INTRODUCTION TO

PROCESS SAFETY 4.0

Ir. Endra Joelianto, Ph.D., SMIEEE
Head of Artificial Intelligence, Control and Automation Laboratory

Instrumentation and Control Research Group,

Faculty of Industrial Technology,
Institut Teknologi Bandung
IEEE

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http://ieee-ims.org/
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https://www.itsoc.org/

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Terms

Catastrophic release:

▪ Major uncontrolled
emission, fire, or
explosion
▪ Involves one or more
highly hazardous
chemicals
▪ Presents serious
danger to employees
in the workplace
Terms

Highly hazardous chemical: a substance

possessing toxic, reactive, flammable, or
explosive properties and specified by section
1910.119(a)(1)
Process Safety Management
Process:
• Any activity involving a highly
hazardous chemical including
use, storage, manufacturing,
handling, or the on-site
movement of such chemicals, or
combination of these activities
• Any group of vessels that are
interconnected, &
• Separate vessels which are
located such that a highly
hazardous chemical could be
involved in a potential release
• All considered a single process
 Process Safety& Risk
Management
The application of
Management Systems to the
IDENTIFICATION,
UNDERSTANDING, and
CONTROL of Process
Hazards to prevent a major
fire, explosion, or toxic
release which could lead to a
fatality or multiple lost
workday cases.

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 PROCESS SAFETY 4.0
• “Industry 4.0 will drive changes in the
process and life science industries in the
coming years. The key message from the
speakers was that process safety
challenges will always be present,
irrespective of evolving technologies in
Industry 4.0. Human involvement will also
continue to be a requirement,” said Brian
Tiernan, event organiser and EHS Department
Manager with PM Group - Cork.

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Key take-aways from the presenters:
Pat Conneely, HSA - Major accident hazards
on both COMAH and non-COMAH sites
• Do sites have adequate layers of protection in place to protect
against any new risks presented by Industry 4.0 designs?
• Accidents can still happen even after Quantitative Risk
Assessment/HAZOP assessment.
• The HSA seek assurance that sites know what can go wrong,
what systems are in place to prevent it going wrong and what
assurance can operators give that the systems are working?
• In 2020, key topics of focus of HSA inspections may include
pressure vessels, PED (Pressure Equipment Directive)
and ATEX (ATmospheres Explosible), out of hours procedures
and shelter in place.

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Pat Swords, PM Group - Can digital
technology improve process safety?
• Improved automation offers significant safety advances.
However, before we connect everything together, we should
‘look before we leap’ and possibly even take a step backwards
before going forward.
• There is a new and quite comprehensive risk management
framework available for cyber security. Before embarking on
the process of connecting critical systems though, you should
really consider whether you need all that connectivity in the
first place?

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Brenda Madden, PM Group - The role of
Human Factors in Industry 4.0 process
safety management
• Analysis of dangerous occurrences and loss of containment
incidents at COMAH establishments reveals a wide range of
Human Factor related underlying causes. These include poor
operational and maintenance procedures, inadequate risk
assessment and poor plant and process design amongst other
factors.
• Process safety experience with Human Factors, particularly with
COMAH establishments, can carry that learning forward to
industry 4.0.
• Process safety professionals and individuals involved in process
hazard analysis would benefit greatly from training in the
human and behavioural sciences.
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Mike Law, PM Group - Toxic / asphyxiant
gases
• Do not assume that ventilation is equally effective in every part
of a room. There may be ‘dead-spots’ where air movement is
poorer and the risk of an asphyxiant zone is higher.
• Do not rely on oxygen depletion sensors for detecting toxic gas
releases. Toxic gases are dangerous at levels far lower than the
sensors alert level.
• If a room is dependent on a particular ventilation rate for
adequate dilution of a gas leak, ensure that the rationale is
captured and documented securely so that the rate cannot
inadvertently be reduced in future.

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 What about Safety?

• Another
fundamental
principle of safety is
that any major
accident does not
happen by chance!
There are minor
incidents and ‘near-
miss’ cases ignored
over a period which
lead to a major
accident.
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 Industry 4.0 & Shop Floor Safety
• Industry 4.0 provides the opportunity
to convert the ideal conditions
mentioned in safety manuals to
executable realities on the shop floor
by leveraging three innovative
technologies IIoT (Industrial Internet
of Things), ML (Machine Learning)
and Big Data & Advanced Analytics.
• Combining these technologies, there
can be a systematic tool to observe
and collect the various shop floor
data and then make a continuous,
meaningful conclusion to enhance https://www.wipro.com/process-and-industrial-manufacturing/industry-4-0-leveraging-
technology-to-enhance-shop-floor-safety-part-1/
safety. 17
The Swiss Cheese Model

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BOWTIE Analysis with Industry 4.0

Learning Protection
Layer may trigger a
model based alarm
from relationship
between multiple
parameters and
provide a longer
advanced warning
system.

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 Process Safety Design 4.0

• Data from: process historian,

laboratory information
management systems, DCS,
MES, ERP, maintenance, other
database.

• Industry 4.0 integrates all of

these current data and future
data sources to create a
protective umbrella type
architecture. Process Safety 4.0, if it can be used as
"decision" when managing abnormal
situation during emergency situation. 20
Process Hazard Analysis (PHA)
• Anticipates events • A method to
based on the determine plant or
chemicals used in process chemical
storage and hazards and develop
processes policies, procedures
and safeguards
• To preclude against emergencies
uncontrolled releases which may occur
or to minimize their
severity if released
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 • PHA on processes covered by
this standard
PHA Concept • Appropriate to the complexity of
the process shall
identify, evaluate and control
the hazards involved
• Determine and document the
priority order for
conducting PHA based on extent
of:
o Process hazards
o Number of potentially
affected employees
o Age of process
o Operating history of
process
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Process Hazard Evaluation

Methods used to determine and evaluate hazards:

• What If
• Checklist
• What If/Checklist
• HAZOP (Hazard & Operability Study)
• FMEA (Failure Mode & Effects Analysis)
• Fault Tree Analysis
• An Appropriate Equivalent Methodology
SUITABILITY OF PHI TO DIFFERENT PHASES
CONCEPT PROCESS DESIGN COMMISSIONING OPERATION MODIFICATION DECOMMISSIONING

HAZOP NS NS MS MS MS MS MS

WHAT IF S S MS MS MS MS MS

PHA MS MS NS NS NS NS S

FTA S S MS MS MS MS MS

Safety MS MS MS MS MS MS MS
Audit

FMEA NS NS MS MS MS MS MS
NS – Not Suitable, MS – Most Suitable, S - Suitable

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 Hazard Evaluation procedures
Steps in Failure Modes
Hazard Hazard and Effects and Fault Event Cause Human
Evaluation Operability Criticality Tree Tree Consequence Error
Process Study Analysis Analysis Analysis Analysis Analysis

Identify Deviations
From Good Practice

Identify Hazards Primary Primary Provides

Purpose Purpose Context
Only
Estimate “Worst Provides Primary
Case” Consequences Context Purpose
Only
Identify Provides Provides
Opportunities to Context Context
Reduce Consequences Only Only

Identify Accident Primary Primary Primary Primary

Initiating Events Purpose Purpose Purpose Purpose

Estimate Probabilities Provides Provides

of Initiating Events Context Context Primary Primary Primary
Only Only Purpose Purpose Purpose

MATRIX RELATING HAZARD EVALUATION PROCEDURES TO HAZARD

EVALUATION PROCESS STEPS (upper right) 25
 Hazard Evaluaton procedures
Steps in Failure Modes
Hazard Hazard and Effects and Fault Event Cause Human
Evaluation Operability Criticality Tree Tree Consequence Error
Process Study Analysis Analysis Analysis Analysis Analysis

Identify Opportunities Primary Primary Primary

to Reduce Probabilities Purpose Purpose Purpose
of Initiating Events

Identify Accident Primary Primary Primary

Event Sequences and Purpose Purpose Purpose
Consequences

Estimate Probabilities Primary Primary Primary

of Event Sequences Purpose Purpose Purpose
Estimate Magnitude Provides Provides
of Consequences of Context Context
Event Sequences Only Only

Identify Opportunities
to Reduce Probabilities Primary Primary Primary
and/or Consequences Purpose Purpose Purpose
of Event Sequences

Quantitative Hazard Primary Primary Primary Primary

Evaluation Purpose Purpose Purpose Purpose

MATRIX RELATING HAZARD EVALUATION PROCEDURES TO HAZARD

EVALUATION PROCESS STEPS (lower right) 26
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What is a Safety Instrumented System
(SIS)?
• An SIS is designed to:

– respond to conditions in the plant which may be

hazardous in themselves or,
– if no action was taken, could eventually give rise to a
hazard, and
– to respond to these conditions by taking defined
actions that either prevent the hazard or mitigate the
hazard consequences.

• Input ---- Logic Solver ---- Output

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Examples of Safety Instrumented Systems
• High fuel gas pressure furnace initiates shutdown of main fuel
gas valves.
• High reactor temperature initiates fail open action of coolant
valve.
• High column pressure initiates fail open action of pressure vent
valve.

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 OSHA & EPA
Process Safety Management
SIF included here Emergency Shutdown
Systems, Control, Relief
Systems

Written Internal Mentor/Engineering Industry Codes

Guidelines Practices & Standards
GOOD ENGINEERING PRACTICE
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Standards Bodies that Define Good Engineering
Practice for Safety Instrumented Systems

• ISA, Instrumentation Systems and Automation

Society
• IEC, International Electrotechnical Commission

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Other standards and guidelines must be
integrated with SIS standards!

API
NFPA
ISA 84.01-2003

ASME
IEC IEC
61508 61511

ISO AICHE
Boiler Codes
Books

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 Safety Instrumented System Standards

IEC 61508 - “Functional Safety: Safety Related Systems”

Current version released 1999
Under revision for next release 2005

IEC 61511 - “Functional Safety: Safety Instrumented

Systems for the Process Industry Sector”
Published 2003

ISA 84.01-2003 - “Functional Safety: Safety

Instrumented Systems for the Process Industry Sector”
Identical to IEC 61511 with inclusion of grandfather clause
To be published October 2003

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Manage risk – Procedures

• Define when the following will take place:

– Verifications,
– Audits, and
– Validation.
• Require procedures for evaluating the
performance of the SIS after it has been
installed
– Performance audits and
– Tracking failures rates.

This is good quality control.

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Safety Integrity Level
SIL PFDavg Risk Reduction Availability (%)

4 10-4 to 10-5 10,000 to 100,000 99.99 to 99.999

3 10-3 to 10-4 1,000 to 10,000 99.9 to 99.99

2 10-2 to 10-3 100 to 1,000 99 to 99.9

1 10-1 to 10-2 10 to 100 90 to 99

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Design SIF Prove it
• Justify selection of devices • Verify
• Document the safety requirements – Safety Integrity Level
specification – Fault tolerance

• Design SIFs to achieve Safety • Commissioning

Integrity Level. – Install SIFs per design documents
• Functional safety assessment
– Make sure all documents are in place
and all hazards analysis items are
addressed.
• Validation
– Test SIFs to ensure that they have
desired functionality 36
Maintain it
• Operation, maintenance and testing
– Use diagnostics and testing to maintain
performance
– Create and maintain procedure to
support these activities
– Train personnel on procedures
Management of change
Monitor changes to SIS that might affect SIL
Audit it
• Includes design and procedures
• Define frequency of audits
• Determine the degree of
independence of auditing activity
• Document audit
• Define follow-up activities
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CONCLUSION: DHRO, digital high reliability
organization
• Process safety is well suited to leverage the design principles of
Industry 4.0
• The addresses issues found in The Swiss Chees model and will
reduce the risk of major incidents
• Become data oriented
• Drive risk awareness
• Focus on accumulating knowledge
• Catch early warning signals
• Learn from incidents and other plants
• Have discipline for not cutting corners
• Use data driven operation guidance
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