Social media and the transformation of ‘Chinese nationalism’

‘Igniting positive energy’ in China since the 2012 London Olympics

Shanshan Du
The author is associate
professor of anthropology
at Tulane University. She
authored Chopsticks only
work in pairs: Gender unity
and gender equality among
the Lahu of southwest
China (Columbia University
Press, 2002) and co-edited
Negotiating women’s roles
and power: The practice
of world religions in
contemporary Asia (a special
issue of Religion, 2007),
and Gender in contemporary
Chinese societies: Beyond
Han patriarchy (Lexington
Books/Rowman & Littlefield,
2012). Her email is sdu@

HAN WANG
tulane.edu.

Fig. 1. The 10 Chinese
grassroots torchbearers in
England.
I would like to thank Li
Zhang, Jieni Li, and Betty
LeJeune for their comments
and suggestions. Although
all the online information
utilized in this paper is
publicly accessible, the
web addresses of private
bloggers are not provided as a
precaution.
1. An examination of many
messages and comments
on the subject suggests that
the initial microbloggers
seemed to have creatively
borrowed and phenomenally
popularized the term ‘positive
energy’, which had already
appeared online in 2007 via
Hong Kong entertainment
stars.
2. Based on
recommendations from
internet users, expert
reviews, and online polling
jointly organized by the
National Language Resource
Monitoring and Research
Center under the Ministry
of Education, the state-run
Commercial Press, and the
Chinese online TV station.
South China Morning
Post, Thursday 3 January
2013. http://www.china.
org.cn/chinese/2012-12/20/
content_27470104.htm.
3. http://news.xinhuanet.
com/collection/2013-
04/25/c_124632209.htm.
4. http://m.voachinese.
com/a/1566337.html and
http://news.china.com.
cn/2013lianghui/2013-03/17/
content_28267842.htm.
5. http://e.gmw.cn/2013-
05/07/content_7550458.htm.
6. http://en.wikipedia.org/
wiki/Li_Ning.s
In the 2012 London Olympics torch relay (19 May - 27
July), the virtual participation of Chinese internet users
sparked a grassroots movement of ‘positive energy’
(zhengnengliang). On 4 July, the first references to
‘igniting positive energy’ appeared in two microblogs
commenting on the torch relay: ‘Ignite (dianran) posi-
tive energy, detonate microcosm (yinbao xiaoyuzhou)’ and
‘Ignite positive energy, [and] be chased by good fortune
(haoyun dangbuzhu)’.1 Within three days, an estimated
half-a-million internet users posted, reposted, commented,
and sent messages on the subject (Baidu).
The explosive effect of this internet meme continued
to intensify after the London Olympics. In January 2013,
a linguistics journal (Yaowenjiaozi) recognized ‘positive
energy’ as China’s number one catchphrase in 2012. The
slogan was also ranked number one among the top 10
new phrases of the Chinese media in 2012.2 Between 4
July 2012 and 31 December 2013, 104,582,080 original
messages concerning ‘positive energy’ appeared on Sina
Weibo (the most popular microblog site in China) with
many more reposts and references on this website alone.
Most internet catchphrases have limited influence
among Chinese communities. Yet ‘positive energy’ has
demonstrated an extraordinary, transformative power in
the socio-political and globalized landscape of China.
Chinese internet users have applied this internet meme to
a wide range of social and interpersonal contexts, as exem-
plified by its powerful deployment as a new humanitarian
and unifying symbol in the wake of the Lushan earthquake
of April 2013.3 While continuously developed and dissem-
inated via ‘grassroots’, the Chinese government and the
official media have also enthusiastically adopted the ‘pos-
itive energy’ concept. Remarkably, not only did China’s
new leader, Xi Jinping, embrace elements of the concept
in his official definition of the ‘China dream’ in March
2013, but he also directly utilized the term to address the
US-China relationship when he met with Jimmy Carter in
December 2012.4 Additionally, many transnational corpo-
rations have employed the meme in their marketing strate-
gies, as exemplified by the central role ‘positive energy’
played in the indigenization of Hollywood culture during
the record-breaking release of Iron Man 3 in China in May
2013.5
In this article, I focus on how the phenomenon of
‘positive energy’ has transformed mainstream ‘Chinese
nationalism’. Nationalism in China is often referred to as
‘wounded nationalism’ (Chang 2001) because it is rooted
in and inspired by the country’s century-long history of
oppression and humiliation between the inception of the
Opium War (1839-1942) and the end of the civil war in
1949. During the post-socialist era, popular nationalism
in China has been shaped primarily by three interrelated
forces: the Patriotic Education Campaign led by the state
(Zhao 1998; Wang 2008), Confucianism-based nation-
alism (Callahan & Cheung 2012) as manifested in ‘filial
nationalism’ (Fong 2004), and spontaneous ‘online nation-
alism’ as marked by fervent reactions to international
events perceived as threatening to China’s sovereignty
(Shen & Breslin 2010; Tok 2010).
The following sections will demonstrate how the grass-
roots ‘positive energy’ movement has fostered an emergent
pattern of patriotism that has come to co-exist with previous
forms of nationalism. I call this new model ‘transcendental
patriotism’ because by highlighting the grassroots moral
inspiration in globalized China, it simultaneously injects
elements of individualism, transnationalism, and univer-
salism into the existing ideal and sentiment of Chinese
patriotism (aiguo, ‘love of country [China]’).
Grassroots-based individualism in national
image-making
Authorized as a state project (Ding 2011), national image-
making in post-socialist China emphasizes the spectacular,
embodied by the extraordinary success of the Chinese elite.
In the context of international sporting events, especially
the Olympics, the official representatives of China have
primarily been the medal winners (Chen 2012). At the
2008 Beijing Olympics, for example, Li Ning, the ‘Prince
of Gymnastics’ and winner of 14 world artistic gymnastics
championships, ‘ignited the cauldron at the opening cer-
emony after being hoisted high into the air with cables and
miming running around the rim of the stadium’.6 Similar
national images were reproduced at the 2012 London
Olympics. In addition to Li Ning, other torchbearers
selected through normative procedures included two
figures recognizable throughout the country via CCTV
(China Central Television) or entertainment, and two rep-
resentatives of corporate power in China, namely, Coca
Cola and China Resources Vanguard.7
While lacking any clear democratic agenda or organiza-
tion, the grassroots focus in the ‘igniting positive energy’
movement, effectively contested these mainstream repre-
sentations of China’s national image. Introduced to China
in the 1980s, the English term ‘grassroots’ was translated

ANTHROPOLOGY TODAY VOL 30 NO 1, FEBRUARY 2014 5


Fig. 2. Chongwen Tao at the
Olympics torch relay.
Fig. 3. Alimjan Halik jogging
in the torch relay.
Fig. 4. Alimjan Halik selling
lamb shashlik on the street.
7. http://www.bbc.
co.uk/news/world-
europe-18002760, and http://
gb.cri.cn/20864/2012/06/25/5
631s3740914_3.htm.
8. See http://news.
xinhuanet.com/travel/2012-
07/20/c_123441175_3.htm
and http://www.bbc.co.uk/
torchrelay/day57.
9. The profiles of the
torchbearers may have
been shaped by public
representations.
10. http://sports.china.
com.cn/txt/2012-07/11/
content_25879298.htm,
http://show.eastday.com/
cooperation/bodyfeel/
gaojian.asp?gaojianID=1329,
and http://torch.2008.sina.
com.cn/hd/other/2008-05-
23/101987377.shtml.
11. See http://baike.baidu.
com/view/6537282.htm.
12. http://baike.baidu.com/
view/1831499.htm. RH (-)
blood group is called ‘panda
blood’ (xiongmao xue) due to
its rarity among the Chinese
population.
13. See http://news.
xinhuanet.com/travel/2012-
07/20/c_123441175_3.htm
14. See http://news.
xinhuanet.com/travel/2012-
07/20/c_123441175_3.htm.
15. http://post.tom.
com/1A001D203978.html.
16. http://www.
psycofe.com/read/
readDetail_26497.htm and
http://news.365jilin.com/
changchun/20130429/573743.
html.
17. To date, such an
inaccurate account of
the intellectual origin of
‘positive energy’ has yet to be
questioned, possibly resulting
from lack of access to the
English edition of this book
in China.
18. See http://homea.
people.com.cn/n/2013/0428/
c41390-21321113.html, and
also http://e.gmw.cn/2013-
05/07/content_7550458.htm
19. http://art.ce.cn/
wwzx/201207/30/
t20120730_23538646.shtml.
20. http://weibo.
com/1558148043/yqTn26sQt.
6 ANTHROPOLOGY TODAY VOL 30 NO 1, FEBRUARY 2014
HAN WANG
HAN WANG
into Mandarin as caogen. The connotations of caogen
centre on the dichotomy between the ordinary people
(pinmin) and the elite (jingying); the popular and the
professional, the official, and the mainstream. Most com-
monly used to refer to the ‘amateur’ in the arena of enter-
tainment, caogen is often metaphorically associated with
xialibaren, a genre of folk songs from ancient China. The
marginalization of caogen is reflected in the annual Spring
Festival Gala held by CCTV, in which a very small pro-
portion of grassroots performers appear, and then only in
recent years. While being limited primarily to the arenas of
entertainment and folk culture, caogen has also frequently
been associated with inferiority or vulgarity.
By their overwhelmingly preferential support for the 10
‘grassroots’ individuals who carried the torch in the relay
on 14 July – in stark contrast to the sparse attention paid to
the ‘elite’ who relayed between May and June – Chinese
internet users established a milestone in the history of
grassroots development in China. While one of the earliest
blogs on 4 July praised ethnic Chinese elites in England,
the limelight in the online ‘igniting positive energy’
movement swiftly turned to ‘grassroots’ from China. This
internet fervour was driven by the vigorous support (zhui-
peng) for the Chinese torchbearers who were categorized
as caogen (‘grassroots’), pinmin (‘ordinary people’), or
minjian (‘folk’). Among the 8,000 torchbearers of the
London Olympics, 18 individuals represented China, of
whom 10 were ‘grassroots’ representatives. The enthu-
siasm of Chinese internet users over ‘positive energy’
reached a new height around 14 July, when these Chinese
caogen joined with torchbearers from the UK and other
countries to carry the Olympic flame from Bournemouth
to Southampton, England.8
Through reposting and commenting on various social
media sites, the news about the grassroots torchbearers,
which had already been published months before, sud-
denly gained the spotlight, providing fuel for the grass-
roots movement. Transcending the state’s exclusive
focus on the elite and the spectacular, the ‘igniting posi-
tive energy’ movement generated an alternative Chinese
national image, where grassroots individuals were pro-
moted as representatives of China for their embodiment
of charity, volunteerism, and public service. Coming
from very ordinary backgrounds or disadvantaged cir-
cumstances, these grassroots torchbearers, had managed
to make an extraordinarily positive impact on their local
communities or upon people in need, as illustrated by the
following examples.9
Chongwen Tao is a legendary racing champion and a
miraculous survivor of severe congenital heart disease,
from which he had twice been declared clinically dead
during his second year of life. He grew up determined to
repay society for the many kindnesses shown to his par-
ents as they struggled to save their young son on a very
limited income. After he became a taxi driver at the age of
HAN WANG
18, he generously offered free rides and assistance to well
over 6,000 elderly or sick passengers, sometimes even car-
rying them up stairs on his back. At the same time, he also
bravely helped local police to successfully crack a number
of criminal cases, often declining the monetary rewards
offered by the victims. Encouraged to do so by one of his
passengers, he participated in car racing in 2001. In 2005,
he won the S4 China Rally Championship.10
Alimjan Halik was well-known in China as a ‘grass-
roots philanthropist (caogen cishanjia)’ even though he
grew up in a poor Uyghur family in Xinjiang and never
completed high school.11 After his demobilization from the
army in 2002, he worked for a year at a collective-owned
shop in Guizhou province. However, on losing this job for
refusing to extort payments from poor residents to whom
he had extended credit, he became a vendor selling lamb
shashlik (Russian shish kebabs) on the street. Since then,
while living a very thrifty lifestyle, he has spent two-thirds
of his limited income on supporting hundreds of impover-
ished students pursuing a college education.
The ‘panda-blood girl’, Chenbing Mao, is another grass-
roots torchbearer whose story touched numerous internet
users.12 As a junior in a vocational-technical school in
Hangzhou in 2007, she noticed an online message seeking
donors of AB Rh-negative blood, needed to save the life of
a pregnant rural woman suffering from a massive haemor-
rhage in Guizhou province where no blood banks carried
this rare type. With no money to spare and no long-dis-
tance travel experience, she borrowed from her classmates
and embarked on a lone journey of over 3,000 kilometres.
Weighing only 97 lb, the then twenty-year-old insisted that
the doctor draw 400 ml. of blood, the maximum allowed.
Having fainted after only 240 ml. had been drawn, she
requested that the doctor complete his procedure just as
soon as she regained consciousness.
Inspired by the stories of these caogen torchbearers,
Chinese internet users bestowed upon them honours
that outshone those accorded to the jingying (elite) at
the London Olympics. Most dramatically, while the vast
majority of these ‘grassroots’ were far from athletic,
they attracted more fans and more ardent cheers from
Chinese internet users than the medal winners themselves.
The overwhelming support for these grassroots torch-
bearers was reflected in a multitude of microblog com-
ments, including: ‘People’s eyes are as bright as the snow.
Positive energy is in the midst of ordinary people’; and
‘Little people, huge radiance, positive energy!’
In addition to their inspirational stories of ‘little people
making a big difference’, most of these torchbearers con-
tinued to charm many Chinese internet users by remaining
caogen even after they had received domestic or interna-
tional acclaim. For example, Alimjan Halik continued to
sell shashlik even after appearing on CCTV as the winner
of the 2011 Touching China Award, and Chenbing Mao
held an ordinary job even after being hailed as one of the

Baidu. Positive energy
(zhengnengliang) http://
baike.baidu.com/
view/4318053.htm
(accessed 16 April 2013).
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Cheung 2012. Away
from socialism, toward
Chinese characteristics:
Confucianism and the
futures of Chinese
nationalism. China
Information 26(2): 205-
218.
Chang, M.H. 2001. Return
of the dragon: China’s
wounded nationalism.
Boulder: Westview Press.
Chen, H. 2012. Medals,
media and myth of
national images: How
Chinese audiences thought
of foreign countries during
the Beijing Olympics.
Public Relations Review
38(5): 755-764.
Chen, N. 2003. Breathing
spaces: Qigong,
psychiatry, and healing
in China. New York:
Columbia University
Press.
Ding, S. 2011. Branding a
rising China: An analysis
of Beijing’s national image
management in the age of
China’s rise. Journal of
Asian and African Studies
46(3): 293-306.
Fong, V. 2004. Filial
nationalism among
Chinese teenagers with
global identities. American
Ethnologist 31(4): 631-
648.
Jankowiak, W. 2004. Market
reform and the expansion
of China’s moral horizon.
The Journal of Urban
Anthropology and Studies
of Cultural Systems
and World Economic
Development 33(24):
167-210.
Laliberté, A. et al. 2011.
Religious philanthropy and
Chinese civil society. In
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Chinese religious life,
139-154. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Ong, A.& L. Zhang 2008.
Introduction. In Zhang,
L. & A. Ong (eds).
Privatizing China:
Socialism from afar, 1-19.
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Palmer, D. 2007. Qigong
fever: Body, science and
utopia in China. New
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2010. Online Chinese
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bilateral relations.
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ANTHROPOLOGY TODAY VOL 30 NO 1, FEBRUARY 2014 7
‘Ten folk (pinmin) heroes/heroines of Hongzhou’. While
reporting on the moving moment when all 10 grass-
roots torchbearers were hugging each other farewell at
the Beijing Capital Airport on 16 July, a journalist com-
mented: ‘At this point, the ten ordinary people (pinmin)
from China have completed their Olympics relay, heading
back to their own work places, continuing their public
service. Representing much that is extraordinary, they are
all fine examples of ordinary people. Let all devotees of
the public welfare join our effort to bring warmth into the
world, just like the sacred flame of the Olympic torch’.13
By claiming and legitimizing the position of the ordi-
nary in that social space which associates the honour of the
nation with the elite, these internet users have collectively
challenged the extreme marginalization of the caogen.
Synchronized with each other in the online grassroots
movement, their individual voices became increasingly
amplified, eclipsing the monopolizing voice of the state in
defining the national image of China. Specifically, com-
peting with the cookie-cutter ideology and moral rhetoric
of the state, they collectively promoted a folk theory that
attributed the qualification of the 10 ordinary Chinese as
Olympic torchbearers to their unique and individual mani-
festations of ‘positive energy’. As summarized by Baidu,
‘Public opinion holds that it is the value of positive energy
glowing from the grassroots torch bearers themselves
which has brought them their good fortune, bringing them
the once-in-a-life-time opportunity to become Olympics
torch bearers and to be invited on this glorious journey to
far-away London to personally carry the torch’.
Such a belief in the potential for ‘little people’
(xiaorenwu) to generate positive energy, make a differ-
ence, and be rewarded with cosmic ‘fortune’ also empow-
ered countless ordinary Chinese individuals to aspire for
those opportunities once reserved exclusively for the elite.
An internet user exclaimed, ‘I am dying to be a member of
their team (to bear the torch for China). It’s so geili (awe-
some, cool)’, an internet catchphrase that means ‘giving
power.’
In brief, in the extemporaneous process of democratizing
the making of China’s national image, the online ‘posi-
tive energy’ movement injected an element of grassroots-
based individualism into mainstream Chinese nationalism.
By fervently praising and supporting the 10 grassroots
torchbearers, innumerable internet users proudly identi-
fied them as unique and inspiring individuals representing
positive images of China on the international stage.
Transnationalism and universalism in
‘transcendental patriotism’
Besides introducing an element of individualism, the ‘pos-
itive energy’ movement further transcended mainstream
‘Chinese nationalism’ by immersing transnationalism
and universalism in the sentiment and ideal of ‘love of
China’ or ‘love of country’ (aiguo). Such a hybrid model
of national pride surpasses the geopolitical and cultural
boundaries of nation-state which constitute the ideolog-
ical, political, and sentimental foundations of nationalism.
Notwithstanding its spontaneous nature, the ‘posi-
tive energy’ movement was largely shaped by transna-
tional forces in China’s globalized market, especially by
Samsung, a multinational conglomerate company head-
quartered in South Korea. As a major sponsor of the 2012
Olympics, Samsung sponsored its global search for grass-
roots torchbearers in 2011, adhering to the UK’s vision
for ‘everyone’s Olympic Games’. The nationwide search
in China produced 10 grassroots individuals as ‘good
examples of the ordinary, relaying the extraordinary’.14
To a certain extent, the optimal combination of economic
power, democratic vision, and commercial interest in such
a transnational company facilitated from the outset the
differentiation between the grassroots torchbearers and
those representing mainstream images of China. While
Samsung sponsored torchbearers from many countries,
the prevailing impact of the democratic vision of the
2012 London Olympics upon China was remarkable.
Such a special ‘China effect’ resulted primarily from the
eagerness and creativity of internet users, who embraced
transnationalism within their own construction of Chinese
identity via the generative power of social media.
This movement has further transformed ‘Chinese nation-
alism’ by the indigenization of foreign symbols, blurring
the symbolic boundaries between ‘Chinese’ and ‘for-
eigners’ in particular, and those between ‘us’ and ‘them’
in general. Most dramatically, Chinese internet users crea-
tively enshrined the physical torch of the London Olympics
as a mascot and enthusiastically indigenized it as a symbol
of ‘positive energy’ and good fortune.15 Acclaimed as ‘a
marvellous spectacular in the history of the Olympics’,
5,000 pricey replicas of that torch were quickly snapped-
up, mostly to be given away to friends and loved ones in
order to uplift their ‘positive energy.’ One internet user
commented that, after queuing for an entire week, he/she
finally obtained the much sought after object to give to a
friend who had been going through extremely tough times,
because it was ‘the most inspiring and encouraging gift
possible’. After all, ‘the theme of this Olympics happened
to be “inspiring a generation” and the Olympic torch had
become a symbol of “positive energy” on the internet’.
To a certain extent, the undercurrents of this grass-
roots movement tend to prefer the transnational over the
national, as manifested in the development of folk theories
of ‘positive energy’ after the Olympics. On rare occasions,
positive ‘energy’ (nengliang) was identified with positive
qi, a traditional Chinese conception of physical, mental,
moral, and cosmic energy which has been popularized in
the West through the qigong movement in China since the
1980s (Chen 2003; Palmer 2007).16 In contrast, Chinese
folk theories generally attribute the foundation of ‘posi-
tive energy’ to positive psychology, which emphasizes the
inner potential and strength available to each individual,
having positive attitudes which enable them to thrive
amidst adversity and bring positive change to the world
around them. Specifically, Rip it up: The simple idea that
changes everything (Wiseman 2012), a popular book on
psychology, was innovatively translated into Chinese as
Positive energy, and advertised as the world-class master
scholarship on the subject (Baidu).17
Transnational engagement in this movement reached
a new height eight months later, when the Hollywood
movie Iron Man 3 was released in China through TCL
Corporation, a Chinese multinational electronics com-
pany.18 Entitled ‘You are my hero’, a website created
by TCL in April 2013 aimed to provide an ‘interactive
platform to spread “positive energy”’ by inviting Chinese
internet users to recommend grassroots (moral) heroes
around them. Promoting the movie by connecting its
superhero with the ‘positive energy’ of Chinese grass-
roots, the pictures of some of the caogen individuals
were posted side-by-side with the image of Iron Man on
billboard advertisements placed in bus stations and other
public places. Many grassroots heroes (pinmin yingxiong)
‘played the leading role’ at the premiere ceremony held
in Beijing on 2 May 2013. By placing grassroots at the
centre of such a privileged and spectacular social space
normally dominated by movie superstars, this marked
an unprecedented step in the globalized film industry
of China. Similar to the popularity of the 2012 London
Olympic torch, the connection between Chinese grass-
roots heroes and the Hollywood figure, Iron Man, also
signified the immersion of the pride of Chinese identity
within the globalized and transnational space of China.

Fig. 5. Chenbing Mao, the
‘panda-blood girl’, at the
Olympics torch relay.
Fig. 6. Number of Sina
microblogs containing
‘positive energy’ between
1/1/2010 and 31/12/2013.
Wang, Z. 2008. National
humiliation, history
education, and the
political memory: Patriotic
education campaign in
China. International
Studies Quarterly 52(4):
783-806.
Wiseman, R. 2012. Rip it
up: The simple idea that
changes everything.
MacMillan.
Yan, Y. 2011. The changing
moral landscape. In
Kleinman, A. et al.(eds).
Deep China: The moral
life of the person, 36-77.
Berkeley: University of
California Press.
Yang, G. 2009. The power
of the internet in China:
Citizen activism online.
New York, NY: Columbia
University Press.
Zhao, S. 1998. A state-led
nationalism: The Patriotic
Education Campaign in
post Tiananmen China.
Communist and Post-
Communist Studies 31(3):
287-302.
Zhou, Y. 2006. Historicizing
online politics: Telegraphy,
the internet, and political
participation in China.
Stanford: Stanford
University Press.
8 ANTHROPOLOGY TODAY VOL 30 NO 1, FEBRUARY 2014
HAN WANG
JIENI LI
In the ‘positive energy’ movement, universalism goes
hand in hand with transnationalism. By promoting a de-
politicized ideal of moral universalism, ‘positive energy’
further transcends conventional nationalism, which cen-
tres on the geopolitical and cultural divisions between
groups. While hailing the grassroots torchbearers as indi-
viduals representing the pride of China, Chinese internet
users focused on the universalistic values they embodied:
‘They are embracing/embodying by their actions the big
love of humanity (renjian da ai), and annotating with their
own exemplary behavior the value of truth (zhen), kind-
ness (shan), and beauty (mei) in life. The value of posi-
tive energy emanating from these torch bearers bestows
positive energy upon the entire society, pressing for
social morals to move in a positive and healthy direc-
tion’.19 Notably, moral universalism tends to outweigh
‘Chineseness’. Corresponding to the marginalization
of the Chinese concept qi, discussions concerning the
moral ideals of ‘positive energy’ have also downplayed
their association with Chinese religious philanthropy
(Jankowiak 2004; Laliberté et al. 2011), which promotes
similar ideals of humanistic love and caring.
A strong emphasis on moral universalisms in the ‘posi-
tive energy’ movement sharply distinguishes itself from
populism, which tends to intertwine radical nationalism
with grassroots resentment against the elite. From its
inception, this online movement tended to bridge the gap
between the grassroots and the elite, rather than polar-
izing and politicizing their divisions. In fact, one of the
earliest ‘positive energy’ messages actually called for
online support of the two (ethnic) Chinese torchbearers
chosen by their local communities back in the UK:
‘Ignite positive energy so that more elite (jingying) with
positive energy can emerge around us. [This is] more
for every single one of us than for them (elite)! Pass on
the message to show your support!’20 After the London
Olympics, many TV reality shows drew large audiences
by facilitating and dramatizing the collaborative synergy
between the grassroots and the elite in programmes pro-
moting ‘positive energy’ via entertainment, public wel-
fare, or environmental protection.
Notably, the moral universalism in this movement is
embedded in what I call ‘hybrid cosmo-psychology’, in
which the ‘scientific’ appeal of positive psychology is
mixed with that of new age spirituality, traditional Chinese
religions, and Christianity. In the overwhelming rhetoric of
moral decay in an age of steep profits and shallow relation-
ships amidst radical social change (Yan 2011), the ‘posi-
tive energy’ movement offers many Chinese a symbolic
space for healing, re-connectedness, refreshment, and
empowerment. According to Baidu, China’s Wikipedia,
‘At this point, the Chinese people label as “positive
energy” any individuals or events that are positive, exu-
berant, inspiring, empowering, and hopeful. It has become
… a remarkably meaningful symbol, deeply attached to
our emotions, serving to express our yearnings and hopes’.
As it has emerged in the larger social context of
increasing protests against corruption and injustice, the
‘positive energy’ movement offers a moral and psycho-
cosmic perspective to the almost exclusive focus on polit-
ical economy in the ongoing debate over the multi-layered
crises of rapidly-changing China. Without any coherent
ideology and political agenda, the grassroots rhetoric of
‘positive energy’ tends to reject violence in interpersonal,
domestic, and international interactions. Accordingly,
such pacifist voices are often ignored by both the liberals
and the Maoists in their fierce online battles. The number
of microblog messages concerning ‘positive energy’
dropped startlingly during the summer of 2013, when ‘the
energy of violence and sickness’ (liqi) in both the social
media and in real life struck China with shock (see Fig. 6).
Nevertheless, the societal significance of cultivating ‘posi-
tive energy’ continues to increase as the popularity of this
internet meme serves as a weather vane indicating Chinese
public sentiment towards the rapid transformation of
morality and interpersonal connectedness in the country.
Concluding remarks
The online movement to ‘ignite positive energy’ in China
emerged from the massive and fervent support for the
Chinese grassroots torchbearers during the 2012 London
Olympics. By expanding and transforming the Chinese
category of ‘grassroots’ (caogen), the active and pow-
erful participation of Chinese internet users provided an
alternative model for making national images of China.
This grassroots-oriented movement has generated a ‘tran-
scendental Chinese patriotism’, in which patriotism is
intertwined with individualism, transnationalism, and uni-
versalism. The ideal and sentiment of this hybrid Chinese
patriotism stands in stark contrast to mainstream ‘Chinese
nationalism’, which has been characterized by scholars as
various forms of reactive collectivism derived from state
authority, Confucian tradition, and the wounded memories
of China’s recent history.
Beyond transforming Chinese nationalism, the grassroots
movement of ‘igniting positive energy’ has also been effec-
tive in shaping the socio-political landscape of China. Being
identified with cosmo-psychological moralities that can
bring about constructive transformation to both individuals
and to the society as a whole, ‘positive energy’ offers a dis-
course of hope to many ordinary Chinese citizens frustrated
by the myriad of societal and environmental crises encoun-
tered in China today. Echoing the search of the post-socialist
state for solutions to its mounting predicaments, the emer-
gent social categories of ‘positive energy’ and ‘grassroots’
have been incorporated into mainstream media and into the
Chinese government as well. The socio-political potential of
internet technology (Zhou 2006; Yang 2009), the influence
and flexibility of the Chinese state (Ong & Zhang 2008),
and the diversity among Chinese internet users, manifested
in the ‘positive energy’ movement, constitute significant
subjects worthy of further investigation. l