1.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ERLINDA RACHO Y

SOMERA, Accused-Appellant.

FACTS:

Racho (Radio) was charged with the crime of Illegal Recruitment in large scale; 16
counts of estafa, of which 6 cases prospered.

All of the cases against Radio were consolidated and tried jointly.

During the trial, the prosecution presented the testimonies of Bella Diaz (Bella), a
senior Labor and Employment Officer from the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration, as well as some of the complainants in the criminal cases.

In particular, Bella Diaz confirmed that Racho was neither licensed nor authorized
to recruit workers for employment abroad as certified in a document dated July 12,
2012.

Meanwhile, Odelio, Simeon, Bernardo, Renato, Rodolfo, and Rex uniformly alleged
that they heard either from a radio advertisement or a friend about an employment
opportunity in East Timor linked to Racho.

On separate dates, they went to meet with Racho either at her residence in Vigan,
Ilocos Sur or her office in Makati City where they were briefed about the available
position for them and the corresponding compensation. They were then asked to
provide documents, fill out bio-data forms, and pay placement fees, which they did.
They then left the Philippines on different dates and stayed in East Timor while
waiting for their working visas. However, two to three months passed and yet no
working visas were issued despite Radio's promises. Thus, they went back to the
Philippines, and after failing to find Racho, filed their complaints before the
Presidential Anti-Illegal Recruitment Task Force Hunter.

RTC: Guilty of IR in large scale and 6 counts of estafa. RTC was convinced that
Racho offered and promised employments in East Timor to complainants despite
not having any license to recruit them.

CA: Affirmed the conviction of Racho.

Issue: WON Racho is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Illegal Recruitment in Large
Scale and Estafa

Held:

The elements of the offense are: (a) the offender has no valid license or authority
to enable him to lawfully engage in recruitment and placement of workers; (b) he
undertakes any of the activities within the meaning of "recruitment and placement"
under Article 13 (b) of the Labor Code or any prohibited practices enumerated
under Article 34 of the Labor Code (now Section 6 of RA 8042); and (c) he commits
the same against three or more persons, individually or as a group.33 Illegal
recruitment when committed by a syndicate or in large scale shall be considered an
offense involving economic sabotage.

The definition of "recruitment and placement" under Article 13 (b) of the Labor
Code includes promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad,
whether for profit or not, provided, that any person or entity which, in any
manner, offers or promises for a fee, employment to two or more persons shall
be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement. Thus, Racho's act of offering
and promising to deploy the complainants to East Timor for work and collecting
placement fees from more than three (3) persons, despite not being authorized to
do so, renders her liable for Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale. 

ESTAFA CASES RULING

Under this provision, Estafa by means of deceit is committed when these elements
concur: (a) the accused used fictitious name or false pretense that he possesses
power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary
transactions, or other similar deceits; (b) he used such deceitful means prior to or
simultaneous with the commission of the fraud; (c) the offended party relied on
such deceitful means to part with his money or property; and (d) the offended
party suffered damage.

Records show that Racho defrauded Odelio, Simeon, Bernardo, Renato, and Rodolfo
by representing that she can provide them with jobs in East Timor even though she
had no license to recruit workers for employment abroad. She even collected the
irrelevant documents and placement fees of varying amounts. Although
complainants were able to fly to East Timor, they remained unemployed there due
to Racho's failure to obtain their working visas. When they returned to the country
and looked for Racho, complainants could not locate her to recover the amounts
they paid. Undeniably, the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt
that Racho committed Estafa against the five (5) complainants.
 2. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, vs. ALELIE TOLENTINO a.k.a.
"Alelie Tolentino y Hernandez," Appellant

FACTS:

Appellant was charged with illegal recruitment and five (5) counts of estafa under
Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code.

complainants Orlando Layoso, Donna Magboo, Jimmy Lejos, and Marcelino

Lejos8 alleged that sometime in the first week of November 2001, they had a
meeting with appellant Alelie Tolentino (appellant) in her office at the 3rd floor,
Arevalo Building, Alabang, Muntinlupa City. Appellant told them the procedure for
overseas employment and offered them assistance to find work abroad for a fee of
₱80,000. Appellant showed them pictures of those she allegedly helped find work
abroad and told them that they would be earning $630 monthly as factory workers
in Korea. When asked about her license to recruit overseas workers, appellant told
private complainants that she would show it to them at some other time. On 14
November 2001, private complainants again met with appellant at her office and
each of them gave appellant ₱20,000 as partial payment of the agreed fee, which
included expenses for medical examination and processing of their documents for
work in Korea. Appellant promised to secure their visas and employment contracts
within three months.

On 30 January 2002, private complainants met with appellant, who was

accompanied by a certain Narcisa Santos, at Wendy’s in Arquiza Street, Manila for
signing of contract. However, the names written on the employment contracts were
not private complainants’ names. Appellant explained that the contracts were
supposedly for other applicants who sought her services but later backed out.
Appellant assured them that original contracts bearing their names would
subsequently be provided. Private complainants signed the contracts and paid
₱15,000 each as their second partial payment.

private complainants received information that the Criminal Investigation and

Detection Group arrested appellant for illegal recruitment. When private
complainants confronted appellant at the Manila City Hall where she was held, they
demanded the return of their payments 

Another complainant, Lederle Panesa, alleged that in August 2001, she met with
appellant, who offered her work in Korea for a placement fee of ₱75,000. On 7
September 2001, Panesa gave appellant ₱15,000 as initial payment. Panesa was
informed that appellant was apprehended for illegal recruitment.

Defense: Private complainants allegedly sought her help regarding possible work in
Korea and that she merely explained the procedure for overseas employment to
them. She testified that she gave the payments to Narcisa Santos.

RTC: guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of large scale illegal
recruitment, which constitutes economic sabotage five counts of estafa.
CA: Affirmed.

ISSUE: WON the accused is guilty of Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale

HELD: YES.

Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale

Article 13(b) of the Labor Code defines recruitment and placement as "any act of
canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring
workers, and includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for
employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not."

Under RA 8042, a non-licensee or non-holder of authority commits illegal

recruitment for overseas employment in two ways: (1) by any act of canvassing,
enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers, and
includes referring, contract services, promising or advertising for employment
abroad, whether for profit or not; and (2) by undertaking any of the acts
enumerated under Section 6 of RA 8042. On the other hand, a licensee or holder of
authority is also liable for illegal recruitment for overseas employment when he or
she undertakes any of the thirteen acts or practices [(a) to (m)] listed under
Section 6 of RA 8042. To constitute illegal recruitment in large scale, the offense of
illegal recruitment must be committed against three or more persons, individually
or as a group.

First, appellant is a non-licensee or non-holder of authority. Part of the evidence

submitted by the prosecution is a POEA Certification15 dated 10 March 2003, stating
that appellant is not licensed by the POEA to recruit workers for overseas
employment. Appellant admitted that she has no valid license or authority required
by law to lawfully engage in recruitment and placement of workers.

Second, despite the absence of a license or authority to undertake recruitment

activities, appellant gave the impression that she has the power or ability to secure
work for private complainants in Korea. Private complainants Orlando Layoso,
Donna Magboo, and Jimmy Lejos all testified that appellant promised them work as
factory workers in Korea and induced them to pay placement fees, which included
the expenses for medical examination and the processing of their documents for
work in Korea. Appellant even showed pictures of previous applicants, whom she
allegedly helped find work abroad. Appellant also explained to them the procedure
for overseas employment and promised them that she would secure their visas and
employment contracts within three months. The testimonies of Orlando Layoso,
Donna Magboo, and Jimmy Lejos were corroborated by private respondents
Marcelino Lejos and Lederle Panesa, whose Affidavits of Complaint were adopted as
their direct testimonies.

This Court has held in several cases that an accused who represents to others that
he could send workers abroad for employment, even without the authority or
license to do so, commits illegal recruitment.
Estafa

We likewise affirm appellant’s conviction for five counts of estafa under Article
315(2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code. It is settled that a person, for the same acts,
may be convicted separately for illegal recruitment under RA 8042 (or the Labor
Code), and estafa under Article 315(2)(a)21 of the Revised Penal Code.22

The elements of estafa are: (1) the accused defrauded another by abuse of
confidence or by means of deceit; and (2) the offended party or a third party
suffered damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation
 3. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee vs. MERCEDITAS
MATHEUS DELOS REYES, Accused-Appellant

FACTS:

Accused-appellant was charged with six counts of Estafa under Article 315 (2) (a)
of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) and one count of Large Scale Illegal Recruitment
under RA 8042.

Suratos went to an office in Cubao, Quezon City where she met the accused-
appellant, who promised her a job in Cyprus as a caretaker. She returned to the
accused-appellant's office a month later. The accused-appellant gave her a machine
copy of her visa to prove that there was a good job waiting for her in Cyprus and
that she would leave in three months upon payment. Suratos gave the accused-
appellant an amount totaling to PhP55,000, inclusive of her passport and medical
examination report. Suratos learned that the accused-appellant was already
detained and could no longer deploy her abroad.

Guillarte went to the office of the accused-appellant who promised her work as a
hotel staff member in Cyprus. She gave accused-appellant an amount totaling PhP
55,000 as full payment for her deployment abroad. 

Alayon met the accusedappellant at the All Care Travel Agency located at 302
Escueta Bldg., Cubao, Quezon City. Accused-appellant offered her a job in Cyprus
as a part of the laundry staff and asked her to pay the total amount of PhP55,000,
to submit her resume and transcript of records, among others, and promised to
deploy her abroad.

Duldulao, through his wife's friend, was introduced to the accused-appellant. When
Duldulao mentioned that she had a sister working in Spain, accused-appellant
promised a tourist visa for him in exchange for PhP 45,000. 

Bagay, Jr. went to the office of the accused-appellant who offered him a job as a
dentist in London. Accused-appellant assured him that with an initial payment of
PhP30,000, 

Defense: She was issued a professional license as an Electronics Communication

Engineer. She claimed that she did not know Suratos, Guillarte, Alayon, Bagay, Jr.,
and Gloria. Although she knew Duldulao, she did not promise him any job.

RTC: rendered its Decision, 10 convicting accused-appellant of the crime of large

scale illegal recruitment and five counts of estafa. 

CA: affirmed the RTC's Decision.

ISSUE:

WON THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE

CRIMES OF ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT AND ESTAFA.
HELD: YES.

Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale –

The offense of illegal recruitment in large scale has the following elements: 15 (l}
the person charged undertook any recruitment activity as defined under Section 6
of RA 8042; 16 (2) accused did not have the license or the authority to lawfully
engage in the recruitment of workers; and, (3) accused committed the same
against three or more persons individually or as a group.

First,  the RTC found accused-appellant to have undertaken recruitment activity

when she promised the private complainants overseas employment for a
fee.1avvphi1

Second,  the March 1, 2004 Certification issued by the Philippine Overseas

Employment Administration unmistakably reveals that the accused-appellant
neither had a license nor authority to recruit workers for overseas
employment.22 Notably, instead of assailing the certification, she admitted during
the pre-trial that she did not have a license or authority to lawfully engage in
recruitment and placement of workers.

Third,  it was established that there were five complainants, i.e., Suratos, Guillarte,
Alayon, Bagay, Jr., and Duldulao.

Estafa under under Article 315(2)(a) of the RPC of the RPC

The elements of estafa are: (1) the accused defrauded another by abuse of
confidence or by means of deceit; and (2) the offended party or a third party
suffered damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation.

Here, the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that accused-appellant

deceived private complainants into believing that she had the authority and
capability to send them abroad for employment, despite her not being licensed by
the POEA to recruit workers for overseas employment. Because of the assurances
given by accused-appellant, the private complainants parted with their hard-earned
money for the payment of the agreed placement fee, for which accused-appellant
issued petty cash vouchers and used fictitious names evidencing her receipt of the
payments.
 4. SUNACE INTERNATIONAL MANAGEMENT SERVICES, INC.Petitioner,
vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, Second Division;
HON. ERNESTO S. DINOPOL, in his capacity as Labor Arbiter, NLRC;
NCR, Arbitration Branch, Quezon City and DIVINA A.
MONTEHERMOZO, Respondents.

FACTS:

Petitioner, Sunace International Management Services (Sunace), a corporation duly

organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines, deployed to Taiwan Divina
A. Montehermozo (Divina) as a domestic helper under a 12-month contract, The
deployment was with the assistance of a Taiwanese broker, Edmund Wang,
President of Jet Crown International Co.

After her 12-month contract expired on February 1, 1998, Divina continued working
for her Taiwanese employer, Hang Rui Xiong, for two more years, after which she
returned to the Philippines.

after her return or on February 14, 2000, Divina filed a complaint2 before the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) against Sunace, one Adelaide Perez,
the Taiwanese broker, and the employer-foreign principal alleging that she was
jailed for three months and that she was underpaid.

Sunace alleged that Divina’s 2-year extension of her contract was without its
knowledge and consent, hence, it had no liability attaching to any claim arising
therefrom, and Divina in fact executed a Waiver/Quitclaim and Release of
Responsibility and an Affidavit of Desistance.

The Labor Arbiter, rejected Sunace’s claim that the extension of Divina’s contract
for two more years was without its knowledge and consent. NLRC affirmed the
decision of LA. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Labor Arbiter and NLRC’s finding
that Sunace knew of and impliedly consented to the extension of Divina’s 2-year
contract. As agent of its foreign principal, [Sunace] cannot profess ignorance of
such an extension as obviously, the act of its principal extending [Divina’s]
employment contract necessarily bound it,

ISSUE:

WON Sunace impliedly consented to the extension of the contract of private

respondent Divina.

HELD: NO.

Contrary to the Court of Appeals finding, the alleged continuous communication was
with the Taiwanese broker Wang, not with the foreign employer Xiong.
The February 21, 2000 telefax message from the Taiwanese broker to Sunace,
the only basis of a finding of continuous communication The message does not
provide evidence that Sunace was privy to the new contract executed after the
expiration on February 1, 1998 of the original contract.
it too is a misapplication, a misapplication of the theory of imputed knowledge.

The theory of imputed knowledge ascribes the knowledge of the agent, Sunace, to
the principal, employer Xiong, not the other way around.23 The knowledge of the
principal-foreign employer cannot, therefore, be imputed to its agent Sunace.

There being no substantial proof that Sunace knew of and consented to be bound
under the 2-year employment contract extension, it cannot be said to be privy
thereto. As such, it and its "owner" cannot be held solidarily liable for any of
Divina’s claims arising from the 2-year employment extension. As the New Civil
Code provides,

Contracts take effect only between the parties, their assigns, and heirs, except in
case where the rights and obligations arising from the contract are not
transmissible by their nature, or by stipulation or by provision of law.24

Furthermore, as Sunace correctly points out, there was an implied revocation of its
agency relationship with its foreign principal when, after the termination of the
original employment contract, the foreign principal directly negotiated with Divina
and entered into a new and separate employment contract in Taiwan. Article 1924
of the New Civil Code reading

The agency is revoked if the principal directly manages the business entrusted to
the agent, dealing directly with third persons.
 5. APQ SHIPMANAGEMENT CO., LTD., and APQ CREW MANAGEMENT
USA, INC., Petitioners, vs. ANGELITO L. CASEÑAS, Respondent

FACTS:

Casenas was hired by APQ, acting for and in behalf of its principal, Crew
Management, as Chief Mate for vessel MV Perseverance for a period of eight (8)
months starting from June 16, 2004 to February 16, 2005,with a basic monthly
salary of US$840.00.

1. Casenas alleged that on June 16, 2004, he left Manila to join his assigned
vessel in Miami, Florida, USA, though the vessel could not leave the Florida
port because of its incomplete documents for operation; that consequently,
he was transferred to another vessel, MV HAITIEN PRIDE, which was in Haiti,
although again because of incomplete documents, the vessel could not leave
the port and remained at Cap Haitien; that together with the rest of the
vessel's officers and crew, he was left to fend for himself;

2. that they were not provided food and water and had to fish for their own food
and were not paid their salaries; that he suffered extreme stress and anxiety
because of the uncertainty of the situation;

3. that his employment contract was extended by APQ from the original eight
(8) months to twenty-six (26) months;

4. that the vessel eventually left for Bahamas; that he felt he became weaker
and got tired easily; that despite his unpaid wages and weakened condition,
he performed his duties as Chief Mate diligently; that in August 2006, he
began to suffer shortness of breath, headache and chest pains; that he was
then brought to the Grand Bahamas Health Services and was diagnosed with
hypertension and was given medicines;

5. that he was then repatriated due to his condition and he arrived in the
Philippines on August 30, 2006; that within three (3) days thereafter, he
reported to APQ for post-employment medical examination where the
company-designated physician later diagnosed him with Ischemic Heart
Disease; that a certain Dr. Ariel G. Domingo likewise examined him,
confirming and certifying that he was suffering from Essential Hypertension
and Ischemic Heart Disease;

6. that he was declared "unfit for sea service"; that as a result; that APQ
refused to provide him further medical attention, thus, he incurred medical
expenses in the amount of 6,390.00 by November 2006; that he demanded
payment of permanent total disability benefits, sickness allowance and
medical expenses to which he was entitled under the POEA Standard
Employment Contract (POEA-SEC), but APQ refused to pay.
DEFENSE: APQ alleged that it could not be held liable for claims pertaining to the
extended portion of the contract for it did not consent to it; Caseñas refused to
return to the Philippines until he finally did on August 30, 2006

ANSWER: Caseñas, however, disputed the position of APQ, claiming that his
contract of employment was duly extended. He presented Deck Logbook, dated 14
August 2006;Report of Mr. Steve Mastroropolous, dated 16 May 2006; Letter, dated
24 April 2006 of Mr. Alex P. Quillope, President of the respondent APQ to OWWA,
admitting that there was no food and water for the crew of MV "HAITIEN PRIDE.

LA: dismissed Casenas’ complaint – employment contract was not extended

pursuant to the terms and conditions of the contract.

NLRC: reversed the LA - it found that the employment contract was extended.
BUT the NLRC, acting on the motion for reconsideration filed by APQ,
reconsidered and set aside its earlier decision.

CA: reinstated the earlier decision of the NLRC.

ISSUE: WON the employment contract of Caseñas was extended with the consent
of APQ/Crew Management.

HELD: YES.

Regarding the issue of extension and its corresponding consequences, two cases
were cited by the parties. In Sunace, the Court ruled that the theory of imputed
knowledge ascribed the knowledge of the agent to the principal, not the other way
around. The knowledge of the principal-foreign employer could not, therefore, be
imputed to its agent. In Placewell, the Court concluded that the original POEA-
approved employment contract subsisted and, thus, the solidary liability of the
agent with the principal continued.

APQ’s primary argument revolves around the fact of expiration of Caseñas’

employment contract, which it claims was not extended as it was without its
consent. While the contract stated that any extension must be made by mutual
consent of the parties, it, however, incorporated Department Order (DO)No. 4 and
Memorandum Circular No. 09.

SECTION 2. COMMENCEMENT/ DURATION OF CONTRACT

A. The Employment contract between the employer and the seafarer shall
commence upon actual departure of the seafarer from the airport or seaport
in the point of hire and with a POEA approved contract. It shall be effective
until the seafarer’s date of arrival at the point of hire upon termination of his
employment pursuant to Section 18 of this Contract.
 B. The period of employment shall be for a period mutually agreed upon by
the seafarer and the employer but not to exceed 12 months. Any extension
of the contract shall be subject to the mutual consent of both parties.

SECTION 18. TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT

A. The employment of the seafarer shall cease when the seafarer completes
his period of contractual service aboard the vessel, signs off from the vessel
and arrives at the point of hire.

B. The employment of the seafareris also terminated when the seafarer

arrives at the point of hire for any of the following reasons:

1. When the seafarer signs off and is disembarked for medical reasons
pursuant to Section 20 (B)[5] of this Contract.

It is to be observed that both provisions require the seafarer to arrive at the point
of hire as it signifies the completion of the employment contract, and not merely its
expiration. Similarly, a seafarer’s employment contract is terminated even before
the contract expires as soon as he arrives at the point of hire and signs off for
medical reasons, due to shipwreck, voluntary resignation or for other just causes.
In a nutshell, there are three (3) requirements necessary for the complete
termination of the employment contract: 1]termination due to expiration or other
reasons/causes; 2]signing off from the vessel; and 3]arrival at the point of hire. In
this case, there was no clear showing that Caseñas signed off from the vessel upon
the expiration of his employment contract, which was in February or April 2005. He
did not arrive either in Manila, his point of hire, because he was still on board the
vessel MV Haitien Pride on the supposed date of expiration of his contract. It was
only on August 14, 2006 that he signed off21 from MV Haitien Pride and arrived in
Manila on August 30, 2006.

Accordingly, Caseñas’ contract should have been terminated and he should have been
repatriated to the Philippines because a seafarer cannot be forced to sail with an
unseaworthy vessel, pursuant to Section 24 of the POEA-SEC.25 There was, however, no
showing that his contract was terminated by reason of such transfer. It is necessary to
reiterate that MV Haitien Pride appears to be manned by, and accredited with, the same
principal/ agency. His joining the said vessel could only mean that it was for the
purpose of completing his contract as the transfer was made well within the period of
his employment contract on board MV Perseverance.

Crew Management also executed the letter,27 dated February 24, 2006, addressed to

DOLE-OWWA in response to the report of the wife of Caseñas to DOLE regarding his
repatriation. 

APQ had actual knowledge that Caseñas continued working on board the said vessel
after February/April 2005. Despite such knowledge, APQ neither posed any
objection to the extension of the contract nor make any effort to protect itself from
any responsibility that might arise from the extension, if it did not indeed intend to
extend the employment contract. 

APQ cannot now feign ignorance of any extension of the contract and claim
that it did not consent to it. As it had knowledge of the extended contract, APQ is
solidarily liable with Crew Management for Caseñas’ claims. Caseñas is,
therefore, entitled to the unpaid wages during the extended portion of his contract.