6.

Liao v CA, GR 102961-62

PARDO, J.:

Petitioner Jesus P. Liao seeks to annul the decisions of the Court of Appeals 1 which annulled an order of the Regional Trial
Court,2 Quezon City, Branch 99 directing the Register of Deeds to issue transfer titles to Estrella Mapa over certain lots in Piedad
Estate, Quezon City.3

The cases before us involve the issuance to different persons of several torrens titles covering the same property.

The facts may be summarized as follows:

On March 5, 1986, Estrella Mapa filed with the Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 99 a petition for reconstitution
of documents and issuance of certificates of title over certain parcels of land covered by OCT 614, Decree No. 6667,
GLRO Rec. No. 5975.4

Estrella Maps claimed that on June 16, 1913, the Director of Lands issued certificates of sales 5 to Vicente Salgado over
the parcels of land covered by OCT 614, Decree No. 6667, GLRO Rec. No. 5975 in accordance with Act. No. 1120,
otherwise known as the Friar Lands Act. The sale involves four (4) parcels of land (Lot Nos. 755, 777, 778 and 783)
located at Bgy. Payatas, Quezon City. Lot No. 755 has an area of 3.691 hectares, Lot No. 777 has 25.0155 hectares, Lot
No. 778 has 24.5091 hectares, and Lot No. 783 has 25.0363 hectares. The four lots form part of the Piedad Estate. 6

On April 12, 1930, Vicente Salgado assigned the property to Estrella Mapa.

After hearing, on June 30, 1986, the trial court issued an order which provides:

WHEREFORE, finding the Assignment of Sales Certificate Nos. 781 and 783 covering lots 778 and 777 respectively, to
be genuine, valid and registrable titles, and the existence of approved technical descriptions of said lots, the Court
hereby orders the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City, after payment of the required fees therefore, to issue a transfer
Certificate of Title in the name of petitioner Estrella Mapa for Lot No. 778 as per technical description approved and
certified by, and on file with the Bureau of Lands, and as earlier ordered reconstituted in the Office of the Land
Registration Commission; and portions of Lot 777 as per amendedtechnical description submitted by petitioner and
based on duly-approved technical description on file with the Bureau of Lands.

SO ORDERED.

Quezon City, Philippines, June 30, 1986.

GODOFREDO Q. ASUNCION
J u d g e7

Pursuant to this order, the Register of Deeds of Quezon City issued T.C.T. No. 348156 dated August 5, 1986 covering Lot No.
778 and a portion of Lot No. 777. On August 12, 1986, the Register of Deeds cancelled this title and issued T.C.T. No. 348291
and T.C.T. No. 348292 covering Lot No. 778 and a portion of Lot No. 777 respectively.8

Unfortunately, the above titles were in conflict with several existing certificates of title, resulting in the filing of several actions with
the Regional Trial Court, Quezon City for quieting, and an investigation into the matter by the National Bureau of
Investigation.9 Meantime, Estrella Mapa assigned the parcels of land covered by T.C.T. No. 348291 and T.C.T. No. 348292 in
favor of Palmera Agricultural Realty Development Corporation, which is a family corporation headed by Lourdes Angeles, Estrella
Mapa's daughter.

Re: G.R. Nos. 102961-62

On March 28, 1990, I.C. Cruz Construction, Inc. (ICC) filed with the Court of Appeals 10 a petition for the annulment of the Order
dated June 30, 1986 of the Regional Trial Court, Quezon City. 11 I.C. Cruz alleged that the title issued by the Register of Deeds of
Quezon City pursuant to said order encompassed property which had been registered and titled in its name under TCT No.
836975.

On July 3, 1990, Arle Realty Development Corporation (hereafter Arle) filed a similar petition with the Court of Appeals 12 praying
for the annulment of the same order of the Regional Trial Court. Arle, claimed ownership of six (6) lots covered by TCT No.
263984 to 263989, which had overlapped TCT No. 348292 covering Lot No. 777.

After consolidation of the two cases, the Court of Appeals set the cases for preliminary conference on March 21, 1991. At this
conference, Jesus P. Liao appeared with his counsel and claimed that he purchased the parcels of land from Palmera by virtue
of a Deed of Omnibus Assignment dated August 23, 1990.

On August 29, 1991, the Court of Appeals rendered decision as follows:

 WHEREFORE, the Order dated June 30, 1986 of the respondent Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (Br. 99) in LRC
Case No. Q-3369 (86) is declared null and void. Consequently, the Register of Deeds of Quezon City is ordered to
cancel T.C.T. No. 348156, T.C.T. No. 348291 and T.C.T No. 348292 of the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City, all of
which were issued pursuant to the aforesaid Order, as well as all the subsequent titles derived therefrom.

SO ORDERED.

SALOME A. MONTOYA
Associate justice

WE CONCUR:

FIDEL P. PURISIMA BONIFACIO CACDAC, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice13

By resolution issued on November 28, 1991, the Court of Appeals denied Jesus Liao's motion for reconsideration. 14

On January 17, 1992, petitioner filed the present recourse. 15

Re: G.R. No. 107625

On February 17, 1988, respondents Susan A. Foronda, Iluminada R. Dionisio, Azucena Q. Pua, and Lucia Pua Liok Bin filed with
the Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 85 a complaint 16 for "Annulment of Title, Reconveyance of Property, Damages and
Injunction with Restraining Order" against Estrella Mapa, Lourdes Angeles, Serafin B. Riosa, Ernie M. Palmos, Palmera
Agricultural Realty Corporation and Maristel Y. Angeles, involving lots titled in the names of the complainants but also covered by
TCT No. 348292 (Lot No. 777).

Respondents alleged that Lot 777 ceased to be part of Friar Land as early as May 1922 when the Director of Lands executed
Deed of Sale No. 10570 conveying ownership of Lot 777 to one Carlos Sarmiento, not to Vicente Salgado. The lot could not have
been validly assigned to defendant Estrella Mapa on April 12, 1930 by Vicente Salgado, who was not the rightful owner of the
property. TCT 348292 was procured only in 1986 while the titles of plaintiffs were issued in 1967 and one was issued in 1958.

Sometime in October 1986, respondents went to the Office of the City Assessor of Quezon City in response to a letter of the City
Assessor informing them that Estrella Mapa was applying for the issuance of tax clearance for Lot 777 covering respondents'
property. The basis of the application was TCT No. 348292 of the Registry of Deeds for Quezon City dated August 12, 1986. The
title contained an encumbrance, which stated that the title was under investigation by the Verification Committee of the Land
Registration Commission (LRC), later known as National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration (NALTDRA). 17

On November 4, 1987, the Verification Committee submitted a report stating that TCT No. 348292 was fraudulently and
irregularly issued, being a duplication of previously issued titles and recommending the filing of an action for the annulment of
TCT Nos. 348156, 348291 and 348292 all in the name of Estrella Mapa.1âwphi1.nêt

The committee recommended that:

1. A complaint be filed in court through the Office of the Solicitor General for the annulment of TCT Nos. 348156, 348291
and 348292 all in the name of ESTRELLA MAPA, for having been fraudulently and/or illegally issued they being a
duplication of several previously issued regular titles;

2. The matter be endorsed to the National Bureau of Investigation to pinpoint the person or persons responsible therefor,
for possible criminal and/or administrative prosecution;

3. To conduct fact finding investigation relative to the issuance of said Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 348156, 348291
and 348292, by the Register of Deeds of Quezon City, notwithstanding the existence of other titles covering the same
lots, for possible administrative prosecution;

4. The Register of Deeds of Quezon City, be informed of these findings for his information and guidance; and

5. The return of the original copies of TCT Nos. 348291 and 348292 to the Register of Deeds of Quezon City, after filing
of the complaint of annulment and annotation of the notice of lis pendens thereof.

Respectfully submitted:

THE VERIFICATION COMMITTEE

By:

EDILBERTO R. FELICIANO
Chairman18

On May 25, 1988, NBI agent Samuel B. Ong submitted a report recommending the prosecution of Estrella Mapa and Lourdes
Angeles for violation of Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code.
On April 22, 1988, Azucena O. Pua and Lucia Pua Liok Bin filed with the Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 85 a motion
for intervention and a complaint in intervention, alleging that they had a legal interest in the property in litigation inasmuch as they
acquired a portion of the lot from Purita Mapua, who in turn acquired it from plaintiff Iluminada Dionisio and that they were
presently owners of the property under TCT 254620.

On July 24, 1990, the trial court rendered decision ruling, citing de Vila vs. Trinidad, 22 SCRA 1167, 1174 [1968], that "where two
certificates of title are issued to different persons covering the same land in whole or in part, the earlier in date must prevail as
between the original parties and in case of successive registrations where more than one certificate is issued over the land, the
person holding under prior certificate is entitled to the land as against the persons who rely on the second certificate." The
dispositive portion of the decision reads:

Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1. Declaring null and void, and ordering the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to cancel TCT No. 348292 in the
name of Estrella Mapa, as well as TCT No. 373356 and all titles emanating from TCT No. 348292.

2. Ordering defendants to reconvey to plaintiff Susan A. Foronda her parcel of land under TCT No. 363045; and
to plaintiff Iluminada R. Dionisio, her parcel of land under TCT Nos. 44738, 117939, 117940, 117941 and
117943;

3. Ordering defendants to refrain and desist from advertising and selling any of the lots within the property of
herein plaintiffs and from building and constructing roads and other structures thereon;

4. Ordering defendants to pay plaintiffs and plaintiffs-intervenors, jointly and severally, the sum of P 20,000 as
attorney's fees;

5. Dismissing the counterclaim and crossclaim, with costs against defendants.

SO ORDERED.

Quezon City, Philippines, July 24, 1990.

BERNARDO P. ABESAMIS
J u d g e19

On appeal by petitioner to the Court of Appeals, on October 23, 1992, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal on two
grounds. First, the decision of the trial court which authorized the issuance to Estrella Mapa of TCT No. 348292 had lost its force
when the Court of Appeals declared it null and void in its decision promulgated on August 29, 1991 20 Second, the July 24, 1990
decision of the trial court was a valid decision, which the Court of Appeals found no reason to disturb. 21

On December 16, 1992, Jesus P. Liao filed this petition.

Re: G.R. No. 108759

Following the same facts above where the Register of Deeds, Quezon City issued TCT No. 348292 in the name of Estrella Mapa,
the third case developed as follows:

On February 9, 1988, Edmund Ruiz, Romeo Gomez, and Rosalinda Villapa filed with the Regional Trial Court, Quezon City,
Branch 105 a complaint for annulment of title, reconveyance of real property, damages, and injunction against Estrella Mapa,
Lourdes Angeles, Serafin Riosa and Ernie Palmos.22

On September 22, 1989, the trial court rendered decision against the defendants therein. The dispositive portion reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered:

1. Declaring Transfer Certificate of Title No. 191487 in the name of plaintiff Edmond M. Ruiz covering Lot 777-B-
7-B-4, Transfer Certificate No. 27265 in the name of plaintiff Romeo Gomez covering Lot 777-B-23, and Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 238282 covering Lot 777-B-5-A in the name of plaintiff Rosalinda N. Villapa, all valid and
to be given full force and effect;

2. Declaring defendant Estrella Mapa's Transfer Certificate of Title No. 348292 as null and void in so far as the
Lot 777 which it covers overlaps the aforementioned lots of plaintiffs;

3. Making permanent the writ of preliminary injunction issued and ordering all the defendants to pay costs;

4. Ordering defendants Estrella Mapa and Lourdes Angeles jointly and severally to pay three the three plaintiffs
Edmond M. Ruiz, Romeo Gomez, and Rosalinda Villapa, P10,000.00 each, as moral damages; P5,000.00 each,
as exemplary damages; and P10,000.00 each, as and by way of attorney's fees.

As recommended by the Verification Committee of the new Land Registration Authority, and considering numerous other
titles and lot owners affected by the issuance of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 348292 of Estrella Mapa, the Office of
 the Solicitor general is hereby directed (if other private parties have not yet done so) to file action to annul said TCT No.
348292.

Likewise, the Land Registration Authority is hereby directed to immediately communicate with the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board for the purpose of investigating the Riosa City Subdivision owned and/or operated by defendants
Serafin B. Riosa and Ernie B. Palmos, the owners-developers of Lot 777 with the view of cancelling whatever authority or
permit granted by said HLURB to sell and/or offer to sell subdivision lots of said subdivision which are within TCT
348292, TCT 348291, and TCT 348156, all in the names of defendant Estrella Mapa, this for the protection of lot buyers.

SO ORDERED.

Quezon City, Metro Manila, this 22nd day of September, 1989.

(Sgd.) TOMAS V. TADEO, JR.

Judge23

On July 13, 1992, petitioner Jesus P. Liao, as successor-in-interest of Palmera Agricultural Realty Development, which was in
turn the successor-in-interest of Estrella Mapa to lot 778 and a portion of lot 777, Piedad Estate, filed a petition for annulment of
judgment with the Court of Appeals.24

On February 4, 1993, the Court of Appeals rendered decision denying due course to the petition, thus:

Nevertheless, let it be stated that it is within the prerogative and in the exercise of its judicial discretion pursuant to
Section 1, Rule 18 of the Revised Rules of Court for respondent court to declare defendant as in default for their failure
to appear during the pre-trial. Likewise, it is within the judicial discretion of respondent court to base its decision on the
report and recommendation of the Verification Committee. The fact that defendants were not able to cross-examine the
members of the committee is a natural and legal consequence of defendants having been declared as in default.

WHEREFORE, finding herein petition for annulment of judgment not to be sufficient in substance, We hereby DENY
DUE COURSE to said petition which is accordingly dismissed pursuant to section 1(c), Rule 6 of the Revised Internal
Rules of the Court of Appeals.

SO ORDERED.25

Hence, this petition.26

The Issue

The basic issue in these consolidated cases is whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in upholding the annulment of the order
of the trial court in LRC Case No. 3369 (86) authorizing issuance of titles on the basis of sales certificates and technical
descriptions as reconstituted by the Land Registration Commission.

We deny the petitions.

The subject lots are part of the Piedad Estate, Quezon City, a Friar Land acquired by the Philippine Government from the
Philippine Sugar Estates Development Company, Ltd., La Sociedad Agricola de Ultramar, the British-Manila Estate Company,
Ltd., and the Recoleto Order of the Philippine Islands on December 23, 1903, as indicated in Public Act No. 1120 (Friar Lands
Act) enacted on April 26, 1904.27 The Piedad Estate has been titled in the name of the Government under Original Certificate of
Tittle No. 614.

By virtue of Act No. 1120, the Piedad Estate was placed under the administration of the Director of Lands.

a. Petitioner not owner of land

Petitioner Liao claims that his predecessor in interest acquired the property through sale certificates Nos. 780, 781, 783, issued
by the Director of Lands is 1913. It is shown, however, that the sale certificates were signed by the Director of Lands and
approved by the Secretary of the Interior. These sales were void. This is because the sales were not approved by the Secretary
of Agriculture and Natural Resources. In Solid State Multi-Products Corp. vs. Court of Appeals,28 we said that approval by the
Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce is indispensable for the validity of the sale of friar lands. In the absence of such approval,
the sales were void.29 In view of the invalidity of the sales, there can be no valid titles issued on the basis of such sales.

In any event, the certificates of sale,30 assuming their validity, became stale after ten (10) years from its issuance. 31They can not
be the source documents for issuance of title more than seventy (70) years later.32

The rule entrenched on public policy denies relief to a claimant whose right has become "stale" by reason of negligence or
inattention for a long period of time.33 In these cases, Estrella Mapa's inaction for a period of about fifty-six (56) years, counted
from the time of the sale to her in 1930 up to the filing of the petition for the issuance of title in 1986, bars petitioner from
whatever rights he could have acquired thereunder. If petitioner's predecessor was indeed the owner, she should have taken
steps to have the land properly titled long ago.
 b. Double Sale

These cases involve a classic issue of double sale.

Faced with a situation where both parties claim to have acquired the subject property, the law provides that as between two
purchasers, the one who registered the sale in his favor has a preferred right over the other who has not registered his title, even
if the latter is in actual possession of the immovable property.34

We have consistently ruled that "when two certificates of title are issued to different persons covering the same land in whole or
in part, the earlier in date must prevail, and, in case of successive registrations where more than one certificate is issued over the
same land, the person holding a prior certificate is entitled to the land as against a person who relies on a subsequent
certificate."35 A certificate is not conclusive evidence of title if the same land had been registered and an earlier certificate for the
same is in existence.36

c. Title not tantamount to ownership

Consequently, private respondents' title must be respected. They have in their favor the law that protects holders of title under
the torrens system of land registration.37 Although title does not vest ownership, time and again we have ruled that a torrens
certificate is evidence of an indefeasible title to property in favor of the person whose name appears thereon.38 Thus, the Court of
Appeals correctly annulled the trial court's order allowing registration of the subject property in the name of Estrella Mapa and her
successors in interest.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED, for lack of merit. The decisions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 20381
& 22098 promulgated on August 29, 1991, CA-G.R. SP No. 28422 promulgated on October 23, 1992, and CA-G.R SP No. 28368
promulgated on February 4, 1993 are AFFIRMED.1âwphi1.nêt

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

7. Dela Torre v CA, GR 113095

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This a petition for review of the December 27, 1991 Decision of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 27891, [1] which
affirmed the April 27, 1990 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 18, in Civil Case No. 978. [2]

The case involves a twenty thousand five hundred thirty-nine (20,539) square meter parcel of land located in Angat, Bulacan,
identified as Land Lot 5483. The said land formed part of a tract of friar land titled in the name of the government under Original
Certificate of Title No. 798. By virtue of Sales Contract No. 6081, dated June 13, 1938, Mamerto dela Torre bought the subject
land from the Bureau of Lands for the sum of One Hundred Ten Pesos (P110.00) payable in ten (10) annual installments.[3] The
first installment of Eleven Pesos (P11.00) was paid on the same date under O.R. No. 744721, leaving a balance of Ninety Nine
Pesos (P99.00) payable in nine (9) installments every May 1 of each year. Mamerto then occupied the subject land until his
death on November 15, 1946. His wife, Maxima, died the following year, on August 19, 1947.

Mamerto left behind three children, petitioners Emilio, Eliseo and Patricio. The latter were asked by their uncle, respondent
Isabelo dela Torre, sometime in February 1972, to sign a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition with Absolute Sale in his favor. The
three, however, did not sign the deed and instead, on October 27, 1975, sold the same to petitioner Martin Pantaleon, [4] the
owner of a piggery farm in the adjoining land.

Meanwhile, on June 6, 1978, respondent Isabelo Dela Torre obtained from the Director of Lands a Deed of Conveyance
executed in his favor covering the subject property, on the strength of a Joint Affidavit, dated October 13, 1948, executed by his
father, Feliciano, and then minor nephew, petitioner Emilio dela Torre, certifying that he bought the subject parcel of land from
Mamerto for Four Hundred Pesos (P400.00).[5] According to respondent Isabelo dela Torre, Mamerto approached him and
offered him half of the land if he could pay the annual amortization thereof starting 1942. When Mamerto died, he shouldered the
latters burial and funeral expenses in exchange for which the remaining half portion of the subject land was ceded to him. He
paid the tax payments of the said land for 1972 and 1978. On November 8, 1978, Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-250534,
covering the subject property, was issued in the name of respondent Isabelo dela Torre and his spouse, Librada, by the Register
of Deeds of Bulacan. Misoedp

After discovering the existence of said title, petitioner Martin Pantaleon filed an adverse claim for annotation on the title on March
26, 1979.[6] Thereafter, he filed a Complaint for Annulment of Title, Reconveyance and Damages with the Regional Trial Court of
Bulacan[7] on April 4, 1979, as a result of which a Notice of Lis Pendens was annotated by the Register of Deeds of Bulacan on
TCT No. T-250534 on April 6, 1979.[8]
Despite the existence of said Notice of Lis Pendens, respondent Isabelo dela Torre was able to sell the subject land for Fifty Five
Thousand Pesos (P55,000.00) to respondents Emilio Andres and spouse Lydia Clark, Arsenio Aurelio and spouse Felicidad
Andres, Gonzalo Maalac and spouse Marina Andres and Norberto Andres and spouse Erlinda de Guzman, on May 25, 1979;
[9]
 leading to the issuance of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-257086 in the name of respondent Emilio Andres and company. [10]

On April 27, 1990, the lower court rendered its Decision dismissing the Complaint of petitioners and confirming the validity of the
grant by the government to respondent Isabelo dela Torre. On appeal to respondent Court of Appeals, the said Decision was
affirmed.

With the denial of petitioners Motion for Reconsideration, the instant Petition was filed, raising the following Assignment of Errors

"- I -

THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT MAMERTO DELA TORRES BENEFICIAL AND
EQUITABLE TITLE HAD NOT RIPENED INTO FULL AND VALID TITLE OVER THE PARCEL OF FRIAR LAND
HE BOUGHT FROM THE GOVERNMENT EVEN IF THE WHOLE PURCHASE PRICE THEREOF HAD BEEN
FULLY PAID, SIMPLY BECAUSE NO FINAL DEED OF CONVEYANCE WAS YET EFFECTED IN HIS FAVOR
BEFORE HIS DEATH, CONTRARY TO THE PROVISIONS OF ACT NO. 1120, AS AMENDED, AND THE
RULING IN PUGEDA VS. TRIAS AND OTHER CASES.

- II -

THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE ALLEGED ORAL SALE OF THE SUBJECT
LAND TO ISABELO DELA TORRE BASED ONLY ON HIS NAKED CLAIM AND JOINT AFFIDAVIT OF
DECEASED AFFIANTS, IN VIOLATION OF THE STATUTE OF FRAUD AND BELIED BY OVERWHELMING
EVIDENCE. Edpmis

- III -

THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE FRIAR LAND IN QUESTION ALREADY
SOLD TO MAMERTO DELA TORRE WAS VALIDLY APPLIED FOR AND AWARDED TO ISABELO DELA
TORRE, AND THAT IT WAS SUBJECT TO ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS AND DETERMINATION. [11]

Re: The First Assigned Error

While respondent Court noted that full payment on the sales contract was made in 1944, it held that Mamerto took possession of
the subject land only until 1943, when he fell ill; such that when full payment was made in 1944, Mamerto was no longer a "settler
and occupant" thereof as required for purposes of conveyance under Section 12 of Act No. 1120.

Petitioners argue that there is nothing in Act No. 1120 which requires that the purchaser be an actual occupant of the subject
land at the time of full payment. Instead, referring to Section 7 thereof, they insist that what is required is that the purchaser be
a bona fide settler or occupant at the time of the sale or lease.

We agree with petitioners.

A careful review of Act No. 1120 fails to yield any provision requiring the applicant/purchaser to be an actual occupant of the
subject land at the time of the payment of the full purchase price thereon.

On the other hand, the non-payment of the full purchase price is the only recognized resolutory condition in the case of sale of
friar lands. Indeed, it has been held that the conveyance executed in favor of a buyer or purchaser, or the so-called certificate of
sale, is a conveyance of the ownership of the property, subject only to the resolutory condition that the sale may be cancelled if
the price agreed upon is not paid in full.[12]

That actual occupancy of the subject land is not required in the case of friar lands is further underscored in Pugeda vs. Trias,
supra, where a distinction was made between the sale of friar lands and the sale of public lands under the Public Lands Act, to
wit --

"We also invite attention to the fact that a sale of friar lands is entirely different from a sale of public lands under
the provisions of the Public Land Act. In the case of public lands, a person who desires to acquire must first
apply for the parcel of land desired. Thereafter, the land is opened for bidding. If the land is awarded to an
applicant or to a qualified bidder the successful bidder is given a right of entry to occupy the land and cultivate
and improve it (Secs. 22-29, Commonwealth Act 141). It is only after satisfying the requirements of cultivation
and improvement of 1/5 of the land that the applicant is given a sales patent (Sec. 30). Jjsc

In the case of friar lands the purchaser becomes the owner upon issuance of the certificate of sale in his favor,
subject only to cancellation thereof in case the price agreed upon is not paid. x x x."

Thus, while in cases of sale under the Public Land Act, cultivation and improvement of the land is a requirement before a sales
patent may issue to the applicant, no such similar requirement is found in the case of sale of friar lands. Again, it was reiterated
that such sale is "subject only to cancellation (thereof) in case the price agreed upon is not paid."
Petitioners next question respondent Courts ruling that even if Mamerto was still a bona fide settler and occupant thereof, no final
conveyance had been effected in his favor by the government and that without such, his equitable title could not have ripened
into a full and valid title over the lot.

Again, we agree with petitioners. On this point, Bacalzo vs. Pacada,[13] is instructive --

"Petitioners contention is that their deceased father Carmiano Bacalzo became the actual owner of the lot in
question upon full payment during his lifetime of the purchase price thereof, and as his legal heirs, they
succeeded him in the ownership of said lot. We find merit in the contention. It is not disputed that the original
purchase price of P200.00 for the lot in question was fully paid on June 17, 1947, with a payment of shortage of
interest on August 12, 1948, or before the death of the purchaser Carmiano Bacalzo on November 5, 1948. All
the requirements of the law for the purchase of the lot having been complied with by said Carmiano Bacalzo on
August 12, 1948, the Government on that date was legally bound to issue to him "the proper instrument of
conveyance" by reason of section 12 of the Friar Lands Act, providing that Scjj

* * * Upon the payment of the final installment together with all accrued interest the Government
will convey to such settler and occupant the said land so held by him the proper instrument of
conveyance in the manner provided in section 122 of the Land Registration Act. * * *.

The fact that the Government failed to do so cannot, in our opinion, preclude the now deceased purchaser from
acquiring during his lifetime ownership over the lot in question. It is not the issuance of the deed of conveyance
that vests ownership in the purchaser under the Friar Lands Act. Thus, in the case of Director of Lands, et al. vs.
Rizal, et al., 87 Phil. 806, this Court speaking through Justice Montemayor, said that in the sale of friar lands
under Act No. 1120, the purchaser, even before the payment of the full payment price and before the execution
of the final deed of conveyance, is considered by law as the actual owner of the lot purchased under the
obligation to pay in full the purchase price, the role or position of the Government being that of a mere lien holder
or mortgagee."

This is well-supported in jurisprudence, which has consistently held that under Act No. 1120, the equitable and beneficial title to
the land passes to the purchaser the moment the first installment is paid and a certificate of sale is issued. [14] Furthermore, when
the purchaser finally pays the final installment on the purchase price and is given a deed of conveyance and a certificate of title,
the title, at least in equity, retroacts to the time he first occupied the land, paid the first installment and was issued the
corresponding certificate of sale.[15]

All told, notwithstanding the failure of the government to issue the proper instrument of conveyance in favor of Mamerto or his
heirs, the latter still acquired ownership over the subject land.

We now come to the rights of Mamertos children to the subject land. The pertinent provision covering the status of the purchased
friar land upon the death of the applicant or purchaser is Section 16 of Act 1120, as amended by Act 2945, which took effect
on February 16, 1921. As amended, Section 16 provides as follows Sjcj

"In the event of death of a holder of a certificate the issuance of which is provided for in section twelve hereof,
prior to the execution of a deed by the Government to any purchaser, the interest of the holder of the certificate
shall descend and deed shall issue to the persons who under the laws of the Philippine Islands would have taken
had the title been perfected before the death of the holder of the certificate, upon proof of compliance with all the
requirements of the certificate "

The said provision being applicable at the time of the death of Mamerto in 1946, his interest descended to his heirs. [16] And with
the death of his wife Maxima in 1947, such interest was left solely to his three sons.

Re: The Second Assigned Error

Notwithstanding our findings that Mamertos heirs rightfully owned the subject land and despite the governments failure to issue
the corresponding instrument of conveyance in their favor, we shall nevertheless discuss the validity of the alleged oral sale of
the subject property to respondent Isabelo dela Torre.

Respondent Isabelo dela Torre claims that he obtained the property from Mamerto by (1) paying the amortizations thereon and
by (2) purchase. However, there is absolutely no written proof of said sale or assignment. In claiming title to the subject land,
respondent Isabelo dela Torre merely presented a Joint Affidavit allegedly executed by his father and nephew. This runs counter
to the basic rule of evidence that unless the affiants themselves are placed on the witness stand to testify on their affidavits, such
affidavits must be rejected for being hearsay.[17] Stated differently, the declarants of written statements pertaining to disputed
facts must be presented at the trial for cross-examination. Without the presentation of the affiants in court, whatever matter the
Joint Affidavit contained is hearsay and consequently, without probative value. [18]

The Joint Affidavit, which was the sole basis for respondent Isabelo dela Torres claim over the subject land, cannot and should
not have been given credence, being hearsay.[19] Therefore, as between the verbal claim of respondent Isabelo dela Torre and
the documented claim of petitioners, the latter should clearly prevail.

Isabelos claim that he paid the annual amortizations to the Bureau of Land beginning 1942 and for six years thereafter, as
Mamerto could no longer pay the same, is doubtful. All receipts during that period were issued not in his name but in Mamertos
name,[20] raising the presumption that the payments were made by the latter. We agree with petitioners that, otherwise, the
receipts should have been issued in Isabelos name for the account of Mamerto. Moreover, Isabelo did not have any original copy
of the receipts, only photocopies of the same from the files of the Bureau of Lands. If indeed he had made the payments he
claims to have made, the receipts, at the very least, should have been in his possession. Supremeo

Re: The Third Assigned Error

Coming now to the last assigned error, we find that the grant made by the government of the subject property in favor of
respondent Isabelo dela Torre was invalid.

To begin with, granting that Mamerto did sell or transfer his interest in the subject land to respondent Isabelo dela Torre, it would
appear that the requirements under Act No. 1120 for a valid transfer of rights have not been complied with. Section 16 thereof
provides as follows

"x x x. In case the holder of the certificate shall have sold his interest in the land before having complied with all
the conditions thereof, the purchaser from the holder of the certificate shall be entitled to all the rights of the
holder of the certificate upon presenting his assignment to the Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands for
registration."

And in Arayata vs. Joya,[21] this Court warned that "in order that a transfer of the rights of a holder of a certificate of sale of friar
lands may be legally effective, it is necessary that a formal certificate of transfer be drawn up and submitted to the Chief of the
Bureau of Public Lands for his approval and registration; and that "the law authorizes no other way of transferring the rights of a
holder of a certificate of sale of friar lands."

In the case at bar, no such assignment or formal certificate of transfer was submitted to the Bureau of Public Lands for its
approval and registration.

In the light of our finding that the Joint Affidavit relied upon by respondent Isabelo dela Torre in support of his claim is hearsay
and has no probative value, the grant of title to him by the government is void.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition is GRANTED and the Decisions of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 27891 and the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 18, in Civil Case No. 978 are SET ASIDE.

Let new judgment issue (1) declaring petitioner Martin Pantaleon as the true owner of the land covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title No. T-257086; (2) canceling Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-257086 as well as the owners duplicate certificate; (3)
directing the Register of Deeds of Bulacan to issue a new certificate of title covering the subject land in the name of Martin
Pantaleon; (4) ordering respondent Isabelo dela Torre to return the amount of P55,000.00 paid by respondents Emilio Andres
and company as purchase price for the litigated property with 12% interest per annum from May 25, 1979 until fully paid, together
with costs of the action.

SO ORDERED.

8. Chavez v PEA, GR 133250 supra

9. Laurel v Garcia, GR 92013

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

These are two petitions for prohibition seeking to enjoin respondents, their representatives and agents from proceeding with the
bidding for the sale of the 3,179 square meters of land at 306 Roppongi, 5-Chome Minato-ku Tokyo, Japan scheduled on
February 21, 1990. We granted the prayer for a temporary restraining order effective February 20, 1990. One of the petitioners
(in G.R. No. 92047) likewise prays for a writ of mandamus to compel the respondents to fully disclose to the public the basis of
their decision to push through with the sale of the Roppongi property inspire of strong public opposition and to explain the
proceedings which effectively prevent the participation of Filipino citizens and entities in the bidding process.

The oral arguments in G.R. No. 92013, Laurel v. Garcia, et al. were heard by the Court on March 13, 1990. After G.R. No.
92047, Ojeda v. Secretary Macaraig, et al.  was filed, the respondents were required to file a comment by the Court's resolution
dated February 22, 1990. The two petitions were consolidated on March 27, 1990 when the memoranda of the parties in
the Laurel case were deliberated upon.

The Court could not act on these cases immediately because the respondents filed a motion for an extension of thirty (30) days
to file comment in G.R. No. 92047, followed by a second motion for an extension of another thirty (30) days which we granted on
May 8, 1990, a third motion for extension of time granted on May 24, 1990 and a fourth motion for extension of time which we
granted on June 5, 1990 but calling the attention of the respondents to the length of time the petitions have been pending. After
the comment was filed, the petitioner in G.R. No. 92047 asked for thirty (30) days to file a reply. We noted his motion and
resolved to decide the two (2) cases.
I

The subject property in this case is one of the four (4) properties in Japan acquired by the Philippine government under the
Reparations Agreement entered into with Japan on May 9, 1956, the other lots being:

(1) The Nampeidai Property at 11-24 Nampeidai-machi, Shibuya-ku, Tokyo which has an area of approximately 2,489.96 square
meters, and is at present the site of the Philippine Embassy Chancery;

(2) The Kobe Commercial Property at 63 Naniwa-cho, Kobe, with an area of around 764.72 square meters and categorized as a
commercial lot now being used as a warehouse and parking lot for the consulate staff; and

(3) The Kobe Residential Property at 1-980-2 Obanoyama-cho, Shinohara, Nada-ku, Kobe, a residential lot which is now vacant.

The properties and the capital goods and services procured from the Japanese government for national development projects
are part of the indemnification to the Filipino people for their losses in life and property and their suffering during World War II.

The Reparations Agreement provides that reparations valued at $550 million would be payable in twenty (20) years in
accordance with annual schedules of procurements to be fixed by the Philippine and Japanese governments (Article 2,
Reparations Agreement). Rep. Act No. 1789, the Reparations Law, prescribes the national policy on procurement and utilization
of reparations and development loans. The procurements are divided into those for use by the government sector  and those
for private parties in projects as the then National Economic Council shall determine. Those intended for the private sector shall
be made available by sale to Filipino citizens or to one hundred (100%) percent Filipino-owned entities in national development
projects.

The Roppongi property was acquired from the Japanese government under the Second Year Schedule and listed under the
heading "Government Sector", through Reparations Contract No. 300 dated June 27, 1958. The Roppongi property consists of
the land and building "for the Chancery of the Philippine Embassy" (Annex M-D to Memorandum for Petitioner, p. 503). As
intended, it became the site of the Philippine Embassy until the latter was transferred to Nampeidai on July 22, 1976 when the
Roppongi building needed major repairs. Due to the failure of our government to provide necessary funds, the Roppongi property
has remained undeveloped since that time.

A proposal was presented to President Corazon C. Aquino by former Philippine Ambassador to Japan, Carlos J. Valdez, to make
the property the subject of a lease agreement with a Japanese firm - Kajima Corporation — which shall construct two (2)
buildings in Roppongi and one (1) building in Nampeidai and renovate the present Philippine Chancery in Nampeidai. The
consideration of the construction would be the lease to the foreign corporation of one (1) of the buildings to be constructed in
Roppongi and the two (2) buildings in Nampeidai. The other building in Roppongi shall then be used as the Philippine Embassy
Chancery. At the end of the lease period, all the three leased buildings shall be occupied and used by the Philippine government.
No change of ownership or title shall occur. (See Annex "B" to Reply to Comment) The Philippine government retains the title all
throughout the lease period and thereafter. However, the government has not acted favorably on this proposal which is pending
approval and ratification between the parties. Instead, on August 11, 1986, President Aquino created a committee to study the
disposition/utilization of Philippine government properties in Tokyo and Kobe, Japan through Administrative Order No. 3, followed
by Administrative Orders Numbered 3-A, B, C and D.

On July 25, 1987, the President issued Executive Order No. 296 entitling non-Filipino citizens or entities to avail of separations'
capital goods and services in the event of sale, lease or disposition. The four properties in Japan including the Roppongi were
specifically mentioned in the first "Whereas" clause.

Amidst opposition by various sectors, the Executive branch of the government has been pushing, with great vigor, its decision to
sell the reparations properties starting with the Roppongi lot. The property has twice been set for bidding at a minimum floor price
of $225 million. The first bidding was a failure since only one bidder qualified. The second one, after postponements, has not yet
materialized. The last scheduled bidding on February 21, 1990 was restrained by his Court. Later, the rules on bidding were
changed such that the $225 million floor price became merely a suggested floor price.

The Court finds that each of the herein petitions raises distinct issues. The petitioner in G.R. No. 92013 objects to the alienation
of the Roppongi property to anyone while the petitioner in G.R. No. 92047 adds as a principal objection the alleged unjustified
bias of the Philippine government in favor of selling the property to non-Filipino citizens and entities. These petitions have been
consolidated and are resolved at the same time for the objective is the same - to stop the sale of the Roppongi property.

The petitioner in G.R. No. 92013 raises the following issues:

(1) Can the Roppongi property and others of its kind be alienated by the Philippine Government?; and

(2) Does the Chief Executive, her officers and agents, have the authority and jurisdiction, to sell the Roppongi property?

Petitioner Dionisio Ojeda in G.R. No. 92047, apart from questioning the authority of the government to alienate the Roppongi
property assails the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 296 in making the property available for sale to non-Filipino citizens
and entities. He also questions the bidding procedures of the Committee on the Utilization or Disposition of Philippine
Government Properties in Japan for being discriminatory against Filipino citizens and Filipino-owned entities by denying them the
right to be informed about the bidding requirements.

II
In G.R. No. 92013, petitioner Laurel asserts that the Roppongi property and the related lots were acquired as part of the
reparations from the Japanese government for diplomatic and consular use by the Philippine government. Vice-President Laurel
states that the Roppongi property is classified as one of public dominion, and not of private ownership under Article 420 of the
Civil Code (See infra).

The petitioner submits that the Roppongi property comes under "property intended for public service" in paragraph 2 of the above
provision. He states that being one of public dominion, no ownership by any one can attach to it, not even by the State. The
Roppongi and related properties were acquired for "sites for chancery, diplomatic, and consular quarters, buildings and other
improvements" (Second Year Reparations Schedule). The petitioner states that they continue to be intended for a necessary
service. They are held by the State in anticipation of an opportune use. (Citing 3 Manresa 65-66). Hence, it cannot be
appropriated, is outside the commerce of man, or to put it in more simple terms, it cannot be alienated nor be the subject matter
of contracts (Citing Municipality of Cavite v. Rojas, 30 Phil. 20 [1915]). Noting the non-use of the Roppongi property at the
moment, the petitioner avers that the same remains property of public dominion so long as the government has not used it for
other purposes nor adopted any measure constituting a removal of its original purpose or use.

The respondents, for their part, refute the petitioner's contention by saying that the subject property is not governed by our Civil
Code but by the laws of Japan where the property is located. They rely upon the rule of lex situs  which is used in determining the
applicable law regarding the acquisition, transfer and devolution of the title to a property. They also invoke Opinion No. 21, Series
of 1988, dated January 27, 1988 of the Secretary of Justice which used the lex situs  in explaining the inapplicability of Philippine
law regarding a property situated in Japan.

The respondents add that even assuming for the sake of argument that the Civil Code is applicable, the Roppongi property has
ceased to become property of public dominion. It has become patrimonial property because it has not been used for public
service or for diplomatic purposes for over thirteen (13) years now (Citing Article 422, Civil Code) and because the intention  by
the Executive Department and the Congress to convert it to private use has been manifested by overt acts, such as, among
others: (1) the transfer of the Philippine Embassy to Nampeidai (2) the issuance of administrative orders for the possibility of
alienating the four government properties in Japan; (3) the issuance of Executive Order No. 296; (4) the enactment by the
Congress of Rep. Act No. 6657 [the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law] on June 10, 1988 which contains a provision stating
that funds may be taken from the sale of Philippine properties in foreign countries; (5) the holding of the public bidding of the
Roppongi property but which failed; (6) the deferment by the Senate in Resolution No. 55 of the bidding to a future date; thus an
acknowledgment by the Senate of the government's intention to remove the Roppongi property from the public service purpose;
and (7) the resolution of this Court dismissing the petition in Ojeda v. Bidding Committee, et al., G.R. No. 87478 which sought to
enjoin the second bidding of the Roppongi property scheduled on March 30, 1989.

III

In G.R. No. 94047, petitioner Ojeda once more asks this Court to rule on the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 296. He had
earlier filed a petition in G.R. No. 87478 which the Court dismissed on August 1, 1989. He now avers that the executive order
contravenes the constitutional mandate to conserve and develop the national patrimony stated in the Preamble of the 1987
Constitution. It also allegedly violates:

(1) The reservation of the ownership and acquisition of alienable lands of the public domain to Filipino citizens. (Sections 2 and 3,
Article XII, Constitution; Sections 22 and 23 of Commonwealth Act 141).i•t•c-aüsl

(2) The preference for Filipino citizens in the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national economy and
patrimony (Section 10, Article VI, Constitution);

(3) The protection given to Filipino enterprises against unfair competition and trade practices;

(4) The guarantee of the right of the people to information on all matters of public concern (Section 7, Article III, Constitution);

(5) The prohibition against the sale to non-Filipino citizens or entities not wholly owned by Filipino citizens of capital goods
received by the Philippines under the Reparations Act (Sections 2 and 12 of Rep. Act No. 1789); and

(6) The declaration of the state policy of full public disclosure of all transactions involving public interest (Section 28, Article III,
Constitution).

Petitioner Ojeda warns that the use of public funds in the execution of an unconstitutional executive order is a misapplication of
public funds He states that since the details of the bidding for the Roppongi property were never publicly disclosed until February
15, 1990 (or a few days before the scheduled bidding), the bidding guidelines are available only in Tokyo, and the
accomplishment of requirements and the selection of qualified bidders should be done in Tokyo, interested Filipino citizens or
entities owned by them did not have the chance to comply with Purchase Offer Requirements on the Roppongi. Worse, the
Roppongi shall be sold for a minimum price of $225 million from which price capital gains tax under Japanese law of about 50 to
70% of the floor price would still be deducted.

IV

The petitioners and respondents in both cases do not dispute the fact that the Roppongi site and the three related properties
were through reparations agreements, that these were assigned to the government sector and that the Roppongi property itself
was specifically designated under the Reparations Agreement to house the Philippine Embassy.
The nature of the Roppongi lot as property for public service is expressly spelled out. It is dictated by the terms of the
Reparations Agreement and the corresponding contract of procurement which bind both the Philippine government and the
Japanese government.

There can be no doubt that it is of public dominion unless it is convincingly shown that the property has become patrimonial. This,
the respondents have failed to do.

As property of public dominion, the Roppongi lot is outside the commerce of man. It cannot be alienated. Its ownership is a
special collective ownership for general use and enjoyment, an application to the satisfaction of collective needs, and resides in
the social group. The purpose is not to serve the State as a juridical person, but the citizens; it is intended for the common and
public welfare and cannot be the object of appropration. (Taken from 3 Manresa, 66-69; cited in Tolentino, Commentaries on the
Civil Code of the Philippines, 1963 Edition, Vol. II, p. 26).

The applicable provisions of the Civil Code are:

ART. 419. Property is either of public dominion or of private ownership.

ART. 420. The following things are property of public dominion

(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the
State, banks shores roadsteads, and others of similar character;

(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some public service or for
the development of the national wealth.

ART. 421. All other property of the State, which is not of the character stated in the preceding article, is
patrimonial property.

The Roppongi property is correctly classified under paragraph 2 of Article 420 of the Civil Code as property belonging to the
State and intended for some public service.

Has the intention of the government regarding the use of the property been changed because the lot has been Idle for some
years? Has it become patrimonial?

The fact that the Roppongi site has not been used for a long time for actual Embassy service does not automatically convert it to
patrimonial property. Any such conversion happens only if the property is withdrawn from public use (Cebu Oxygen and
Acetylene Co. v. Bercilles, 66 SCRA 481 [1975]). A property continues to be part of the public domain, not available for private
appropriation or ownership until there is a formal declaration on the part of the government to withdraw it from being such
(Ignacio v. Director of Lands, 108 Phil. 335 [1960]).

The respondents enumerate various pronouncements by concerned public officials insinuating a change of intention. We
emphasize, however, that an abandonment of the intention to use the Roppongi property for public service and to make it
patrimonial property under Article 422 of the Civil Code must be definiteAbandonment cannot be inferred from the non-use alone
specially if the non-use was attributable not to the government's own deliberate and indubitable will but to a lack of financial
support to repair and improve the property (See Heirs of Felino Santiago v. Lazaro, 166 SCRA 368 [1988]). Abandonment must
be a certain and positive act based on correct legal premises.

A mere transfer of the Philippine Embassy to Nampeidai in 1976 is not relinquishment of the Roppongi property's original
purpose. Even the failure by the government to repair the building in Roppongi is not abandonment since as earlier stated, there
simply was a shortage of government funds. The recent Administrative Orders authorizing a study of the status and conditions of
government properties in Japan were merely directives for investigation but did not in any way signify a clear intention to dispose
of the properties.

Executive Order No. 296, though its title declares an "authority to sell", does not have a provision in its text expressly authorizing
the sale of the four properties procured from Japan for the government sector. The executive order does not declare that the
properties lost their public character. It merely intends to make the properties available to foreigners and not to Filipinos alone in
case of a sale, lease or other disposition. It merely eliminates the restriction under Rep. Act No. 1789 that reparations goods may
be sold only to Filipino citizens and one hundred (100%) percent Filipino-owned entities. The text of Executive Order No. 296
provides:

Section 1. The provisions of Republic Act No. 1789, as amended, and of other laws to the contrary
notwithstanding, the above-mentioned properties can be made available for sale, lease or any other manner of
disposition to non-Filipino citizens or to entities owned by non-Filipino citizens.

Executive Order No. 296 is based on the wrong premise or assumption that the Roppongi and the three other properties were
earlier converted into alienable real properties. As earlier stated, Rep. Act No. 1789 differentiates the procurements for the
government sector and the private sector (Sections 2 and 12, Rep. Act No. 1789). Only the private sector properties can be sold
to end-users who must be Filipinos or entities owned by Filipinos. It is this nationality provision which was amended by Executive
Order No. 296.

Section 63 (c) of Rep. Act No. 6657 (the CARP Law) which provides as one of the sources of funds for its implementation, the
proceeds of the disposition of the properties of the Government in foreign countries, did not withdraw the Roppongi property from
being classified as one of public dominion when it mentions Philippine properties abroad. Section 63 (c) refers to properties
which are alienable and not to those reserved for public use or service. Rep Act No. 6657, therefore, does not authorize the
Executive Department to sell the Roppongi property. It merely enumerates possible sources of future funding to augment (as and
when needed) the Agrarian Reform Fund created under Executive Order No. 299. Obviously any property outside of the
commerce of man cannot be tapped as a source of funds.

The respondents try to get around the public dominion character of the Roppongi property by insisting that Japanese law and not
our Civil Code should apply.

It is exceedingly strange why our top government officials, of all people, should be the ones to insist that in the sale of extremely
valuable government property, Japanese law and not Philippine law should prevail. The Japanese law - its coverage and effects,
when enacted, and exceptions to its provision — is not presented to the Court It is simply asserted that the lex loci rei sitae or
Japanese law should apply without stating what that law provides. It is based on faith that Japanese law would allow the sale.

We see no reason why a conflict of law rule should apply when no conflict of law situation exists. A conflict of law situation arises
only when: (1) There is a dispute over the title or ownership  of an immovable, such that the capacity to take and transfer
immovables, the formalities of conveyance, the essential validity and effect of the transfer, or the interpretation and effect of a
conveyance, are to be determined (See Salonga, Private International Law, 1981 ed., pp. 377-383); and (2) A foreign law on land
ownership and its conveyance is asserted to conflict with a domestic law on the same matters. Hence, the need to determine
which law should apply.

In the instant case, none of the above elements exists.

The issues are not concerned with validity of ownership or title. There is no question that the property belongs to the Philippines.
The issue is the authority of the respondent officials to validly dispose of property belonging to the State. And the validity of the
procedures adopted to effect its sale. This is governed by Philippine Law. The rule of lex situs does not apply.

The assertion that the opinion of the Secretary of Justice sheds light on the relevance of the lex situs rule is misplaced. The
opinion does not tackle the alienability of the real properties procured through reparations nor the existence in what body of the
authority to sell them. In discussing who are capable of acquiring the lots, the Secretary merely explains that it is the foreign law
which should determine who can acquire the properties so that the constitutional limitation on acquisition of lands of the public
domain to Filipino citizens and entities wholly owned by Filipinos is inapplicable. We see no point in belaboring whether or not
this opinion is correct. Why should we discuss who can acquire the Roppongi lot when there is no showing that it can be sold?

The subsequent approval on October 4, 1988 by President Aquino of the recommendation by the investigating committee to sell
the Roppongi property was premature or, at the very least, conditioned on a valid change in the public character of the Roppongi
property. Moreover, the approval does not have the force and effect of law since the President already lost her legislative powers.
The Congress had already convened for more than a year.

Assuming for the sake of argument, however, that the Roppongi property is no longer of public dominion, there is another
obstacle to its sale by the respondents.

There is no law authorizing its conveyance.

Section 79 (f) of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917 provides

Section 79 (f ) Conveyances and contracts to which the Government is a party. — In cases in which the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines is a party to any deed or other instrument conveying the title to
real estate or to any other property the value of which is in excess of one hundred thousand pesos, the
respective Department Secretary shall prepare the necessary papers which, together with the proper
recommendations, shall be submitted to the Congress of the Philippines for approval by the same. Such deed,
instrument, or contract shall be executed and signed by the President of the Philippines on behalf of the
Government of the Philippines unless the Government of the Philippines unless the authority therefor be
expressly vested by law in another officer. (Emphasis supplied)

The requirement has been retained in Section 48, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292).

SEC. 48. Official Authorized to Convey Real Property. — Whenever real property of the Government
is authorized by law to be conveyed, the deed of conveyance shall be executed in behalf of the government by
the following:

(1) For property belonging to and titled in the name of the Republic of the Philippines, by the President, unless
the authority therefor is expressly vested by law in another officer.

(2) For property belonging to the Republic of the Philippines but titled in the name of any political subdivision or
of any corporate agency or instrumentality, by the executive head of the agency or instrumentality. (Emphasis
supplied)

It is not for the President to convey valuable real property of the government on his or her own sole will. Any such conveyance
must be authorized and approved by a law enacted by the Congress. It requires executive and legislative concurrence.
Resolution No. 55 of the Senate dated June 8, 1989, asking for the deferment of the sale of the Roppongi property does not
withdraw the property from public domain much less authorize its sale. It is a mere resolution; it is not a formal declaration
abandoning the public character of the Roppongi property. In fact, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations is conducting
hearings on Senate Resolution No. 734 which raises serious policy considerations and calls for a fact-finding investigation of the
circumstances behind the decision to sell the Philippine government properties in Japan.

The resolution of this Court in  Ojeda v. Bidding Committee, et al., supra, did not pass upon the constitutionality of Executive
Order No. 296. Contrary to respondents' assertion, we did not uphold the authority of the President to sell the Roppongi property.
The Court stated that the constitutionality of the executive order was not the real issue and that resolving the constitutional
question was "neither necessary nor finally determinative of the case." The Court noted that "[W]hat petitioner ultimately
questions is the use of the proceeds of the disposition of the Roppongi property." In emphasizing that "the decision of the
Executive to dispose of the Roppongi property to finance the CARP ... cannot be questioned" in view of Section 63 (c) of Rep.
Act No. 6657, the Court did not acknowledge the fact that the property became alienable nor did it indicate that the President was
authorized to dispose of the Roppongi property. The resolution should be read to mean that in case the Roppongi property is re-
classified to be patrimonial and alienable by authority of law, the proceeds of a sale may be used for national economic
development projects including the CARP.

Moreover, the sale in 1989 did not materialize. The petitions before us question the proposed 1990 sale of the Roppongi
property. We are resolving the issues raised in these petitions, not the issues raised in 1989.

Having declared a need for a law or formal declaration to withdraw the Roppongi property from public domain to make it alienable
and a need for legislative authority to allow the sale of the property, we see no compelling reason to tackle the constitutional
issues raised by petitioner Ojeda.

The Court does not ordinarily pass upon constitutional questions unless these questions are properly raised in appropriate cases
and their resolution is necessary for the determination of the case (People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 [1937]). The Court will not pass
upon a constitutional question although properly presented by the record if the case can be disposed of on some other ground
such as the application of a statute or general law (Siler v. Louisville and Nashville R. Co., 213 U.S. 175, [1909], Railroad
Commission v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 [1941]).

The petitioner in G.R. No. 92013 states why the Roppongi property should not be sold:

The Roppongi property is not just like any piece of property. It was given to the Filipino people in reparation for
the lives and blood of Filipinos who died and suffered during the Japanese military occupation, for the suffering
of widows and orphans who lost their loved ones and kindred, for the homes and other properties lost by
countless Filipinos during the war. The Tokyo properties are a monument to the bravery and sacrifice of the
Filipino people in the face of an invader; like the monuments of Rizal, Quezon, and other Filipino heroes, we do
not expect economic or financial benefits from them. But who would think of selling these monuments? Filipino
honor and national dignity dictate that we keep our properties in Japan as memorials to the countless Filipinos
who died and suffered. Even if we should become paupers we should not think of selling them. For it would be
as if we sold the lives and blood and tears of our countrymen. (Rollo- G.R. No. 92013, p.147)

The petitioner in G.R. No. 92047 also states:

Roppongi is no ordinary property. It is one ceded by the Japanese government in atonement for its past
belligerence for the valiant sacrifice of life and limb and for deaths, physical dislocation and economic
devastation the whole Filipino people endured in World War II.

It is for what it stands for, and for what it could never bring back to life, that its significance today remains
undimmed, inspire of the lapse of 45 years since the war ended, inspire of the passage of 32 years since the
property passed on to the Philippine government.

Roppongi is a reminder that cannot — should not — be dissipated ... (Rollo-92047, p. 9)

It is indeed true that the Roppongi property is valuable not so much because of the inflated prices fetched by real property in
Tokyo but more so because of its symbolic value to all Filipinos — veterans and civilians alike. Whether or not the Roppongi and
related properties will eventually be sold is a policy determination where both the President and Congress must concur.
Considering the properties' importance and value, the laws on conversion and disposition of property of public dominion must be
faithfully followed.

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petitions are GRANTED. A writ of prohibition is issued enjoining the
respondents from proceeding with the sale of the Roppongi property in Tokyo, Japan. The February 20, 1990 Temporary
Restraining Order is made PERMANENT.

SO ORDERED.

10. Luz Farms v Sec. of DAR, GR 86889

This is a petition for prohibition with prayer for restraining order and/or preliminary and permanent injunction against the
Honorable Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform for acting without jurisdiction in enforcing the assailed provisions of
R.A. No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 and in promulgating the Guidelines and
Procedure Implementing Production and Profit Sharing under R.A. No. 6657, insofar as the same apply to herein petitioner, and
further from performing an act in violation of the constitutional rights of the petitioner.
As gathered from the records, the factual background of this case, is as follows:
On June 10, 1988, the President of the Philippines approved R.A. No. 6657, which includes the raising of livestock, poultry and
swine in its coverage (Rollo, p. 80).
On January 2, 1989, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform promulgated the Guidelines and Procedures Implementing Production and
Profit Sharing as embodied in Sections 13 and 32 of R.A. No. 6657 (Rollo, p. 80).
On January 9, 1989, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform promulgated its Rules and Regulations implementing Section 11 of R.A.
No. 6657 (Commercial Farms). (Rollo, p. 81).
Luz Farms, petitioner in this case, is a corporation engaged in the livestock and poultry business and together with others in the
same business allegedly stands to be adversely affected by the enforcement of Section 3(b), Section 11, Section 13, Section
16(d) and 17 and Section 32 of R.A. No. 6657 otherwise known as Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law and of the Guidelines
and Procedures Implementing Production and Profit Sharing under R.A. No. 6657 promulgated on January 2, 1989 and the
Rules and Regulations Implementing Section 11 thereof as promulgated by the DAR on January 9, 1989 (Rollo, pp. 2-36).: rd
Hence, this petition praying that aforesaid laws, guidelines and rules be declared unconstitutional. Meanwhile, it is also prayed
that a writ of preliminary injunction or restraining order be issued enjoining public respondents from enforcing the same, insofar
as they are made to apply to Luz Farms and other livestock and poultry raisers.
This Court in its Resolution dated July 4, 1939 resolved to deny, among others, Luz Farms' prayer for the issuance of a
preliminary injunction in its Manifestation dated May 26, and 31, 1989. (Rollo, p. 98).
Later, however, this Court in its Resolution dated August 24, 1989 resolved to grant said Motion for Reconsideration regarding
the injunctive relief, after the filing and approval by this Court of an injunction bond in the amount of P100,000.00. This Court also
gave due course to the petition and required the parties to file their respective memoranda (Rollo, p. 119).
The petitioner filed its Memorandum on September 6, 1989 (Rollo, pp. 131-168).
On December 22, 1989, the Solicitor General adopted his Comment to the petition as his Memorandum (Rollo, pp. 186-187).
Luz Farms questions the following provisions of R.A. 6657, insofar as they are made to apply to it:
(a) Section 3(b) which includes the "raising of livestock (and poultry)" in the definition of "Agricultural, Agricultural
Enterprise or Agricultural Activity."
(b) Section 11 which defines "commercial farms" as "private agricultural lands devoted to commercial, livestock, poultry
and swine raising . . ."
(c) Section 13 which calls upon petitioner to execute a production-sharing plan.
(d) Section 16(d) and 17 which vest on the Department of Agrarian Reform the authority to summarily determine the just
compensation to be paid for lands covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law.
(e) Section 32 which spells out the production-sharing plan mentioned in Section 13 —
". . . (W)hereby three percent (3%) of the gross sales from the production of such lands are distributed within sixty (60)
days of the end of the fiscal year as compensation to regular and other farmworkers in such lands over and above the
compensation they currently receive: Provided, That these individuals or entities realize gross sales in excess of five
million pesos per annum unless the DAR, upon proper application, determine a lower ceiling.
In the event that the individual or entity realizes a profit, an additional ten (10%) of the net profit after tax shall be
distributed to said regular and other farmworkers within ninety (90) days of the end of the fiscal year . . ."
The main issue in this petition is the constitutionality of Sections 3(b), 11, 13 and 32 of R.A. No. 6657 (the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law of 1988), insofar as the said law includes the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage as well
as the Implementing Rules and Guidelines promulgated in accordance therewith.:-cralaw
The constitutional provision under consideration reads as follows:
ARTICLE XIII
x  x  x
AGRARIAN AND NATURAL RESOURCES REFORM
Section 4. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the right of farmers and regular
farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other farmworkers, to
receive a just share of the fruits thereof. To this end, the State shall encourage and undertake the just distribution of all
agricultural lands, subject to such priorities and reasonable retention limits as the Congress may prescribe, taking into
account ecological, developmental, or equity considerations, and subject to the payment of just compensation. In
determining retention limits, the State shall respect the rights of small landowners. The State shall further provide
incentives for voluntary land-sharing.
x  x  x"
Luz Farms contended that it does not seek the nullification of R.A. 6657 in its entirety. In fact, it acknowledges the
correctness of the decision of this Court in the case of the Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc.
vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform (G.R. 78742, 14 July 1989) affirming the constitutionality of the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law. It, however, argued that Congress in enacting the said law has transcended the mandate of the
Constitution, in including land devoted to the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage (Rollo, p. 131).
Livestock or poultry raising is not similar to crop or tree farming. Land is not the primary resource in this undertaking and
represents no more than five percent (5%) of the total investment of commercial livestock and poultry raisers. Indeed,
 there are many owners of residential lands all over the country who use available space in their residence for commercial
livestock and raising purposes, under "contract-growing arrangements," whereby processing corporations and other
commercial livestock and poultry raisers (Rollo, p. 10). Lands support the buildings and other amenities attendant to the
raising of animals and birds. The use of land is incidental to but not the principal factor or consideration in productivity in
this industry. Including backyard raisers, about 80% of those in commercial livestock and poultry production occupy five
hectares or less. The remaining 20% are mostly corporate farms (Rollo, p. 11).
On the other hand, the public respondent argued that livestock and poultry raising is embraced in the term "agriculture" and the
inclusion of such enterprise under Section 3(b) of R.A. 6657 is proper. He cited that Webster's International Dictionary , Second
Edition (1954), defines the following words:
"Agriculture — the art or science of cultivating the ground and raising and harvesting crops, often, including also, feeding,
breeding and management of livestock, tillage, husbandry, farming.
It includes farming, horticulture, forestry, dairying, sugarmaking . . .
Livestock — domestic animals used or raised on a farm, especially for profit.
Farm — a plot or tract of land devoted to the raising of domestic or other animals." (Rollo, pp. 82-83).
The petition is impressed with merit.
The question raised is one of constitutional construction. The primary task in constitutional construction is to ascertain and
thereafter assure the realization of the purpose of the framers in the adoption of the Constitution (J.M. Tuazon & Co. vs. Land
Tenure Administration, 31 SCRA 413 [1970]).: rd
Ascertainment of the meaning of the provision of Constitution begins with the language of the document itself. The words used in
the Constitution are to be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed in which case the significance
thus attached to them prevails (J.M. Tuazon & Co. vs.  Land Tenure Administration, 31 SCRA 413 [1970]).
It is generally held that, in construing constitutional provisions which are ambiguous or of doubtful meaning, the courts may
consider the debates in the constitutional convention as throwing light on the intent of the framers of the Constitution. It is true
that the intent of the convention is not controlling by itself, but as its proceeding was preliminary to the adoption by the people of
the Constitution the understanding of the convention as to what was meant by the terms of the constitutional provision which was
the subject of the deliberation, goes a long way toward explaining the understanding of the people when they ratified it (Aquino,
Jr. v. Enrile, 59 SCRA 183 [1974]).
The transcripts of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission of 1986 on the meaning of the word "agricultural," clearly
show that it was never the intention of the framers of the Constitution to include livestock and poultry industry in the coverage of
the constitutionally-mandated agrarian reform program of the Government.
The Committee adopted the definition of "agricultural land" as defined under Section 166 of R.A. 3844, as laud devoted to any
growth, including but not limited to crop lands, saltbeds, fishponds, idle and abandoned land (Record, CONCOM, August 7, 1986,
Vol. III, p. 11).
The intention of the Committee is to limit the application of the word "agriculture." Commissioner Jamir proposed to insert the
word "ARABLE" to distinguish this kind of agricultural land from such lands as commercial and industrial lands and residential
properties because all of them fall under the general classification of the word "agricultural". This proposal, however, was not
considered because the Committee contemplated that agricultural lands are limited to arable and suitable agricultural lands and
therefore, do not include commercial, industrial and residential lands (Record, CONCOM, August 7, 1986, Vol. III, p. 30).
In the interpellation, then Commissioner Regalado (now a Supreme Court Justice), posed several questions, among others,
quoted as follows:
x  x  x
"Line 19 refers to genuine reform program founded on the primary right of farmers and farmworkers. I wonder if it means
that leasehold tenancy is thereby proscribed under this provision because it speaks of the primary right of farmers and
farmworkers to own directly or collectively the lands they till. As also mentioned by Commissioner Tadeo, farmworkers
include those who work in piggeries and poultry projects.
I was wondering whether I am wrong in my appreciation that if somebody puts up a piggery or a poultry project and for
that purpose hires farmworkers therein, these farmworkers will automatically have the right to own eventually, directly or
ultimately or collectively, the land on which the piggeries and poultry projects were constructed. (Record, CONCOM,
August 2, 1986, p. 618).
x  x  x
The questions were answered and explained in the statement of then Commissioner Tadeo, quoted as follows:
x  x  x
"Sa pangalawang katanungan ng Ginoo ay medyo hindi kami nagkaunawaan. Ipinaaalam ko kay Commissioner
Regalado na hindi namin inilagay ang agricultural worker sa kadahilanang kasama rito ang piggery, poultry at livestock
workers. Ang inilagay namin dito ay farm worker kaya hindi kasama ang piggery, poultry at livestock workers (Record,
CONCOM, August 2, 1986, Vol. II, p. 621).
It is evident from the foregoing discussion that Section II of R.A. 6657 which includes "private agricultural lands devoted to
commercial livestock, poultry and swine raising" in the definition of "commercial farms" is invalid, to the extent that the aforecited
agro-industrial activities are made to be covered by the agrarian reform program of the State. There is simply no reason to
include livestock and poultry lands in the coverage of agrarian reform. (Rollo, p. 21).
Hence, there is merit in Luz Farms' argument that the requirement in Sections 13 and 32 of R.A. 6657 directing "corporate farms"
which include livestock and poultry raisers to execute and implement "production-sharing plans" (pending final redistribution of
their landholdings) whereby they are called upon to distribute from three percent (3%) of their gross sales and ten percent (10%)
of their net profits to their workers as additional compensation is unreasonable for being confiscatory, and therefore violative of
due process (Rollo, p. 21).:-cralaw
It has been established that this Court will assume jurisdiction over a constitutional question only if it is shown that the essential
requisites of a judicial inquiry into such a question are first satisfied. Thus, there must be an actual case or controversy involving
a conflict of legal rights susceptible of judicial determination, the constitutional question must have been opportunely raised by
the proper party, and the resolution of the question is unavoidably necessary to the decision of the case itself (Association of
Small Landowners of the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, G.R. 78742; Acuna v. Arroyo, G.R. 79310; Pabico v.
Juico, G.R. 79744; Manaay v. Juico, G.R. 79777, 14 July 1989, 175 SCRA 343).
However, despite the inhibitions pressing upon the Court when confronted with constitutional issues, it will not hesitate to declare
a law or act invalid when it is convinced that this must be done. In arriving at this conclusion, its only criterion will be the
Constitution and God as its conscience gives it in the light to probe its meaning and discover its purpose. Personal motives and
political considerations are irrelevancies that cannot influence its decisions. Blandishment is as ineffectual as intimidation, for all
the awesome power of the Congress and Executive, the Court will not hesitate "to make the hammer fall heavily," where the acts
of these departments, or of any official, betray the people's will as expressed in the Constitution (Association of Small
Landowners of the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, G.R. 78742; Acuna v. Arroyo, G.R. 79310; Pabico v. Juico,
G.R. 79744; Manaay v. Juico, G.R. 79777, 14 July 1989).
Thus, where the legislature or the executive acts beyond the scope of its constitutional powers, it becomes the duty of the
judiciary to declare what the other branches of the government had assumed to do, as void. This is the essence of judicial power
conferred by the Constitution "(I)n one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law" (Art. VIII, Section
1 of the 1935 Constitution; Article X, Section I of the 1973 Constitution and which was adopted as part of the Freedom
Constitution, and Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution) and which power this Court has exercised in many instances
(Demetria v. Alba, 148 SCRA 208 [1987]).
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. Sections 3(b), 11, 13 and 32 of R.A. No. 6657 insofar as
the inclusion of the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage as well as the Implementing Rules and Guidelines
promulgated in accordance therewith, are hereby DECLARED null and void for being unconstitutional and the writ of preliminary
injunction issued is hereby MADE permanent.
SO ORDERED.