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Samelo Vs Manotok Services G.R. No. 170509
Samelo Vs Manotok Services G.R. No. 170509
170509
Article 1670. If at the end of the contract the lessee should continue
enjoying the thing leased for fifteen days with the acquiescence of the
lessor, and unless a notice to the contrary by either party has previously
been given, it is understood that there is an implied new lease, not for the
period of the original contract, but for the time established in Articles 1682
and 1687. The other terms of the original contract shall be revived.
An implied new lease or tacita reconduccion will set in when the following
requisites are found to exist: a) the term of the original contract of lease has
expired; b) the lessor has not given the lessee a notice to vacate; and c) the
lessee continued enjoying the thing leased for fifteen days with the
acquiescence of the lessor.[20] As earlier discussed, all these requisites
have been fulfilled in the present case.
Article 1687. If the period for the lease has not been fixed, it is understood
to be from year to year, if the rent agreed upon is annual; from month to
month, if it is monthly; from week to week, if the rent is weekly; and from
day to day, if the rent is to be paid daily.
Since the rent was paid on a monthly basis, the period of lease is considered
to be from month to month, in accordance with Article 1687 of the Civil
Code. [A] lease from month to month is considered to be one with a definite
period which expires at the end of each month upon a demand to vacate by
the lessor.[21] When the respondent sent a notice to vacate to the petitioner
on August 5, 1998, the tacita reconduccion was aborted, and the contract is
deemed to have expired at the end of that month. [A] notice to vacate
constitutes an express act on the part of the lessor that it no longer consents
to the continued occupation by the lessee of its property.[22] After such
notice, the lessees right to continue in possession ceases and her possession
becomes one of detainer.[23]
Estoppel of tenant
We find no merit in the petitioners allegation that the respondent had no
authority to lease the subject premises because the latter failed to prove
that it is its owner or administrator.
These provisions bar the petitioner from contesting the respondents title
over the subject premises. The juridical relationship between x x x [a] lessor
and x x x [a lessee] carries with it a recognition of the lessor's title. As
[lessee, the petitioner is] estopped [from denying the] landlord's title, or to
assert a better title not only in [herself], but also in some third person while
[she remains] in possession of the subject premises and until [she
surrenders] possession to the landlord. This estoppel applies even though
the lessor had no title at the time the relation of [the] lessor and [the] lessee
was created, and may be asserted not only by the original lessor, but also by
those who succeed to his title.[24] Once a contact of lease is shown to exist
between the parties, the lessee cannot by any proof, however strong,
overturn the conclusive presumption that the lessor has a valid title to or a
better right of possession to the subject premises than the lessee.
Indeed, the relation of lessor and lessee does not depend on the formers
title but on the agreement between the parties, followed by the possession
of the premises by the lessee under such agreement. As long as the latter
remains in undisturbed possession, it is immaterial whether the lessor has
a valid title or any title at all at the time the relationship was entered into.
[citations omitted]
Petitioner cites Jacinto Co v. Rizal Militar, et al., which has facts and
legal issues identical to those of the instant case. The petitioner therein filed
an unlawful detainer case against the respondents over a disputed property.
He had a Torrens title thereto, while the respondents as actual occupants of
the property claimed ownership thereof based on their unregistered Deeds
of Sale. The principal issue was who between the two parties had
the better right to possess the subject property.
This Court resolved the issue by upholding the title holder as the one
who had the better right to possession of the disputed property
based on the following justification:
We have, time and again, held that the only issue for resolution in an
unlawful detainer case is physical or material possession of the
property involved, independent of any claim of ownership by any
of the party litigants. Moreover, an ejectment suit is summary in nature
and is not susceptible to circumvention by the simple expedient of asserting
ownership over the property.
In forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases, even if the defendant raises
the question of ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession
cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the lower
courts and the Court of Appeals, nonetheless, have the undoubted
competence to provisionally resolve the issue of ownership for the sole
purpose of determining the issue of Possession.
Such decision, however, does not bind the title or affect the ownership of
the land nor is conclusive of the facts therein found in a case between the
same parties upon a different cause of action involving possession.
In the instant case, the evidence showed that as between the parties, it is
the petitioner who has a Torrens Title to the property. Respondents merely
showed their unregistered deeds of sale in support of their claims. The
Metropolitan Trial Court correctly relied on the transfer certificate of title
in the name of petitioner.
Well-settled is the rule that what determines the nature of the action as well
as the court which has jurisdiction over the case are the allegations in the
complaint. In ejectment cases, the complaint should embody such
statement of facts as to bring the party clearly within the class of cases for
which the statutes provide a remedy, as these proceedings are summary in
nature. The complaint must show enough on its face to give the court
jurisdiction without resort to parol evidence.
The spouses Capco, on the other hand, aside from their bare allegation that
respondent Rufino is an heir of the true owners thereof, presented nothing
to support their claim. While they submitted receipts evidencing their
payments of the realty taxes of their house and the camarin standing in the
subject property, the same only militates against their claim since the latest
receipts indicate Teodora as the owner of the land. Moreover, the spouses
Capco’s attempt to attack the title of Teodora is futile. "It has repeatedly
been emphasized that when the property is registered under the Torrens
system, the registered owner's title to the property is presumed legal and
cannot be collaterally attacked, especially in a mere action for unlawful
detainer. It has even been held that it does not even matter if the party's
title to the property is questionable."
All told, the Court agrees with the MeTC's conclusion, as affirmed by the
RTC, that the spouses Dela Cruz are better entitled to the material
possession of the subject property. As its present owners, they have a right
to the possession of the property which is one of the attributes of
ownership.