Hybrid regimes that alloy democratic rules with authoritarian governance are the most widespread

political systems in the world at the beginning of the 21st century. Conventional accounts describe them
as defective democracies or competitive authoritarian regimes. Alternative views point to the genuine
features and functions of these regimes that cannot be reduced to those of half-democracies or half-
autocracies. In fact, hybrid regimes are puzzling in several ways: (1) their establishment and
sustainability have been unexpected either by the school of democratization/transitology or by the
school of (new) authoritarianism; (2) neither democratic institutions (e.g. elections) nor autocratic
institutions (e.g. dominant parties) function in a conventional way there; and (3) contrary to the
expectations of stability, hybrid regimes have demonstrated a variety of (within-type) dynamics.

One characteristic of hybrid rule is the duality of power, and that has
its own perils. The present political disorder is symptomatic of this

incongruity. F rom India to Brazil, and the United States to

Europe, a drift to authoritarianism is derailing democracy. Divisive
polarising figures occupy high offices, challenging the very edifice on
which democracies thrive. Respecting political opponents, fair play
and transparency are hallmarks of democratic tradition. But these
values are increasingly disappearing.

Introduction
Hybrid regimes are found in most developing countries, especially since the end of the Cold War. They are called
hybrid because they combine democratic traits (e.g., frequent and direct elections) with autocratic ones (e.g., political
repression). To better understand this vast grey zone of institutional ambiguities, Typologies have been created in
order to identify various institutional arrangements of hybrid regimes and how they differ from other types of regimes.
The current annotated bibliography of literature on hybrid regime trajectories points to a logical sequence of scientific
inquiry in the following three domains: Causes of Emergence, Conditions of Stability, and Transition from Hybridity. It
is supported with proposed key readings for each. Also included are datasets, major journals, and university presses
on the subject. The selection was largely driven by the criteria of originality and potential for generalization, leaving
aside the question of iterated testing and idiographic research. The crosscutting from literature on authoritarian to
democratic regimes is what makes hybrid regimes such a dynamic subject for generating new insights and innovative
thinking toward a better understanding of political regimes in developing countries.

The term ‘hybrid regime’ has gained increasing currency in

Pakistan among analysts and politicians. It is specifically used to
explain the existential nature of the current PTI-led coalition
government, which came to power after the July 2018 elections.
The elections were severely criticised by various parties for being
‘rigged,’ whereas a December 9, 2018 report by the Free and Fair
Election Network (FAFEN) found ‘various irregularities’ in the
electoral process. The government’s critics insist that institutions such as
the Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) — at the behest of the so-called
‘military-establishment’ — tampered with the voting and counting processes.
They claim that this was done to aid Imran Khan’s centre-right PTI, so it could
gain just enough seats to form a coalition government

Pakistan has been under a hybrid martial law regime for over two years now, and it
seems that the country’s all-powerful army is unwilling to jettison its Imran Khan
project. It is commonly believed that the prime minister has been trying to
manage the affairs of the state largely with the help of his 14 special assistants
and Federal Minister Asad Umar. The special assistants to the prime minister,
except one, are not elected members of parliament, but they enjoy the status of
cabinet members. The government’s law experts should examine the question
of whether they can have this privilege because it is reserved for federal
ministers, who must be duly elected members of parliament.

The Constitution recognises the prime minister, the cabinet, federal ministers
and ministers of state. It also recognises a maximum of five advisers to the
prime minister that we already have. But it does not recognise any special
assistants to the prime minister. Further, there is apparently no law that
sanctions the appointment of special assistants. The government’s law experts
should examine the question of whether the prime minister can confer on
anyone appointed by him the status and privileges of an elected member of
parliament and make him a member of the cabinet.

Sometimes confusion is created by declaring that so and so has been granted

the status of a federal minister. This is largely a matter of protocol, or a way to
enable the person concerned to meet and engage with a representative of a
foreign country holding ministerial office. But this so and so can neither be a
member of the cabinet nor can he address parliament. The only non-member
who is allowed to address parliament is the attorney general.

All advisers to the prime minister enjoy the rank of federal ministers but they
cannot address parliament. This year again, the finance adviser, Hafeez
Shaikh, could not deliver his budget speech and it was read out by Minister
Hammad Azhar and there were perhaps moments when both of them felt
embarrassed.
This hybrid system should be unwelcome to the people as it denies them rule
by a proper cabinet that is an essential pillar of the parliamentary system. One
is sure the prime minister means well but it is the responsibility of the law
ministry to ensure that the constitutional limits are not crossed.

This is a serious problem indeed, but the solution doesn’t lie in packing the
cabinet with strangers. It should be addressed at the time of the next election.
At least tickets for election as senators could be given to persons capable of
contributing to good governance. Another indication of the system having
become hybrid is the tendency of the president and governors to rewrite their
roles in a marked deviation from convention.

President Dr Arif Alvi is an extremely fine gentleman, learned and cultured.

For his qualities of head and heart he is held in high esteem on both sides of
the political divide. But he has difficulty in adjusting to the role of a
constitutional head of state who is expected to say only what the government
advises him to say. Perhaps he wants to be a combative president, always
ready to bolster his former party’s position (at present he cannot belong to any
party). The other day, he declared that the reference against Justice Faez Isa
was correct. No head of state is expected to rubbish an apex court’s judgement,
and one delivered by 10 honourable judges (though any Supreme Court
verdict is equally sacrosanct).

He was also reported to have said that anyone having grievances against NAB
should go to court. But he is not the president of NAB only; he is also
president of the people who have complaints against the accountability
institution. He is also reported to have said that the 18th Amendment must be
reviewed. As president, he is not expected to take sides on a controversial
issue.

The most recent evidence of the hybrid nature of the current regime came with the
rushed passage of legislation aimed at hounding opposition politicians under the guise
of countering money laundering and terror financing.

Pakistan has been on the watchdog Financial Action Task Force’s (FATF’s) grey list
for over two years. The so-called grey list implies increased monitoring of countries
for “strategic deficiencies in their regimes to counter money laundering, terrorist
financing, and proliferation financing.” Pakistan showed ostensible compliance with
the FATF regimen via the legislation passed in September, ahead of the FATF’s
October meetings. That could mean getting a clean bill and transitioning to the white
list, while non-compliance could result in blacklisting that entails potentially crippling
economic sanctions.

Under the garb of complying with the FATF requirements, Khan’s Pakistan Tehreek-
e-Insaf (PTI) government steamrolled through eight pieces of legislation in mid-
September that target the political opposition. In this effort, the PTI was helped by the
army’s notorious Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI). The opposition,  led by
ex-Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) and
including the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) led by Bilawal Bhutto-Zardari, claimed
that its members received mysterious phone calls telling some to stay away from the
parliamentary proceedings, thereby paving the way for the regime to bulldoze their
way through the joint session of the parliament. The opposition had previously
defeated several of the bills in the Senate – the upper house of Pakistan’s bicameral
parliament – where it has a numerical majority. But by herding together the Senate
with the National Assembly in a joint session, and forcing some three dozen
opposition parliamentarians to stay away from the vote, the regime managed to get a
wafer-thin majority to piggyback clauses that go way beyond the FATF requirements.
In Pakistan, the PTI’s mode of governance and its competence in policymaking
and efficiency in service delivery are being more widely questioned by people
who have closely observed its performance over the past two years.

The hybrid democracy is a recipe for political instability

as demonstrated by the Pakistan Democratic Movement’s
efforts to build political muscle on street power to
reinforce its demand for fresh free and fair elections
As PPP founder Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto wrote from his death cell: ‘the people lead
and the people are led.’
Last August, Khan’s political dependency on Bajwa became more
apparent when he extended the Army Chief’s tenure. The order lacked
legality and became highly controversial, resulting in a court case. On
28 November, the Supreme Court ruled to extend Bajwa’s tenure by
six months and ordered the Parliament to formulate new rules in the
Army Act and the 1973 Constitution for the process.
Ultimately, Bajwa got the three-year extension he desired by
successfully manipulating political parties that have weakened due to
years of poor political direction. Pakistan’s political parties have
weakened to the point where they must negotiate timidly for short-
term personal benefits rather than long-term political dividends.
Bajwa’s continuation will further weaken Pakistan’s democratic
institutions, as his team have adopted harsh measures to tame the
judiciary and media. Restrictions were placed on the media to not air
news outside of that recommended by the military’s public relations
agency.
This model of hybrid democracy does not seem sustainable in the long run. All
these manifestations of ‘hybrid regimes’ claim to be democratic but resort to
undemocratic practices, including usurping civil rights, using strong-arm
tactics and state machinery to browbeat the opposition. However, according to
Morse, electoral authoritarianism and/or ‘hybrid regimes’ can become
problematic for those who impose and retain them.