Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Legal Ethics Cases No. 7 1
Legal Ethics Cases No. 7 1
7 1
G.R. No. 109493. July 2, 1999.*
On September 1, 1992, the Court of Appeals 5 denied the motion of herein petitioners to
SPOUSES SERAFIN AQUINO and RUMELIA AQUINO, petitioners, vs. COURT OF
“recall Entry of Judgment and to reinstate appeal etc., there being no showing therein of any
APPEALS, GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, ET AL., respondents.
reason to justify the failure of appellant’s counsel to file appellant’s brief within the reglementary
period and considering that the resolution dated July 25, 1991 dismissing the appeal became
Remedial Law; Attorneys; Pleadings and Practice; Requisites to be complied with in
final x x x.”6
cases of substitution of attorneys. —In cases of substitution of attorneys the following requisites
must be complied with: (1.) written application for substitution; (2.) written consent of the
On March 15, 1993, the Court of Appeals 7 denied the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of
client; and (3.) a written consent of the attorney to be substituted. In case the consent of the
its September 1, 1992 Resolution on the ground that it was beyond the power of the Court to
attorney to be substituted cannot be obtained, there must at least be proof that notice of the
modify the dismissal since the order dismissing the appeal had become final and executory on
motion for substitution has been served upon him in the manner prescribed by our rules.
August 19, 1991 and Entry of Judgment was issued on November 4, 1991. 8
Hence, this petition where the petitioners assign the following errors:
Same; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Failure of an appellant to file an appellant’s brief is
ground for the dismissal of the appeal. —The failure of an appellant to file an appellant’s brief is
ground for the dismissal of the appeal. The dismissal becomes final and executory after fifteen “I.IT WAS ERROR FOR THE COURT OF APPEALS NOT TO HAVE SERVED A COPY OF ITS
days from receipt of the judgment or order. In the present case, since it is not denied that Atty. RESOLUTION OF DISMISSAL UPON THE APPELLANT DESPITE KNOWLEDGE THAT THEIR
Barican, the counsel of record, received the copy of the resolution of the Court of Appeals FORMER COUNSEL OF RECORD HAD DIED.
dismissing the petitioner’s appeal, the dismissal became final and executory after the lapse of
fifteen days. II.IT WAS ERROR FOR THE COURT OF APPEALS TO SERVE COPIES OF RESOLUTIONS
UPON THE APPELLANT’S FORMER COUNSEL DE PARTE.
Same; Same; Forum-Shopping; Petitioners are not guilty of forum shopping; There is
forum shopping whenever, as a result of an adverse opinion in one forum, a party seeks a
favorable opinion (other than by appeal or certiorari) in another. —We agree with the petitioners III.IT WAS ERROR FOR THE COURT OF APPEALS TO DENY APPELLANT’S MOTION FOR
that they are not guilty of forum shopping. There is forum shopping whenever, as a result of an RECONSIDERATION ON THESE GROUNDS.
adverse opinion in one forum, a party seeks a favorable opinion (other than by appeal or
certiorari) in another. The rule on forum shopping applies only when two (or more) cases are IV.IT WAS ERROR FOR THE COURT OF APPEALS TO DENY ADMISSION OF THE BRIEF
still pending. There is only one case, G.R. No. 109493, the present Petition for Review on FOR THE APPELLANT WHICH WAS ALREADY APPENDED TO THEIR MOTION FOR
Certiorari, pending between the parties in the present case. RECONSIDERATION.
Unless the procedure prescribed in the above mentioned section is complied with, the attorney Note.—Willful and deliberate forum-shopping constitutes either direct or indirect contempt
of record is regarded as the counsel who should be served with copies of the judgments, orders of court. (Zebra Security Agency and Allied Services vs. National Labor Relations
and pleadings and who should be held responsible for the case. 17 In cases of substitution of Commission, 270 SCRA 476 [1997])
attorneys the following requisites must be complied with:
PANGANIBAN, J.: In compliance with this Court’s March 24, 1999 Resolution, Respondent Uy 2 filed his Comment
on June 7, 1999. Denying that he violated Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
Lawyers must promptly account for money or property they receive on behalf of their clients. he explained:
Failure to do so constitutes professional misconduct and justifies the imposition of disciplinary
sanctions.
“1).In a criminal case, then pending before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 121 of
Kalookan City, Metro Manila, presided by the complainant Honorable Adoracion G.
LEGAL ETHICS CASES NO. 7 4
Angeles, entitled ‘People of the Philippines vs. Norma Trajano, et al.,’ Criminal Case No. being handed over to Primitiva Del Rosario, [the latter] and her daughter x x x , however,
C-54176-77 (98), Atty. Thomas C. Uy, Jr., herein referred to as [r]espondent, was told [r]espondent to just let the money in the sum of P16,500.00 be kept at the office of
engaged as [p]rivate [p]rosecutor of the complainant therein, Mrs. Primitiva Malansing the [r]espondent so that future payments of Norma Trajano will be save[d] in whole and
Del Rosario. At the outset Norma Trajano, accused in said criminal case, expressed her for them to avoid spending the same as what had happened to the past installment
desire and offered to settle the civil aspect of the criminal case against her to which payments of Norma Trajano. Respondent then acceded to the request of Primitiva Del
Primitiva Del Rosario acceded. On separate hearings, Norma Trajano made installment Rosario and her daughter and told them that they can get the money anytime they want
payments to Primitiva Del Rosario some of which payments were duly acknowledged by from the [r]espondent’s office. Hence, the money was kept locked [in] the filing cabinet
the latter in the presence of [r]espondent; of the [respondent where he used to keep all his personal file[s].
“2).On a previously cancelled date of hearing of the aforesaid criminal case x x x on “5).On December 23, 1998, early before noon, Primitiva Del Rosario and her daughter
December 14, 1998, Norma Trajano went to the office of the [r]espondent at about 8:45 Aurora Del Rosario, on a prior invitation, attended the Christmas Party of the office of
o’clock in the morning, x x x and met Mr. Romeo C. Jamisola, Jr., who is acting as [r]espondent and undersigned counsel, x x x Respondent, after the x x x lunch, instructed
[r]espondent’s personal secretary and at the same time the liason officer of the law firm Mr. Romeo Jamisola, Jr., to give the sum of money (P16,500.00) and for Primitiva Del
De Veyra, Uy and Associates x x x. Mr[.] Romeo Jamisola, Jr., is the lone staff of the law Rosario to receive the same for fear of a repetition of a burglary incident before, where
firm x x x. Respondent was at that time not in the office as he was attending a hearing some cash and minor office appliances of undersigned were lost. Primitiva Del Rosario,
before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 122, Kalookan City, Metro Manila, x x x however, insisted that said sum of money be kept at the office of the [r]espondent to
save in whole the installment payments of Norma Trajano and that [was] the wish of her
son Fernando ‘Bong’ Del Rosario, who is a long time friend and a compadre of the
“3).On the aforesaid date and time (December 14, 1998) at the office of the
[r]espondent. Respondent, respecting the trust reposed upon hint by Primitiva Del
[r]espondent, Norma Trajano told Mr. Romeo Jamisola, Jr. that she will make another
Rosario, her daughter Aurora Del Rosario, and son Fernando Del Rosario, acceded to hold
partial payment to Primitiva M. Del Rosario because she cannot attend the hearing the
in trust the said sum of [s]ixteen [t]housand [f]ive [h]undred (P16,500.00) [p]esos,
following day (8[:]30 o’clock a.m. of December 15, 1999) before Judge Adoracion G.
Philippine [c]urrency, which [was] locked and safely kept [in] the filing cabinet of the
Angeles due to a conflict of schedule with her [other] case in the Regional Trial Court,
[r]espondent until February 12, 1999; x x x;
Branch 19, Malolos, Bulacan, where she is likewise the accused for [e]stafa[.] Mr. Romeo
Jamisola told Norma Trajano to wait for a while as he will fetch [r]espondent at the
ground floor in the sala of the Honorable Remigio E. Zari. Respondent, upon being “6).On February 10, 1999 [during] the hearing of the Norma Trajano case before the
informed of the presence of Norma Trajano in the office of the [r]espondent by Romeo Hon. Adoracion G. Angeles, [r]espondent appeared shortly before 10:30 o’clock in the
Jamisola, Jr. went to his office and Norma Trajano immediately told [r]espondent that morning, pursuant to a ‘Motion to Call Case at 10:30 o’clock in the Morning’ x x x.
she knew that the setting for that day (December 14, 1998) was previously cancelled and
that she cannot attend the hearing the following day (8[:]30 o’clock a.m. December 15,
“7).When the said Norma Trajano [case] x x x was called on second call at 11[:]25 a.m.,
1998) and further told the [r]espondent that she (Norma Trajano) will make another
[i]n said February 10, 1999 hearing, respondent was first scolded by the Honorable Court
partial payment to Primitiva M. Del Rosario and that she will just leave her payment in the
(Judge Adoracion G. Angeles) x x x [for] giving more preference to the Metropolitan Trial
sum of [s]ixteen [t]housand [five hundred] [p]esos (P16,500.00), Philippine [c]urrency, in
Court than her Court. Resp[o]ndent, however, beg[ged the] indulgence of the Honorable
the office of the [r]espondent. Respondent then told Norma Trajano to inform Primitiva
Court (Judge Adoracion G. Angeles) and explained why [he] first attend[ed] the
M. Del Rosario first but Norma Trajano replied that she will just call Primitiva [Del
Mandaluyong hearing of Manny Chua’s case, to wit; x x x.
Rosario]. Nonetheless, [r]espondent told Romeo Jamisola, Jr. to call Primitiva Del Rosario,
using the office phone, and let her talk with Norma Trajano, and, if Primitiva Del Rosario
agreed [r]espondent instructed Romeo Jamisola, Jr., to just prepare a receipt. “8).That it was during the course of [the] litany of sermon, [i]n that hour, made by the
Respondent, fearing that his case (People vs. Rommel Senadrin, et al. above-stated) Honorable Court addressed to the [r]espondent that Norma Trajano x x x butted in and
might have been called in the calendar, immediately left the office and proceeded [at] the informed the Honorable Court (Judge Adoracion G. Angeles) that she will be tendering
sala of the Honorable Remigio E. Zari. Respondent, after the hearing x x x, returned to another partial payment; it was at that moment that Judge Adoracion G. Angeles asked
his office and upon learning that his signature was affixed by Romeo Jamisola. Jr. upon Norma Trajano how much had she paid Primitiva Del Rosario, and, Norma [T]rajano
the insistence of Norma Trajano scolded Romeo Jamisola, Jr. and for his unsuccessful answered that she had already paid P36,500.00 as full payment for one case, and that of
attempt to contact first Primitiva Del Rosario before receiving the sum of money left by the P36,500, P20,000.00 was paid to Primitiva Del Rosario and HESITANTLY said that the
Norma Trajano; P16,500 was paid to the [r]espondent. Judge Angeles then took the receipt from Norma
Trajano and had it xeroxed by a personnel of the Court. The carbon duplicate original of
the Receipt, dated [D]ecember 14, 1998, showing the receipt by the office of the
“4).The following day [o]n the morning of December 15, 1998, [r]espondent arrived at
[r]espondent, through Romeo Jamisola, Jr., whose printed [name] was pre[ceded] by the
his office and met Primitiva Del Rosario and her daughter Aurora Del Rosario and
word ‘By,’ indicating that he received the sum of money on behalf of or in representation
immediately the trio appeared before the sala of Judge Adoracion G. Angeles in the
of the [r]espondent, is hereto [attached] and marked as ANNEX ‘5,’ to form part hereof;
hearing of the Norma Trajano case. Returning [to] the office of the [r]espondent after
the hearing, Primitiva Del Rosario and Aurora Del Rosario, being earlier informed that on
December 14, 1998 Norma Trajano went [to] his office and made partial payment in the “9).That it was perhaps due to the belief [in] and the immediate impression of Judge
sum of P16,500 thru Mr. Romeo Jamisola, Jr., the [r]espondent told Mr. Romeo Jamisola Adoracion G. Angeles [of the] answer of Norma Trajano that prompted Judge Angeles to
to get the money from the filing cabinet and while the money in the envelope [was] ask, instantaneously in a loud manner, Primitiva Del Rosario ‘IN TAGALOG,’ the question,
LEGAL ETHICS CASES NO. 7 5
‘NATANGGAP MO BA KAY ATTY. UY ANG PERA NA P16,500.00.?’ Primitiva Del Rosario, a of the sala of Judge Angeles and informed the [r]espondent that he carried with him the
seventy-year-old, who was shocked by the tone and the manner she was asked by Judge key to [r]espondent’s cabinet and the presence of some [squatter] families of Batasan
Angeles simply just answered ‘HINDI PO, KASI GUSTO [KO] PO NA MABUO ANG PERA.’ Hills, Quezon City at the office of the [r]espondent, who has an appointment with the
Primitiva Del Rosario, however, tried to explain her answer ‘HINDI PO’ and why she did [r]espondent, that the [r]espondent left the premises of the sala of Judge Angeles, [sic]
not yet [receive] the money from the [r]espondent by raising her hand but was Respondent, at his office ordered Romeo Jamisola, Jr. to open the filing cabinet and
prevented by Judge Adoracion G. Angeles from further answering by telling Primitiva Del returned to the premises of the sala of Judge Angeles alone at about 4:00 o’clock P.M.
Rosario to stop. With that answer of Primitiva Del Rosario, [r]espondent butted in to after his meeting with the squatter families. But again, his request to ‘Armand’ to talk
explain Primitiva Del Rosario’s answer of ‘HINDI PO’ and her having not yet received the with Judge Angeles, after the media interview, was denied. At about 5:30 o’clock in the
sum of money, subject of the inquisition of Judge Angeles by manifesting to wit; x x x afternoon, ‘Armand,’ the court personnel, served the Order, of said date, February 10,
that Primitiva Del Rosario did not get the money when x x x handed the same on 1999 at the office of the [r]espondent;
December 15, 1998 because she wanted [it] to be save[d] in whole together with the
future installment payments of Norma Trajano and to be kept in the office of the
“13).In the early afternoon of the following day, February 11, 1999, [r]espondent
[r]espondent as wished by her son Bong Del Rosario; and, that the said sum of money
together with Primitiva Del Rosario and her daughter Aurora Del Rosario went again [to]
[was] kept in the filing cabinet in the office of the [r]espondent. All explanation[s] of the
the sala of Judge Angeles x x x to seek an audience with Judge Angeles. Their request x
[r]espondent went to x x x naught as the [r]espondent was cut short by x x x Judge
x x w[as] likewise in vain. Primitiva Del Rosario, after the last attempt to seek audience
Angeles, [who] in a loud and angry voice orally directed the [r]espondent to get the
with Judge Angeles and already tired of going [to] and [from] the sala of Judge Angeles,
money from [r]espondent’s office and give the same to Primitiva Del Rosario. It was
decided on February 12, 1999, to receive the sum of money in the amount of P16,500.00
already 11:45 o’clock in the morning, more or less, and the [r]espondent was given
from the office of the [r]espondent, through, Romeo Jamisola, Jr. and executed a
fifteen (15) minutes to comply; [r]espondent requested Judge Angeles to be
Sinumpaang Salaysay, x x x;
accompanied by Primitiva Del Rosario and her daughter Aurora Del Rosario but both were
ordered to stay in court by Judge Angeles;
“14).The Sinumpaang Salaysay of Primitiva Del Rosario, dated February 16, 1999 as well
as the Acknowledgment Receipt, dated February 12, 199[9] was attached to a
“10).Respondent in compliance with the oral order of Judge Angeles immediately
Manifestation caused to be filed by the [r]espondent on March 3, 1999 when the
proceeded [to] his office but only to find out that Romeo Jamisola, Jr., who [held] the
respondent was confined in Fatima Hospital in Valenzuela City, Metro Manila on March 2,
only key [to r]espondent’s filing cabinet, was on errand x x x that morning of February
1999;
10, 1999 [for] Atty. Angel B. De Veyra (the Undersigned Counsel) [who had sent him] to
the offices of the solicitor general in Makati City, and, the City Prosecutor’s Office of
Manila to [furnish copies to] both offices; x x x; “15).Learning of the instant administrative case against the [respondent, Bong Del
Rosario, the son of Primitiva Del Rosario, upon whose wish the subject sum of money
was kept at the office of the [respondent to save the same in whole as well as the future
“11).Respondent, expecting that Romeo Jamisola, Jr. would [arrive] before 12[:]00 noon,
installment payments of Norma Trajano executed a Sinumpaang Salaysay, attesting [to]
x x x waited for Romeo Jamisola, Jr. while at the same time called up [his] wife to
and confirming the statement of [his] mother Primitiva Del Rosario, x x x” 3
immediately [come] to his office to spare the sum of P16,500.00 as Romeo Ja[mi]sola
may not [arrive] [within] the time allotted by Judge Angeles. The wife of respondent,
however, arrived at about 12:25 P.M., more or less, ahead of Romeo Jamisola, Jr. and Stripped of unnecessary verbiage, the Comment contends that the respondent kept the money
spared [r]espondent the sum of P16,500.00 and [r]espondent immediately went [to] the in his office because that was the alleged wish of both his client and her son. He allegedly
fourth floor, where the sala of Judge Angeles [was] located but unfortunately the session informed them of such money and tried to give it to them, but they insisted that he retain it. He
was already adjourned. Respondent then talked to ‘Armand,’ one of the court personnel further maintained that it was only after Judge Angeles issued the February 10, 1999 Order that
and is known as the door keeper of the chamber of Judge Angeles, and [requested that his client relented and accepted the money on February 12, 1999.
he be allowed to go inside the chamber to show [his] compliance, though late.
Respondent, however, was told by ‘Armand’ that Judge Angeles was on her lunch break After the judge filed her Reply on June 30, 1999, this Court referred the case to the Office of the
and that it [was] better for [r]espondent to take his lunch too and return a little later; Bar Confidant for report and recommendation. The Court dispensed with the normal referral to
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines because the records were complete and the question raised
was simple. No further factual investigation was necessary in the premises.
“12).At about 1:30 o’clock in the afternoon of that day (February 10, 1999) [r]espondent
returned [to] the sala of Judge Angeles together with Primitiva Del Rosario and her Bar Confidant’s Report and Recommendation
daughter Aurora Del Rosario, who likewise returned to the court, to seek an audience in Recommending that Atty. Thomas C. Uy, Jr. be suspended from the practice of law for one
[the] chamber [of] Judge Angeles. Said audience with Judge Angeles was desired by month, the Office of the Bar Confidant in its Report and Recommendation dated December 15,
Primitiva Del Rosario to let Judge Angeles [witness] the giving of the money to Primitiva 1999 said:
Del Rosario. But request[s] for the same, through ‘Armand,’ were twice denied by Judge “x x x [I]t is clear that it is the sworn duty of a member of the bar to be accountable, at all
Angeles because at that time Judge Angeles was being interviewed by several media times, for anything which he receives for and in behalf of his client.
personnel of some TV stations. The Del [Rosarios], however, left earlier upon knowing
that Judge Angeles denied their request for an audience. [They] told [r]espondent that “In the case at bar, this Office is more inclined to believe the story of the complainant.
they will be back the following day. It was only when Romeo Jamisola arrived at about
3:00 o’clock, more or less, in the afternoon and went at the fourth floor at the premises
LEGAL ETHICS CASES NO. 7 6
“First, it cannot be disputed that the transcript of stenographic notes is the most reliable In the present case, it is clear that respondent failed to promptly report and account for the
record of what indeed transpired (and what words were uttered by the parties involved) on P16,500 he had received from Norma Trajano on behalf of his client, Primitiva Del Rosario.
February 10, 1999 at the hearing of Crim. Case No. C-54176-77 (98). Records clearly show that Although the amount had been entrusted to respondent on December 14, 1998, his client
the private complainant in the criminal case, when asked by Judge Angeles as to the revealed during the February 10, 1999 hearing that she had not yet received it. Worse, she did
whereabouts of the P16,500.00, spontaneously replied that she had no knowledge of the same; not even know where it was.
in effect saying that Atty. Uy has not given her the subject P16,500.00. If, indeed, Primitiva Del
Rosario requested Atty. Uy to keep the money as far back as December 1998, then she should Respondent maintains that on December 15, 1998 he informed Mrs. Del Rosario about the
have told the same to Judge Angeles. payment. He further avers that he kept the money upon her instruction, as she had allegedly
wanted “future payments x x x [to] be saved in whole and for them to avoid spending the same
“Atty. Uy’s allegation that Judge Angeles prevented Primitiva Del Rosario from saying in as what had happened to the past installment payments x x x.” 7This assertion allegedly finds
open court the words ‘HINDI PO KASI GUSTO KO PO NA MABUO ANG PERA does not have any support in her answer to the question of Judge Angeles, who had asked her whether she had
proof as nothing of that sort appears in the transcript of stenographic notes. Atty. Uy has not received the disputed payment: “Hindi po kasi gusto [ko] po na mabuo ang pera.”
even bothered to refute the truth of the contents of the stenographic notes, all the more
bolstering this Office’s opinion that the said notes are accurate and truthful. The Court is not persuaded. Respondent’s assertions are contradicted by the following
transcript of stenographic notes:
“Second, the affidavits executed by Primitiva Del Rosario and her son, Fernando Del Rosario,
“Court: This P 16,500, did you turn it over to the private complainant?
dated February 16, 1999 and June 7, 1999, respectively, attesting to Atty. Uy’s averment that
his act of personally keeping the subject P16,500.00 was with and at their request cannot be Atty. Uy: No your Honor, because she wanted the full amount of the settlement.
given much credence to outweigh the arguments of Judge Angeles. The said affidavits, both
Court: Private complainant, is it true that you did not
executed after February 10, 1999, are suspect. Caught by surprise when Judge Angeles inquired
of the whereabouts of his client’s money, Atty. Uy x x x resorted to seeking the help of his client want to accept
to corroborate his defense. Being the clients of Atty. Uy, Primitiva Del Rosario and her son could
have been persuaded to help extricate their counsel from the latter’s predicament. the money?
Mrs. Del Rosario: Hindi po, sila po ang nagbigayan.
“In the absence of any contradicting evidence to dispute the allegation that Atty. Uy failed
to immediately remit to his client the money due the latter, it is safe to conclude that Atty. Uy Court: Hindi pa ibinibigay sa inyo ni Atty. Uy?
has violated his sworn duty to uphold, at all times, the trust and confidence reposed in him by
Mrs. Del Rosario: Hindi po.
his client(s).
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
“In the instant case, Atty. Uy, upon receipt of the P16,500.00 from the accused in the Court: Nasaan iyong P16,500? Huwag kayong matakot.
criminal case, should have promptly remitted the same to his client, Primitiva Del Rosario. Had
Mrs. Del Rosario: Aywan ko po sa kanilang dalawa.”8
Judge Angeles not inquired of the whereabouts of the money, the same would have remained
with Atty. Uy, to the prejudice of the latter’s client.” 4
If it were true that Mrs. Del Rosario was informed about the payment and that she entrusted it
This Court’s Ruling to respondent, she would have known its whereabouts. That she did not know it showed the
We agree with the findings and the recommendation of the Office of the Bar Confidant. falsity of his claim.
Administrative Liability of Respondent
It is noteworthy that respondent did not dispute the foregoing transcript although it belied
The relationship between a lawyer and a client is highly fiduciary; it requires a high degree of
his allegation that Mrs. Del Rosario’s express wish was to have the payments in full.
fidelity and good faith. It is designed “to remove all such temptation and to prevent everything
of that kind from being done for the protection of the client.” 5
Neither are we convinced by the affidavits of Mrs. Del Rosario and her son, both of whom
affirmed their intention to have their money in the safekeeping of respondent. It should be
Thus, Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that “a lawyer shall hold in
stressed that he was her counsel and the compadre of her son. Moreover, the affidavits were
trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come into his possession.” Furthermore,
executed after the filing of this Complaint. As the Office of the Bar Confidant observed, these
Rule 16.01 of the Code also states that “a lawyer shall account for all money or property
considerations militate against the credibility of the affiants. In any event, their affidavits fail to
collected or received for or from the client.” The Canons of Professional Ethics is even more
explain adequately why Mrs. Del Rosario, during the hearing on February 10, 1999, did not
explicit:
know where her money was.
“The lawyer should refrain from any action whereby for his personal benefit or gain he abuses
or takes advantage of the confidence reposed in him by his client.
The records do not clearly show whether Attorney Uy had in fact appropriated the said amount;
in fact, Mrs. Del Rosario acknowledged that she had received it on February 12, 1999. They do
“Money of the client collected for the client or other trust property coming into the
show, however, that respondent failed to promptly report that amount to her. This is clearly a
possession of the lawyer should be reported and accounted for promptly and should not under
violation of his professional responsibility. Indeed, in Aya v. Bigornia,9 the Court ruled that
any circumstances be commingled with his own or be used by him.”6
money collected by a lawyer in favor of his clients must be immediately turned over to them.
In Daroy v. Legaspi,10 the Court held that “lawyers are bound to promptly account for money or
LEGAL ETHICS CASES NO. 7 7
property received by them on behalf of their clients and failure to do so constitutes professional
misconduct.”
Verily, the question is not necessarily whether the rights of the clients have been
prejudiced, but whether the lawyer has adhered to the ethical standards of the bar. 11 In this
case, respondent has not done so. Indeed, we agree with the following observation of the Office
of the Bar Confidant:
“Keeping the money in his possession without his client’s knowledge only provided Atty. Uy the
tempting opportunity to appropriate for himself the money belonging to his client . This situation
should, at all times, be avoided by members of the bar. Like judges, lawyers must not only be
clean; they must also appear clean. This way, the people’s faith in the justice system would
remain undisturbed.”12
In this light, the Court must stress that it has the duty to look into dealings between attorneys
and their clients and to guard the latter from any undue consequences resulting from a situation
in which they may stand unequal.13 The present situation calls for the exercise of this duty.
For misappropriating and failing to promptly report and deliver money they received on behalf of
their clients, some lawyers have been disbarred 14 and others have been suspended for six
months.15 In the present case, the records merely show that respondent did not promptly report
that he received money on behalf of his client. There is no clear evidence of misappropriation.
Under the circumstances, we rule that he should be suspended for one month.
Notes.—A lawyer is guilty of grave professional misconduct where he received from a client
compensation to handle the latter’s case in the trial court, but the same was dismissed for lack
of interest and failure to prosecute. He had abandoned his client in violation of his contract
ignoring the most elementary principles of professional ethics. ( Richards vs. Asoy, 152 SCRA
45 [1987])
Responsible litigants need not be told that only pleadings formulated with intellectual
honesty on facts duly ascertained can subserve the ends of justice and dignify the cause of the
pleader. (Komatsu Industries [Phils.], Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 289 SCRA 604 [1998])
LEGAL ETHICS CASES NO. 7 8
Same; Same; The rule is settled that a lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any
Adm. Case No. 2040. March 4, 1998.*
misconduct, even if it pertains to his private activities, as long as it shows him to be wanting in
IMELDA A. NAKPIL, complainant, vs. ATTY. CARLOS J. VALDES, respondent.
moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor.—In the case at bar, complainant is not
charging respondent with breach of ethics for being the common accountant of the estate and
Administrative Law; Attorneys; As a rule, a lawyer is not barred from dealing with his
the two creditors. He is charged for allowing his accounting firm to represent two creditors of
client but the business transaction must be characterized with utmost honesty and good faith. —
the estate and, at the same time, allowing his law firm to represent the estate in the
As a rule, a lawyer is not barred from dealing with his client but the business transaction must
proceedings where these claims were presented. The act is a breach of professional ethics and
be characterized with utmost honesty and good faith. The measure of good faith which an
undesirable as it placed respondent’s and his law firm’s loyalty under a cloud of doubt. Even
attorney is required to exercise in his dealings with his client is a much higher standard than is
granting that respondent’s misconduct refers to his accountancy practice, it would not prevent
required in business dealings where the parties trade at “arms length.” Business transactions
this Court from disciplining him as a member of the Bar. The rule is settled that a lawyer may be
between an attorney and his client are disfavored and discouraged by the policy of the law.
suspended or disbarred for ANY misconduct, even if it pertains to his private activities, as long
Hence, courts carefully watch these transactions to assure that no advantage is taken by a
as it shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor.
lawyer over his client. This rule is founded on public policy for, by virtue of his office, an
Possession of good moral character is not only a prerequisite to admission to the bar but also a
attorney is in an easy position to take advantage of the credulity and ignorance of his client.
continuing requirement to the practice of law.
Thus, no presumption of innocence or improbability of wrongdoing is considered in an attorney’s
favor.
Same; Same; In the case at bar, respondent exhibited less than full fidelity to his duty to
observe candor, fairness and loyalty in his dealings and transactions with his clients.—Public
Same; Same; Respondent’s misuse of his legal expertise to deprive his client of the
confidence in law and lawyers may be eroded by the irresponsible and improper conduct of a
Moran property is clearly unethical.—It ought to follow that respondent’s act of excluding the
member of the bar. Thus, a lawyer should determine his conduct by acting in a manner that
Moran property from the estate which his law firm was representing evinces a lack of fidelity to
would promote public confidence in the integrity of the legal profession. Members of the Bar are
the cause of his client. If respondent truly believed that the said property belonged to him, he
expected to always live up to the standards embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility
should have at least informed complainant of his adverse claim. If they could not agree on its
as the relationship between an attorney and his client is highly fiduciary in nature and demands
ownership, respondent should have formally presented his claim in the intestate proceedings
utmost fidelity and good faith. In the case at bar, respondent exhibited less than full fidelity to
instead of transferring the property to his own corporation and concealing it from complainant
his duty to observe candor, fairness and loyalty in his dealings and transactions with his clients.
and the judge in the estate proceedings. Respondent’s misuse of his legal expertise to deprive
his client of the Moran property is clearly unethical.
ADMINISTRATIVE CASE in the Supreme Court. Misconduct.
Same; Same; Respondent violated Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
which provides that a lawyer owes fidelity to his client’s cause and enjoins him to be mindful of The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
the trust and confidence reposed on him.—Respondent seeks to exculpate himself from this Alampay, Gatchalian, Mawis, Carranza & Alampayfor complainant.
charge by disclaiming knowledge or privity in the preparation of the list of the estate’s liabilities. San Juan, Africa, Gonzalez & San Agustin for respondent.
He theorizes that the inclusion of the loans must have been a mere error or oversight of his
accounting firm. It is clear that the information as to how these two loans should be treated PUNO, J.:
could have only come from respondent himself as the said loans were in his name. Hence, the
supposed error of the accounting firm in charging respondent’s loans against the estate could
The friendship of JOSE NAKPIL and respondent CARLOS J. VALDES dates back to the ’50s during
not have been committed without respondent’s participation. Respondent wanted to “have his
their school days in De La Salle and the Philippine Law School. Their closeness extended to their
cake and eat it too” and subordinated the interest of his client to his own pecuniary gain.
families and respondent became the business consultant, lawyer and accountant of the Nakpils.
Respondent violated Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that a
lawyer owes fidelity to his client’s cause and enjoins him to be mindful of the trust and
In 1965, Jose Nakpil became interested in purchasing a summer residence in Moran Street,
confidence reposed on him.
Baguio City.1 For lack of funds, he requested respondent to purchase the Moran property for
him. They agreed that respondent would keep the property in trust for the Nakpils until the
Same; Same; The proscription against representation of conflicting interests finds
latter could buy it back. Pursuant to their agreement, respondent obtained two (2) loans from a
application where the conflicting interests arise with respect to the same general matter and is
bank (in the amounts of P65,000.00 and P75,000.00) which he used to purchase and renovate
applicable however slight such adverse interest may be.—As regards the third charge, we hold
the property. Title was then issued in respondent’s name.
that respondent is guilty of representing conflicting interests. It is generally the rule, based on
sound public policy, that an attorney cannot represent adverse interests. It is highly improper to
It was the Nakpils who occupied the Moran summer house. When Jose Nakpil died on July
represent both sides of an issue. The proscription against representation of conflicting interests
8, 1973, respondent acted as the legal counsel and accountant of his widow,
finds application where the conflicting interests arise with respect to the same general matter
complainant IMELDA NAKPIL. On March 9, 1976, respondent’s law firm, Carlos J. Valdes &
and is applicable however slight such adverse interest may be. It applies although the attorney’s
Associates, handled the proceeding for the settlement of Jose’s estate. Complainant was
intentions and motives were honest and he acted in good faith. However, representation of
appointed as administratrix of the estate.
conflicting interests may be allowed where the parties consent to the representation, after full
disclosure of facts. Disclosure alone is not enough for the clients must give their informed
The ownership of the Moran property became an issue in the intestate proceedings. It
consent to such representation. The lawyer must explain to his clients the nature and extent of
appears that respondent excluded the Moran property from the inventory of Jose’s estate. On
the conflict and the possible adverse effect must be thoroughly understood by his clients.
LEGAL ETHICS CASES NO. 7 9
February 13, 1978, respondent transferred his title to the Moran property to his company, the On the merit of the first charge, respondent reiterated his defense in the reconveyance case
Caval Realty Corporation. that he did not hold the Moran property in trust for the Nakpils as he is its absolute owner.
On March 29, 1979, complainant sought to recover the Moran property by filing with the Respondent explained that the Nakpils never bought back the Moran property from him, hence,
then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Baguio City an action for reconveyance with the property remained to be his and was rightly excluded from the inventory of Nakpil’s estate.
damages against respondent and his corporation. In defense, respondent claimed absolute
ownership over the property and denied that a trust was created over it. As to the second charge, respondent denied preparing the list of claims against the estate
which included his loans of P65,000.00 and P75,000.00 for the purchase and renovation of the
During the pendency of the action for reconveyance, complainant filed this administrative Moran property. In charging his loans against the estate, he stressed that the list drawn up by
case to disbar the respondent. She charged that respondent violated professional ethics when his accounting firm merely stated that the loans in respondent’s name were applied
he: “probably for the purchase of the house and lot in Moran Street, Baguio City.” Respondent
insisted that this was not an admission that the Nakpils owned the property as the phrase
“probably for the purchase” did not imply a consummated transaction but a projected
acquisition.
I.Assigned to his family corporation the Moran property ( Pulong Maulap) which belonged
to the estate he was settling as its lawyer and auditor.
Respondent also disclaimed knowledge or privity in the preparation of a letter (Exhibit “H”) of
his accounting firm to the Baguio City treasurer remitting the real estate taxes for the Moran
II.Excluded the Moran property from the ‘inventory of real estate properties’ he prepared property on behalf of the Nakpils. He contended that the letter could be a mere error or
for a client-estate and, at the same time, charged the loan secured to purchase the said oversight.
excluded property as a liability of the estate, all for the purpose of transferring the title to
the said property to his family corporation. Respondent averred that it was complainant who acknowledged that they did not own the
Moran property for: (1) complainant’s February 1979 Statement of Assets and Liabilities did not
III.Prepared and defended monetary claims against the estate that retained him as its include the said property, and; (2) complainant, as administratrix, signed the Balance Sheet of
counsel and auditor.2 the Estate where the Moran property was not mentioned.
Respondent admitted that complainant retained the services of his law and accounting firms
On the first charge, complainant alleged that she accepted respondent’s offer to serve as lawyer in the settlement of her husband’s estate. 5 However, he pointed out that he has resigned from
and auditor to settle her husband’s estate. Respondent’s law firm then filed a petition for his law and accounting firms as early as 1974. He alleged that it was Atty. Percival Cendaña
settlement of the estate of the deceased Nakpil but did not include the Moran property in the (from the law firm Carlos Valdes & Associates) who filed the intestate proceedings in court in
estate’s inventory. Instead, respondent transferred the property to his corporation, Caval Realty 1976.
Corporation, and title was issued in its name. Complainant accused respondent of maliciously
appropriating the property in trust knowing that it did not belong to him. She claimed As to the third charge, respondent denied there was a conflict of interest when his law firm
that respondent has expressly acknowledged that the said property belonged to the late Nakpil represented the estate in the intestate proceedings while his accounting firm (C.J. Valdes & Co.,
in his correspondences3 with the Baguio City Treasurer and the complainant. CPAs) served as accountant of the estate and prepared the claims of creditors Angel Nakpil and
ENORN, Inc. against the estate. He proffered the following reasons for his thesis: First, the two
On the second charge, complainant alleged that respondent’s auditing firm (C.J. Valdes & claimants were closely related to the late Nakpil. Claimant ENORN, Inc. is a family corporation of
Co., CPAs) excluded the Moran property from the inventory of her husband’s estate, yet the Nakpils of which the late Nakpil was the President. Claimant Angel Nakpil is a brother of the
included in the claims against the estate the amounts of P65,000.00 and P75,000.00, which late Nakpil who, upon the latter’s death, became the President of ENORN, Inc. These two
respondent represented as her husband’s loans applied “probably for the purchase of a house claimants had been clients of his law and accounting firms even during the lifetime of Jose
and lot in Moran Street, Baguio City.” Nakpil. Second, his alleged representation of conflicting interests was with the knowledge and
consent of complainant as administratrix. Third, there was no conflict of interests between the
As to the third charge, complainant alleged that respondent’s law firm (Carlos J. Valdes and estate and the claimants for they had forged a modus vivendi, i.e., that the subject claims would
Associates) filed the petition for the settlement of her husband’s estate in court, while be satisfied only after full payment of the principal bank creditors. Complainant, as
respondent’s auditing firm (C.J. Valdes & Co., CPAs) acted as accountant of both the estate and administratrix, did not controvert the claims of Angel Nakpil and ENORN, Inc. Complainant has
two of its creditors. She claimed that respondent represented conflicting interests when started paying off the claims of Angel Nakpil and ENORN, Inc. after satisfying the banks’ claims.
his accounting firm prepared the list of claims of creditors Angel Nakpil and ENORN, Inc. against Complainant did not assert that their claims caused prejudice to the estate. Fourth, the work of
her husband’s estate which was represented by respondent’s law firm. Complainant averred that Carlos J. Valdes & Co. as common auditor redounded to the benefit of the estate for the firm
there is no distinction between respondent’s law and auditing firms as respondent is the senior prepared a true and accurate amount of the claim. Fifth, respondent resigned from his law and
and controlling partner of both firms which are housed in the same building. accounting firms as early as August 15, 1974 .6 He rejoined his accounting firm several years
later. He submitted as proof the SEC’s certification of the filing of his accounting firm of an
We required respondent to answer the charges against him. In his ANSWER,4 respondent Amended Articles of Partnership. Thus, it was not he but Atty. Percival Cendaña, from the firm
initially asserted that the resolution of the first and second charges against him depended on the Carlos J. Valdes & Associates, who filed the intestate proceedings in court. On the other hand,
result of the pending action in the CFI for reconveyance which involved the issue of ownership the claimants were represented by their own counsel Atty. Enrique O. Chan. Sixth, respondent
of the Moran property. alleged that in the remote possibility that he committed a breach of professional ethics, he
LEGAL ETHICS CASES NO. 7 10
committed such “misconduct” not as a lawyer but as an accountant who acted as common In 1983, the CFI of Baguio dismissed the action for reconveyance. The trial court ruled that
auditor of the estate and its creditors. Hence, he should be held accountable in another forum. respondent held the Moran property in trust for the Nakpils but found that complainant waived
her right over it.
On November 12, 1979, complainant submitted her REPLY.7 She maintained that the
pendency of the reconveyance case is not prejudicial to the investigation of her disbarment On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court. The appellate court held that
complaint against respondent for the issue in the latter is not the ownership of the Moran respondent was the absolute owner of the Moran property. The Decision was elevated to this
property but the ethics and morality of respondent’s conduct as a CPA-lawyer. Court.
On February 18, 1986, during the pendency of complainant’s appeal to this Court, the OSG
Complainant alleged that respondent’s Annexes to his Reply (such as the Statement of Assets & submitted its Report11 on the disbarment complaint. The OSG relied heavily on the decision of
Liability of the Nakpils and the Balance Sheet of the Estate) which showed that complainant did the Court of Appeals then pending review by this Court. The OSG found that respondent was
not claim ownership of the Moran property were all prepared by C.J. Valdes & Co. as accountant not put on notice of complainant’s claim over the property. It opined that there was no trust
of the estate of Jose Nakpil and filed with the intestate court by C.J. Valdes & Associates as agreement created over the property and that respondent was the absolute owner thereof.
counsel for the estate. She averred that these Annexes were not proofs that respondent owned Thus, it upheld respondent’s right to transfer title to his family corporation. It also found no
the Moran property but were part of respondent’s scheme to remove the property from the conflict of interests as the claimants were related to the late Jose Nakpil. The OSG
estate and transfer it to his family corporation. Complainant alleged that she signed the recommended the dismissal of the administrative case.
documents because of the professional counsel of respondent and his firm that her signature
thereon was required. Complainant charged respondent with greed for coveting the Moran Prefatorily, we note that the case at bar presents a novel situation as it involves the
property on the basis of defects in the documents he himself prepared. disbarment of a CPA-lawyer for his demeanor in his accounting profession and law practice in
connection with the property of his client.
Complainant urged that respondent cannot disown unfavorable documents (the list of
claims against the estate and the letter regarding Nakpil’s payment of realty tax on the Moran As a rule, a lawyer is not barred from dealing with his client but the business transaction
property) which were prepared by his law and accounting firms and invoke other documents must be characterized with utmost honesty and good faith. 12 The measure of good faith which
prepared by the same firms which are favorable to him. She averred that respondent must an attorney is required to exercise in his dealings with his client is a much higher standard than
accept responsibility not just for some, but for all the representations and communications of his is required in business dealings where the parties trade at “arms length.” 13 Business transactions
firms. between an attorney and his client are disfavored and discouraged by the policy of the law.
Hence, courts carefully watch these transactions to assure that no advantage is taken by a
Complainant refuted respondent’s claim that he resigned from his firms from March 9, 1976 lawyer over his client. This rule is founded on public policy for, by virtue of his office, an
to “several years later.” She alleged that none of the documents submitted as evidence referred attorney is in an easy position to take advantage of the credulity and ignorance of his client.
to his resignation from his law firm. The documents merely substantiated his resignation from Thus, no presumption of innocence or improbability of wrongdoing is considered in an attorney’s
his accounting firm. favor.14
In his REJOINDER,8 respondent insisted that complainant cannot hold him liable for In the case at bar, we cannot subscribe to the findings of the OSG in its Report. These
representing the interests of both the estate and the claimants without showing that his action findings were based mainly on the decision of the Court of Appeals in the action for
prejudiced the estate. He urged that it is not per se anomalous for respondent’s accounting reconveyance which was reversed by this Court in 1993.15
firmto act as accountant for the estate and its creditors. He reiterated that he is not subject to
the jurisdiction of this Court for he acted not as lawyer, but as accountant for both the estate As to the first two charges, we are bound by the factual findings of this Court in the
and its claimants. aforementioned reconveyance case.16 It is well-established that respondent offered to the
complainant the services of his law and accounting firms by reason of their close relationship
He alleged that his accounting firm merely prepared the list of claims of the creditors Angel dating as far back as the ’50s. She reposed her complete trust in respondent who was the
Nakpil and ENORN, Inc. Their claims were not defended by his accounting or law firm but by lawyer, accountant and business consultant of her late husband. Respondent and the late Nakpil
Atty. Enrique Chan. He averred that his law firm did not oppose these claims as they were agreed that the former would purchase the Moran property and keep it in trust for the latter. In
legitimate and not because they were prepared by his accounting firm. He emphasized that violation of the trust agreement,respondent claimed absolute ownership over the property and
there was no allegation that the claims were fraudulent or excessive and that the failure of refused to sell the property to complainant after the death of Jose Nakpil. To place the property
respondent’s law firm to object to these claims damaged the estate. beyond the reach of complainant and the intestate court, respondent later transferred it to his
corporation.
In our January 21, 1980 Resolution,9 we deferred further action on the disbarment case
until after resolution of the action for reconveyance between the parties involving the issue of Contrary to the findings of the OSG, respondent initially acknowledged and respected the
ownership by the then CFI of Baguio. Complainant moved for reconsideration on the ground trust nature of the Moran property. Respondent’s bad faith in transferring the property to his
that the issue of ownership pending with the CFI was not prejudicial to her complaint which family corporation is well discussed in this Court’s Decision ,17 thus:
involved an entirely different issue, i.e.,the unethical acts of respondent as a CPA-lawyer. We “x x x Valdes (herein respondent) never repudiated the trust during the lifetime of the late Jose
granted her motion and referred the administrative case to the Office of the Solicitor General Nakpil. On the contrary, he expressly recognized it. x x x (H)e repudiated the trust when (he)
(OSG) for investigation, report and recommendation. 10 excluded Pulong Maulap from the list of properties of the late Jose Nakpil submitted to the
intestate court in 1973. x x x
xxx
LEGAL ETHICS CASES NO. 7 11
where the parties consent to the representation, after full disclosure of facts. Disclosure alone is
“The fact that there was no transfer of ownership intended by the parties x x x can be not enough for the clients must give their informed consent to such representation. The lawyer
bolstered by Exh. “I-2,” an annex to the claim filed against the estate proceedings of the late must explain to his clients the nature and extent of the conflict and the possible adverse effect
Jose Nakpil by his brother, Angel Nakpil, which was prepared by Carlos J. Valdes & Co., the must be thoroughly understood by his clients.22
accounting firm of herein respondent. Exhibit “I-2,” which is a list of the application of the
proceeds of various FUB loans contracted as of 31 December 1973 by the late Jose Nakpil, x x In the case at bar, there is no question that the interests of the estate and that of its creditors
x contains the two (2) loans contracted in the name of respondent. If ownership of Pulong are adverse to each other. Respondent’s accounting firm prepared the list of assets and liabilities
Maulap was already transferred or ceded to Valdes, these loans should not have been included of the estate and, at the same time, computed the claims of two creditors of the estate. There
in the list. is clearly a conflict between the interest of the estate which stands as the debtor, and that of
“Indeed, as we view it, what the parties merely agreed to under the arrangement outlined in the two claimants who are creditors of the estate. In fact, at one instance, respondent’s law firm
Exh. “J” was that respondent Valdes would x x x ‘take over the total loan of P140,000.00 and questioned the claims of creditor Angel Nakpil against the estate.
pay all of the interests due on the notes’ while the heirs of the late Jose Nakpil would continue
to live in the disputed property for five (5) years without remuneration save for regular To exculpate himself, respondent denies that he represented complainant in the intestate
maintenance expenses. This does not mean, however, that if at the end of the five-year period proceedings. He points out that it was one Atty. Percival Cendaña, from his law firm Carlos J.
petitioner (Nakpil) failed to reimburse Valdes for his advances, x x x Valdes could already Valdes & Associates, who filed the intestate case in court. However, the fact that he did not
automatically assume ownership of Pulong Maulap. Instead, the remedy of respondents Carlos personally file the case and appear in court is beside the point. As established in the records of
J. Valdes and Caval Realty Corporation was to proceed against the estate of the late Jose M. this case and in the reconveyance case ,23 respondent acted as counsel and accountant of
Nakpil and/or the property itself.” (emphasis supplied) complainant after the death of Jose Nakpil. Respondent’s defense that he resigned from his law
and accounting firms as early as 1974 (or two years before the filing of the intestate case) is
In the said reconveyance case, we further ruled that complainant’s documentary evidence unworthy of merit. Respondent’s claim of resignation from his law firm is not supported by any
(Exhibits “H,” “J” and “L”), which she also adduced in this administrative case, should estop documentary proof. The documents on record 24 only show respondent’s resignation from his
respondent from claiming that he bought the Moran property for himself, and not merely in trust accounting firm in 1972 and 1974. Even these documents reveal that respondent returned to his
for Jose Nakpil.18 accounting firm on July 1, 1976 and as of 1978, the intestate proceedings for the settlement of
Jose’s estate had not yet been terminated. It does not escape us that when respondent
It ought to follow that respondent’s act of excluding the Moran property from the estate transferred the Moran property to his corporation on February 13, 1978, the intestate
which his law firm was representing evinces a lack of fidelity to the cause of his client. If proceedings was still pending in court. Thus, the succession of events shows that respondent
respondent truly believed that the said property belonged to him, he should have at least could not have been totally ignorant of the proceedings in the intestate case.
informed complainant of his adverse claim. If they could not agree on its ownership, respondent
should have formally presented his claim in the intestate proceedings instead of transferring the Respondent claims that complainant knew that his law firm Carlos J. Valdes & Associates
property to his own corporation and concealing it from complainant and the judge in the estate was the legal counsel of the estate25 and his accounting firm, C.J. Valdes & Co., CPAs, was the
proceedings. Respondent’s misuse of his legal expertise to deprive his client of the Moran auditor of both the estate and the two claimants against it. 26 The fact, however, that
property is clearly unethical. complainant, as administratrix, did not object to the set-up cannot be taken against her as there
is nothing in the records to show that respondent or his law firm explained the legal situation
To make matters worse, respondent, through his accounting firm, charged the two loans of and its consequences to complainant. Thus, her silence regarding the arrangement does not
P65,000.00 and P75,000.00 as liability of the estate, after said loans were obtained by amount to an acquiescence based on an informed consent.
respondent for the purchase and renovation of the property which he claimed for
himself. Respondent seeks to exculpate himself from this charge by disclaiming knowledge or We also hold that the relationship of the claimants to the late Nakpil does not negate the
privity in the preparation of the list of the estate’s liabilities. He theorizes that the inclusion of conflict of interest. When a creditor files a claim against an estate, his interest is per se
the loans must have been a mere error or oversight of his accounting firm. It is clear that the adverse to the estate. As correctly pointed out by complainant, if she had a claim against her
information as to how these two loans should be treated could have only come from respondent husband’s estate, her claim is still adverse and must be filed in the intestate proceedings.
himself as the said loans were in his name. Hence, the supposed error of the accounting firm in
charging respondent’s loans against the estate could not have been committed without Prescinding from these premises, respondent undoubtedly placed his law firm in a position
respondent’s participation. Respondent wanted to “have his cake and eat it too” and where his loyalty to his client could be doubted. In the estate proceedings, the duty of
subordinated the interest of his client to his own pecuniary gain. Respondent violated Canon 17 respondent’s law firm was to contest the claims of these two creditors but which claims were
of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that a lawyer owes fidelity to his prepared by respondent’s accounting firm. Even if the claims were valid and did not prejudice
client’s cause and enjoins him to be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed on him. the estate, the set-up is still undesirable. The test to determine whether there is a conflict of
interest in the representation is probability, not certainty of conflict. It was respondent’s duty to
As regards the third charge, we hold that respondent is guilty of representing conflicting inhibit either of his firms from said proceedings to avoid the probability of conflict of interest.
interests. It is generally the rule, based on sound public policy, that an attorney cannot
represent adverse interests. It is highly improper to represent both sides of an issue. 19 The Respondent advances the defense that assuming there was conflict of interest, he could not be
proscription against representation of conflicting interests finds application where the conflicting charged before this Court as his alleged “misconduct” pertains to his accounting practice.
interests arise with respect to the same general matter20 and is applicable however slight such
adverse interest may be. It applies although the attorney’s intentions and motives were honest We do not agree. Respondent is a CPA-lawyer who is actively practicing both professions.
and he acted in good faith.21 However, representation of conflicting interests may be allowed He is the senior partner of his law and accounting firms which carry his name. In the case at
LEGAL ETHICS CASES NO. 7 12
bar, complainant is not charging respondent with breach of ethics for being the common
accountant of the estate and the two creditors. He is charged for allowing his accounting firm to
represent two creditors of the estate and, at the same time, allowing his law firm to represent
the estate in the proceedings where these claims were presented. The act is a breach of
professional ethics and undesirable as it placed respondent’s and his law firm’s loyalty under a
cloud of doubt. Even granting that respondent’s misconduct refers to his accountancy practice, it
would not prevent this Court from disciplining him as a member of the Bar. The rule is settled
that a lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for ANY misconduct, even if it pertains to his
private activities, as long as it shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity or
good demeanor.27 Possession of good moral character is not only a prerequisite to admission to
the bar but also a continuing requirement to the practice of law.
Public confidence in law and lawyers may be eroded by the irresponsible and improper conduct
of a member of the bar. Thus, a lawyer should determine his conduct by acting in a manner that
would promote public confidence in the integrity of the legal profession. Members of the Bar are
expected to always live up to the standards embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility
as the relationship between an attorney and his client is highly fiduciary in nature and demands
utmost fidelity and good faith.28 In the case at bar, respondent exhibited less than full fidelity to
his duty to observe candor, fairness and loyalty in his dealings and transactions with his clients. 29
Let copies of this Decision be furnished all courts, as well as the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and the Office of the Bar Confidant.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado (Chairman), Mendoza and Martinez, JJ.,concur.
Melo, J., No part. Previous associate with respondent.
Respondent found guilty of misconduct and suspended from the practice of law for one
year.
ACCORDINGLY, this Court REPRIMANDS respondent with a STERN WARNING that the
commission of the same or similar offense will be dealt with more severely in the future. LET
copies of this decision be spread in his records and copies be furnished the Department of
Justice and the Office of the Bar Confidant.
SO ORDERED.
Davide,
Jr. (C.J.), Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Purisima
, Pardo, Buena and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.
Respondent reprimanded and warned against the commission of similar offense.
Note.—It cannot be denied that the respect of litigants for the profession is inexorably
diminished whenever a member of the Bar betrays their trust and confidence. ( Busiños vs.
Ricafort, 283 SCRA 407 [1997])