NAVIA v.

PARDICO
G.R. No. 184467 | June 19, 2012

Petitioners: Edgardo Navia, Ruben Dio, Andrew Buising

Respondents: Virginia Pardico, for and in behalf and in representation of Benhur Pardico

Ponente: Del Castillo, J.

DOCTRINE: For the protective writ of amparo to issue in enforced disappearance cases, allegation and proof that the
persons subject thereof are missing are not enough. It must be shown by the required quantum of proof that their
disappearance was carried out by, “or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of the government or a
political organization, followed by a refusal to acknowledge the same or give information on the fate or
whereabouts of said persons.”

FACTS:
On the evening of March 31, 2008, a vehicle of Asia Land Strategies Corporation arrived at the house of Lolita
Lapore at Grand Royale Subdivision. The arrival of the vehicle awakened Enrique Lapora (Bong), Lolita’s son, and
Benhur Pardico (Ben). Two (2) uninformed guards, Dio and Buising asked Ben and Bong to go with them to the
security office of Asian Land because there was a complaint against them for theft of electric wires and lamps.

VERSION OF PETITIONERS NAVIA ET AL. According to Navia et al., they invited Ben and Bong because of a report
from a certain Mrs. Emphasis regarding the unauthorized taking of lamps in the subdivision. Bong and Ben voluntarily
went with them to Asia Land. The two likewise admitted that they took the lamp but only because they were
transferring it to a post nearer to Lolita’s house.

Navia, the supervisor of the security guards, ordered their release. Bong signed a statement that the guards released
him without inflicting any harm or injury to him. Lolita also signed the logbook with an entry stating that she will never
harbor/entertain Ben in her house again. Thereafter, Lolita and Bong left the security office.

According to Navia et al., Ben was left behind as the guards were still talking to him about those who might be
involved in the loss of electric wires and lamps. However, after a brief discussion, Navia allowed Ben to leave and
asked the latter to affix his signature on the logbook declaring that he was released unharmed and without any injury.

Upon Navia’s instructions, Dio and Buising went back to Lolita’s house to make her sign the logbook as witness that
Ben was indeed released. Lolita asked Buising to read aloud the entry in the logbook she was being asked to sign, to
which Buising did. Not contended, Lolita put on her reading glasses and read the entry again before affixing her
signature.

Subsequently, Navia et al. received an invitation from the Malolos City Police Station to appear with regard to
Virginia Pardico’s complaint about her missing husband Ben.

VERSION OF RESPONDENT PARDICO. According to Virginia, Bong and Ben were not merely invited but unlawfully
arrested. Upon seeing Ben at the security office, Navia lividly grumbled “Ikaw na naman?” and slapped and punched
him. Navia took hold of his gun, looked at Bong and said, “Wala kang Nakita at wala kang narinig, papatayin ko na si
Ben.”

The following morning, Virginia went to the Asia Land security office to visit her husband Ben, only to be told that he
was already released the night before. She looked for Ben, asked around and went to the barangay. Still, she could
not find her husband, so Virginia reported it to the police. In the course of the investigation, it dawned upon Lolita that
Navia et al. took advantage of her poor eyesight and naivete as they made her sign the logbook as witness of Ben’s
release when in fact, she never actually witnessed his release.

Exasperated with the mysterious disappearance of her husband, Virginia filed a Petition for Writ of Amparo before
the RTC.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY:
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT. In favor of Pardico. Found Virginia;s petition sufficient in form and substance. Ordered
Navia et al. to produce the body of Ben. A summary hearing was thereafter conducted.

SUPREME COURT. In favor of Navia, et al. Reversed the decision of the Supreme Court.

ISSUES:
Whether or not Benhur Pardico’s disappearance as alleged falls within the ambit of the Rule on Writ of Amparo (A.M.
No. 07-9-12-SC) and relevant laws? (NO)

HELD:
NO, Virginia’s Petition for Writ of Amparo is fatally defective and must be dismissed.

A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC or The Rule on the Writ of Amparo was promulgated to arrest the rampant extralegal killings
and enforced disappearances in the country. Its purpose is to provide an expeditious and effective relief “to any
person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of
a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity.”

Indeed, Section 1 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC provides:

SECTION 1. Petition. – The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty and
security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private
individual or entity.

The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.

It is important to note that the Rule does not define “extralegal killings and enforced disappearances”. This omission
was intentional as the Committee on Revision of the Rules of Court which drafted the said Rule chose to allow it to
evolve through time and jurisprudence and through substantive laws as may be promulgated by Congress.

DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING THE WRIT ON AMPARO. The budding jurisprudence on amparo blossomed in
Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis, when the Court defined “enforced disappearances by applying the generally accepted
principles of international law and by adopting the definition of the International Convention for the Protection of All
Persons from Enforced Disappearances: “the arrest, detention, abduction or any other form of deprivation of liberty
by agents of the State or by persons of groups acting with authorization, support or acquiescence of the
State, followed by a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or by concealment of the fate or whereabouts of
the disappeared person, which place such person outside the protection of law.”

Subsequently, another significant development was the enactment of Republic Act No. 9851 wherein Section 3(g)
thereof defines “enforced or involuntary disappearances as follows:
(g) "Enforced or involuntary disappearance of persons" means the arrest, detention, or abduction of persons by, or with the
authorization, support or acquiescence of, a State or a political organization followed by a refusal to acknowledge that
deprivation of freedom or to give information on the fate or whereabouts of those persons, with the intention of removing from
the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time.

Then came Rubrico v. Macapagal-Arroyo, where Justice Brion, in his Separate Opinion wrote that the Rule is now
a procedural law anchored, not only on the constitutional rights to the rights to life, liberty and security but on a
concrete statutory definition of what an “enforced or involuntary disappearance” is. Thus, the Rule’s reference to
“enforced disappearances” should be construed to mean the “enforced or involuntary disappearance” contemplated
in RA No. 90851.

ELEMENTS OF ENFORCED DISAPPEARANCE. From the statutory definition of “enforced or involuntary

disappearance”, the elements are:

(1) That there be an arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of liberty;

(2) That it be carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, the State or a political
organization;

(3) That it be followed by the State or political organization’s refusal to acknowledge or give information on the
fate or whereabouts of the person subject of the amparo petition; and,

(4) That the intention for such refusal is to remove subject person from the protection of the law for a prolonged
period of time.

For the protective writ of amparo to issue in enforced disappearance cases, allegation and proof that the persons
subject thereof are missing are not enough. It must be shown by the required quantum of proof that their
disappearance was carried out by, “or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of the government or a
political organization, followed by a refusal to acknowledge the same or give information on the fate or
whereabouts of said persons.”
Thus, the petitioner in an amparo case has the burden of proving by substantial evidence the indispensable element
of government participation.

RULING. In the case at bar, the Court believed more the testimonies of Bong et al. that Navia slapped and indeed
inflicted fistic blows against Ben. But the Court stated that in an amparo petition, proof of disappearance alone is not
enough. Virginia’s petition did not contain any allegation of State complicity, and none of the evidence presented tend
to show that the government or any of its agents orchestrated Ben’s disappearance.

Thus, in the absence of an allegation or proof that the government or its agents had a hand in Ben’s disappearance
or that they failed to exercise extraordinary diligence in investigating his case, the Court will not hold Navia et al.
responsible or accountable persons.

DISPOSITION:
WHEREFORE, the July 24, 2008 Decision of the Regional Trial Court is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Petition
for Writ of Amparo filed by Virginia Pardico is hereby DISMISSED.

NOTES:
WRIT OF AMPARO AGAINST A PRIVATE INDIVIDUAL OR ENTITY. The Court stated that it is aware that the writ
may lie against a private individual or entity. However, government involvement in the disappearance remains an
indispensable element. Here, Navia et al. are mere security guards at a subdivision and their principal, the Asian land
is a private entity. They do not work for the government and there is nothing linking them to some covert police,
military or governmental operation. As discussed above, even though a writ of amparo may lie against a private
entity, government involvement is necessary. This hallmark of state participation/government involvement
differentiates an enforced disappearance case from an ordinary case of a missing person.