UNIVERSITI TEKNOLOGI MARA

FINAL ASSESSMENT
PEPERIKSAAN KHAS
SEPTEMBER 2020

COURSE NAME : LAW OF EVIDENCE 1

COURSE CODE : LAW529
ASSESSMENT : 29th SEPTEMBER 2020
RELEASE DATE
ASSESSMENT LAST : 30th SEPTEMBER 2020
SUBMISSION DATE

NAME : SERENA JAMES BERNARD

MATRIC NUMBER : 2016250662
The fact in issue is whether Gelugor and Assam can be charged of an offence of trafficking
in dangerous drugs under section 39B(1)(a) of the Dangerous Drugs Act 1952.

The first issue is whether the confession made by Gelugor to Inspector Kal is relevant and
admissible?
Gelugor made a confession that he did trafficking cannabis after 10 hours of a continuous
intense interrogation.

Section 17(2) of Evidence Act 1950 ("EA") provides that a confession is an admission made
at any time by a person accused of an offence, stating or suggesting the inference that he
committed that offence. Generally, under Section 113(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code
stated that a confession made by an accused person to police officers in the course of an
investigation cannot be used against the accused however, there are exceptions to this
provision where the statements are made under the Dangerous Drugs Act. Section 24 of EA
1950 stated that any confessions that are made which appears to have the elements of
inducement, threat or promise will be regarded as irrelevant in any criminal proceeding. For a
confession to be admissible, there are conditions that must be established to prove that it was
made voluntarily.
The first condition is that the confession must not be obtained by reason of an inducement,
threat, promise or oppression. Every confession made must be made voluntarily by the
accused person and not through inducement, threat, promise or oppression. In the case of
Selvadurai v PP, it was held that even with a slight element of inducement, it is sufficient to
render the confession inadmissible. Meanwhile in Dato Mokhtar Hashim v PP, it is held that
a confession must be made voluntarily in the sense that it was not obtained by fear of prejudice
or hope of advantage created by a person in authority, or by oppression. Oppression is a
situation whereby a statement is obtained from the accused by causing extreme discomfort
such as denial of food, rest or sleep. In the case of Lim Kit Tat v PP, a statement was taken
after questioning the accused for four nights in a row and the accused has not had sufficient
sleep is held as an oppression toward the accused.
The second condition is that the inducement, threat, promise or oppression was made by
a person in authority. The accused must have truly believed that the person he dealt with had
some degree of power over him at the time when he made the confession. In R v AB, the
person in authority is said to be the persons who ordinarily engaged in the arrest, detention,
examination or prosecution of the accused.
The third condition is that the inducement, threat, or promise must have reference to the
charge against the accused. The fourth condition is that such inducement, threat, promise or
oppression must be sufficient to give the accused the grounds for supposing that by making

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the confession, he would gain an advantage, or avoid any evil of a temporal nature.
Where all conditions have not been established, it would prove that the confession was
not made voluntarily, thus rendering it inadmissible under section 24 unless the court has
removed such elements discussed before under section 28 of EA which would make the
confession relevant.
By applying to the present case, Gelugor had admitted to trafficking cannabis made
confession after 10 hours of an intense and continuous interrogation by Inspector Kal. By
virtue of section 17(2), such confession is an admission as it states the inference that he
committed that offence of trafficking cannabis. The confession made by Gelugor can be used
against himself in the criminal proceeding, although section 113(1) of CPC forbid the
statements to be used against himself, because the statement which were made by him are
related to the Dangerous Drugs Act. Therefore, the confession can be used against him.
However, such confession must be made in line with section 24 of EA.
By virtue of section 24 of EA, a confession to be admissible it must be proven that it was
made voluntarily without any elements of inducement, threat, promise or even oppression. By
referring to the present case, Gelugor was interrogated by Inspector Kal continuously for 10
hours. An interrogation should not be more than 4 hours otherwise it would be deemed as an
excessive interrogation. Such an extreme interrogation may have given the court the
impression that Gelugor was oppressed by Inspector Kal as that 10 hours of continuous
questioning may have caused Gelugor to be placed in a discomfort situation The court may
look at it as an oppression towards Gelugor as he was not given the time to rest as in the case
of Dato Mokhtar Hashim v PP and Lim Kit Tat v PP, where both accused in respective case
are denied of their right to perform his religious duty and sleep respectively. Given the time
that it took to get a confession out of Gelugor, it shows that he does not believe that Inspector
Kal, the person questioning him had some degree of power over him at the time when he
made the confession. Even though Inspector Kal is in charge of the detention and interrogation
which by referring to R v AB is the person in authority, Gelugor does not believed it to be so.
Therefore, the confession was not made voluntarily because of the impression of oppression
toward Gelugor.
In conclusion, by virtue of section 17, the confession made by Gelugor may be relevant
however, it may not be admissible as under section 24 unless the prosecution could convince
the court that 10 hours of interrogation is needed and not to be seen as an oppression toward
Gelugor. In this case, if a confession as referred to in section 24 is made after the impression
caused by any such inducement, threat, promise or even oppression has in the opinion of the
court been fully removed, the confession then became relevant by virtue of section 28 of EA
1950.

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The second issue is whether the confession of Gelugor that led to the discovery of several
slabs of cannabis is relevant and admissible as evidence.
Gelugor stated that "The drugs belongs to us. There are some more hidden at our home. I will
show you."

Section 17(2) of EA 1950 provides that a confession is an admission made at any time by a
person accused of an offence, stating or suggesting the inference that he committed that
offence. Section 27 of EA 1950 provides that when any fact is deposed to as discovered in
consequence of information received from a person accused of any offence in the custody of
a police officer, so much of the information, whether the information amounts to a confession
or not, as related distinctly to the fact thereby discovered may be proved. In order for a
statement to fall under the provision, there are conditions to be established.
Firstly, the information received must be given by the accused himself. In the case of
Choong Soon Koy v PP, it was held that a person who was charged of an offence must be
the person to have given the information that led to the discovery of fact. Secondly, the
information received must be while the accused was still in police custody. Thirdly, the fact
must be discovered as a consequence of the information received. If there was a discovery
without any evidence of information given by the accused, section 27 will not be applicable. In
the case of Wai Chan Leong v PP, it was held that the fact must be the consequence of the
information received which cause of the discovery of fact in order to apply section 27.
Fourthly, only the information that leads to the discovery of the fact is admissible. In
Hasamuddin Talena v PP, the accused made a statement during the interrogation with the
approximate effect whereby the words used were vague but eventually he led the police to the
place where certain drugs have been concealed. At the scene, the accused made a second
statement and pointed to show where the drugs were concealed. It was held under section 27
that approximations are not permitted. Thus, the exact words spoken by the accused have to
be proven.

Applying to the present case, Gelugor has admitted that the drugs that was found in the silver
Honda car by Inspector Dahan belongs to him and Assam and by virtue of section 17(2), the
confession is relevant as it shows that he committed the offence of trafficking cannabis.
Gelugor are one of the people who was charged for the offence who has led to the discovery
of the cannabis hidden at their house. Although it is true that Gelugor gave information to
Inspector Kal that there was more drugs that was hidden at their house, he did not specifically
mention during the interrogation the whereabout of the drugs was concealed and there was
vagueness in term of the exact location of the hidden cannabis at their house. When they were
inside the house, Gelugor made another statement and pointed out the location of the hidden

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cannabis which was according to him was in Assam's room, hidden behind a secret
compartment to which if he did not say anything, it may not be discovered by the police.
According to the case of Hasamuddin Talena v PP, the discovery of the cannabis which was
only discovered upon Gelugor pointed out the exact location, is not admissible under section
27 because the words spoken by Gelugor when he gave the information is vague. It was held
in that case, the exact words spoken by the Gelugor must be proven that it was given during
while in police custody.

In conclusion, the confession made by Gelugor that the cannabis belonged to them is relevant
to suggest the inference of the fact in issue by virtue of section 17(2). However, the confession
made which led to the discovery of the hidden cannabis at their house is not admissible unless
the prosecution could convince the court that the information that led to the discovery of the
cannabis was given at the time Gelugor was still in the police custody and that he only pointed
out to confirmed the information he has given to Inspector Kal.

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The third issue is whether the evidence of Corporal Dahan and Corporal Madi is relevant and
admissible to charge Gelugor and Assam for the offence in fact in issue.

Based on the given fact, Corporal Dahan and Corporal Madi were under disguise, carrying out
their routine of anti-crime patrolling duty. Dahan saw a silver car where the three persons in
the car was acting suspiciously. As they observe the three's behaviour, they saw Assam went
out of the car holding some packages. He was seen exchanging the package with money
several times when approached by different persons. The modus operandi is that Assam will
be approached by different people at a time, and he will exchange the package for money.

The general rule is that an oral evidence is required to be direct. In section 60 of EA

1950, all oral evidence must be direct in order for it to be admissible. Section 6 of EA 1950
provides that facts which, though not in issue, are so connected with a fact in issue as to form
part of the same transaction are relevant, whether they occurred at the same time and place
or at different times and places. In the case of Leong Hong Khie v PP, the appellant was
charged for drug trafficking. The Senior Customs Officer was called to testify, introduced
evidence of oral statements made to him by two informers which were not called as witnesses.
The defence objected on the ground that the statements were hearsay. It was held that the
evidence did not form part of res gestae. The statements were inadmissible as the lapse of
several days caused it not to form part of the same transaction. Section 9 of EA 1950 also
provides the facts necessary to support or rebut an inference suggested by a fact in issue. It
allows for an admission of circumstantial evidence which is not part of the transaction.

By applying the relevant authority and decided case, the testimony of Corporal Dahan and
Madi in which they saw Assam exchanging the package with money several times when
approached by different persons form part of the same transaction. By virtue of Leong Hong
Khie v PP, the statements were inadmissible as the lapse of several days and caused it not
to form part of the same transaction. However, if the prosecution could rebut the fact that the
exchange of package with money several times, each time with a different person, it will allow
an admission of circumstantial evidence which are not part of the transaction.

Based on the given fact, when they were approached by Madi, they quickly jumped into the
car and sped off from the scene.
Section 8(2) of EA 1950 states that the conduct of any party, or of any agent to any
party, to any suit or proceeding in reference to that suit or proceeding, or in reference to any
fact in issue therein or relevant thereto, and the conduct of any person an offence against
whom is the subject of any proceeding, is relevant if the conduct influences or is influenced by

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any fact in issue or relevant fact, and whether it was previous or subsequent thereto. The
conduct in this section means the external behaviour of a person. The conduct of a person
would become relevant if his conduct is related with the incident. In other words, it must be
closely connected with the incident concerned. As in the case of Lee Lee Chong, the court
held that the evidence of the accused absconding from the scene of the crime is relevant
under section 8(2) of EA 1950.
By applying to the present case, the fact that Assam and Jawa get into the car quickly
when realizing the presence of police officers, Madi, is relevant as it shows the subsequent
conduct of guilt. Furthermore, the further action of speeding off from the scene also shows
that they wanted to run off from being captured. No one will run off if they knew that they are
not guilty of any offence. This shows the external behaviour of the three of them when they
had done something which was wrong and that in this case connected to the fact in issue,
trafficking drugs. Their action of absconding from the scene is then relevant by virtue of section
8(2).
In conclusion, evidence of Corporal Dahan and Corporal Madi is relevant and
admissible to charge Gelugor and Assam for the offence in fact in issue.

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The fourth issue is whether the items seized, and the evidence given by Mr Pin is relevant and
admissible.
Based on the given fact, Mr Pin made an analysis of all the compacted slabs of dried plant
materials and the 10 seized packages given by Inspector Amir. After the analysis, he confirmed
that the items that were seized were cannabis with a combined weight of 1,924g and 200g.

Section 9 of EA 1950 provides the items seized are necessary to explain the fact in
issue that Gelugor and Assam was charged for the offence of drug trafficking. It is not admitted
as evidence of truth of the matter but merely as explanatory to the existence of a fact. The
facts also establish the identity of things that was seized. If an accused person is charged for
trafficking drug under the Dangerous Drug Act 1952, the production of the drug in court is the
real and best evidence. The drugs seized and the chemist who examined and identified the
type and weight of the drug falls under this provision.
Sometimes, an expert is required to identify the things relevant to the fact in issue.
Section 45 of EA 1950 stated that an expert can also give evidence. His evidence (the
analysis) must be read together with section 45 of EA. In the case of Dato' Mokhtar bin
Hashim v PP, in determining whether a particular bullet that killed the victim came from the
gun that belonged to the accused person, a chemist was regarded as competent expert
witness to identify the murder weapon.
Based on the given fact, Mr Pin has received compacted slabs of dried plant materials
and the 10 seized packages from Inspector Amir and where he has made an analysis toward
the items. Upon his analysis, he found the type and weight of the drugs. By applying the
relevant authorities, the items that was seized was necessary to explain the fact in issue. The
analysis done by Mr Pin also establish the type and weight of the drugs that are needed by
the prosecutor for the charge. The report analysis itself will not be sufficient to be introduced
to the court as it may need the evidence from Mr Pin who is the chemist that made the analysis
and confirmed the type of drugs that was in the possession of Gelugor and Assam. Mr Pin as
in the case of Dato' Mokhtar bin Hashim v PP are regarded as a competent expert witness
to testify the validity of the analysis report and the drugs seized.
In conclusion, the items seized, and the evidence given by Mr Pin is relevant and
admissible as evidence to charge Gelugor and Assam of an offence of trafficking in dangerous
drugs under section 39B(1)(a) of the Dangerous Drugs Act 1952.

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The fifth issue is whether Kari's statement is relevant and admissible as evidence.

Based on the given fact, Kari who was caught by Madi was in a possession of a 20g package
of cannabis. His statement was taken and recorded by Inspector Lim at the police station. He
admitted that he is an addict and that he often makes a transaction with Gelugor and Assam
for the drug. Before the trial, Kari was recently involved in an accident and died.

The general rule is that an oral evidence is required to be direct and the oral evidence
is required to be stated before the court by the person who received the first-hand knowledge
of the facts. In section 60 of EA 1950, all oral evidence must be direct in order for it to be
admissible. A hearsay statement which is an out of court statement made by someone who
cannot be present in court, to repeat it, does not fall within the ambit of Section 60, thus making
it inadmissible. One of the exceptions to the general rule is hearsay evidence which is
considered inadmissible as it is not stated on oath and there is no opportunity of cross-
examining the original source by the party against whom the proof is given. The hearsay rule
is mainly based on two major considerations which are the necessity of the evidence, and also
the circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness.
Section 32 of EA 1950 provides and exception to the general rule and under this
section the hearsay evidence is admissible. According to this provision, any written or verbal
statement of relevant facts which is made by a person who is either dead or cannot be found
or has been given by a person who has become incapable of giving evidence, or the
attendance of such person can require delay or expense which could appears unreasonable
to the court, are relevant in the following cases. In the present case, Kari who had earlier on
gave his statement where he admitted he is an addict and that he often makes a transaction
with Gelugor and Assam for the drug is found dead in an accident. Kari in this situation falls
best under the category of a person who has become incapable of giving evidence, therefore,
the evidence may then be tendered under the exception in Section 32.
In section 6 of EA 1950, it states that whether the facts occurred at the same time and
place or at different times and places, facts which are so connected with a fact in issue as to
form part of the same transaction are relevant. There are two approaches in allowing res
gestae to be applicable, namely strict approach and liberal approach. Based on the given fact,
the more appropriate approach to be use is the liberal approach. In the case of R v Andrews,
where shortly after the victim was attacked and robbed, he named his attackers to the police.
However, the victim died before the trial took place. It was held that the evidence by the police
was rightly admitted as part of res gestae.
In Section 9 of EA 1950, provides that the facts to support an inference suggested by
a fact in issue is relevant.

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 Applying to the present case, based on the fact given, Kari who was caught and brought
to the police station admitted that he is an addict and that he often makes a transaction with
Gelugor and Assam for the drug. His statements were recorded by Inspector Lim. By virtue of
section 9, the statement that was given by Kari is relevant to support an inference that Gelugor
and Assam has been dealing drugs. The statement also connected to the fact in issue where
Gelugor and Assam was charge with trafficking cannabis. However, when he died recently in
an accident his evidence became a hearsay evidence and general rule is that it is not
admissible in the proceeding. Although Inspector Lim has interrogated Kari and recorded the
information, the information contained cannot be said to be within his personal knowledge as
he would not have perceived the circumstances. Thus, the information would amount to
multiple hearsay evidence, falling outside the scope of the provision of section 32. If the
prosecutor of the case is capable to convince the court that Kari is a person who made the
statement and later become incapable to depose, the evidence is then admitted and may be
proved during the proceedings. In this situation, the statement was made for the purposes of
an investigation or inquiry into an offence committed by Gelugor and Assam which is relevant
to the fact in issue. By virtue of section 6, the evidence by Kari’s statement was rightly admitted
as part of res gestae because Kari did mention to Inspector Lim that he often do transactions
with Gelugor and Assam before he died.

In conclusion, Kari's statement may be relevant and admissible as evidence to be used

against Gelugor and Assam for the offence of trafficking cannabis under section 39B(2) of the
Dangerous Drug Act 1952.

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The sixth issue is whether the corroboration evidence of Jawa can be made relevant and
admissible as evidence to convict Gelugor and Assam for the offence as stated in the fact in
issue.
Based on the question, Jawa are willing to give an evidence on behalf of the prosecution
provided that he will not be charged.

In section 60 of EA 1950, all oral evidence must be direct in order for it to be

admissible. Admissibility of hearsay evidence are allowed in section 6 of EA 1950. The
provision states that whether the facts occurred at the same time and place or at different
times and places, facts which are so connected with a fact in issue as to form part of the same
transaction are relevant. There are two approaches in allowing res gestae to be applicable,
namely strict approach and liberal approach. As for strict approach the statement must be
spontaneous, continuous and dominating the mind of the person who made the statement as
this will avoid any attempt of fabrication. This can be seen in the case of R v Bedingfield. In
this case, the statement was made by the victim whereby the accused was alleged to have
threatened to kill the victim by cutting her throat. One night, the accused and the victim were
in the house, when suddenly she ran out of the house with her throat cut, uttering “See what
Harry has done!” which was heard by her assistant. It was held that the victim’s statement did
not form part of the res gestae principle as it was uttered after the act of cutting the throat was
done and was thus inadmissible. Meanwhile in a liberal approach, hearsay evidence could be
admitted as part of the res gestae principle as long as the possibility of fabrication,
misconception and concoction is non-existent. The words or actions must be spontaneous or
natural, but it is not necessary be contemporaneous. In the case of R v Andrews, where
shortly after the victim was attacked and robbed, he named his attackers to the police.
However, the victim died before the trial took place. It was held that the evidence by the police
was rightly admitted as part of res gestae.

The word corroboration as per Lord Hailsham in the Killbourne's case by itself means that
no more than evidence tending to "confirm" and "support" other evidence. In other words, it is
an evidence which renders the other evidence more probable. Section 134 of EA 1950
provides there are no particular number of witnesses shall be required for the proof of any fact.
A testimony of a single witness is sufficient to establish a fact if it is believed. The court may
act on the testimony of a single witness even though uncorroborated. This provision follows
the maxim "testes ponderantur non numerantur" which means that evidence is to be weight
and not to be counted. The court is more concerned with the quality and not the quantity of
the evidence because if there is a particular number of witness is required, it would hamper
the administration of justice.

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 The general principle of corroboration is that evidence will not in law amount to
corroboration unless it meets certain requirement as in the case of PP v Rosman Abdul
Wahab. There are four principles that safeguard the evidence of corroboration. The first
principle is that the evidence must be relevant and admissible. The second principle is
evidence in question must be credible. In Killbourne's case, it was held by the court that if a
witness's testimony has no quality, then the question of his being capable of giving
corroboration does not arise. The third principle is that the corroborating evidence must be
independent. In other words, it should come forth from a source other than the witness which
requires corroboration. As per Lord Reid in Killbourne's case, the court must have an ability
to accurately assess the corroborative evidence if it is truly independent of the doubted
statement. It was decided that an evidence that has colluded between the maker of the
statements would not be accepted as corroborative evidence. The fourth principle is the
corroborating evidence must implicate the accused in a material particular. In R v Baskerville,
the evidence in corroboration must be independent testimony which affects the accused by
connecting or tending to connect him with the crime.
Section 133 provides that an accomplice shall be a competent witness against an
accused person; and a conviction is not illegal merely because it proceeds upon the
uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice. According to Section 114, illustration (b) of EA
1950, the court may presume that an accomplice is unworthy of credit unless he is
corroborated in material particulars. In the case of Public Prosecutor v Nomezam Apandy,
it states that in Malaysia, a person is an accomplice if he has participated in the commission
of an offence. Where he had played an active role, his evidence must be corroborated but if
his roles are passive, his evidence may be accepted with the usual corroboration warning.
Based on the question, upon negotiation, Jawa are willing to give an evidence on behalf
of the prosecution with a condition that he will not be charged. In the present case, Jawa can
be identified as a by-stander who perceived the event with his own senses. As for this, a strict
approach will be more appropriate. In strict approach, the statement made by Jawa must be
spontaneous, continuous and dominating his mind when he made the statement to avoid any
attempt of fabrication which is unfair to the accused persons. Based on the given fact, Jawa
is willing to give an evidence on behalf of the prosecution after negotiation shows that there is
a possibility of fabrication attempted. This will make the evidence irrelevant. However, if the
prosecution could convince the court that the testimony from Jawa alone is enough to establish
the fact that Gelugor and Assam does involve in trafficking cannabis, if it is believed, it will be
relevant by virtue of section 134. However, the prosecution must meet certain requirement to
show that the evidence that will be given by Jawa amount to corroboration as in the case of
PP v Rosman Abdul Wahab. For the prosecution to use the corroboration evidence, it must
be relevant to the fact in issue where in the present case, the involvement of Gelugor and

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Assam in trafficking cannabis, hence making it admissible. The evidence in that Jawa are
willing to give must also be credible. Given that Jawa was together with Gelugor and Assam
in the car, and also at the scene where Assam was selling the drug, he is deemed as a credible
witness as he perceived the events first-hand. The corroborating evidence must be
independent. Jawa's corroborating evidence must not have a statement where it can leave
doubts. Statements that will be made by Jawa must not be colluded otherwise it would not be
accepted as corroborative evidence. Finally, Jawa's corroborating evidence must have the
ability to implicate Gelugor and Assam as to the fact in issue. His testimony must be
connecting or tending to connect Gelugor and Assam with the crime. Also based on the facts
given, Jawa who was seen getting out from the car and standing nearby while observing
Assam and their surrounding can be an accomplice to Gelugor and Assam by virtue of the
case Public Prosecutor v Nomezam Apandy. In Malaysia, although Jawa's roles are passive,
he is still an accomplice as he has participated in the commission of trafficking cannabis. His
evidence may be accepted with the usual corroboration warning.

In conclusion, the corroboration evidence of Jawa may be relevant and admissible as

evidence to convict Gelugor and Assam for the offence as stated in the fact in issue so long
as the prosecution meets the principles that safeguards the evidence of corroboration.

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The seventh issue is whether the previous conviction of Gelugor and Assam for self-
administration of drugs is relevant and admissible as evidence to charge them for the offence
of drug trafficking.
Based on the given fact, both Gelugor and Assam has previously been convicted for self-
administration of drugs in 2001 and was released from jail just recently.

The general rule is that the evidence of bad character is not relevant and admissible
as evidence. This can be seen in the case of Muthusamy v PP, where the accused are
charged with house trespass and assault. The evidence tending to show that the accused is
a quarrelsome person and that he had quarrelled before and on other occasion is irrelevant.
There are, however, exception to the general rule. Section 54 of EA 1950 provides that in
criminal proceedings the fact that the accused person has a bad character is irrelevant unless
evidence has been given that he had a good character where it then becomes relevant. The
proof that a person has committed or been convicted of that other offence is admissible
evidence to show that he is guilty of the offence wherewith he is then charged. In R v
Butterwasser, if the accused does not give evidence of this nature, his previous conviction
may not be led by the prosecution. In this case, the trial judge had permitted the prosecution
to lead the evidence of the accused's previous convictions, thus the conviction was quashed.

In section 6 of EA 1950, facts which, though not in issue, are so connected with a fact
in issue as to form part of the same transaction are relevant, whether they occurred at the
same time and place or at different times and places. In Kanapathy v R, if the evidence
complained of forms part of res gestae, it is admissible as it is on entirely different footing to
evidence tending to show the previous bad character of an accused. According to Section 14
of EA 1950, facts that shows the existence of any state of mind, such as intention, knowledge,
good faith, negligence, rashness, ill-will or good-will towards any particular person, or showing
the existence of any state of body or bodily feeling, are relevant when the existence of any
such state of mind or body or bodily feeling in issue is relevant. Explanation 2 provides state
that the previous commission by the accused of an offence upon the trial of the accused
person is relevant within the meaning of this provision. Therefore, the previous conviction of
that person will also be a relevant fact. In DPP v Boardman, it was held that the similarity of
the evidence was enough to justify admission as the possibility of prejudice which might arise
if the pupils had been conspiring against the appellant was unlikely in the case. In the case of
PP v Veeran Kutty & Anor, it was decided that the prosecution could adduce evidence of the
commission of an armed robbery which was the previous conviction of the accused prior to
them being caught in possession of firearms and ammunition. In this case, the evidence of the
accused being armed with revolvers is similar in nature to the fact in issue, which is the

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possession of firearms. Thus, the prejudicial effect of the evidence of an armed robbery has
been overridden by its striking similarity making it admissible.

Based on the given fact, it shows that Gelugor and Assam had displayed a bad
character in their previous conviction where both of them were convicted of self-administration
of drugs. Generally, it is not relevant for the prosecution to bring bad character of Gelugor and
Assam as evidence. However, by applying to the relevant authorities and decided cases, the
prosecutor can do so as provided that the evidence of bad character is brought to the court as
to rebut the defence of the accused of having a good character by virtue of section 54. In
cases where prosecutor managed to rebut the defence of having a good character, then it
becomes relevant otherwise it remains irrelevant as evidence. The prosecution could also
bring the evidence of bad character under section 6 to show that the previous conviction of
self-administration of drugs does form part of the same transaction which are then relevant to
the fact in issue. Although previously Gelugor and Assam was only involved in self-
administration of drugs and not a dealer, it forms as part of the transaction where in involves
the same substance which is, drugs. The fact that they had just been released from jail and
get involved in drugs trafficking shows that they have the audacity and mind for the act done
and by virtue of the case Kanapathy v R, the evidence is admissible as it tending to show the
previous bad character of Gelugor and Assam. However, the prosecutor the evidence of
previous conviction could be relevant and admissible under section 14. The previous
conviction of self-administration of drugs of that Gelugor and Assam will also be a relevant
fact by virtue of explanation 2 of section 14. By virtue of the case PP v Veeran Kutty & Anor,
the evidence of the accused persons in the previous conviction is similar in nature to the fact
in issue, which is possession of drugs. Although in the past, they are in possession of the
drugs as users, the fact in issue also suggest that they are in possession of the drugs as
traffickers or dealers. Hence, the prejudicial effect of the evidence of self-administration of
drugs has been overridden by its striking similarity making it admissible as evidence.

In conclusion, the evidence of Gelugor's and Assam's previous conviction may be

relevant and admissible as evidence under section 14 or as under section 6. If the good
character is brought forward by the defense, prosecution could rebut the defense of good
character under section 54 which will only then become relevant.

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