(THAILAND) The Urban Political Ecology of The 2011 Floods in Bangkok The Creation of Uneven-Vulnerabilities

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The Urban Political Ecology of the 2011 Floods

in Bangkok: The Creation of Uneven
Vulnerabilities
Article in Pacific Affairs · September 2015

DOI: 10.5509/2015883623
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The Urban Political Ecology
of the 2011 Floods in Bangkok:
The Creation of Uneven
Vulnerabilities
Delivered by Publishing Technology to: Pennsylvania State University IP: 180.155.144.228 on: Thu, 28 Jan 2016 02:15:22
Danny Marks
Abstract
This paper uses an urban political ecology analysis to question the discourses
used by Thai government leaders regarding the causes of the 2011 floods
in Bangkok and the solutions that they have proposed in response. In
contrast to their argument that the main causes of the floods in Bangkok
Copyright (c) Pacific Affairs. All rights reserved.
were climate change and nature, I argue that the causes of the 2011 floods
are compound. They are a result of human-nature interactions: while
Thailand did receive heavy rainfall that year, a number of human activities
interacted with this heavy rainfall to create the floods. During the past few
decades, local political elite have risen to power and profited the most from
Bangkok’s urbanization activities while changes to the physical environment
of Bangkok have made those living there more vulnerable to floods. These
activities include massive land use change and concretization which have
drastically increased run-off, over-pumping of groundwater, and the filling
of canals. Further, both the local and national government’s overreliance
on antiquated and poorly maintained infrastructure made the city more
vulnerable to the 2011 floods.
In 2011, human decisions, particularly by politicians, about where
to direct and block water heavily influenced which groups were most
vulnerable. As a result, the inner city was protected at the expense of those
living in the city’s peripheral areas. Analyses of disasters in urban areas
therefore need to consider how discourses, socio-political relations, and
ecological conditions shape governance practices of disasters.
Keywords: 2011 Thailand floods, urban political ecology, disaster

governance, social vulnerability, Bangkok urbanization, Thai flood
management
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5509/2015883623
____________________
Danny Marks is a PhD candidate in human geography at the University of Sydney.

Email: danny.marks@sydney.edu.au.
© Pacific Affairs: Volume 88, No. 3 September 2015 623

Pacific Affairs: Volume 88, No. 3 – September 2015
“It seems like we’re fighting against the forces of nature.” 1
“They build their estates in low-lying areas that are supposed to be

reservoirs and they throw up a dam or a dike, and they block the flow
where the water is supposed to go in the rainy season.” 2
Introduction
I
n the second half of 2011, Bangkok experienced its worst flooding in

many decades. Overall in Thailand, the floods killed over 800 people,
affected millions and cost the economy at least US$45 billion.3 Much of
this devastation occurred in Bangkok and its environs. The destruction
wrought by the floods was certainly partially a result of heavy rainfall—
significantly more rain fell in 2011 than average (43 percent more than the
average rainfall from May to October, 1982 to 2002).4 However, there have
been years where it rained more and the country faced more tropical cyclones
than it did in 2011, but the magnitude of flooding was less severe in those
years than it was in 2011.5 Further, the city’s western and northern outskirts
were heavily flooded for many weeks but the inner part remained dry despite
the areas lying at similar elevations. These phenomena suggest that this
disaster was not natural but a compound disaster: a result of both natural
and social processes, the latter of which occurred not only in 2011 but also
beforehand, during the disaster’s incubation period. These social processes
arose largely due to the poor governance of flooding in the urban transition
of Thailand’s Central Plains. They include mismanagement and the failure
of infrastructure, uncoordinated land use change, land subsidence, and the
filling in of canals.
The prime minister, her Cabinet members, and some senior bureaucrats,6
however, blamed the external forces of nature and climate change for the
____________________
1 Thai Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra during the height of the 2011 floods. Seth Mydans,
“Floods Lapping at Heart of Thailand’s Capital,” Seattle Times, 31 October 2011, http://www.
seattletimes.com/nation-world/floods-lapping-at-heart-of-thailands-capital/, accessed 29 April 2015.
2 Smith Dharmasaroja, former director general of the Thai Meteorological Department. Seth
Mydans, “As Thailand Floods Spread, Experts Blame Officials, Not Rains,” New York Times, 13 October
2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/14/world/asia/a-natural-disaster-in-thailand-guided-by
-human-hand.html?_r=0, accessed 29 April 2015.
3 Voice of America, “Thailand Moves to Avoid Repeat of 2011 Flood Catastrophe,” 11 April 2012,
http://www.voanews.com/content/thailand-budgets-12-billion-to-avoid-repeat-of-2011-flood
-catastrophe-147139575/179378.html, accessed 19 May 2014.
4 Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, White Paper on International Economy and Trade 2012
(Tokyo, 2012) http://www.meti.go.jp/english/report/data/gWT2012fe.html, accessed 19 May 2014.
5 2011 Thailand Floods Event Recap Report—Impact Forecasting March 2012 (Chicago: Impact
Forecasting, 2012) http://thoughtleadership.aonbenfield.com/Documents/20120314_impact_
forecasting_thailand_flood_event_recap.pdf, accessed 19 May 2014.
6 For example, in an interview with the author in October 2014, a senior Royal Irrigation
Development official declared, “I think the main cause of the floods was climate change or climate
624
Political Ecology of Bangkok Floods
floods. Science and Technology Minister Plodprasop Surasawadi stated that

Thais “must continue living with the flood for now” and “would have to
accept that climate change is occurring.”7 In another instance, Deputy Prime
Minister Kittiratt Na-Ranong declared that the flooding “has to be the result
of climate change and global warming.”8 Blaming nature or climate change,
rather than governance failures, as the main cause of floods not only absolves
the government of any responsibility for causing or worsening the extent of
the flooding but also leads to the belief that floods should be controlled and
managed mainly by implementing structural measures to control water and
protect populations from water.

The practice of governance, however, forms an essential component of
compound disasters, not just natural forces and technical failures. While a
vast literature exists on disaster management, there is little written so far on
disaster governance. Based on the World Bank’s definition of governance,
good disaster governance would be exercising power to successfully and fairly
reduce vulnerabilities and exposures to disasters. However, throughout much
of Asia, disaster governance by the state, which in many cases has a low
institutional capacity and has been mostly captured by the elite, causes
disasters to be more damaging and their effects unequal, hurting the poor
disproportionately. The most marginalized members of society have become
the most vulnerable while the elite suffer the least. Therefore, analyses of
disasters in Asia need to include studies of power relations and contestations.
Further, the discourses used to govern disasters are also essential for
understanding the causes of escalating failures before and during disasters.
The discourse used by Thai national leaders depoliticizes disasters. By stating
that unlucky victims happened to be in the “wrong place at the wrong time,”
this discourse “conceal[s] the socio-economic processes that place vulnerable
populations at risk and consequently, such processes are not regarded as
policy issues because ‘natural’ hazards become the policy problem to solve.”9
This misplaced analysis can lead policy makers to propose engineering and
structural solutions which often do not address underlying vulnerabilities
and can have a number of negative repercussions. For example, engineering
designs and operational planning norms are normally based on historically
expected flood returns, but climate change and other factors may cause
these estimations to be too low. Further, depending on flood-control
____________________
variability.” In another interview in December 2013, a permanent secretary of a ministry said, “The
major cause of the floods was excessive water – it was natural.”
7 Bangkok Post, “Plodprasop: Accept the Reality,” 3 November 2011.
8 NBC News, “As the Floods Recede, Bangkok Blame Game Begins,” 22 November 2011, http://
worldblog.nbcnews.com/_news/2011/11/22/8956474-as-the-floods-recede-bangkok-blame-game
-begins, accessed 19 May 2014.
9 Fernando J. Aragón-Durand, “Unpacking the Social Construction of Natural Disaster through
Policy Discourses and Institutional Responses in Mexico: The Case of Chalco Valley’s Floods, State of
Mexico” (PhD dissertation, University College London, 2009), 21.
625
infrastructure creates a false sense of security which suggests that changing

the built environment through land use planning and ecosystem protection
and improving flood-response capacity are not needed. This can lead to
increased losses in urban areas when events exceed the projects’ design
capacity of engineering projects.
In response to the problems arising from using the aforementioned
approach, this paper proposes that we use an urban political ecology (UPE)
approach, which rejects this separation of environment and urban. Instead,
it views disasters as compound events that have cascading consequences with
feedbacks to the local and wider political economy10 and the urban as a “site
where ecology, economy, and society collapse on another and must be
untangled.”11 Such an analysis can help reveal why high and unequal levels
of devastation are experienced in disasters in urban areas throughout Asia
as well as which types of responses are needed to reduce future vulnerabilities
to disasters.
The 2011 floods in Bangkok provide a useful case study of the governance
of disasters in Asia’s urban transition. A UPE analysis of the period before,
during, and after the floods reveals how the exercising of power by the city’s
elite through state and market institutions has not only changed the
environment of the Bangkok metropolitan area so that those living there
have become more vulnerable to floods, but also has created a spatial pattern
of urban development which has led to uneven exposure to floods. Further,
the case study shows how governance failures of water and land management
made flooding worse in Bangkok, particularly to the city’s most vulnerable
communities. Overall, poor governance elevated the floods in 2011 from
being a minor disaster to a major one.
To make this argument, the paper will first summarize the theory of UPE
and how it relates to urban flood governance. Second, it will describe the
political economy of Bangkok’s urbanization processes and the city’s flood
governance during the last few decades, the effects urbanization has had on
the physical environment, and the pre-2011 flood conditions these processes
created. Third, it will link Bangkok’s urbanization and water management
schemes to the 2011 floods, arguing that actions and policy decisions by the
country’s elite subjected those in the outer city to more extensive flooding
to ensure that the inner city stayed dry. Last, it will briefly conclude with a
discussion of the governments’ response after the floods. The paper uses
a mixture of primary and secondary sources, drawing from interviews
conducted with Thai government officials, academics, NGO activists,
____________________
10 Michael Douglass, “The Urban Transition of Environmental Disaster Governance in Asia,”

(working paper 210, Asia Research Institute, Singapore, 2013).
11 Saskia Sassen and Natan Dotan, “Delegating, Not Returning, to the Biosphere: How to Use
the Multi-scalar and Ecological Properties of Cities,” Global Environmental Change 21, no. 3 (2011): 825.
626
community leaders, and community members from December 2013 to

October 2014.12
Urban Political Ecology and Its Relationship to Flooding

The field of urban political ecology provides a useful framework for thinking
about the creation and shape of disasters, particularly in an urban context.
This field could be called a subfield of political ecology, which combines
“concerns of ecology and a broadly defined political economy”13 and asserts
that environmental change and ecological conditions are the outcomes of

political processes. Prior to the development of this field of political ecology,
both academics and policy makers mistakenly often sought to address
environmental problems with technical or management solutions that did
not tackle the political economy dimensions of these problems.
Blaikie pioneered the argument that environmental problems cannot be
solved unless these dimensions are addressed.14 In The Political Economy of
Soil Erosion in Developing Countries, he argues that soil erosion is a socio-
political problem because of the involvement of a number of key stakeholders

who live outside the affected areas, and of the state, which is never a neutral
actor. Together with Bloomfield, Blaikie continued to analyze environmental
problems through a political economy lens in Land Degradation and Society,15
arguing that not only was the state not neutral but also that it often bestows
its power to the dominant group and classes while marginalizing the least
powerful. Influenced by Marxism, political ecology focuses on unequal power
relations and examines control over access to natural and social environments
and to natural resources, thereby making conflict and contestation over
resources central to most analyses.
Only in the last fifteen years have studies in UPE taken off. Before, most
political ecology studies were conducted in rural areas. With a strong Marxist
leaning, UPE developed from the work of Harvey (and Lefebvre). In his
seminal work, Social Justice and the City, Harvey begins with the position that
the city is a tangible, built environment but also a social product.16 Cities
are built for the purpose of circulating capital, including human,
commodities or finance. Using this Marxist framework, he argues that “cities
are founded upon the exploitation of the many by the few”17 and posits that
____________________
12 The identities of some of the interviewees have been concealed to protect confidentiality
agreements.
13 Piers Blaikie and Harold Brookfield, Land Degradation and Society (London: Methuen, 1987),
17.
14 Piers Blaikie, The Political Economy of Soil Erosion in Developing Countries (London: Longman,
1985).
15 Blaikie and Brookfield, Land Degradation.
16 David Harvey, Social Justice and the City (London: Edward Arnold, 1973).
17 Harvey, Social Justice, 314.
627
the roots of urban inequality are the scarcity and high value of land in good
locations.
Urban political ecologists expand upon Harvey’s theory of the city,
perceiving landscapes and urban infrastructures of cities as hybrids and
“historical products of human-nature interaction.”18 Thinking of the city as
a socio-spatial hybrid enables us to see how the “social production of urban
space unevenly spreads the vulnerability to hazards, exposure to risk and
ecological breakdown.” 19 For example, they argue that the spaces of
environmental degradation and high exposure to hazards as well as those
of protection to hazard threats are unevenly distributed over the topography

of the city. One other important contribution they make is their
conceptualization of the city as an ever-changing landscape of power.
Swyngedouw argues that urbanization is a contested political-economic
process of exclusion and marginalization, creating new landscapes of power,
rather than manifestations of existing ones.20 Therefore, they focus on power
relations and social actors who carry them out21 because these two factors
largely determine who can access and mobilize scarce resources or other
components of the environment and who is marginalized by being forced

to live in spaces of high vulnerability.
Specifically in the case of urban flooding, uneven vulnerabilities
experienced by different individuals during floods are largely due to the
state and market institutions protecting the lives and the interests of the elite
while failing to protect marginalized groups or making them more vulnerable.
Normally the state, rather than the private sector, has undertaken investments
in flood risk reduction, such as flood protection structures, designation of
public floodways and land-use controls and therefore plays a key role in
determining how vulnerable people are to floods. Hence, the state is a crucial
arena of contestation over flood protection. In this contemporary landscape,
the elites often have been able to use the state to accumulate social surpluses
in areas where they live and work at the expense of other groups.22 However,
the structures of power governing floods and their effects are not static.
Rather, by opening political space, floods can act as catalysts or tipping points
shaping “the future political trajectory towards an accelerated status quo or
____________________
18 Roger Keil, “Urban Political Ecology,” Urban Geography 24, no. 8 (2003): 724.
19 Martin J. Murray, “Fire and Ice: Unnatural Disasters and the Disposable Urban Poor in Post-
Apartheid Johannesburg,” International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 33, no. 1 (2009): 171.
20 Erik Swyngedouw, “Power, Nature, and the City. The Conquest of Water and the Political
Ecology of Urbanization in Guayaquil, Ecuador: 1880–1990,” Environment and Planning A 29, no. 2
(1997): 311–332.
21 Erik Swyngedouw, Social Power and the Urbanization of Water: Flows of Power (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2004).
22 Timothy W. Collins, “Marginalization, Facilitation, and the Production of Unequal Risk: The
2006 Paso del Norte Floods,” Antipode 42, no. 2 (2010): 258–288.
628
a critical juncture.”23 Consequently, as Pelling argues, while floods are physical

occurrences, their form, magnitude, and location, and the people they affect
are the outcome of ongoing and past socio-economic and political processes.24
Thus we must study these processes in order to fully understand floods.
Before 2011: The Flood’s Incubation Period

Many people suffered in Bangkok during the floods of 2011 at vastly different
levels—some remained safe and dry at the expense of others. Given the key
role of state and market institutions in determining this vulnerability, our

analysis should focus on the governance processes that created, distributed,
and reduced these vulnerabilities. Further, disasters do not simply occur
because of a one-off phenomenon, such as a heavy rainfall event, but also
because of “environmental unsustainable development projects over time.”25
Or, as Douglass argues, before each urban disaster’s onset, there is an
incubation period when causal factors contributing to a disaster accumulate,
interact in an unnoticed manner, and compound vulnerability.26 Therefore,
analyzing the 2011 flood incubation period in Bangkok can shed light into
this process. This section describes the political economy of Bangkok’s
urbanization and the effects this had on the environment and on the creation
of uneven vulnerabilities to flooding.
Founded in 1782 in the low-lying floodplain of the Chao Phraya Delta
(see figure 1, next page), Bangkok is located in an area which has always
been prone to flooding. However, during the initial period of the city’s
establishment (1782–1890), flood damage was not a major problem and
“excess water was a part of life and considered as benevolent nourishment.”27
Life revolved around an aquatic network of natural or dug canals (khlongs)
and residents lived in amphibious dwellings. Further, plantation irrigation
ditches and low-lying rice paddies served as drainage and water catchments,
thereby reducing serious flooding.28
In the 1890s, the city began to change from a floating city to a land-based
one. Over 135 roads and 41 bridges were constructed between 1890 and
____________________
23 Mark Pelling and Kathleen Dill, “Disaster Politics: Tipping Points for Change in the Adaptation
of Sociopolitical Regimes,” Progress in Human Geography 34, no. 1 (2010): 29.
24 Mark Pelling, “A Political Ecology of Urban Flood Hazard and Social Vulnerability in Guyana”
(PhD dissertation, University of Liverpool, 1997), 3.
25 Greg Bankoff, Georg Frerks, and Dorothea Hilhorst, eds., Mapping Vulnerability: Disasters,
Development, and People (London: Earthscan, 2004), 3.
26 Douglass, “The Urban Transition.”
27 Danai Thaitakoo and Brian McGrath, “Bangkok Liquid Perception: Waterscape Urbanism in
the Chao Phraya River Delta and Implications to Climate Change Adaptation,” in Water Communities,
eds. Rajib Shaw and Danai Thaitakoo, (Bingley: Emerald, 2010), 41.
28 Sidh Sintusingha, “Bangkok’s Urban Evolution: Challenges and Opportunities for Urban
Sustainability,” in Megacities: Urban Form, Governance, and Sustainability, eds. Andre Sorensen and
Junichiro Okata (Tokyo: Springer, 2011), 133–161.
629
Figure 1
The Chao Phraya Delta
Source: Kreeta Sroikeeree and Rattana Bannatham, “Flood

and Flood Management in Bangkok, Thailand,” in Water-
Related Risk Management in Urban Agglomerations, ed. Ulrike
Kastrup (Bonn: UNU-EHS, 2006), 8.
1935.29 Shop houses and mansions replaced their aquatic counterparts. In

addition, the government allowed land tenure for the first time, which
stimulated land-based settlements, on either side of the khlongs.30
____________________
29 Porphant Ouyyanont, “Physical and Economic Change in Bangkok, 1851–1925,” Southeast

Asian Studies 36, no. 4 (1999): 456.
30 Sintusingha, “Bangkok’s Urban Evolution,” 141.
630
The city’s land-based urbanization and population expanded rapidly after

World War II as the country transformed from an agriculture-based to an
export-led manufacturing and service economy. This transformation
accelerated from the 1960s onwards when the government successfully wooed
foreign direct investment (FDI) in export-oriented manufacturing. During
the 1980s, facing rising manufacturing costs domestically and an increased
value of the yen especially after the 1985 Plaza Accords, Japanese companies
significantly invested in manufacturing.31 Much of this investment occurred
in the Bangkok Metropolitan Region (BMR), consisting of the metropolis
of Bangkok and the five surrounding provinces. To attract investment,

the government concentrated transportation and telecommunications
infrastructure in this area, giving it a competitive advantage over the rest of
the country.32 The expansion of roads into former agricultural areas around
Bangkok plus the high cost of land in the city centre spurred rapid urban
and industrial expansion into Bangkok’s hinterlands. 33 The majority of
multinational companies decided to locate their industries here given its
infrastructure advantages, the lower cost of land and labour, and the weaker
enforcement of regulations.34
The newfound opportunities to accumulate wealth, infrastructure
expansion, the massive wave of migrants to the BMR,35 and the lower cost of
land contributed significantly to a real estate boom in the peri-urban areas
of Bangkok, particularly in the form of townhouses and detached housing.
The real estate market exploded during this period and eventually overheated.
As an example of this massive land change, in peri-urban Pathum Thani
Province, a province above Bangkok, non-agriculture land use burgeoned
from 25 percent in 1980 to 31 percent in 1990 and 39 percent in 2000. This
trend has continued until the present. To build these new roads and estates,
developers filled in paddy fields and many of the khlongs or reduced them
to drainage ditches and open sewers.36 Overall, the built-up area of the BMR
ballooned from 67 km2 in the 1950s to 683 km2 by 2007.37
____________________
31 The Japanese constituted 44% of the total investment in manufacturing in Thailand from
1960–1992. Michael J. G. Parnwell and Luxmon Wongsuphasawat, “Between the Global and the Local:
Extended Metropolitanisation and Industrial Location Decision Making in Thailand,” Third World
Planning Review 19, no. 2 (1997): 127.
32 Gavin Shatkin, “Globalization and Local Leadership: Growth, Power and Politics in Thailand’s
Eastern Seaboard,” International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 28, no. 1 (2004): 11–26.
33 Suwanna Rongwinriyaphanich, “Effects of Land Policy on Hybrid Rural-urban Development
Patterns and Resilience: A Case Study of the Territorial Development in the Bangkok Metropolitan
Region,” (paper presented at Regional Studies Association European Conference, Delft, Netherlands,
15 May 2012).
34 Parnwell and Wongsuphasawat, “Between the Global,” 119–138.
35 A daily average of 30,000 from 1985 to 1990.
36 Edsel E. Sajor and Rutmanee Ongsakul, “Mixed Land Use and Equity in Water Governance
in Peri-Urban Bangkok,” International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 31, no. 4 (2007): 782–801.
37 Shlomo Angel, Jason Parent, and Daniel Civco, “Urban Sprawl Metrics: An Analysis of Global
Urban Expansion Using GIS,” (paper presented at ASPRS 2007 Annual Conference, Tampa, Florida,
7–11 May 2007).
631
However, the BMR developed in a haphazard and sprawling fashion. It

grew outwards in a ribbon-like fashion along the three major transportation
routes leading out of the urban core with these corridors becoming heavily
congested while underutilized land remained between the corridors.38 The
expansion resulted in a situation in which all types of urban land uses,
including individual houses, housing estates, and commercial and industrial
buildings were located beside each other. Development was “influenced as
much by ‘who owns land where’ as by any sound urban planning principles.”39
This pattern of unregulated and sprawled-out urban development has
had a number of negative effects on the physical environment and has

increased the city’s overall vulnerability to flooding. Previously agricultural
lands had contributed to flood retention by holding up surplus water during
times of heavy rain.40 The widespread paving of the surface for roads or
residential, commercial, and industrial buildings decreased water infiltration,
has increased run-off and hastened it into channels.41 On land with natural
ground cover, 50 percent of precipitation infiltrates into the ground whereas
in a surface that is 75 to 100 percent impervious, only 15 percent infiltrates
the ground.42 In particular, the illegal construction of houses and factories

in floodways and green zones (discussed below) has harmfully encroached
onto natural drainage channels and flood storage areas. Further, the filling
and degradation of khlongs which previously played a major role draining
storm run-off water has also shrunk the city’s capacity to cope with rainfall.
A number of illegal settlements encroaching upon the remaining khlongs has
limited their drainage capacity and made it more difficult to dredge them.43
Another damaging effect has been the city’s heavy land subsidence, which
began in the 1970s. The city’s ground has already sunk more than one metre
since then. This has occurred mainly because of excessive groundwater
pumping, particularly by industries. The state has failed to manage expanding
water demand, which rose as a result of the city’s expansion. Demand for
____________________
38 Charles A. Setchell, “The Growing Environmental Crisis in the World’s Mega Cities: The Case
of Bangkok,” Third World Planning Review 17, no. 1 (1995): 1–18.
39 Craig Plumb, “Bangkok,” in Cities in the Pacific Rim, Planning Systems and Property Markets, eds.
Jim Berry and Stanley McGreal (London: E. & F. N. Spon, 1999), 154.
40 Vudipong Davivongs, Makoto Yokohari, and Yuji Hara, “Neglected Canals: Deterioration of
Indigenous Irrigation System by Urbanization in the West Peri-Urban Area of Bangkok Metropolitan
Region,” Water 4, no. 1 (2012): 12–27.
41 Judith A. Rees, Urban Water and Sanitation Services; An IWRM Approach (Stockholm: Global
Water Partnership, 2006), http://www.gwp.org/Global/ToolBox/Publications/Background%20
papers/11%20Urban%20Water%20and%20Sanitation%20Services;%20An%20IWRM%20
Approach%20%282006%29%20English.pdf, accessed 20 May 2014.
42 Joachim Tourbier and Iain White, “Sustainable Measures for Flood Attenuation: Sustainable
Drainage and Conveyance Systems SUDACS,” in Advances in Urban Flood Management, eds. Richard
Ashley et al. (London: Taylor & Francis, 2007), 14.
43 Thongchai Roachanakanan, “Floodways and Flood Prevention in Thailand,” (paper presented
at the World Flood Protection, Response, Recovery and Drawing up of Flood Risk Management
Conference, Bangkok, 12–13 September 2012).
632
Figure 2
Groundwater Pumping Rate in the Bangkok Plain
from 1955–2004
Source: N. Phien-Wej, P.H. Giao, and P. Nutalaya, “Land Subsidence in Bangkok,

Thailand,” Engineering Geology 82, no. 4 (2006): 191.
groundwater surpassed the threshold of the city’s aquifer system and

consequently over-extraction occurred. This problem was exacerbated by
the lack of a proper city plan to manage the city’s land usage and infrastructure
development. While the government did succeed in curbing the pumping
rate during the early 1990s, it rose again in the late 1990s due to the city’s
expansion into new outer areas where no surface water supply was available
(see figure 2 above). Until the early 2000s, the Federation of Thai industries
had succeeded in limiting a tax increase of well-pumping charges.44 The
subsidence has debilitated the city’s flood protection. Flood walls and dikes
subside steadily as the ground sinks and the city therefore needs to make
greater efforts to pump and drain potential floodwater through khlongs and
tunnels.45 The World Bank estimates that 70 percent of the increase in
Bangkok’s flooding costs in 2050 will be due to land subsidence.46
____________________
44 François Molle, “Scales and Power in River Basin Management: The Chao Phraya River in
Thailand,” The Geographical Journal 173, no. 4 (2007): 35–73.
45 N. Phien-Wej, P.H. Giao, and P. Nutalaya, “Land Subsidence in Bangkok, Thailand,” Engineering
Geology 82, no. 4 (2006): 187–201.
46 World Bank, Climate Risks and Adaptation in Asian Coastal Megacities: A Synthesis Report
(Washington, DC: World Bank, 2010), http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EASTASIAPACIFICEXT/
Resources/226300-1287600424406/coastal_megacities_fullreport.pdf, accessed 20 May 2014.
633
An underlying driver of this ineffective planning system and subsequent

degrading urbanization is a change in the country’s political economy
beginning in the second half of the 1970s, which reshaped the urban political
ecological landscape. Up until this period, Thailand’s political system had
been described as a bureaucratic polity: bureaucrats and the military
dominated the political process and monopolized power at the local level
through almighty central government ministries, particularly the Ministry
of Interior. During this period, three changes occurred that led to the decline
of the power of the bureaucratic polity and the rise of local politicians-
cum-businessmen who gained enormous wealth and power. 47 First, after the
middle class agitated for change and launched large-scale street protests,
the national government devolved power to the local level, including
significantly increasing the budgets of the elected Provincial Administration
Organizations (PAO) which were created in the 1950s. PAOs soon began to
be dominated by local businessmen since they were given the responsibility
to allocate state funding for local infrastructure projects, which became more
important as the country rapidly invested in infrastructure during this period.
Second, democratization occurred from this period onwards as the power

of Parliament grew. This change enabled provincial elites to run for national
office or exert informal power by financially backing parliamentary
candidates. Third, the aforementioned industrial transformation provided
new opportunities for provincial elites to accumulate wealth, particularly in
the construction, transportation, and real estate sectors, and translate this
wealth into political power.48 Largely due to the concentrated economic
boom in the Bangkok Metropolitan Region, a number of these local elite
operated in this area.49
The rise of the local political elite has had a strong influence on the
haphazard form of Bangkok’s urbanization and the city’s increased
vulnerability to flooding. First, they often either acted as brokers for outside
investors wanting to buy a big piece of land or invested in a number of
housing and industrial projects.50 They would consolidate land for these
projects either through legal purchases or graft and intimidation. Their
excessive pursuit of property development, however, contributed to
overbuilding in the BMR, including in the green zones, and in floodways,
such as industrial estates in Ayutthaya. Second, members of Parliament have
protected illegal communities encroaching upon khlongs in order to gain
their votes. According to a local government officer in Don Muang, one of
____________________
47 Shatkin, “Globalization and Local Leadership,” 11–26.

48 Shatkin, “Globalization and Local Leadership,” 11–26.
49 Of a list of the seven most influential local strongmen compiled by the military, five operated
in the BMR.
50 Sombat Chantornvong, “Local Godfathers in Thai Politics,” in Money and Power in Provincial
Thailand, ed. Ruth T. McVey (Copenhagen: NIAS Press, 2000), 53–73.
634
Bangkok’s northernmost districts, this is why a number of communities still

are allowed to encroach upon a major canal, Khlong Prem Prachakorn.51
Third, local elected politicians in Bangkok and surrounding areas often have
responded to the electorate’s desire to adopt road-led development by giving
higher priority to infrastructure development and income-generation
projects over long-term conservation. Last, in public hearings and meetings
between government officials and business interest groups, landowners and
developers have pressured government officials to change land-use plans
from green zones to other areas so that they can build in these areas.52
Besides the rise of the local elite, another, albeit interrelated, underlying
driver of the city’s lack of planning is the limited power and interest of the
state institutions governing Bangkok’s urbanization. As Askew argues, city
planning “remained a highly symbolic modernistic ritual for sections of the
western-educated municipal and state-level bureaucracy, but it is effectively
impotent as policy.”53 Until 1992, Bangkok was probably the largest city in
the world without an official development plan. The first Bangkok General
Plan was delayed numerous times and was in draft status for fifteen years
until it was officially adopted. However, even after its passage, there was “no
actual commitment to the plan.”54 The lengthy delay in adopting the plan
and lack of enforcement after its implementation occurred because of not
only strong resistance from powerful local elites but also the persistently
fragmented and feeble government institutions governing urbanization.
Government regulations curbing degrading forms of land use have been
weak. Until the creation of the city’s 2006 Comprehensive Plan, the plans
themselves have been vague without any detailed or quantifiable goals, such
as set floor area and open space ratios, and the plans have not been linked
with wider policy goals.55 For example, the 1992 plan merely has an objective
that the plan should “be used as a guide to the development of the city.”56
While the 2006 Bangkok Comprehensive Plan positively provides a clearer
framework, including spatial ratios and plot sizes,57 it will be difficult to
modify previous infringements. Legal and tax provisions also do not
encourage environmentally sound land usage. Legally real estate developers
who purchased land are entitled to take any action on their land, including
filling khlongs. Consequently, of the filled khlongs, 97 percent of them have
____________________
51 Don Muang District deputy governor, interview by Danny Marks, Bangkok, 16 July 2014.
52 BMA city planning official, interview by Danny Marks, Bangkok, 4 April 2014.
53 Marc Askew, Bangkok: Place, Practice and Representation (London: Routledge, 2002), 63.
54 W. Konisranukul, “Successful Urban Design: The Case of Bangkok” (PhD dissertation,
University College London, 2006), 106.
55 Plumb, “Bangkok,” 129–156.
56 Comprehensive Plan for the Bangkok Metropolis (Bangkok: Bangkok Metropolitan Administration,
1992), Clause 4. URL no longer available.
57 Cassidy Johnson et al., “Private Sector Investment Decisions in Building and Construction:
Increasing, Managing and Transferring Risks,” in Global Assessment Report 2013 on Disaster Risk Reduction,
UNISDR, 33 (Geneva: UNISDR, 2013).
635
been filled on privately owned land.58 However, despite the clear influence
of ownership on khlong degradation, this policy remains unchanged. Further,
taxes on residential properties fail to control land use because the tax rates
are too low and the tax base excludes unutilized property. This system has
encouraged speculative land holding.59
Also, the state’s fragmented institutions have a limited capacity to enforce
land-use regulations. The numerous Thai government ministries responsible
for urban governance operate like small kingdoms, with fragmented and
competing jurisdictions. They rarely coordinate with each other. Additionally,
the long-winded approval process and rigid review procedures mean that
the city plan’s drafting and implementation process is constantly slowed
down—evident by the 17-year period it took Bangkok to pass its first city plan
after the initial draft.60 Further, provincial governments of the BMR have not
coordinated land-use plans. For example, the Bangkok Metropolitan
Administration (BMA) has designated a water catchment area (green and
grey areas) to be undeveloped in northwestern Bangkok, but north of this
area, the Nonthaburi provincial government has allowed extensive
development (yellow, orange, and red zones), thereby rendering this

catchment area ineffective.
A strong example of the state’s limited capacity to enforce land-use
regulation is the illegal development in designated swathes of eastern and
western Bangkok. The BMA has set these areas as green zones in order to
keep these as drainage areas which would reduce the city’s risk of flooding.
Under this designation, the BMA has prohibited nearly twenty uses of the
land, including housing estates. However, an investigation found developers
have built housing estates on both sides of roads and disregarded spacing
regulations.61 Another study counted over 28,000 houses constructed in the
eastern floodway.62 According to the head of a major real estate company,
in previous decades, a number of developers paid bribes to government
agencies in order to obtain housing permits in these areas, although this
practice has mostly ceased during the past few years.63 During the floods in
2011, water diverted to these green zones not only severely damaged these
houses but also was blocked by all of these buildings from flowing south into
____________________
58 Davivongs, Yokohari, and Hara, “Neglected Canals,” 20.

59 Orapan Srisawalak-Nabangchang and Warin Wonghanchao, “Evolution of Land-use in Urban-
Rural Fringe Area: The Case of Pathum Thani Province,” in The Chao Phraya Delta: Historical Development,
Dynamics and Challenges of Thailand’s Rice Bowl: Proceedings of the International Conference (Bangkok:
Kasetsart University, 2000), 8–9.
60 Plumb, “Bangkok,” 137.
61 Charles Mehl and Banasopit Mekvichai, “Contemporary Issues in Urban Land Management
in Thailand,” (paper presented at the International Symposium on Emergent Cities in Southeast Asia,
Vientiane, Laos, 26–28 November 2013).
62 Sutat Weesakul, “Thailand Flood in 2011 and Mitigation Strategies,” (lecture, Asia Institute
of Technology, Bangkok, Thailand, 16 September 2013).
63 Real estate developer, interview by Danny Marks, Bangkok, 27 August 2014.
636
the Gulf of Thailand.64 Thus, these practices by developers who profited

handsomely from building these estates contributed to those residents in
northern Bangkok being exposed to the floodwater longer.
While these powerful politicians and businessmen who have profited the
most from the BMR’s rapid growth often live in the better protected inner
city of Bangkok (as discussed below) or in the outskirts in houses with high
floodwalls, the rest of the population in the BMR, which has risen rapidly
during the past few decades to at least 15 million (as of 2010), has become
more exposed to floods due to these land-use practices. Further, those most
vulnerable to floods are low-income slum communities. They have a low

level of capacity to cope with floods due to their community’s limited
infrastructure, poorer quality of housing, low level of financial resources,
lack of access to decision makers, and in the majority of cases land tenure
insecurity.65 The geographic pattern of slum settlement has made them
highly vulnerable to floods too. While the number of slums has shrunk in
the city core, new slums have emerged in suburban areas, particularly near
industrial areas in the east and north, areas which have less flood protection
infrastructure than the core does.66 The majority of slums are in low-lying,
unfilled land which often floods during the rainy season. It is a common
practice for real-estate developers to fill the land of new housing estates
before they build them, thereby making low-lying communities more exposed
to floods.67 Many slum settlements can be found in the strips along either
railway lines or khlong banks. The latter is particularly the case in Pathum
Thani, which has many public irrigation khlongs. This is because the squatters
do not have to pay rent in this publicly owned land and cannot afford to
move to less exposed areas.68
The slum communities along canals in the peripheral areas of the BMR
are the ones that are most exposed to the overflowing of khlongs due to
heavy rainfall or pluvial flooding69 and, due to their lack of assets, their coping
capacity is also the lowest. Thus, the urbanization pattern of Bangkok has
created vast inequalities in vulnerability to environmental harms, particularly
floods. The next section argues that it has also created inequalities in access
to environmental goods, such as flood protection infrastructure.
____________________
64 Mehl and Mekvichai, “Contemporary Issues.”

65 Norio Saito, “Challenges for Adapting Bangkok’s Flood Management Systems to Climate
Change,” Urban Climate 9 (2014): 89–100.
66 Utis Kaothien and Douglas Webster, “The Bangkok Region,” in Global City Regions: Their
Emerging Forms, eds. Roger Simmonds and Gary Hack (New York: E. & F.N. Spon, 2000), 23–37.
67 Real estate developer, interview by Danny Marks, Bangkok, 27 August 2014.
68 Kioe Sheng Yap and Koen De Wandeler, “Self-help Housing in Bangkok,” Habitat International
34, no. 3 (2010): 332–341.
69 Shaikh M.M. Ahsan, “Resilient Cities for the Poor or by the Poor? A Case Study from Bangkok,”
(master’s thesis, Technology University of Berlin, 2013), http://www.urbanmanagement.tu-berlin.de/
fileadmin/f6_urbanmanagement/Study_Course/student_work/Thesis_Ahsan_Resilient_Cities_for_
the_Poor_or_by_the_Poor.pdf, accessed 20 May 2014.
637
Bangkok’s Flood Management

Because Bangkok is prone to flooding and has faced heavy flooding since
its inception, in recent decades both the national government and the BMA
have mostly sought to reduce the exposure of the population of Bangkok
and surrounding areas to floods by putting in place structural measures such
as dams, dikes, and flood tunnels. Unlike a number of governments of
Western cities, such as those in the US, the UK, and Canada, they have mostly
overlooked nonstructural measures, such as prohibiting development in
high-hazard areas, acquiring and relocating buildings in high-hazard areas,

and restoring natural habitations such as wetlands. When they have
implemented such measures, such as the gam ling (King’s monkey cheek)
scheme of building retention ponds to hold water, they have not been
expanded sufficiently. However, this over-reliance on infrastructural measures
without building the population’s coping capacity can have devastating
impacts if the infrastructure fails, as it did in 2011. Governance failures
further weaken the government’s flood management. Moreover, the spatial
pattern of this infrastructure development is uneven, protecting the inner
city, the location of the palace, shopping malls, and government buildings,
at the expense of the outer city.
One major strategy the government has used to protect Bangkok from
floods is by constructing dams upstream, particularly the massive Bhumibol
and Sirikit dams, which were built in 1964 and 1972 respectively. However,
the multi-purpose nature of the dams, providing irrigation and energy
primarily and flood protection secondarily, can cause this strategy to backfire.
This occurred both in 2006, when the dams were already full and could not
retain any more water, and more recently in 2011. As the dams began to fill
by August due to heavy rainfall, the Thai Meteorology Department informed
the Electricity Generation Authority of Thailand (EGAT), the managers of
the dams, that more heavy rain would likely come. The dam manager said in
an interview that he wanted to release water in order stop the dams from
overfilling. However, the Agriculture Minister Theera Wongsamut overruled
him, ordering him to delay releasing water so that farmers in the central plains
would have sufficient time to harvest a second crop of rice.70 However, this
strategy backfired due to heavy rainfall in August and September which forced
the managers to release 7,000 million cubic metres of water from the dams
in October to stop them from breaking. This outpour of the dams’ water
combined with the heavier than usual tropical rainstorms in the second half
of 2011 caused a huge amount of water to flow into the Chao Phraya Basin.71
____________________
70 EGAT and Thai Meteorology Department senior officials, interviews by Danny Marks,
September and October 2014.
71 Suluck Lamubol, “Thailand: Floods Expose System Failures: Academics,” University World News,
4 November 2011, http://www.universityworldnews.com/article.php?story=20111104093419380,
accessed 20 May 2014.
638
The city has also sought to prevent water from flowing outside into the
city or in some cases to temporarily divert the water elsewhere. Recently
Bangkok endured large floods in 1983, 1995, and 2006. After each of these
floods, the city administration constructed more infrastructure to protect
the city. In response to the 1983 floods, a polder system was built, including
a major dyke running from the east bank of the Chao Phraya from Pathum
Thani to major areas of Bangkok and the King’s Dyke at the northern and
eastern boundaries of Bangkok.72 In 1995, the BMA used central government
funding to build a 77 kilometre barrier along the Chao Phraya River, which
was completed in 2010. In 2006, after extensive flooding, the BMA built a
series of additional flood barriers along the main khlongs and pumping
stations.73 Most of the flood protection infrastructure is concentrated in the
central core of Bangkok, which is where the majority of the city’s upper-
income segments live, work, and shop.
However, this strategy has multiple drawbacks. While those inside the
dykes are better protected, conditions are worse for those outside. Starting
in the 1980s, urbanization occurred beyond the King’s Dyke in the form of
housing estates and industries. But without the construction of additional

dykes and pumping stations in these areas, they became unevenly exposed
to pluvial and fluvial floods.74 For example, in 2006, areas outside the King’s
Dyke in eastern Bangkok, such as Minburi and Nong Chok, suffered heavy
flooding. In Pathum Thani, a local NGO leader said that the area “was being
drowned to protect Bangkok.”75 With water being diverted from the protected
zone, the outer zone was transformed into a retention area to store the
region’s excessive water.76 Also, Suvarnabhumi Airport has polders blocking
major khlongs which could have been used to drain flood-prone areas, as
was the case in 2011.77 The importance placed on keeping the airport dry
causes areas outside the polder system, particularly those closer to the
airport,78 to become more flooded.
____________________
72 Louis Lebel et al., “The Promise of Flood Protection: Dykes and Dams, Drains and Diversions,”
in Contested Waterscapes in the Mekong Region: Hydropower, Livelihoods and Governance, eds. François
Molle, Tira Foran, and Mira Käkönen (London: Earthscan, 2009), 283–306.
73 Archana M. Patankar et al., Enhancing Adaptation to Climate Change by Integrating Climate Risk
into Long-Term Development Plans and Disaster Management, (Kobe: Asia-Pacific Network for Global
Change Research, 2012), 80, http://www.apn-gcr.org/resources/files/original/06516ed9ac5850386
cdd0d5d73f7033f.pdf, accessed 20 May 2014.
74 Hiroyasu Ohtsu, “Construction and Development of Social Infrastructure” in Challenges for
Human Security Engineering, eds. Yuzuru Matsuoka and Mamoru Yoshida (Tokyo: Springer Japan,
2014), 61–78.
75 Lebel et al., “The Promise,” 287.
76 N. Preyawanit, “Planning in the Sprawling Zone of an Asian Mega-urban Region: The Case
Study of Bang Kachao, Bangkok Metropolitan Region” (PhD dissertation, University College London,
2007), 107–108.
77 Jon Fernquest, “Bangkok’s Drainage System,” Bangkok Post, 1 November 2011, http://www.
bangkokpost.com/learning/learning-from-news/264228/bangkok-drainage-system, accessed 20 May
2014.
78 Lebel et al., “The Promise,” 283-306.
639
Figure 3
Flood Protection Infrastructure in Eastern Bangkok
Source: Jon Fernquest, “Bangkok’s Drainage System,” Bangkok Post, 1 November 2011.
Additionally, as seen in 2011, the existing system insufficiently protects

large areas of Bangkok from major flows of water. For example, the King’s
Dyke (mapped in figure 3 above) is designed primarily to address low-level
flooding rather than infrequent but high-level flooding events 79 and
subsequently was breached in two places in 2011.80 Also, achieving artificial
drainage through water gates, khlongs, and pumps in flat-lying Bangkok is
not only expensive but also “complex and full of agents that respond to
problems in their own areas of jurisdiction,”81 which means that the drainage
system is less than optimal. The number and size of the retention ponds were
____________________
79 Patankar et al., “Enhancing Adaptation,” 81.

80 Hydro and Agro Informatics Institute official, interview by Danny Marks, Bangkok, 18 July 2014.
81 Lebel et al., “The Promise,” 289.
640
too small to hold the floodwaters in 2011 and they are less effective than
they could have been because they are not connected to a network of other
ponds and khlongs.82
Further, in 2011, infrastructure failed along the Chao Phraya River
upstream of Bangkok. At least thirteen dykes and water gates broke because
local government agencies had not adequately maintained these ageing
structures. The breaking of this infrastructure, especially of the Bang Chom
Sri water gate in Singburi, caused flood protection embankments along the
river to be breached.83 For a number of weeks afterwards, over 300 million
cubic metres of water flowed daily through these breaches on the eastern
bank of the river, causing large parts of Lopburi and Ayutthaya to be
inundated and making it much more difficult to control the water.84 In
addition, the government had neglected to dredge many irrigation canals
for a while and remove weeds from them, causing them to have less than
maximum flow capacity in 2011.85
Similar to the situation of land management in Bangkok, poor governance
further enfeebles flood management. At the national level, there is no single
regulatory framework for water management in place; at least eight different

agencies—none of which coordinate with each other—are responsible for
regulating water policies. Technical weaknesses, such as inaccurate methods
of measuring rainfall and river flows, also hinder the government’s ability
to manage water.86 Likewise, within the BMA, there exists no systematic
coordination between departments, who instead work independently in
“silos.”87 Moreover, national-level and provincial-level agencies often have
fundamentally different objectives. For example, the Department of Water
Drainage of the BMA aims to achieve zero flooding within Bangkok, but this
makes it more difficult for the Royal Irrigation Department (RID) to manage
in surrounding provinces. The city administration has so far had little interest
in aligning dyke infrastructure inside its boundaries with those outside of
it.88 As seen in 2011, the two agencies are often at loggerheads and rarely
cooperate with each other. Last, prior to the 2011 floods, neither the national
government nor the BMA had a flood emergency plan.
____________________
82 Thongchai Roachanakanan, interview by Danny Marks, Bangkok, 16 December 2013.

83 Nipon Poapongsakorn and Pitsom Meethom, “Impact of the 2011 Floods, and Flood
Management in Thailand,” in Economic and Welfare Impacts of Disasters in East Asia and Policy Responses,
eds. Yasuyuki Sawada and Sothea Oum ( Jakarta: ERIA, 2012), 247–310, http://www.eria.org/
publications/research_project_reports/FY2011/No.8.html, accessed 22 April 2015.
84 Bangkok Post, “Up to 50,000 May Have to Quit Sing Buri,” 3 October 2011.
85 Pithaya Pookaman, Mungman Tam Ngaan Borehan Jat Gan Nam Phua Prachachon [Commitment
to Work on Water Management for the People] (Bangkok: The Office of National Water and Flood
Management Policy, 2013), 12.
86 Danny Marks, “Climate Change and Thailand: Impact and Response,” Contemporary Southeast
Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs 33, no. 2 (2011): 229–258.
87 Saito, “Challenges for Adapting Bangkok’s Flood,” 89–100.
88 Lebel et al., “The Promise,” 283–306.
641
There are a number of reasons why the government prefers structural

solutions rather than non-structural ones. First, citizens’ incomplete
information affects the type of disaster policies governments undertake and
reduces political awards for them to pursue prevention policies. It is difficult
for citizens to observe the implementation and effects of improving building
codes, early warning systems, land-use planning, and floodplain management.
Second, because voters tend to reward politicians for strong relief efforts
which they can evaluate more easily, politicians tend to prioritize relief over
prevention. Third, incentives drive politicians to favour infrastructure
solutions even if they are not the best policy. Infrastructure is easy for
beneficiaries to observe and can be located in areas of favoured constituencies.
Further, many local Thai politicians, such as PAO council members, have
their own construction companies and so addressing flooding through
infrastructure projects aligns with their business interests. PAO councils have
been nicknamed sapha phu rap mao, or contractors’ councils.89 Infrastructure
projects are also a lucrative source of rents: politicians can dole out contracts
for infrastructure projects to their key supporters or earn money from bribes
and infrastructure can increase the value of flood-protected land to owners.90

In 2008, Nishimatsu Construction confessed that it gave a bribe of more than
US$4 million to senior BMA officials in order to win the right to build a
drainage tunnel in Bangkok.91 Thus, disaster governance is particularly subject
to perverse political incentives which have driven BMR politicians to favour
structural projects over non-structural measures.
During the 2011 Floods: Creation of Uneven Vulnerabilities

These urban inequalities and governance failures once again starkly
manifested themselves during the government’s response to the floods. It
was clear—to the chagrin of local residents in the outer parts—that the
government sought to protect the inner city at all costs. Further, conflicts
and miscommunication arose between government agencies, particularly
between the BMA and the RID, which undermined the state’s response.
The large amount of water that flowed into Bangkok and its surrounding
areas would have been much less without political interference. Numerous
academics and NGOs believe that Banharn Silapa-archa, a well-connected
former prime minister and veteran politician, used his connections within
the Royal Irrigation Department and commanded them not to open the
____________________
89 Shatkin, “Globalization and Local,” 11–26.

90 Philip Keefer, Disastrous Consequences: The Political Economy of Disaster Risk Reduction, special
paper commissioned by the Joint World Bank Report – UN Project on the Economics of Disaster Risk
Reduction, 24 January 2009, https://www.gfdrr.org/sites/gfdrr/files/Keefer_Disastrous_Consequences.
pdf, accessed 22 April 2015.
91 Weerawong Wongpreedee, “BMA Asks Japan to Aid Bribery Probe,” Bangkok Post, 9 July 2008.
642
water gates to Suphanburi, his home province and often referred to as

“Banharn Buri,” in order to allow farmers there enough time to harvest their
crops.92 Statistics of the amount of water flow suggest that the RID did not
open the three water gates in the western side of the Chao Phraya to their
maximum capacity until the beginning of October.93 Not fully opening these
gates caused more water to flow downstream.
Following months of heavy rain and the release of water from Bhumibol
and Sirikit dams, a massive run-off slowly swept towards the capital in October.
In response, the BMA erected huge sandbag barriers, closed water gates,
and diverted water to the west to protect the city’s central districts. For
example, in mid-October, after a big sandbag wall had been placed near an
air force base at the boundary between Pathum Thani and the city of
Bangkok, the level of water was almost one metre lower on the BMA side.94
While this scheme kept the centre dry, those outside of the centre heavily
bore this cost: these walls and water gates held up the floodwaters in the
northern and western areas, submerging these areas for weeks.95
This decision generated significant discontent among local residents in
these areas, who had seen on the news that the inner city was still dry but
their area had been flooded for weeks.96 One elderly woman in a low-income
community in Don Muang believed that the “the government unfairly divided
people. People in the inner city are big people and big rich companies but
they did not protect the small people.”97 One middle-class resident of Don
Muang complained, “The government was only concerned about impacts
to the economy. It did not think about how much people outside the inner
city are suffering. And the assistance provided was not enough.”98
In response, throughout October and November, these residents frequently
expressed their anger through petitions and protests and attempted to
destroy the sandbags or open water gates. For example, in early November,
after enduring protracted inundation, hundreds of residents of a housing
estate in Western Bangkok blocked a major road, insisting upon the removal
of a sandbag barrier and only dispersed after the police agreed to remove
____________________
92 Kasetsart University professor, Rangsit University professor, Chulalongkorn University professor,

and two local NGO leaders, interviews by Danny Marks, Bangkok, January-March, 2014.
93 Poapongsakorn and Meethom, “Impact of the 2011 Floods,” 258.
94 INN News, “Jao Naa Ti Waang Bik Bak Yack Sah Por Au Fang Pathum” [FROC Officials Place
Big Bags at the Pathum Thani Side], 11 October 2011.
95 Damon Wake, “Misery Lingers for Bangkok’s ‘Forgotten’ Flood Victims,” ABS-CBN News, 27
November 2011, http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/global-filipino/world/11/27/11/misery-lingers
-bangkoks-forgotten-flood-victims, accessed 22 April 2015.
96 Chatnarong Wisitku, “Jat Gaan Banhaa Namtuam Yaang Mai Ben Thaam … Saang
Kwamdtackdtang Nai Sangkhom” [Managing the flood Problem is Not Just … Creates a Rift in Society],
Krungthep Turakij, 22 November 2011.
97 Phrom Samrit community member, interview by Danny Marks, Bangkok, 5 October 2014.
98 Yu Chareon community member, interview by Danny Marks, Bangkok, 16 August 2014.
643
the barrier.99 In mid-November, over 200 residents in Pathum Thani removed

the sandbags by Khlong Hok Wa as well as demanded a nearby water gate to
be opened by 20 cm.100 In late November, almost a thousand residents in
Don Muang demolished a sandbag dyke after the government reneged on
its promise to lower the level of the dyke.101 And on 24 November, in the
western area of Bang Khae, residents blocked a section of the Western Outer
Ring Road, demanding that the government explain its unfair flood
mitigation measures. They said that they had to endure chest-high putrid
floodwater for over five weeks without any explanations or response from
the government.102 Further examples abound. The last example suggests

that an additional problem was that the government did not communicate
clearly its plans with communities. It neither articulated its method to drain
the water in flooded areas, the duration these areas would be flooded, and
the location of where it would place sandbags. Nor did it give strong rationales
for its mitigation measures.103 This lack of clear information frustrated
residents because they did not know how much longer their areas would stay
flooded and why their area had remained flooded while others remained
dry.104 Overall, eighty-five flood-related protests occurred in the BMR.105

The government’s priority of protecting the inner city at all costs was also
reflected in Prime Minister Yingluck’s statement in mid-November 2011 at
the ASEAN Summit in Indonesia. She said, “it’s certain the inner zone of
Bangkok will be safe from floods, as the measures to hold floodwaters have
been successful.”106 She declared success even when those in the peripheries
of the city were still suffering from the floods and residents of these areas
who had evacuated had still not returned.
At the same time, conflict and lack of cooperation between different
agencies in the national and local government hampered the government’s
response.107 The national government, the BMA, and provincial governments
had differing objectives and strategies to address the floods and often did
not collaborate, especially at the beginning. For example, some khlongs
which pass through Bangkok are under the responsibility of the RID, yet
BMA officials were reluctant to ask the RID to help divert water from the
____________________
99 Bangkok Post, “Govt Apologises to Flood Victims,” 12 November 2011.

100 Krungthep Turakij, “Chao Lum Luk Ka Ruu Nao Gan Nam Tuam Khet Sai Mai” [Lam Luk Ka
People Removes the Water Barrier. Floods in Sai Mai District], 17 November 2011.
101 Yu Chareon community leader, interview by Danny Marks, Bangkok, 12 March 2014.
102 Nation, “Bang Khae Residents Block Expressway,” 25 November 2011, http://www.
nationmultimedia.com/national/Bang-Khae-residents-block-expressway-30170601.html, accessed 20
May 2014.
103 Sasin Chalermlarp, interview by Danny Marks, Bangkok, 18 July 2014.
104 Terry Fredrickson, “Flood Management Controversy,” Bangkok Post, 25 November 2011.
105 They were 67% of the total number of protests (126) in the country. Former FROC member,
interview by Danny Marks, Bangkok, 17 July 2014.
106 Bangkok Post, “Inner City Spared from Floods, Says Yingluck,” 20 November 2011.
107 Terry Fredrickson, “Saturday Flood News,” Bangkok Post, 5 November 2011.
644
city.108 In other instances, the Flood Relief Operation Center (FROC), created
by the national government to respond to the floods, ordered the city
administration to open water gates at the northern border of the city to ease
flooding in Pathum Thani, such as at Khlong Sam Wa, but the BMA resisted,
saying that they were afraid of further rainfall, and did not open them for
a week.109
The BMA and the FROC also disseminated contradicting information.
For example, during the height of the flooding, the national government
spokesperson told the public in Bangkok’s Taling Chan and Laksi districts
to go to work while the Bangkok governor, Sukhumbhand Paribatra,

announced that people in these districts should evacuate and said that people
should listen to him only.110 A large source of the conflict is that Sukhumbhand
hails from the opposition Democrat Party whereas Yingluck was the head of
the ruling Pheu Thai Party and these two leaders bickered frequently. Deep-
seated polarization between the two parties exists and each sought to blame
the other for the heavy flooding in the BMR. Conflicts, however, did not only
occur between the Democrats and Pheu Thai but between local politicians
who all sought to protect their own turf. They led their constituents to destroy
flood protection dykes or open water gates so that water would be diverted
to other areas. In many instances, local Pheu Thai leaders disobeyed the
commands of the relief centre. Their actions undermined the overall
management of the flooding.111
The flood relief centre also worsened the losses incurred by flooded
communities in Bangkok when it proclaimed it could handle the floods
(ao yu) and that they would not be flooded. For example, satellite imagery
in late October showed that some parts of Bangkok faced severe, lengthy
flooding but the centre still incorrectly announced that the level of the water
would decrease by the middle of November.112 A number of these residents,
such as those in Don Muang, trusted the government’s announcement and
consequently did not protect their houses and possessions as much as they
would have if they had been warned earlier that their communities would
be flooded.113
The uneven vulnerability of Bangkok residents to the flood is suggested
in a study conducted by the National Housing Authority after the floods.
The study found that while 21 percent of the total population living in the
____________________
108 Fernquest, “Bangkok’s Drainage System.”

109 Former FROC member, interview by Danny Marks, Bangkok, 17 July 2014.
110 Wang Lin, “Grassroots Innovation in Disaster Crisis Communication: A Case Study of 2011
Thailand Floods” (master’s thesis, Asian Institute of Technology, 2013), 43.
111 Poapongsakorn and Meethom, “Impact of the 2011 Floods,” 247–310.
112 Samchai Sirisan, “Kwam Pitplaat Khong Rathabaan Nai Gaan Jat Gaan Wikkrit Nam Tuam:
Mum Mawng Taang Sangkhom Wittaya” [The Failure of the Government to Deal with the Flood Crisis:
a Sociological Perspective], Prachathai¸ 30 October 2011.
113 Don Muang district officer, interview by Danny Marks, Bangkok, 30 June 2014.
645
city of Bangkok were affected by the floods (this number is higher in three
other provinces of the BMR: Nonthaburi, Pathum Thani, and Nakhon
Pathom), 73 percent of Bangkok’s low-income population were affected.114
One statistic which supports this finding is that the nine districts in Bangkok
which have the highest number of slum communities (and are all in
northwestern, northern, or northeastern Bangkok) were all flooded, some
very heavily, such as Don Muang, Sai Mai, and Nong Khaem districts.115
While certainly middle-class and upper-class housing estates were badly
flooded as well as factories in the northern and western parts of the BMR,
these owners could easily evacuate to other cities or could better cope with
losses because of possessing higher assets. In these mixed communities,
where the rich and middle-class live near the poor, slum communities were
the worst affected. A Don Muang district official and a slum community
leader agreed that Don Muang slum communities living along a canal faced
the highest amount of water and for the longest period.116 This is because
these communities do not have floodwalls to protect their houses, their land
is the lowest-lying, and they have the fewest assets. Further, their vulnerability
was compounded by two other factors. First, there was the issue of
unemployment, because many of them work as day labourers and could not
work for a few months because they could not access their workplaces or
their workplaces became inundated and subsequently closed. Second, there
was the problem of theft: in one slum community in Don Muang about half
of the community’s houses were robbed by outsiders who arrived on boats
at night and broke into their houses.117 In addition, for the majority, the
compensation they received after the floods was inadequate to cover the
costs of renovating their houses and buying new furniture and other
possessions. Some had to use all or most of their limited savings.118
In sum, socio-economic conditions prior to the 2011 floods, especially
uneven power and economic relations and governance weaknesses, can
largely help explain the flood’s effects, which unequally hurt the poor the
____________________
114 UN ESCAP, “The Thailand Floods of 2011: While Businesses Lost Millions, the Urban Poor
Lost Out Most from the Floods,” Working Paper (Bangkok: UN ESCAP Sustainable Urban Development
Section, 2012).
115 The number of slum communities by districts is found in: The Statistical Profile of Bangkok
Metropolitan Administration 2011 (Bangkok: Bangkok Metropolitan Administration, 2011) http://
office.bangkok.go.th/pipd/05_Stat/08Stat(En)/Stat(En)54/pdf%20(not%20edit)/stat_eng2011%20
(not%20edit).pdf, accessed 28 October 2014. The flooding of those districts is based on BMA’s flood
alert map on 1 November 2011 and the news article: Bangkok Post, “470 Spots Under 80cm of Water,”
7 November 2011.
116 Don Muang district official and Phrom Samrit community leader, interviews by Danny Marks,
Bangkok, 30 June and 29 August 2014.
117 Phrom Samrit community leader, interview by Danny Marks, Bangkok, 29 August 2014.
118 In the slum community in Lamlukka, surveys (n=25) conducted by the author from June to
August 2014 revealed that losses ranged from 50,000 to 200,000 baht while none received more than
25,000 baht from the government and some less than this amount. The majority in the community
receive the minimum daily wage of 300 baht per day.
646
most. In particular, these conditions help reveal why various government

agencies rarely cooperated and even clashed with each other and why the
government committed to protecting the inner city, which meant that those
in the peripheral areas suffered more. Rising political tensions and anger
against the government during the last few years once again flared during
the floods as numerous local communities protested and sought to destroy
flood barriers and water gates.
After the Floods: Has Anything Changed?

However, despite this widespread anger and devastation and high number
of deaths, after the floods subsided, the Yingluck government did not
significantly alter its strategy to prevent floods. It continued to view structural
measures as the best way to protect populations and industries from floods.
It built higher flood walls around previously flooded industrial estates. It
also proposed a massive US$11.3 billion water infrastructure improvement
plan to increase protection, with almost 90 percent of the budget allocated
to manage water in the Chao Phraya River basin. Included in the plan’s
nine modules were 20 new dams and two 300-km diversion khlongs to divert
water from the north to the west and east and then to the sea, the conversion
of land into water retention areas, and the cleaning up of khlongs and
waterways.119
The plan, however, was met with fierce criticism from civil society,
academics, and local communities and resistance from the judiciary. Civic
engineering groups lambasted the plan for being too expensive and poorly
conceived, focusing too much on improving irrigation rather than preventing
floods.120 A water specialist of the Japan International Co-operation Agency
asserted that from an integrated water management perspective neither the
new dams nor the floodways are necessary. Civil society advocates charged
that the government has not sought adequate public input on the plans.121
In Samut Songkhram and Nakhon Pathom provinces, thousands protested
against the western flood diversion channel, declaring that the water from
the floodway would hurt their fishing and agricultural activities.122 Backed
by these communities, a local NGO, Stop Global Warming Association of
____________________
119 Peter Janseen, “Two Years after Deluge, Thailand Braces for More Floods,” Oman Observer, 29
September 2013, http://main.omanobserver.om/?p=17234, accessed 20 May 2014.
120 Ron Corben, “Thai Flood Prevention Dam Draws Criticism,” Voice of America, 26 September
2013, http://www.voanews.com/content/thai-flood-prevention-dam-draws-criticism/1757489.html,
accessed 20 May 2014.
121 Cleanbiz.Asia, “Strong Whiff of Corruption from Thailand’s Water Mega-project,” 21 February
2013, http://www.cleanbiz.asia/news/strong-whiff-corruption-thailand%E2%80%99s-water-mega
-project#.U3rrutKSy-0, accessed 20 May 2014.
122 Ploenpote Atthakor, “Samut Songkhram Pressures Govt over Water Project,” Bangkok Post, 25
November 2013, http://www.bangkokpost.com/news/local/381525/samut-songkhram-pressures
-govt-over-water-project, accessed 20 May 2014.
647
Thailand, filed a lawsuit in Thailand’s Administrative Court, claiming that

the bidding procedures for the megaproject violated Thailand’s constitution
because the government had not adequately included local communities in
the decision-making process and failed to carry out mandatory environmental
and health impact assessments. In late 2013, in agreement with the lawsuit,
the Administrative Court ruled that the plan must be put on hold until public
hearings and environmental and health impact assessments are conducted.123
The scheme was suspended after the military coup in May 2014. In June,
the new prime minister, Prayut Chan-o-cha, ordered agencies to draft a new
national water management plan. However, senior government officials

revealed that several of the modules of the previous projects are likely to
be included in the new plan.124 While the military government released
11 billion baht (US$338 million) in late June to repair water management
infrastructure such as floodwalls, water gates, and pumping stations, it has
yet to release any money for non-structural measures. “We don’t have new
tools for water management, despite the fact three years have passed since
the flood disaster,’’ said Suwatana Chittaladakorn, an adviser to the Water
Management and Policy Committee.125

The new government’s response raises the question of why its approach
to flood protection remains unchanged. One reason is that political leaders
continue to see rehabilitation to floods as a political opportunity and a
source of rents. The previous government’s reconstruction efforts were
tainted by accusations of corruption. For example, the National Anti-
Corruption Commission warned that the government’s short timeline for
reviewing projects and its hurried approval of consultants generated
opportunities for corruption.126 Without any agencies to monitor the military
government, there are fears that the procurement of the new plan will be
corrupt as well.127 Global indices suggest that corruption became worse after
the 2006 military coup.128
Another reason is that, while the leadership at the top of the political
____________________
123 Janseen, “Two Years after Deluge.”

124 Hydro and Agro Informatics Institute official and RID official, interviews by Danny Marks,
June–August, 2014.
125 Patsara Jikkham and Apinya Wipatayotin, “Flood Projects Run Aground,” Bangkok Post, 20
October 2014, http://www.bangkokpost.com/news/environment/438532/flood-projects-run
-aground, accessed 28 October 2014.
126 Santi Nindang and Teigan Allen, “Ahead of Flood Season, Thailand’s Communities Demand
Greater Preparedness,” In Asia, 8 August 2012, http://asiafoundation.org/in-asia/2012/08/08/
ahead-of-flood-season-thailands-communities-demand-greater-preparedness, accessed 20 May 2014.
127 Hydro and Agro Informatics Institute official, interview by Danny Marks, Bangkok, 18 July
2014.
128 In the World Bank’s Control of Corruption Indicator (http://info.worldbank.org/governance/
wgi/index.aspx), Thailand fell from 54 (out of 100) in 2005 to 43 in 2007. In Transparency
International’s Corruption Perception Index (http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview),
the country dropped dramatically from ranking 59th worldwide in 2005 to 84th in 2007.
648
structure has changed, the structure itself remains the status quo. It is still
highly unequal, even more autocratic, and there is even less political space
for reform. Consequently, those in power will continue to be able to have
the greatest access to both natural and man-made resources and to
decide how to use them. They will therefore continue to use land in ways
that are most profitable—yet degrade the environment and apportion flood
protection infrastructure to areas where they live or invest in. Simultaneously,
the poor will continue to suffer the most: they will continue to live in areas
of high vulnerability without receiving additional assistance or will be forced
to relocate due to new projects, such as planned dykes along the major canals.
Conclusion
This paper has used an urban political ecology analysis to challenge the
discourses used by Thai government leaders about the causes of the 2011
floods in Bangkok and the infrastructure-heavy solutions that they have
proposed in response. In contrast to their argument129 that the main causes
of the floods in Bangkok were climate change and nature, it argues that the
causes of the floods are multiple. They are a result of human-nature
interactions over time, particularly the last half-century: while Thailand did
receive heavy rainfall that year, a number of human activities interacted with
this heavy rainfall to create the floods. During this time period, fuelled by
industrialization and a real-estate boom, Bangkok’s rapid urbanization was
haphazard and environmentally degrading. Components of this urbanization
included massive land-use change and concretization which drastically
increased run-off, over-pumping of groundwater, and the filling of khlongs.
The underlying drivers behind this form of urbanization are the decline in
influence of the bureaucratic polity and the rise of the local politicians-
cum-businessmen, who profited handsomely from this urbanization, and the
perpetual limited capacity of state institutions governing land use and water
management. Further, both the local and national governments’ overreliance
on antiquated and poorly maintained infrastructure made the city more
vulnerable to the 2011 floods.
The discourses used and solutions proposed by these leaders, and the
statements they made in interviews, suggest that they believe the risks of the
floods were distributed equally across different socio-economic groups of
the urban population.130 However, while certainly many middle-class and
wealthy households were adversely affected, the poorest suffered the most
from the floods. This is because they have the fewest assets to cope with the
____________________
129 By argument I refer to both public statements and answers given by leading policy makers to
my interview question of what were the causes of the 2011 floods.
130 In interviews, senior BMA and RID officials said that the poor and rich were equally affected
by the floods.
649
floods and the majority live in low-lying land, sometimes near canals, in
the areas which have the lowest level of flood infrastructure and where in
2011 the government blocked the water from entering the inner city.
The vulnerability of some slum community members was compounded by
unemployment and theft. In contrast, while certainly some elites suffered
from flooding of the factories and housing estates, the majority were
protected by the government’s decision to protect the inner city or by high
floodwalls around their houses and the raised land below them. They also
possessed the most assets to cope with the floods.
The value of using the UPE lens to analyze the 2011 Bangkok floods in
contrast to a focus on more conventional politics is twofold. First, this analysis
highlights the unevenness and unjust spatiality of exposure to the floods.
The peripheral areas of the Bangkok Metropolitan Region were the ones
which received heavy FDI and immigrants from the countryside. They were
also made more vulnerable to floods due to heavy land use, land subsidence,
and their location outside the King’s Dyke. Moreover, these were the areas
where the government blocked the water from entering into the inner city
and where people suffered the most.

Second, this lens draws attention to the multiple ways in which ecological
conditions, which conventional political analyses tend to ignore, and socio-
political relations interacted with each other to form Bangkok’s hazardscape131
to the floods. In particular, power geometries and discourses constructing
the environment have shaped the use of natural resources and the control
of the environment.132 Examples include the building and manipulation of
water gates, dykes, and temporary sandbag walls which helped shape the
uneven geography of the floods in 2011, the filling of canals by developers
to build housing estates, and the use of infrastructure projects, from which
local elites profited, to protect the city from flooding but which actually
made it more vulnerable when this infrastructure failed. All of these examples
are laden with uneven power relations and underpinned by elite discourses
which consequently shaped uneven vulnerability to the floods.
By using an UPE analysis, this research suggests for a more inclusive and
more comprehensive approach to urban disaster governance in Asia than
conventional disaster risk management approaches. Such an approach takes
into account the multiple causalities, both social and environmental, and
compound nature of disasters. Specifically, analyses of disaster governance
need to consider how socio-political relations, discourses used to interpret
____________________
131 Here I draw on Mustafa’s notion of the hazardscape which expands analyses of disasters beyond
the material to include the discursive realm. Daanish Mustafa, “The Production of an Urban
Hazardscape in Pakistan: Modernity, Vulnerability, and the Range of Choice,” Annals of the Association
of American Geographers 95, no. 3 (2005): 566–586.
132 Anja Nygren and Sandy Rikoon, “Political Ecology Revisited: Integration of Politics and Ecology
Does Matter,” Society and Natural Resources 21, no. 9 (2008): 767–782.
650
and address disasters, and ecological conditions shape governance practices.

Understanding them provides insight into how, where, and for how long
disasters are likely to unfold and what must be done to reduce the vulnerability
of the most vulnerable from these disasters. In most Asian cities, where power
structures and assets are still highly unequal, and where urbanization has
been highly degrading, urban governance practices need to be reformed so
that they are more ecologically sustainable and so that power and the benefits
of urbanization are shared more equally.
University of Sydney, Sydney, Australia, May 2015

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The Urban Political Ecology of the 2011 Floods

Article in Pacific Affairs · September 2015

2018 Summer Academy_World Risk Adaptation Futures View project

The user has requested enhancement of the downloaded file.

Keywords: 2011 Thailand floods, urban political ecology, disaster

Danny Marks is a PhD candidate in human geography at the University of Sydney.

© Pacific Affairs: Volume 88, No. 3 September 2015 623

“It seems like we’re fighting against the forces of nature.” 1

“They build their estates in low-lying areas that are supposed to be

n the second half of 2011, Bangkok experienced its worst flooding in

floods. Science and Technology Minister Plodprasop Surasawadi stated that

protect populations from water.

infrastructure creates a false sense of security which suggests that changing

10 Michael Douglass, “The Urban Transition of Environmental Disaster Governance in Asia,”

community leaders, and community members from December 2013 to

Urban Political Ecology and Its Relationship to Flooding

that environmental change and ecological conditions are the outcomes of

political problem because of the involvement of a number of key stakeholders

of protection to hazard threats are unevenly distributed over the topography

components of the environment and who is marginalized by being forced

a critical juncture.”23 Consequently, as Pelling argues, while floods are physical

Before 2011: The Flood’s Incubation Period

role of state and market institutions in determining this vulnerability, our

Source: Kreeta Sroikeeree and Rattana Bannatham, “Flood

1935.29 Shop houses and mansions replaced their aquatic counterparts. In

29 Porphant Ouyyanont, “Physical and Economic Change in Bangkok, 1851–1925,” Southeast

The city’s land-based urbanization and population expanded rapidly after

of Bangkok and the five surrounding provinces. To attract investment,

However, the BMR developed in a haphazard and sprawling fashion. It

had a number of negative effects on the physical environment and has

the ground.42 In particular, the illegal construction of houses and factories

Source: N. Phien-Wej, P.H. Giao, and P. Nutalaya, “Land Subsidence in Bangkok,

groundwater surpassed the threshold of the city’s aquifer system and

An underlying driver of this ineffective planning system and subsequent

Second, democratization occurred from this period onwards as the power

47 Shatkin, “Globalization and Local Leadership,” 11–26.

Bangkok’s northernmost districts, this is why a number of communities still

development (yellow, orange, and red zones), thereby rendering this

58 Davivongs, Yokohari, and Hara, “Neglected Canals,” 20.

the Gulf of Thailand.64 Thus, these practices by developers who profited

vulnerable to floods are low-income slum communities. They have a low

64 Mehl and Mekvichai, “Contemporary Issues.”

Bangkok’s Flood Management

high-hazard areas, acquiring and relocating buildings in high-hazard areas,

housing estates and industries. But without the construction of additional

Additionally, as seen in 2011, the existing system insufficiently protects

79 Patankar et al., “Enhancing Adaptation,” 81.

regulatory framework for water management in place; at least eight different

82 Thongchai Roachanakanan, interview by Danny Marks, Bangkok, 16 December 2013.

There are a number of reasons why the government prefers structural

and infrastructure can increase the value of flood-protected land to owners.90

During the 2011 Floods: Creation of Uneven Vulnerabilities

89 Shatkin, “Globalization and Local,” 11–26.

water gates to Suphanburi, his home province and often referred to as

92 Kasetsart University professor, Rangsit University professor, Chulalongkorn University professor,

the barrier.99 In mid-November, over 200 residents in Pathum Thani removed

the government.102 Further examples abound. The last example suggests

dry.104 Overall, eighty-five flood-related protests occurred in the BMR.105

99 Bangkok Post, “Govt Apologises to Flood Victims,” 12 November 2011.

to go to work while the Bangkok governor, Sukhumbhand Paribatra,

108 Fernquest, “Bangkok’s Drainage System.”

most. In particular, these conditions help reveal why various government