To begin with, the
process of extradition does not involve the determination of the guilt or innocence of an
accused. His guilt or innocence will be adjudged in the court of the state where he will be
extradited. Hence, as a rule, constitutional rights that are only relevant to determine the guilt
or innocence of an accused cannot be invoked by an extraditee x x x.
xxxxxxxxx
There are other differences between an extradition proceeding and a criminal proceeding.
An extradition proceeding is summary in nature while criminal proceedings involve a full-
blown trial. In contradistinction to a criminal proceeding, the rules of evidence in an
extradition proceeding allow admission of evidence under less stringent standards. In terms
of the quantum of evidence to be satisfied, a criminal case requires proof beyond reasonable
doubt for conviction while a fugitive may be ordered extradited ‘upon showing of the
existence of a prima facie case.’ Finally, unlike in a criminal case where judgment becomes
executory upon being rendered final, in an extradition proceeding, our courts may adjudge
an individual extraditable but the President has the final discretion to extradite him. The
United States adheres to a similar practice whereby the Secretary of State exercises wide
discretion in balancing the equities of the case and the demands of the nation’s foreign
relations before making the ultimate decision to extradite."
Given the foregoing, it is evident that the extradition court is not called upon to ascertain the guilt or
the innocence of the person sought to be extradited. 37 Such determination during the extradition
proceedings will only result in needless duplication and delay. Extradition is merely a measure of
international judicial assistance through which a person charged with or convicted of a crime is
restored to a jurisdiction with the best claim to try that person. It is not part of the function of the
assisting authorities to enter into questions that are the prerogative of that jurisdiction. 38 The ultimate
purpose of extradition proceedings in court is only to determine whether the extradition request
complies with the Extradition Treaty, and whether the person sought is extraditable. 39
4. Compliance Shall Be in Good Faith.
Fourth, our executive branch of government voluntarily entered into the Extradition Treaty, and our
legislative branch ratified it. Hence, the Treaty carries the presumption that its implementation will
serve the national interest.
Fulfilling our obligations under the Extradition Treaty promotes comity 40 with the requesting state. On
the other hand, failure to fulfill our obligations thereunder paints a bad image of our country before
the world community. Such failure would discourage other states from entering into treaties with us,
particularly an extradition treaty that hinges on reciprocity. 41
Verily, we are bound by pacta sunt servanda to comply in good faith with our obligations under the
Treaty. 42 This principle requires that we deliver the accused to the requesting country if the
conditions precedent to extradition, as set forth in the Treaty, are satisfied. In other words, "[t]he
demanding government, when it has done all that the treaty and the law require it to do, is entitled to
the delivery of the accused on the issue of the proper warrant, and the other government is under
obligation to make the surrender." 43 Accordingly, the Philippines must be ready and in a position to
deliver the accused, should it be found proper.
5. There Is an Underlying Risk of Flight
Fifth, persons to be extradited are presumed to be flight risks. This prima facie presumption finds
reinforcement in the experience 44 of the executive branch: nothing short of confinement can ensure
that the accused will not flee the jurisdiction of the requested state in order to thwart their extradition
to the requesting state.
The present extradition case further validates the premise that persons sought to be extradited have
a propensity to flee. Indeed,
extradition hearings would not even begin, if only the accused were willing to submit to trial in the
requesting country. 45 Prior acts of herein respondent -- (1) leaving the requesting state right before
the conclusion of his indictment proceedings there; and (2) remaining in the requested state despite
learning that the requesting state is seeking his return and that the crimes he is charged with are
bailable -- eloquently speak of his aversion to the processes in the requesting state, as well as his
predisposition to avoid them at all cost. These circumstances point to an ever-present, underlying
high risk of flight. He has demonstrated that he has the capacity and the will to flee. Having fled
once, what is there to stop him, given sufficient opportunity, from fleeing a second time?
First Substantive Issue:
Is Respondent Entitled to Notice and Hearing

Before the Issuance of a Warrant of Arrest?
Petitioner contends that the procedure adopted by the RTC --informing the accused, a fugitive from
justice, that an Extradition Petition has been filed against him, and that petitioner is seeking his
arrest -- gives him notice to escape and to avoid extradition. Moreover, petitioner pleads that such
procedure may set a dangerous precedent, in that those sought to be extradited -- including
terrorists, mass murderers and war criminals -- may invoke it in future extradition cases.
On the other hand, Respondent Jimenez argues that he should not be hurriedly and arbitrarily
deprived of his constitutional right to liberty without due process. He further asserts that there is as
yet no specific law or rule setting forth the procedure prior to the issuance of a warrant of arrest, after
the petition for extradition has been filed in court; ergo, the formulation of that procedure is within the
discretion of the presiding judge.
Both parties cite Section 6 of PD 1069 in support of their arguments. It states:
SEC. 6. Issuance of Summons; Temporary Arrest; Hearing, Service of Notices.- (1)

Immediately upon receipt of the petition, the presiding judge of the court shall, as soon as
practicable, summon the accused to appear and to answer the petition on the day and hour
fixed in the order. [H]e may issue a warrant for the immediate arrest of the accused which
may be served any where within the Philippines if it appears to the presiding judge that the
immediate arrest and temporary detention of the accused will best serve the ends of justice.
Upon receipt of the answer, or should the accused after having received the summons fail to
answer within the time fixed, the presiding judge shall hear the case or set another date for
the hearing thereof.
(2) The order and notice as well as a copy of the warrant of arrest, if issued, shall be
promptly served each upon the accused and the attorney having charge of the case."
(Emphasis ours)
Does this provision sanction RTC Judge Purganan’s act of immediately setting for hearing the
issuance of a warrant of arrest? We rule in the negative.
1. On the Basis of the Extradition Law
It is significant to note that Section 6 of PD 1069, our Extradition Law, uses the word "immediate" to
qualify the arrest of the accused. This qualification would be rendered nugatory by setting for hearing
the issuance of the arrest warrant. Hearing entails sending notices to the opposing
parties, 46 receiving facts and arguments 47 from them, 48 and giving them time to prepare and present
such facts and arguments. Arrest subsequent to a hearing can no longer be considered "immediate."
The law could not have intended the word as a mere superfluity but, on the whole, as a means of
imparting a sense of urgency and swiftness in the determination of whether a warrant of arrest
should be issued.
By using the phrase "if it appears," the law further conveys that accuracy is not as important as
speed at such early stage. The trial court is not expected to make an exhaustive determination to
ferret out the true and actual situation, immediately upon the filing of the petition. From the
knowledge and the material then available to it, the court is expected merely to get a good first
impression -- a prima facie finding -- sufficient to make a speedy initial determination as regards the
arrest and detention of the accused.
Attached to the Petition for Extradition, with a Certificate of Authentication among others, were the
following: (1) Annex H, the Affidavit executed on May 26, 1999 by Mr. Michael E. Savage -- trial
attorney in the Campaign Financing Task Force of the Criminal Division of the US Department of
Justice; (2) Annexes H to G, evidentiary Appendices of various exhibits that constituted evidence of
the crimes charged in the Indictment, with Exhibits 1 to 120 (duly authenticated exhibits that
constituted evidence of the crimes charged in the Indictment); (3) Annex BB, the Exhibit I "Appendix
of Witness [excerpts] Statements Referenced in the Affidavit of Angela Byers" and enclosed
Statements in two volumes; (4) Annex GG, the Exhibit J "Table of Contents for Supplemental
Evidentiary Appendix" with enclosed Exhibits 121 to 132; and (5) Annex MM, the Exhibit L "Appendix
of Witness [excerpts] Statements Referenced in the Affidavit of Betty Steward" and enclosed
Statements in two volumes. 49
It is evident that respondent judge could have already gotten an impression from these records
adequate for him to make an initial determination of whether the accused was someone who should
immediately be arrested in order to "best serve the ends of justice." He could have determined
whether such facts and circumstances existed as would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent
person to believe that the extradition request was prima facie meritorious. In point of fact, he actually
concluded from these supporting documents that "probable cause" did exist. In the second
questioned Order, he stated:
In the instant petition, the documents sent by the US Government in support of [its] request
for extradition of herein respondent are enough to convince the Court of the existence of
probable cause to proceed with the hearing against the extraditee." 50
We stress that the prima facie existence of probable cause for hearing the petition and, a priori, for
issuing an arrest warrant was already evident from the Petition itself and its supporting documents.
Hence, after having already determined therefrom that a prima facie finding did exist, respondent
judge gravely abused his discretion when he set the matter for hearing upon motion of Jimenez. 51
Moreover, the law specifies that the court sets a hearing upon receipt of the answer or upon failure
of the accused to answer after receiving the summons. In connection with the matter of immediate
arrest, however, the word "hearing" is notably absent from the provision. Evidently, had the holding
of a hearing at that stage been intended, the law could have easily so provided. It also bears
emphasizing at this point that extradition proceedings are summary 52 in nature. Hence, the silence of
the Law and the Treaty leans to the more reasonable interpretation that there is no intention to
punctuate with a hearing every little step in the entire proceedings.
It is taken for granted that the contracting parties intend something reasonable and
something not inconsistent with generally recognized principles of International Law, nor with
previous treaty obligations towards third States. If, therefore, the meaning of a treaty is
ambiguous, the reasonable meaning is to be preferred to the unreasonable, the more
reasonable to the less reasonable x x x ." 53
Verily, as argued by petitioner, sending to persons sought to be extradited a notice of the request for
their arrest and setting it for hearing at some future date would give them ample opportunity to
prepare and execute an escape. Neither the Treaty nor the Law could have
intended that consequence, for the very purpose of both would have been defeated by the escape of
the accused from the requested state.
2. On the Basis of the Constitution
Even Section 2 of Article III of our Constitution, which is invoked by Jimenez, does not require a
notice or a hearing before the issuance of a warrant of arrest. It provides:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall
be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation
of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place
to be searched and the persons or things to be seized."
To determine probable cause for the issuance of arrest warrants, the Constitution itself requires only
the examination -- under oath or affirmation -- of complainants and the witnesses they may produce.
There is no requirement to notify and hear the accused before the issuance of warrants of arrest.
In Ho v. People 54 and in all the cases cited therein, never was a judge required to go to the extent of
conducting a hearing just for the purpose of personally determining probable cause for the issuance
of a warrant of arrest. All we required was that the "judge must have sufficient supporting documents
upon which to make his independent judgment, or at the very least, upon which to verify the findings
of the prosecutor as to the existence of probable cause." 55
In Webb v. De Leon, 56 the Court categorically stated that a judge was not supposed to conduct a
hearing before issuing a warrant of arrest:
Again, we stress that before issuing warrants of arrest, judges merely determine personally
the probability, not the certainty of guilt of an accused. In doing so, judges do not conduct a
de novo hearing to determine the existence of probable cause. They just personally review
the initial determination of the prosecutor finding a probable cause to see if it is supported by
substantial evidence."
At most, in cases of clear insufficiency of evidence on record, judges merely further examine
complainants and their witnesses. 57 In the present case, validating the act of respondent judge and
instituting the practice of hearing the accused and his witnesses at this early stage would be
discordant with the rationale for the entire system. If the accused were allowed to be heard and
necessarily to present evidence during the prima facie determination for the issuance of a warrant of
arrest,
what would stop him from presenting his entire plethora of defenses at this stage -- if he so desires --
in his effort to negate a prima facie finding? Such a procedure could convert the determination of a
prima facie case into a full-blown trial of the entire proceedings and possibly make trial of the main
case superfluous. This scenario is also anathema to the summary nature of extraditions.
That the case under consideration is an extradition and not a criminal action is not sufficient to justify
the adoption of a set of procedures more protective of the accused. If a different procedure were
called for at all, a more restrictive one -- not the opposite -- would be justified in view of respondent’s
demonstrated predisposition to flee.
Since this is a matter of first impression, we deem it wise to restate the proper procedure:
Upon receipt of a petition for extradition and its supporting documents, the judge must study them
and make, as soon as possible, a prima facie finding whether (a) they are sufficient in form and
substance, (b) they show compliance with the Extradition Treaty and Law, and (c) the person sought
is extraditable. At his discretion, the judge may
require the submission of further documentation or may personally examine the affiants and
witnesses of the petitioner. If, in spite of this study and examination, no prima facie finding 58 is
possible, the petition may be dismissed at the discretion of the judge.
On the other hand, if the presence of a prima facie case is determined, then the magistrate must
immediately issue a warrant for the arrest of the extraditee, who is at the same time summoned to
answer the petition and to appear at scheduled summary hearings. Prior to the issuance of the
warrant, the judge must not inform or notify the potential extraditee of the pendency of the petition,
lest the latter be given the opportunity to escape and frustrate the proceedings. In our opinion, the
foregoing procedure will "best serve the ends of justice" in extradition cases.
Second Substantive Issue:
Is Respondent Entitled to Bail?
Article III, Section 13 of the Constitution, is worded as follows:
Art. III, Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient
sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall
not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended.
Excessive bail shall not be required."
Respondent Mark B. Jimenez maintains that this constitutional provision secures the right to bail of
all persons, including those sought to be extradited. Supposedly, the only exceptions are the ones
charged with offenses punishable with reclusion perpetua, when evidence of guilt is strong. He also
alleges the relevance to the present case of Section 4 59 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court which,
insofar as practicable and consistent with the summary nature of extradition proceedings, shall also
apply according to Section 9 of PD 1069.
On the other hand, petitioner claims that there is no provision in the Philippine Constitution granting
the right to bail to a person who is the subject of an extradition request and arrest warrant.
Extradition Different from Ordinary Criminal Proceedings
We agree with petitioner. As suggested by the use of the word "conviction," the constitutional
provision on bail quoted above, as well as Section 4 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, applies only
when a person has been arrested and detained for violation of Philippine criminal laws. It does not
apply to extradition proceedings, because extradition courts do not render judgments of conviction or
acquittal.
Moreover, the constitutional right to bail "flows from the presumption of innocence in favor of every
accused who should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to
acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt." 60 It follows that the constitutional
provision on bail will not apply to a case like extradition, where the presumption of innocence is not
at issue.
The provision in the Constitution stating that the "right to bail shall not be impaired even when the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended" does not detract from the rule that the
constitutional right to bail is available only in criminal proceedings. It must be noted that the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus finds application "only to persons judicially
charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion." 61 Hence, the
second sentence in the constitutional provision on bail merely emphasizes the right to bail in criminal
proceedings for the aforementioned offenses. It cannot be taken to mean that the right is available
even in extradition proceedings that are not criminal in nature.
That the offenses for which Jimenez is sought to be extradited are bailable in the United States is
not an argument to grant him one in the present case. To stress, extradition proceedings are
separate and distinct from the trial for the offenses for which he is charged. He should apply for bail
before the courts trying the criminal cases against him, not before the extradition court.
No Violation of Due Process
Respondent Jimenez cites the foreign case Paretti 62 in arguing that, constitutionally, "[n]o one shall
be deprived of x x x liberty x x x without due process of law."
Contrary to his contention, his detention prior to the conclusion of the extradition proceedings does
not amount to a violation of his right to due process. We iterate the familiar doctrine that the essence
of due process is the opportunity to be heard 63 but, at the same time, point out that the doctrine does
not always call for a prior opportunity to be heard. 64 Where the circumstances -- such as those
present in an extradition case -- call for it, a subsequent opportunity to be heard is enough. 65 In the
present case, respondent will be given full opportunity to be heard subsequently, when the
extradition court hears the Petition for Extradition. Hence, there is no violation of his right to due
process and fundamental fairness.
Contrary to the contention of Jimenez, we find no arbitrariness, either, in the immediate deprivation
of his liberty prior to his being heard. That his arrest and detention will not be arbitrary is sufficiently
ensured by (1) the DOJ’s filing in court the Petition with its supporting documents after a
determination that the extradition request meets the requirements of the law and the relevant treaty;
(2) the extradition judge’s independent prima facie determination that his arrest will best serve the
ends of justice before the issuance of a warrant for his arrest; and (3) his opportunity, once he is
under the court’s custody, to apply for bail as an exception to the no-initial-bail rule.
It is also worth noting that before the US government requested the extradition of respondent,
proceedings had already been conducted in that country. But because he left the jurisdiction of the
requesting state before those proceedings could be completed, it was hindered from continuing with
the due processes prescribed under its laws. His invocation of due process now has thus become
hollow. He already had that opportunity in the requesting state; yet, instead of taking it, he ran away.
In this light, would it be proper and just for the government to increase the risk of violating its treaty
obligations in order to accord Respondent Jimenez his personal liberty in the span of time that it
takes to resolve the Petition for Extradition? His supposed immediate deprivation of liberty without
the due process that he had previously shunned pales against the government’s interest in fulfilling
its Extradition Treaty obligations and in cooperating with the world community in the suppression of
crime. Indeed, "[c]onstitutional liberties do not exist in a vacuum; the due process rights accorded to
individuals must be carefully balanced against exigent and palpable government interests." 66
Too, we cannot allow our country to be a haven for fugitives, cowards and weaklings who, instead of
facing the consequences of their actions, choose to run and hide. Hence, it would not be good policy
to increase the risk of violating our treaty obligations if, through overprotection or excessively liberal
treatment, persons sought to be extradited are able to evade arrest or escape from our custody. In
the absence of any provision -- in the Constitution, the law or the treaty -- expressly guaranteeing the
right to bail in extradition proceedings, adopting the practice of not granting them bail, as a general
rule, would be a step towards deterring fugitives from coming to the Philippines to hide from or
evade their prosecutors. 1âwphi1.nêt
The denial of bail as a matter of course in extradition cases falls into place with and gives life to
Article 14 67 of the Treaty, since this practice would encourage the accused to voluntarily surrender to
the requesting state to cut short their detention here. Likewise, their detention pending the resolution
of extradition proceedings would fall into place with the emphasis of the Extradition Law on the
summary nature of extradition cases and the need for their speedy disposition.
Exceptions to the No Bail Rule
The rule, we repeat, is that bail is not a matter of right in extradition cases. However, the judiciary
has the constitutional duty to curb grave abuse of discretion 68 and tyranny, as well as the power to
promulgate rules to protect and enforce constitutional rights. 69 Furthermore, we believe that the right
to due process is broad enough to include the grant of basic fairness to extraditees. Indeed, the right
to due process extends to the "life, liberty or property" of every person. It is "dynamic and resilient,
adaptable to every situation calling for its application." 70
Accordingly and to best serve the ends of justice, we believe and so hold that, after a potential
extraditee has been arrested or placed under the custody of the law, bail may be applied for and
granted as an exception, only upon a clear and convincing showing (1) that, once granted bail, the
applicant will not be a flight risk or a danger to the community; and (2) that there exist special,
humanitarian and compelling circumstances 71 including, as a matter of reciprocity, those cited by the
highest court in the requesting state when it grants provisional liberty in extradition cases therein.
Since this exception has no express or specific statutory basis, and since it is derived essentially
from general principles of justice and fairness, the applicant bears the burden of proving the above
two-tiered requirement with clarity, precision and emphatic forcefulness. The Court realizes that
extradition is basically an executive, not a judicial, responsibility arising from the presidential power
to conduct foreign relations. In its barest concept, it partakes of the nature of police assistance
amongst states, which is not normally a judicial prerogative. Hence, any intrusion by the courts into
the exercise of this power should be characterized by caution, so that the vital international and
bilateral interests of our country will not be unreasonably impeded or compromised. In short, while
this Court is ever protective of "the sporting idea of fair play," it also recognizes the limits of its own
prerogatives and the need to fulfill international obligations.
Along this line, Jimenez contends that there are special circumstances that are compelling enough
for the Court to grant his request for provisional release on bail. We have carefully examined these
circumstances and shall now discuss them.
1. Alleged Disenfranchisement
While his extradition was pending, Respondent Jimenez was elected as a member of the House of
Representatives. On that basis, he claims that his detention will disenfranchise his Manila district of
600,000 residents. We are not persuaded. In People v. Jalosjos, 72 the Court has already debunked
the disenfranchisement argument when it ruled thus:
When the voters of his district elected the accused-appellant to Congress, they did so with
full awareness of the limitations on his freedom of action. They did so with the knowledge
that he could achieve only such legislative results which he could accomplish within the
confines of prison. To give a more drastic illustration, if voters elect a person with full
knowledge that he is suffering from a terminal illness, they do so knowing that at any time, he
may no longer serve his full term in office.
In the ultimate analysis, the issue before us boils down to a question of constitutional equal
protection.
The Constitution guarantees: ‘x x x nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of
laws.’ This simply means that all persons similarly situated shall be treated alike both in
rights enjoyed and responsibilities imposed. The organs of government may not show any
undue favoritism or hostility to any person. Neither partiality nor prejudice shall be displayed.
Does being an elective official result in a substantial distinction that allows different
treatment? Is being a Congressman a substantial differentiation which removes the accused-
appellant as a prisoner from the same class as all persons validly confined under law?
The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has never been
an excuse to free a person validly [from] prison. The duties imposed by the ‘mandate of the
people’ are multifarious. The accused-appellant asserts that the duty to legislate ranks
highest in the hierarchy of government. The accused-appellant is only one of 250 members
of the House of Representatives, not to mention the 24 members of the Senate, charged
with the duties of legislation. Congress continues to function well in the physical absence of
one or a few of its members. Depending on the exigency of Government that has to be
addressed, the President or the Supreme Court can also be deemed the highest for that
particular duty. The importance of a function depends on the need for its exercise. The duty
of a mother to nurse her infant is most compelling under the law of nature. A doctor with
unique skills has the duty to save the lives of those with a particular affliction. An elective
governor has to serve provincial constituents. A police officer must maintain peace and
order. Never has the call of a particular duty lifted a prisoner into a different classification
from those others who are validly restrained by law.
A strict scrutiny of classifications is essential lest[,] wittingly or otherwise, insidious

discriminations are made in favor of or against groups or types of individuals.
The Court cannot validate badges of inequality. The necessities imposed by public welfare
may justify exercise of government authority to regulate even if thereby certain groups may
plausibly assert that their interests are disregarded.
We, therefore, find that election to the position of Congressman is not a reasonable
classification in criminal law enforcement. The functions and duties of the office are not
substantial distinctions which lift him from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom
and restricted in liberty of movement. Lawful arrest and confinement are germane to the
purposes of the law and apply to all those belonging to the same class." 73
It must be noted that even before private respondent ran for and won a congressional seat in Manila,
it was already of public knowledge that the United States was requesting his extradition. Hence, his
constituents were or should have been prepared for the consequences of the extradition case
against their representative, including his detention pending the final resolution of the case.
Premises considered and in line with Jalosjos, we are constrained to rule against his claim that his
election to public office is by itself a compelling reason to grant him bail.
2. Anticipated Delay
Respondent Jimenez further contends that because the extradition proceedings are lengthy, it would
be unfair to confine him during the pendency of the case. Again we are not convinced. We must
emphasize that extradition cases are summary in nature. They are resorted to merely to determine
whether the extradition petition and its annexes conform to the Extradition Treaty, not to determine
guilt or innocence. Neither is it, as a rule, intended to address issues relevant to the constitutional
rights available to the accused in a criminal action.
We are not overruling the possibility that petitioner may, in bad faith, unduly delay the proceedings.
This is quite another matter that is not at issue here. Thus, any further discussion of this point would
be merely anticipatory and academic.
However, if the delay is due to maneuverings of respondent, with all the more reason would the
grant of bail not be justified. Giving premium to delay by considering it as a special circumstance for
the grant of bail would be tantamount to giving him the power to grant bail to himself. It would also
encourage him to stretch out and unreasonably delay the extradition proceedings even more. This
we cannot allow.
3. Not a Flight Risk?
Jimenez further claims that he is not a flight risk. To support this claim, he stresses that he learned
of the extradition request in June 1999; yet, he has not fled the country. True, he has not actually
fled during the preliminary stages of the request for his extradition. Yet, this fact cannot be taken to
mean that he will not flee as the process moves forward to its conclusion, as he hears the footsteps
of the requesting government inching closer and closer. That he has not yet fled from the Philippines
cannot be taken to mean that he will stand his ground and still be within reach of our government if
and when it matters; that is, upon the resolution of the Petition for Extradition.
In any event, it is settled that bail may be applied for and granted by the trial court at anytime after
the applicant has been taken into custody and prior to judgment, even after bail has been previously
denied. In the present case, the extradition court may continue hearing evidence on the application
for bail, which may be granted in accordance with the guidelines in this Decision.
Brief Refutation of Dissents
The proposal to remand this case to the extradition court, we believe, is totally unnecessary; in fact,
it is a cop-out. The parties -- in particular, Respondent Jimenez -- have been given more than
sufficient opportunity both by the trial court and this Court to discuss fully and exhaustively private
respondent’s claim to bail. As already stated, the RTC set for hearing not only petitioner’s application
for an arrest warrant, but also private respondent’s prayer for temporary liberty. Thereafter required
by the RTC were memoranda on the arrest, then position papers on the application for bail, both of
which were separately filed by the parties.
This Court has meticulously pored over the Petition, the Comment, the Reply, the lengthy
Memoranda and the Position Papers of both parties. Additionally, it has patiently heard them in Oral
Arguments, a procedure not normally observed in the great majority of cases in this Tribunal.
Moreover, after the Memos had been submitted, the parties -- particularly the potential extraditee --
have bombarded this Court with additional pleadings -- entitled "Manifestations" by both parties and
"Counter-Manifestation" by private respondent -- in which the main topic was Mr. Jimenez’s plea for
bail.
A remand would mean that this long, tedious process would be repeated in its entirety. The trial
court would again hear factual and evidentiary matters. Be it noted, however, that, in all his
voluminous pleadings and verbal propositions, private respondent has not asked for a remand.
Evidently, even he realizes that there is absolutely no need to rehear factual matters. Indeed, the
inadequacy lies not in the factual presentation of Mr. Jimenez. Rather, it lies in his legal arguments.
Remanding the case will not solve this utter lack of persuasion and strength in his legal reasoning.
In short, this Court -- as shown by this Decision and the spirited Concurring, Separate and
Dissenting Opinions written by the learned justices themselves -- has exhaustively deliberated and
carefully passed upon all relevant questions in this case. Thus, a remand will not serve any useful
purpose; it will only further delay these already very delayed proceedings, 74 which our Extradition
Law requires to be summary in character. What we need now is prudent and deliberate speed, not
unnecessary and convoluted delay. What is needed is a firm decision on the merits, not a circuitous
cop-out.
Then, there is also the suggestion that this Court is allegedly "disregarding basic freedoms when a
case is one of extradition." We believe that this charge is not only baseless, but also unfair. Suffice it
to say that, in its length and breath, this Decision has taken special cognizance of the rights to due
process and fundamental fairness of potential extraditees.
Summation
As we draw to a close, it is now time to summarize and stress these ten points:
1. The ultimate purpose of extradition proceedings is to determine whether the request

expressed in the petition, supported by its annexes and the evidence that may be adduced
during the hearing of the petition, complies with the Extradition Treaty and Law; and whether
the person sought is extraditable. The proceedings are intended merely to assist the
requesting state in bringing the accused -- or the fugitive who has illegally escaped -- back to
its territory, so that the criminal process may proceed therein.
2. By entering into an extradition treaty, the Philippines is deemed to have reposed its trust in
the reliability or soundness of the legal and judicial system of its treaty partner, as well as in
the ability and the willingness of the latter to grant basic rights to the accused in the pending
criminal case therein.
3. By nature then, extradition proceedings are not equivalent to a criminal case in which guilt
or innocence is determined. Consequently, an extradition case is not one in which the
constitutional rights of the accused are necessarily available. It is more akin, if at all, to a
court’s request to police authorities for the arrest of the accused who is at large or has
escaped detention or jumped bail. Having once escaped the jurisdiction of the requesting
state, the reasonable prima facie presumption is that the person would escape again if given
the opportunity.
4. Immediately upon receipt of the petition for extradition and its supporting documents, the
judge shall make a prima facie finding whether the petition is sufficient in form and
substance, whether it complies with the Extradition Treaty and Law, and whether the person
sought is extraditable. The magistrate has discretion to require the petitioner to submit
further documentation, or to personally examine the affiants or witnesses. If convinced that a
prima facie case exists, the judge immediately issues a warrant for the arrest of the potential
extraditee and summons him or her to answer and to appear at scheduled hearings on the
petition.
5. After being taken into custody, potential extraditees may apply for bail. Since the
applicants have a history of absconding, they have the burden of showing that (a) there is no
flight risk and no danger to the community; and (b) there exist special, humanitarian or
compelling circumstances. The grounds used by the highest court in the requesting state for
the grant of bail therein may be considered, under the principle of reciprocity as a special
circumstance. In extradition cases, bail is not a matter of right; it is subject to judicial
discretion in the context of the peculiar facts of each case.
6. Potential extraditees are entitled to the rights to due process and to fundamental fairness.
Due process does not always call for a prior opportunity to be heard. A subsequent
opportunity is sufficient due to the flight risk involved. Indeed, available during the hearings
on the petition and the answer is the full chance to be heard and to enjoy fundamental
fairness that is compatible with the summary nature of extradition.
7. This Court will always remain a protector of human rights, a bastion of liberty, a bulwark of
democracy and the conscience of society. But it is also well aware of the limitations of its
authority and of the need for respect for the prerogatives of the other co-equal and co-
independent organs of government.
8. We realize that extradition is essentially an executive, not a judicial, responsibility arising

out of the presidential power to conduct foreign relations and to implement treaties. Thus, the
Executive Department of government has broad discretion in its duty and power of
implementation.
9. On the other hand, courts merely perform oversight functions and exercise review
authority to prevent or excise grave abuse and tyranny. They should not allow contortions,
delays and "over-due process" every little step of the way, lest these summary extradition
proceedings become not only inutile but also sources of international embarrassment due to
our inability to comply in good faith with a treaty partner’s simple request to return a fugitive.
Worse, our country should not be converted into a dubious haven where fugitives and
escapees can unreasonably delay, mummify, mock, frustrate, checkmate and defeat the
quest for bilateral justice and international cooperation.
10. At bottom, extradition proceedings should be conducted with all deliberate speed to
determine compliance with the Extradition Treaty and Law; and, while safeguarding basic
individual rights, to avoid the legalistic contortions, delays and technicalities that may negate
that purpose.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The assailed RTC Order dated May 23, 2001 is hereby
declared NULL and VOID, while the challenged Order dated July 3, 2001 is SET ASIDE insofar as it
granted bail to Respondent Mark Jimenez. The bail bond posted by private respondent is
CANCELLED. The Regional Trial Court of Manila is directed to conduct the extradition proceedings
before it, with all deliberate speed pursuant to the spirit and the letter of our Extradition Treaty with
the United States as well as our Extradition Law. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 109920 August 31, 2000
CEFERINO A. SORIANO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ADORACION C. ANGELES, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Caloocan City,
Regional Trial Court, Branch CXXI, and RUEL GARCIA, respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari to annul the decision rendered by the Regional Trial Court, Branch
121, Caloocan City, on March 15, 1993 in Criminal Case No. C-40740 which acquitted private
respondent Ruel Garcia of direct assault.
The prosecution’s evidence was as follows: Private respondent Ruel Garcia and his uncle, Pedro
Garcia, were members of the Caloocan police. Shortly after midnight on November 7, 1991, they
barged into the barangay hall of Barangay 56, Zone 5 in Caloocan City, looking for petitioner
Ceferino A. Soriano, the barangay captain. Private respondent gave petitioner fist blows on the face
four times with his left hand, while he poked a gun at him with his right hand, at the same time
cursing him, "Putang ina mo cabeza" ("You son of a bitch chief"). Although there were four
barangay tanods (Manuel Montoya, Arturo del Rosario, Ramiro Samson, and Francisco Raton) in
the barangay hall, they could not come to the aid of petitioner because they were held at bay by
Pedro Garcia. The Garcias then left with their companions who had been waiting outside the hall.
Petitioner was treated for his injuries in the hospital.
Private respondent denied petitioner’s allegations. He testified that he went to the barangay hall in
the evening of November 6, 1991 because his younger brother had been reportedly arrested and
beaten up by petitioner. (It appears that the younger Garcia was involved in a brawl with Dennis
Mones and a certain Ocampo. They were arrested and taken to the barangay hall. One of the boys,
who was apparently drunk, vomitted while their names were recorded. Petitioner, therefore, ordered
the three boys to be taken to the Ospital ng Kalookan for a check-up.) As private respondent saw
petitioner near the door of the barangay hall, he asked for the whereabouts of his brother and the
reason for the latter’s arrest. Apparently thinking that private respondent was trying to intervene in
the case he was investigating, petitioner angrily told private respondent to lay off: "Walang pulis pulis
dito" ("Your being a policeman doesn’t pull strings here"). When private respondent insisted on going
inside the barangay hall, petitioner blocked him and then pushed him on the chest. Private
respondent also pushed petitioner, causing him to fall on a pile of nightsticks and injure himself. All
the time, private respondent claimed he had his gun tucked at his waist. Private respondent’s uncle,
Pedro Garcia, then arrived and took him home.
In acquitting private respondent, respondent Judge Adoracion C. Angeles found it incredible that
petitioner did not resist or even say anything when private respondent allegedly assaulted him and
that none of the four barangay tanods who were near him came to his aid. She thought that if
petitioner had indeed been attacked, he would have suffered more serious injuries than a contusion
on the forehead, erythema on the chest, and a lacerated wound on the lower lip. Respondent judge
also excluded from the evidence the testimonies of petitioner and barangay tanod Manuel Montoya
on the ground that their testimonies had not been formally offered in evidence as required by Rule
132, §§34 to 35 of the Revised Rules on Evidence.
Hence this petition for certiorari. Petitioner alleges that the decision is void because it was not
rendered by an impartial tribunal. He contends that respondent judge was "hell-bent on saving the
private respondent from conviction and had pre-judged the case" as shown by the fact that (1) on
August 26, 1992, before private respondent’s arraignment, she called the parties and their counsels
to her chambers and urged them to settle the case, and, when petitioner refused, she did not set the
case for hearing until after three weeks allegedly to provide a "cooling off" period; (2) that at the
initial trial on September 15 and 16, 1992, respondent judge again called on the parties to settle the
case. Petitioner alleges that, while respondent judge stated in her order of September 15, 1992
cancelling the hearing on that date that this was done to enable Atty. Maria Lelibet Sampaga to
study the case as she had been appointed as private respondent’s counsel only on that day, the
same was actually a pretext, the real reason being to give private respondent another opportunity to
persuade petitioner to settle the case. The records in fact show that Atty. Sampaga had been private
respondent’s counsel at the arraignment on August 26, 1992; (3) that respondent judge excluded the
testimonies of petitioner and his witness, Manuel Montoya, for failure of the prosecution to offer
formally the same when the transcript of stenographic notes shows this was not so and that, at any
rate, the defense waived the objection based on this ground by cross-examining petitioner and
Montoya; and (4) that respondent judge failed to find private respondent guilty despite the
testimonies of three eyewitnesses (barangay tanods Montoya, del Rosario, and Samson). Petitioner
therefore prays that a mistrial be declared and that the case be ordered retried before another judge.
On the other hand, private respondent Ruel Garcia contends that, if at the outset, petitioner doubted
respondent judge’s impartiality, he should have sought her inhibition right then and there; that it was
not true respondent judge called the parties to her chambers on August 26, 1992 as only the
arraignment took place on that day; that at said arraignment, his counsel, Atty. Emilio Bermas, was
absent for which reason respondent judge designated Atty. Maria Lelibet S. Sampaga to assist him;
that the schedule of the trial (September 15, 16, and 21, 1992) was not fixed by respondent judge
but by the clerk in charge of the matter, taking into account the schedule of the other cases assigned
to the court; that it was only on the first day of trial on September 15, 1992 that respondent judge
first talked to the parties, and, upon learning that both were public officers, thought it proper to ask
them if they were not willing to settle their dispute, and seeing the parties and their counsels to be
receptive, she invited them to her chambers; that as petitioner later appeared to have second
thoughts and, on the other hand, as Atty. Sampaga needed time to prepare for trial, respondent
judge postponed the trial to the next day, September 16, 1992; that on September 16, 1992,
respondent judge again called the parties to her chambers to see if they had come to any
agreement, but as she was told by petitioner that "for him to withdraw his complaint against the
private respondent, he must have to transfer his residence first," thus implying that he wished the
case against private respondent to continue, respondent judge proceeded with the trial that morning.
Private respondent contends that the instant petition does not have the consent and conformity of
the public prosecutor but was instead filed by the private prosecutor who does not have the requisite
legal personality to question the decision acquitting him.
Required to comment, the Solicitor General argues that this petition should be dismissed:
A perusal of the judgment of the trial court showed that the parties were heard conformably to the
norms of due process, evidence was presented by both parties and duly considered, their arguments
were studied, analyzed, and assessed, and judgment was rendered in which findings of facts and
conclusions of law were set forth. These conclusions of fact or law cannot in any sense be
characterized as outrageously wrong or manifestly mistaken or whimsically or capriciously arrived at.
The worst that may perhaps be said of them is that they are fairly debatable and may even be
possibly erroneous. But they cannot be declared to have been made with grave abuse of discretion
(Bustamante vs. NLRC, 195 SCRA 1991). Clearly, there was no mistrial in this case which would
warrant the nullity of the assailed judgment. 1
The preliminary issue in this case is whether the petition should be dismissed outright because it
was filed without the intervention of the OSG as counsel for the prosecution.
This question is not a novel one. In the case of People v. Santiago, this Court held:
2
The question as to whether or not U.P., as the private offended party, can file this special civil action
for certiorari questioning the validity of said decision of the trial court should be answered in the
affirmative.
It is well-settled that in criminal cases where the offended party is the State, the interest of the
private complainant or the private offended party is limited to the civil liability. Thus, in the
prosecution of the offense, the complainant’s role is limited to that of a witness for the prosecution. If
a criminal case is dismissed by the trial court or if there is an acquittal, an appeal therefrom on the
criminal aspect may be undertaken only by the State through the Solicitor General. Only the Solicitor
General may represent the People of the Philippines on appeal. The private offended party or
complainant may not take such appeal. However, the said offended party or complainant may
appeal the civil aspect despite the acquittal of the accused.
In a special civil action for certiorari filed under Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court wherein it is
alleged that the trial court committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction or
on other jurisdictional grounds, the rules state that the petition may be filed by the person aggrieved.
In such case, the aggrieved parties are the State and the private offended party or complainant. The
complainant has an interest in the civil aspect of the case so he may file such special civil action
questioning the decision or action of the respondent court on jurisdictional grounds. In so doing,
complainant should not bring the action in the name of the People of the Philippines. The action may
be prosecuted in name of said complainant. 3
The above ruling has been reiterated in De la Rosa v. Court of Appeals and Perez v. Hagonoy Rural
4
Bank, Inc., in which the legal personality of private complainant to file a special civil action
5
of certiorari questioning the dismissal by the trial court of a criminal case has been upheld subject to
the limitation that the accused’s right to double jeopardy is not violated. As explained by the Court
6
in People v. Court of Appeals: 7

7
A judgment rendered with grave abuse of discretion or without due process is void, does not exist in
legal contemplation, and, thus, cannot be the source of an acquittal. However, where the petition
demonstrates mere errors in judgment not amounting to grave abuse of discretion or deprivation of
due process, the writ of certiorari cannot issue. A review of the alleged errors of judgment cannot be
made without trampling upon the right of the accused against double jeopardy. 8
In short, petitioner must establish that the judgment of acquittal resulted from a mistrial so as not to
place private respondent, as accused, in double jeopardy.
In only one case has the Court categorically declared a mistrial, and that is the case of Galman v.
Sandiganbayan. Petitioner would have the Court draw parallelisms between this case
9
and Galman where the Court nullified the judgment of acquittal of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal
Case Nos. 10010 and 10011 entitled "People of the Philippines v. General Luther Custodio, et al."
This cases is, however, a far cry from Galman. There, it was shown that evidence was suppressed
in order to justify the acquittal of the accused. This Court held that "the secret Malacañang
conference at which the authoritarian President called together the Presiding Justice of the
Sandiganbayan [Manuel Pamaran] and Tanodbayan [Bernardo] Fernandez and the entire
prosecution panel headed by Deputy Tanodbayan [Manuel] Herrera and told them how to handle
and rig (moro-moro) the trial and the close monitoring of the entire proceedings to assure the pre-
determined ignominious final outcome are without parallel and precedent in our annals and
jurisprudence." 10
In contrast, petitioner does not allege any such irregularity in the trial of private respondent. He
simply claims that respondent judge’s bias and partiality denied the prosecution a fair and impartial
trial. Why respondent judge was biased for the defense petitioner does not say. It is noteworthy that
petitioner does not even dispute private respondent’s allegation that respondent judge was not
personally acquainted with him until she heard the criminal case against him.
It is pertinent at this point to cite certain principles laid down by the Court regarding the
disqualification of a judge for lack of the objectivity that due process requires. It is settled that mere
suspicion that a judge is partial to one of the parties is not enough; there should be evidence to
prove the charge. Bias and prejudice cannot be presumed, especially weighed against a judge’s
11
sacred allegation under oath of office to administer justice without respect to any person and do
equal right to the poor and the rich. There must be a showing of bias and prejudice stemming from
12
an extrajudicial source resulting in an opinion in the merits on some basis other than what the judge
learned from his participation in the case. 13
The arguments which petitioner advances by way of proof of respondent’s judge’s alleged bias are
not persuasive.
Respondent judge’s efforts to have the parties arrive at an amicable settlement is not evidence of
partiality for private respondent. She could have been motivated by factors other than a desire to
clear private respondent of criminal liability, i.e., the clearing of her court docket or, as pointed out by
the OSG in its comment, in setting a good example considering that petitioner and private
14
respondent were neighbors occupying public offices charged with the maintenance of peace and
order in the community.
As for the allegation that the trial was not held until after three weeks to give private respondent
more time to persuade petitioner to amicably settle the case, it has been shown that it was not
respondent judge but court personnel in charge of scheduling cases who assigned the dates of trial
taking into account the court calendar. The cancellation of the September 15, 1992 hearing, on the
other hand, was made to give private respondent’s counsel, Atty. Maria Lelibet Sampaga, time to
study the case and prepare for trial. Although Atty. Sampaga had once appeared in behalf of private
respondent, it was for the purpose of assisting the latter at the arraignment because the regular
counsel was absent. As new counsel, Atty. Sampaga needed to study the case. A postponement to
the next day, September 16, 1992, was not an unreasonable request. Indeed, this did not involve
resetting the case since September 16, 1992 had been originally designated as one of the initial trial
dates.
Nor is there any showing that respondent judge decided the criminal case on grounds other than its
merits. A reading of her decision acquitting private respondent shows that the same was made on
the basis of her evaluation of the evidence of the prosecution and of the defense. Because of the
conflicting versions of the parties as to what really happened, her decision was necessarily based on
her appreciation of the credibility of the witnesses for the prosecution and the defense.
True, petitioner is correct in his argument that respondent judge mistakenly excluded from the
evidence his testimony as well as that of prosecution witness Manuel Montoya on the ground that
the same had not been formally offered at the time they were called to the witness stand. For the
fact was that petitioner and Montoya had been cross-examined at length by the defense and,
therefore, the latter had waived objection to the failure of the prosecution to make an offer of the
evidence. It has been held in Go v. Court of Appeals, however, that divergence of opinion between
15 16
the trial judge and a party’s counsel as to the admissibility of evidence is not proof of bias or
partiality. Besides, though respondent judge stated in her decision that the testimonies of petitioner
and Montoya "cannot be considered by this Court as constituting part of the evidence for the
prosecution," her decision shows that she actually considered the testimonies in piecing together the
prosecution’s version of the events and in evaluating the evidence in the case. The testimonies of
petitioner and Montoya were after all referred to by the other witnesses for the prosecution, namely,
del Rosario and Samson. Thus respondent judge’s decision reads in pertinent part:
The allegation of the private complainant that he neither resisted the punches of the accused nor
said anything to the latter is quite hard to believe. No rational man would allow another to hurt him
without offering any form of resistance, for he is instinctively concerned [with] his self-preservation. It
is more in consonance with human nature that when one is hurt, especially if the feeling of
innocence is within him, to immediately retaliate to an unjust act.
Another equally unbelievable allegation is that the four barangay tanods just stood and watched their
barangay captain while he was being mauled. There were four of them inside the hall yet no one
even dared to defend herein private complainant or stop herein accused. If they could not do it for
their barangay captain and inside their hall, how can they be expected to protect the residents of
their barangay outside their hall?
Furthermore, if herein private complainant was indeed mauled, he should have suffered a lot more
serious injuries than he alleged[ly] incurred. Considering their allegation that the barangay tanods
were guarded at the point of a gun by Pedro Garcia, herein accused thus had all the time and
opportunity to inflict on the private complainant as many serious injuries as he could. But the results
of the medical examination belie this point.
Well-settled is the rule that the prosecution must rely on the strength of its own evidence and not on
the weakness of the defense (People vs. Dennis Mendoza, 203 SCRA 148, G.R. No. 85176,
October 21, 1991). After a thorough examination of the pieces of evidence presented by the
prosecution, the latter failed to fulfill the test of moral certainty and establish such degree of proof
necessary to support conviction. "If the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of one or
more explanations, one of which is consistent with innocence and the other consistent with his guilt,
then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to support a
conviction. The constitutional presumption of innocence stands until overthrown by strong and
convincing evidence, one of which will prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt" (People vs. Gina
Sahagun, 182 SCRA 91, G.R. No. 62024, February 12, 1990).
The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses are merely unfounded accusations insufficient to gain
conviction. In the case of People vs. Guinto, 184 SCRA 287, G.R. 88400, April 6, 1990, the Supreme
Court held: "Accusation is not synonymous with guilt. The accused is protected by the constitutional
presumption of innocence which the prosecution must overcome with contrary proof beyond
reasonable doubt. Even if the defense is weak, the case against the accused must fail if the
prosecution is even weaker. . . . If the prosecution has not sufficiently established the guilt of the
accused, he has a right to be acquitted and released even if he presents naught a shred of
evidence." 17
That respondent judge believed the evidence of the defense more than that of the prosecution does
not indicate that she was biased. She must have simply found the defense witnesses to be more
credible.
18
Indeed, no grave abuse of discretion may be attributed to a court simply because of its alleged
misappreciation of facts and evidence. A writ of certiorari cannot be used to correct a lower tribunal’s
evaluation of the evidence and factual findings. Thus, in People v. Court of Appeals, the Court
19
dismissed a petition for certiorari filed by the prosecution from a decision of the Court of Appeals
reversing that of the trial court and acquitting the accused of homicide and serious physical injuries
on the ground that he acted in self-defense. The Court held:
To show grave abuse of discretion, herein petitioner contends that Respondent Court of Appeals
committed manifest bias and partiality in rendering the assailed Decision. It claims that Respondent
Court ignored and discarded "uncontroverted physical evidence" which the trial judge had relied
upon. Furthermore, it allegedly erred in finding that he had "base[d] his decision on the testimony of
witnesses whose demeanor he did not personally witness." In addition, it supposedly harped on
insignificant inconsistencies in the testimonies of some prosecution witnesses, while unquestioningly
accepting the private respondent’s claim of self-defense.
Finally, the solicitor general maintains that the assailed Decision (1) failed to discuss the effect of
Maquiling’s escape from confinement during the pendency of the case; (2) shifted the burden of
proof on the prosecution to prove Maquiling’s guilt, although he admitted killing the victim in self-
defense; (3) ignored the physical evidence ¾ particularly the downward trajectory of the bullets that
had hit the two victims, thereby showing that private respondent was still standing when he shot
them; and the shotgun wound sustained by private respondent, which disabled him and rendered
him incapable of shooting the victims.
It is quite obvious from the foregoing allegations that petitioner imputed grave abuse of discretion to
Respondent Court because of the latter’s supposed misappreciation and wrongful assessment
of factual evidence. However, as earlier stressed, the present recourse is a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65. It is a fundamental aphorism in law that a review of facts and evidence is
not the province of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari; which is extra ordinem ¾ beyond the ambit
of appeal. Stated elsewise, factual matters cannot normally be inquired into by the Supreme Court in
a certiorari proceeding. This Court cannot be tasked to go over the proofs presented by the parties
and analyze, assess and weigh them again, in order to ascertain if the trial and the appellate courts
were correct in according superior credit to this or that piece of evidence of one party or the other.
The mere fact that a court erroneously decides a case does not necessarily deprive it of
jurisdiction. Thus, assuming arguendo that a court commits a mistake in its judgment, the error does
1âwphi1
not vitiate the decision, considering that it has jurisdiction over the case.
An examination of the 65-page Decision rendered by the Court of Appeals shows no patent and
gross error amounting to grave abuse of discretion. Neither does it show an arbitrary or despotic
exercise of power arising from passion or hostility. . . .
20
Finally, petitioner’s claim that respondent judge was biased is belied by his failure to move for
respondent judge’s inhibition. Petitioner’s claim that he did not do so because of his "belief and
desire for said respondent judge to finally return to her normal sense of fairness" is a feeble excuse.
His failure to file such motion stands as one more stark difference between this case
and Galman since the private prosecutors in the latter case lost no time in seeking the
disqualification of the members of the Sandiganbayan on grounds of manifest bias and partiality for
the defense. 21
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Quisumbing, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Footnotes
OSG’s Comment, pp. 3-4; Rollo, pp. 112-113.

1
174 SCRA 143 (1989).

2
Id., pp. 152-153.

3
253 SCRA 499 (1996).

4
G.R. No. 126210, Mar. 9, 2000.

5
Const., Art. III, §21 provides:

6
"No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is
punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a
bar to another prosecution for the same act."
308 SCRA 687 (1999).

7
Id., p. 690.
8
144 SCRA 43 (1986).

9
10
Id, pp. 82-83.
11
Geneblazo v. Court of Appeals, 174 SCRA 124, 134 (1989).
12
Pimentel v. Salanga, 21 SCRA 161, 167 (1967).
13
Webb v. People, 276 SCRA 243, 253 (1997).
14
OSG’s Comment, p. 3; Rollo, p. 112.
15
People v. Java, 227 SCRA 669, 680 (1992).
16
221 SCRA 397, 413 (1993).
17
Petition, Annex A, pp. 10-11; Rollo, pp. 22-23.
18
See People v. Tabarno, 242 SCRA 456, 460 (1995).
19
308 SCRA 687 (1999).
20
Id., pp. 700-701.
The Court in fact viewed in a negative light the Sandiganbayan’s rush to judgment
21
notwithstanding the pendency of the motion for inhibition.

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G.R. No. 118127 April 12, 2005

(the Ordinance) of the City of Manila. 4

1993, the said Ordinance is entitled–

AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE ESTABLISHMENT OR OPERATION OF

The Ordinance is reproduced in full, hereunder:

SECTION 1. Any provision of existing laws and ordinances to the contrary

10. Dance Halls

SEC. 3. Owners and/or operator of establishments engaged in, or devoted to, the

1. Curio or antique shop

3. Handicrafts display centers

5. Records and music shops

9. Music lounge and sing-along restaurants, with well-defined activities for

SEC. 5. This ordinance shall take effect upon approval.

(vii) Regulate the establishment, operation, and maintenance of any entertainment or

Manila (Revised Charter of Manila) which reads, thus:

THE MUNICIPAL BOARD

In the Petition and in its Memorandum, petitioners in essence repeat the assertions they made

In its Memorandum dated 27 May 1996, private respondent maintains that the Ordinance is ultra

The Ordinance contravenes

of delegated power as it is unconstitutional and repugnant to general laws.

The relevant constitutional provisions are the following:

Requisites for the valid exercise

are other means to reasonably accomplish the desired end.

Means employed are

The Ordinance disallows the operation of sauna parlors, massage parlors, karaoke bars,

In addition, the Ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive as it substantially divests the respondent

B. The Ordinance violates Equal

valid, it must conform to the following requirements:

1) It must be based on substantial distinctions.

2) It must be germane to the purposes of the law.

3) It must not be limited to existing conditions only.

4) It must apply equally to all members of the class. 104

C. The Ordinance is repugnant

(iv) Regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance of cafes, restaurants,

(vii) Regulate the establishment, operation, and maintenance of any entertainment or

vesting upon City Councils prohibitory powers.

powers, therefore, should not be confused, commingled or consolidated as to create a

The Congress unequivocably specified the establishments and forms of amusement or

person, thing, or consequence is tantamount to an express exclusion of all others. Expressio unius

succinctly illustrated in Solicitor General v. Metropolitan Manila Authority:

Dated 11 January 1995; Rollo, pp. 6-73 with annexes.

The lower court declared the Ordinance to be null and void.

Id. at. 75; It now calls itself Hotel Victoria.

The principal authors of the Ordinance are: Hons. Bienvenido M. Abante, Jr.; Humberto B.

(iv) Regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance of cafes, restaurants,

Area as Commercial Zones with Certain Restrictions. It reads in full:

WHEREAS, the government is committed to the promotion and development of tourism

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue

41 Phil. 103 (1920); see also Samson v. Mayor of Bacolod City, G.R. No. L-28745, 23

October 1974, 60 SCRA 267.

849, 860 (1967).

See U.S. v. Toribio, 15 Phil. 85 (1910); Fabie v. City of Manila, 21 Phil. 486 (1912);

Case v. Board of Health, 24 Phil. 256 (1913).

Publications, Don Bosco Compound, Makati.

Concerned Employee v. Glenda Espiritu Mayor, A.M. No. P-02-1564, 23 November

2004, J. Tinga, ponente.

Rev. 219, 229 (1965).

People v. Fajardo, supra note 76 at 443, 448 citing Tews v. Woolhiser (1933) 352 I11. 212,

185 N.E. 827.

Francisco, Vicente J., Statutory Construction, Second Edition 172 (1959); See Pepsi-Cola

(1940); See Mecano v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 103982, 11 December 1992, 216

SCRA 595, 601.

Francisco, supra note 113 at 178-179; See King, et al. v. Hernaez, etc., et al., 114 Phil.