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Review: What is Happening in Classical Indology?

--A Review Article


Reviewed Work(s): Vedic Ritual: The Non-solemn Rites. by Jan Gonda: Vedic Mythology,
Vol. 1. by Alfred Hillebrandt and S. Rajeswara Sarma:
Consciounes sin Advaita Vedānta.
by William M. Indich:
Poetry and Speculation of the Ṛg Veda.
by Willard Johnson:
Vedisch ukṣ und Ukṣ/vakṣ: Wortgeschichtliche und Exegetische Untersuchungen.
by Catharina Kiehnle:
Classical Sāṃkhya: An Interpretation of Its History and Meaning.
by Gerald J. Larson: Karma and Rebirth in Clasical Indian Traditions. by Wendy
Doniger O'Flaherty: Women, Androgynes, and Ohter Mythical Beasts. by Wendy
Doniger O'Flaherty:
Māyā in Śaṅkara: Measruing the Immeasurable.
by L. Thomas O'Neil: Indian and Indology: Selected Articles by W. Norman Brown. by
Rosane Rocher:
Poésie Sanskrite Conservée dans les Anthologies et les Inscriptions. Vol. 1. De Aṃśudhara
à Ghoraka.
by Ludwik Sternbach
Review by: Frits Staal
Source: The Journal of Asian Studies , Feb., 1982, Vol. 41, No. 2 (Feb., 1982), pp. 269-291
Published by: Association for Asian Studies

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VOL. XLI, No. 2 JOURNAL OF ASIAN STUDIES FEBRUARY 1982

What is Happening in Classical Indology?


A Review Article

FRITS STAAL

Hotons-nous de revenir a' la'ntiquite, qui seule


peut livrer une probl6matique utile.
Louis Renou

M ,{ any Sanskritists would agree that the late Louis Renou was the leading Sanskrit
scholar of the mid-twentieth century. His work covered virtually the entire
gamut of Sanskrit and Indological studies, excluding only Buddhism. He contributed
translations, surveys, manuals, and basic textbooks, but also wrote extensively on the
two subjects that are generally regarded as the most significant manifestations of the
genius of ancient India: Panini and the Veda. Among the series of works that Renou
established as ready receptacles for his prodigious output, the seventeen volumes of
the Etudes v6diques et pdnineennes hold pride of place. In the sixth volume, Renou
touches on some modern Indian attitudes with regard to the Veda. He refers to the
humanistic synthesis of Rabindranath Tagore and the spiritual Vedanta of Radhakrishnan,
both equally far removed from those Vedic sources they claim to represent and

Frits Staal is Professor of Philosophy and of ed. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, and Santa Barbara:
South Asian Languages at the University of Cali- Ross/Erikson, 1979. xvii, 315 pp. Appendixes
fornia, Berkeley. He is grateful to Padmanabh A-D, Bibliography, Index, Corrections. Rs 60;
Jaini, Jeff Masson, Terri Masson, Michel Strickrnann,$8.95.
and Bruce Vermazen for comments on an earlier Karma and Rebirth in Classical Indian Tradi-
draft of this article. tions. Edited by Wendy Doniger O'Flaherty. Berke-
ley: University of California Press, 1980. xxv, 342
Vedic Ritual: The Non-solemn Rites. By Jan Gonda.
Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1980. xiv, 516 pp. General pp. Bibliography, Index, Glossary. N.p.
Index, Sanskrit Index. f 148. Women, Androgynes, and Other Mythical Beasts.
Vedic Mythology, Vol. 1. By Alfred Hillebrandt, By Wendy Doniger O'Flaherty. Chicago: Univer-
translated by S. Rajeswara Sarma. Delhi: Motilal sity of Chicago Press, 1980. xviii, 382 pp. Bibli-
Banarsidass, 1980. xv, 476 pp. Appendixes I-II, ography, Index, Glossary. N.p.
Notes. $24. Mdyd in 9a;kara: Measuring the Immeasur-
Consciousness in Advaita Vedenta. By William able. By L. Thomas O'Neil. Columbia, Mo.: South
M. Indich. Columbia, Mo.: South Asia Books Asia Books. xi, 222 pp. Appendixes A-B, Bibliog-
1980. xi, 144 pp. Bibliography, Index. $14. raphy, Index. $16.
Poftry and Speculation of the Rg Veda. By Wil-India and Indology: Selected Articles by W. Nor-
lard Johnson. Berkeley: Univeisity of California man Brown. Edited by Rosane Rocher. Delhi:
Press, 1980. xxviii, 192 pp. Notes, Bibliography, Motilal Banarsidass, 1978. xxxvii, 302 pp. Plates
Index. $18.50. I-LIV, Foreword, Prefaces, Editor's Introduction
Vedisch uks und ukslvaks: Wortgeschichtliche with
und Biographical Sketch and Bibliography of W.
exegetische Untersuchungen. by Catharina Kiehnle. Norman Brown's Writings. $43.50.
Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1979. v, 241 Poesie sanskrite conservee dans les anthologies et les
pp. 3 Appendixes, Bibliography, Index of Text inscriptions. Vol. 1. De Amfudhara a Ghoraka. By
Places. DM 27. Ludwik Stembach. Paris: College de France, Institut
Classical Sdmkhya: An Interpretation of Itsde civilisation indienne. lxxiii, 265 pp. N.p.
His-
tory and Meaning. By Gerald J. Larson. 2nd rev.

269

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270 FRITS STAAL

emulate. He mentions Coomaraswamy's philosophia perennis extracted from often


uncritical comparisons and not always exempt from pretense. He prefers to Aurobindo's
mystical and anachronistic recreations of the "profound" thought of the Rgveda,
Nehru's much more open-minded attitude toward the Vedas as "a wonderful flowering
of a richly endowed imagination, full of human lessons." And then, checking
himself, he starts a new paragraph with an expression of the sentiment that is our
motto: "Let us hasten back to antiquity, which alone can produce a fruitful discus-
sion" (Renou 1960, vol. 6: 5-6).
Although not all Sanskritists and classical Indologists would agree with this
opinion, it is good to keep it in mind at the outset of this survey, which intends to
provide the readership of the Journal of Asian Studies with a glimpse of classical
Indology as reflected in some recent publications. Before we begin, we shall ask
ourselves whether or not the domains of the Journal and classical Indology already
overlap. There are several methods by which we might try to arrive at an answer to
this question. First, we could formulate our subjective impressions. This I shall
resist. Second, we might look for explicit statements, assuming for the sake of
discussion that they correspond to reality. Since theJAS itself gives no assistance, one
might quote the "User Guide" from the Bibliography of Asian Studies (1974), which
"intends to provide comprehensive but not exhaustive coverage of Western language
scholarly monographs and articles concerned with East, South, and Southeast Asia.
The heaviest emphases are placed on history, the humanities, and the social sciences."
That "East" (continuing the former "Far East") still prevails over "South" has to be
deduced from more subtle indications (e.g., the "Area Periodicals Reviewed" include
the Journal of Chinese Philosophy but not the Journal of Indian Philosophy, in many
respects its twin).
Since classical Indology, the second term of our comparison, is not an organization
and has no appointed spokesmen, let me quote a somewhat representative statement
from one of the books under review: "As mere assertion unconfirmed by textual
evidence is extremely unsatisfactory I have made it a rule to support every statement
by at least one text-place" (Gonda 1980: vii). And if this credo of philology were not
sufficient to characterize this perspective, the author adds a few pages later: "It does
not seem needless to say that all data must be studied critically" (3, n. 13). What,
then, would be the area of overlap between classical Indology and the JAS? One
might say: textual evidence-mostly from Sanskrit-that would throw light on
history, the humanities, and the social sciences, primarily with respect to South,
East, and Southeast Asia. If this conclusion is correct, the overlap is indeed of vast
extent.
A third method for determining the relationship between the domains of classical
Indology and theJAS is to study what books pertaining to the former are submitted
for review to the latter. The books here listed constitute a sample. However, not only
is this sample haphazard; the publishers themselves admit that they are at sea. Brill,
for example, puts a slip of paper in review copies: "If you think this work less sultable
for review in your periodical, a prompt return of same will oblige." Who will oblige
and return the same? I shall not and will instead draw the only conclusion that
appears to be fruitful: I shall use these blooks to the extent that I can use them to
provide the glimpse I have undertaken to supply to the readership of theJAS. I shall
accordingly concentrate 6n what pertains to history, the humanities, and the social
sciences but deemphasize language and literature.
Two books on the list do not directly contribute to a glimpse of this type, and I

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WHAT IS HAPPENING IN CLASSICAL INDOLOGY? 271

shall therefore dispose of them first. The first is Catharina Kiehnle's careful philologi-
cal study of the Vedic verbal root ukslvaks, enriched by comparison with related forms
in Old Iranian and in later Sanskrit. The author concludes that we have here a case of
homonymy, which gradually appears and disappears. At first, the root meant "grow"
(cf. English wax), a meaning that became increasingly rare. Soon, the second
meaning, "scatter, sprinkle," appeared, and became increasingly common. Because
the dictionaries generally postulate two different roots-uks "wax" and vaks "scatt
er"- this conclusion is new and of value. The supporting material is rich and varied,
and, although it justifies the author's conclusion, it does not explain this particular
semantic development.
Ludwik Sternbach, who died on March 25, 1981, was the undisputed master of a
special subbranch of Sanskrit studies: the inventory of Sanskrit poems and poetic
fragments, sayings, epigrams, and aphorisms, of which the original context is
generally lost but which are quoted in a variety of later sources. The book under
review is one of his many contributions to this area of research. It provides an
alphabetical list of poets, known and unknown, together with some of their incipits,
as preserved in later anthologies and inscriptions. The inclusion of inscriptions is
important, because they have rarely been used for such a purpose, often quote earlier
authors than do the anthologies, and are generally dated. Because this volume is the
first of a series, covering authors whose names begin with the vowels and first four
consonants of the Sanskrit alphabet, one would expect that another three to four
volumes are needed to complete the entire project. As it is likely that Sternbach left
the materials for these volumes behind, it is to be hoped that they will soon be
published.
The remaining books fall into two clearly demarcated groups: (1) Philosophy, and
(2) Veda. To a third, which is less clearly demarcated, I shall refer as (3) General.
Taken by themselves, these books would not enable anyone to reconstruct an
adequate picture of what is happening in classical Indology. They are too motley an
accumulation. I shall, therefore, refer to other publications (listed in full in the list of
references) that I regard as significant and often more significant than the publications
that are reviewed here.

Indian Philosophy

The limitations of the present selection are especially apparent in the case of
philosophy. The books by Indich and O'Neil contain much that is trite, not a little
that is wrong, and very little that is new. Devoid of an adequate philological
foundation, they also lack philosophical sophistication. Such books do a disservice to
Advaita Vedanta, which has been studied fruitfully in recent years from a philologi-
cal as well as from a philosophical point of view. Paul Hacker (1950) in Germany and
-Sengaku Mayeda (1973, 1979) in Japan, for example, have thrown much new light
on Saiikara and his pupils, and have secured a more reliable foundation for these
studies in general by establishing criteria for distinguishing genuine works by
Sankara from spurious works attributed to him. First-rate philosophic contributions
in the realm of Advaita are not confined to the Old World, as Phyllis Granoffs
magisterial work (1978) on the Vedanta of Sri Harsa demonstrates.
I would guess that there exist about a hundred works entitled "Maya in
San'kara," "Consciousness in Advaita Vedanta," or something extremely similar.
These would include a sizeable number of Ph.D. dissertations submitted to depart-

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272 FRITS STAAL

ments of Philosoph
One reason, no doubt, is Saiikara's fame as a philosopher, which has greatly increased
during the past hundred years because of Neo-Vedanta, the Hindu Renaissance, and
also because Saiikara's chief work, the commentary on the Vedentasgtra, has been
clearly and reliably translated into English by George Thibaut. This translation
appeared first in 1890 in the Sacred Books of the East and has been reprinted regularly.
Moreover, virtually all other existing translations of this commentary into English
(and there are several) are heavily indebted to it. The secondary literature is also large,
and adding these third- and fourth-generation publications, we are no longer justified
in thinking of this phenomenon in terms of a snowball. We are definitely facing an
avalanche.
Why are most of these books so bad? Here Sanskritists are apt to proffer an
answer: because their authors do not know Sanskrit. This is partly untrue (because
some do know some); it would also throw a peculiar and unflattering light on
Sanskritists themselves. For what is the latter's task if not that of making Sanskrit
works accessible to non-Sanskritists so that they too can study and ponder them? If
these books are so bad because their authors are ignorant of Sanskrit, Sanskritists have
obviously failed to do part of their job.
I suspect that the real reason for this ubiquitous mediocrity lies elsewhere. Most
of these authors do not merely ignore Sanskrit and lack philosophic sophistication;
what they lack primarily is knowledge of the Indian tradition. (Indian authors need
not be excluded, because the tradition is not innate, and their experience-like that
of other men and women-need not go beyond a life span.) In order to illustrate e
contrario what these contributions lack, I can do no better than quote Louis Renou,
who himself translated the introductory portions of Saiikara's commentary on the
Vedentasitra into French. Renou did, of course, know Sanskrit well, and was fully
at home in the Indian tradition. However, he was no philosopher and did not have
the advantage of Thibaut who had studied Advaita with Indian pandits. Yet Renou
did understand Saiikara, assess him adequately, and put him in proper perspective.
This constitutes the value of his translation and accompanying notes, and is apparent
from the preface:

Sankara est tout penetre de Mimams-, il est fort a son fait dans les darsana en
general, dans la grammaire, dans d'autres branches, laiques ou religieuses, ortho-
doxes ou 'heretiques', du savoir indien . . . l'oeuvre de SaAkara n'est autre, pour
une large part, qu'une exegZese serr&e des Upanisad vediques: ~'a d'u etre sans
doute l'objet premier du Vedantadarsana de fournir une hermeneutique des
Brahmana que le Mimamsadarsana s'etait assigne pour but, et en puisant
d'abord dans la tradition du Samaveda. (Renou 1951: iii)

Renou does not mention these various backgrounds because he wants to flaunt his
erudition. He merely situates Saiikara in the proper context. In so doing he provides
us with features of his own perspective and approach that go far to explain the
excellence of his work. The term "hermeneutique," incidentally, has nothing to do
with contemporary fads of that name. It means, as Renou has explained elsewhere
(1960, vol. 6:54), pdribhdsika and thus refers to a teaching or tradition that uses the
concept of paribhdsd (or "metarule") first developed by the Indian ritualists and
grammarians around the sixth century B.C. A paribhhds is, as Patanijali reminds us,
"like a lamp, illuminating an entire science, though it occurs only in one place"
(paribh&sa punar ekadefasthc sati sarvam iistram abhhyvalayati pradipavat: Mahhbhdsya
ad Panini 2.1.1).

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WHAT IS HAPPENING IN CLASSICAL INDOLOGY? 273

Our conclusion should not surprise anyone who knows how to study a philosopher
such as Spinoza. It is desirable, in such a case, to know Latin and perhaps Hebrew.
However, it may be possible to dispense with a sound knowledge of these languages
because there are so many good translations and secondary works dealing with the
matter. But one is bound to misinterpret Spinoza if one is not familiar with the earlier
history not only 6f Western philosophy, but of Judaism and Christianity, of mathe-
matics, and of numerous other intellectual traditions that made up the milieu to
which Spinoza belonged. Can one not study a philosopher, then, by merely concen-
trating on his arguments and his own explicit statements? This may be possible in the
case of a contemporary philosopher who belongs to one's own tradition. In general,
however, I contend that the answer to this question is "No."
Many of these strictures do not apply to Gerald J. Larson's work on the classical
Saimkhya. True, its references to the Vedic background and Buddhist context are
weak, but this hardly affects its basic exposition. The book gives a good if unexciting
account of the classical Saimkhya. Its dullness is due not so much to the author's
treatment as to the subject itself. The philosophy of the Sarmkhya is poor and
unsatisfactory. Its alleged empirical foundation has no relation to facts, and no
rational denizen of the twentieth century could take any of its tenets seriously. Yet
this philosophy was enormously influential in Hindu as well as Buddhist circles.
How could a system of such questionable merit have such a pervasive influence?
This problem has never been properly resolved, and Larson does not address it. Even
so, the basic reasons are not far to seek. The most characteristic and original
contributions of the Hindu Vedanta and of many of the philosophies of Buddhism lie
in the realm of metaphysics, far removed from ordinary matters, such as the internal
structure of the world or of man. Such a lofty position prevents contradictions with
ordinary experience from catching the eye and accounts for much of the success of
these philosophies. However, the proponents of these metaphysical constructions felt
the need of an empirical, or allegedly empirical, substructure. Unable to offer one
themselves, they adopted and adapted Sarmkhya notions that had long been popular
among nonphilosophers and other ordinary folk (as the Indian epic, e.g., attests).
Many of the Hindu and Buddhist philosophers were themselves sufficiently percep-
tive to recognize the poverty of these notions. Yet this did not deter them; it is
precisely what they were looking for. The Vedantin and Buddhist metaphysicians
accepted the Saimkhya notions only on that lower level which they were in any event
eager to reject, leaving their spirits free to contemplate the metaphysical peaks that
were their strongholds. Thus, they could use Samkhyan notions and at the same time
criticize the Sarmkhya philosophy. This state of affairs explains much of the historical
success of the Samkhya but does not add an iota to its philosophic merit.
Sarmkhya is the only darsana system that did not develop from an early sutra
text. Such a text, the Sdrkhyapravacanasatra, was finally produced around the
fifteenth century A.D. Some Sarmkhya works composed after that date evince greater
philosophic sophistication than any of the early texts. Unfortunately, Larson's book is
concerned almost exclusively with the "Classical Sarmkhya" of the Sdrkhyakdrikd,
the earliest text of the system. Its early date is indicated and its historical importance
illustrated by the fact of its translation into Chinese in the sixth century A.D. Larson
rightly characterizes it as more religious than philosophical, a characterization that is
consistent with its popular character.
The absence of an early Sdrnkhyasitra is another curious fact about the system
that Larson does not account for and that has never been properly explained. The only

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274 FRITS STAATL

explanation that has been suggested is that the Sutra was composed to bring the
Sarmkhya into line with the other darsana philosophies, and add to its prestige by
providing it with a pedigree. The question naturally arises why it took Sarmkhya
philosophers about a thousand years to make up for this deficiency in public relations.
A better explanation would be that a sitra is intrinsically a sophisticated, often
scientific treatise that demands a higher degree of technicality than is consistent with
the popular character of the classical Sarmkhya.
There is however a more precise solution to this problem, itself related to another
question: the meaning of the name Sarmkhya. The Sanskrit term sdmkhya generally
means "enumeration," but in the context of the Saimkhya system it has been argued
(e.g., by Edgerton) that it must refer to reason or rational inquiry. Larson accepts this
with reservations. Leaving aside the question as to why an irrational system should be
called rational (not difficult), there is good reason to assume that the name sdmkhya
must be taken in the precise meaning "enumeration," which expresses the chief
characteristic of the system. In Indian scientific theories, sdrnkhya is generally
contrasted with sutra. Ritualists and grammarians evolved the sitra style because a
sutra expresses a general rule or regularity that covers or governs an indefinitely large
number of cases (see Staal 1982b; in press). With regard to such cases, an enumera-
tion (sdrnkhya) would be impossible, because it would never reach the end. Such
enumerations were therefore rejected as evincing too narrow an empiricist attitude
(the Pratisakhya literature offers an illustration). The Sarmkhya engaged in pre-
cisely such an enumeration of principles. It did not feel the need of generalizations
and accordingly of sutras. These considerations explain at the same time why the
name was so apt and the Sutra so late. This explanation is further supported by the
fact that the term Sarmkhya has been used to refer to other "enumerative" systems.
According to Bronkhorst (1981:3 15 -16), for example, the expression sesvara sdrmkhya
("Sarmkhya with God") was later used to refer to the Paincaratra system.
Enumerations in general have no explanatory power or value and are devoid of
philosophic interest. Larson has unwittingly demonstrated this, but has failed to
show that such lack of interest itself can be of interest. Perhaps a third revised edition
of his book will incorporate discussions of some of these matters. The present, second
revised edition differs from the first mainly through material that has been added
(e.g., an examination of Saiikara criticism of the Samkhya, and a reconstruction of
what a Sarmkhya rejoinder could have been). A third revised edition would benefit
not only from additions but also from deletions. A better book would result if all
traces of its dissertation origins were erased or reduced: for example, the lengthy
"Critical Review of the History of Interpretations of the Sarmkhya," not to mention
such parts as the bibliography of "Reference Works" (which include students'
accessories such as Whitney's Roots, Verb-Forms, and Primary Derivatives of the Sanskrit
Language).
Enough has been said about the philosophical books included in our sample. If it
is true that the Vedanta, or at least the Advaita Vedanta, suffers from overexposure,
and the Sarmkhya is unworthy of our philosophic attention, should it be concluded
that Indian philosophy is perhaps best left alone? Far be it from me to suggest such a
thing. I have already referred to several thought-provoking studies dealing with the
Vedanta. And there are many other interesting darfana systems, such as ma-mpmsa,
Nyaya, and Yoga. The Mimamsa continues to be neglected, although it is quite
possibly the most original, and certainly the most Indian of all these systems. "Fur
eine exakte Forschung bleibt jedoch fast alles noch zu tun" (Frauwallner 1968:5). At

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WHAT IS HAPPENING IN CLASSICAL INDOLOGY? 275

least one American scholar is actively interested in the Mlmrmsa James A.


Santucci), and one of its important manuals was the subject of an excellent translation
by Edgerton, published many years ago (1929). Nyaya and Yoga are treated by more
scholars than it would be feasible to enumerate here. An idea of the vast extent of the
Nyaya-Vaisesika literature can be gained from Karl Potter's Encyclopedia (1977),
which treats these systems up to the time of Gaiigega. With Gaiigesa we enter the
period of navya-nydya or modern logic, which was the subject of a pioneering work
by the Harvard Sanskritist Ingalls (1951; see my review of 1960). Much excellent and
creative work on Buddhist and Hindu logic is done by former pupils of Ingalls,
including M. Hattori (1968), B. K. Matilal (1968, 197 1), and M. Tachikawa
(1980).
I have not so far referred to Buddhist and Jaina philosophies, which are unac-
countably absent from our sample. To start with the latter-we now have the
authoritative monograph by P. S. Jaini (1979), which deals with Jainism in all
important respects and includes discussions of those doctrinal developments that are
at the heart of Jaina philosophy. It is to be hoped that this book will lead to a revival
of the study of Jaina philosophy, which has been long neglected outside India.
Buddhist philosophy, in contrast, continues to receive much attention, especially in
Europe and Japan. It would be rash for me to mention any names, but if I had to
make one exception, it would be for that of D. Seyfort Ruegg (e.g., 1969).
Nagarjuna is the one Buddhist philosopher who seems to have achieved renown
in popular culture. His name occurs so often in faddish tracts that Sanikara seems in
danger of being eclipsed. The stage is set for another avalanche. Both thinkers have
similar metaphysical propensities and are equally easily misunderstood. Just as
Saiikara is "tout penetre de Mimimsa" (see above), Nagarjuna is pervaded by
the Abhidharma literature of earlier Buddhist philosophies. Popular interest is, of
course,-unaffected by the niceties of such distinctions. In fact, devotees of Buddhism
are often attracted by features that are equally Hindu, and vice versa. To adequately
understand Nagarjuna, additional barriers have to be crossed. To begin with, there
have been several Nagarjunas, and many works attributed to them. Some of these
works are no longer extant in Sanskrit, although Chinese translations exist. There is
no reliable translation of any of them into English. However, there is in progress a
magnificent translation from Chinese into French by Etienne Lamotte of the Maha-
prajframitAstra, "Le traite de la grande vertu de sagesse." The N5g5rjuna who
originally composed this work in Sanskrit lived somewhat later than the Nagarjuna
who authored the Milamadhyamakakdrikd. This latter text, although badly trans-
lated by Inada, has been the subject of an illuminating logical analysis by Tachikawa
in the Ingalls Festschrift (1980). The first four volumes of Lamotte's translation were
published in 1944, 1949, 1970, and 1976, and the fifth has just appeared (1981).
This annotated translation constitutes one of the great works of contemporary
scholarship.
With Buddhist philosophy and Buddhism in general, we enter an area that is not
confined to classical Indology, although there is a large overlap. In terms of language,
Buddhist studies involve not only Sanskrit and Prakrits, but Tibetan, Chinese, and
Japanese-to mention only these. The enormous translation activity from Sanskrit
especially into Chinese should not be thought of as merely affecting "religion" -a
concept that is anyway Western. These translations contributed to the large-scale
Indianization of Asia and are on a par with (although more extensive than) the
translations from Greek into Arabic, Syriac, Hebrew, etc., which brought civiliza-

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276 FRITS STAAL

tion to northern and western Europe. Much of this translation work was done in
Central Asia and was of high quality. Other translations were bad, even ludicrously
bad. Brough (1964) has extracted much entertainment from the work of Chinese
translators of Aryasara's Jdtakamdld who "to the bitter end . . did persevere in
the sad labour of forcing what little sense they could from the difficult Sanskrit" (p. 49).
The Indianization of Asia is wider and deeper than is generally acknowledged. It
can be profitably observed, for example, in Japan. Americans and Europeans who visit
Japan for the first time may be struck by what appears to them as Americanization
and Europeanization, respectively. Indologists, however, will not fail to observe that
Japan evinces numerous symptoms of past Indianization. These range from Zen
meditation to Shingon fire ceremonies and the so-called martial arts.
Another related area of classical Indology also goes beyond the geographical
boundaries of South Asia: Tantrism. This subject has long been ill-defined and
neglected but is now coming into its own. There are not only ramifications within
Hinduism and Buddhism, but also connections with other religious and cultural
phenomena in Central, East, and Southeast Asia. An idea of the riches of this field of
research can be gained from the volume on Hindu Tantrism from the Handbuch der
Orientalistik by S. Gupta, D. J. Hoens, and T. Goudriaan (1979), and especially from
the three volumes of Tantric and Taoist Studies in Honour of R. A. Stein, edited by
Michel Strickmann, Iof which the first volume has appeared (1981).

The Four Vedas

Tantra is sometimes referred to as "the fifth Veda" (as are music, dance, the
Mahabharata epic, and other manifestations of Indian civilization). It is however to
the first four Vedas-Rgveda, Atharvaveda, Yajurveda, and Samaveda-that the
present rubric refers. It is with the Veda, more than with the rarified ramifications o
Indian philosophy, that we come close to the core of classical Indology. Its study,
however, has long suffered from extraneous perspectives: the religious perspective,
which stresses the Hindu sequel, and the linguistic perspective, which stresses the
Indo-European background. Although the Vedas constitute the foundation of Hindu-
ism, their position is paradoxical. They are often invoked in Hinduism, but they are
no longer understood. There exists in fact a wide gap between the Rgveda and all
later Indian cultures.
From the linguistic point of view, the study of the Veda has been in need of as
many languages as the study of Buddhism; only, in the case of the Veda, these are the
related languages of the Indo-European family and those of its Indo-Iranian subfamily.
The latter include Old Iranian (Avestan and Old Persian) and Middle Iranian (e.g.,
Khotanese and Sogdian). Because of this perspective, Vedic studies are sometimes
colored by overemphasis on Indo-European philology. Between the Vedas and Bud-
dhism, there are some linguistic affinities and many geographical connections. Both
spilt across the mountain ranges of the western Himalayas, but in opposite directions.
Both have features in common, which are also shared with Tantrism and Shamanism.
However, all these labels are to some extent misleading. The underlying reality is
better described as a continuous exchange of people, goods, and ideas across the
mountain ranges between India and Central Asia.
Of the three books in our Vedic sample, one appears solid but not so new, one
new but not so solid, and one solid as well as new. Appearances deceive to some
extent, however, and these impressions stand in need of qualification. Alfred Hillebrandt's

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WHAT IS HAPPENING IN CLASSICAL INDOLOGY? 277

Vedic Mythology is a classic. The first German edition appeared almost a century ago,
and its first volume appears now in English translation. It is rich in information, not
only on mythology but also on ritual, with which the author was equally familiar.
Unlike later authors, Hillebrandt keeps these two domains distinct, which is one of
the reasons why this book has kept much of its original worth. Later investigations
have suffered from the official doctrine of scholars of religion and anthropologists that
myth and ritual are closely related-in fact, reflect each other. In Vedic, however,
the most important mythic episodes have no ritual equivalences, and vice versa.
Hillebrandt knew this and reported the facts without prejudice.
The dustjacket of this translation alerts us to the fact that Hillebrandt followed
"the method of philological exegesis," and shunned "unsubstantial theories." Unfor-
tunately, this is not entirely true, because more than half of the book is devoted to a
demonstration that Soma, throughout the Rgveda, denoted the moon. Although this
meaning can be demonstrated in some of the later hymns, the thesis is untenable in
its generality and has been universally rejected. Fortunately, although Hillebrandt's
theory lacks substance, the evidence marshalled in the course of its exposition is
marked by the same attention to detail that characterizes the rest of the book. The
careful descriptions of the Soma plant and of the Soma ritual, based in part on the
Rgveda and in part on the ritual manuals, therefore retain their value.
Much has happened since Hillebrandt's publication. We have seen grand and
adventurous theories about the mythology and society of the Indo-Europeans, such as
Dumezil's (which drew American attention through a 1976 symposium in the JAS
long after it had passed its apogee in Europe), as well as much careful and detailed
work to whichJ. Gonda (1979), F. B. J. Kuiper (1979), H. P. Schmidt (1968), and
many other scholars continue to contribute. Deserved publicity has been given to
Gordon Wasson's thesis (1968) that the Vedic Soma plant was a hallucinogenic
mushroom, the fly-agaric (Amanita muscaria ). Another theory, defended with the
same careful attention to detail but using primarily Iranian rather than Indian
sources, is due to D. S. Flattery (1982). According to this thesis, which had earlier
been maintained by Sir William Jones and by P. A. de Lagarde, the original Soma
was the wild rue (Peganum harmala). The first test to which any such theory has to be
submitted is to verify whether it is in accordance with Hillebrandt's descriptions. If it
is, further corroboration should be sought. If it is not, the theory is probably wrong.
The lasting value of Hillebrandt's work lies in his attention to realia. Though such
realism is still found in German Indology (in West Germany, e.g., in the work of
Wilhelm Rau, and in East Germany in that of Klaus Mylius), much contemporary
work is disfigured by overemphasis on psychology, symbolism, and religious and
spiritual values and speculations. One is led to believe that the Vedic Indians were
disembodied spirits, not people of flesh and blood.
On cursory inspection, Willard Johnson's Poetry and Speculation of the Rg Veda
would appear to suggest that the Vedic Indians were raving madmen. The book
seems a jumble of disconnected notions and exhortations, a labyrinth of confusion,
padded with quotations. On closer inspection it contains interesting ideas, which
partially derive from Renou's interpretations of certain Rgvedic hymns. Renou's
approach to the Rgveda was characterized by his emphasis on its poetic content.
Johnson has concentrated on certain hymns that have long been known as enigmatic,
because their interpretation has been difficult. A topic that is naturally obscure calls
for an analysis that is especially lucid. Johnson's interpretations are not unclear, but
they have to be exhumed from heaps of surrounding debris. It is not clear for what

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278 ERITS STAAL

audience this book was intended. It contains enough substance to be of interest to


specialists, although they may not agree that this study is as innovative as the
dustjacket, not surprisingly, claims. However, the book seems to address at the same
time a general public interested in poetry and literary criticism, and that even larger
audience of Californian students who are looking for something. With such a diverse
potential readership, each audience is bound to be sometimes gratified and sometimes
exasperated.
The author states in his introduction that he has used an approach inspired by
literary criticism and philosophical studies of language. I do not see where this has
substantially contributed to any of his findings. True, we meet from time to time
with a discussion expressed in terms of "vehicle" and "tenor." This distinction can be
made in many ways, however. The chief benefit of such theories and the accompany-
ing terminologies is, as far as I can see, cosmetic. The "new approach" is a package
technique. Some chocolates can only be sold if they are wrapped up in gold-speckled
papers. Books about the Rgveda will only be read when presented through the
medium of some fashionable theory.
Now to the substance of the book. Johnson distinguishes enigma from riddle. A
riddle is like a crossword puzzle. Once the keys are found, the riddle dissolves. The
enigma resists interpretation. It points to features of reality that are obscure and
enigmatic by their very nature. The enigma, poetically expressed, does not analyze or
elucidate; it evokes, recreates, and places features of reality in front of our eyes, ears,
or minds. But, although the evoked reality remains unanalyzed, it is of course the
scholar's task to analyze the entire process and make it intelligible to us. Johnson does
not always remember this. Some passages of this book, therefore, read like evocations
rather than analyses.
The Rgveda refers to poetic contests that rewarded quick wit as well as inspired
speech, and were held to produce knowledge regarded as powerful. Such contests
reflect archaic institutions, found among many Shamanistic cultures (as N. K.
Chadwick [1952] has shown). Johnson has studied several hymns that embody such
inspired speech, which, he says, enables the poet to attain visionary participation in a
region of mystery. According to him, the Vedic enigma is like the kung-an or koan of
Ch'an/Zen Buddhism. An example occurs in the famous verse (Rgveda 1. 164.20-22)
depicting two birds sitting on the same tree, one eating a sweet fig, the other merely
looking on. After commenting on earlier interpretations and discussing ornithology
and its possible contributions, Johnson argues that the two birds have to be under-
stood as "two symposiasts or contestants, antagonists who take two positions, the
prior or son's position and the latter or father's position, corresponding respectively to
the candidate-for-vision's position and the accomplished-in-vision or master's posi-
tion" (p. 54). This interpretation is new and may have uncovered a dimension of
meaning that is really there. However, what is more significant about it is that it
throws light on Johnson's own theories about the enigma: for it shows that an
enigma, even if different from an "ordinary riddle," receives an interpretation once it
becomes an object of scholarly analysis. The very analysis that Johnson provides thus
demonstrates the untenability of his theory that enigmas are not amenable to analysis.
We cannot fruitfully talk or write about the ineffable. IfJohnson makes sense of what
appears to be ineffable, the has in so doing shown that it is not ineffable. The
mysterious enigma vanishes, and we are left with the nonmysterious solution of what
now turns out, after all, to be not so different from a puzzling riddle.
Johnson provides interesting interpretations of several other hymns and Rgvedic

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WHAT IS HAPPENING IN CLASSICAL INDOLOGY? 279

metaphors, especially the sun and the wheel. Sanskritists inclined to raise their
eyebrows should remember that Renou himself, who rejected Aurobindo's symbolic
interpretations as obvious anachronisms, showed that words for "cow" in the Rgveda
frequently denote features of poetry (e.g., 1955:10-11). Readers interested in
Rgveda 10.71 are invited to compare Johnson's translation and interpretation (pp.
12-17) with my own (Staal 1977). The comparison will show, I believe, that it is not
justifiable to omit the last couplet, as Johnson has done. There is a final chapter that
deals with Albert Camus, who wrote an essay on the enigma. Like other digressions
in this book, it is entertaining and not without interest. However, it does not seem to
throw any new light on the Rgveda.
In Jan Gonda's Vedic Ritual we have what in German is called a Fundgrube, a mine
in which much valuable information can be found. It should be added, however, that
some cutting, loosening, sifting, and cleaning, and all transportation of the ores is
left to the reader, who is moreover expected to be already familiar with some basic
notions and terms pertaining to the large and complex field of Vedic ritual. Much of
the required background information can be found in other publications by the same
author, which he obligingly quotes. The most important of these is The Ritual Sitras
of 1977, which deals with the ritual manuals and other similar sources to which each
page of Vedic Ritual refers. If one does not know these sources and how they are
related, Vedic Ritual is reduced to the semblance of a telephone directory that lists the
numbers of interesting people. If one wishes to meet any of these people, one needs
more than a telephone number: an introduction is required, an appointment must be
made, and, given a map and means of transportation, an actual visit may ensue.
Two general considerations should be kept in mind by any prospective user of
Gonda's book. The first is that Vedic ritual consists of two rather different types,
which can be distinguished in formal terms: the srauta or "solemn" ritual, which
requires three fires and the service of several priests; and the grhya, "domestic," or
"non-solemn" ritual, which requires only one fire (the domestic fire) and one priest
(the domestic priest or purohita). While the significance and function of the srauta
rites are not immediately apparent, the grhya rites seem straightforward in this
respect: most of these rites are rites-de-passage, with a large admixture of what we
would refer to as magical practices.
The second general consideration is that most of the non-solemn rites with which
Gonda's book deals are known only from the later Vedic literature. Though some
rites, e.g., the marriage rites, occur in the Rgveda, the majority are found only in
sources that originate after the already referred to gap, which separates the Rgveda
from all later Indian developments. Although many of these non-solemn rites are
undoubtedly ancient and correspond to similar ceremonies in other parts of the world,
almost all are directly related to later rites of Hinduism. The subject matter of
Gonda's book owes part of its significance to the fact that it illustrates this transition
from Vedism to Hinduism.
Gonda is a prolific author, and this work exhibits a format that is also found in
many of his other books. It does not develop a thesis, defend a theory, or introduce a
point of view. It simply inundates us with data. Reading these chapters is like
looking over the shoulders of someone who is going through his card indexes. Because
Gonda has read more Sanskrit sources (including many lesser known sources) than
most other Sanskrit scholars, the experience is rewarding. It is impossible, by the
same token, to characterize these wanderings in general terms. An idea may be gained
from a simple enumeration of some of the contents: Numbers, Colors, Orientation,

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280 FRITS STA AL

Posture, Gestures, Fire, Functionaries, Mantras, Places, Time, Exorcism, Medicine,


Auspiciousness, Divination, Taboo, Purity and Impurity, Learning, Concentration,
Deities, the Cult of the Dead. There is a detailed "General Index," but no lists of the
quoted sources.
In the last chapter Gonda takes up a general problem: "Purposes and Effect of the
Rites." This is related to a topic the author has recently treated in other publications
(e.g., Gonda 1980 and 1981). In these publications, Gonda has tried to show that
there is in general a close connection between rites and the accompanying mantras,
even if this is not apparent at first sight. Similarly, Gonda argues in the last chapter of
Vedic Ritual that rites have specific purposes. Many of these are listed, e.g., health,
wealth, progress, a wife, a son, fame, heaven, a kingdom, cattle, victory, an enemy's
death, happiness, how to consecrate a house, destroy something, escape rebirth, gain
prestige, prevent a servant from running away.
It is clear that mantras may have been originally connected with the ritual acts
they accompany. However, since the rites continue to be performed even when the
accompanying mantras are no longer understood, knowledge of the original connec-
tion between the two cannot be a necessary feature of ritual. Similarly, if rites at one
time had a purpose it does not follow that that purpose is a necessary feature of the
performance of the rite. There seems to be something "ritual" about ritual that does
not stand in need of such purposefulness.
Because I have argued elsewhere that ritual is meaningless (Staal 1979 and 1980),
a few words of elucidation may be in order here. In the case of the srauta or solemn
rites, my argument was directed primarily against the ancient authors of the Brahmana
literature and against contemporary anthropologists and scholars of religion who had
provided rites with numerous inconsistent and ad hoc interpretations, attempting to
show that they were symbolic and represented something else. In contrast with these
obvious rationalizations, I emphasized that ritual was activity and was performed for
its own sake. In the case of the non-solemn rites, the argument applies differently,
because many of these rites were believed to reach -specific ends. However, there still
remains a fundamental distinction between ordinary, practical activity, which is
purposeful and can therefore be effective, and ritual activity, which is characterized
by the fact that it should be performed painstakingly and in precise accordance with a
body of rules. One difference between the two kinds of activity is that the former is
subject to modification and rational improvement, while ritual activity is jealously
preserved in exactly the same mysterious form in which it was inherited from the
ancestors. Accordingly, the performer concentrates not on the alleged effects, but on
the correct execution of the rites. Ritual is, in these respects, unlike any practical
activity. It is like music.
An example may illustrate what I have in mind. Let us assume that I am afraid
that my servant will run away, but that I know the rite that from time immemorial is
prescribed for precisely such circumstances. Let us further assume, for the sake of
simplicity, that this rite consists of wearing green clothes and singing a certain song.
This is similar to the rites that accompany the death of a friend or relative, viz., to
wear black and sing a requiem. It is clear in the latter case that I do not believe that
the dead will come back to life when I perform these rites. The rites have no effect, in
that respect. I know equally well that wearing green and singing a prescribed song do
not guarantee that my servant will stay. To effectively prevent my servant from
running away I must do something different from performing a rite: increase his
salary, improve conditions about which he has complained, or lock him up. To wear

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WHAT IS HAPPENING IN CLASSICAL INDOLOGY? 281

green for him or black for the dead and sing the appropria
right frame of mind, make me feel in tune with my surro
society, or simply make me feel praiseworthy or good. The
that induce people to perform rites. They may not be
proper thing to do.
Anthropologists will find Gonda's Vedic Ritual extrem
much needed background and perspective to many custo
still be observed all over India. Gonda's book supplement
mine of information that should be the Bible of social s
Asia: P. V. Kane's History of Dharmasastra (1930-1962).
People have complained that books about Vedic ritual, and ritual generally, are
tedious and dull. This is often true and always due to the fact that ritual activities
should be seen and heard, not read about. Witnessing the live performance of one
ritual provides more understanding than the study of dozens of monographs. Fortu-
nately, films are now available of some rites that cannot be easily witnessed. In the
case of the more puzzling solemn ritual, a long-awaited publication will soon provide
numerous photographic illustrations of rites as well as tapes of chants and recitations
(see and hear Staal 1982a).
We have come to the end of our Vedic section without being able to give more
than an inkling of the enormous scholarly literature on the Veda that continues to be
published. Unable to remedy this situation within this context, let me at least
mention two important publications. The first is the Vedic Bibliography of R. N.
Dandekar, published by the University of Poona (1946-1973). This work continued
Renou's Bibliographie v6dique, which recorded publications that had appeared between
1805 and 1930. Dandekar's first volume covers the period 1931-1945; the second,
1946-1960; and the third, 1961-1972. The fourth volume should appear soon.
The last publication I shall mention in this context is a Penguin Classic that has
just appeared and put an end to what was one of the scandals of Vedic scholarship: the
absence of a good translation of the Rgveda into English. True, there exists a
translation by R. T. H. Griffiths, first published in 1889 and republished in 1973;
but it is hopelessly inadequate and is only used by authors who do not know better
(like some of the authors reviewed in our philosophy section). The only reliable
complete translation is that by K. F. Geldner into German (195 1). There is an almost
complete translation into French by Renou, and Stanley Insler is preparing a transla-
tion into English, which is more than half completed. Wendy Doniger O'Flaherty
has now taken the bull by the horns and has published a translation of 108 hymns
(out of the staggering total of 1,028) into readable English (1981). This should
finally bring the Rgveda out of its closet.

General Books

What is "general" about the remaining three publications is that they do not fit
into the categories of "philosophy" or "Veda," and do not fit into any other specific
category either. I shall begin with two books written and edited, respectively,
Wendy Doniger O'Flaherty. The book about Women, Androgynes, and Other Mythica
Beasts is basically about mythology. It is rich in material, but I must confess that it
baffles me. I was not puzzled by Hillebrandt's Vedic Mythology, the other contribu-
tions on Vedic mythology referred to earlier, or O'Flaherty's own earlier book about
Siva (1973). Nor is it the case that the present book suffers from the overemphasis

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282 FRITS STAAL

psychology and reli


realizing that Indian
physiological functions described depict Indians as obsessed with deeds of sex and
violence that most definitely require a body. Perhaps it is their minds that puzzle me.
They certainly believe things that are wildly improbable and apparently contradicto-
ry. Such beliefs, however, would not distinguish Indians from most other people.
The allegation of contradictoriness constitutes a problem that needs clarification.
In an interesting recent (1979) book that makes much use of Indian mythology, F. B.
J. Kuiper is concerned about these apparent contradictions that present difficulties to
"rational thinking." He sees logical contradictions in Varuna, for example, because it
is a "divine-demoniacal" god. Others see logical contradictions in the figure of the
Androgyne. From a logical point of view, however, there are no contradictions here.
If we feel that there are contradictions between gods and demons or between men and
women, we are merely expressing the values and prejudices of our culture, which have
little to do with logic. A logical contradiction is different: it is a statement that is
accepted and at the same time rejected, or regarded as both true and false. Such
statements are actually rather rare, one reason being that they presuppose the use of
an unambiguous and explicit language. I have not come across any such statements in
Indian mythology.
There are other so-called contradictions that are believed to be typical of India and
Indians. O'Flaherty refers in her introduction to a Rajput who consulted four
different medical practitioners: "one practising Ayurvedic medicine, one homeo-
pathic, one allopathic (i.e., Western), and one Unnani (Muslim)" (for "Unnani" read:
Yimndni, i.e., "lonian" or "Greek"). This is followed by a similar quote from
Carstairs. What is strange about this, and where are the logical contradictions? There
are none. Moreover, every sick person will carefully compare different physicians and
drugs. The only difference is that India offers a wider selection than we find in most
Western countries (California excepted).
When it comes to religion, the Orient is generally rational and avoids contradic-
tions; it is only Western religion that welcomes them. Irrationalism as a creed or
philosophy, too, exists only in the West. I believe that I have adduced a great deal of
solid evidence supporting this conclusion (Staal 1975), and I shall therefore not revert
to it here.
Perhaps I am baffled by O'Flaherty's book because I do not see what it sets out to
do. This is probably connected with its lack of method, which the author discusses at
length in her introduction. Not surprisingly, she does not arrive at a conclusion. Nor
does the book as a whole (although the author says, in this same introduction, that
conclusions are hidden in portions of various chapters). Should the myths then merely
be allowed to speak for themselves (and for the author, as she disarmingly adds)? This
would be fine, not only because they speak very loud and clear (in both respects), but
also because the book could then be regarded as an inventory-akin, in that respect,
to the contributions of Hillebrandt and Gonda. However, although it is rich in
material, O'Flaherty's book is obviously not an inventory. On the one hand, it is less,
because it is too unsystematic; on the other hand, more, because the author discusses
many motifs in relation to each other, and has many things to say on the relationship
between myths and myths, and between myths and other things. Yet all these
discussions are ad hoc, and no general conclusion emerges. Perhaps I should give up,
respond in kind, and say no more about this book than that the author is exception-
ally good at telling stories, especially sexual stories.

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WHAT IS HAPPENING IN CLASSICAL INDOLOGY? 283

Even if we forego a general evaluation, a book so rich in th


leaves ample scope for specific comments. The chapter on an
probably the least unsystematic, presents a typology of these bein
ing theory of their evolution. A pedant might ask whether th
operates on a level of essences. She observes that the Indian androg
from the male and not from the female; accordingly, "she has bec
he has not become half of her." On the whole, the author accep
beings without demur. At other times she displays more con
These I attribute in part to the influence of her elders, especially
has always retained a good measure of moralizing (see, e.g
discussed in Staal 1975:96-97). O'Flaherty refers to some forms,
"coarse," "decadent," "unnatural"; or they are said to "offend t
Clothing, ornaments, and hairstyles of the Indian androgyne, on t
"never unnatural." I regard such judgments as expressions of m
with an artistic application. Early Chola androgynes, for examp
beautiful and appear therefore more natural than a Kalighat
doodle. The author reverts to such representations on pages 326ff.
"sad degeneration" of the late-medieval and modern depictions of
must reflect, "at least in part," "the mounting tension betwee
during this period." If this were a fact, we would have hit upon a
Indian art history. Unfortunately, each period of Indian art has it
style, which is not only manifest in androgynes, and which is unl
or even at all on the relationship between male and female.
O'Flaherty accepts without question that there exists a special c
androgyny (the essence) and homosexuality (the overt activity)
for various comments. First, she says that homosexuality in
regarded as a shameful abberation, known to be fairly common in
only if practised in secret" (p. 88). This is not true if we except W
The facts, moreover, are more complex. As in some other coun
India, whether homosexual or heterosexual, is often accompan
there should be an active and a passive partner. O'Flaherty ha
this, but only on the heterosexual level. In homosexual relatio
notion prevails, shame attaches only to the partner who plays the
explains that such relationships are concealed when they exist betw
Juergensmeyer, who has described these attitudes in an unpublish
also emphasized that the chief Indian concern in all sexual relation
lack of control over one's sexual inclinations that is frowned u
shame, not the inclinations as such.
Androgyny opposes the presumption that there should be a
partner, and is therefore not restricted to homosexual relations. I
part in all sexual relations. The basic facts are simple and are amen
tion, provided we use a little algebra and define some basic notion
along the following lines. We shall have to make some idealizi
first is that every person, at any given sexual encounter, evi
tendencies, which together account for all of his or her sexu
further assume that these tendencies can be measured in such a w
male and female tendencies is 1. This measure is relative, not a
two persons who are assigned numerically equal tendencies ne
strong drives.

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284 FRITS STAAL

Let "m(A)" be the


1 - m(A), or m(A) = 1 - f(A). Now for an encounter between A and B to be
successful, we should exclude two cases: the case in which the tendencies of both are
entirely male, and the case in which they are entirely female. This may be formulated
by requiring that the following two independent conditions are met:

m(A) * m(B) < 1. (1)

f(A) f(B) < 1. (2)

These two conditions make essential use of the notions of both male and female. One
notion suffices if we require:

0 < m(A) m(B) < 1

or analogously with "f" for "im."


We may now define, for each A at a given encounter, the dominance
as follows:

d(A) = m(A) - f(A) I.

The vertical bars are defined in such a way that:

m(a) - f(A) / = m(A) - f(A) if and only if m(A) : f(A); and:


| m(A) - f(A) j = f(A) - m(A) if and only if m(A) < f(A).

Next we define the androgyny factor "a(A)" as follows:

a(A) = 1- d(A).

Note that, if a person at a given encounter displays only male or only female
tendencies, d(A) = 1 and a(A) = 0, i.e., that person is completely nonandrogynous,
on that occasion. However, if the male and female tendencies are equal, d(A) = 0 and
ot(A) = 1, viz., the person is fully androgynous, on that occasion. Maurice Henry's
idea that "androgynes don't fuse," whether true or false (see Plate 8), can now be
expressed by requiring that, for an encounter to be successful, the following condition
is met:

ox(A) ca(B) < 1. (3)

I shall not discuss the merits of (3), because there are in any event other conditions
that have to be met. Note, however, that (3) makes essential use of the notion of
androgyny.
Juergensmeyer has noted that in Indian languages there seems to be no general
term for a homosexual orientation, although specific terms for homosexual encounters
and activities exist. I have not been able to check whether this is true but have
adopted it as one of the reasons for using encounter as a basic notion. Of course, a
general orientation can always be defined in terms of encounters. Theoretically, this
may be a piece of behaviorism, but the formal expressions can be used by nonbehaviorists
like myself. This algebra can be developed and extended in various ways, but this

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WHAT IS HAPPENING IN CLASSICAL INDOLOGY? 285

context is not appropriate for such an exercise. My main intention has been to show
that conditions such as (1)-(3) and the notion of androgyny itself apply indiscrimi-
nately to homosexual and heterosexual encounters and orientations.
In fine, I shall offer four unrelated comments on psychology, ritual, the balance of
power, and Sanskrit. These comments are occasioned by O'Flaherty's book, but they
also intend to draw attention to other contemporary work. Psychology can be applied
to the study of myths in various unhelpful and ambiguous ways, e.g., the Jungian
(see Staal 1975:113-14). O'Flaherty avoids specific Jungian theories and notions,
such as archetype, but makes occasional use of Freudian notions. These uses are
unsystematic. The only clear and promising use of psychology in this realm that I can
think of would consist in the construction of a theory that enables us to derive from
myths true statements about the psychology of their anonymous makers. Freudians
continue to discuss whether this is possible, but J. Moussaieff Masson, a Sanskritist
and trained psychoanalyst, has demonstrated that it can be done. In his book The
Oceanic Feeling ( 1980), Masson interprets Indian myths, legends, and stories systemat-
ically as the distorted expressions of ordinary human needs. Readers of theJAS should
be familiar with Masson's work from his contribution to the symposium on Louis
Dumont (1976).
O'Flaherty accepts with few reservations the general connection between ritual
and myth in which scholars of religion believe. One well-known ritual plays a
significant part in her book: the asvamedha or "horse sacrifice." On this the author
has some worthwhile things to say, e.g., about the contrast between the Indian
coupling of a queen with a stallion versus the Irish coupling of a king with a mare.
Such a comment throws light on the prehistory of the ritual but has no more to do
with the ritual and its structure than the etymology of a word has to do with its
meaning and function. Where can we obtain significant information on the rituals? In
the Srauta Sutras. Not in the Brahmana literature because it offers rationalizations
that are ad hoc and not devoid of real, i.e., logical contradictions.
A relevant example occurs in the Satapatha Brahmana, which comments on the
gift of gold and brahmaudana, "a mess of cooked rice," to the priests at the outset of
the asvamedha ritual (SB 13. 1. 1.4; 13.4. 1.5-6). The brahmana declares that both
gold and brahmaudana are seed. O'Flaherty, deviating from Eggeling (1966), trans-
lates brahmaudana in this passage as "ball of rice" (p. 155). There is no harm in doing
so; the translation would not be literal, but Indians have since time immemorial eaten
cooked rice after kneading it into balls. The translation, however, comes from the
brahmana, which holds forth in its inimitable fashion: "For when the horse was
sacrificed, its seed went from it and became gold; thus, when he gives gold, he
supplies the horse with seed. . . . For the brahmaudana is seed, and gold is seed; by
means of seed he thus lays seed into that" (SB 13. 1. 1.3).
Why is this a rationalization? Because gold and brahmaudana are always given to
the priests, also in the numerous other rituals that are closely related in structure to
the asvamedha, but that do not incorporate horses, horse-balls, or horse-seed. On
such other occasions, the Brahmanas keep silent or offer different interpretations. All
such interpretations are therefore ad hoc and worthless.
An interesting chapter (III.4) describes the shifting balance of power from male
dominance in the Rgveda, via a transition in the epics, to female dominance in the
Puranas. The argument for the Rgveda can now be strengthened, because Joel P.
Brereton (1982) has shown that Aditi, who seemed so important as "mother of the
gods," is derived from a much more abstract concept. At the same time, the vision of

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286 FRITS STAAL

Aditi as mother was probably a priestly production without great depth in the
religious tradition. I have no quarrel with O'Flaherty's characterization of this shift of
power, but its significance is-restricted by the nature of our sources, and it should not
be regarded as a paradigm for Indian sexual or religious history. The Rgveda' was
composed by a handful of people (hence its "family books") in the extreme northwest
of the subcontinent. These people were originally outsiders, barbarians even; they
formed at any rate a tiny minority. The Vedic Indians exerted subsequently an
enormous influence, which is the reason that we know anything about them at all.
We know next to nothing, however, about the silent majority of the period. We may
assume that the latter had mother goddesses, because these seem to occur even earlier:
excavations from the Indus civilization have yielded numerous terra-cotta figurines
that probably represent such goddesses. All of this is speculation. The importance of
the Rgveda lies for no small part in its antiquity, subsequent fame, and the
astonishing reliability of its text, which is due to the strength and precision of its oral
transmission.
With the two epics we are on firmer ground in the sense that they depict
widespread ideal norms of classical Hinduism. Rima, principal hero of the Ramayana
epic, is, in Robert Goldman's words, "carefully cast as the ideal of Hindu manhood.
Noble, unwavering and utterly self-denying he embodies the culture's predilection
for a personality that combines great strength of character with extreme deference to
figures of authority. Similarly, the faithful SRtA is an idealization of the Hindu wife,
utterly devoted and submissive to her lord . . ." (1981:10).
The Indian epics are monumental and voluminous, but their transmission is less
firm than that of the Vedas. The first critical editions of the Mahabharata and the
Riimyana have recently been completed in India, and American scholars have made
a beginning with the translation of these texts into English. The late van Buitenen
published three volumes of a translation of the Mahabharata (1973-1978), but he
died before he could complete this work. Its continuation is one of the desiderata of
classical Indology. The Ramayana is being translated into English under the
direction of Robert Goldman by a team of scholars: R. Lefeber, J. M. Mason, B. A.
van Nooten, S. I. Pollock, S. J. Sutherland, and Goldman himself. The first volume
is about to appear. An interesting controversy has arisen in the JAS (1976) in
connection with this momentous translation activity. According to van Buitenen, the
epic may be very large, but it can only be adequately translated by a single scholar.
According to Goldman, this is not only impracticable, but undesirable; the task calls
for computerization and teamwork. (Ingalls has also made use of a computer in
studying the Mahibharata.)
With the Puranas we are again back-in a no-man's land. We can now read them
all together, which no Indian of the past could have done, but the transmissions have
been unsteady, and the existing editions are hardly critical. We know nothing about
the genetic, historical, geographical, and social affiliations of these floating traditions
(see my 1964 review of a book by Paul Hacker that presents an entirely imaginary
picture of some such affiliations).
All these considerations should be kept in mind when we postulate a "develop-
ment" from the Rgveda via the epics to the Puranas.
Male Sanskritists (the great majority) will feel some uneasiness about the Women
book, because it was obviously not written by a man and also not for them. This does
not mean, however, that they should not read it. On the contrary, they could learn a
great deal from many of its meanderings. They will be disappointed that the

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WHAT IS HAPPENING IN CLASSICAL INDOLOGY? 287

translations are not literal. This makes for such excellent and easy reading that it
would seem ungracious to complain about it. Moreover, since the general goals of the
book are not explicit, it is not clear that it is necessary for the translations to be
literal. Translations should be literal if psychological conclusions are sought (Mas-
son's are). They should also be literal if we follow Malinowski's admonition that a
scholar should present his materials in such a way that a reader can use them to
construct an alternative theory. O'Flaherty does not comply with such strict and
old-fashioned requirements. She also looks at primary sources through the admitted
eyes of secondary sources. This was illustrated by the balls of rice we have just
contemplated, but is also apparent (to me) in her use of the Srauta Suitras. An
anomalous creation occurs in the list of such Sanskrit texts on page 346: "Kitydyana
Srauta Sitra of SUklayajuhprdtifdkhyam." But I have said enough and should not
subject the reader to further nitpicking.
I have two books left in our motley selection. Both are collections, and I shall
treat them briefly. It is well known that American scholars take great delight in
conferences, symposia, workshops, etc. Unfortunately, this enjoyable custom often
unites with the academic emphasis on publishing, which union results in publica-
tion. While the value of the meetings is often questionable, the value of the resulting
publications is rarely in doubt. There generally is none. Surprisingly, the volume on
Karma and Rebirth, edited by O'Flaherty, is an exception. Not all its contributions are
good, but many are. I can give no more than a faint impression of some of the latter.
Ludo Rocher's contribution on the Dharmafdstra is solid. It pictures the extreme
ends to which the lawgivers went to specify the mechanisms of karma. All schools
agree, for example, that a thief of garments will be reborn with leprosy. According to
Manu, an adulterer ("adulterator," says Rocher) will be reborn with extra limbs; but
according to the Visnusmrti he will be reborn with fewer limbs. It obviously pays to
shop around in the Hindu canon.
George Hart offers a more lively picture, but he feels that it contains contradic-
tions. Kannaki became a stone, which is not unusual for Tamil women, but she was
also reborn in heaven as a goddess. Whether this is a contradiction depends on
whether goddesses in heaven can be stones. In India this does not seem impossible.
After all, even Muslims, who worship only Allah, also worship a stone-the hajar
al-aswad in the Ka'ba at Mecca.
In a paper of twenty-eight pages, Gananath Obeyesekhere sketches a typology of
religion that uses data from preliterate and literate religious traditions. This paper is
interesting and should be read in full. Padmanabh Jaini provides a detailed descrip-
tion of karma and the problem of rebirth in Jainism. It seems to me that his article
throws a good deal of light on the origins of karma in India. There is much more. The
only thing missing in this volume is a clear exposition of what an orthoprax,
"right-doing" Hindu accepts: the nityakanmnni which are universally enjoined; the
nisiddhakarmani which are prohibited; the naimittikakarmani or periodic rites; and
the kamyakarmani or optional rites. Each of these are held to have specific results,
some that fall within this life, others in the next.
India and Indology, edited by Rosane Rocher, is the result of a labor of love even if
it was not expected that the book would only appear after Norman Brown died, on
April 22, 1975. Brown was the doyen of American Sanskritists, and this volume
contains not only his best articles, but warm appreciations by four great Indian
scholars (R. N. Dandekar, V. Raghavan, Moti Chandra, and S. K. Chatterji), a
biographical sketch, and a complete bibliography. To cover the work of a lifetime of a

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288 FRITS STAAL

great scholar is mor


areas of study of these thirty-five papers: Veda and Religion; Fiction and Folklore;
Art; and Philology.
Norman Brown was an excellent administrator and did much for Sanskrit and
Indology in the United States. The American Institute of Indian Studies, which
enables scholars and students to work in India, is a lasting tribute to his organiza-
tional activities. Brown was also a kind and affectionate man. I have seen him angry
only once. He had invited me to teach Indian Philosophy at the University of
Pennsylvania, and I did. After a year, I decided to accept the offer of a chair in general
philosophy at my old alma mater, the University of Amsterdam. When I told
Norman Brown about this, he got very angry, partly because he had other things in
mind for me; but also because he felt strongly that the future did not lie with
philosophy, but with Sanskrit and Indology, fields in which new discoveries are still
the order of the day, and from which the modern world and especially the West have
much to learn.

This is an appropriate note on which to conclude my own meanderings, but I


cannot do so without injustice unless I refer to one area of research that I have so far
neglected. As indicated earlier, there are two fields of study that characterize classical
Indology as a scientific discipline: the Vedas and Panini. I have frequently referred to
the Vedas, although I have never mentioned any of the problems that pertain to the
philological foundation of their study. In another context, I would have emphasized
that some Vedic texts still await publication (e.g., the entire corpus of the Jaiminiya
Samaveda), while others have only recently become amenable to serious study (e.g.,
the Kausitaki Brahmana of the Rgveda, now edited, together with an important
commentary, by E. R. Sreekrishna Sarma [1968-1976]).
Enough of the Vedas-but who or what is Panini? Panini, the greatest linguist
of all time, was born in the sixth or fifth century B.C. in a distant corner of the
Achaemenid empire which is now in Pakistan. Panini wrote an almost complete
grammar of the Sanskrit language that was spoken in his time and that corresponds to
the language we find in the prose texts of later Vedic (such as the Aranyakas and the
Srauta Suitras). Panini's grammar led to the codification of Sanskrit as a classical
language for the next two-and-a-half millenia, but also formulated and analyzed for
the first time many general properties of language.
The study of Panini and of the tradition of the Sanskrit grammarians boasts an
enormous bibliography (see Cardona's Survey of 1980), and a long and venerable
history (see my Reader of 1972). At present there is a renaissance of these studies to
which contributions are made by some of the best savants in India, Japan, and the
West. At the recent International Seminar on Panini (held at the University of Poona
in July 1981), there was a meeting of minds between modern linguists, philologists,
pandits, and other traditionalists. Such meetings are fruitful as long as the partici-
pants avoid ideological skirmishes and concentrate on real problems.
If I had once more to single out one work that illustrates contemporary work in
this area, it would be Kiparsky's 1979 book Pdnini as a Variationist. This work
demonstrates that Panini distinguished carefully and consistently between three
kinds of optional rules. Although each syllable of Panini's grammar had been
scrutinized, from Patanijali onward, by ancient and modern scholars for 2,500 years,
nobody had noticed that Panini made use of such a distinction.
Subjects such as Panini and the Veda are of value not only because they throw

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WHAT IS HAPPENING IN CLASSICAL INDOLOGY? 289

light on history, the humanities, or the social sciences, or on South, Southeast, or


East Asia. They deserve our attention because they rank among the great achieve-
ments of mankind.

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