See discussions, stats, and author profiles for this publication at: https://www.researchgate.

net/publication/322521755

A new risk prioritization model for failure mode and effects analysis

Article  in  Quality and Reliability Engineering · January 2018

DOI: 10.1002/qre.2269

CITATIONS READS

19 5,302

4 authors:

Vitor Anes Elsa Henriques

Instituto Politécnico de Lisboa University of Lisbon
72 PUBLICATIONS   341 CITATIONS    147 PUBLICATIONS   1,577 CITATIONS   

SEE PROFILE SEE PROFILE

Manuel José Freitas Luis Reis

University of Lisbon University of Lisbon IST
253 PUBLICATIONS   2,999 CITATIONS    249 PUBLICATIONS   2,129 CITATIONS   

SEE PROFILE SEE PROFILE

Some of the authors of this publication are also working on these related projects:

Gigacycle - Hysteretic damping as an energy parameter in gigacycle fatigue (FCT Project PTDC/EME-PME/69904/2006) View project

INFLUENCE RESEARCH OF WELDING PARAMETERS IN TEMPERATURE AND TENSILE TEST IN A BUTT WELDED FOR FSW IN ALCLAD ALUMINIUM ALLOY 2024-T3 View
project

All content following this page was uploaded by Elsa Henriques on 21 November 2018.

The user has requested enhancement of the downloaded file.

Received: 13 March 2017 Revised: 11 December 2017 Accepted: 14 December 2017
DOI: 10.1002/qre.2269

RESEARCH ARTICLE

A new risk prioritization model for failure mode and effects

analysis

V. Anes1,2 | E. Henriques1 | M. Freitas1 | L. Reis1

1
IDMEC, Instituto Superior Técnico,
Universidade de Lisboa, Lisbon, Portugal
2
GI‐MOSM, Instituto Superior de
Engenharia de Lisboa, Instituto
Politécnico de Lisboa, Lisbon, Portugal
Correspondence
V. Anes and L. Reis, IDMEC, Instituto
Superior Técnico, Universidade de Lisboa,
Av. Rovisco Pais, 1, 1049‐001 Lisbon,
Portugal.
Email: vitor.anes@tecnico.ulisboa.pt, luis.
g.reis@ist.utl.pt
Abstract
Failure modes and effects analysis is a framework that has been widely used to
improve reliability by prioritizing failures modes using the so‐called risk prior-
ity number. However, the risk priority number has some problems frequently
pointed out in literature, namely its non‐injectivity, non‐surjectivity, and the
impossibility to give weights to risk variables. Despite these disadvantages,
the risk priority number continues to be widely used due to its higher simplicity
when compared with other alternatives found in literature. In this paper, we
propose a novel risk prioritization model to overcome the major drawbacks of
the risk priority number. The model contains 2 functions, the risk isosurface
function that prioritizes 3 risk variables considering their order of importance
in a given risk scenario, and the risk prioritization index function which prior-
itizes 3 risk variables considering their weights. The novelty of the proposed
model is its injectivity, surjectivity, and ease of use in failure modes prioritiza-
tion. The performance of the proposed model was analyzed using some exam-
ples typically used to discuss the conventional risk priority number
shortcomings. The model was applied to a case study and its performance cor-
related with other risk prioritization models. Results show that the failure
modes prioritization reached with the proposed model agrees with the expecta-
tions made for the risk scenario.

KEYWORDS
failure mode and effects analysis, reliability management, risk priority index function (RPI), risk
priority number (RPN), risk isosurface function (RI)

1 | INTRODUCTION used in all kind of industries, from aerospace to

Failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA) was described
for the first time in the late 1950s by the US Army. The
document was firstly known as MIL‐P‐1629 and then
renamed as MIL‐STD‐1629A1 in 1980. In the 1960s, NASA
starts to use the FMEA framework in high risk space pro-
grams followed by the civil aviation in 1967. In the 1970s,
the FMEA methodology spread to other industries, such
as offshore and automotive. Over time its dissemination
has acquired a strong momentum and nowadays is widely
healthcare.2,3
The FMEA methodology strongly supports decision‐
making since the preliminary design phases and drives
the design process, by identifying underperformances.
The FMEA outcomes can be used in regulatory reports,
continuous improvement, and preventive approaches,
promoting the reduction of the likelihood of customer
complaints, campaign changes, and safety failures. More-
over, it may also reduce the maintenance and warranty
costs, and promotes the extending of products' life cycle.

516 Copyright © 2018 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/qre Qual Reliab Engng Int. 2018;34:516–528.
ANES ET AL. 517

Other benefits generally pointed out are the reduction of
product development time, and start‐up costs,4 due to a
considerably lower number of tests required to assess
reliability.
Essentially, the FMEA methodology was primarily
developed to identify and analyze potential failure modes
during product design activities and engineering design
processes. Its main objective is to identify potential fail-
ures and its effects and then prioritize failure modes
according to their risk.5 The traditional FMEA classifies
each failure mode according to its Severity (S), Occur-
rence (O), and Detectability (D) using rating scales.
Table 1 shows the Severity, Occurrence, and Detectability
scales followed by automotive industry to classify failure
modes, as proposed in the standard SAE—J 1739.6
In general terms, the failure modes of a given risk sce-
nario are ranked following their risk priority number
(RPN), which measures the criticality of the failure mode,
stated by the simple function given in Equation 1.
RPN ¼ S×O×D
The failure modes with the highest RPN ratings, the
critical ones, point out the areas that need redesigning
or other intervention.7 Recommendations for correction
or mitigation are then expected, together with an action
plane. After the suggestions implementation, the failure
modes are re‐evaluated in an iterative process that guides
designers towards more robust design solutions.
Despite the wide use of FMEA, its shortcomings are
well known. Basically, they are related to the nature of
RPN function described in Equation 1, which is a non‐
injective and non‐surjective function.8,9 In fact, different
combinations of Severity, Occurrence, and Detectability
can lead to the same RPN, meaning that different failure
modes may have the same rating in the RPN scale, which
makes ambiguous their prioritization.10 Also, some
ratings of the RPN scale, which generally ranges from 1
to 1000 in the conventional approach, will never be
achieved. As a matter of fact, the non‐surjective feature
of the RPN function is a result of its non‐injective behav-
iour. Figure 1 depicts the non‐injective and non‐surjective
behaviour of the conventional RPN function, which
results in a no‐ordinary RPN measurement scale,
although the measurement scales of the 3 risk variables
(S, O, D) are ordinal.
Many researchers have reported the need of taking
into account the relative importance of risk variables.11,12
They claim that the weight of each risk variable may
change accordingly to the risk scenario and field of appli-
cation. For instance, the original RPN approach is not able
to consider requirements in which Occurrence is more
important than Severity, or Detectability is the most
important risk variable, because the relative importance
between them is always the same, regardless the risk
scenario.
Other issue pointed out to the conventional RPN is that
(1) the precise evaluation of the 3 risk variables is often diffi-
cult,13,14 due to 3 main reasons. First, the original RPN
approach to assess the risk variables does not fit in the field
FIGURE 1 Frequency results for the conventional RPN function

TABLE 1 Severity, occurrence, and detection rating scales6

Severity (S) Occurrence (O) Detection (D) Rating

Hazardous without warning Very high failure is almost inevitable Absolute uncertainty 10
Hazardous with warning Very high failure is almost inevitable Very remote 9
Very high High repeated failures Remote 8
High High repeated failures Very low 7
Moderate Moderate occasional failures Low 6
Low Moderate occasional failures Moderate 5
Very low Moderate occasional failures Moderately high 4
Minor Low relatively few failures High 3
Very minor Low relatively few failures Very high 2
None Remote failure is unlikely Almost certain 1
518
data available. Second, field data may not be available to
rate each risk variable, and third, the FMEA team may
not have the required expertise to interpret each scenario
and correctly rate each risk variable in a quantitative or
qualitative approach. Braglia et al15 have reported that
the qualitative approach to rating risk variables can lead
to different risk prioritizations even within the same
FMEA team. These authors strongly emphasize the impor-
tance of FMEA team experience, together with the qualita-
tive approach dependence on the team, pointing these
issues as a possible weakness of the FMEA framework.
The conventional RPN shortcomings noted earlier
have been a motivation of intense research in the last
decades, and many alternatives have been proposed in lit-
erature to improve the FMEA methodology. For example,
in 2016, Liu16 authored the first book on improvements
on the conventional FMEA procedures, making using of
uncertainty theories and multi criteria decision making
methods and presenting a great number of demonstrative
case studies. In the same year, Wang et al17 proposed a
FMEA model to prioritize failure modes under uncer-
tainty, vague, and incomplete information. The model
uses interval‐valued intuitionistic fuzzy sets (IVIFSs) and
integrates the COmplex PRoportional ASsessment
method and the analytic network process method to solve
multi‐criteria decision‐making problems. The authors
argued that the proposed method overcomes the weak-
nesses of the traditional FMEA and provides a structured
and systematic framework for risk priority ranking, but
they pointed out the need of further studies on risk vari-
ables weighting.
Also, in 2106, Zhao et al18 proposed a new approach to
deal with the subjective assessment of FMEA team mem-
bers. It uses the IVIFSs to handle with uncertainty and
MULTIMOORA method to prioritize failure modes. The
risk variable weighting is performed using continuous
weighted entropy. The authors argued that the proposed
method is effective and practicable to deal with the impre-
cise and fuzzy assessment information in the failure
analysis process; however, they also argue that further
improvements are still needed in risk variables weighting.
Liu et al19 propose a new risk‐ranking model for
FMEA involving a hybrid averaging operator and a
modified ELECTRE method to analyze the group interval
2‐tuple linguistic data; the authors stress out the need of a
software tool to make the proposed FMEA approach sim-
ple and efficient to conventional FMEA users. In 2017, the
same authors developed a risk prioritization model for
FMEA also using IVIFSs and the multi‐attributive border
approximation area comparison method, combined with
linear programming to obtain the optimal weights of the
risk variables20; they argued that the proposed model is
an effective tool for rational risk management decisions,
ANES ET AL.
but additional and more complex studies are needed to
confirm the model robustness and efficiency.
Both, in these very recent and in older proposals,
previous knowledge is always necessary to understand
and use non‐traditional FMEA models. Thus, a traditional
FMEA user needs to spent time and effort to learn the
basis of these new models, which due to their high
complexity can be a hard task. This may explain why
many FMEA users continue to apply the conventional
RPN, which is significantly simpler and user friendly. In
fact, they consider that failure modes interpretation and
analysis is a complex engineering task, and efficient and
simple tools to prioritize them are always welcome.
Under this point of view, some recent research
works21,22 have been performed intending to alleviate
the drawbacks found in the traditional RPN without
compromising its usability as regards the ease of use and
required prior knowledge. However, they only reduce
the non‐injectivity and non‐surjectivity levels found in
the traditional RPN function, ie, they keep somehow rely-
ing on non‐injectivite and non‐surjectivite models.
In this context, it can be argued that a research gap
persists in the literature related with RPN functions, as
regards the need of a simple but reliable risk prioritization
model to be used and understandable by any FMEA user,
independently of his/her background. Therefore, this
paper proposes a risk prioritization model with a usability
and simplicity similar to the found in the conventional
RPN. The shortcomings, resulting from the non‐injective
and non‐surjective nature of conventional RPN functions,
and the absence of different relative importance of risk
variables are overcome. The objective is to provide a con-
sistent and simple tool to facilitate the reliability analysis
and failure modes prioritization during the design process
of engineering systems.
2 | PROPOSED RISK
PRIORITIZATION MODEL
In this section, a new risk prioritization model is proposed
and described. The model reasoning is presented step by
step for a deep understanding, and illustrative examples
are used to clarify complex steps and assist in the model
analysis.
Two functions are used to prioritize failure modes: the
first deals with the cases where the order of importance of
risk variables is sufficient to prioritize failure modes (risk
isosurface function [RI]); the second, involving an evolu-
tion of the RI, allows taking into account the relative
weight of variables (risk priority index function [RPI]).
While the RI is easy to understand and use, the RPI
requires a sequence of steps to prioritize failure modes.
ANES ET AL.
In the majority of the cases, the RI is enough to prioritize
failure modes; however, if different relative weights of risk
variables are a requirement, thus the RPI must be used.
2.1 | Risk isosurface (RI) function
In the following, the RI that prioritizes the risk variables
according to their order of importance is present. To
introduce this function, Severity, S, Occurrence, O, and
Detectability, D, are used as risk variables with a scale
length equal to 10, and an order of importance given by
D > S > O. This order of importance means that Detect-
ability is more important than Severity and Occurrence,
and Severity is more important than Occurrence.
Figure 2 shows a conceptual prioritization between
Severity and Occurrence. At the most left position, we
have the Severity scale, ranging from 1 to 10, and at the
top position we have the Occurrence scale, also ranging
from 1 to 10.
In the middle, within the matrix brackets, the critical-
ity values are represented as a function of Severity and
Occurrence. As one can see, for a given Severity, when
Occurrence value varies by 1 unit, the resulted criticality
also varies in steps of 1 unit. However, for a given Occur-
rence, a variation of 1 unit on Severity changes the
resulted criticality value in 10 units. In this way, Severity
has priority over Occurrence. For instance, for S = 1,
O = 10 the criticality value is 10, and for S = 2, O = 1
the criticality value is 11, and any 1 point increase in
Severity implies a 10‐point variation in the Occurrence
scale. The criticality values, RI(S, O)S > O, depicted in
Figure 2 can be computed using Equation 2.
RI ðS; OÞS>O ¼ 10⋅S þ O−10 (2)
FIGURE 2 Criticality (S vs O) for a 10‐point scale, Severity as
master risk variable
519
The criticality values represented in Figure 2 are
arranged such that Severity rules over Occurrence;
however, switching the position of each risk variable,
the relative importance of the risk variables changes, as
shown in Figure 3.
In this representation, Occurrence becomes more
important than Severity, and the criticality function,
RI(S,O)O > S, takes the following shape:
RI ðO; SÞO>S ¼ 10⋅O þ S−10: (3)
Thus, a generic criticality function can be defined
according to the order of importance set by the user.
Setting A and B as generic risk variables, the criticality
function can be written:
RI ðA; BÞA>B ¼ α⋅A þ B−α (4)
where the order of importance is given byA > B, and α is
the scale length of the risk variables.
The graph of the criticality function (Equation 4) is
depicted in Figure 4 as a function of 2 generic risk
variables A and B. The continuous plane without holes
neither repeated values, shows that this criticality
function is injective and surjective. At this point, a third
risk variable has to be added to fully define a 3‐variable
risk function like the conventional RPN function.
The inclusion of the third variable makes use of the
concept of risk isosurfaces in which the previous critical-
ity plane, defined by the criticality function, is moved
across the axis of the third risk variable. The criticality
plane translation is made by discrete unit increments of
the third risk variable, from 1 to α, meaning that the risk
function will consist of α risk isosurfaces. The risk values
in each risk isosurface are computed by adding to the crit-
icality function the respective value of the third risk
FIGURE 3 Criticality (O vs S) for a 10‐point risk factors scale,
Occurrence as master risk factor
520
FIGURE 4 Criticality risk function surface for the order of
importance given by A > B [Colour figure can be viewed at
wileyonlinelibrary.com]
variable multiplied by α2. Figure 5 illustrates the risk
isosurfaces concept for α = 10.
Therefore, for each value of the third risk variable,
there is a criticality plane, in which the criticality values,
RI(A, B, C)C > A > B, can be obtained by using Equation 5.
RI ðA; B; CÞC>A>B ¼ α⋅A þ B−α þ ðC−1Þ⋅α2 (5)
To the extent that Equation 5 keeps its injective and
surjective nature, it can be argued that the RI overcomes
FIGURE 5 3D plot of the risk isosurface function, 10 isosurfaces
for a 10‐point risk variable scale [Colour figure can be viewed at
wileyonlinelibrary.com]
ANES ET AL.
the most basic issues identified in the conventional RPN
functions. The positions in which A, B, and C risk vari-
ables are placed in Equation 5 indicate their relative
importance given by C > A > B. Considering that A > B > C
is a more intuitive order of importance, Equation 5 can be
rearranged as follows (Equation 6):
RI ðA; B; C ÞA>B>C ¼ ðA−1Þ⋅α2 þ B⋅α þ C−α (6)
where A, B, C, α ∈ Ν. In practice, the scale length of the
risk variables and their order of importance must be set
in Equation 6 by the user. For instance, in a risk scenario
that has an order of importance given by S > O > D and a
5‐point scale to evaluate risk variables, the RI takes the
form of Equation 7.
RI ðS; O; DÞS>O>D ¼ ðS−1Þ⋅52 þ O⋅5 þ D−5 (7)
Considering another example: if the risk scenario sets
Occurrence as the most important risk variable, and
Detectability as more important than Severity, ie, O > D > S,
and a risk scale length equal to 6, α = 6, is intended, the
RI is set as follows (Equation 8):
RI ðO; D; SÞO>D>S ¼ ðO−1Þ⋅62 þ D⋅6 þ S−6 (8)
To inspect the performance of the RI regarding the
shortcomings pointed out to the conventional RPN func-
tion, it was obtained in an Excel spread sheet all possible
values of the RI for a risk scale length of 10 points,
α = 10. A total of 1000 unique integers were obtained,
ranging from 1 to 1000 (from 1 to α3). Both, the mean
and the median assume the same value and, for any value
of α, the RI yields a unique value for a unique combination
of the 3 risk variables. Moreover, the results of the RI do
not create holes in the co‐domain, being fully defined
within the co‐domain[1; α3]. Figure 6 shows the frequency
of the RI results for α = 10.
For 3 illustrative scenarios, ScA, ScB, and ScC, Table 2
shows the risk factors ratings and their respective risk
isosurface values. The results of the RI show that 1‐point
variation on Severity leads to the same variation in the
risk isosurface results, independently of the values given
to Occurrence and Detectability. This indicates that the
risk isosurface values can be compared, and therefore dif-
ferent failure modes can be prioritized using this function.
2.2 | Risk priority index function (RPI)
The RI prioritizes failure modes for the desired order of
importance of risk variables set by the user. If the 3 gener-
ally used variables are used, 6 different sequences of
importance are possible, corresponding to the permuta-
tions of Severity, Occurrence, and Detectability. However,
ANES ET AL.
FIGURE 6 Frequency of the risk isosurface function results with
α = 10 [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
the RI by itself masks the order of importance with fixed
weights for the variables. In fact, the most important var-
iable is considered with an importance weight of 102, and
the second and third variables in the importance sequence
have a weight of 101 and 100, respectively. Certainly, it is
possible to envisage risk scenarios in which such an
importance distribution is clearly inappropriate. More-
over, risk analysers are essentially used to some freedom
on establishing the risk variables importance attributing
free weights, wi, subject to the constrain ∑wi = 100%.
For example, within the order of importance S > O > D,
different combinations of importance weights can be set
(Table 3) to reflect the reality of distinct risk scenarios.
This means that the approach based only on the order of
importance reflected in the RI may not be sufficient to
fully characterize a given risk scenario.
So, the relative weight of the risk variables has to be
set. For instance, the first scenario of Table 3, Sc1, reflects
a risk scenario in which Occurrence is almost as impor-
tant as Severity, and Detectability has little impact on risk
criticality: Severity is 1.25 times more important than the
Occurrence and 5 times more important than the Detect-
ability. In the third scenario, Sc3, Severity is 3.5 times
more important than Occurrence and 7 times more
important than Detectability, modeling a case in which
Severity clearly dominates Occurrence and Detectability.
Of course, to do this type of relative pondering, the risk
variables (eg, S, O, D) must be in the same scale of impor-
tance. Developed to guarantee the injective and surjective
TABLE 2 Sensitivity of risk isosurface function to risk variables variation
Scenario Severity (S) Occurrence (O)
ScA1 3 8
ScA2 4 8
ScB1 8 3
ScB2 9 3
ScC1 8 5
ScC2 9 5
521
TABLE 3 Different risk scenarios with different weighted risk
variables within the S > O > D order of importance
Scenario S>O>D
Sc1 50%*S 40%*O 10%*D
Sc2 60%*S 30%*O 10%*D
Sc3 70%*S 20%*O 10%*D
nature, the RI introduces different scales of importance to
the risk variables according to their order of importance (a
10 in the Severity scale has a different importance of a 10
in the Detectability scale). So, it does not allow the direct
use of weight functions in risk prioritization, meaning that
a transformation of the original risk variables values into
the same scale of importance is necessary.
This transformation is done by ranking the failure
modes according to the results of RI applied to the values
given by experts to the risk variables (Equation 6). As the
RI considers not only the experts evaluation of the risk var-
iables, but also their relative order of importance, it thus
makes possible to rank failure modes according to their
risk and order of importance of the risk variables. For all
importance permutations of the risk variables, Table 4
shows the results of the RI for 8 failure modes evaluated
by experts, and Table 5 shows the failure modes ranking
based on the values of the RI. This approach allows rank-
ing failure modes according to the values assigned to the
risk variables and to their interdependent importance.
Because the ranking of each failure mode in Table 5 is
directly related to the magnitude of its risk, the failure
mode position for a given order of importance of risk var-
iables is equivalent to the evaluation performed by the
experts, with the advantage of having the same scale of
importance in all permutations of the risk variables (first
row of Table 5). In this way, the experts' evaluations for
the risk variables are reduced to the same scale of impor-
tance, allowing the experts' conventional reasoning to
attribute weight coefficients to ponder the risk variables
into a global failure mode risk value.
However, any scale of importance based on a specific
risk variable involves 2 sequences. For instance, a scale
based on Severity as main risk variable involves the
sequences (SOD, SDO) related with the permutations on
Detectability (D) Risk Isosurface Function Variation
8 278 100
8 378
8 728 100
8 828
8 748 100
8 848
522 ANES ET AL.

TABLE 4 Illustrative example, risk isosurface values

FMEA Expert Ratings Risk Isosurface Values

Failure
Modes S O D SOD SDO OSD ODS DSO DOS
FM1 9 4 7 837 864 387 369 639 684
FM2 3 4 4 234 234 324 333 333 324
FM3 4 6 4 354 336 534 534 354 336
FM4 6 4 4 534 534 354 336 336 354
FM5 9 4 4 834 834 384 339 339 384
FM6 10 4 3 933 924 393 330 240 294
FM7 8 7 2 762 717 672 618 168 177
FM8 6 6 5 555 546 555 546 456 456

TABLE 5 Illustrative example, failure modes ranking according to the results of the risk isosurface function for the different orders of
importance of risk variables

FMEA Expert Ratings Failure Modes Ranking

Failure modes S O D SOD SDO OSD ODS DSO DOS
FM1 9 4 7 2 2 5 4 1 1
FM2 3 4 4 8 8 8 7 6 6
FM3 4 6 4 7 7 3 3 5 3
FM4 6 4 4 6 6 7 6 4 5
FM5 9 4 4 3 3 6 5 3 4
FM6 10 4 3 1 1 4 8 7 7
FM7 8 7 2 4 4 1 1 8 8
FM8 6 6 5 5 5 2 2 2 2

the other 2 variables. Thus, it becomes necessary to make The RPI for each failure mode can then be computed
each main variable independent of the following by Equation 12, where the order of importance is given
sequence. This is done by computing the average value by δA > δB > δC and respective weights wA > wB > wC.
of the rankings of failure modes obtained in each Equation 13 provides the failure mode RPI for the impor-
sequence. Equations 9 to 11 show this procedure for a tance order δS > δO > δD (wS > wO > wD).
generic set of risk variables, A, B, and C:
RPI ¼ wA δA þ wB δB þ wC δC (12)
RI ðA; B; CÞA>B>C rating þ RI ðA; B; CÞA>C>B rating
δA ¼ (9)
2
RPI ¼ wS δS þ wO δO þ wD δD (13)

RI ðA; B; CÞB>A>C rating þ RI ðA; B; C ÞB>C>A rating However, Equation 12 has the same drawbacks of the
δB ¼
2 original RPN as it can assign the same RPI to different risk
(10) scenarios. To analyze the injectivity of Equation 12, a
Matlab routine was implemented to test all possible com-
RI ðA; B; CÞC>A>B þ RI ðA; B; CÞC>B>A binations of wA, wB, wC and δA, δB, δC. It was verified that
rating rating
δC ¼ if a small correcting factor is sum to the weights, wA, wB,
2
(11) wC, of the delta risk variables, δA, δB, δC, the non‐
injectivity problem can be overcome. The correcting fac-
where δA, δB, and δC are the delta risk drivers. For the tors were set to 10−3 and 10−2 (1/ε3 and 1/ε2 with ε =10)
illustrative example (Table 5), dealing with Severity, to be added to the greater weight,wA, and to the interme-
Occurrence, and Detectability as risk variables, the calcu- diate weight, wB. This means that to guarantee the
lations of the delta drivers, δS, δO, and δD are shown in injectivity of Equation 12, the weights are modified so that
Table 6. their sum becomes slightly higher than 100%: the sum of
ANES ET AL. 523

TABLE 6 Illustrative example, delta risk driver values

FMEA Expert Ratings Delta Risk Drivers for S, O, and D Risk Variables
Failure
Modes S O D δS δO δD
FM1 9 4 7 (2 + 2)/2 = 2 (5 + 4)/2 = 4.5 (1 + 1)/2 = 1
FM2 3 4 4 8 7.5 6
FM3 4 6 4 7 3 4
FM4 6 4 4 6 6.5 4.5
FM5 9 4 4 3 5.5 3.5
FM6 10 4 3 1 6 7
FM7 8 7 2 4 1 8
FM8 6 6 5 5 2 2

the corrected weights yields a total of 100.011%, denoting
a small variation of 0.011 percentage points from 100%.
While this variation can be considered negligible, it effec-
tively solves the non‐injectivity problem of Equation 12
and is consistent with the original weights, because wA
modified with 1/ε3 continues to be higher than wB modi-
fied with 1/ ε2, and wC remains the lowest weight if
1 1
wA −wB > 2 − 3 :
ε ε
Equation 14 guarantees the preservation of the order
of importance given by the user to the weights and does
not significantly reduce the user options for the wA, wB
weights as far as the difference between the greatest and
intermediate weights must be greater than 0.009 percent-
age points, which is a very low value without practical rel-
evance. Thus, in its final form, the RPI is given by
Equation 15.
   
wA ε 3 þ 1 wB ε2 þ 1
RPI ¼ δA þ δB þ wC δC
ε3 ε2
Where δA, δB, and δC are the delta risk drivers that
must take the respective values computed in Equations 9
to 11. Their order of importance is given by δA > δB > δC,
and their weights in percentage must respect the follow-
ing conditions: wA > wB > wC, wA + wB + wC = 100%,
1 1
and wA −wB > 2 − 3 , where for scenarios with 3 risk vari-
ε ε
ables ε is equal to 10.
3 | CASE STUDY
In this section, the risk prioritization model proposed in
this paper is applied to a case study originally studied by
Lu et al23 and later used by Liu et al24 for comparison
and validation. The case study involves a blood transfu-
sion process aiming the analysis and prioritization of its
failure modes according to their risk. Five medical FMEA
expert teams identified 11 failure modes and evaluated
each risk variable S, O, and D, based on historical data
and questionnaires.
3.1 | Baseline case study
Liu et al24 used this case study to correlate their proposal,
a risk priority model using the interval 2‐tuple hybrid
(14) weighted distance (ITHWD), with 2 other risk prioritiza-
tion models, namely, the conventional RPN function
and the Fuzzy VIKOR model. Table 7 shows the ranking
results reached by Liu et al.24
The conventional RPN, Fuzzy Vikor, ITHWD, and the
proposed model are different risk priority models devel-
oped to be used in FMEA contexts. Despite their different
difficulty levels and required prior knowledges, they all
have a common objective, which is the failure modes pri-
oritization according to their risk based on the capture of
the risk expectations made for a given risk scenario.
In Table 7, the conventional RPN ranking, where the
(15)
RPN is obtained by S × O × D, shows failure modes
FM6 and FM7 in the same rank position. This is a typical
shortcoming frequently pointed out, and a subject of
intense discussion on the RPN validity to rank failure
modes. It also identifies failure modes FM3, FM8, and
FM10 as the most critical in this order of importance. Cor-
relating the values given to the risk variables of failure
modes FM3 (7‐5‐7) and FM8 (8‐6‐5) with their RPN rank,
one can conclude that the 2 additional points in the
Detectability (D) rating of FM3 (ie, FM3( ‐ ‐ 7) > FM8( ‐
‐ 5)), has a higher impact on RPN than the additional
points distributed on Severity (S) and Occurrence (O) in
FM8 (ie, FM3(7‐5‐ ) > FM8(8‐6‐ )). However, in FM10
(8‐4‐7) this higher impact changes, in the sense that the
2 points increase in the Occurrence (O) of FM8 (8‐6‐5)
has a higher effect on RPN than the Detectability (D) of
failure mode FM10. These results show that the conven-
tional RPN model changes the order of importance of
each risk variable in a way not controlled by the user.
524 ANES ET AL.

TABLE 7 Failure modes ranking based on several prioritization methods (Liu et al24)

Failure Mode S O D Conventional RPN Results Ranking RPN Ranking Fuzzy VIKOR Ranking ITHWD
FM1 7 6 3 126 5 4 4
FM2 6 6 5 180 4 7 6
FM3 7 5 7 245 1 2 1
FM4 7 5 3 105 8 8 10
FM5 5 3 6 90 9 11 11
FM6 10 1 8 80 10 1 3
FM7 8 2 5 80 10 6 9
FM8 8 6 5 240 2 5 5
FM9 7 4 4 112 6 10 7
FM10 8 4 7 224 3 3 2
FM11 7 4 4 112 6 9 8

The Fuzzy VIKOR model ranks the failure modes as
follows for the 3 first positions: FM6 (10‐1‐8) > FM3 (7‐
5‐7) > FM10 (8‐4‐7). This result shows that the failure
mode that has the highest Severity (S = 10), a high Detect-
ability (D = 8), and an improbable Occurrence (O = 1) is
the most critical failure mode. For instance, under the
S > O > D order of importance, this ranking can be ques-
tionable as it might not make sense to allocate resources
to reduce, in the first place, the effects of a failure mode
that probably will never occur.
The ITHWD model identified the 3 most critical fail-
ure modes as follows: FM3 (7‐5‐7) > FM10 (8‐4‐7) >
FM6 (10‐1‐8). These failure modes are the same identified
in the Fuzzy VIKOR model, but in this case failure mode
6 appears in third place against the first place given by the
Fuzzy VIKOR model, which makes more sense. However,
in the same reasoning, the following ITHWD rating: FM6
(10‐1‐8) > FM1 (7‐6‐3) do not makes sense under the
S > O > D order of importance.
In fact, several inconsistencies on the failure modes
prioritization achieved with the 3 methods can be found.
Most of these inconsistencies are based on the variation
of the order of importance, which must be set to and
reflect the intended risk scenario. In the following, the
use of the proposed risk prioritization model in this case
study is shown and discussed.
3.2 | Failures prioritization based on the
proposed model
For the implementation of the proposed model, we
assume that the experts' evaluation of the risk variables,
shown in columns 2, 3, and 4 of Table 7, is approved
and truly embodied the risk of each failure mode. There-
fore, they will be used in the proposed risk prioritization
model.
The first step of the model consists in the failure
modes prioritization for the different risk variables per-
mutations using the risk function, RI. For each permuta-
tion, meaning an order of importance of the risk
variables, Equation 6 is set, and the 11 failure modes
(Table 7) are ranked. The results are shown in Table 8.
The delta risk drivers for the 11 failure modes can then
be calculated (Table 9), using Equations 12 to 14. For
instance, FM6 has the highest value of Severity, and
FM5 has the lowest one. One should note that different
sets of values of expert's evaluations can result in the same
delta risk drivers, due to the way are computed.
The following step consists in attributing importance
weights to each delta risk driver that better reflect the risk
scenario. Table 10 shows the failure modes RPI values for
6 different scenarios (Sci, i = 1,… 6) with specific combina-
tions of risk drivers' weights (wS, wO, wD), which represent
the relative importance that can be set by experts accord-
ing to the intended risk scenario. For instance, in scenario
Sc5 of Table 10, the failure modes risk is prioritized con-
sidering Severity, Occurrence, and Detectability weights
of 50%, 30%, and 20%, respectively. For this scenario, the
failure mode FM8 is the one with the highest risk, and
the lowest one is FM5.
It is interesting to note that, according to the proposed
RPI model, FM8 is the most critical failure mode in all
risk scenarios, which indicates a strong consistency on
ranking FM8 as the highest risk.
3.3 | Comparison and discussion of results
Two risk scenarios are selected from Table 10, namely,
Sc4 and Sc5, to correlate the results provided by Liu et al24
(Table 7) with the ones achieved by the proposed model,
the RPI. In the risk scenario Sc4, the highest importance
was given to the Occurrence driver (one can say that
ANES ET AL. 525

TABLE 8 Failure modes prioritization for different orders of importance of risk variables

Experts Evaluation of Risk Variables Risk Isosurface Failure Modes Rankings

Failure
Mode S O D SOD SDO OSD ODS DSO DOS
FM1 7 6 3 5 8 2 3 10 10
FM2 6 6 5 10 10 3 2 7 6
FM3 7 5 7 6 5 4 4 3 2
FM4 7 5 3 7 9 5 5 11 11
FM5 5 3 6 11 11 9 9 4 4
FM6 10 1 8 1 1 11 11 1 1
FM7 8 2 5 4 4 10 10 6 7
FM8 8 6 5 2 3 1 1 5 5
FM9 7 4 4 8 6 7 7 8 8
FM10 8 4 7 3 2 6 6 2 3
FM11 7 4 4 9 7 8 8 9 9

TABLE 9 Delta risk drivers for the risk variables S, O, and D may represent the risk drivers' weights for most the risk
evaluation scenarios. Table 11 presents the results
Failure Mode δS δO δD
achieved with the proposed RPI model together with the
FM1 6.5 2.5 10
ones obtained with the risk evaluation models considered
FM2 10 2.5 6.5 for comparison.
FM3 5.5 4 2.5 The risk weights of scenario Sc4, S (30%), O (50%), and
FM4 8 5 11 D (20%), yield a specific prioritization of failure modes:
FM5 11 9 4
FM8 (8‐6‐5) is ranked first, and FM3 (7‐5‐7) and FM10
(8‐4‐7) are ranked as second and third more important,
FM6 1 11 1
respectively. In the Sc5 case, the risk weights are S
FM7 4 10 6.5 (50%), O (30%), and D (20%), yielding a different prioriti-
FM8 2.5 1 5 zation: FM8 (8‐6‐5), FM10 (8‐4‐7), and FM6 (10‐1‐8) are
FM9 7 7 8 ranked first, second, and third, respectively. Table 12
FM10 2.5 6 2.5
shows the results of Table 11 restricted to the 3 ranked
highest failure modes according to the existent and pro-
FM11 8 8 9
posed failures prioritization models.
Comparing the results achieved for the first place in
50% of the risk results from Occurrence), Severity stands risk prioritization for the different models (Table 12), the
in second place followed by the Detectability driver (both RPI estimates seem to be more consistent. The criticality
accounting for the remaining 50%). In the scenario Sc5, (S × O) of the first ranked failure mode identified by the
the Severity driver has the highest importance, Occur- RPI model (FM8) is much higher than the one found for
rence has a moderate importance, and Detectability a FM3 (first ranked in conventional RPN and ITHWD)
low importance. These 2 cases were selected because they and FM6 (first ranked by Fuzzy VIKOR); the higher

TABLE 10 Failure modes ranks for weighted risk drivers (failure modes are horizontally prioritized for each weighting case)

wS% wO% wD% 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11

Sc1 50 20 30 FM8 FM6 FM10 FM3 FM7 FM1 FM9 FM2 FM11 FM4 FM5
Sc2 20 50 30 FM8 FM3 FM10 FM2 FM1 FM6 FM9 FM4 FM7 FM5 FM11
Sc3 20 30 50 FM8 FM3 FM10 FM6 FM2 FM5 FM1 FM7 FM9 FM11 FM4
Sc4 30 50 20 FM8 FM3 FM10 FM1 FM2 FM6 FM4 FM9 FM7 FM11 FM5
Sc5 50 30 20 FM8 FM10 FM6 FM3 FM1 FM7 FM2 FM9 FM4 FM11 FM5
Sc6 30 30 40 FM8 FM10 FM3 FM6 FM2 FM7 FM1 FM5 FM9 FM11 FM4
526 ANES ET AL.

TABLE 11 Risk prioritization comparative results

Failure Mode S O D Conventional RPN Fuzzy VIKOR ITHWD RPI (Sc4) RPI (Sc5)
FM1 7 6 3 5 4 4 4 5
FM2 6 6 5 4 7 6 5 7
FM3 7 5 7 1 2 1 2 4
FM4 7 5 3 8 8 10 7 9
FM5 5 3 6 9 11 11 11 11
FM6 10 1 8 10 1 3 6 3
FM7 8 2 5 10 6 9 9 6
FM8 8 6 5 2 5 5 1 1
FM9 7 4 4 6 10 7 8 8
FM10 8 4 7 3 3 2 3 2
FM11 7 4 4 6 9 8 10 10

TABLE 12 Three ranked highest failure modes for the different risk prioritization models. Figures in brackets represent the experts' eval-
uation of risk variables (S, O, D) for each failure mode

Ranking RPN Fuzzy VIKOR ITHWD RPI—Sc4 RPI—Sc5

1 FM3 (7‐5‐7) FM6 (10‐1‐8) FM3 (7‐5‐7) FM8 (8‐6‐5) FM8 (8‐6‐5)
2 FM8 (8‐6‐5) FM3 (7‐5‐7) FM10 (8‐4‐7) FM3 (7‐5‐7) FM10 (8‐4‐7)
3 FM10 (8‐4‐7) FM10 (8‐4‐7) FM6 (10‐1‐8) FM10 (8‐4‐7) FM6 (10‐1‐8)

values of Detectability in FM3 and FM6 do not justify the
first place for FM3 and FM6 yield by RPN, ITHWD, and
Fuzzy VIKOR models.
Regarding the second place in failure modes prioriti-
zation (third row of Table 12), FM3 in RPI‐Sc4 seems to
be a natural choice because in this scenario, Occurrence
has the highest importance weight. In RPI‐Sc5 where
Severity has the highest importance weight, FM10 is over
FM6 despite its lower Severity rate. This prioritization
order is a result of a higher value given to Occurrence in
FM10.
Other interesting result is that the failure modes
pointed out by the proposed RPI model in scenarios Sc4
and Sc5 in the 3 first ranking positions, namely FM3,
FM6, FM8, and FM10, are also identified by at least 1 of
the other prioritization models in the top 3 ranks. It
should be noted that the Fuzzy VIKOR and ITHWD
models do not include failure mode FM8 in the top 3
ranks. As already discussed, the Fuzzy VIKOR model
put FM6 in the first place, which with an Occurrence rat-
ing of 1 does not seem to make sense. The ITHWD sug-
gests FM3 as the most critical failure mode, which
seems to be more appropriate.
The results computed for the third place are very alike,
the RPM, Fuzzy VIKOR, and RPI (Sc4) models suggest
FM10 for the third place, and ITHWD and RPI (Sc5)
models suggest FM6. The RPI results obtained in this case
study are quite acceptable, being in agreement with the
expectations made for the risk scenario.
4 | C ON C L U S I ON
In this paper, a new risk prioritization model was devel-
oped aiming to overcome the major shortcomings pointed
out to the conventional RPN. The proposed model com-
prises 2 functions, namely, the RI and the RPI. The first
function prioritizes failure modes accordingly to the order
of importance given to risk variables, and the second pri-
oritizes failure modes according to the importance
weights given to these variables reflecting the intended
risk scenario. The injective and surjective nature of these
functions, together with the ease of use and understand-
ing of the proposed prioritization model, makes it suitable
for integration in FMEA frameworks of the real industrial
practice. Moreover, additional previous knowledge is not
required to use the proposed risk prioritization model.
The performance of the prioritization model was analyzed
in a case study containing 11 failure modes, and the
results showed that the shortcomings typically pointed
out to the conventional RPN were overcome. Also, the
failure modes prioritization made for the 11 failure modes
ANES ET AL.
agrees with the expectations made for the risk scenario.
We conclude that the proposed risk prioritization model
has a good potential to prioritize failure modes according
to their risk, but further studies are required to fully char-
acterize the performance of the proposed model. Namely,
the correlation with other relevant risk prioritization
methods—different from the Fuzzy VIKOR and ITHWD
methods, and the use of more complex risk scenarios.
Despite being enough for the majority of the risk scenar-
ios in FMEA, there are cases where more than 3 risk var-
iables might be needed to fully characterize a given failure
mode. In fact, Severity is a very aggregated variable which
frequently hides significantly different effects, from safety
to economic and environmental impacts, meaning that its
disaggregation into more elementary risk variables can
provide more informed risk analysis. To overcome this
shortcoming, the RI should allow a dimension set to the
number of risk variables needed to characterize a given
failure mode.
ACK NO WLE DGE MEN TS
The authors are very grateful to the editor and reviewers
for their insightful and constructive comments and sug-
gestions which are very helpful in improving the quality
of the paper.
This work was supported by FCT, through IDMEC,
under LAETA project UID/EMS/50022/2013. The first
author gratefully acknowledges financial support from
FCT—Fundação para Ciência e Tecnologia (Portuguese
Foundation for Science and Technology), for the PhD
Grant PD/BD/52344/2013.
ORCID
L. Reis http://orcid.org/0000-0001-9848-9569
R EF E RE N C E S
1. Bertolini M, Bevilacqua M, Massini RFMECA. Approach to
product traceability in the food industry. Food Control.
2006;17(2):137‐145.
2. Reiling JG, Knutzen BL, Stoecklein M. FMEA—the cure for
medical errors. Qual Prog. 2003;36(8):67
3. Lukas L. Risk mapping for mobile communication. In: Mathe-
matics and Computers in Sciences and in Industry (MCSI), 2014
International Conference on IEEE; 2014:1–5.
4. Liu H‐C, Liu L, Liu N. Risk evaluation approaches in failure
mode and effects analysis: a literature review. Expert Syst Appl.
2013;40(2):828‐838.
5. Stamatis DH. Failure Mode and Effect Analysis: FMEA from
Theory to Execution. Milwaukee, Wisconsin: ASQ Quality
Press; 2003.
527
6. Standard SAE. SAE J 1739: Potential Failure Mode and Effects
Analysis in Design (Design FMEA) and Potential Failure Mode
and Effects Analysis in Manufacturing and Assembly Processes
(Process FMEA) and Effects Analysis for Machinery (Machinery
FMEA). Warrendale, PA: SAE; 2002.
7. Teng S‐H, Ho S‐Y. Failure mode and effects analysis: an
integrated approach for product design and process control.
International J Qual Reliab Manag. 1996;13(5):8‐26.
8. Garcia PA, Schirru R. A fuzzy data envelopment analysis
approach for FMEA. Progress in Nuclear Energy.
2005;46(3–4):359‐373.
9. Chang D‐S, Sun K‐LP. Applying DEA to enhance assessment
capability of FMEA. Int J Qual Reliab Manag. 2009;26(6):629‐
643.
10. Kutlu AC, Ekmekçioğlu M. Fuzzy failure modes and effects
analysis by using fuzzy TOPSIS‐based fuzzy AHP. Expert Systems
with Applications. 2012;39(1):61‐67.
11. Zhang Z, Chu X. Risk prioritization in failure mode and effects
analysis under uncertainty. Expert Syst Appl. 2011;38(1):206‐214.
12. Chin K‐S, Wang Y‐M, Poon GKK, Yang J‐B. Failure mode and
effects analysis by data envelopment analysis. Decision Support
Systems. 2009;48(1):246‐256.
13. Abdelgawad M, Fayek AR. Risk management in the construc-
tion industry using combined fuzzy FMEA and fuzzy AHP. J
Constr Eng Manag. 2010;136(9):1028‐1036.
14. Yang J, Huang H‐Z, He L‐P, Zhu S‐P, Wen D. Risk evaluation in
failure mode and effects analysis of aircraft turbine rotor blades
using Dempster–Shafer evidence theory under uncertainty. Eng
Fail Anal. 2011;18(8):2084‐2092.
15. Mark FW. Failure mode and effect analysis (FMEA) as a quality
by design (QbD) tool for managing biopharmaceutical product
development and manufacturing risks. Bio Process J. 2014;13(3):
16. Liu H‐C. FMEA using uncertainty theories and MCDM
methods. In: FMEA Using Uncertainty Theories and MCDM
Methods. Singapore: Springer; 2016:13‐27.
17. Wang L‐E, Liu H‐C, Quan M‐Y. Evaluating the risk of failure
modes with a hybrid MCDM model under interval‐valued
intuitionistic fuzzy environments. Comput Ind Eng.
2016;102:175‐185.
18. Zhao H, You J‐X, Liu H‐C. Failure mode and effect analysis
using MULTIMOORA method with continuous weighted
entropy under interval‐valued intuitionistic fuzzy environment.
Soft Computing. 2016;1‐13.
19. Liu H‐C, You J‐X, Chen S, Chen Y‐Z. An integrated failure mode
and effect analysis approach for accurate risk assessment under
uncertainty. IIE Transactions. 2016;48(11):1027‐1042.
20. Liu H‐C, You J‐X, Duan C‐Y. An integrated approach for failure
mode and effect analysis under interval‐valued intuitionistic
fuzzy environment. International Journal of Production Econom-
ics. 2017, in press.
21. Akbarzade Khorshidi H, Gunawan I, Ibrahim MY. Applying
UGF concept to enhance the assessment capability of FMEA.
Quality and Reliability Engineering International.
2016;32(3):1085‐1093.
528
22. Nguyen T‐L, Shu M‐H, Hsu B‐M. Extended FMEA for sustain-
able manufacturing: an empirical study in the non‐woven
fabrics industry. Sustainability. 2016;8(9):939
23. Lu Y, Teng F, Zhou J, Wen A, Bi Y. Failure mode and effect anal-
ysis in blood transfusion: a proactive tool to reduce risks.
Transfusion. 2013;53(12):3080‐3087.
24. Liu H‐C, You J‐X, You X‐Y. Evaluating the risk of healthcare
failure modes using interval 2‐tuple hybrid weighted distance
measure. Comput Ind Eng. 2014;78:249‐258.
Vitor Anes was born in Lisbon, Portugal, in 1976, and
received the MS and PhD degrees in Mechanical Engi-
neering, in 2009 and 2015, respectively, both from
Instituto Superior Técnico (IST), University of Lisbon,
Portugal. He is a faculty member of Instituto Superior
de Engenharia de Lisboa (ISEL) at the Department of
Mechanical Engineering since 2015, where he has
been teaching engineering mechanics courses (statics,
dynamics, and machine design). He is a researcher at
the center of mechanical design of the Institute of
Mechanical Engineering (IDEMC). His main research
areas are on cyclic plasticity, multiaxial fatigue behav-
ior of materials, fracture mechanics, experimental
mechanics, structural reliability, risk‐based fatigue life
prediction and design, finite element analysis, and
computer‐aided design. He has published over 40
papers in international refereed conferences and
peer‐reviewed journals. More recently, Vitor Anes
has been focus on the extent of the life cycle of aero-
space structures by improving their maintainability
in early design stages. Applications of this work
View publication stats
ANES ET AL.
include the development of more reliable structural
designs to extend the life cycle of aerospace structures.
Elsa Henriques is an Associate Professor in the
Mechanical Engineering Department at Instituto
Superior Técnico, Technical University of Lisbon, Por-
tugal. His research interests include lean manufactur-
ing, production planning, product life‐cycle
management, and design engineering.
Manuel Freitas is an Emeritus Professor of the
Mechanical Engineering Department at Instituto
Superior Técnico, Technical University of Lisbon, Por-
tugal. His research interests include composites,
mechanical behaviour of materials, materials charac-
terization, and mechanical testing.
Luis Reis is an Associate Professor in the Mechanical
Engineering Department at Instituto Superior
Técnico, Technical University of Lisbon, Portugal.
His research interests include multiaxial fatigue
behaviour of materials, fracture mechanics, experi-
mental mechanics, structural reliability, and risk‐
based fatigue life prediction and design.
How to cite this article: Anes V, Henriques E,
Freitas M, Reis L. A new risk prioritization model
for failure mode and effects analysis. Qual Reliab
Engng Int. 2018;34:516–528. https://doi.org/
10.1002/qre.2269