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    Amingandtimepressureindecisionmaking 1993

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    Amingandtimepressureindecisionmaking 1993

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    of 12
    9 Framing and Time Pressure in Decision Making Ola Svenson and Lehman Benson, LI Introduction This study investigates the effect of time pressure on decision framing. Tversky and Kahneman (1981) introduced the term decision frame for a decision maker's representation of a decision problem including acts outcomes and contingencies associated with different alternatives (cf. Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). They showed that different decision frames can be induced from the same factual information. Two versions of a particular decision problem may be constructed that are formally identical, yet the wording of each is slightly different by ‘emaphasizing either the gains or the losses. This apparently trivial difference may change the decision-maker's frame and lead to a reversal in preference for the alternatives. This is difficult to handle in formal decision theory (cf. Keeney & Railfa, 1976), leading to alternative formulations like Prospect Theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). This issue is (Ota Svenson + Deparameat of Paychology, Stackholm Uaiverity. $-10691 Stockholm, Sw den, Lehman Bensou, Ill + Deparment of Prychology, Lund University, $-22350 Lund, ‘Sweden. Time Pressure and Sires in Human Judgment and Decision Making, edited by Ola Svenson and A. Joha Maule. Plenum Pres, New Yak, 1993. 1 ta Svenson and Lehman Besson, TIL illustrated by considering two versions of the following problem, the frst empha- sizing losses and the second gains: lnagine that Sweden is preparing to igh the AIDS disease, which i assumed to ‘ll 600 people during a given time, if cothing is done. Two altemative programs have ben developed to fight he disease. Assume thatthe exact Scientific estimates of the eects ofthe two programs A and B are (a) if program A is chosen £00 people will le, snd (0) if program B is chosen, there isa one-third probability tha nobody will ie and two-thirds probabil har 600 people ill de Which of the two programs do you prefer? In the positive framing condition the alternatives are instead: (a) If Program A is chosen, 200 people will be saved and (b) if B is chosen, there is a one-third probability that all will be saved and a tworthird probability that nobody will be saved. ‘Typically, people choose the risky alternative (B) inthe first version and the certain alternative (A) in the second version despite the fact thatthe two versions are formally identical (cf. Maule, 1989: Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). Though standard economic or decision theory cannot predict this finding, Prospect Theo- ry cam by assuming thatthe two versions of the probiem are framed differently, as «a choice between losses and a choice between gains. respectively. Risk taking is known to be different in losses as compared with gains. The act of framing, so critical to this explanation. is assumed to be the result of immediate automatic Drocesses that are very quick and analogous to those underlying visual percep tion. AAs such, the imposition of a deadline should have lite effect on the way that choice problems are framed, and therefore the usual reversal of preference identified above would be expected even under time pressure conditions. In addition to Prospect Theory, there are other alternative theories, some of ‘which model decision making as a process over time. One of these theories is Differentiation and Consolidation Theory (Svenson, (992; Maule & Svenson, this volume) that models decision making as a process in which one alternative is gradually differentiated from other alternatives. This process requires time to allow the decision maker to reach a level of differentiation that is sufficient for a decision. Ifthe deadline for a decision is too close, the resulting time pressure leads to a forced premature closure of the differentiation process. In other words, the decision is made but without sufficient deliberation. If framing effects are the result of more complex elaborative differentiation processes that are not speeded up to compensate for lack of time, then time pressure would weaken the framing effect. On the other hand, if framing effects are the result of immediate quick processes analogous to visual perception as suggested by Tversky and Kahneman (1981) time pressure would not weaken the framing effect significantly. The pres cent study was designed to determine which of these two hypotheses is appropri- ate. Framing and Tie Presurein Deon Making bs Experiment 1 Method Subjects Seventy six senior high-school students served as voluntary participants. ‘They were each randomly assigned to one of four treatment groups, each con- taining 19 students. Materials and Stimuli ‘The stimuli consisted ofa series of pairs of decision problems. Each deci- sion problem consisted of two options as exemplified in the introduction. The first four pairs were loteries and included filler problems. They were followed by the AIDS problem, a rephrased version of the Asian disease problem (cf. Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). A slide projector equipped with an automatic timer was used to regulate the time intervals. The problems were presented on slides projected on a screen in front of each group. In addition to marking their choices (Alternatives A or B) on ‘the response sheets in front of them. the subjects were instructed to mark the size Of the attractiveness difference between the two alternatives on the screen. This ‘was done by circling a number (1 = no difference to 10 = great difference) on the response sheet. The layout of the response scale on the response sheet was counterbalanced with half of the answer sheets having the following layout from left to right: (1. 2... .9, 10), The other half of the answer sheets had the ‘opposite layout: (10, 9, 8... . 1). This control was performed to ensure that any effects of framing and/or time pressure could not be attributed to a response antfact. This response scale gives a more sensitive measures of changes of prefer- ences as compared with simple counts of A and B choices. This is because each choice is reflected not only on a binary scale but also on an interval rating scale. ‘This rating scale was used successfully in earlier studies (cf. Svenson, Edland, & Slovic, 1990). ‘A measure of perceived stress was also developed, based on the scale described above. The only difference was that 0 on the scale = no stress and 10 ‘= much stress. This scale was administered to all subjects before and after the experimental session. At the end ofa session, the following additional statements. ‘were presented: (1) exposure time was too short, (2) had time to think. (3) experienced time pressure, and (4) satisfied with my decision. The subjects responded on a scale from zero = do not agree to 10 = agree a lot. 16 Ola Svensoa and Lehman Benson, I Design and Procedure ‘The four treatments involved: (1) Positive framing no time pressure, Pos- NoTp, (2) positive framing time pressure, PosTp, (3) negative framing no time pressure, NegNoTp, and (4) negative framing time pressure, NegTp. ‘The 38 subjects, who were in the no-time-pressure conditions, were allowed as much time as they needed to complete the task. Following each presentation of the stimuli, the experimenter asked if everybody was ready for the next stimuli to be presented. After the subjects had responded “yes” the experimenter displayed the next slide. The 38 subjects, who were in the time pressure conditions were allowed only a certain amount of time to complete the task. The time limits were deter- ‘mined from data in an earlier pilot study and represented the average time taken to complete each task subtracted by one standard deviation. For the filler prob- lems 1-4 the subjects had 12 seconds to complete each task. For Question 5 the subjects had 40 seconds to complete the task Results The average score reported for amount of stress felt in the time pressure condition before the experiment was 2.7 on a scale ranging from 0 to 10. The average score of amount of stress felt in the time pressure condition after the experiment was 4.7. This difference is statistically significant (F = 6.0. df = 1/72, p<0.01). Contrasting this, in the no-time-pressure condition the average score reported before was 2.7 and 2.8 after which is a nonsignificant difference. AAs for the questions that came after the experiment, all the means on these scales (exposure too short.” “had time to think,” and “experienced time pressure”) were significantly different for the time pressure and no-time-pressure groups except the last question about satisfaction. These conclusions were based on one way ANOVA analyses with p<0.01. The decision-problem data were coded in the following manner. There were ‘wo alternatives in each of the decision problems, A and B. The choice of Alternative A (always the certain alternative) was given a positive sign number. ‘The choice of Alternative B (always the risky alternative) was given a negative ssumber sign. Thus, ifa student selected Alternative A and marked 3 on the rating scale (1= no attractiveness difference, 10= great attractiveness difference) the score would be 3.0. Ifa student selected Alternative B with the same degree of attractiveness difference, the score would be -3.0. The mean and standard deviations were computed across the subjects for each of the questions. ‘An analysis of variance (“positive framing-negative framing” x “time pressure-no time pressure”) of the 19 subjects in each condition indicated that Framing and Time Pressure in Decision Making ar Positive framing» Negative framing a Attractiveness difference Time pressure No time pressure ‘Figure 1. Arractivenss difference 24a function of time limit in Experiment |. The ditereace is Postve if favoring the certain alternative (A) and aegative forthe uncertain alternative (B. ta the ‘one of the frst four filler problems had a significant main effect. Therefore these problems will not be analyzed further. In the AIDS question, however, there was a significant main effect for the framing factor. The mean attractiveness difference for positive framing was 2.51 whereas the mean for negative framing was ~3.2 (two-way ANOVA. F 23.93, df = 1/72, p<.001). There was no effect on mean atractiveness across Positive and negative framing related to the time factor, but there was a signifi- ‘Sant interaction (F = 12.69, df = 1/72, p<.OO1). Thus, in the positive framing ‘Condition the certain alternative (A) was more preferred than the risky alternative @B) under no time pressure and in the negative framing condition the certain alternative was fess preferred than the risky alternative (cf. Figure 1). In the time Pressure condition there was no significant difference between framing condi- . In other words, time pressure reduced the framing effect. The mean for the time pressure negative framing condition was -0.42, and the mean for the no- {ime-pressure negative framing condition was ~6.00 (in post hoc analysis t = 3.44, df = 36, p<.001). The mean for time pressure positive framing was 1.16, and the mean for no-time-pressure positive framing was 4.00 (t = 1.68, df = 36, P<.05). ‘These data support the hypothesis that framing effects are evolving over time. There is no evidence that they are immediate and analogous to perceptual bs (Ola Swenson and Lehman Bensoa, I Table 1. Decision Problems Used in Experiment 2° (8) Alera: Notime Time Problem bp A B pressure pressure 1 Eanpdiffete 570 ickes euy 100 210 10 mas SEK 48 SEK 192 imicutt S56 tickets 11S ookess 3.0 -0 SEK 48 SEK 192 2. Food poisoning 120 kids 0 posiive 30 kids 255 chance al awed = = 195 3.10 saved 739 nobody saved ceganive 90 kids de 255 chance n9s 35 obody dies 759 all die 3. Breast cancer 32 women lose one breast postive 20 women 62.5% all women save 43s us sve boch bath bres breass 379% aobody will sve eh bres seganve H2women 52S aobodylows2 3.65 ~2.00 ose one beast breast 37% du all ose a east ‘or Level I decision processes (cf. Svenson, 1990) as suggested by Kahneman and ‘Tversky (1984). Experiment 2 This experiment was designed to test the robustness of the findings of Experiment | and whether they generalize to other types of framing problems. For example, Johnson, Payne, and Benman (1988) suggested that changes to information displays can result in preference reversals. Consequently, a decision Framing snd Time Pressure in Decision Making Be ‘Table 1. continued rere Ammacivenes diference (a8) Aeros Notime Tine Problem type A B pressure pressure 4. Hear operation 20 patents die pose 6 puiens 30% chance all cured 65 9s - cared 70% sobody cured negative 14 patients 30% chance nobody 1.50 90 ie ies 708% al die S. Asian flu 40 people die or postive 10 people 0 people saved as -35 saved i nob sed negative 30 people nobody dies

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