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To cite this article: Martin Geiger & Antoine Pécoud (2014) International Organisations
and the Politics of Migration, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 40:6, 865-887, DOI:
10.1080/1369183X.2013.855071
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Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 2014
Vol. 40, No. 6, 865–887, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2013.855071
The last two decades have seen major shifts in the way international organisations (IOs)
address migration. While state sovereignty remains central in the politics of migration,
IOs are increasingly developing their visions regarding how the cross-border movements
of people should be governed (or ‘managed’) and, in some cases, they have become
important actors in the design and implementation of migration policy. Research on the
role and functions of IOs remains scarce, however, and there are major uncertainties,
concerning not only their actual influence, but also the political context in which they
operate and the outcome of their initiatives. According to their advocates, the
involvement of IOs would enable greater international cooperation, which would lead
to policies that pay greater attention to human rights and development imperatives. Yet,
at times, interventions by IOs seem to reinforce existing imbalances, as these
organisations primarily tend to align themselves with the interests and agenda of
developed receiving states. In addition, the work of IOs is embedded in a complex
institutional setting, characterised by sometimes-problematic institutional relations
between them, as well as between IOs and other international cooperation mechanisms.
1. Introduction
One of the core trends characterising the last two decades is the regionalisation and
internationalisation of migration-related policy issues. At the regional level, Europe is
Martin Geiger is a Banting Fellow at the Department of Political Science and the Institute of European,
Russian and Eurasian Studies, Carleton University, Ottawa, Canada. Correspondence to: Martin Geiger,
Department of Political Science and Institute of European, Russian and Eurasian Studies, Carleton University,
B647 Loeb, 1125 Colonel By Drive, Ottawa, ON, K1S 5B6, Canada. E-mail: martin.geiger@carleton.ca. Antoine
Pécoud is a Professor of Sociology, University of Paris. Correspondence to: Antoine Pécoud, Professor of
Sociology, University of Paris 13, 99 av J-B Clément, 93430 Villetaneuse, France. E-mail: antoine.pecoud@
univ-paris13.fr.
Sassen writes, ‘when it comes to immigrants and refugees, … the national state claims
all its old splendour in asserting its sovereign right to control its borders’ (Sassen
1996, 59). Even if cooperation were recognised as useful, or even necessary, in
properly ‘managing’ migration, it would face the obstacle of states’ concern over the
sovereign control of human mobility (Martin, Martin, and Weil 2006). States’
unilateral approach to migration would most obviously manifest itself through the
one-sided way they control their borders, and by the persistence of such methods
over time (see e.g., Zolberg 1997). In this view, migration politics is marked by the
‘tyranny of the national’ (Noiriel 1991) and ‘cooperation’ (including the role of IOs)
is something that would have yet to emerge.
Nevertheless, this ignores the fact that, from a functionalist point of view, the
international nature of migration dynamics has long made them amenable for
international cooperation. The longue durée perspective not only shows that ‘the state
monopolisation of the legitimate means of movement’ is the outcome of a long-
standing, sometimes incomplete, and still on-going process, as governments have to
cope with the influence of non-state actors (like corporations) while also struggling to
develop and maintain the bureaucratic and administrative resources to successfully
monitor peoples’ mobility (Torpey 2000; see also Geiger 2013). It also reveals the
permanent tension between sovereignty and cooperation in migration politics.
Indeed, the ILO’s early work did not arise out of nothing, but reflected the political
concerns of the time with regard to the need to foster cooperation between
governments, to strengthen the international legal framework in which labour
migration took place, or to treat foreigners in a way that did not hurt receiving states’
diplomatic interests (Rosental 2006, 2011). Importantly, these concerns were not born
solely out of humanitarian or idealistic preoccupations, but displayed a mix of social,
economic and political imperatives (as, for instance, social rights could help to
monitor foreigners’ presence and activities).
Another object of early international cooperation concerns asylum seekers and
refugees. The position of a High Commissioner for Refugees was first created in 1921
by the League of Nations, which marked the beginning of a process that culminated
in the creation of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in 1950 and
the adoption of the 1951 Geneva Convention (Loescher 2001). This also resulted in
868 M. Geiger & A. Pécoud
an institutional fragmentation that exists to this day. For historical and political
reasons (framed by World War II [WWII] and the East–West confrontation),
attention was mostly focused on the creation of a regime for refugee protection. The
ILO nevertheless kept its labour migrants’ rights mandate, which indicated the sharp
discrepancy in the treatment of refugees and (labour) migrants by IOs and
governments. To further complicate the picture, yet another IO was created in
1951, but outside the UN system: what is now the IOM was initially called the
Provisional Intergovernmental Committee for the Movement of Migrants from
Europe (PICMME), designed as a temporary Europe-centred organisation with a
focus on logistics and transportation (rather than on protection). The IOM only
became a permanent organisation in 1989 (Georgi 2010).
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to distinguish from other categories of people on the move); the ILO (and the UN
at large) have also been struggling to adapt their rights-based mandate to a more
governance- and control-oriented context (Pécoud and de Guchteneire 2007).
Yet, such ‘real-world’ developments are only one side of the coin. Nay (2011)
argues that changes within IOs result from both external pressure and from internal
dynamics; in particular, IOs should be seen as ‘bureaucratic entrepreneurs’ capable of
seizing external opportunities and responding innovatively to them. Indeed,
neoinstitutionalist research has long made it clear that one cannot see IOs as static
sets of rules, mandates, bodies, etc., but as actors that can behave in a somewhat
autonomous manner, for instance by expanding in directions that were not initially
expected (or by failing to do what they are tasked to do). This scholarship has also
showed how IOs may be less concerned with their formal mission than with their
own rules – or survival. Thus, both the UNHCR and the IOM were originally
supposed to work within the European context; yet, the scope of their interventions
gradually became global, in a process that had much to do with IOs themselves
looking for work opportunities outside Europe (once this continent became more
peaceful and less ‘promising’ in terms of the ‘problems’ IOs are tasked to address).
This is even more obvious in the case of the IOM, which was not destined to become
a permanent organisation, but nevertheless managed to endure by constantly
reinventing its role and functions—becoming so successful in this endeavour that it
has been growing substantially over the past decade (Georgi 2010; Loescher 2001).3
At a smaller scale, several other IOs whose formal mandate does not explicitly
focus on migration were able to step in, by channelling their field of expertise (like
health, development or transnational crime, etc.) to the cross-border movements of
people; this is the case of most of the agencies that are currently part of the GMG,
and that thereby displayed a certain agency in redefining their activities. As
Kathleen Newland sums up:
attention to international migration in the 1990s was sporadic and largely fruitless…
No UN agency had migrants or migration processes as priorities… All of this changed
quite suddenly around the turn of the millennium. Suddenly, migration was
everywhere one looked in the UN system and beyond. (Newland 2010, 331–332).
Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 871
4. Investigating the Role of IOs in the Politics of Migration
According to Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore, ‘surprisingly few … students
of IOs have been critical of their performance or desirability’ (1999, 701). This lack of
criticism and general ‘optimism’ about IOs might be caused by the widespread
assumption that they do what they are mandated to do, that is, solve problems and
foster cooperation between states–which is arguably preferable to confrontation,
conflict or war. As far as migration is concerned, however, this optimism makes for a
surprising paradox. It is common to criticise certain states for designing inappropri-
ate or unsuccessful migration policies (Castles 2004), but the same criticisms are
hardly applied to IOs. Nonetheless, if the way states deal with migration is open to
critique, and if states are the primary instruction-givers of IOs, it would logically
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follow that IOs should also become the focus of criticism, since they must be equally
unsuccessful in their migration initiatives.
Writing about the IOM, Rutvica Andrijasevic and William Walters note that:
despite the fact that [it] has become a major operator in the field of international
borders and migration governance, there is surprisingly very little academic research
that has interrogated this agency. Migration scholars routinely use IOM material as
data, and often participate in IOM research and policy programmes. But rarely has it
been the subject of critical scrutiny itself. … It is high time that the IOM [is] made an
object of inquiry in its own right. (2010, 980)
It is indeed striking to observe that, despite the influence of this organisation, only a
small number of articles were published on its activities, and only in very recent years
(e.g., Ashutosh and Mountz 2011; Caillaut 2012; Collyer 2012; Felli 2013; Geiger
2010; Georgi 2010; Georgi and Schatral 2012; Pécoud 2010). Oleg Korneev’s analysis
of the IOM’s role in the elaboration and implementation of the EU-Russia
readmission agreement thus clearly stresses the need to acknowledge the importance
of this organisation in brokering and essentially organising international cooperation
in the field of migration (Korneev 2014).
A similar lack of research concerns other important agencies. The work of the ILO,
for instance, seems to be researched mainly from historical or legal perspectives
(Böhning 1991; Haseneau 1991; Rosental 2006). Very little information is also
available on the activities and possible influence of other increasingly important
institutions, like the UN Development Programme (UNDP) or the World Bank (even
if this may be understandable given their recent engagement with migration). Other
regional bodies (like the IGC, the ICMPD, and RCPs) are in the same situation
(Georgi 2007; Hess 2010; Oelgemöller 2011; Thouez and Channac 2006).
The case of the UNHCR is quite different. It has been the object of much more
research, especially on its history and on the political, legal and humanitarian
dilemmas that characterise its agenda. Although there is no room here for an
overview of this literature, one can nevertheless observe that, while the UNHCR is
regularly criticised for failing to protect refugees and for betraying its founding ideal
872 M. Geiger & A. Pécoud
in the face of the political pressure put on by developed receiving states, this is usually
interpreted as a ‘challenge’ stemming from the environment in which the UNHCR
operates, and not from the UNHCR itself. The agency tends to be viewed as
inherently well intentioned, as simply trying to do its best in a difficult setting. But
Jennifer Hyndman (2000) provides a critical assessment of the UNHCR’s actual
activities, which leads her to stress the need to ‘study up’ and to complement the
analysis of migrants’ or refugees’ situation with an investigation of the institutions
that govern their lives (see also Agier 2006). Bhupinder Chimni (1998) underlines the
close ties that exist between the UNHCR and the research community, to the extent
that debates on this organisation often take the form of sympathetic comments rather
than of criticism. In this special issue, the need for such a critical approach is made
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crucial, as it hides the real power relations between states and enables IOs to
intervene in a neutral, technical and (potentially) more efficient manner. According
to Andrijasevic and Walters (2010), the IOM is thus well-adapted to a post-imperial
world, in which states are in principle independent and where dominant governments
are not supposed to impose their views on the rest of the world. Yet, there are many
issues—and the control of borders is one of them—that are characterised by state
interdependency, and for which dominant states feel the need to steer the behaviour
of other states. This is where the IOM’s added value comes in, as this organisation has
the capacity to guide the behaviour of weak states through persuasion, in a manner
that formally respects their sovereignty.
Colleen Thouez and Sarah Rosengartner (2007) provide another example by
looking at the IOM’s role in RCPs. These are designed to enable governments in a
given region to discuss migration; whereas one could expect these exchanges to be
region-specific and to address issues that are most salient in the respective regions,
they seem on the contrary to focus on more or less the same topics—and, what is
more, on precisely those topics that matter most for receiving governments (i.e.,
border control). This paradoxical situation partly has to do with the fact that most
RCPs (like the Puebla Process or the Colombo Process) have the IOM as their
‘secretariat’, meaning that this agency plays a key role in steering discussions and
setting the agenda. This not only enables the IOM to subsequently get involved in the
implementation of the initiatives agreed upon within RCPs, but it also illustrates the
way in which an IO can vehicle the concerns of its most important member states,
even when working ‘for the benefit’ of non-Western countries. Moreover, it shows
how an IO can ‘export’ both concerns and practical ‘solutions’ from one part of the
world to the others (Geiger 2010; see also Korneev 2014).
new issues.
One of these is the ‘managerial’ approach to migration. It is clearly an outcome of
the ‘New Public Management’ (NPM) philosophy, which sees public actors develop
market-oriented positions to enhance cost-effectiveness. ‘Migration management’
could also be seen as a reaction to the over-politicisation (or even ‘scandalisation’) of
migration; over-politicisation makes the work of IOs difficult, and the argument
according to which political sensitivity would inhibit the development of econom-
ically ‘sound’ policies is a common one. The issue then is the respective importance of
technical/economic and political concerns; ‘migration management’ is clearly on the
economic side, with the risk of downplaying values, rights and democratic legitimacy
(Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011; Kalm 2010). Another implication of IOs’ narratives is
their comprehensive and holistic nature. Migration policy is traditionally a
fragmented field, as different institutional actors and ministries deal with admission,
integration, asylum, the labour market, international cooperation, human rights,
development, etc. One of the key objectives of IOs in their interventions is—to use
their jargon—to ‘mainstream’ migration and achieve ‘policy coherence’.
Chris Shore and Susan Wright (1997, 8) argue that ‘a key feature of modern power’
is the masking of the political ‘under the cloak of neutrality’. Introducing a
managerial logic, promoting unquestionably ‘good’ objectives (development, good
governance, cooperation, protection of migrants and refugees, ‘policy coherence’,
etc.), and claiming to benefit all parties—are all ways of depoliticising migration. This
enables IOs to appear as ‘impersonal, value-neutral, not self-interested and hence
technocratic actors whose purpose is not the exercise of power but equitable problem-
solving’ (Lavenex 2007, 253).
This calls for critically assessing the actual meanings and implications of even the
most widely accepted objectives of IOs. Their narratives indeed rely upon assumptions
that seem so straightforward that they are hardly questioned. This applies to
‘cooperation’, for example, ‘the sweetest and seemingly entirely unproblematic of
words’ according to Raymond Apthorpe, adding, ‘we should … be suspicious of a term
which is agreed among so many people, which everybody likes, and which everybody is
in favour of’ (Apthorpe 1997, 53). Indeed, there is evidence that ‘cooperation’ may
mean nothing else than the imposition of control/security concerns upon sending
878 M. Geiger & A. Pécoud
countries (Pina-Delgado 2013). The same applies to the protection, humanitarian and
development-oriented agendas of IOs, usually presented as a much needed, positive and
human rights-friendly counterpart to securitisation. Yet, Stephen Castles and Nicholas
van Hear (2011) warn that ‘helping’ states to develop or ‘protecting’ deserving migrants
(to the detriment of others) can display patterns of violence and power relations that—
while less direct and visible than border surveillance—are just as real. Parvati Raghuram
(2009) also stresses the normative, and sometimes even coercive, assumptions in the
aspirations to transform migrants into ‘development agents’.
especially in less developed countries. Given their political weakness and perceived
lack of experience, these countries are exposed to external interventions seeking to
shape their migration policy, often through IOs’ ‘help’ and ‘expertise’; while this is
formally done for the sake of development and ‘in their interests’, there are obvious—
but often unexplored—hidden agendas at stake in such processes (Caillaut 2012; Geiger
2010; Poutignat and Streiff-Fenart 2010).
What these examples make clear is the disconnection between IO narratives and
practices (Basok and Piper 2012; Geiger and Pécoud 2010). The former envisages a
clear-cut yet imagined ideal ‘migration world’ (Walters 2010) in which people would
move for the benefit of all, while the latter take the form of much more down-to-
earth projects that do not seem to have the potential to transform the world in such a
way—and even seem to reinforce existing trends. This situation can be interpreted as
an indication that IOs are unable to actually do what they claim they want to do; they
would rather talk than act and this gap between narratives and practices demonstrates
their powerlessness. Yet, another interpretation is that the function of IOs is precisely
to provide a new discursive framework for practices that are not in themselves new or
challenging. The apparent dichotomy between narratives and practices would then be
functional and developing and communicating discourses, policy scripts and ‘stories’
would be a kind of practice in its own right.
circulate between different milieus: universities, but also IOs, think tanks, NGOs, etc.
This is not exclusive to migration, as the same types of professional trajectories have
long characterised development practice and thinking, for example. This means that
critical research implies what Jennifer Hyndman (2000) calls ‘duplicity’, that is, the
combination of participation in IOs’ work and the independent criticism of their
activities.
An alternative position has been put forward by Fabian Georgi and Susanne
Schatral (2012), who argue that researchers face a dilemma. One the one hand, many
of them are deeply aware of the shortcomings and dead-ends in contemporary
migration politics; they know that ‘controlling’ or ‘managing’ migration has
disturbing consequences, on migrants themselves and on the moral and political
foundations of receiving societies (see e.g., Anderson 2012). They also know that IOs
are unable to challenge this situation and that some of their activities fuel, rather than
solve, these problems. Nonetheless, very few address these concerns directly by, for
example, engaging in critical discussions on freedom of movement; they would rather
engage in arguably superficial criticisms of some of the most brutal state practices, an
area in which they can find allies among IOs, in a way that makes a radical rethinking
of the premises of migration politics impossible.
This is a delicate issue, on which much remains to be thought and said. It involves
a range of factors, from researchers’ ambitions and quest for funding or reputation, to
their fundamental moral or political reactions in the face of the harsh realities
associated with migration. Analysing the birth of ‘forced migration studies’, Chimni
(2009) reminds us that social sciences are intrinsically connected to history and
politics, but that they can to some extent surmount this through critical self-
reflection; he mentions social anthropology as an example of a discipline that, while
born out of a colonialism, has since managed to reassess its ties to Western power
and global imbalances. There are indications that refugee studies and, more recently,
migration studies have started to engage in such a process. It is nevertheless probably
fair to conclude that, thus far, this is not the dominant approach in the field, and that
time and efforts are still needed to achieve this goal.
Migration has, over the last two decades, become a ‘global’ issue. One of the
consequences of this is that IOs find it easier than ever before to talk about migration
882 M. Geiger & A. Pécoud
and to take initiative in this policy field. To many observers, this may be an
inherently good development, as IOs are traditionally associated with internationally
recognised values (like global justice, development, human rights, inter-state
cooperation), which often seem to be lacking in the current politics of migration.
But as this introductory article has tried to show, the interventions of IOs in the
politics of migration also raise a number of fundamental research issues—hence the
need to critically assess the role and functions of IOs. This is what contributions to
this special issue attempt to do, by exploring their agency, discourses and activities
from a variety of angles, in different contexts and policy fields.
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Notes
[1] The GMG currently brings together sixteen agencies: the IOM, the International Labour
Organization (ILO), the OHCHR, the UN Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD), the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA), the UN
Development Fund for Women (UN Women), the UNDP, UNESCO, the UN Population
Fund (UNFPA), the UNHCR, UNICEF, the UN Institute for Training and Research
(UNITAR), the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the UN Regional Commissions,
the World Bank and WHO.
[2] These conventions include, in particular, the ILO Conventions 97 and 143, as well as the UN
International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and
Members of Their Families.
[3] The IOM is not the only example. The IMF, for instance, was initially created to manage the
Bretton Woods system. It did not, however, go out of business when this system based on
fixed international exchange rates disappeared, as it successfully created new roles for itself.
[4] At times, the IOM even seems to behave in way that is closer to a multinational corporation
than to a typical UN agency. For example, the IOM is based in Geneva but outsources lower
ranking headquarter functions to new service centres in Manila and Panama, according to
cost-effective logic that is still quite uncommon among national and international
bureaucracies.
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