Criminal Intelligence

and the Challenge

of Transnational Organized
Crime in Latin America
Eduardo E. Estévez

Abstract
The purpose of this article is to understand the evolution in Latin America of
criminal intelligence, a new discipline that intersects sectors such as public
security, intelligence systems, and criminal justice system. In a context
of high rates of violent crime, the emergence of the business of organized
crime in the region poses a serious threat. The legacies of an authoritarian
past in several countries of the region impacts in the democratization of the
intelligence sector carried out by new democracies. The article furthers a
theoretical and doctrinal discussion on the subject, including the emergence
of the ‘Intelligence-Led Policing’ (ILP) approach. Issues such as Big Data,
the impact of technology and concerns related to privacy and the handle of
information by police and intelligence are discussed. A section is devoted to
overview of recent developments in Latin America, including Brazil, Colombia
and Honduras recent experiences. In the region, the development of criminal
intelligence is still incipient; if there is now a momentum, it is primarily due
to the emergence of transnational organized crime as a perceived and real
threat to the security of the region. Another section examines the case of
Argentina. Since the recovery of democracy in December 1983, its criminal
intelligence subsector had a swinging path. Internal Security Law 24,059 of
1992 and National Intelligence Law of 2001 were the legal framework. Given
that some countries in the region adopted a federal system of government, a

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few experiences of sub-national are highlighted. Although criminal intelligence

is reflected in some legal frameworks, it is not being fully implemented as a
specific activity, organizationally structured and, functionally effective. The
article concludes that the consolidation of criminal intelligence is a challenge
for the countries of the region.

Introduction
The need to promote criminal intelligence activities, and therefore, in some
cases specific agencies in Latin American countries, has risen in recent years.
This developed as a consequence of a context of high rates of criminality, and
the search for crime prevention strategies adapted to such scenario. However,
it gives the impression that there is still no effective assimilation of it into
the intelligence policy or security strategies. Criminal intelligence appears
as an activity attributable to different agencies –police, intelligence services,
judiciary– and therefore with no “owner”, or said in other words, specificity.
Although criminal intelligence is reflected in some legal frameworks, it is not
being fully implemented as a specific activity, organizationally structured and,
functionally effective.
The fact is that the field of criminal intelligence is new and recent not only for
Latin America, but for other regions. As Adrian James put it, “Important for its
application to the discovery of evidence, criminal intelligence largely did not merit
much attention as a discipline in its own right.”1 In the Latin American case, it
should be noted that its authoritarian past taints any process of change in the field
of intelligence, including the developments in this new field. It is then pertinent
to dedicate some space to a theoretical and doctrinal discussion on the subject,
including the fact that the intelligence sector began to adapt to new technologies.
Criminal intelligence intersects sectors such as public security, intelligence
systems, and criminal justice system. Considering this, it is appropriate
to distinguish clearly what is criminal intelligence and what is criminal
investigation. Also, to distinguish it from the field of crime analysis. At the
same time, it is extremely relevant to include in this review the emergence of
the ‘Intelligence-Led Policing’ (ILP) approach. In fact, criminal intelligence
activities may be assigned either or both to civilian intelligence agencies and
police agencies. Since several decades, ILP, as opposed to traditional reactive
policing paradigm, gained status as a distinct policing strategy, a challenged
paradigm. “Commonly, the development of ILP is linked to concerns about:
organized crime; the search for ‘best evidence’: the discrediting of investigative
strategies that relied on suspects’ confessions; and the availability of increasingly
sophisticated surveillance and information technologies.”2 These issues will be
addressed later in this article.

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The context of high rates of violent crime is associated with emergence of the
business of organized crime in the region. This poses a serious threat to nation-
states and society. Moreover, it correlates with the capabilities in the field of
criminal intelligence. This imperative shall be discussed in more detail later in
a separate section.
After an overview of recent developments in Latin America, the case of
Argentina shall be subsequently examined in a separate section. Given that
some countries in the region adopted a federal system of government, a few
experiences of sub-national Governments shall be mentioned in this work. The
article concludes with a discussion of the implications these findings have for
the developments of criminal intelligence in the region.

Criminal Intelligence under Discussion

In principle, it should be acknowledged that criminal intelligence undertakes
distinctive activities, and for this reason, it is different from strategic intelligence
or military intelligence. Very important is also to distinguish clearly what is
criminal intelligence and what is criminal investigation. Also, to distinguish it
from the field of crime analysis.
In short, the objective of criminal intelligence is to produce knowledge and
assessments of certain realities of crime to assist decision-making on crime
prevention strategies and public security policies. For its part, criminal
investigation aims to gather evidence to elucidate a specific criminal act filed
before courts, adequately registered in a judicial record. Criminal intelligence
is of a proactive nature, while criminal investigation is of a reactive nature.
Indeed, criminal intelligence is not restricted to a given case –a court case-, but
it embraces multiple and varied cases to understand phenomena.
While traditional policing was directed to committed offences, to reported
crime, “at present several factors are affecting police efforts towards a model of
prospective strategy in which the effort is focused not on the reaction towards the
commission of crime, but in anticipating and taking measures to prevent such
events from occurring.”3
Besides the differences acknowledged previously, between criminal investigation
and criminal intelligence activities, there is a connection, criminal investigation
will be responsible for supporting intelligence and intelligence will be responsible
for supporting criminal investigation.4 In addition to collaborate in the investigation
of a crime, criminal intelligence can provide to a police investigations unit and
detectives an essential and comprehensive contribution about the reality of crime,
through sound analysis of the context and scenario analysis.
In a first approximation, three large fields that use the same subject of study,
crimes, may be admitted. Criminal intelligence activities supporting criminal
investigations, i.e. operational intelligence. Criminal intelligence focused on

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complex crimes, on transnational organized crime, through analytical means.

Crime analysis to guide decision-making and prevention in the police area,
information for action.
It is quite clear that criminal intelligence intersects sectors such as public security,
intelligence systems, and criminal justice system. Thus, criminal intelligence
serves to decision-makers from the field of public security policies and strategies,
and the intelligence sector; to the uniformed police for prevention at various levels
of the organization; to the judicial authorities with jurisdiction in court cases filed,
as well as to the police investigation units.
Moreover, according to UNODC, “timely and actionable criminal intelligence
is essential to make an impact on the prevention, reduction and investigation of
serious and organised crime, particularly when it is of a trans-national nature.
(“Timely” means that it is provided in good time and “actionable” means that its
detail and reliability supports the taking of action.)”.5
To explore the scope of the broad array of criminal intelligence activities
four specific fields can be distinguished, namely, criminal intelligence for the
prevention of crime, criminal intelligence for the prevention of complex crimes,
criminal intelligence for public security policy, and criminal intelligence for the
protection of the constitutional and democratic order. In particular, regarding the
relationship between criminal intelligence and police, it can be considered that
intelligence for crime prevention field would correspond to police intelligence,
updated in its latest version of ILP. Civilian intelligence bodies with competence
in criminal intelligence may well be undertake the other three fields mentioned
above, but of course with formal capacity for coordination with the police
intelligence agencies. Concurrently, criminal intelligence should develop
analytical products for strategic purposes, and for tactical needs.
On ILP, UNODC stated “intelligence can form the bedrock of an effective
policing model –often termed ‘Intelligence Led Policing’– where intelligence is
essential to providing strategic direction and central to the deployment of staff
for all forms of tactical policing activity, including community policing and
routine patrols”.6
Among the requirements of effective ILP such as technology and expertise, Ryan
Prox and Curt Taylor Griffiths, suggest “a number of other essential ingredients
to developing, implementing and utilizing ILP in a police service”7, which are: a
receptive organizational environment; dedicating resources and building capacities;
creating partnerships with universities and industry; recruiting, training and
retaining analysts; operational interface; complementing other police strategies.
Adrian James warns, “Without cultural evolution in the wider policing institution,
intelligence practice will remain at the margins of policing and decision-makers
will continue to rely on faith rather than intelligence to determine action.”8
The application of the ILP model offers a way to overcome the autonomy of
police forces, and in particular of its intelligence elements – a characteristic of

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many Latin American countries – so that they are fully integrated into crime
prevention strategies defined by a public policy of citizen security.
The world is changing because of the information revolution and new
technologies. This brings into focus the need for placing the subject of this
section in the context of certain current and challenging topics. One, Big Data,
transcends the worlds of information technology, business, and is becoming
increasingly present in almost all spheres of human activities, individuals,
societies, and governments. Another one relates to the new field known as ‘data
protection’, the protection of personal data through specific legislation that
constrains access and limits the use and handling of certain information.9
Certainly, new technologies and the information society provide a new scope for
criminal intelligence, the potential of using Big Data. As described elsewhere,
intelligence is currently in the third phase of development, characterized by the
linkage of intelligence with knowledge management.10 The role of the analytic
function in this context assumes significance and requires an adaptation of the
intelligence cycle. For example, ‘social media intelligence’ –SOCMINT–, a
recently coined term, “can contribute decisively to public safety: identifying
criminal activity; giving early warning of disorder and threats to the public;
or building situational awareness in rapidly changing situations. As society
develops and adopts new ways to communicate and organise, it is vital that
public bodies, including law enforcement and the intelligence community, keep
up with these changes.”11
The balance between penetration, surveillance and privacy by intelligence
agencies is a delicate and complex issue in debate with ethical implications,
principally after Edward Snowden revelations. It requires legal and political
accountability and oversight mechanisms. Because, following Claudia Aradau
and Tobias Blanke, intelligence agencies may be considered “as Big Data
organizations that employ data-driven methods to anticipate future dangers”.12
Consequently, the handle of information by police and intelligence agencies
including metadata and the use of algorithms are under scrutiny:
“In the world of public safety, ‘big data’ comprise existing data often
stored in disparate databases, including a wide range of sources, from
arrest records to court documents and mug shots. Much of it is also
text-based documents, police reports and field reports to name a few.
For many agencies, it can be difficult to make sense of this data in a
meaningful way that can be used to help solve and even prevent crime.
Combined with the near infinite volumes of new data sources from the
Web and mobile applications, this challenge is further compounded”.13
In addition, as Rosamunde van Brakel, who has studied the use of Big Data for
‘predictive policing’, warns, “predictive Big Data policing is a tool that can improve
policy but that there is a serious potential for the disempowerment of individuals,

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groups, and society depending how it is implemented and with what intention.”14
Finally, and from the perspective of the Anglo-Saxon Critical Criminology it
is recognized that society is undergoing a shift from post-crime to pre-crime.
Lucia Zedner describes that as follows:
“… In a post-crime society there are crimes, offenders and victims,
crime control, policing, investigation, trial and punishment, all of
which are staples of present criminological enquiry. Pre-crime, by
contrast, shifts the temporal perspective to anticipate and forestall that
which has not yet occurred and may never do so. In a pre-crime society,
there is calculation, risk and uncertainty, surveillance, precaution,
prudentialism, moral hazard, prevention and, arching over all these,
there is the pursuit of security”.15

Imperatives in Latin America: Organized Crime

Toine Spapens16 proposed an approach to organized crime that integrates the
functionalist, economic, and social-network approaches by starting from theories
stemming from economic sociology and organization sociology. His approach is
based on three pillars: the criminal macro network, the criminal collective, and
the criminal business process. The criminal macro network concept is defined
as “… the set of individuals who have the motivation, the skills, and the access to
the resources needed to engage successfully in organized criminal activity.” The
criminal collective concept is defined as “a subset of members of the criminal
macro network who are, at a given point in time, actively executing a criminal
business process.” The criminal business process is defined as “a collection of
related and structured activities designed to produce a specific illegal product,
service, or other output prohibited by law, such as theft or fraud.”
This selected approach, among others not mentioned here, indicates the
complexity facing the criminal intelligence structures to counter organized
crime and drug trafficking. To illustrate further the situation Latin America, it
is acknowledged, “In a context where organized crime crosses several countries
in the region, leaving thousands of deaths per year, makes the population to live
with fear and extortion, and corrupts politicians, judges, police and military,
these criminal organizations erode democracy and social development.”17
The region has expressed concern about the issues. The Santiago Declaration
(“Alliance for Sustainable Development: Promoting Investments of Social and
Environmental Quality”) issued by the Community of Latin American and
Caribbean States and the European Union (CELAC-EU) Summit that convened
in Santiago, Chile, on 26 and 27 January 201,3 stated:
“34. We recognise that transnational organised criminal activities may
undermine the legitimate economies and, in some cases, threaten the

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stability and security of States, weaken the rule of law, governance

systems, national economies and their development, and human rights.
In this regard, we vow to continue implementing, as appropriate,
concrete actions, aimed at strengthening, inter alia, law enforcement
cooperation, mutual legal assistance, trans-border intelligence sharing,
in order to dismantle criminal organizations, all within the full respect
of human rights and international law.”18
Two quotes from the UN World Drug Report 201619 are illustrative of the impact
drug trafficking in the region. The first one states “The intensity of drug-related
violence is greatest, however, when associated with drug trafficking (systemic
violence), as the example of Latin America shows”. The second one is related
to drug flows, “The most frequently mentioned Latin American countries of
origin, departure and transit for cocaine shipments to Asia in the period 2009-
2014 were Brazil, followed by Colombia, Peru, the Plurinational State of Bolivia,
Argentina and Mexico.”
Looking at what is needed to develop tools and strategies to cope with
transnational organized crime, “criminal intelligence must aspire to something
more descriptive than producing reports. To put it simply, strategic analysis,
coupled with prospective studies articulate the scrutiny of the criminal reality
orientated towards the future.”20
As mentioned earlier, complex crimes are also a priority of criminal intelligence
areas in Latin America. In this regard, a UNDP report21 suggests that different
types of crimes and illegal markets require differentiated strategies, being advisable
to train specialized police forces, with appropriate investigative techniques and
adequate intelligence systems to face crimes such as extortion, kidnapping and
trafficking in persons. Also described as midlevel threats, they include “powerful
youth gangs, transnational criminal-trafficking organizations, and terrorists.
Some of these elements are extremely violent, well-armed, and well-funded. They
operate in and around densely populated areas and compete with each other for
control over drugs, contraband, illicit enterprises, and (often) territory.”22
It is noteworthy that Peter Gill observed a lack of interest in organized crime
from ‘intelligence studies’ which
“reflects the interaction between the politics and government of crime
and researchers’ view thereof. In the United States – home to most
students of intelligence – the imbalance between, say, studies of foreign
intelligence and criminal intelligence is that the former is viewed as an
entirely legitimate exercise of state power, while the latter smacks of
tyranny and invasion of human rights, and is tolerated, if at all, very
reluctantly.”23
Those warnings about the scope of criminal intelligence that is unfolding in
the pre-crime society, mentioned in the previous part, become extensible to the

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practical linkage between criminal intelligence and organized crime.

Another controversial issue is the involvement of armed forces to counter
organized crime. This relates to the authoritarian past of several armed forces
of the region. According to Carolina Sancho, such participation “in certain fluid
Organized Crime security situations remains an adequate short-term measure
in several countries of the region, even as the police learn to overcome their
limitations in this arena. The longer-term use of armed forces to confront
Organized Crime may adversely affect both public security institutions, as they
suffer de-professionalization …”.24 In the case of Argentina, the armed forces are
prohibited by law to perform public security or internal intelligence activities.
It is then essential to bear in mind that issues such as transnational organized
crime, which seriously affects the region, coexist with shortcomings noted in
the implementation and management of security and intelligence sectors in
some Latin American countries. Overcome these drawbacks is the challenge.

An Overview of Recent Developments in Latin America

Recent history shows that the intelligence activity carried out by police
and security forces in Latin America was in general controlled directly or
indirectly by the armed forces, having been their fundamental objective the
alleged ideological enemy.25 Countries of the region “are still overcoming the
authoritarian legacy of intelligence agencies that acted as ‘political police’, even
performed criminal activities affecting human rights on grounds of national
security, counterterrorism, or plainly regime protection.” 26 Also, it has been
noted the existence of blurred boundaries between counterintelligence and
domestic intelligence, as well as also the boundaries between policing, criminal
intelligence, and the intelligence activity.27
New legislation adopted in democracy, not without delay, helped the intelligence
sector to obtain some degree of democratic legitimacy – e.g. Brazil, Law 9,883 of
1999; Argentina, Law 25,520 of 2001; Chile, Law 19,974 of 2004; Ecuador, Law
on Public and State Security of 2009; Peru, Law 28.664 of 2006; Guatemala,
Legislative Decrees 71 of 2005, and 18 of 2008; Paraguay, Law 5,241 of 2014
–.28 In fact, several countries engaged in the process of democratizing the
intelligence sector, a task that has proven to be very difficult and with more
setbacks than successes. The aim has been and is to supersede the legacies and
to dismantle the remaining authoritarian ‘enclaves’.
In some countries, citizen security policies or strategies cover programs linked
with criminal intelligence and the fight against organized crime. A recent
study deals with the cases of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Mexico.29
While the analysis of security planning does not confirm if indeed the changes
occurred, it serves to identify that in the cases studied intelligence is considered
publicly and explicitly with mandate for public security, showing a reorientation

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towards the citizen needs. On the other hand, that there are different applications
associated with the prevention of crime, including the necessary reform and
control of it.
In the case of Brazil, it is worth mentioning that its intelligence system includes
the ‘public security intelligence subsystem’. Created by Decree 3695 of 2000, its
regulation, approved in 2009 by resolution30 is relevant because of its contribution
with respect to definitions of terms such as intelligence for public security, police
intelligence, and criminal analysis. ‘Intelligence for public security’ is defined
as the permanent and systematic activity through specialized actions that aims
to identify, monitor and assess the actual or potential threats to public safety,
and produce knowledge and information that assist the planning and execution
of public security policies, as well as actions to prevent, neutralize and repress
criminal acts of any kind, in an integrated manner, and assisting research and
knowledge production. ‘Police intelligence’ is defined as the set of actions that
use special investigative techniques, aims to confirm evidence, indications, and
to obtain knowledge about disguised and complex criminal activities, as well
as the identification of criminal networks and organizations, in order to provide
a perfect understanding on how are acting and operating, branches, trends and
scope of criminal conduct. It also defines criminal analysis in a significant
attempt to bring clarity to confusion that commonly occurs between criminal
intelligence and criminal analysis. The resolution also defines ‘crime analysis’
as a set of systematic processes aimed at the provision of timely and relevant
information on the patterns of crime and its correlations of trends, to support
the operational and administrative areas in the planning and distribution of
resources for the prevention and repression of criminal activities.
Through these definitions, Brazilians clear the confusion that commonly occurs
between criminal intelligence and crime analysis. Anyhow, according to Priscila
Brandao, this “National Doctrine for Public Security Intelligence, has yet to be
fully implemented. The doctrine has not yet been fully implemented even in the
federal police force. … The continuing lack of a common professional vocabulary
suggests the absence of management interest in promoting interaction between
the corporative agencies that make up the subsystem”31
As said above, it is relevant to consider experiences of sub-national Governments
of countries with a federal system of government. Beginning in 2000, the State
Government of Minas Gerais, Brazil, developed an approach of citizen security
- social defense in its local terminology-characterized by the integration and
articulation of different spheres and the use of the information for decision-
making. Its strategic plan 2012-2105 included among other strategies: to promote
and systematize the timely dissemination of objective and comprehensive
intelligence products; to expand and strengthen counterintelligence measures;
to configure the intelligence for public security activities focused in large public
events. As indicators for intelligence for public security the plan defined, an
efficiency index and an index of productivity.32 Accordingly, the development

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of intelligence activities of public security at the levels both strategic and

tactical levels, carried out by specific structures, technically more linked, was
conceived as an evolution with the need to meet the demands in a more modern
and specialized criminal and historical context.33
As for the case of Colombia, the integrated center of information and intelligence
for the public security, CI3 24/7, of the Colombian National Police began to
operate in 2013. This technology-driven center contributes to the strengthening
of new capabilities and development of technological innovation applied to
strategic and operational intelligence, police management and public security
based on an integrative concept and specialized handling of information and
situational analysis that privileges anticipation.34
A recent paper by widely-known expert Jerry Ratcliffe and others shared an
ILP experience in Honduras, the application of structured thinking techniques
to the development of ILP anti-gang strategies in the Honduran National Police
(HNP). The paper concluded that “The value of ILP to the HNP in this context
is not because it tells the HNP what to do, but rather gives them a mechanism to
better understand the threat as a precursor to initiating a response. And perhaps
this is key to the translation of policing concepts from first-world countries to
developing countries in Latin America.”35
As a partial conclusion, it appears that in Latin America, the development of
criminal intelligence is still incipient. Maybe this was due to the early perception
of policy-makers in the region that Colombia and Mexico cases related to drug
trafficking and drug cartels were specific, encapsulated, atypical, and that this
would not spilled over the rest of the region. If so, it would be an indication of
a fault in the strategic intelligence. If there is now a momentum, it is primarily
due to the emergence of transnational organized crime as a perceived and real
threat to the security of the region.
To recognize the conditions that are required to properly implement criminal
intelligence in the region it is worth being aware of the main problems. First,
the poor strategic criminal intelligence produced is principally focused on the
identification of threats under a military logic, and criminal intelligence at
the tactical level is focused on specific cases a far from the operational needs
of police elements. Police intelligence in the region is mainly tactical, based
on infiltration of criminal organizations, on informants, and on very specific
relations and cases.36 Moreover, “while the police may have a reputation for
being violent, they are also ineffective. They do not use intelligence to discern,
disarm, and demobilize criminal organizations. Instead, they are notorious for
lashing out and rounding up ‘suspects’”37
Another shortcoming in general is referred to specialized human resources. On this
subject Ryan Prox and Curt Taylor Griffiths, suggest “Equally important as the adoption
and integration of the technology needed to support ILP is the hiring and retention of
the analysts capable of producing highly sought after intelligence products.”38
Besides training analysts, teaching intelligence in the wider police and security

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organization is another important need: “In mainstream policing, intelligence

often is seen as ancillary to the business of ‘real’ policing; co-existing in
parallel with the latter but not influencing it in a sufficiently meaningful way.
Teaching intelligence work in law-enforcement means educating the wider anti-
intellectual, action-oriented workforce of its worth.”39
The generation of coordination or consolidation arrangements of intelligence
seems to be another difficulty. Particularly in cases in which various agencies
with criminal intelligence functions coexist in a country it is required a level to
coordinate the flow of information between agencies.
Another problem affecting the advances in the field of criminal intelligence is
the trend towards politicization of the intelligence sector. Circumstances such
as those observed in Colombia, Peru, and Argentina are illustrative. Moreover,
it must be bear in mind that covert and clandestine activities carried out by
intelligence services outside the established legal order have been present in
many new democracies.

The Case of Argentina

The recovery of democracy since December 1983 brought several very sensitive
issues under discussion, such as how to establish democratic controls over
the military and reform its organization. One goal was to separate clearly
the functions of the armed forces and the police agencies, their roles in the
field of national defenses and public security, respectively. The idea was that
the military would be restrained from performing internal security tasks and
domestic intelligence activities. The precedent was the fact that during the
military regime of repressive and authoritarian nature that began in March
1976, the intelligence and police sectors engaged in political policing under the
strict control of the armed forces in the framework a systematic plan during the
‘dirty war’ against subversion.
For such purposes, many bills were presented; debates were opened within
Congress and elsewhere, all of it extensively covered by the press. Such goal
was later materialized through the sanction in 1988 of the National Defense Law
23,554. According to this law, the military were limited to exercise activities in
the field of national defense –entailing external aggressions of military nature–,
and military intelligence was banned from performing internal security and
domestic intelligence.
Argentina’s criminal intelligence subsector – a distinct layer within the
intelligence sector – had a swinging path, and after sixteen years from the
sanction of the National Intelligence Law 25,520 of 2001, it is still in an embryonic
stage. And if the count starts in 1992, when it was passed the Internal Security
Law 24,059 that formally established an Internal Intelligence Directorate under
the Ministry of Interior, and nevertheless the importance given to the issue by

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Congress, the life of the directorate had ups and downs that at least denote a lack
of management skills, or even a lack of interest.
Law 25,520 defined criminal intelligence as the intelligence related to
specific criminal activities that, due to their nature, magnitude, foreseeable
consequences, dangerousness or mode, affect the freedom, life, and property
of individuals, as well as their rights and guarantees, and the institutions of the
federal, republican, and representative system established by the Constitution.
The National Directorate for Criminal Intelligence, under the Interior Security
Secretariat, Ministry of Interior – and since December 2010 under the Ministry
of Security –, was tasked with the production of criminal intelligence. This
directorate is part of the National Intelligence System. In accordance with
the provisions of article 16 of the Internal Security Law, such directorate is
responsible for the functional management and coordination of the intelligence
activities of the national police effort, including the intelligence elements of the
federal police, the security forces – National Gendarmerie and Naval Prefecture
–, the police for airport security, and provincial police forces.
In February 2015, in the wake of an intelligence scandal, National Congress
passed Law 27,126 introducing reforms to Law 25,520, including the creation
of the Federal Intelligence Agency (Agencia Federal de Inteligencia, AFI) that
replaced the Secretariat of Intelligence. Among other functions, AFI was tasked
with the production of criminal intelligence on complex federal crimes related to
terrorism, drug trafficking, arms trafficking, trafficking in persons, cybercrime,
offences against the financial and economic order, as well as offences against the
public authorities and the constitutional order, through own means of obtaining
and gathering of information. Thus, the criminal intelligence function was
partially extracted from its natural state sphere, i.e. the Ministry of Security,
the field of the democratic policy of public security. This circumstance may
significantly weaken the necessary coordinated and articulated set-ups of the
internal security system established by law.
Why did criminal intelligence subsector was slow in starting up a consolidation
stage?
Certainly, the process of establishing a new agency faces various bureaucratic
obstacles, such as budgetary constraints, the need to train new specialized
personnel, the difficulties to promote coordination with preexistent police
intelligence elements, the rivalries with the main national intelligence agency.
Another limitation to add is the scarcity of civilian officials with expertise in
intelligence issues, or at least with experience in the formation of security and
intelligence agencies.
There were unfinished initiatives. For example, in 2005 training courses were
organized for provincial police intelligence officers in the framework of the
installation of i2 software at the intelligence areas of the provincial police.
This was associated to the implementation of a unified network of criminal

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intelligence (Red Unificada de Inteligencia Criminal, REDUNIC, in Spanish),

which provided for the coordination of the intelligence agencies, the federal
police and security forces, provincial police agencies, and the integration of
their technological capabilities.40 However, such effort was discontinued.
A worth mentioning positive fact was that the National Directorate for Criminal
Intelligence, implemented in 2005 a recruitment mechanism consistent in
a course open to the public to incorporate and train future civilian criminal
analysts, an initiative that concluded satisfactorily with the support of the
National Intelligence School.
Among the negative features that affected the National Directorate for Criminal
Intelligence was the assignment of crime mapping and crime statistics
responsibilities. More recently, the assignment in 2016 of the search for federal
fugitives, although based on current needs and in the framework of new special
unit – Comando Unificado Federal de Recaptura de Evadidos, in Spanish –, may
disperse the attention of strategic analysts.
The new administration of President Macri initiated a new approach in the field
of criminal intelligence. The DNIC was relocalized under the Undersecretary
for Investigation of Organized and Complex Crimes of the Ministry of Security.
Since 2016, this undersecretary is implementing several projects. One relates
to the establishment of regional centers of criminal intelligence (Centro de
Inteligencia Criminal Regional, CICRE, in Spanish).
The CICREs aims to deploy a deeper investigation that encompasses all levels
of the chain to break criminal enterprises entirely, in particular organized crime
and drug trafficking. It promotes the decentralization of criminal intelligence
through the creation of seven centers across the country. In addition, for the
first time it integrates in a same joint and coordinated working sphere, the four
federal law enforcement forces, the Federal Intelligence Agency, the penitentiary
service, local police, and justice.41 Of the seven centers projected, three are
already created, as of May 2017.
Visual analysis software is one of the tools of such centers. Moreover, it implies
normalization of data bases selected, including national and provincial ones.
Clearly, collaboration and exchange of information informs this initiative.
A provincial experience of intelligence for the prevention of crime is the province
of Buenos Aires, Argentina. In the context of two police reforms (1998-199 and
2004-2007), it was advanced a model of criminal intelligence that progressively
was integrated tot the practices of crime prevention and developed the function
of assisting decisions in public security strategies. The General Directorate of
Evaluation of Information for the Prevention of Crime was established in 1998
under the Ministry of Justice and Security. As a technical structure, its function
consisted of police intelligence activities aimed at the prevention of crime, according
to article 25 of provincial Law 12,155 of 1998. A resolution provided regulations
concerning the scope of strategic intelligence – focused on evaluating criminal
problem to advice public security and police decision-making –, and operational

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or tactical intelligence – focused on assisting the planning and execution of police

operational deployments as well as functionally supporting activities in the field
of investigative police and for criminal investigation purposes related to complex
crimes and drug trafficking –. This area developed database unified of organized
crime, established in 2005 by provincial law, and implemented the intensive use
of i2 software known for criminal intelligence analysis.42
Giving life to a criminal intelligence system with multiplicity of actors, disciplines
and government sectors that report from their specificity to the field of public
security, in a federal country and its vast geography, claims adequate planning,
coordination, implementation, budgeting, and institutional sustainability.

Conclusion 43
As a new discipline in the wider world of the intelligence profession, criminal
intelligence has to overcome several obstacles. The consolidation of criminal
intelligence, as stated in previous sections, is a challenge for the countries of the
region. It is double because on the one hand, it is associated with its emergence
as a new practice at global level, and on the other hand, it is immersed in the
framework of unstable processes of transformation of the intelligence agencies.
The rise of violent crime and the emergence of the business of organized crime
as a relevant actor, and menace, in turn pose challenges to new democracies.
Criminal intelligence is one of the tools to overcome such problems. Other
tools ought to develop simultaneously, such as police reforms, judicial reforms,
anticorruption strategies.
A subject to study is what has been or is the role of policy-makers and state
officials in consolidation or not of criminal intelligence arrangements. Issues
such as permeability of corruption by drug trafficking organizations ought to
be considered. Indeed, political support from the very highest level is essential
for the development and sustained exercise of criminal intelligence activities,
organization, and knowledge.
A criminal intelligence system is much more than an agency or body that
centralizes analysis. The notion of network – network of people, network of
agencies and elements, network of networks –, is applicable for building a
dynamic system, adapted to the new technologies of information and challenging
specific criminal phenomenon, as well as anticipate the new ones.
As “[I]n the intelligence sector, decision-making rationalities, doctrines and
practices developed in the (authoritarian) past impact on the present, reproducing
them, thus reinforcing the vitality of those legacies even under democratic
rule”44, to avoid wrongdoing by criminal intelligence elements, congressional
overseers, public opinion and civil society ought to pay close attention. Related
to the dangers posed the access of massive data by intelligence and security
agencies, it is important to bear in mind that “the management of personal

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data requires specific measures to avoid risk practices, starting from data
minimization and avoiding the routine mass collection of data which is not
needed in first place”.45
Actually, criminal intelligence should be understood as a new knowledge
production context. And ILP as “a collaborative enterprise based on improved
intelligence operations and community-oriented policing and problem solving
…[were] the development of analytical techniques, training, and technical
assistance needs to be supported.” 46
In a world that currently foster the values of transparency, access to information,
and respect for human rights, criminal intelligence must be subject to democratic
controls and accountability, which less that restrain it, may well promote its
legitimation.
In short, with all the challenges that this entails, it is all about to implement changes
in the framework of the vital democratization of intelligence in Latin America.

Endnotes:
01_ James, Adrian, Examining Intelligence Led Policing: Developments in research,
policy and practice, (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), p. 2.
02_ James, Examining Intelligence Led Policing, p. 5.
03_ Sansó-Rubert Pascual, Daniel, “Analysis of criminal intelligence from a criminological
perspective: The future of the fight against organized crime 1”, Journal of Law and
Criminal Justice, Vol. 3, No.1 (2015), p. 42.
04_ Fernández, Jesús, “Inteligencia criminal”, Inteligencia y Seguridad: Revista de análisis
y prospectiva, No. 6 (2009), p. 98.
05_ UNODC, (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime), Police Information and
Intelligence Systems, in Criminal justice assessment toolkit, (New York: United
Nations, 2006), p. 2.
06_ UNODC, Police Information and Intelligence Systems, p. 2.
07_ Prox, Ryan, and Taylor Griffiths, Curt, “Introduction to the special issue”, Police
Practice and Research: An International Journal, Vol. 16, No. 2, (2015), p. 101-105.
08_ James, Adrian, “Teaching intelligence practice in law enforcement agencies”, Paper
prepared for the Twelfth IAFIE Conference, 22 - 24 June 2016, p. 1; at: https://www.
researchgate.net/publication/306518365
09_ Otamendi, Alejandra, and Estévez, Eduardo E., “Inteligencia en América Latina:
Desafíos de democratización y oportunidades para la seguridad ciudadana”,
in Fernández Rodríguez, J.J., and Sansó-Rubert Pascual, D. (eds.), Avances en
Inteligencia, (Madrid: Plaza y Valdés Editores, forthcoming).
10_ Coyne, John W. Strategic Intelligence in Law Enforcement: Anticipating Transnational
Organised Crime (TOC), unpublished doctoral thesis, Queensland University of
Technology (QUT), Brisbane Queensland, Australia, 2014, p. 33; at http://eprints.qut.
edu.au/71394/
11_ Omand, David, “The cycle of intelligence”, in Robert Dover, Michael S. Goodman
and Claudia Hillebrand (eds.), Routledge Companion to Intelligence Studies, (London:
Routledge, 2015), p. 68-69.

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Eduardo E. Estévez

12_ Aradau, Claudia, and Blanke, Tobias, “The (Big) data security assemblage: Knowledge
and critique”, Big Data and Society, Vol. 2, No. 2 (2015), p. 2.
13_ Prox and Taylor Griffiths, “Introduction to the special issue”, p. 101-105.
14_ Van Brakel, Rosamunde, “Pre-Emptive Big Data surveillance and its (dis) empowering
consequences: The case of predictive policing”, in Bart van der Sloot, Dennis Broeders
and Erik Schrijvers (eds.), Exploring the Boundaries of Big Data, (Amsterdam:
Amsterdam University Press, 2016), p. 132.
15_ Zedner, Lucia, “Pre-crime and post-criminology?”, Theoretical Criminology, Vol. 11,
No. 2 (2007), p. 262.
16_ Spapens, Toine, “Macro networks, collectives, and business processes: An integrated
approach to organized crime”, European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and
Criminal Justice, Vol.18, No. 2 (2010), pp. 185–215.
17_ Otamendi, Alejandra, and Estévez, Eduardo E., “Intelligence challenges in Latin
America and prospects for reform: A comparative matrix on democratic governance”,
Paper prepared for presentation at the ISA (International Studies Association) Annual
Convention, 2016, Atlanta, Georgia, March 16-19, p. 20.
18_ Santiago Declaration (“Alliance for Sustainable Development: Promoting Investments
of Social and Environmental Quality”), Community of Latin American and Caribbean
States and the European Union (CELAC-EU), Santiago, Chile, on 26 and 27 January
2013; at http://walk.sela.org/attach/258/EDOCS/SRed/2013/01/T023600004832-0-
Santiago_Declaration_-_CELAC-UE_-_Chile_26-01-2013.pdf
19_ UNODC, (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime), World Drug Report, 2016,
(New York: United Nations, 2016).
20_ Sansó-Rubert Pascual, “Analysis of criminal intelligence from a criminological
perspective”, p. 47.
21_ PNUD, Informe regional de desarrollo humano 2013-2014 - Seguridad ciudadana
con rostro humano: Diagnóstico y propuestas para América Latina (Nueva York:
Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo – PNUD, 2013), p. 88.
22_ Pion-Berlin, David, and Harold Trinkunas, “Latin America’s growing security gap”,
Journal of Democracy, Vol. 22, No.1 (2011), p.41.
23_ Gill, Peter, “Organised crime”, in Robert Dover, Michael S. Goodman and Claudia
Hillebrand (eds.), Routledge Companion to Intelligence Studies, (London: Routledge,
2015), p. 314.
24_ Sancho Hirane, Carolina, “Armed forces and organized crime: Strengths and weaknesses
to deal with this unlawful in the democracies of Latin American countries”, Paper
prepared for 24th IPSA World Congress of Political Science, Poznan, Poland, July 23-
28, 2016, p. 7; at http://paperroom.ipsa.org/app/webroot/papers/paper_55922.pdf
25_ Ugarte, José M., “La actividad de inteligencia en América Latina y el surgimiento de
la inteligencia criminal: nuevos y viejos paradigmas, en un panorama en evolución”,
Paper prepared for the 2007 Meeting of the Latin American Studies Association,
Montreal, Canada, 2007, September 5-8, p. 5.
26_ Estévez, Eduardo E., “Comparing intelligence democratization in Latin America:
Argentina, Peru, and Ecuador Cases”, Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 29, No.
4 (2014), p. 552.
27_ Ugarte, José M., “El ámbito normativo de la inteligencia interior en América Latina”,
Varia Historia, Vol. 28, (2012), p. 123.
28_ For more details, see Gómez de la Torre Rotta, Andrés and Medrano Carmona,
Arturo, “Intelligence “laws in Peru and Latin America—Historical, legal, and

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 Criminal Intelligence and the Challenge of Transnational Organized Crime in Latin America

institutional evolution”, and, Zuniga, Liza, “Intelligence laws of North, Central,

and South America (Table)”, both in Swenson, Russell and Sancho, Carolina (eds.),
Intelligence Management in the Americas, (Washington DC: National Intelligence
University, 2015), pp. 29-47 and pp. 48-78. Also see Ugarte, José M., “Panorama de
la inteligencia criminal latinoamericana. Desarrollo, dilemas y dificultades”, URVIO,
Revista Latinoamericana de Estudios de Seguridad, No. 15 (2014), p. 41-54.
29_ Otamendi and Estévez, “Inteligencia en América Latina”.
30_ Resolução SNSP Nº 1, de 15 de Julho de 2009.
31_ Brandao, Priscila C., “Institutional challenges in the integration of the Brazilian Public
Security Intelligence System”, in: Swenson, Russel and Sancho, Carolina (eds.),
Intelligence Management in the Americas, (Washington DC: National Intelligence
University, 2015), p. 275.
32_ Chagas Cardoso, Wilson, and Hiroshi Hamada, Hélio, “Inteligência estratégica e
policiamento ostensivo: A experiência de Minas Gerais”, in Brandão, Priscila Carlos,
y Marco Cepik (eds.). Inteligencia de segurança pública: Teoría e prática no control
da criminalidade, (Niterói, RJ: Editora Impetus, 2013), p. 300-301.
33_ Chagas Cardoso and Hiroshi Hamada, “Inteligência estratégica e policiamento
ostensivo”, p. 301.
34_ Cortecero, Ignacio M. and Durán Martínez, John A., “Centro Integrado de Información
de Inteligencia para la Seguridad Ciudadana CI3 24/7: Un reto institucional para la
excelencia del servicio de Inteligencia Policial”, Boletín DIPOL – CIPRO, No. 11
(2012), pp.3-8.
35_ Ratcliffe, Jerry H., Evan T. Sorg, and James W. Rose, “Intelligence-led policing in
Honduras: Applying Sleipnir and social psychology to understand gang proliferation”,
Journal of Police and Criminal Psychology, Vol. 30, No. 2 (2015), pp. 112-123.
36_ As stated by Marcelo Saín; see Pontón Cevallos, Daniel, “Un debate ausente: la
producción de inteligencia criminal en América Latina. Entrevista a Marcelo Fabián
Saín”, URVIO, Revista Latinoamericana de Estudios de Seguridad, No. 15 (2014), p.
128.
37_ Pion-Berlin and Trinkunas, “Latin America’s growing security gap”, p. 45.
38_ Prox and Taylor Griffiths, “Introduction to the special issue”, p. 103.
39_ James, Adrian, “Teaching intelligence practice in law enforcement agencies”, p. 1.
40_ See, “Ponen en marcha la primera etapa de la Dirección de Inteligencia Criminal”,
Infobae, Buenos Aires, 18 January 2005; at http://www.infobae.com/2005/01/18/162806-
ponen-marcha-la-primera-etapa-la-direccion-inteligencia-criminal/
41_ Ministerio de Seguridad, “Más inteligencia para luchar contra el crimen organizado”,
Ministerio de Seguridad, Presidencia de la Nación, República Argentina, Buenos Aires,
6 June 2016; at http://www.minseg.gob.ar/m%C3%A1s-inteligencia-para-luchar-
contra-el-crimen-organizado Also see, “El Gobierno apuesta a un nuevo esquema de
Inteligencia Criminal para combatir el delito organizado”, Infobae, Buenos Aires, 3
April 2017; at http://www.infobae.com/politica/2017/04/03/el-gobierno-apuesta-a-un-
nuevo-esquema-de-inteligencia-criminal-para-combatir-el-delito-organizado/
42_ For a detailed account, see Estévez, Eduardo E., “Reformando la inteligencia policial
en la provincia de Buenos Aires”, URVIO, Revista Latinoamericana de Estudios de
Seguridad, No. 15 (2014), pp.71-84.
43_ At this point it is worth mentioning that this article continues the discussion started in
an unpublished by this author, “Escenarios actuales de inteligencia: Desafíos en las
dimensiones estratégica y criminal. Legados, cambio y prioridades”, Paper prepared

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for the 2014 Meeting of the Latin American Studies Association, Chicago, Illinois,
Chicago, Illinois, 2014, May 21-24. Also see a recent and related chapter: Estévez,
Eduardo E., “Inteligencia criminal: Una nueva disciplina para una antigua profesión”,
in Eissa, Sergio E. (ed.), Políticas Públicas y Seguridad Ciudadana (Buenos Aires:
Editorial EUDEBA, 2015), pp. 229-243.
44_ Estévez, “Comparing intelligence democratization in Latin America”, p. 578.
45_ Galdon Clavell, Gemma, “Policing, Big Data and the commodification of security”,
in Bart van der Sloot, Dennis Broeders and Erik Schrijvers (eds.), Exploring the
Boundaries of Big Data, (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2016), p. 109.
46_ Peterson, Marilyn, Intelligence-led policing: The new intelligence architecture,
(Washington, DC: US Department of Justice, 2005), p. vii.

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